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PREFACE.

IN the Preface to the ﬁrst edition of this work. the author stated

its purpose to be, to furnish to the practitioner and the student of

the law such a presentation of elementary constitutional principles

as should serve, with the aid of its references to judicial decisions,

legal treatises, and historical events, as a convenient guide in the

examination of questions respecting the constitutional limitations

which rest upon the power of the several State legislatures. In

the accomplishment of that purpose, the author further stated that

he had faithfully endeavored to give the law as it had been settled

by the authorities, rather than to present his own views. At the

PREFACE.

same time, he did not attempt to deny — what he supposed would

be sufficiently apparent—that he had written in full sympathy

with all those restraints which the caution of the fathers had im-

posed upon the exercise of the powers of government, and with

faith in the checks and balances of our republican system, and in

correct conclusions by the general public sentiment, rather than

in reliance upon a judicious, prudent, and just exercise of authority,

when conﬁded without restriction to any one man or body of men,

whether sitting in legislative capacity or judicial. In this sympa-

thy and faith he had written of jury trials and the other safeguards

to personal liberty, of liberty of the press and of vested rights;

and he had also endeavored to point out that there are on all sides
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deﬁnite limitations which circumscribe the legislative authority,

independent of the speciﬁc restrictions which the people impose by

their State constitutions. But while not predisposed to discover in

any part of our system the rightful existence of any unlimited

power, created by the Constitution, neither, on the other hand, had

he designed to advance new doctrines, or to do more than clearly

IN the Preface to the first edition of this work. the author stated
its purpose to be, to furnish to the practitioner and the student of
the law such a presentation of elementary constitutional principles
as should serve, with the aid of its references to judicial decisions,
legal treatises, and historical events, as a convenient guide in the
examination of questions respecting the constitutional limitations
which rest upon the power of the several State ·legislatures. In
the accomplishment of that purpose, the author further stated that
he bad faithfully endeavored to give the law as it had been settled
by the authorities, rather than to present his own views. At the
same time, he did not attempt to deny- what he supposed would
be sufficiently apparent- that he had written in full sympathy
with all those restraints wl1ich the caution of the fathers had imposed upon the exercise of the powers of government, and with
faith in the checks and balances of our republican systeiDt and in
correct conclusions by the general public sentiment, rather than
in reliance upon a judicious, prudent, and just exercise of authority,
when confided without restriction to any one man or body of men,
whether sitting in legislative capacity or judicial. In this sympathy and faith he had written of jury trials and the other safeguards
to personal liberty, of liberty of the press and of vested rights ;
and he had also endeavored to point out that there are on all sides
definite lim\tations which circumscribe the legislative authority,
independent of the specific restrictions which the people impose by
their State constitutions. But while not predisposed to discover in
any part of our system the rightful existence of any unlimited
power, created by the Constitution, neither, on the other hand, had
be designed to advance new doctrines, or to do more than clearly
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and with reasonable conciseness to state the principles to be de-
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PREFACE.

duced from the judicial decisions.

The unexpected favor with which the work has been received

having made a new edition necessary, the author has reviewed

every part of it with care, but without ﬁnding occasion to change

in any important particular the conclusions before given. Further

reﬂection has only tended to conﬁrm him in his previous views of

the need of constitutional restraints at every point where agents

are to exercise the delegated authority of the people; and he is

gratiﬁed to observe that in the judicial tribunals the tendency is

not in the direction of a disregard of these restraints. The reader

will ﬁnd numerous additional references to new cases and other

authorities; and some modiﬁcations have been made in the

phraseology of the text, with a view to clearer and more accurate

expression of his views. Trusting that these modiﬁcations and

additions will be found not without value, he again submits his

work “to the judgment of an enlightened and generous pro-

fession.”

THOMAS M. COOLEY.

Umvznsn-Y or MICHIGAN, %
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and with reasonable conciseness to state the principles to be deduced from the judicial decisions.
The unexpected favor with which the work has been received
having made a new edition necessary, the author has reviewed
every part of it with care, but without finding occasion to change
in any important particular the conclusions before given. Further
reflection has only tended to confirm him in his previous views of
the need of constitutional restraints at every point where agents
are to exercise the delegated authority of the people ; and he i~
gratified to observe that in the judicial tribunals the tendency is
not in the direction of a disregard of these restraints. The reader
will find numerous additional references to new cases and other
authorities ; and some modifications ha:ve been made in the
phraseology of the text, with a view to clearer and more accurate
expression of his views. Trusting that these modifications and
additions will be found not without value, he again submits his
work " to the judgment of an enlightened and generous profession."
THOMAS M. COOLEY.
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN,
}
ANN ARBOR, July, 1871.
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CONSTI'I‘U'I‘IONAL LIMITATIONS.

CHAPTER _I.

_ DEFINITIONS.

A STATE is a body politic, or society of men, united together for

the purpose of promoting their mutual safety and advantage by the

joint eﬂbrts of their combined strength} The terms nation and

State are frequently employed, not only in the law of nations but

in common parlance, as importing the same thing ; 2 but the term

nation is more strictly synonymous with people, and while a. single

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

State may embrace different nations or peoples, a single nation will

sometimes be so divided politically as to constitute several States.

In American constitutional law the word State is applied to the

several members of the American Union, while the word nation is

applied to the whole body of the people embraced within the juris-

diction of the Federal government.

Sovereignty, as applied to States, imports the supreme, absolute,

CHAPTER I.

uncontrollable power by which any State is governed.“ A State is

called a sovereign State when this supreme power resides within

itself, whether resting in a single individual, or in a number of in-

DEFINI'l'IONS.

dividuals, or in the whole body of the people.‘ In the view of

international law, all sovereign States are and must be

equal in rights, ‘since from the very deﬁnition of sover- [“ 2]

‘ Vattel, b. 1, c.1,§ 1; Story on Const. § 207; Wheat. Int. Law, pt. 1,
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c. 2, § 2; Halleck, Int. Law, 63; Bouv. Law Dict. “ State.” “A multitude of

people united together by a communion of interest, and by common laws, to

which they submit with one accord.” Burlamaqui, Politic Law, c. 5.

' Thompson, J ., in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 52; Vattel, 8‘llp1‘G.

' Story on Const. §207; 1 Black. Com. 49; Wheat. Int. Law, pt. 1, e. 2,

§ 5; Halleck, Int. Law, 63, 64; Chipman on Government, 137. “ The right of

commanding ﬁnally in civil society.” Burlamaqui, Politic Law, c. 5.

‘ Vattel, h. 1, c. 1, § 2; Story on Const. § 207; Halleck, Int. Law, 65. In

other words, when it is an independent State. Chipman on Government, 137 _

1 [11

A STATE is a body politic, or society of men, united together for
the purpose of promoting their mutual safety and advantage by tho
joint efforts of their combined strength.1 The te1·ms nation and
State are frequently employed, not only in the law of nations but
in common parlance, as importing the same thing; 2 but the term
nation is more strictly synonymous with people, and while a single
State may embrace different nations or peoples, a single nation will
sometimes be so divided politically as to constitute several States.
In American constitutional law the word State is applied to the
several members of the American Union, while the word. nation is
applied to the whole body of the people embraced within the jurisdiction of the Federal government.
Sover~crnty, as applied to States, imports the supreme, absolute,
uncontrollable power by which any State is governed.3 A State is
called a sovereign State when this supreme power resides within
itself, whether resting in a single individual, or in a number of individuals, or in the whole body of the people.4 In the view of
international law, all sovereign States are and must be
equal in rights, • since from the very definition 9f sover- [• 2]
1 Vattel, b. i, c. 1, § 1; Story on Const. § 207; Wheat. Int. Law, pt. 1,
c. 2, § 2; Halleck, Int. Law, 63; Bouv. Law Diet. "State."" A multitude of
people united together by a communion of interest, and by common laws, to
which they submit with one accord." Burlamaqui, Politic Law, c. 5.
1 Tlwmpsfm, J., in Cherokee Nation o. Georgia, 5 Pet. 52; Vattel, supra.
~ Story on Const. § 207; 1 Black. Com. 49; Wheat. Int. Law, pt. 1, c. 2,
§ 5; Halleck, Int. Law, 63, 64; Chipman on Government, 137. "The right of
commanding finally in civil society." Burlamaqui, Politic Law, c. 5.
4 Vattel, b. 1, c. 1, § 2; Story on Const. § 207; Halleck, Int. Law, 65.
In
other words, when i~ is an independent State. Chipman on Government, 137.
1
[ 1]

‘* 2 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. I.

• 2

I

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

[cu. r.

eign State, it is impossible that there should be, in respect to it,

any political superior.

The sovereignty of a State commonly extends to all the subjects

of government within the territorial limits occupied by the associa-

ted people which compose it; and, except upon the high seas,

which belong equally to all men, like the air, and no part of which

can rightfully be appropriated by any nation,‘ the dividing line

between sovercignties is usually a territorial line. In American

constitutional law, however, there is a division of the powers of

sovereignty between the national and State governments by sub-

jects: the former being possessed of supreme, absolute, and uncon-

trollable power over certain subjects throughout all the States and

territories, while the States have the like complete power, within

their respective territorial limits, over other subjects.’ In regard

to certain other subjects, the States possess powers of regulation

which are not sovereign powers, inasmuch as they are liable to be

controlled, or for the time being to become altogether dormant by

the exercise of a power vested in the general government in respect

to the same subjects.

A Constitution is sometimes deﬁned as the fundamental law of a

State, containing the principles upon which the government is
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founded, regulating the division of the sovereign powers, and

directing to what persons each of these powers is to be conﬁded,

and the manner in which it is to be exercised.” Perhaps an

equally complete and accurate deﬁnition would be, that body of

rules and maxims in accordance with which the powers of sover-

eignty are habitually exercised.

In a much qualiﬁed and very imperfect sense every State may

be said to possess a constitution; that is to say, some leading prin-

ciple has prevailed in the administration of its government,

until it has become an understood part of its system, to which

' Vattcl, b. 1, c. 23, § 281; Wheat. Int. Law, pt. 2, c. 4, § 10.

9 McLean, J., in License Cases, 5 How. 588. “ The powers of the general

government and of the State, although both exist and are exercised within the

same territorial limits, are yet separate and distinct sovereignties, acting sepa-

rately and independently of each other, within their respective spheres. And the

sphere of action appropriated to the United States is as far beyond the reach of

the judicial process issued by a State judge or a State court, as if the line of

division was traced by landmarks and monuments visible to the eye." Tancy,

Ch. J., in Ableman 1:. Booth, 21 How. 516.

’ 1 Bouv. lust. 9; Duer, Const. Juris. 26.

[2]

eign State, it is impossible that there should be, in respect to it,
any political superior.
The sovereignty of a State commonly extends to all the subjects
of government within the territorial limits occupied by the associated people which compose it; and, except upon the high seas,
which belong equally to all men, like the air, and no part of which
can rightfully be appropriated by any nation,1 the dividing line
between sovereignties is usually a territorial line. In American
constitutional law, however, there is a division of the powers of
sovereignty between the national and State governments by subjects: the former being possessed of supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power over certain subjects throughout all the States and
territories, while the States have the like complete power, within
their respective territorial limits, over other suhjects.2 In regard
to c.ertaiu other subjects, the States possess powe~:s of regulation
which a1·e not sovereign powers, inasmuch as they are liable to be
controlled, or for the time being to become altogether dormant by
the exercise of a power vested in the general government in respect
to the same subjects.
A Constitution is sometimes defined as the fundamental law of a
State, containing the principles upon which the government is
founded, regulating the division of the sovereign powers, and
directing to what persons each of these powers is to be confided,
and the manner in which it is to be exercised.8 Perhaps an
equally complete !lnd accurate definition would be, that body of
rules and maxims in accordance with which the powers of sovereignty are habitually exercised.
In a much qualified and very imperfect sense every State may
be said to possess a constitution; that is to say, some leading principle has prevailed in the administration of its government,
until it has bec9me an understood part of its system, to which
Vattd, b. 1, c. 28, § 281; Wheat. Int. Law, pt. 2, c. 4, § 10.
"The powers of the general
governmrnt and of the State, although both exist and are exercised within the
same territorial limits, are yet separate and distinct sovereignties, acting separately and independently of each other, within their respective spheres. And the
11phere of action appropriated to the United States is as far beyond the reach of
the judicial process issued by a State judge or a State court, as if tbe line of
divi.ion was traced by landmarks and monuments visible to the eye." Taney,
Ch. ,J., in Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 516.
~ 1 Bouv. Inst. 9; Duer, Const. Juris. ::.!6.
1
1

:McLean, J., in License Cases, 5 How. 588.

[2]

on. 1.] DEFINITIONS. * 3

obedience ‘is expected and habitually yielded; like the [* 3]

CH. I.]

*3

DEFINITIONS.

hereditary principle in most monarchies, and the custom of

choosing the chieftain by the body of the people which prevails

among some barbarous tribes. But the term constitutional govern-

ment is applied only to those whose fundamental rules or maxims

not only locate the sovereign power in individuals or bodies desig-

nated or chosen in some prescribed manner, but also deﬁne the

limits of its exercise so as to protect individual rights, and shield

them against the assumption of arbitrary power. The number of

these is not great, and the protection they afford to individual

rights is far from being unif0rm.1

In American constitutional law the word Constitution is used in

a restricted sense, as implying the written instrument agreed upon

by the people of the Union, or of any one of the States, as the ab-

solute rule of action and decision for all departments and oﬁicers

of the Government, in respect to all the points covered by it, until

it shall be changed by the authority which established it, and in

opposition to which any act or regulation of any such department

or oﬂiccr, or even of the people themselves, will be altogether void.

The term unconstitutional law must vary in its meaning in differ-

ent States, according as the powers of sovereignty are or are not pos-

sessed by the individual or body which exercises the powers of ordi-
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nary legislation. Where the law-making department of a State is

restricted in its powers by a written fundamental law, as in the

American States, we understand by unconstitutional law one which,

being opposed to the fundamental law, is therefore in excess of legis-

lative authority, and void. Indeed, the term unconstitutional law,

as employed in American jurisprudence, is a misnomer, and im-

plies a contradiction ; that enactment which is opposed to the Con-

stitution being in fact no law at all. But where, by the theory of

' Absolute monarchs, under a pressure of necessity, or to win the favor of

their people, sometimes grant them what is called a constitution; but this, so long

as the power of the monarch is recognized as supreme, can be no more than his

promise that he will observe its provisions, and conduct the govemment accord-

ingly. The mcre grant of a constitution does not make the government a con-

stitutional government, until the monarch is deprived of power to set it aside at

will. The mere grant of Magma Charla did not make the English a constitu-

tional monarchy; it was only after repeated violations and conﬁrmations of that

instrument, and after a further disregard of its provisions had become dangerous

to the Crown, that fundamental rights could be said to have constitutional guar-

anties, and the government to be constitutional.

1 [31

obedience • is expected and habitually yielded ; like the [* 3]
hereditary principle in most monarchies, and the custom of
choosing the chieftain by the body of the people which prevails
among some barbarous tribes. But the term constitutional government is applied only to those whose fundamental rules or maxims
not only locate the sovereign power in individuals or bodies desig~
nated or chosen in some prescribed manner, but also define the
limits of its exercise so as to protect individual rights, and shield
them against the assumption of arbitrary power. The number of
these is not great, and the protection they afford to individual
rights is far from being uniform. 1
In American constitutional law the word Constitution is used in
a restricted sense, as implying the written instrument agreed upon
by the people of the Union, or of any one of the States, as the absolute rule of action and decision for all departments and officers
of the Government, in respect to all the points covered by it, until
it shall be changed by the authority which established it, and in
opposition to which any act or regulation of any such department
or officer, or even of the people themselves, will be altogether void.
The term unconstitutional lazo must vary in its meaning in different States, according as the powers of sovereignty are or are not possessed by the individual or body which exercises the powers of ordinary legislation. Where the law-making department of a State is
restricted. in its powers by a written fundamental law, as in the
American States, we understand by unconstitutional law one which,
being opposed to the fundamental law, is therefo'te in excess of legislati,·e authority, and void. Indeed, the term unconstitutional law,
as employed in American jurisprudence, is a misnomer, and implies a contradiction; that enactment which is opposed to the Constitution being in fact no law at all. But where, by the theory of
1 Absolute monarchs, under a pressure of necessity, or to win the favor of
their people, sometimes grant them what is called a constitution; but this, so long
as the po,ver of the monarch is recognized as supreme, can be no more than his
promise that he will observe its provisions, and conduct the government accordingly. The mere grant of a constitution does not make the government a constitutional government, until the monarch is deprived of power to set it aside at
will. The mere grant of Magna Charta did not make the English a constitutional monarchy; it was only after repeated violations and confirmations of that
instrument, and after a further disregard of its provisions had become dangerous
to the Crown, that fundamental rights could be said to have constitutional guaranties, and the government to be constitutional.

[ 3]

" 3 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [on. 1.

the government, the complete sovereignty is vested in the same in-

dividual or body which enacts the ordinary laws, any law, being

•s

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

[en.

I.

an exercise of power by the sovereign authority, could not be void,

but if it conﬂicted with any existing constitutional principle, must

have the effect to modify or abrogate such principle, instead of

being nulliﬁed by it. This must be so in Great Britain with every

law not in harmony with pre-existing constitutional principles ;

since, by the theory of its government, Parliament exercises sove-

reign authority, and may even change the Constitution

[* 4] *‘ at any time, as in many instances it has done, by declaring

its will to that eﬂ'ect.1 And when thus the power to control

and modify the Constitution resides in the ordinary law-making

power of the State, the term unconstitutional law can mean no

more than this: a. law which, being opposed to the settled maxims

upon which the government has habitually been conducted, ought

not to be, or to have been, adopted. It follows, therefore, that in

Great Britain, constitutional questions are for the most part to be

discussed before the people or the parliament, since the declared

will of the parliament is the ﬁnal law; but in America, after a.

constitutional question has been passed upon by the legislature,

there is generally a right of appeal to the courts when it is at-

tempted to put the will of the legislature in force. For the will
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of the people, as declared in the Constitution, is the ﬁnal law; and

the will of the legislature is only law when it is in harmony with,

or at least is not opposed to, that controlling instrument which

governs the legislative body equally with the private citizen.”

' 1 Black. Com. 161; De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, c. 6; Broom,

Const. Law, 795.

' See Chapter VII. post.

[4]

i

the government, the complete sovereignty is vested in the same individual or body which enacts the ordinary laws, any law, being
an exercise of power by the sovereign authority, could not be void,
but if it conflicted with any existing constitutional principle, must
have the effect to modify or abrogate such principle, instead of
being nullified by it. This must be so in Great Britain with every
law not in harmony with pre-existing constitutional principles;
since, by the theory of its government, Parliament exercises sovereign authority, and may even change the Constitution
[• 4] • at any time, as in many instances it has done, by declaring
its will to that effect.1 And when thus the power to control
and modify the Constitution resides in the ordinary law-making
power of the State, the term unconstitutional law can mean no
more than this: a law which, being opposed to the settled maxims
upon which the government has habitually been conducted, ought
not to be, or to have been, adopted. It follows, therefore, that in
Grea.t Britain, constitutional questions are for the most part to be
discussed before the people or the parliament, since the declared
will of the parliament is the final law; but in America, after a
constitutional question has been passed upon by the legislature,
there is generally a right of appeal to the courts when it is attempted to put the will of the legislature in force. For the will
of the people, as declared in the Constitution, is the final law ; and
the will of the legislature is only law when it is in harmony with,
or at least is not opposed to, that controlling instrument which
governs the legislative body equally with the private citizen.2
1 Black. Com. 161 i De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, c. 6 i Broom,
Const. Law, 795.
1 See Chapter VII. post.
1

[4]
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*‘OHAPTER II. [*5]

CH.

n.]

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.

•s

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.

Tan government of the United States is the existing represent-

ative of the national government which has always in some form

existed over the American States. Before the Revolution the

powers of government, which were exercised over all the colonies

in common, were so exercised as pertaining either to the Crown of

Great Britain or to the Parliament; but the extent of those powers,

[* 5]

• CHAPTER II.

and how far vested in the Crown and how far in the parliament, were

questions never deﬁnitely settled, a.nd which constituted subjects

of dispute between the mother country and the people of the colo-

THE CONSTITUTION OF TRE UNITED STATES.

nies, ﬁnally resulting in hostilities} That the power over peace

and war, the general direction of commercial intercourse with other

nations, and the general control of such subjects as fall within the

province of international law, were vested in the home government,

and that the colonies were not, therefore, sovereign States in the

full and proper sense of that term, were never seriously disputed

in America, and indeed were often formally conceded ; and the dis-

putes related to questions as to what were or were not matters of

internal regulation, the control of which the colonists insisted

should be left exclusively to themselves.

Besides the tie uniting the several colonies through the crown
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of Great Britain, there had always been a. strong tendency to a

more intimate and voluntary union, whenever circumstances of

danger threatened them; and this tendency led to the New Eng-

land Confederacy of 1643, to the temporary Congress of 1690, to

the plan of union agreed upon in Convention of 1754, but rejected

by the Colonies as well as the Crown, to the Stamp Act Congress

of 1765, and ﬁnally to the Continental Congress of 1774. When

the difficulties with Great Britain culminated in actual war, the

‘ 1 Pitkin’s Hist. U. S. c. 6; Life and Works of John Adams, Vol. I. pp.

122, 161; Vol. II. p. 311; Works of Jefferson, Vol. IX. p. 294; 2 Marshall’s

\Vashington, c. 2; Declaration of Rights by Colonial Congress of 1765; Ram-

say’s Revolution in. South Carolina, pp. 6-11; 5 Bancroft’s U. S. c. 18; 1

Webster‘s \Vorks, 128; Story on Const. § 183, et seq.

[5]

THE government of the United States is the existing representative of the national government which has always in some form
existed over the American States. Before the Revolution the
powers of government, which were exercised over all the colonies
in common, were so exercised as pertaining either to the Crown of
Great Britain or to the Parliament; but the extent of those powers,
and how far vested in the Crown and how far in the parliament, were
questions never definitely settled, and which constituted subjects
of dispute between the mother country and the people of the colonies, finally resulting in hostilities. 1 That the power over peace
and war, the general direction of commercial intercourse with other
nations, and the general control of such subjects as fall within the
province of international law, were vested in the home government,
and that the colonies were not, therefore, sovereign States in the
full and proper sense of that term, were never seriously disputed
in America, and indeed were often formally conceded ; and the disputes related to questions as to what were or were not matters of
internal regulation, the control of which tbe colonists insisted
should be left exclusively to themselves.
Besides the tie uniting the several colonies through the crown
of Great Britain, there had always been a strong tendency to a
more intimate and voluntary union, whenever circumstances of
danger threatened them ; and this tendency led to the New England Confederacy of 1643, to the temporary Congress of 1690, to
the plan of union agreed upon in Convention of 1754, but rejected
by the Colonies as well as tho Crown, to the Stamp Act Congress
of 1765, and finally to the Continental Congress of 1774. When
the difficulties with Great Britain culminated in actual war, the
' 1 Pitkin's Hist. U. S.c. 6; Life and Works of John Adams, Vol. I. pp.
122, 161 ; Vol. II. p. 811 ; Works of Jefferson, Vol. IX. p. 294; 2 Marshall's
W uhington, c. 2; Declaration of Rights by Colonial Congress of 1765; Ramsay's Revolution in. South Carolina, pp. 6-11; 5 Bancroft's U. S. c. 18; 1
Webster's 'Vorks, 128; Story on Const. § 183, et seq.

[ 5]

"‘ 5 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [cn. 11.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

Congress of 1775 assumed to itself those powers of external con-

[CH. II.

trol which before had been conceded to the crown or to

[* 6] the * Parliament, together with such other powers of sov-

ereignty, as it seemed essential a general government should

exercise, and became the national government of the United Colo-

nies. By this body, war was conducted, independence declared,

treaties formed, and admiralty jurisdiction exercised. It is evi-

dent, therefore, that the States, though declared to be “sovereign

and independent,” were never strictly so in their individual

character, but that they were always, in respect to the higher pow-

ers of sovereignty, subject to the control of a central power, and

were never separately known as members of the family of nations.‘

The Declaration of Independence made them sovereign and

independent States, by altogether abolishing the foreign juris-

‘ “All the country now possessed by the United States was [prior to the

Revolution], a part of the dominions appertaining to the Crown of Great Britain.

Every acre of land in this country was then held, mediatcly or immediately, by

grants from that crown. All the people 01' this country were then subjects of the

king of Great Britain, and owed allegiance to him; and all the civil authority

then existing or exercised here ﬂowed from the head of the British empire. They

were in a strict sense fellow-subjects, and in a variety of respects one people.

When the Revolution commenced, the patriots did not assert that only the same

Congress of 1775 assumed to itself those powers of external control which before had been conceded to the crown or to
[• 6] the • Parliament, together with such other powers of sovereignty, as it seemed essential a general government should
exercise, and became the national government of the United Colonies. By this body, war was conducted, independence declared,
treaties formed, and admiralty jurisdiction exercised. It is evident, therefore, that the States, though declared to be " sovereign
and independent," were never strictly so in their individual
character, but that they were always, in respect to the higher powers of sovereignty, subject to the control of a central power, and
were never separately known as members of the family of nations.1
The Declaration of Independence made them sovereign and
independent States, by altogether abolishing the foreign juris-
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atizinity and social connection suhsisted between the people of the colonies, which

subsisted between the people of Gaul, Britain, and Spain while Roman provinces,

namely, only that affinity and social connection which result from the mere cir-

cumstance of being governed by one prince; different ideas prevailed, and gave

occasion to the Congress of 1774 and 1775.

“ The Revolution, or rather the Declaration of Independence, found the people

already united for general purposes, and at the same time providing for their

more domestic concerns by State conventions and other temporary arrangements.

From the Crown of Great Britain the sovereignty of their country passed to the

people oi‘ it; and it was not then an uncommon opinion that the unappropriatcd

lands which belonged to the Crown passed, not to the people of the colony or

State within whose limits they were situated, but to the whole people. On what-

ever principles this opinion rested, it did not give way to the other, and thirteen

sovereignties were considered as emerged from the principles of the Revolution,

combined with local convenience and considerations; the people, nevertheless,

continued to consider themselves, in a national point of view, as one people; and

they continued without interruption to manage their national concerns accord-

ingly. Alterwards, in the hurry of the war, and in the warmth of mutual conﬁ-

dence, they made a confederation of the States the basis of a general government.

Experience disappointed the expectations they had formed from it; and then the

people, in their collective capacity, established the present Constitution.” Per

Jay, Ch. J ., in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 470.

[6]

1 "All the country now possessed by the United States was [prior to the
Revolution], a part of the dominions appertaining to the Crown of Great Britain.
Every acre of land in this country was then held, mediately or immediately, by
grants from that crown. All the people of this country were then suhject~ of the
king of Great Britain, and owed allegiance to him; and all the civil authority
then existing or exercised here flowed from the head of the British empire. They
were in a strict sense fellow-subjects, and in a variety of respects one people.
When the Revolution commenced, the patriots did not assert that only the same
affinity and social connection subsisted between the people of the colonies, which
subsisted between the people of Gaul, Britain, and Spain while Roman provinces,
n1mely, only that affinity and social connection which result from the mere circumstance of being governed by one prince; different ideas prevailed, and gave
occasion to the Congress of 1774 and 1775.
"The Revolution, or rather the Declaration oflndependence, found the people
already united for general purposes, and at the same time providing for their
more domestic concerns by State conventions and other temporary arrangements.
From the Crown of Great Britain the sovereignty of their country passed to the
people of it; and it was not then an uncommon opinion that the unappropriated
lands which belonged to the Crown passed, not to the people of the colony or
State within whose limits they were situated, but to the whole people. On whatever principles. this opinion rested, it did not give way to the other, and thirteen
sovereignties were considered as emerged from the principles of the Revolution,
combined with local convenience and considerations; the people, nevertheleas,
continued to consider themselves, in a national point of Yiew, as one people; and
they continued without interruption to manage their national concerns accordingly. Afierwards, in the hurry of the war, and in the warmth of mutual confidence, they made a confederation of the States the basis of 11 general government.
Experience disappointed the expectations they had formed from it; and then the
people, in their collective capacity, established the present Constitution. 11 Per
Jay, Ch. J., in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 470.

[ 6]

ca. 11.] run consrrrurron or rat: UNITED srarss. *6

diction, and substituting a national government of their own

CH. II.]

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.

creation.

But while national powers were assumed by and conceded

to * the Congress of 1775-76, that body was nevertheless [* 7]

strictly revolutionary in its character, and like all I‘GVOlll-

tionary bodies, its authority was undeﬁned, and could be limited

only, ﬁrst, by instructions to individual delegates by the States

choosing them; second, by the will of the Congress, and third, by

the power to enforce that will} As in the latter particular it was

essentially feeble, the necessity for a clear speciﬁcation of powers

which should be exercised by the national government became

speedily apparent, and led to the adoption of the Articles of Con-

federation. But those articles did not concede the full measure of

power essential to the efficiency of a national government at home,

the enforcement of respect abroad, or the preservation of the pub-

lie faith or public credit; and the diﬁiculties experienced, induced

the election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention held in

1787, by which a Constitution was formed which was put into opera-

tion in 1789. As much larger powers were vested by this instrument

in the general government than had ever been exercised in this

country, by either the Crown, the Parliament, or the Revolutionary

Congress, and larger than those conceded to the Congress under
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the Articles of Confederation, the assent of the people of the sev-

eral States was essential to its acceptance, and a provision

was inserted in the Constitution that the ratiﬁcation “‘ of [‘ 8]

the conventions of nine States should be sufﬁcient for the

establishment of the Constitution between the States so ratifying

the same. In fact, the Constitution was ratiﬁed by conventions of

delegates chosen by the people in eleven of the States, before the

new government was organized under it; and the remaining two,

North Carolina and Rhode Island, by their refusal to accept, and

by the action of the others in proceeding separately, were excluded

altogether from that national jurisdiction which before had embraced

them. This exclusion was not warranted by any thing contained

in the Articles of Confederation, which purported to be articles of

“ perpetual union ” ; and the action of the eleven States in making

radical revision of their Constitution, and excluding their associ-

' See remarks of Iredell, J ., in Penhallow v. Doane‘a Adm’r,' 3 Dall. 91, and

of Blair, J., in the same case, p. 111. The true doctrine on this subject is very

clearly explained by C’/case, J ., in Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 231.

[7]

diction, and substituting a national government of their own
creation.
But while national powers were assumed by and conceded
to • the Congress of 1775-7G, that body was nevertheless [• 7]
strictly revolutionary in its character, and like all revolutionary bodies, its authority was undefined, and could be limited
only, .first, by instructions to individual delegates by the States
choosing them ; second, by the will of the Congress, and third, by
the power to enforce that will.l As in the lattet• particular it was
esseutially feeble, the necessity for a clear specification of powers
which should be exercised by the national government became
speedily apparent, and led to the adoption of the Articles of Confederation. But those articles did not concede the full measure of
power essential to the efficiency of a national government at home,
the enforcement of respect abroad, or the preservation of the public faith or public credit; and the difficulties experienced, induced
the election of delegates to the Constitutioual Convention held in
1787, by which a Constitution was formed which was put into operation in 1789. As much larger powers were vested by this instrument
in the general government than had ever been exercised in this
country, by either the Crown, the Parliament, or the Revolutionary
Congress, and larger than those conceded to the Congress under
the Articles of Confederation, the assent of the people of the several States was essential to its acceptance, and a provision
was inserted in the Constitution that the ratification • of [• 8]
the conventions of nine States should be sufficient for the
establishment of the Constitution between the States so ratifying
the same. In fact, the Constitution was ratified by conventions of
delegates chosen by the people in eleven of the States, before the
new government was organized under it; and the remaining two,
North Carolina and Rhode Island, by their refusal to accept, and
by the action of the others in proceeding separately, were excluded
altogether f1·om that national jurisdiction which before had embraced
them. This exclusion was not warranted by any thing contained
in the Articles of Confederation, which purported to be articles of
'' perpetual union " ; and the action of the eleven States in making
radical revision of their Constitution, and excluding their associ' See remarks of Iredell, J., in Pcnhallow t!. Doane's Adm'r,' 3 Dall. 91, and
of Blair, J., in the same case, p. 111. The true doctrine on this subject is very
clearly explained by Chase, J., in Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 231.

[ 7]

"‘ 8 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITKIIONS. [ou. II.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITk'l'IONS,

\

[ca. n.

ates for refusal to assent, was really revolutionary in character, and

only to be defended on the same ground of necessity on which all

revolutionary action is justiﬁed, and which in this case, was the ab-

solute need, fully demonstrated by experience, of a more efficient

general government}

[* 9]- * Left at liberty now to assume complete powers of sover-

eignty as independent governments, these two States saw ﬁt

soon to resume their place in the American family, under a per-

' “ Two questions of a very delicate nature present themselves on this occa-

sion: 1. On what principle the confederation, which stands in the form of a

solemn compact among the States, can be superseded without the unanimous con-

sent of the parties to it; 2. What relation is to subsist between the nine or more

ates for refusal to assent, was really revolutionary in character, and
only to be defended on the same ground of necessity on which all
revolutionary action is justified, and which in this case, was the absolute need, fully demonstrated by experience, of a more efficient
general government.I
[• 9} • Left at liberty now to assume complete powers of sovereignty as independent governments, these two States saw fit
soon to resume their place in the American family, under a per-

States ratifying the Constitution, and the remaining few who do not become

parties to it. The ﬁrst question is answered at once by recurring to the absolute

necessity of the case; to the great principle of self-preservation ; to the tran-

scendent law of nature and of nature‘s God, which declares that the safety and

happiness of society are the objects at which all political institutions aim, and

to which all such institutions must be sacriﬁced. Perhaps, also, an answer may be

found without searching beyond the principles of the compact itself. It has been

heretofore noted, among the defects of the confederation, that in many of the

States it had received no higher sanction than a mere legislative ratiﬁcation.
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The principle of reciprocality seems to require that its obligation on the other

States should be reduced to the same standard. A compact between independent

sovereigns, founded on acts of legislative authority, can pretend to no higher

validity than a league or treaty between the parties. It is an established doc-

trine on the subject of treaties, that all of the articles are mutually conditions of

each other; that a breach of any one article is a breach of the whole treaty; and

that a breach committed by either of the parties absolves the others, and author-

izes them, if they please, to pronounce the compact violated and void. Should

it nnhappily be necessary to appeal to these delicate truths for a justification for

dispensing with the consent of particular States to a dissolution of the federal

pact, will not the complaining parties ﬁnd it a difﬁcult task to answer the multi-

plied and important infractions with which they may be confronted? The time

has been when it was incumbent on us all to veil the ideas which this paragraph

exhibits. The scene is now changed, and with it the part which the same motives

dictate. The second question is not less delicate, and the ﬂattering prospect of

its being merely hypothetical forbids an over-curious discussion of it. It is one

of those cases which must be left to provide for itself. In general it may be

observed, that although no political relation can subsist between the assenting

and dissenting States, yet the moral relations will remain uncancelled. The

claims ofjustice, both on one side and on the other, will be in force and must be

fulﬁlled; the rights of humanity must in all cases be duly and mutually respected;

whilst considerations of a common interest, and above all the remembrance of

the endearing scenes which are past, and the anticipation of 'a speedy triumph

over the obstacles to reunion, will, it is hoped, not urge in vain moderation on

one side, and prudence on the other.” Federalist, N o. 43 (by Madison).

[8]

1 "Two questions of a very delicate nature present themselves on-this occasion: 1. On what principle the confederation, which stands in the form of a
solemn compact among the States, can be superseded without the unanimous consent of the parties to it; 2. 'Vhat relation is to subsist between the nine or more
States ratifying the Constitution, and the remaining few who do not become
parties to it. The first question is answered at once by recurring to the absolute
necessity of the case; to the great principle of self-preservation ; to the transcendent law of nature and of nature's God, which declares that the safety and
happiness of' society are the objects at which all political institutions aim, and
to whil'h all such institutions must be sacrificed. Pedwps, also, an answer may be
found without searching beyond the principles of the compact itself. It has been
heretofore noted, among the defects of the confederation, that in many of the
States it had received no higher sanction than a mere legislative ratification.
The principle of reciprocality seems to require that its obligation on the other
States should be reduced to the same standard. A compact between independent
1:1overeigns, founded on acts of legislative authority, can pretend to no higher
validity than a league or treaty between the parties. It is an established doctrine on the subject of treaties, that all of the articles are mutually conditions of
eneh other; that a breach of any one article is a breach of the whole treaty; and
that a breach committed by either of the parties absolves the others, and authorizes them, if they please, to pronounce the compact violated and void. Should
it unhappily be necessary to appeal to these delicate truths for a justification for
dispensing with the consent of particular States to a dissolution of the federal
pact, will not the complaining parties find it a difficult task to answer the multiplied and important infractions with which they may be confronted? The time
has been when it was incumbent on us all to veil the ideas which this paragraph
exhibits. The scene is now changed, and with it the part which the same motives
dictate. The second question is not less delicate, and the flattering prospect of
its being merely hypothetical forbids an over-curious discussion of it. It is one
of those cases which must be left to provide for itself. In general it may be
observed, that although no political relation can subsist between the assenting
and dissenting States, yet the moral relations will remain uneancelled. The
claims of justice, both on one side and on the other, will be in force and must be
fulfilled; the rights of humanity must in all cases be duly and mutually respected;
whilst con~iderations of a common interest, and above all the remembrance of
the endearing scenes which are past, and the anticipation or-a speedy triumph
over the obstacles to reunion, will, it is hoped, not urge in vain moderati01~ on
one 11idc, and prudence on the other." Federalist, No. 43 (by Madi8on).

[ 8]
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mission contained in the Constitution; and new States have since

CH. II.]

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.

been added from time to time, all of them, with the exception of

one, organized by the consent of the general government and em-

bracing territory previously under its control. The exception was

Texas, which had previously been an independent sovereign State,

but which, by the conjoint action of its government and that'of the

United States, was received into the Union on an equal footing

with the other States.

Without therefore discussing, or even designing to allude to any

abstract theories as to the precise position and actual power of the

several States at the time of forming the present Constitution} it

may be said of them generally that they have at all times been sub-

ject to some common national government, which has exercised

control over the subjects of war and peace, and other matters per-

taining to external sovereignty; and that when the only three States

which ever exercised complete sovereignty, accepted the Constitution

and came into the Union, on an equal footing with all the other States,

they thereby accepted the same relative position to the general gov-

ernment, and divested themselves permanently of those national

powers which the others had never exercised.

The government of the United States is one of enumerated

powers; the national Constitution being the instrument which
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speciﬁes them, and in which authority should be found for the

exercise of any powe; which the national government assumes to

possess? In this respect it differs from the constitutions of

the ' several States, which are not grants of powers to the ["‘ 10]

States, but which apportion and impose restrictions upon

the powers which the States inherently possess. The general pur-

' See this subject discussed in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1.

' “ Tho government of the United States can claim no powers which are not

granted to it by the Constitution; and the powers actually granted must be such

as are expressly given, or given by necessary implication.” Per Marshall, Ch. J .,

in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 1 \Vheat. 326. “This instrument contains an

enumeration of the powers expressly granted by the people to their government."

lllarskall, Ch. J., in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 \Vheat. 187. See Calder v. Bull, 3

Dall. 386; Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 11 Pet. 257; Gilman v. Philadelphia,

3 Wal. 713; Weister v. Hade, 52 Penn. St. 477. The tenth amendment to the

Constitution provides that “ The powers not delegated to the United States by

the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States

respectively, or to the people.” N 0 power is conferred by the Constitution upon

mission contained in the Constitution ; and new States have since
been added from time to time, all of them, with the exception of
one, organized by the consent of the general government and embracing territory previously under its control. The exception was
Texas, which had previously been an independent sovereign State,
but which, by the conjoint action of its government and that" of the
United States, was received into the Union on an equal footing
with the other States.
Without therefore discussing, or even designing to allude to any
abstract theories as to the precise position and actual power of the
several ~tates at the time of forming the present Constitution,1 it
may be said of them generally that they have at all times been subject to some common national government, which has exercised
control over the subjects of war and peace, and other matters pertaining to external sovereignty; and that when the only three States
which ever exercised complete sovereignty, accepted the Constitution
and came into the Union, on an equal footing with all the other States,
they thereby accepted the same relatiYe position to the general government, and divested themselves permanently of those national
powers which the others had never exercised.
The government of the United States is one of enumerated
powers; the national Constitution being the instrument which
specifies them, and in which authority should be found for the
exercise of any pow~ which the national government assumes to
possess.2 In this respect it differs from the constitutions of
the • several States, which are not grants of powers to the [•10]
States, but which apportion and impose restrictions upon
the powers which the States inherently possess. The general pur-

Congress to establish mere police regulations within the States. United States

v. Dewitt, 9 ‘Val. 41.

I

[9 ]

See this subject discussed in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1.
The government of the United States can claim no powers which are not
granted to it by the Constitution ; and the powers actually granted must be such
as are expressly given, or given by necessary implication." Per Marshall, Ch. J.,
in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 "Wheat. 326. "This instrument contains an
enumeration of the powers expressly granted by tbe people to their government.' 1
J.farahall, Ch. J., in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 187. See Calder v. Bull, 3
Dall. 386; Briscoe 11. Bank of Kentucky, 11 Pet. 257; Gilman v. Philadelphia,
S Wal. 713; Weister v. Hade, 52 Penn. St. 477. The tenth amendment to the
Constitution provides that "The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people." No power is conferred by the Constitution upon
Congress to establish mere police regulations within the States. United States
"· Dewitt, 9 W al. 41.
1

1 "

[ 9]

' 10 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [cs. 1!.

pose of the Constitution of the United States is declared by its

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

[ca.

II.

founders to be, “to form a more perfect union, establish justice,

insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, pro-

mote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to

ourselves and our posterity.” To accomplish these purposes, the

Congress is empowered by the eighth section of article one:—

1. To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises; to

pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general wel-

fare of the United States. But all duties, imposts and excises, shall

be uniform throughout the United States.

2. To borrow money on the credit of the United States.

3. To regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the

several States, and with the Indian tribes.

4. To establish a uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform

laws on the subject of bankruptcy, throughout the United States.

5. To coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin,

and ﬁx the standard of weights and measures.

6. To provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities

and current coin of the United States.

7. To establish post-otﬁces and post-roads.

8. To promote the progress of science and the useful arts, by

securing for limited terms to authors and inventors the exclusive
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right to their respective writings and discoveries.

9. 'l‘o constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court. To

deﬁne and punish piracies and felonies committed upon the high

seas, and offences against the law of nations.

10. To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and

make rules concerning captures on land and water.

11. To raise and support armies ; but no appropriation of money

to that use shall be for a longer term than two years. .

12. To provide and maintain a navy.

13. To make rules for the government and regulation of the

land and naval forces.

[* 11] * 14. To provide for calling forth the militia to execute

the laws of the nation, suppress insurrections, and repel

invasions.

15. To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the

militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed

in the service of the United States, reserving to the States re-

spectively the appointment of the officers, and the authority of

[10]

pose of the Constitution of the United States is declared by its
founders to be, "to form a more perfect union, establish justice,
insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to
ourselves and our posterity." To accomplish these purposes, the
Congres.s is empowered by the eighth section of article one: 1. To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises ; to
pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States. But all duties, imposts and excises, shall
be uniform throughout the United States.
2. To borrow money on the credit of the United States.
3. To regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the
several States, and with the Indian tribes.
4. To establish a uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform
laws on the subject of bankruptcy, throughout the United States.
5. To coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin,
and fix the standard of weights and measures.
6. To provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities
and current coin of the United States.
7. To establish post-offices and post-roads.
8. To promote the progress of science and the useful arts, by
securing for limited terms to authors and inventors the exclusive
right to their respective writings and discoveries.
9. 'l'o constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court. To
define and punish piracies and felonies committed upon the high
seas, and offences against the law of nations.
10. To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and
make rules concerning captures on land and water.
11. To raise and support armies; but no appropriation of money
to that use shall be for a longer term thau two years.
12. To provide and maintain a navy.
13. To mako rules for the government and regulation of the
land and naval forces.
[•11]
• 14. To provide for calling forth the militia to execute
the laws of the nation, suppress insurrections, and repel
invasions.
15. To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the
militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed
in the service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively the appointment of the officers, and the authority of
[ 10]

ca. 11.] ms CONSTITUTION or was UNITED srxrss. *11

training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by

CH. II.]

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.

*11

Congress.

16. To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever,

over such district not exceeding ten miles square as may, by ses-

sion of particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, become

the scat of government of the United States; and to exercise like

authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legisla-

ture of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of

forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings.

17. To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for

carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers

vested by the Constitution in the government of the United States,

or in any department or ofﬁcer thereof.

Congress is also empowered by the thirteenth, fourteenth, and

ﬁfteenth amendments to the Constitution to enforce the same by

appropriate legislation. The thirteenth amendment abolishes

slavery and involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for

crime, throughout the United States and all places subject to

their jurisdiction. The fourteenth amendment has several objects.

1. It declares all persons born or naturalized in the United States,

and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, to be citizens of the United

States and of the State wherein they reside; and it forbids any
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State to make or enforce any law which shallabridge the privi-

leges or immunities of citizens of the United States, or to deprive

any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law,

or to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-

tion of the laws. 2. It provides that when the right to vote at

any election for the choice of electors for president or viee-presi-

dent of the United States, representatives in Congress, the execu-

tive and judicial oﬂicers of a State, or the members of the

legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of

such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the

United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in

rebellion or other crime, the basis of Congressional representation

therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of

such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens

twenty-one years of age in such State. 3. It disqnaliﬁcs from

holding Federal or State offices certain persons who shall have en-

gaged in insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or

given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. 4. It declares the

[11]

training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by
Congress.
16. To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever,
over such district not exceeding ten miles square as may, by see.
sion of particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, become
the seat of government of the United States; and to exercise like
authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of
forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings.
17. To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers
vested by the Constitution in the government of the United States,
or in any department or officer thereof.
Congress is also empowered by the thirteenth, fourteenth, and
fifteenth amendments to the Constitution to enforce the same by
appropriate legislation. The thirteenth amendment abolishes
slavery and involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime, through~ut the United States and all places subject to
their jurisdiction. The fourteenth amendment has several objects.
1. It declares all persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, to be citizens of the United
States aud of the State wherein they reside ; and it forbids any
State to make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, or to deprive
any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law,
or to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 2. It provides that when the right to vote at
any election for the choice of electors for president or vice-president of the United States, representatives in Congress, the executive and judicial officers of a State, or the members of the
legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of
such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the
United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in
rebellion or other crime, the basis of Congressional representation
therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of
such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens
twenty-one years of age in such State. 3. It disqualifies from
holding Federal or State offices certain persons who shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or
given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. 4. It declares the
[ 11]

* 11 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [cm II.

CONSTITUTIONAL LlliiTATIONS.

inviolability of the public debt of the United States, and forbids

(CH. II.

the United States or any State assuming or paying any debt or

obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the

United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any

slave. The ﬁfteenth amendment declares that the right of citizens

of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the

United States or by any State, on account of race, color, or pre-

vious condition of‘ servitude.

The executive power is vested in a president, who is made

commander-in-chief of the army and navy, and of the militia of

the several States when called into the service of the United

States ; and who has power, by and with the consent of the Senate,

to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senate concur, and

with the same advice and consent, to appoint ambassadors and

other public ministers and consuls, judges df the Supreme Court,

and other ofﬁcers of the United States, whose appointments are

not otherwise provided for.1

The judicial power of the United States extends to all cases in

law and equity arising under the national Constitution, the laws

of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made,

under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other

public ministers and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and mar-
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itime jurisdiction ; to controversies to which the United States shall

be a party ; to controversies between two or more States ; between

a State and citizens of another State; between citizens of dif-

ferent States; between citizens of the same State claiming

lands under grants of different States; and between a

[* 12] *State or citizens thereof and foreign States, citizens,

or subjects.“ But a State is not subject to be sued in

the courts of the United States by the citizens of another State,

or by citizens or subjects of any foreign State.”

The Constitution and the laws of the United States, made in

pursuance thereof, and all treaties made under the authority of the

United States, are declared to be the supreme law of the land ; and

the judges of every State are to be bound thereby, any thing in the

constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.‘

‘ U. S. Const. art. 2. ' U. S. Const. art 3, § 2.

' U. S. Const. llth Amendment.

‘ U. S. Const. art. 6; Owings v. Norwood’s Lessee, 5 Cranch, 348; McCul-

l Iaryland, 4 Wheat. 316; Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253, 314; Cook v.

0

$-

5’

bl

[ 12 1

inviolability of the public debt of the United States, and forbids
the United States or any State assuming or paying any debt or
obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the
United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any
slave. The fifteenth amendment declares that the right of citizens
of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any; State, on account of race, color, or previous condition of' servitude.
The executive power is vested in a president, who is made
commander-in-chief of the army and navy, and of the militia of
the several States when called into the service of the United
States; and who has power, by and with the consent of the Senate,
to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senate concur, and
with the same advice and consent, to appoint ambassadors and
other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court,
and other officers of the United States, whose appointments are
not otherwise provided for. 1
The judicial power of the United States extends to all cases in
law and equi~ arising under the national Constitution, the laws
of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls ; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States shall
be a party ; to controversies between two or more States ; between
a State and citizens of another State ; between citizens of different States ; between citizens of the same State claiming
lands under grants of different States; and between a
[* 12] * State or citizens thereof and foreign States, citizens,
or subjects.2 But a State is not subject to be sued in
the courts of the United States by the citizens of another State,
or by citizens or subjects of any foreign State.3
The Constitution and the laws of the United States, made in
pursuance thereof, and all treaties made under the authority of the
United States, are declared to be the supreme law of t\te land; and
the judges of every State are to be bound thereby, any thing in the
constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.•
1 U. S. Const. art 3, § 2.
U. S. Const. art. 2.
U.S. Const. lltb Amendment.
' U. S. Const. art. 6; Owings v. Norwood's Lessee, 5 Cranch, 348; 1\lcCulloch v. },{aryland, 4 Wheat. 316; Foster"· Neilson, 2 Pet. 253, 314; Cook v.
1

1

[ 12]
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It is essential to the protection of the national jurisdiction, and

CR.

n.)

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.

to prevent collision between State and national authority, that the

ﬁnal decision upon all questions arising in regard thereto should

rest with the Courts of the Union ;1 and as such questions must

frequently arise ﬁrst in the State Courts, provision is made by the

Judiciary Act of 1789 for removing to the Supreme Court of the

United States the ﬁnal judgment or decree in any suit, rendered in

the highest court of law or equity of a State in which a decision

could be had, in which was drawn in question the validity of a

treaty, or statute of, or authority exercised under, the United States,

and thedecision was against their validity; or where was drawn in

question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised un-

der, any State, on the ground of their being repugnant to the Con-

stitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, and the decision

was in favor of such their validity; or where was drawn in ques-

tion the construction of any clause of the Constitution, or of a

treaty, or statute of, or commission held under the United

States, and the decision was against the right, * title, [* 13]

privilege, or exemption specially set up or claimed by either

party under such clause of the said Constitution, treaty, statute, or

commission.”

But to authorize the removal under that act, it must appear by
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the record, either expressly or by clear and necessary intendment,

that some one of the enumerated questions did arise in the State

Court, and was there passed upon. It is not suﬂicient that it

might have arisen or been applicable.“ And if the decision of the

Moﬂht, 5 How. 295; Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331. When a treaty has been

ratiﬁed by the proper formalities, it is, by the Constitution, the supreme law of

the land, and the courts have no power to inquire into the authority of the per-

sons by whom it was entered into on behalf of the foreign nation: Doe v. Braden,

16 How. 635, 657; or the powers or rights recognized by it in the nation with

which it was made: Maiden v. Ingersoll, 6 Mich. 373. A State law in conﬂict

with it must give way to its superior authority. Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 99;

Yeaker v. Yeaker, 4 Met. Ky. 33. See further, United States v. Aredondo,

6 Pet. 691 ; United States v. Percheman, 7 Pet. 51 ; Garcia v. Lee, 12 Pet. 511.

' Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 334; Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat.

264; Bank of United States v. Norton, 3 Marsh. 423; Braynard v. Marshall,

8 Pick. 196, per Parker, Ch. J .; Spangler’s Case, 11 Mich. 298.

It is essential to the protection of the national jurisdiction, and
to prevent collision between State and national authority, that the
final decision upon all questions arising in regard thereto should
rest with the Courts of the Union ;1 and as such questions must
frequently arise first in the State Courts, provision is made by the
Judiciary Act of 1789 for removing to the Supreme Court of the
United States the final judgment or decree in any suit, rendered in
the highest court of law or equity of a State in which a decision
could be had, in which was drawn in question the validity: of a
treaty, or statute of, or authority exercised under, the United States,
and the· decision was against their validity; or where was drawn in
question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under, any State, on the ground of their being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, and the decision
was in favor of such their validity; or where was drawn in question the construction of any clause of the Constitution, or of a
treaty, or statute of, or commission held under the United
States, and the decision was against the right, • title, [* 13]
privilege, or exemption specially set up or claimed by either
party under such clause of the said Constitution, treaty, statute, or
commission.2
But to authorize the removal under that act, it must appear by
the record, either expressly or by clear and necessary intendment,
that some one of the enumerated questions did arise in the State
Court, and was there passed upon. It is not sufficient that it
might have arieen or been applicable.8 And if the decision of the

’ 1 Statutes at Large, 83; Brightly‘s Digest, 259.

‘ Owings o. Norwood’s Lessee, 5 Cranch, 344; Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee,

1 Wheat. 304; Inglee v. Coolidge, 2 Wheat. 363; Miller v. Nicholls, 4 Wheat.

311; Williams v. Norris, 12 Wheat. 117; Hickie v. Starke, 1 Pet. 98; Harris v.

[13]

Moffat, 5 How. 295; Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331. When a treaty has been
ratified by the proper formalities, it is, by the Constitution, the supreme law of
the land, and the courts have no power to inquire into the authority of the persons by whom it was entered into on behalf of the foreign nation: Doe v. Braden,
16 How. 635, 657 ; or the powers or rights recognized by it in the nation with
which it was made: Maiden v. Ingersoll, 6 1\'licb. 373. A State law in conB.ict
with it must give way to its superior authority. Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 99;
Yeaker t'. Yeaker, 4 Met. Ky. 33. See further, United States v. Aredondo,
6 Pet. 691 ; United States v. Percbeman, 7 Pet. 51 ; Garcia v. Lee, 12 Pet. 511.
1 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 834; Cobens "· Virginia, 6 \Vbeat.
264; Bank of United States v. Norton, S Marsh. 423; Braynard v. Marshall,
8 Pick. 196, per Parker, Ch. J.; Spangler's Cue, 11 Mich. 298.
' 1 Statutes at Large, 83; Brightly's Digest, 259.
3 Owings"· Norwood's Lessee, 5 Cranch, 344; Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,
1 Wheat. 304; lnglee 11. Coolidge, 2 Wheat. 363; Miller 11. Nicholls, 4 Wheat.
811; Williams "·Norris, 12 Wheat. 117; Rickie"· Starke, 1 Pet. 98; Harris v.

[ 13]
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CONSTITUTIONAL LUIITATIONB.

State court is in favor of the right, title, privilege, or exemption so

[cu. u.

claimed, the Judiciary Act does not authorize such removal}

Neither does it where the validity of the State law is drawn in

question, and the decision of the State court is against its validity.’

But the same reasons which require that the ﬁnal decision upon

all questions of national jurisdiction should be left to the national

courts will also hold the national courts bound to respect the de-

cisions of the State Courts upon all questions arising under the

State" constitutions and laws, where no question of national au-

thority is involved, and to accept those decisions as correct,

and to follow them whenever the same questions arise in the

national courts? With the power to revise the decisions of the

Dennie, 3 Pet. 292; Fisher's Lessee v. Cockerell, 5 Pet. 256; New Orleans v.

De Armas, 9 Pet. 223, 234; Keene v. Clarl-re, 10 Pet. 291; Crowell v. Randell,

10 Pet. 368; McKinny v. Carroll, 12 Pet. 66; Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540;

Scott v. Jones, 5 How. 348; Smith v. Hunter, 7 How. 738; \Villiams v. Oliver,

12 How. 111; Calcotu v. Stanton, 18 How. 243; Maxwell v. Newbold, 18 How.

511; Hoyt v. Shelden, 1 Black, 518; Farney v. Towle, 1 Black, 350; Day v.

State court is in favor of the right, title, privilege, or exemption so
claimed, the Judiciary Act does not authorize such removal. 1
Neither does it where the· validity of the State law is drawn in
question, and the decision of the State court is against its Yalidity.2
But the same reasons which require that the final decision upon
all questions of national jurisdiction should be left to the national
courts will also hold the national courts bound to respect the decisions of the State Courts upon all questions arising under the
State· constitutions and laws, where no question of national authority is involved, and to accept ihose decisions as correct,
and to follow them whenever the samo questions arise in the
national courts.8 With the power to revise the decisions of the

Gallup, 2 Wal. 97. lt is not sullicient that the presiding judge of the State

court certiﬁes that a right claimed under the national authority was brought in

question. Railroad Co. tr. Rock, 4 \Val. 177.

‘ Gordon v. Caldcleugh, 3 Cranch, 268; McDonough v. Millaudon, 3 How.
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693; Fulton 0. McAﬂ‘ee, 16 Pet. 149; Linton v. Stanton, 12 How. 423; Burke v.

Gaines, 19 How. 388; Reddall v. Bryan, 24 How. 420; Roosevelt v. Meyer,

1 \Val. 512; Ryan v. Thomas, 4 \Val. 603.

’ Commonwealth Bank v. Gritlith, 14 Pet. 56; \Valker v. Taylor, 5 How. 64.

\Ve take no notice here of the statutes for the removal of causes from the State

to the Federal courts for the purposes of original trial. °

’ That this is the rule of the Federal courts, the following cases will show.

Mt-Keen v. De Lancy’s Lessee, 5 Cranch, 22 ; Polk’s Lessee v. Wendal, 9 Cranch,

87 ; Mutual Assurance Society v. \Vatts, 1 Wheat. 279; Shipp v. Miller, 2 Wheat.

316; Jackson v. Chew, 12 \Vheat. 153; Fullerton v. Bank of United States,

1 Pet. 604; Green v. Neal’s Lessee, 6 Pet. 291 ; Rowan v. Runels, 5 How. 139;

Massingill v. Downs, 7 How. 767; Nesmith v. Sheldon, 7 How. 812; Van Reus-

selaer v. Kearney, 11 How. 297; \Vebster v. Cooper, 14 How. 488; Luther v.

Borden, 7 How. 1; Beauregard 1:. New Orleans, 18 How. 497; Parker v. Kane,

22 How. 1; League v. Egery, 24 How. 264; Amey v. Allegheny City, 24 How.

364; Leﬁingwell v. Warren, 2 Black, 599; Sumner v. Hicks, 2 Black, 532;

Greene v. James, 2 Curt. 189; Du Bois v. McLean, 4 Mt-Lean, 488; Woolsey

v. Dodge, 6 Mt-Lean, 150; Thompson v. Phillips, Baldw. 246; Jefferson Branch

Bank v. Skelley, 1 Black, 436; Lane Co. v. Oregon, 7 Wal. 71; Gut v. State,

9 Wal. 35. The Judiciary Act of 1789 recognizes this principle, in providing

that “ the laws of the several States, except where the Constitution, treaties, or

statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded

as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United States,

[14]

Dennie, S Pet. 292; Fisher's Lessee v. Cockerell, 5 Pet. 256; New Orleans v.
De Armas, 9 Pet. 223, 234; Keene v. Clarke, 10 Pet. 291; Crowell v. Randell,
10 Pet. 368; McKinny v. Carroll, 12 Pet. 66; Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. MO;
Scott v. Jones, 5 Ho,v. 348; Smith v. Hunter, 7 How. 738; Williams v. Oliver,
12 How. 111; Calcote v. Stanton, 18 How. 243; Maxwell"· Newboltl, 18 How.
611; Hoyt v. Sheltlen, 1 Black, 518; Farney"· Towle, l Black, 350; Day v.
Gallup, 2 Wal. 97. It is not sufficient that the presiding judge of the State
court ce1·tifies that a right claimed under the national authority was brought in
question. Railroad Co. v. Rock, 4 Wal. 177.
1 Gordon v. Caldcleugh, 8 Cranch, 268 ; McDonough "· 1\lillaudon, 8 How.
698; Fulton v. McAffee, 16 Pet. 149; Linton"· Stanton, 1i How. 423; Burke v.
Gaines, 19 How. 388; Reddall "· Bryan, 24 How. 420; Roosevelt v. Meyer,
1 Wal. 512; Ryan v. Thomas, 4 WaJ. 603.
' Commonwealth Bank"· Griffith, 14 Pet. 56; Walker v. Taylor, 5 How. 64.
\Ve take no notice here of the statutes for the removal of causes from the State
to the Federal courts for the purposes of original trial.
a That this is the rule of the Federal court11, the following cases will show.
Mt·Kcen v. De Laney's Lessee, 5 Cranch, 22; Polk'8 Lessee v. W endal, 9 Crancb,
87; Mutual Assurance Society v. Watts, 1 Wheat. 279; Shipp v. Miller, 2 Wheat.
316; Jackson v. Chew, 12 Wheat. 153; Fullerton v. Bank of United States,
1 Pet. 60!; Green v. Neal's Lessee, 6 Pet. 291; Rowan 11. Runels, 5 How. 139;
Massingill v. Downs, 7 How. 767; Nesmith v. Sheldon, 7 How. 812; Van Rensselaer v. Kearney, 11 How. :297; Webster "· Cooper, 14 How. 488; Luther v.
Bortlen, 7 How. 1; Beauregard v. New Orleans, 18 How. 497; Parker v. Kane,
22 How. 1; J,eague v. Egery, 24 How. 264; Amey v. Allegheny City, 24 How.
364; Leffingwell 11. Warren, 2 Black, 599; Sumner v. Hicks, 2 Black, 582;
Greene v. James, 2 Curt. 189; Du Bois "· McLean, 4 McLean, 488; Woolsey
v. Dodge, 6 McLean, 150; Thompson e~. Phillips, Baldw. 246; Jefferson Branch
Bank v. Skelley, 1 Black, 436; Lane Co. v. Oregon, 7 Wal. 71; Gut v. State,
9 Wal. S5. The Judiciary Act of 1789 recognizes this principle, in providing
that " the laws of the several States, except where the Constitution, treaties, or
statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded
as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United States,

[ 14]
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State‘ courts in the cases already pointed out, the due [* 14]
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observance of this rule will prevent those collisions of ju-

dicial authority which would otherwise be inevitable, and

which, besides being unseemly," would be dangerous to the [* 15]

peace, harmony, and stability of the Union under our pe-

culiar system. -

Besides conferring speciﬁed powers upon the national govern-

ment, the Constitution contains also certain restrictions upon the

action of the States, a portion of them designed to prevent en-

croachments upon the national authority, and another portion

to protect individual rights against possible abuse of State

power. Of the ﬁrst class are the following: No State shall en-

ter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation, grant letters of

marque or reprisal, coin money, emit bills of credit,‘ or make

any thing but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts.

No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any imposts

or duties upon imports or exports, except what may be absolutely

where they apply.” Sec. 34. In Suydam v. Williainson, 24 How. 427, the

Supreme Court of the United States overruled several of its former decisions,

in order to make its rulings conform to a more recent decision in the State of

New York,-—thc question involved being one of real estate law in that State.

And in Leﬂingwell v. Warren, 2 Black, 599, the court reiterate the doctrine of
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former cases, that if the highest tribunal of a State adopt new views on a ques-

tion of State statutory law, reversing its former decisions, the Supreme Court of

the United States will follow the latest settled adjudications. See also Green v.

Neal‘s Lessee, 6 Pet. 291. But questions of private right depending solely upon

State • courts in the cases already pointed out, the due [*14]
observance of this rule will prevent those collisions of judicial authority which would otherwise be inevitable, and
which, besides being unseemly,* would be dangerous to tho [*15)
peace, harmony, and stability of the Union under our peculiar system.
Besides conferring specified powers upon the national government, the Constitution contains also certain restrictions upon the
action of the States, a portion of them designed to prevent encroachments upon the national authority, and another portion
to protect individual rights against possible abuse of State
power. Of the first class are the following: No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation, grant letters of
marque or reprisal, coin money, emit bills of credit,1 or make
any thing but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts.
No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any imposts
or duties upon imports or exports, except what may be absolutely

the common law, aml not being questions of title to property, will be determined

by the Federal tribunals on their view of the common law alone: Chicago v.

Robbins, 2 Black, 418. And questions of general commercial law are not re-

garded as questions of local law upon which the decisions of the State courts

should he of binding force. Robinson v. Commonwealth Insurance Co., 3 Sum.

220; Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1. See further as to exceptions to the general

rule, Austen v. Miller, 5 McLean, 153 ; VVilliamson 0. Berry, 8 How. 495; Bragg

v. Meyer, 1 McAll. 408.

' To constitute a bill of credit within the meaning of the Constitution, it must

be issued by a State, involve the faith of the State, and be designed to circulate

as money on the credit of the State in the ordinary uses of business. Briscoe v.

Bank of Kentucky, 11 Pet. 2-57; Woodruﬁ‘ v. Trapnall, 10 How. 209. The

facts that a State owns the entire capital stock of a bank, elects the directors,

makes its bills receivable for the public dues, and pledges its faith for their

redemption, do not make the bills of such bank “ bills of credit” in the constitu-

tional sense. Darrington v. State Bank of Alabama, 13 How. 1'2. See further,

Craig v. Missouri, 4 Pet. 410; Byrne v. Missouri, B Pet. 40; Moreau v. Detch-

amendy, 41 Mo. -131.
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where they apply." Sec. 34. In Suydam "· Williamson, 24 How. 427, the
Supreme Court of the United States overruled several of its former decisions,
in order to make its rulings conform to a more recent decision in the State of
New York,- the question involved being one of real estate law in that State.
And in Leffingwell r. Warren, 2 Black, 599, the court reiterate the doctrine of
former cases, that if the highest tribunal of a State adopt. new views on a question of State statutory law, reversing its former decisions, the Supreme Court of
the United States will follow the latest settled adjudi<'ations. See also Green v.
Ne:~l's Lessee, 6 Pet. 291. But questions of private right depending solely upon
the <·ommon law, and not being qnt>stions of title to property, will be determined
by the F~deral tribunals on their view of the common lnw alone: Chicago "·
Robbins, 2 Black, 418. And questions of general commercial law are not regarded as questions of local law upon which the decisions of the State courts
should be of binding force. Robinson v. Commonwealth Insurance Co., 3 Sum.
220; Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1. See fu1·ther as to exceptions to the general
rule, Austen"· l\liller, 5 McLean, 153; ·williamson o. Berry, 8 How. 495; Bragg
o. Meyer, 1 McAll. 408.
1 To constitute a bill of credit within the meaning of the Constitution, it must
be issued by a State, involve the faith of the State, and be designed to circulate
as money on the credit of the State in the ordinary uses of business. Briscoe "·
Bank of Kentucky, 11 Pet. 257; Woodruff v. Trapnall, 10 How. 209. The
facts that a State owns the entire capital stock of a bank, elects the diredors,
makes its bills receivable for the public dues, and pledges its faith for their
red~mption, do not make the bills of such bank "bills of credit" in the constitutional ~ense. Darrington v. State Bank of Alabama, 13 How. 12. See further,
Craig v. 1\lissouri, 4 Pet. 410; Byrne "· Missouri, 8 Pet. 40 ; :Moreau v. Detchamendy, 41 Mo. 431.
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necessary for executing its inspection laws; and the net produce
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of all duties and imposts laid by any State on imports or exports,

shall be for the use of the treasury of the United States, and all

such laws shall be subject to the revision and control of Congress.

No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of

tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter into

any agreement or compact with another State or with a foreign

power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such immi-

nent danger as will not admit of delay. Of the second class are

the following: No State shall pass any bill of attainder, ea: post

facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts} or make or

enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities

of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any

person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor

deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of

the laws.“

Other provisions have for their object to prevent discriminations

by the several States against the citizens and public authority and

proceedings of other States. Of this class are the provisions that

the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges

and immunities of citizens in the several States;“ that fugitives

‘ Const. of U. S. art. 1, § 10.
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’ Const. of U. S. 14th Amendment.

‘ Const. of U. S. art. 4. “ What are the privileges and immunities of citi-

zens in the several States? We feel no hesitation in conﬁning these expressions

to those privileges and immunities which are in their nature fundamental; which

belong of right to the citizens of all free governments; and which have, at all

times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several States which compose this

Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign. What

those fundamental principles are, it would perhaps be more tedious than diﬁicult

to enumerate. They may, however, be all comprehended under the following

necessary for executing ita inspection laws ; and the net produce
of all duties and imposts laid by any State on imports or exports,
shall be for the use of the treasury of the United States, and all
such laws shall he subject to the rev~sion and control of Congress.
No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of
tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter into
any agreement or compact with another State or with a foreign
power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay. Of the second class are
the following: No State shall pass any bill of attainder, ex post
facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts,1 or make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the ·equal protection of
the laws.2
Other provisions have for their object to prevent discriminations
by the several States against the citizens and public authority and
proceedings of other States. Of this class are the provisions that
the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges
and immunities of citizens in the several States ; 8 that fugitives

general heads: protection by the government, the enjoyment of life and lib-

erty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue

and obtain happiness and safety, subject nevertheless to such restraints as the

government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole. The right

of a citizen of one State to pass through, or to reside in any other State, for

purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise, to claim the

beneﬁt of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions of every

kind in the courts of the State; to take, hold, and dispose of property, either

real or personal; and an exemption from higher taxes or impositions than are

paid by the citizens of the other State, may be mentioned as some of the partic-

ular privileges and immunities of citizens, which are clearly embraced by the

general description of privileges deemed to be fundamental; to which may be

[16]

Const. of U. S. art. 1, § 10.
Const. of U.S. 14th Amendment.
a Const. of U. S. nrt. 4. "What are the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States? We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions
to those privileges and immunities which are in their nature fundamental; which
belong of right to the citizens of all free governments; and which have, at all
times, been enjoyed by the c~izens of the several States which compose this
Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign. What
those fundamental principles are, it would perhaps be more tedious than difficult
to enumerate. They may, however, be all comprehended under the following
geperal heads : protection by the government, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue
and obtain happiness and safety, subject nevertheless to such restraints as the
government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole. The right
of a citizen of one State to pass through, or to reside in any other State, for
purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise, to claim the
benefit of the writ of habeas corpus ; to institute and maintain actions of every
kind in the courts of the State; to take, hold, and dispose of property, either
real or personal ; and an exemption from higher taxes or impositions than are
paid by the citizens of the other State, may be mentioned as some of the particular privileges and immunities of citizens, which are clearly embraced by the
general description of privileges deemed to be fundamental ; to which may be
1

1
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from justice shall ‘be delivered up,‘ and that full faith [* 16]
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added the elective franchise as regulated and established by the laws or constitu-

tion of the State in which it is to be exercised. These, and many others which

might be mentioned, are, strictly speaking, privileges and immunities, and the

from justice shall • be delivered up,1 and that full faith [*16]

enjoyment of them by the citizens of each State in every other State, was mani-

festly calculated (to use the expressions of the preamble of the corresponding

provision in the old Articles of Confederation) ‘ the better to secure and perpet-

nate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different States

of the Union.’ ” Washington, J., in Corﬁeld v. Coryell, 4 VVash. C. C. 380.

The Supreme Court will not describe and deﬁne those privileges and immunities,

in a general classiﬁcation; preferring to decide each case as it may come up.

Conner v. Elliott, 18 How. 591. For discussions upon this subject, see Murray

v. McCarty, 2 Munf. 393; Lemmon v. People, 26 Barb. 270, and 20 N. Y. 562;

Campbell v. Morris, 3 Har. & M‘H. 554; Amy v. Smith, 1 Lit. 326; Crandall

v. State, 10 Conn. 340; Butler v. Farnsworth, 4\Vash. C. C. 101; Common-

wealth v. Towles, 5 Leigh, 743; Haney v. Marshall, 9 Md. 194; Slaughter v.

Commonwealth, 13 Grat. 767; State v. Medbury, 3 R. I. 138; People v. Imlay,

20 Barb. 68; People v. Coleman, 4 Cal. 46; People v. Thurber, 13 lll. 544;

Phmnix Insurance Co. v. Commonwealth, 5 Bush, 68; Ducat v. Chicago, 48 Ill.

172; Fire Department v. Noble, 3 E. D. Smith, 441; Same v. “fright, ib.

453; Same v. Holfenstein, 16 WVis. 136. The constitutional provision does not

apply to corporations. \Varren Manuf. Co. v. Etna Ins. Co. 2 Paine, 501.
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A discrimination between local freight on railroads and that which is extra-terri-

torial, is not personal, and therefore not forbidden by this clause of the Consti-

tution. Shipper v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co. 47 Penn. St. 338. The requirement

of a license fee of persons not permanent residents of Baltimore, who offer or

expose for sale goods, &c., within that city, does not violate this provision.

Ward v. State, 31 Md. 279. And see further, Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wal. 168.

' For decisions under this clause, see Ex parts Joseph Smith, 3 McLean,

133; Dow’s Case, 18 Penn. St. 39; Matter of Clark, 9 Wend. 221; Johnson v.

Riley, 13 Geo. 97; Matter of Fetter, 3 Zab. 311. The three cases last cited

decide that the alleged offence need not be an offence at the common law; it is

sufficient that it be a crime against the State from which the accused has ﬂed.

But it must have been actually committed within the State reclaiming the alleged

offender, and he must have been an actual fugitive therefrom. E1: parte Smith,

supra. The whole subject was considered in Commonwealth of Kentucky v.

Dennison, 24 How. 66. One Lago was indicted in Kentucky for enticing and

assisting a slave to escape from his master, and a requisition was made upon the

governor of Ohio for his surrender to the Kentucky authorities as a fugitive from

justice. The governor of Ohio refused to surrender him, on the ground that the

act with which he was charged was not an offence known to the laws of Ohio, and

not an act affecting the public safety, or regarded as malum in se by the general

judgment and conscience of civilized nations. Application was then made to the

Supreme Court of the United States for a mandamus to compel the governor of

Ohio to perform this duty. The application was denied, on the ground that,

although the governor erred in his refusal, no power was delegated to the general

2 [111

added the elective franchise as regulated and established by the laws or constitution of the State in which it is to be exercised. ThE>se, and many others which
might be mentioned, are, strictly speaking, privileges and immunities, and the
enjoyment of them by the citizens of each State in every other State, was manifestly calculated (to use the expressions of the preamble of the corresponding
provision in the old Articles of Confederation) 'the better to secure and perpetuate mutual friend~hip and intercourse among the people of the different States
of the Union.'" Washington, ,J., in Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 380.
The Supreme Court will not describe and define those privileges and immunities,
in a general classification ; preferring to decide each case as it may come up.
Conner"· Elliott, 18 How. 591. For discussions upon this subject, see l\Iurray
"·:McCarty, 2 Munf. 393; Lemmon v. People, 26 Barb. 2i0, and 20 N.Y. 562;
Campbell t'. Morris, 3 Har. & M'H. 554; Amy v. Smith, 1 Lit. 326; Crandall
11. State, 10 Conn. 340; Butler v. Farnsworth, 4 'Vash. C. C. 101; Commonwealth v. Towles, 5 Leigh, i43; Haney v. :Marshall, 9 l\Id. 19!; Slaughter v.
Commonwealth, 13 Grat. 767; State v. Medbury, 3 R. I. 138; People v. Imlay,
20 Barb. 68; People 11. Coleman, 4 Cal. 46 ; People v. Thurber, 13 Ill. 544;
Phreni."( Insurance Co. v. Commonwealth, 5 Bush, 68; Ducat v. Chicago, 48 Ill.
1i2; Fire Depsrtment "· Noble, 3 E. D. Smith, 441; Same v. Wright, ih.
453 ; Same v. Holf'tmstein, 16 Wis. 136. The constitutional provision does not
apply to corporations. 'Varren l\Ianuf. Co. v . .lEtna Ins. Co. 2 Paine, 501.
A discrimination between local freight on railroads and that which is extra-territorial, is not personal, and therefore not forbidden by this clause of the Constitution. Shipper v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co. 47 Penn. St. 338. The requirement
of a license fee of persons not permanent residents of Baltimore, who offer or
expose for sale goods, &c., within that city, does not violate this pro,·ision.
Ward"· State, 31 ~Id. 279. And see further, Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wal. 168.
1 For decisions under this clause, see Ex parte .Joseph Smith, 3 :McLean,
133; Dow's Case, 18 Penn. St. 39; :Matter of Clark, 9 Wend. 221; Johnson v.
Riley, 13 Geo. 97; :Matter of Fetter, 3 Zab. 311. The three cases last cited
decide that the alleged offence need not be an offence at the common law ; it is
sufficient that it be a crime against the State from which the accused has fled.
But it must have been actually committed within the State reclaiming the alleged
offender, and he must have been an actual fugitive therefrom. Ex parte Smith,
supra. The whole subject was considered in Commonwealth of Kentucky v.
Dennison, 24 How. 66. One Lago was indicted in Kentucky for enticing and
assisting a slave to escape from his master, and a requisition was made upon the
go,·ernor of Ohio for his surrender to the Kentucky authorities as a fugitive from
justice. The governor of Ohio refused to surrender him, on the ground that the
act with which be was charged was not an offence known to the laws of Ohio, and
not an act affecting the public safety, or regarded as malum in se by the general
judgment and conscience of civilized nations. Application was then made to the
Supreme Court of the United States for a mandamus to compel the governor of
Ohio to perform this duty. The application was denied, on the ground that,
although the governor erred in his refusal, no power was delegated to the general
2
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records, and judicial proceedings of every other State.‘

[en. n.

The last provisions that we shall here notice are that the United

States shall guarantee to every State a republican form of govern-

ment,’ and that no State shall grant any title of nobility.“ The

_ purpose of these is to protect a Union founded on republi-

[* 18] can principles, and composed entirely of " republican 1nem-

bers against aristocratic and monarchial innovations.‘

government, either through the judicial or any other department, to employ any

coercive means to compel him. See Matter of Voorhies, 32 N. J. 141.

‘ Const. of‘ U. S. art. 4. This clause of the Constitution has been the sub-

ject of agood deal of discussion in the courts. It is well settled that if the record

of a judgment shows that it was rendered without service of process or appear-

ance of the defendant, or ifthat fact can be shown without contradicting the reci-

[•17] and credit shall be given in • each State to the public acts,
records, and judicial proceedings of every other State. I
The last provisions that we shall here notice are that the. United
States shall guarantee to every State a republican form of government? and that no State shall grant any title of nobility.s The
purpose of these is to protect a Union founded on republi[•18] can pl'iuciples, and composed entirely of • republican members against aristocratic and monarchial innovations.'

tals of the record, it will be treated as void in any other State, notwithstanding

this constitutional provision. Benton v. Burgot, 10 S. & R. 2-12; Thurber v.

Blackbourne, 1 N. H. 242; Hall v. Williams, 6 Pick. 232; Aldrich v. Kinney,

4 Conn. 380; Bradshaw v. Heath, 13 Wend. 407; Robinson v. \Vard’s Execu-

tors, 8 Johns. 86; Fenton v. Garlick, ib. 194; Kilbourn v. \Voodworth, 5

Johns. 37; Pawling v. Bird's Executors, 13 Johns. 192; Starbuck v. Murray,‘

5 VVend. 1/61; Noyes v. Butler, 6 Barb. 613; \Voodward v. Tremcre, 6 Pick.

354; Lincoln v. Tower, 2 McLean, 473; \Vestervelt v. Lewis, ib. 511; Bime-
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lar v. Dawson, 4 Scam. 536; Gleason v. Dodd, 4 Met. 333; \Varren v. M‘Carthy,

25 Ill. 95; Rape v. Heaton, 9 \Vis. 328; VVood v. Watkinson, 17 Conn. 500;

Norwood v. Cobb, 24 Texas, 551; McLaurine v. Monroe, 30 Mo. 46:2; Com-

monwealth v. Blood, 97 Mass. 538. But whether it would be competent to show,

in opposition to the recitals of the record, that a judgment of another State was

rendered without jurisdiction having been obtained of the person of the defend-

ant, is not settled by the authorities. Many cases hold not. Field v. Gibbs,

1 Pet. C. C. 156-; Green v. Sarmiento, ib. 76; Lincoln v. Tower, 2 McLean,

473; Westervelt v. Lewis, ib. 511; Pearce v. Olney, 20 Conn. 544; lloxie 0.

Wright, 2 Vt. 263; Newcomb v. Peck, 17 Vt. 302; \Villc0x v. Kassick, 2 Mich.

165; Bimelar v. Dawson, 4 Scam. 536; \Velch v. Sykes, 3 Gil. 197; Roberts v.

Caldwell, 5 Dana, 512. Other cases admit such evidence. Starbuek v. Murray,

5 Wend. 148; Holbrook v. Murray, ib. 161; Shumway v. Stillman, 6 Wend.

417; Borden v. Fitch, 15 Johns. 121; Hall v. VVilliams, 6 Pick. 232; Aldrich v,

Kinney, 4 Conn. 380; Bradshaw v. Heath, 13 Wend. 407; Gleason v. Dodd,

4 Met. 333; Norwood v. Cobb, 24 Texas, 551. The same defences may be

made to a judgment when sued in another State which could have been made to

it in\the State where rendered. Hampton v. McConnel, 3 \Vheat. 234; Mills v.

Duryea, 7 Cranch, 484; Steele v. Smith, 7 1V. & S. 447; Bank of the State v.

Dalton, 9 How. 528. But no others: Green v. Van Buskirk, 7 Wal. 139 ; Christ-

mas v. Russell, 5 Wal. 290; Cheever v. “Wilson, 9 Wal. 108.

’ Const. of U. S. art. 4, § 4. " Const. of U. S. art. 1, § 10.

‘ Federalist, Nos. 43 and 44. It does not fall within our province to discuss

[13]

government, either through the judicial or any other department, to employ any
coercive meat~s to compel him. See Matter of Voorhies, 32 N.J. 141.
1 Const. of U. S. art. 4.
This clause of the Constitution has been the subject of a -good deal of discussion in the courts. It is well seUled that if the record
of a juclgment shows that it was rendered without service of process or appearance of the defendant, or if that fact can be shown without contradicting the recitals of the record, it will be treated u void in any other State, notwithstanding
this constitutional provision. Benton "· Burgot, 10 S. & R. 242; Thurber v.
Blackbourne, 1 N. H . 242; Hall v. Williams, 6 Pick. 232; Aldrich v. Kinney,
4 Conn. 380; Bradshaw v. Heath, 18 Wend. 407; Robinson v. Ward's Executors, 8 Johns. 86; Fenton v. Garlick, ib. 194; Kilbourn v. Woodworth, 5
Johns. 37; Pawling " · Bird's Executors, 13 Johns. 192; Starbuck v. Murray,·
6 Wend. Ml; Noyes "· Butler, 6 Barb. 613; Woodward v. Tremere, 6 Pick .
354; Lin<·oln "· TQwer, 2 McLean, 473; Westervelt "· Lewis, ib. 511; Bimelar v. Dawson,.4 Scam. !i36; Gleason v. Dodd, 4 Met. 333 ; Warren v. l\l'Carthy,
25 Ill. 95; Rape "· Heaton, 9 Wis. 328; Wood v. Watkinson, 17 Conn. 500;
Norwood v. Cobb, 24 Texas, 551; McLaurine v. Monroe, 30 Mo. 462; Commonwealth v. Blood, 97 Mass. 538. But whether it would be competent to show,
in opposition to the r.ecitals of the record, that a judgment of another State was
rendered without jurisdiction having been obtained of the person of the defendant., is not settled by the authorities. Many Ca8es hold not. Field "· Gibbs,
1 Pet. C. C. 156; Green v. Sarmil.'nto, ib. 76; Lincoln v. Tower, 2 McLean,
473; Westervelt v. Lewis, ib. 511; Pearce v. Olney, 20 Conn. 544; Hoxie "·
Wright, 2 Vt. 263; Newcomb"· Peck, 17 Vt. 302; Willcox v. Kassick, 2 Mich.
165; Bimelar 11. Dawson, 4 Scam. 536 ; Welch v. Sykes, 3 Gil. 197; Roberts v.
Caldwell, 5 Dana, 512. Other cases admit such evidence. Starbuck"· Murray,
5 Wend. 148; Holbrook "· Murray, ib. 161; Shumway v. Stillman, 6 Wend.
4-17; Borden v. Fitch, 15 Johns. 121; Hall v. Williams, 6 Pick. 232; Aldrich v.
Kinney, 4 Conn. 380; Bradshaw v. Heath, 13 Wend. 407; Gleason "· Dodd,
4 Met. 333; Norwood v. Cobb, 24 Texas, 551. The same defences may be
made to a judgment when sued in another State which could have been made to
it in,the State where rendered. Hampton v. McConnel, 3 Wheat. 234; Mills v.
Duryea, 7 Cranch, 484; Stet'le v. Smith, 7 W. & S. 447; Bank of the State"·
Dalton, 9 How. 528. But no others: Green"· Van Buskirk, 7 \Val. 139; Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wal. 290; Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wal. 108.
1 Const. of U. S. art. 4, § 4.
3 Const. of U. S . art. 1, § 10.
' Federalist, Nos. 43 and 44. It does not fttll within our province to discuss
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So far as a particular colisideration of the foregoing provisions
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falls within the plan of our present work, it will be more convenient

to treat of them in another place, especially as such of them as

have for their object the protection of person or property are

usually repeated in the bills of rights contained in the State consti-

tutions, and will require some notice at our hands as a part of

State constitutional law.

Where powers are conferred upon the general government, the

exercise of the same powers by the States is impliedly prohibited,

wherever the intent of the grant to the national government would

be defeated by such exercise. On this ground it is held that the

States cannot tax the agencies or loans of the general government;

since the power to tax, if possessed by the States in regard to these

objects, might be so exercised as altogether to destroy such agen-

cies and impair or even destroy the national credit.‘ And where by

the national constitution jurisdiction is given to the national’ courts

with a view to the more efficient and harmonious working of the

system organized under it, it is competent for Congress in its wis-

dom to make that jurisdiction exclusive of the State courts.“ On

some other subjects State laws may be valid until the power of

Congress is exercised, when they become superseded, either wholly,

or so far as they are found inconsistent. The States may legislate
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on the subject of bankruptcy if there be no law of Congress which

will conflict.” State laws for organizing and'diseiplining the mili-

tia are valid except as they may conﬂict with national legislation ;4

and the States may constitutionally provide for punishing the coun-

terfeiting of coin‘ and the passing of counterfeit money,“ since

these provisions. They have been much discussed in Congress within a. few

years, but in a party, rather than a judicial spirit.

' MeCulloch v. Maryland, 4 \Vheat. S16, 427; Weston v. Charleston, 2 Pet.

449. See cases collected, post, p. 482.

' Martin 0. Hunter’s Lessee, 1 \Vheat. 334; The Moses Taylor v. Hammons,

-1 Wal. 411; The Ad Hine v. Trevor, ib. 555. And see note to these cases in

the Weslern Jurist, Vol. I., p. 241.

3 Sturgis v. Crowninshield, 4 \Vheat. 122; McMillan v. McNeil], ib. 209.

And see post, pp. 293-94.

‘ Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1, 51.

" Harlan v. People, 1 Doug. Mich. 207.

‘ Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 410; United States v. Marigold, 9 How. 560. And

So far as a particular corisideration of the foregoing provrsrons
falls within the plan of our present work, it will be more convenient
to trent of them in another place, especially as such of them as
haYe for their object the protection of person or propenty are
usually repeated in the bills of rights contained in the State constitutions, and will require some notice at our hands as a part. of
State constitutional law.
Where powers are conferred upon the general government, the
exercise of the same powers by the States is impliedly prohibited,
wherever the intent of the grant to the national government would
be defeated by such exercise. On this ground it is held that the
States cannot tax the agencies or loans of the general government;
since the power to tax, if possessed by the States in regard to these
objects, might be so exercised as altogether to destroy such agencies and impair or even destroy the national credit. 1 And where by
the national constitution jurisdiction is given to the nationar courts
with a view to the more efficient and harmonious working of the
system organized under it, it is competent for Conp;ress in its wisdom to make that jurisdiction exclusive of the State courts.2 On
some other subjects State laws may be valid until the power of
Congress is exercised, when they become superseded, either wholly,
or so far as they are found inconsistent. The States may legislate
on the subject of bankruptcy if there be no law of Congress which
will conflict.3 State laws for organizing and· disciplining the militia are valid except as they may conflict with national legislation ; •
and the States may constitutionally provide for punishing the counterfeiting of coin 6 and the passing of counterfeit money ,6 since

see Hendrick‘s Case, 5 Leigh, 707 ; J ett v. Commonwealth, 18 Grat. 933; Moore

v. People, 1-1 How. 13.
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these provisions. They have been much discussed in Congress within & few
years, but in a party, rather than a judicial spirit.
' :McCulloch t1. :M.aryland, 4 Wheat. 816, 427 ; Weston t!. Charleston, 2 Pet.
449. See cases collected, post, p. 482.
' Martin 11. Hunter's Lessee, 1 ·wheat. 884; The :Moses Taylor v. Hammons,
4 \Val. 411; The Ad Hine 11. Trevor, ib. boo. And see note to these CW!es in
the Western Jurist, Vol. I., p. 241.
3 Sturgis 11. Crowninsbield, 4 Wheat. 122; McMillan v. McNeill, ib. 209.
And see post, pp. 293-94.
' Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1, 61.
1 Harlan 11. People, 1 Doug. Mich. 207.
• Fox v. Ohio, 6 How. 410; United States 11. Marigold, 9 How. 560. And
see Hendrick's Case, 5 Leigh, 707; Jett v. Commonwealth, 18 Grat. 933; Moore
v. People, 14 How. 13.
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these acts are offences against the State, notwithstanding they may

•18

CONSTITUTION A.L LIMITATIONS.

[cu.

11.

be oﬁ'ences against the nation also.

[* 19] * The tenth amendment to the Constitution provides that

the powers not delegated to the United States by the Con-

stitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the

States respectively, or to the people. And it is to be observed of

this instrument, that being framed for the establishment of a national

government, it is a settled rule of construction that the limitations

it imposes upon the powers of government are in all cases to be

understood as limitations upon the government of the Union only,

except where the States are expressly mentioned}

With other rules for the construction of the national Constitu-

tion, we shall have little occasion to deal. They have been the

subject of elaborate treatises, judicial opinions and legislative de-

bates, which are familiar alike to the legal profession and to the

public'at large. So far as that instrument apportions powers to

the national judiciary, it must be understood, for the most part, as

simply authorizing Congress to pass the necessary legislation for

the exercise of those powers by the Federal courts, and not as

directly, of its own force, vesting them with that authority. The

Constitution does not, of its own force, give to national courts

jurisdiction of the several cases which it enumerates, but an act
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of Congress is essential, ﬁrst, to create courts, and afterwards to

apportion the jurisdiction among them. The exceptions are of

those few cases of which the Constitution confers jurisdiction

upon the Supreme Court by name. And although the courts of

the United States administer the common law in many cases, they

do not derive authority from the common law to take cognizance

of and punish offences against the government. Offences against

‘ Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243; Livingston’s Lessee v. Moore, 7 Pet. 551;

Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 432; Smith v. Maryland, 18 How. 71; Buonaparte v. Cam-

den & Amboy R.R. Co. Baldw. 220; James v. Commonwealth, 12 S. & R. 221 ;

Barker v. People, 3 Cow. 686; Colt v. Eves, 12 Conn. 243; Jane v. Common-

wealth, 3 Met. (Ky.) 18; Lincoln v. Smith, 27 Vt. 336; Matter of Smith, 10

Wend. 449; State v. Barnett, 3 Kansas, 250; Reed v. Rice, 2 J. J. Marsh. 45;

Purvear v. Commonwealth, 5 \Val. 475; Twitchell v. Commonwealth, 7 \Val. 321.

For instance, though the right of trial by jury is preserved by the Constitution of

the United States, the States may, nevertheless, if they choose, provide for the

trial of all offences against the States, as well as the trial of civil cases in the

State courts, without the intervention of a jury.

[20]

these acts are offences against the State, notwithstanding they may
be offences against the n~tion also.
[* 19] *The tenth amendment to the Constitution provides that
the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people. And it is to be observed of
this instrument, that being framed for the establishment of a national
government, it is a settled nlle of construction that the limitations
it imposes upon the powers of government are in all cases to be
understooa as limitations upon the government of the Union only,
except where the States are expressly mentioned. 1
With other rules for the construction of the national Constitution, we shall have little occasion to deal. They have been the
subject of elaborate treatises, judicial opinions and legislative debates, which are familiar alike to the legal profession and to the
public'at large. So far as that instrument apportions powers to
the national judiciary, it must be understood, for the most part, as
simply authorizing Congre8s to pass the necessary legislation for
the exercise of those powers by the Federal co\trts, and not as
directly, of its own force, vesting them with that authority. The
Constitution does not, of its own force, give to national courts
jurisdiction of the several cases which it enumerates, but an act
of Congress is essential, first, to create courts, and afterwards to
apportion the jurisdiction among them. The exceptions are of
those few cases of which the Constitution confers jurisdiction
upon the Supreme Court by name. And although the courts of
the United States administer the common law iit many cases, they
do not derive authority from the common law to take cognizance
of and punish offences against the government. Offences against
Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243; Livingston's Lessee v. Moore, 7 Pet. 551;
Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 432; Smith v. Maryland, 18 How. 71; Buonaparte v. Camden & Amboy R.R. Co. Baldw. 220; James v. Commonwealth, 12 S. & R. 221;
Barker v. People, 3 Cow. 686; Colt v. Eves, 12 Conn. 243; Jane v. Commonwealth, 3 Met. (Ky.) 18; Lincoln v. Smith, 27 Vt. 336; Matter of Smith, 10
Wend. 449; State v. Barnett, 3 Kansas, 250; Reed v. Rice, 2 J. J. Marsh. 45;
Purvear v. Commonwealth, 5 Wal. 475; Twitchell v. Commonwealth, 7 Wal. 321.
For instance, though the right of trial by jury is preserved by the Constitution of
the United States, the States may, nevertheless, if they choose, provide for the
trial of all offences against the States, as well as the trial of civil cases in the
State courts, without the intervention of a jury.
1
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the nation are deﬁned and their punishment prescribed by acts of

CR.

n.]

:J'HE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.

• 19

Congress.‘

‘ Demurrer to an indictment for a libel upon the President and Congress. By

the court: " The only question which this case presents is, whether the circuit

courts can .exercise a common-law jurisdiction in criminal cases. . . . The gen-

the nation are defined and their punishment prescribed by acts of
Congress. 1
•

eral acquiescence of legal men shows the prevalence of opinion in favor of the

negative of the proposition. The course of reasoning which leads to this con-

clusion is simple, obvious, and admits of but little illustration. The powers of

the general government are made up of concessions from the several States;

whatever is not expressly given to the former, the latter expressly reserve. The

judicial power of the United States is a constitutional part of these concessions:

that power is to be exercised by courts organized for the purpose, and brought

into existence by an effort of the legislative power of the Union. Of all the

courts which the United States may, under their general powers, constitute, one

only, the Supreme Court, possesses jurisdiction derived immediately from the

Constitution, and of which the legislative power cannot deprive it. All other

courts, created by the general government, possess no jurisdiction but what is

given them by the power that created them, and can be vested with none but

what the power ceded to the general government will authorize them to confer.

It is not necessary to inquire whether the general government, in any and what

extent, possesses the power of conferring on its courts a jurisdiction in cases

similar to the present; it is enough that such jurisdiction has not been conferred
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by any legislative act, if it does not result to those courts as a consequence of

their creation.” United States v. Hudson, 7 Crunch, 32. See United States v.

Coolidge, 1 Wheat. 415. “ It is clear there can be no common law of the United

States. The Federal government is composed of twenty-four sovereign and

independent States, each of which may have its local usages, customs, and com-

mon law. There is no principle which pervades the Union, and has the authority

of law, that is not embodied in the Constitution or laws of the Union. The com-

mon law could be made a part of our Federal system only by legislative adop-

tion.” Per M'cLean, J., in Wheaten v. Peters, 8 Pet. 658. See, also, Kendall

1:. United States, 12 Pet. 524. As to the adoption of the common law by the

States, see Van Nest v. Pacard, 2 Pet. 144, per Story, J., post, p. 23, and

cases cited in notes. -

[ 21 ]

1 Demurrer to an indictment for a libel upon the President and Congress. By
the court: "The only question which this case presents is, whether the circuit
courts can .exercise a common-law jurisdiction in criminal cases. . . . The general acquiescence of legal men shows the prevalence of opinion in favor of the
negative of the proposition. The course of reasoning which leads to this conclusion is simple, obvious, and admits of but little illustration. The powers of
the general government are made up of concessions from the several States ;
whatever is not expressly given to the former, the latter expressly reserve. The
judicial power of the United States is a constitutional part of these concessions:
that power is to be exercised by courts organized for the purpose, and brought
into existence by an effort of the legislative power of the Union. Of all the
courts which the United States may, under their general powers, constit.ute, one
only, the Supreme Court, possesses jurisdiction derived immediately from the
Constitution, and of which the legislative power cannot deprive it. All other
courts, created by the general government, possess no jurisdiction but what is
given them by the power that created them, and can be vested with none but
what the power ceded to the general government will authorize them to confer.
It is not necessary to inquire whether the general government, in any and what
extent, possesses the power of conferring on its courts a jurisdiction in cases
similar to the present; it is enough that such jurisdiction bas not been conferred
by any legislative act, if it does not result to those courts as a consequence of
their rreation." United States v. Hudson, 7 Crancb, 32. See United States 11.
Coolidge, 1 Wheat. 415. "It is clear there can be no common law of the United
States. The Federal government is composed of twenty-four sovereign and
independent States, each of which may have its local usages, customs, and common law. There is no principle which pervades the Union, and bas the authority
of law, that is not embodied in the Constitution or laws of the Union. The common law could be made a part of our Federal system only by legislath·e adop·
tion." Per McLean, J., in Wheaton 11. Peters, 8 Pet. 658. See, also, Kendall
t'. United States, 12 Pet. 524.
As to the adoption of the common law by the
States, see Van Nest v. Pacard, 2 Pet. 144, per Story, J.; post, p. 23, and
cases cited in notes.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

[*21] *CHAPTER 111.

THE FORMATION AND AMENDMENT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS.

•

(cH. m.

THE Constitution of the United States assumes the existence

of thirteen distinct State governments, over whose people its au-

thority was to be extended if ratiﬁed by conventions chosen for

the purpose. Each of these States was exercising the powers of

government under some form of written constitution, and that

instrument would remain unaffected by the adoption of the national

Constitution, except in those particulars in which the two would

(* 21]

*CHAPTER III.

come in conﬂict; and as to those, the latter would modify and

control the former. But besides this fundamental law, every State

had also a body of laws, prescribing the rights, duties, and obliga-

THE FORMATION AND AMENDMENT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS.

tions of persons within its jurisdiction, and establishing those mi-

nute rules for the various relations of life which cannot he properly

incorporated in a constitution, but must be left to the regulation of

the ordinary law-making power.

By far the larger and more valuable portion of that body of laws

consisted of the common law qf England, which had been trans-

planted in the American wilderness, and which the colonists, now

become an independent nation, had found a shelter of protection

during all the long contest with the mother country, brought at

last to so fortunate a conclusion.
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The common law of England consisted of those maxims of

freedom, order, enterprise, and thrift which had prevailed in the

conduct of public affairs, the management of private business, the

regulation of the domestic institutions, and the acquisition, con-

trol, and transfer of property from time immemorial. It was the

outgrowth of the habits of thought and action of the people, and

was modiﬁed gradually and insensibly from time to time as those

habits became modiﬁed, and as civilization advanced, and new

inventions introduced new wants and conveniences, and new

modes of business. Springing from the very nature of the people

themselves, and developed in their own experience, it was obvi-

ously the body of laws best adapted to their needs, and as they

[22]

THE Constitution of the United States assumes the existence
of thirteen distinct State governments, over whose people its authority was to be extended if ratified by conventions chosen for
the purpose. Each of these States was exercising the powers of
government under some form of written constitution, and that
instrument would remain unaffected by the adoption of the national
Constitution, except in those particulars in which the two would
come in conflict ; and as to those, the latter would modify and
control the former. But besides this fundamental law, every State
bad also a body of laws, prescribing the rights, duties, and obligations of persons within its jurisdiction, and establishing those minute rules for the various relations of life which cannot be properly
incorporated in a constitution, but must be left to the regulation of
the ordinary law-making power.
By far the larger and more valuable portion of that body of laws
consisted of the common law of England, which had been transplanted in the American wilderness, and which the colonists, now
become an independent nation, had found a shelter of protection
during all the long contest with the mother country, brought at
last to so fortunate a conclusion.
The common law of England consisted of those maxims of
freedom, order, enterprise, and thrift which had prevailed in tho
conduct of public affairs, the management of private business, the
regulation of the domestic institutions, and the acquisition, control, and transfer of property from time immemorial. It was the
outgrowth of the habits of thought and action of the people, and
was modified gradually and insensibly from time to time ns those
habits became modified, and as civilization advanced, and new
inventions introduced new wants and conveniences, and new
modes of business. Springing from the very nature of the people
themselves, and developed in their own experience, it was obviously the body of laws best adapted to their needs, and as they
[ 22]
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took with them their nature, so also they would take with them

CR. III.]

FORMATION AND Al\IENDl\IENT OF CONSTITUTIONS.

* 21

these laws whenever they should transfer their domicile from one

country to another.

‘To eulogize the common law is no part of our pres- [‘22]

ent purpose. Many of its features were exceedingly harsh

and repulsive, and gave unmistakable proofs that they had their

origin in times of profound ignorance, superstition, and barbar-

ism. The feudal system, which was essentially a system of vio-

lence, disorder, and rapine,1 gave birth to many of the maxims of

the common law; and some of these, long after that system has

passed away, may still be traced in our law, especially in the rules

which govern the acquisition, control, and enjoyment of real

estate. The criminal code was also marked by cruel and absurd

features, some of which have clu11g to it with wonderful tenacity,

even after the most stupid could perceive their inconsistency with

justice and civilization. But on the whole, the system was the

best foundation on which to erect an enduring structure of civil

liberty which the world has ever known. It was the peculiar

excellence of the common law of England that it recognized the

worth, and sought especially to protect the rights and privileges of

the individual man. Its maxims were those of a sturdy and inde-

pendent race, accustomed in an unusual degree to freedom of
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thought and action, and to a share in the administration of public

affairs; and arbitrary power and uncontrolled authority were not

recognized in its principles. Awe surrounded, and majesty clothed

the king, but the humblest subject might shut the door of his

cottage against him, and defend from intrusion that privacy which

was as sacred as the kingly prerogatives? The system was the

opposite of servile ; its features implied boldness, and independent

self-reliance on the part of the people; and if the‘ criminal code

was harsh, it at least escaped the inquisitorial features which

fastened themselves upon criminal ‘procedure in other civilized

countries, and have ever been fruitful of injustice, oppression, and

terror.

‘ “ A feudal kingdom was a confederacy of a numerous body, who lived in a

state of war against each other, and of rapine towards all mankind, in which the

king, according to his ability and vigor, was either a cipher or a tyrant, and a

great portion of the people were reduced to personal slavery." Mackintosh,

History of England, c. 3.

' See post, p. 299.

[23]

took with them their nature, so also they would take with them
these laws whenever they should transfer their domicile from one
country to another.
• To eulogize the common law is no part of our pres- [*22]
ent purpose. Many of its features were exceedingly harsh
and repulsive, and gave unmistakable proofs that they had their
origin in times of profound ignorance, superstition, and barbarism. The feudal system, whicb was essentially a system of violence, disorder, and rapine,1 gave birth to many of the maxims of
the common law; and some of these, long after that system has
passed away, may still be traced in our law, especially in the rules
which go\"ern the acquisition, control, and enjoyment of real
estate. The criminal code was also marked by cruel and absurd
features, some of which have clung to it with wonderful tenacity,
even after the most stupid could perceive their inconsistency with
justice and civilization. But on the whole, the system was the
best foundation on which to erect an enduring structure of civil
liberty which the world has ever known. It was the peculiar
excellence of the common la.w of England that it recognized the
worth, and sought especially to pt·otect the rights and pdvilegcs of
the individual man. Its maxims were those of a sturdy and independent race, accustomed in an unusual deg•·cc to freedom of
thought and action, and to a sharo in the administration of public
affairs; and arbitrary power and uncontrolled authority were not
recognized in its principles. Awe surrounded, and majesty clothed
the king, but the humblest subject might shut the door of his
cottage against him, and defend from intrusion that privacy which
was as sacred as the kingly prerogatives.2 The system was the
opposite of servile ; its features implied boldness, and independent
self-reliance on the part of the people ; and if the· criminal code
was harsh, it at least escaped the inquisitorial features which
fastened themselves upon criminal procedure in other civilized
counti~es, and have ever been fruitful of injustice, oppression, and
terror.
1 "A feudal kingdom was a confederacy of a numerous body, who lived in a
state of war against each othPr, and of rapine towards all mankind, in which the
king, according to his ability and vigor, was either a cipher or a tyrant, and a
great portion of the people were reduced to personal slavery." Mackintosh,
History of England, c. 8.
1 Sec post, p. 299.
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For several hundred years, however, changes had from time to

• 22

[CH. III.

CONSTITUTIONAL LlllllTATIONS.

time been made in the common law by means of statutes. Origi-

nally the purpose of general statutes was mainly to declare and

re-aﬁirm such common-law principles as, by reason of usnrpations

and abuses, had come to be of doubtful force, and which,

[’* 23] therefore, ‘needed to be authoritatively announced, that

king and subject alike might understand and observe

them. Such was the purpose of the ﬁrst great statute, promul-

gated at a time when the legislative power was exercised by the

king alone, and which is still known as the Magna Charta of King

John. Such also was the purpose of the several conﬁrmations of

that charter, as well as of the Petition of Right,‘ and the Bill of

Rights,2 each of which became necessary by reason of usurpations.

But further statutes also became needful because old customs and

modes of business were unsuited to new conditions of things,

when property had become more valuable, wealth greater, com-

merce more extended, and when all these changes had brought

with them new desires and necessities, and also new dangers

against which society as well as the individual subject needed pro-

tection. For this reason the Statute of Wills,3 and the Statute

of Frauds and Per_juries4 became important; and the Habeas

Corpus Act5 was also found necessary, not so much to change the
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law,° as to secure existing principles of the common law against

being habitually set aside and violated by those in power.

From the ﬁrst the colonists in America claimed the beneﬁt and

protection of the common law. In some particulars, however, the

common law as then existing in England, was not suited to their

condition and circumstances in the new country, and those partic-

ulars they omitted as it was put in practice by them.7 They

' 1 Charles I. c. 1.

1 \Villiam & Mary, Sess. 2, c. 2.

32 Henry VIII. c. 7, and 34 and 35 Henry VIII. c. 5.

29 Charles II. c. 3.

31 Charles II. c. 2.

“ I dare not advise to east the laws into a new mould. The work which I

propound tendeth to the pruning and grafting of the law, and not the plowing

up and planting it again, for such a remove I should hold for a perilous innova-

tion.” Bacon’s \Vorks, Vol. II. p. 231, Phil. Ed. 1852.

" “ The common law of England is not to be taken, in all respects, to be that

of America. Our ancestors brought with them its general principles, and

claimed it as their birthright; but they brought with them and adopted only that

u

is

u

[24]

For several hundred years, however, changes had from time to
time been made in the common law by means of statutes. Ol'iginally the purpose of general statute8 was mainly to declare and
re-affirm such common-law principles as, by reasol1 of usurpations
and abuses, had come to he of doubtful force, and which,
[* 23] therefore, • needed to be authoritatively announced, that
king and subject alike might understand and observe
them. Such was the purpose of the first great statute, promulgated at a time when the legislative power was exercised by the
king aloue, and which is still known as the Magna Charta of King
John. Such also was the purpose of the several confirmations of
that charter, as well as of the Petition of Right,1 and the Bill of
Rights,2 each of which became nece~;sary by reason of usurpations.
But further statutes also became needful because old customs and
modes of business were unsuited to new conditions of things,
when property had become more valuable, wealth greater, commerce more extended, and when all these changes had brought
with them new desires and necessities, and also new dangers
against which society as well as the individual subject needed protection. For this reason the Statute of Wills,3 and the Statute
of Frauds and Perjuries 4 became important ; and the Habeas
Corpus Act 6 was also found necessary, not so much to change the
law ,6 as to secure existing principles of the common law against
being habitually set aside and violated by those in power.
From the fit·st the colonists in America claimed the benefit and
protection of the common law. In some particulars, however, the
common law as then existing in England, was not suited to their
condition and circumstances in the new country, and those particulat·s they omitted as it was put in practice by them.i They
1 Charles I. c. 1.
1 William & 1\lary, Sess. 2, c. 2.
a 32 Henry VIII. c. 7, and 34 and 35 Henry VIII. c. 5.
' 29 Charles II. c. 3.
a 31 Charles II. c. 2.
8 " I dare not advise to cast the laws into a new mould.
The work which I
propound tendeth to the pnming and grafting of the law, and not the plowing
up and planting it again, for such a remove I should hold for a perilous innovation." Bacon's Works, Vol. II. p. 231, Phil. Ed. 1852.
7 " The common law of England is not to be taken, in all respects, to be that
of America. Our ancestors brought with them its general principles, and
claimed it as their birthright; but they brought with them and adopted only that
1

1

[ 24]

.

. I

cu. 111.] FORMATION arm AMENDMENT or CONSTITUTIONS. * 23

also claimed the beneﬁt of * such statutes as from time to [" 24]
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time had been enacted in modiﬁcation of this body of

rules.‘ And when the difﬁculties with the home government sprung

up, it was a source of immense moral power to the colonists that

they were able to show that the rights they claimed were conferred

by the common law, and that the king and Parliament were seeking

to deprive them of the common birthright of Englishmen. Did

Parliament attempt to levy taxes in America, the people demanded

the beneﬁt of that maxim with which for many generations every

intelligent subject had been familiar, that those must vote the tax

portion which was applicable to their condition.” Story, J ., in Van Nest v.

Packard, 2 Pet. 144. “ The settlers of colonies in America did not carry with

them the laws of the land as being bound by them wherever they should settle.

They left the realm to avoid the inconveniences and hardships they were under,

where some of these laws were in force; particularly ecclesiastical laws, those

for payment of tithes and others. Had it been understood that they were to

also claimed the benefit of • such statutes as from time to [• 24]
time had been enacted in modification of this body of
rules. 1 And when the difficulties with the home government sprung
up, it was a source of immense moral power to the colonists that
they were able to show that the rights they claimed were conferred
by the common law, and that the king and Parliament were seeking
to deprive them of the common birthright of Englishmen. Did
Parliament attempt to levy taxes in America, the people demanded
the benefit of that maxim with which for many generations every
intelligent subject had been familiar, that those must vote the tax

carry these laws with them, they had better have stayed at home among their

friends, unexposed to the risks and toils ofa new settlement. They carried with

them a right to such parts of laws of the land as they should judge advantageous

or useful to them ; a right to be free from those they thought hurtful, and a right

to make such others as they should think necessary, not infringing the general

rights of Englishmen; and such new laws they were to form as agreeable as
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might be to the laws of England.” Franklin, Works by Sparks, Vol. IV. p. 271.

See, also, Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dali. 435; Commonwealth v. Knowlton, 2

Mass. 534; Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Met. 122; Mayo v. Wilson, 1 N. H. 58;

Houghton v. Page, 2 N. H. 4-1; State v. Rollins, 8 N.H. 550; State v. Buchanan,

5 H. & J. 356 ; Lindsey v. Coats, 1 Ohio, 245 ; Bloom v. Richards, 2 Ohio, N. s. 390;

Lyle v. Richards, 9 S. & R. 330; Craft v. State Bank, 7 Ind. 219; Dawson v.

Cotfman, 28 Ind. 220; Bogardus v. Trinity Church, 4 Sandf. Ch. 757; Morgan

v. King, 80 Barb. 9; Lansing v. Stone. 37 Barb. 15; Simpson v. State, 5 Yerg.

356; Stout v. Keyes, 2 Doug. Mich. 184; Lorman v. Benson, 8 Mich. 18; Pier-

son v. State, 12 Cal. 149; Norris v. Harris, 15 Cal. 226; Hamilton v. Kneeland,

1 Nev. 40. The courts of one State will presume the common law of a sister

State to be the same as their own in the absence of evidence to the contrary.

Abel] v. Douglass, 4 Denio, 305; Kermott v. Ayer, 11 Mich. 181; Schurman v.

Marley, 29 Ind. 458.

' The acts of Parliament passed after the settlement of a colony were not in

force therein, unless made so by express words, or by adoption. Commonwealth

v. Lodge, 2 Grat. 579; Pemble v. Clifford, 2 McCord, 31. See Swift v. Tousey,

5 Ind. 196; Baker v. Mattocks, Quincy, 72; Cathcart v. Robinson, 5 Pet. 280.

Those amendatory of the common law, if suited to the condition of things in

America, were generally adopted by tacit consent. For the differing views taken

by English and American statesmen upon the general questions here discussed,

see the observations by Governor Pownall, and the comments of Franklin

thereon, 4 Works of Franklin, by Sparks, 271.
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portion which was applicable to their condition." Story, J., in Van Nest "·
Packard, 2 Pet. 144. ''The settlers of colonies in America did not carry with
them the laws of the land as being bound by them wherever they should settle.
They left the realm to avoid the inconveniences and hardships they were under,
where some of these laws were in force; particularly ecclesiastical laws, those
for payment of tithes and others. Had it been understood that they were to
carry these laws with them, they had better have stayed at home among their
friends, unexposed to the risks and toils of a new settlement. They carried with
them a right to such parts of laws of the land as they should judge advantageous
or useful to them ; a right to be free from those they thought hurtful, and a right
to make su('h others as they should think necessary, not infringing the general
rights of Englishmen; and such new laws they were to form as agreeable as
might be to the laws of England." Franklin, Works by Sparks, Vol. IV. p. 271.
See, also, Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 435; Commonwealth v. Knowlt-on, 2
l\Iass. 534; Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 l\let. 122; 1\Iayo 11. Wilson, 1 N. H. 58;
Houghton v. Page, 2 N.H. 44; State v. Rollins, 8 N. H.li50; State v. Buchanan,
li H. & J. 356; Lindsey v. Coats, 1 Ohio, 245; Bloom v. Richards, 2 Ohio, N. s. 390;
Lyle "· Richards, 9 S. & It. 330; Craft v. State Bank, 7 Ind. 219; Dawson v.
Coffman, 28 Ind. 220; Bogardus "· Trinity Church, 4 Sand f. Ch. 757; 1\lorgan
v. King, 30 Barb. 9; Lansing v. Stone, 37 Barb. 15; Simpson v. State, 5 Yerg.
356; Stout v. Keyes, 2 Doug. Mich. 1R-!; Lorman v. Benson, 8 Mich. 18; Pierson v. State, 12 Cal. 149; Norris"· Harris, 15 Cal. 226; Hamilton v. Kneeland,
1 Nev. 40. The courts of one State will pres!lme the common law of a sister
State to be the same as their own in the absence of evidence t() the contrary.
Abell v. Douglass, 4 Denio, 305; Kermott v. Ayer, 11 Mich. 181; Schurman v.
llarley, 29 Ind. 458.
1 The acts of Parliament passed after the settlement of a colony were not in
force therein, unless made so by express words, or by adoption. Commonwealth
"· Lodge, 2 Grat. 579; Pemble v. Clifford, 2 McCord, 31. See Swift v. Tousey,
5 Ind. 196; Baker v. Mattocks, Quincy, 72; Cathcart"· Robinson, 5 Ptlt. 280.
Those amendatory of the common law, if suited to the condition of things in
America, were generally adopted by tacit consent. For the differing views taken
by English and American statesmen upon the general questions here discussed,
see the observations by Governor Pownall, and the comments of Franklin
thereon, 4 Works of Franklin, by Sparks, 271.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIHJTATIONS.

who are to pay it.‘ Did Parliament order offenders against the laws

[cH. m.

in America to be sent to England for trial, every American was

roused to indignation, and protested against the trampling under

foot of that time-honored principle that trials for crime must be by

ajury of the vicinage. Contending thus behind the bulwarks of

the common law, Englishmen would appreciate and sympathize

with their position, and Americans would feel doubly strong in a

cause that was right not only, but the justice of which must be

conﬁrmed by an appeal to the consciousness of their enemies them-

selves.

The evidence of the common law consisted in part of the declar-

atory statutes we have mentioned,’ in part of the commentaries of

such men learned in the law as had been accepted as authority,

but mainly in the decisions of the courts applying the

[’* 25] * law to actual controversies. While colonization con-

tinued,-—that is to say, until the war of the Revolution ac-

tually commenced, — these decisions were authority in the colonies,

and the changes made in the common law up to the same period were

operative in America also if suited to the condition of things here.

The opening of the war of the Revolution is the point of time at

which the continuous stream of the common law became divided,

and that portion which had been adopted in America ﬂowed on by
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itself, no longer subject to changes from across the ocean, but

liable still to be gradually modiﬁed through changes in the modes

of thought and of business among the people, as well as through

statutory enactments.

‘ “The blessing of Judah and Issachar will never meet; that the same people

or nation should be both the lion‘s whelp and the ass between burdens; neither

will it be that a people overlaid with taxes should ever become valiant and mar-

tial. It is true that taxes levied by consent of the State do abate men’s courage

less, as it hath been seen notably in the exercise of the Low Countries, and in

some degree in the subsidies of England, for you must note that we speak now

of the heart and not of the purse; so tbatialthough the same tribute or tax laid

by consent or by imposing be all one to the purse, yet it works diversely upon

the courage. So that you may conclude that no people overcharged with tribute

is ﬁt for empire." Lord Bacon on the True Greatness of Kingdoms.

’ These statutes upon the points which are covered by them, are the best

evidence possible. They are the living charters of English liberty to the present

who arc to pay it.1 Did Parliament order offenders against the laws
in America to be sent to England for trial, every American was
roused to indignation, and protested against the trampling under
foot of that time-honored principle that trials for crime must be by
a jury of the vicinage. Contending thus behind the bulwarks of
the common law, Englishmen would appreciate and sympathize
with their position, and Americans would feel doubly strong in a
cause that was right not only, but the justice of which must be
confirmed by an appeal to the consciousness of their enemies themselves.
The evidence of the common law consisted in part of the declaratory statutes we have mentioned,2 in part of the commentaries of
such men learned in the law as had been accepted as authority,
but mainly in the decisions of the courts applying the
[• 25] •Iaw to actual controversies. While colonization continued,- that is to say, until the war of the Revolution actually commenced,- these decisions were authority in the colonies,
and the changes made in the common law up to the same period were
operative in America. also if suited to the condition of things here.
The opening of the war of the Revolution is the point of time at
which the continuous stream of the common law became divided,
and that portion which had been adopted in America flowed on by
itself, no longer subject to changes from across ·the oceo.n, but
liable still to be gradually modified through changes in the modes
of thought and of business among the people, as well as through
statutory enactments.

day; and as the forerunners of the American constitutions and the source from

which have been derived many of the most important articles in their bills of

rights, they are constantly appealed to when personal liberty or private rights

are placed in apparent antagonism to the claims of government.

[26]

1 "The blessing of Judah and Issarhar will never meet; that the same people
or nation should be both ~he lion's whelp and the ass between burdens; neither
will it be that a people overlaid with taxes should ever become valiant and mar-.
tial. It is true that taxes levied by consent of the State do abate men's courage
leSB, as it bath been seen notably in the exercise of the Low Countries, and in
some degree in the subsidies of England, for you must note that we speak now
of the heart and not of the purse; so that.although the same tribute or tax laid
by consent or by imposing be all one to the purse, yet it works diversely upon
the courage. So that you may conclude that no people overcharged with tribute
is fit for empire." Lord Bacon on the True Greatness of Kingdoms.
s These statutes upon the points which are covered by them, are the best
evidence possible. They are the living charters of English liberty to the present
day; and as the forerunners of the American constitutions and the source from
which have been derived many of the most important articles in their bills of
rights, they are constantly appealed to when personal liberty or private rights
are placed in apparent antagonism to the claims of government.
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The colonies also had legislatures of their own, by which laws
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had been passed which were in force at the time of the separation,

and which remained unaffected thereby. When, therefore, they

emerged from the colonial condition into that of independence, the

laws which governed them consisted, ﬁrst, of the common law of

England, so far as they had tacitly adopted it as suited to their

condition ; second, of the statutes of England, or of Great Britain,

amendatory of the common law, which they had in like manner

adopted ; and third, of the colonial statutes. The ﬁrst and second

constituted the American common law, and by this in great part

are rights adjudged and wrongs redressed in the American States

to this day}

' A few of the States, to get rid of confusion in the law, deemed it desirable

to repeal the acts of Parliament, and to re-enact such portions of them as were

regarded important here. See the Michigan repealing statute, copied from that

of Virginia, in Code of 1820, p. 459. In some of the new States there were also

other laws in force than those to which we have above alluded. Although it has

been said in La Plaisance Bay Harbor Co. v. The City of Monroe, \Val. Ch. 155,

and Depew v. Trustees of \Vabash & Erie Canal, 5 Ind. 8, that the ordinance of

1787 was superseded in each of the States formed out of the North-West Territory

The colonies also had legislatures of their own, by which laws
had been passed which were in force at the time of the separation,
and which remained unaffected thereby. When, therefore, they
emerged from the colonial condition into that of independence, the
laws which govcmed them consisted, first, of the common law of
England, so far as they had tacitly adopted it as suited to their
condition ; sec~nd, of the statutes of England, or of Great Britain,
amendatory of the common law, which they had in like manner
adopted; and tltird, of the colonial statutes. The first and second
constituted the American common law, and by this in great part
are rights adjudged and wrongs redressed in tho American States
to this day .1
A felv of the States, to get rid of confusion in the law, deemed it desirable
to repeal the acts of Parliament, and to re-enact such portions of them as were
regarded important here. See the Michigan repealing statute, copied from that
of Virginia, in Code of 1820, p. 459. In some of the new States there were also
other laws in force than those to which we hal'e above alluded. Although it has
been said in La Plaisance Bay Harbor Co. v. The City of 1\lonroe, W al. Ch. 155,
and Depew r. Trustees of,Vabash & Eric Canal, 5 Ind. 8, that the ordinance of
1787 was superseded in each of the States formed out of theNorth-West Territory
by the adoption of a State constitution, and admission to the Union, yet the
weigl•t of judicial authority is probably the other lvay. In Hogg v. The Zanesville Canal Manufacturing Co. 5 Ohio, 410, it was held that the provision of the
ordinance that the navigable waters of the territory, and the carrying-places
between ~hould be common highways and for ever free, was permanent in its
obligation, and could not be altered without the cons~nt both of the people of
the State, and of the United States, given through their representlltives. " It is
an article of compact; and until we assume the principle that the sovereign power
of a State is not bound by compact, this clause must be considered obligatory."
Justices JllcLtan and Leavitt, in Spooner"· McConnell, 1 McLean, 337, examine
this subject at considerable length, and both arrive at the same conclusion with
. the Ohio court. The view taken of the ordinance in that case was, that such
parts of it as were designed temporarily to regulate the government of the territory, were abolished by the change from a territorial to a State government,
while the other parts, which were designed to be permanent, are unalterable
except by common consent. Some of these, however, being guaranteed by the
Federal Constitution, afterwards adopted, may be regarded as practically annulled, while any others which are opposed to the constitution of any State formed
out of the territory, must also be considered as annulled by common consent;
the people of the State assenting in forming their constitution, and Congress in
admitting the State into the Union under it. The artiele in regard to navigable
waters is therefore still in force. The same was also said in regard to the article
prohibiting slavery, though that also may now be regarded as practically annulled
by the amendment to the Federal Constitution covering the same ground. The
like opinion was subsequently expressed in Palmer v. Commissioners of Cuyahoga
1

by the adoption of a State constitution, and admission to the Union, yet the

weight ofjudicial authority is probably the other way. In Hogg v. The Zanes-
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ville Canal Manufacturing Co. 5 Ohio, 410, it was held that the provision of the

ordinance that the navigable waters of the territory, and the carrying-places

between should he common highways and for ever free, was permanent in its

obligation, and could not be altered without the consent both of the people of

the State, and of the United States, given through their representatives. “ It is

an article of compact; and until we assume the principle that the sovereign power

of a State is not bound by compact, this clause must be considered obligatory."

Justices ﬂlclean and Leavilt, in Spooner v. McConnell, 1 McLean, 337, examine

this subject at considerable length, and both arrive at the same conclusion with

the Ohio court. The view taken of the ordinance in that case was, that such

parts of it as were designed temporarily to regulate the government of the terri-

tory, were abolished by the change from a territorial to a State government,

while the other parts, which were designed to be permanent, are unalterable

except by common consent. Some of these, however, being guaranteed by the

Federal Constitution, afterwards adopted, may be regarded as practically an-

nulled, while any others which are opposed to the constitution of any State formed

out of the territory, must also be considered as annulled by common consent;

the people of the State assenting in forming their constitution, and Congress in

admitting the State into the Union under it. The article in regard to navigable

waters is therefore still in force. The same was also said in regard to the article

prohibiting slavery, though that also may now be regarded as practically annulled

by the amendment to the Federal Constitution covering the same ground. The

like opinion was subsequently expressed in Palmer v. Commissioners of Cuyahoga

[211

[ 27]

* 26 cossrrrorrorun LIMITATIONS. [cH. III.

[* 26] *Every colony had also its charter, emanating from the
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Crown, and constituting its colonial constitution. All but

two of these were swept away by the whirlwind of revolution, and

others substituted which had been framed by the people themselves,

through the agency of conventions which they had chosen. The

exceptions were the States of Connecticut and Rhode Island, each

of which had continued its government as a State under the colo-

nial chartcr, finding it sufficient and satisfactory for the time being,

and accepting it as the constitution for the State}

[* 27] New States have since from time ‘ to time, formed con-

stitutions either regularly in pursuance of enabling acts

passed by Congress, or irregularly by the spontaneous action of

the people, or under the direction of the legislative or executive

authority of the Territory to which the State succeeded. Where

irregularities existed, they must be regarded as having been cured

by the subsequent admission of the State into the Union by Congress ;

and there were not wanting in the case of some States plau-

[* 28] sible reasons for insisting that such admission “‘had be-

come a matter of right, and that the necessity for an

Co. 3 McLean, 2'26, and in Jolly v. Terre Haute Drawbridge Co. 6 McLean,

237. See also Strader v. Graham, 10 How. 82; Doe v. Douglass, 8 Blackf.

12; Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Cross, 18 Wis. 109; Milwaukee Gas-
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light Co. v. Schooner Gamecock, 23 "Wis. 144. In the cases in the ﬁrst and third

McLean, however, the opinion was expressed that the States might, lawfully im-

prove the navigable waters and the carrying-places between, and charge tolls

upon the use of the improvement to obtain reimbursement of their expenditures.

In some of the States formed out of the territory acquired by the United States

from foreign powers, traces will be found of the laws existing before the change

[* 26] • Every colony had also its charter, emanating from the
Crown, and constituting its colonial constitution. All but
two of these were swept away by the whirlwind of revolution, and
others substituted which had been framed by the people themselves,
through the agency of conventions which they had chosen. The
exceptions were the States of Connecticut and Rhode Island, each
of which had continued its government as a State under the colonial charter, finding it sufficient and satisfactory for the time being,
and accepting it as the constitution for the State. 1
[* 27] New States have since from time • to time, formed constitutions either regularly in pursuance of enabling acts
passed by Congress, or irregularly by the spontaneous action of
the people, or under the direction of the legislative or executive
authority of the Territory to which the State succeeded. Where
irregularities existed, they must be regarded as having been cured
by the subsequent admission of the State into the Union by Congress;
and there were not wanting in the case of some States plau[* 28] sible reasons for insisting that such admission • had become a matter of right, and that the necessity for an

of government. Louisiana has a code peculiar to itself, based upon the civil law.

Much of Mexican law, and especially as regards lands and land titles, is retained

in the systems of Texas and California. In Michigan, when the acts of Parlia-

ment were repealed, it was also deemed important to repeal all laws derived from

France, through the connection with the Canadian provinces, including the

Coutume dc Paris, or ancient French common law. In the mining States and

Territories a peculiar species of common law, relating to mining rights and titles,

has sprung up, having its origin among the miners, but recognized and enforced

by the courts.

‘ It is worthy of note, that the ﬁrst case in which a legislative enactment was

declared unconstitutional and void, on the ground of incompatibility with the

constitution of the State, was decided under one of these royal charters. The

case was that of Trevett v. \Veeden, decided by the Superior Court of Rhode

Island in 1786. See Arnold’s History of Rhode Island, Vol. Il. c. 24. The

case is further referred to, post, p. 160, n.
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Co. 3 McLean, 226, and in Jolly v. Terre Haute Drawbridge Co. 6 McLean,
237. See also Strader v. Graham, 10 How. 82; Doe v. Douglass, 8 Blackf.
12; Connecticut :Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Cross, 18 Wis. 109; Milwaukee Gaslight Co. v. Schooner Gamecock, 23 \Vis. 144. In the cases in the first and third
McLean, however, the opinion was expressed that the States might, lawfully improve the navigable waters and the carrying-places between, and charge tolls
upon the use of the improvement to obtain reimbursement of t.heir expenditures.
In some of the States formed out of the tl~rritory acquired by the United States
from furei~n powers, traces will be found of the laws existing before the change
of government. Louisiana has a code peculiar to itself, based upon the civil law.
Much of 1\Iexican law, and especially as regards lands and land titles, is retained
in the syste01s of Texas and California. In Michigan, when the acts of Parliament were repealed, it was also deemed important to repeal all laws derived from
France, through the connection with the Canadian provinces, including the
Coutume de Parz:s, or ancient French common law. In the mining States and
Territories a peculiar species of common law, relating to mining rights and titles,
has sprung up, having its origin among the miners, but recognized and enforced
by the courts.
1 It is worthy of note, that the first case in which a legislative enactment was
declared uucon:~titutional and void, on the ground of incompatibility with the
constitution of the State, was decided under one of these royal charters. The
case was that of Trevett v. "\Veeden, decided by the Superior Court of Rhode
Island in 1786. Sec Arnold's History of Rhode Island, Vol. II. c. 24. The
case is further referred to, post, p. 160, n.
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enabling act by Congress, was dispensed with by the previous stip-

CR.

m.J

FORMATION AND AMENDMENT OF CONSTITUTIONS.

•

28

ulations of the national government in acquiring the Territory from

which such States were formed} Some of these constitutions

pointed out the mode for their own modiﬁcation; others were

silent on that subject; but it has been assumed that in such cases

the power to originate proceedings for that purpose, rested with

the legislature of the State, as the department most nearly repre-

senting its general sovereignty; and this is doubtless the correct

view to take of this subject.”

The theory of our political system is that the ultimate sover-

eignty is in the people, from whom springs all legitimate authority.”

The people of the Union created a national constitution, and

conferred upon it powers of sovereignty over certain subjects, and

the people of each State created a State government, to exercise the

remaining powers of sovereignty so far as they were disposed to

allow them to be exercised at all. By the constitution which they

establish, they not only tie up the hands of their oﬂicial agencies, but

their own hands as well, and neither the oﬂicers of the State, nor

the whole people as an aggregate body, are at liberty to take action

in opposition to this fundamental law. But in every State, although

all persons are under the protection of the government, and obliged

to conform their action to its laws, there are always some who are
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altogether excluded from participation in the government, and are

compelled to submit to be ruled by an authority in the creation of

which they have no choice. The political inaxim, that government

rests upon the consent of the governed, appears, therefore, to be

practically subject to many exceptions; and when we say the sov-

ereignty of the State is vested in the people, the question very nat-

‘ This was the claim made on behalf of Michigan; it being insisted that the

citizens, under the provisions of the ordinance of 1787, whenever the Territory

acquired the requisite population, had an absolute right to form a constitution

and be admitted to the Union under it. See Scott v. Detroit Young Men’s

Society's Lessee, 1 Doug. Mich. 119, and _the contrary opinion in Myers v. Man-

hattan Bank, 20 Ohio, 283. The debates in the Senate of the United States on

the admission of Michigan to the Union go fully into this question. See Benton‘s

Abridgment of Congressional Debates, Vol. XIII. pp. 69-72. And as to the

right of the people of a Territory to originate measures looking to an application

for admission to the Union, see Opinions of Attorneys-General, Vol. II. p. 726.

' See Jameson on Constitutional Conventions, c. 8.

“ McLean, J ., in Spooner v. McConnell, 1 McLean, 347.
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enabling act by Congress, was dispensed with by the previous stipulations of the national government in acquiring the Territory from
which such States were formed. 1 Some of these constitutions
pointed out the mode for their own modification ; others were
silent on that subject; but it has been assumed that in such cases
the power to originate proceedings for that purpose, rested with
the legislature of the State, as the department most nearly representing its general sovereignty ; and this is doubtless the correct
view to take of this subject.2
The theory of our political system is that the ultimate sovereignty is in the people, from whom springs all legitimate authority.a
The people of the Union created a national constitution, and
conferred upon it powers of sovereignty over certain subjects, and
the people of each State created a State government, to exercise the
remaining powers of sovereignty so far as they were disposed to
allow them to be exercised at all. By the constitution which they
establish, they not only tie up the hands of their official agencies, but
their own hands as well, and neither the officers of the State, nor
the whole people as an aggregate body, are at liberty to take action
in opposition to this fundamental law. But in every State, although
all persons are under tho protection of the government, and obliged
to conform their action to its laws, there are always some who are
altogether excluded from participation in the government, and are
compelled to submit to be ruled by an authority in the creation of
which they have no choice. The political maxim, that government
rests upon the consent of the governed, appears, therefore, to be
practically subject to many exceptions ; and when we say the sovereignty of the State is vested in the people, the question very nat1 This was the claim made on behalf of Michigan ; it being insisted that the
citizens, under the provisions of the ordinance of 1787, whenever the Territory
acquired the requisite pppulation, had an absolute right to form a constitution
and be admitted to the Union under it. See Scott v. Detroit Young :Men's
Society's Lessee, 1 Doug. 1\Iich. 119, and .the contrary opinion in :Myers "· Manhattan Bank, 20 Ohio, 283. The debates in &he Senate of the United States on
the admission of l\Iichigan to the Union go fully into this question. ~ee Benton's
Abridgment of Congressional Dllhates, Vol. XIII. pp. 69-72. And as to the
right of the people of a Territory to originate measures looking to an application
for admisl!ion to the Union, see Opinions of Attorneys-General, Vol. H. p. 726.
1 See Jameson on Constitutional Conventions, c. 8.
3 McLean, J., in Spooner v. McConnell, 1 McLean, 847.
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urally presents itself, What are we to understand by The People as
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used in this connection?

[* 29] " What should be the correct rule upon this subject, it

does not fall within our province to consider. Upon this

men will theorize ; but the practical question lies back of the form-

ation of the constitution, and is addressed to the people them-

selves. As a practical fact, the sovereignty is vested in those

persons who are permitted by the constitution of the State to

exercise the elective franchise. These persons may have been des-

ignated by description in the enabling act of Congress permitting

the formation of the constitution, if any such there were, or the

convention which framed the constitution may have determined

the qualiﬁcations of electors without external dictation. In either

case, however, it was essential to subsequent good order and satis-

faction with the government, that those classes in general should be

admitted to a voice in its administration, whose exclusion on the

ground of want of capacity or of moral ﬁtness, could not reason-

ably and to the general satisfaction be defended.

Certain classes have been almost universally cxcluded,—the

slave, because he is assumed to be wanting alike in the intelligence

and the freedom of will essential to the proper exercise of the

right; the woman, from mixed motives, but mainly perhaps, be-
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cause, in the natural relation of marriage, she was supposed to be

under the inﬂuence of_ her husband, and, where the common law

prevailed, actually was in a condition of dependence upon and sub-

jection to him; the infant, for reasons similar to those which

exclude the slave; the idiot, the lunatic, and the felon, on ob-

vious grounds; and sometimes other classes for whose exclusion

it is diﬁicult to assign reasons so generally satisfactory.

The theory in these cases we take to be that classes are ex-

cluded because they lack either the intelligence, the virtue, or the

liberty of action essential to the proper exercise of the elective

franchise. But the rule by which the presence or absence of these

qualiﬁcations is to be determined, it is not easy to establish on

grounds the reason and propriety of which shall be accepted by all.

It must be one that is deﬁnite and easy of application, and it must

be made permanent, or an accidental majority may at any time

change it, so as to usurp all power to themselves. But to be deﬁ-

nite and easy of application, it must also be arbitrary. The infant

of tender years is wanting in competency, but he is daily acquiring

[301 _

urally presents itself, What are we to understand by Tlte People as
used in this connection?
[* 29]
• What Blzould be the correct rule upon this subject, it
does not fall within our province to consider. Upon this,
men will theorize ; ·but the practical question lies back of the formation of the constitution, and is addressed to the people themseh·es. As a practical fact, the sovereignty is vested in those
persons who are permitted by the constitution of tho State to
exercise the elective franchise. These persons may have been designated by description in the enabling act of Congress permitting
the formation of the constitution, if any such there were, or the
convention which framed the constitution may have determined
the qualifications of electors without external dictation. In either
case, howe,Ter, it was essential to subsequent good order and satisfaction with the government, that those classes in general should be
admitted to a voice in its administration, whose exclusion on the
ground of want of capacity or of moral fitness, could not reasonably and to the ge11eral satisfaction be defended.
Certain classes have been almost universally excluded,- the
slave, because he is assumed to be wanting alike in the intelligence
and the freedom of will essential to the proper exercise of the
right; the woman, from mixed motives, but mainly perhaps, because, in the natural relation of marriage, she was supposed to be
under the influence of_ her husband, and, where the common law
prevailed, actually was in a condition of dependence upon and subjection to him; the infant, for reasons similar to those which
exclude the slave; the idiot, the lunatic, and the felon, on obvious grounds; and sometimes other classes for whose exclusion
it is difficult to assign reasons so generally satisfactory.
The theory in these cases we take to be that classes are excluded because they lack either the intelligence, the virtue, or the
liberty of action essential to the proper exercise of the elective
franchise. But the rule by which the presence or absence of these
qualifications is to be determined, it is not easy to establish on
grounds the reason and propriety of which shall be accepted by all.
It must be one that is definite and easy of application, nnd it must
be made permanent, or an accidental majority may at nny time
change it, so as to usurp all power to themselves. But to be definite and easy of application, it must also be arbitrary. Tho infant
of tender years is wanting in competency, but he is daily acquiring
[ 30]
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to possess what is requisite. The alien may know nothing of

our political system and laws, and he is excluded until

[' 30] * he has been domiciled in the country for a period judged

to be sufﬁciently long to make him familiar with its insti-

tutions; races are sometimes excluded arbitrarily; and there have

been times when in some of the States the possession of a certain

amount of property, or the capacity to read, were regarded as es-

sential to satisfactory proof of sufficient freedom of action and in-

telligence.1

Whatever the rule that is once established, it must remain ﬁxed

until those who by means of it have the power of the State put

into their hands see ﬁt to invite others to participate with them in

its exercise. Any attempt of the excluded classes to assert their

right to a share in the government, other.wise than by operating

upon the public opinion of those who possess the right of suffrage,

would be regarded as an attempt at revolution, to be put down by

the strong arm of the government of the State, assisted, if need

be, by the military power of the Union?

In regard to the formation and amendment of State constitu-

tions, the following appear to be settled principles of American

constitutional law: -
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I. The people of the several Territories may form for them-

selves State constitutions whenever enabling acts for that purpose

are passed by Congress, but only in the manner allowed by such

enabling acts, and through the action of such persons as the en-

abling acts shall clothe with the elective franchise to that end.

If the people of a Territory shall, of their own motion, without

such enabling act, meet in convention, frame and adopt a consti-

tution, and demand admission to the Union under it, such action

does not entitle them, as matter of right, to be recognized as

‘ State v. \Voodruﬂ', 2 Day, 50-l; Catlin v. Smith, 2 S. & R. 267; Opinions of

Judges, 18 Pick. 575. For some local elections it is quite common still to require

property qualiﬁcation or the payment of taxes in the voter; but statutes of this

description are generally construed liberally. See Crawford o. \Vils-on, 4 Barb.

504. Many special statutes, referring to the people of a municipality the ques-

tion of voting aid to internal improvements, have conﬁned the right of voting on

the question to tax-payers.

’ The case of Rhode Island and the “ Dorr Rebellion,” so p0pulnl'ly known,

will he fresh in the minds of all. For a discussion of some of the legal aspects

of the ease, see Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1.

[ 31 ]

it, and a period is fixed at which he shall conclusively be presumed
to possess what is requisite. The alien may know nothing of
our political system and laws, and he is excluded Hntil
[• 30] • he has been domiciled in the country for a period judged
io be sufficiently long to make him familiar with its institutions; races are sometimes excluded arbitrarily; and there have
been times when in some of the States the possession of a certain
amount of p1·operty, or the capacity to read, were regarded as essential to satisfactory proof of sufficient freedom of action and intelligence.1
Whatever the rule that is once established, it must remain fixed
until those who by means of it have the power of the State put
into their hands see fit to invite others to participate with them in
its exercise. Any attempt of the excluded classes to assert their
right to a share in the government, otherwise than by operating
upon the public opinion of those who possess the right of suffrage,
would be regarded as an attempt at revolution, to be put down by
the strong arm of the government of the State, assisted, if need
be, by the mili~ry power of the Union. 2
In regard to the formation and amendment of State constitutions, the following appear to be settled principles of American
constitutional law:I. The people of the several Territories may form for themselves State constitutions whenever enabling acts for that purpose
are passed by Congress, but only in the manner allowed by such
enabling acts, and through the action of such persons as the enabling acts shall clothe with the elective franchise to that end.
If the people of a Territory shall, of their own motion, without
such enabling act, meet in convention, frame and adopt a constitution, and demand admission to the Union unde1· it, such action
does not entitle them, as matter of right, to be recognized as
State v. Woodruff, 2 Day, 504; Catlin v. Smith, 2 S. & R. 267; Opinions of
Judges, 18 Pick. 575. For some local elections it is quite common still to require
property qualification or the payment of taxes in the ,·oter; but statutes of this
description are generally construed liberally. See Crawford v. \Vilson, 4 Barb.
50!. :Many spedallltatutes, referring to the people of a municipality the question of voting aid to internal improvements, have confined the right of voting on
the question to tax-payers.
1 The case of Rhode Island and the "Dorr Rebellion," so popularly known,
will be fresh in the minds of all. For a discussion of some of the legal aspects
of the case, see Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1.
1
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a State; but the power that can admit can also refuse, and the
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territorial status must be continued until Congress shall be satis-

ﬁed to suffer the Territory to become a State. There are always

in these cases questions of policy as well as of constitutional law

to be determined by the Congress before admission becomes a

matter of right,-—- whether the constitution formed is republican ;

whether the proper State boundaries have been ﬁxed upon;

whether the population is sufficient; whether the proper qualiﬁ-

cations for the exercise of the elective franchise have been agreed

to; whether any inveterate evil exist in the Territory which is

now subject to control, but which might be perpetuated under a

State government,-—these and the like questions, in which the

whole country is interested, cannot be ﬁnally solved by the people

of the Territory for themselves, but the ﬁnal decision must rest

with Congress, and the judgment must be favorable before admis-

sion can be claimed or expected.

II. In the original States, and all others subsequently admitted

to the Union, the power to amend or revise their constitutions

resides in the great body of the people as an organized body poli-

tic, who, being vested with ultimate sovereignty, and the source

of all State authority, have power to control and alter the law

which they have made at their will. But the people, in the legal
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sense, must be understood to be those who, by the existing consti-

tution, are clothed with political rights, and who, while that in-

strument remains, will be the sole organs through which the will

of the body politic can be expressed.

III. But the will of the people to this end can only be ex-

pressed in the legitimate modes by which such a body politic can

act, and which must either be prescribed by the constitution

whose revision or amendment is sought, or by an act of the legis-

lative department of the State, which alone would be authorized

to speak for the people upon this subject, and to point out a mode

for the expression of their will in the absence of any provision for

amendment or revision contained in the constitution itself}

' Opinions of the Judges, 6 Cush. 573; Collier v. Frierson, 24 Ala. 100. The

ﬁrst constitution of New York contained no provision for its own amendment,

and Mr. Hammond, in his Political History of New York, Vol. I. c. 26, gives a

very interesting account of the controversy before the legislature and in the coun-

cil of revision as to the power of the legislature to call a convention for revision,

and as to the mode of submitting its work to the people. In Collier v. Frierson,
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a State; but the power that can admit can also refuse, and the
territorial status must be continued until Congress shall be satisfied to suffer the Territory to become a State. There are always
in these cases questions of policy as well as of constitutional law
to be determined by the Congress before admission becomes a
matter of right,- whether the constitution formed is republican ;
whether the proper State boundaries have been fixed upon ;
whether the population is sufficient; whether the proper qualifications for the exercise of the elective franchise have been agreed
to; whether any inveterate evil exist in the Territory which is
now subject to control, but which might be perpetuated under a
State government,- these and the like questions, in which the
whole country is interested, cannot be finally solved by the people
of the Territory for themselves, but the final decision must rest
with Congress, and the judgment must be favorable before admission can be claimed or expected.
II. In the original States, and all others subsequently admitted
to the Union, the power to amend or revise their constitutions
resides in the gl'eat body of the people as an organized body politic, who, being vested with ultimate sovereignty, and the source
of all State authority, have power to control and alter the law
which they have made at their will. But the people, in the legal
sense, must be understood to be those who, by the existing constitution, are clothed with political rights, and who, while that instrument remains, will be the sole organs through which the will
of the body politic can be expressed.
III. But the will of the people to this end can only be expressed in the legitimate modes by which such a body politic can
act, and which must either be prescribed by the constitution
whose revision or amendment is sought, or by an act of the legislative department of the State, which alone would be authorized ·
to speak for the people upon this subject, and to point out a mode
for the expression of their will in the absence of any provision for
amendment or revision contained in the constitution itself.l
1 Opinions of the Judges, 6 Cusb. 573; Collier v. Frierson, 24 Ala. 100.
The
first constitution of New York contained no provision for its own amendment,
and Mr. Hammond, in his Political History of New York, Vol. I. c. 26, gives a
very interesting account of the controversy before the legislature and in the council of revision as to the power of the legislature to call a convention for revision,
and as to the mode of submitting its work to the people. In Collier v. Frierson,
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very necessity of the case, amendments to an existing con-

stitution, or entire revisions of it, must be prepared and matured by

some body of representatives chosen for the purpose. It is obviously

impossible for the whole people to meet, prepare, and discuss the

proposed alterations, and there seems to be no feasible mode by

which an expression of their will can be obtained,except by asking

it upon the single point of assent or disapproval. But no body of

representatives, unless specially clothed with power for that pur-

pose by the people when choosing them, can rightfully take

deﬁnitive action upon amendments or revisions; they must submit

the result of their deliberations to the people — who alone are com-

petent to exercise the powers of sovereignty in framing the funda-

mental law — for ratiﬁcation or rejection. The constitutional con-

24 Ala. 108, it appeared that the legislature had proposed eight different amend-

ments to be submitted to the people at the same time; the people had approved

them, and all the requisite proceedings to make them a part of the constitution

had been had, except that in the subsequent legislature the resolution for their

ratiﬁcation had by mistake omitted to recite one of them. On the question

whether this one had been adopted, we quote from the opinion of the court:

“ The constitution can be amended in but two ways; either by the people who

originally framed it, or in the mode prescribed by the instrument itself. If the

• IV. In accordance with universal practice, and from the [* 32]
very necessity of the case, amendments to an existing constitution, or entire revisions ofit, must be prepared and matured by
some body of representatives chosen for the purpose. It is obviously
impossible for the whole people to meet, prepare, and discuss the
proposed alterations, and there seems to be no feasible mode by
which an expression of their will can be obtained, except by asking
it upon the single point of assent or disapproval. But no body of
representatives, unless specially clothed with power for that purpose by the people when choosing them, can rightfully take
definitive action upon amendments or revisions; they must submit
the result of their deliberations to the people- who alone are competent to exercise the powers of sovereignty in framing the fundamental law- for ratification or rejection. The constitutional con-
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last mode is pursued, the amendments must be proposed by two-thirds of each

house of the General Assembly; they must be published in print, at least three

months before the next general election for representatives; it must appear from

the returns made to the Secretary of State that a majority of those voting for

representatives have voted in favor of the proposed amendments, and they must

be ratiﬁed by two-thirds of each house of the next General Assembly after such

election, voting by yeas and nays, the proposed amendments having been read at

each session three times on three several days in each house. \Ve entertain no

doubt that to change the constitution in any other mode than by a convention,

every requisition which is demanded by the instrument itself must be observed,

and the omission of any one is fatal to the amendment. \Ve scarcely deem any

argument necessary to enforce this proposition. The constitution is the supreme

and paramount law. The mode by which amendments are to be made under it

is clearly deﬁned. It has been said that certain acts are to be done, certain

requisitions are to be observed, before a change can be effected. But to what

purpose are those acts required or those requisitions enjoined, if the legislature or

any department of the govemment can dispense with them? To do so would be

to violate the instrument which they are sworn to support, and every principle of

public law and sound constitutional policy requires the courts to pronounce against

any amendment which is not shown to have been made in accordance with the

rules prescribed by the fundamental law." See also State v. McBride, 4 Mo.

303.

s [ 33 ]

24 Ala. 108, it appeared that the legislature had proposed eight different amendments to be submitted to the people at the sa~e time ; the people had approved
them, and all the requisite proceedings to make them a part of the constitution
bad been had, except that in the subsequent legislature the resolution for their
ratification had by mistake omitted to recite one of them. On the question
whether this one had been adopted, we quote from the opinion of the court:
•• The constitution can be amended in but two ways ; either by the people who
originally framed it, or in the mode prescribed by the instrument it.self. If the
last mode is pursued, the amendments must be proposed by two-thirds of each
house of the General Assembly; they must be published in print, at least three
months before the next general ele<~tion for representatives; it must appear from
the returns made to the Secretary of State that a majority of those voting for
representatives haYe voted in favor of tho proposed amendments, and they must
be ratified by two-thirds of each house of tho next General Assembly after such
election, voting by yeas and nays, the proposed amendments having been read at
each session three times on three several days in each house. 'V e entertain no
doubt that to change the constitution in any other mode than by a conYention,
every requisition which is demanded by tbe instrument itself must be observed,
and the omission of any one is fatal to the amendment. 'Ve scarcely deem any
argument necessary to enforce this proposition. The constitution is the supreme
and paramount law. The mode by which amendments are to be made under it
is clearly defined. It has been said that certain acts nrc to b~ done, certain
requisitions are to be observed, before a change can be effected. But to what
purpose are those acts required or those requisitions enjoined, if the legislature or
any department of the government can dispense with them? To do so would bn
to ,·iolate the instn1mcnt which they are sworn to ~;upport, and every principle of
public law and sound constitutional policy requires the courts to pronounce against
any amendment which is not shown to have been made in accordant·e with the
rules prescribed by the funtlamental law." See also State "· McBride, 4 .Mo.

303.
3
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vention is the representative of sovereignty only in a very qualiﬁed
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sense, and for the speciﬁc purpose, and with the restricted authority

to put in proper form the questions of amendment upon which

["‘ 33] the people are to pass; but the changes in the * fundamental

law of the State must be enacted by the people themselves.‘

V. The power of the people to amend or revise their constitu-

tions is limited by the Constitution of the United States in the

following particulars : —

1. It must not abolish the republican form of government, since

such act would be revolutionary in its character, and would call

for and demand direct intervention on the part of the government

of the United States.’

2. It must not provide for titles of nobility, or assume to violate

the obligation of any contract, or attaint persons of crime, or pro-

vide ex post facto for the punishment of acts by the courts which

were innocent when committed, or contain any other provision

which would, in effect, amount to the exercise of any power ex-

pressly or implicdly prohibited to the States by the Constitution

of the Union. For while such provisions would not call for the

direct and forcible intervention of the government of the Union,

it would be the duty of the courts, both State and national, to re-

fuse to enforce them, and to declare them altogether void, as
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much when enacted by the people in their primary capacity as

makers of the fundamental law, as when enacted in the form of

statutes through the delegated power of their legislatures.“

VI. Subject to the foregoing principles and limitations, each

State must judge for itself what provisions shall be inserted in its

constitution ; how the powers of government shall be apportioned

in order to their proper exercise ; what protection shall be thrown

around the person or property of the citizen; and to what ex-

tent private rights shall be required to yield to the general

‘ See upon this subject Jameson on the Constitutional Convention, §§ 415-418,

and 479-520. This work is so complete and satisfactory in its treatment of the

general subject, as to leave little to he said by one who shall afterwards attempt

to cover the same ground. The Supreme Court of Missouri have expressed the

opinion that it was competent for a convention to put a new constitution in force

without submitting it to the people. State v. Neal, 42 Mo. 119. But this was

obiler.

’ Const. of U. S. art. 4, § 4; Federalist, No. 43.

‘ Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wal. 277; Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skclly, 1

Black, 436; State v. Keith, 63 N. C. 140; Jackoway v. Denton, 25 Ark. 525.

[34]

vention is the representative of sovereignty only in a very qualified
sense, and for the specific purpose, and with the restricted authority
to put in proper form tbequestionsof amendment upon which
[* 33] the people are to pass; but the changes in the • fundamental
law of the State must be enacted by the people themselves. 1
V. The power of the people to amend or revise their constitutions is limited by the Constitution of the United States in the
following particulars: 1. It must not abolish the republican form of government, since
such act would be revolutionary in its character, and would call
for and demand direct intervention on tho part of the government
of the United States.2
2. It must not pro\\ide for titles of nobility, or assume to violate
the obligation of any contract, or attaint persons of crime, or provide ex post facto for the punishment of acts by the courts which
were innocent when committed, or contain any other provision
which would, in effect, amount to the exercise of any power expressly or impliedly prohibited to the States by the Constitution
of the Union. For while such provisions would not call for the
direct and forcible intervention of the government of the Union,
it would be the duty of the courts, both State and national, to refuse to enforce them, and to declare them altogether void, as
much when enacted by the people in their primary capacity as
makers of the fundamental law, as when enacted in tho form of
statutes through the delegated power of their lcgislatures.3
VI. Subject to tho foregoing principles and limitations, each
State must judge for itself what provisions shall be inserted in its
constitution ; how the powers of government shall be apportioned
in order to their proper exercise ; what protection shall be thrown
around the persori or property of the citizen ; and to what extent private rights shall be required to yield to the general
1 See upon this subject Jameson on the Constitutional Convention, §§ 415-!18,
and 479-.'>20. This work is so complete and sati~factory in its trt'atmcnt of the
general subject, as to leave little to be said by one who shall afterwards attempt
to cover the same ground. The Supreme Court of Missouri have expressed the
opinion that it was competent for a convention to put a new constitution in force
without submitting it to the people. St.ate "· Neal, 42 Mo. 119. But this wa(j
obiter.
'Const. of U.S. art. 4, § 4; Federalist, No. 43.
3 Cummings "· Missouri, 4 Wal. 277; Jefferson Braneh Bank v. Skdly, 1
Black, 436; State v. Keith, 68 N. C. 140; Jackoway v. Denton, 25 Ark. 525.
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of the Union, would be precluded from inquiring into the

justice of their action, or questioning its validity, because of any

supposed conﬂict with fundamental rules of right or of govern-

ment, unless they should be able to show collision at some point

between the instrument thus formed and that paramount law

which constitutes, in regard to the subjects it covers, the funda-

mental rule of action throughout the whole United States.”

How far the constitution of a State shall descend into the par-

ticulars of government is a question of policy addressed to the

' Matter of the Reciprocity Bank, 22 N. Y. 9; McMullen v. Hodge, 5 Texas,

34; Matter of Oliver Lee and Co.’s Bank, 21 N. Y. 9. In the ease last cited,

Dcnio, J., says: “ The [constitutional] convention was not obliged, like the legis-

lative bodies, to look carefully to the preservation of vested rights. It was com-

petent to deal, subject to ratiﬁcation by the people, and to the Constitution of

the Federal government, with all private and social rights, and with all the exist-

good. 1 • And the courts of the State, still more the courts [* 84]
of the Union, would be precluded ft·om inquiring into the
justice of their action, or questioning its validity, because of any
supposed conflict with fundamental rules of right or of government, unless they should be able to show collision at some point
between the instrument thus formed and that paramount law
which constitutes, in regard to the subjects it covers, the fundamental rule of action throughout the whole United States. 2
How far the constitution of a State shall descend into the particulars of government is a question of policy addressed to the

ing laws and institutions of the State. If the convention had so willed, and the

people had concurred, all former charters and grants might have been annihilated.

\Vhen, therefore, we are seeking for the true construction of a constitutional pro-

vision, we are constantly to bear in mind that its authors were not executing a

delegated authority, limited by other constitutional restraints, but are to look

upon them as the founders of a State, intent only upon establishing such princi-
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ples as seemed best calculated to produce good government and promote the pub-

lie happiness, at the expense of any and all existing institutions which might

stand in their way.”

' All the State constitutions now contain within themselves provisions for their

amendment. Some require the question of calling a convention to revise the

constitution to be submitted to the people at stated periods ; others leave it to the

legislature to call a convention or to submit to the people the question of calling

one ; while the major part allow the legislature to mature speciﬁc amendments to

be submitted to the people separately, and these become a part. of the constitution

ifadopted by the requisite vote.

‘Vixen the late rebellion had been put down by the military forces of the United

States, and the State governments which constituted a part of the disloyal sys-

tem had been displaced, serious questions were raised as to the proper steps to

be taken in order to restore the States to their harmonious relations to the Union.

These questions, and the ‘controversy over them, constituted an important part of

the history of our country during the administration of President Johnson; but

as it is the hope and trust of our people that the occasion for discussing such

questions will never arise again, we do not occupy space with them in this work.

It suffices for the present to say, that Congress claimed, insisted upon, and

enforced the right to prescribe the steps to be taken and the conditions to be

observed in order to restore these States to their former positions in the Union,

and the right also to determine when the prescribed conditions had been com-

plied with, so as to entitle them to representation in Congress.

. [35]

1 Matter of the Reciprocity Bank, 22 N.Y. 9; McMullen"· Hodge, 5 Texas,
84; l\latter of Oliver Lee and Co.'s Bank, 21 N.Y. 9. In the case last cited,
Denio, .J ., says: "The [constitutional] convention was not obliged, like the legislative bodies, to look carefully to the preservation of vested rights. It was competent to deal, subject to ratification by the people, and to the Constitution of
the Federal government., with all private and social right.B, and with all the existing laws and institutions of the State. If the convention bad so willed, and the
p<>oplc had concurred, all former charters and grants might have been annihilated.
\Vhen, therefore, we arc seeking for the true construction of a constitutional provision, we are constantly to bear in mind that its authors were not executing a
deleg11ted authority, limited by other constitutional restraints, but are to look
upon them as the founders of a State, intent only upon establishing such principles as seemed best calculated to produce good government and promote the public happiness, at the expense of any and all existing institutions whil!h might
stand in their way."
1 All the State constitutions now contain within themselves provisions for their
amendment. Some require the question of calling a convention to revise the
constitution t{) be submitted to the people at stated periods ; others leave it to the
le~i~lature to call a convention or to submit to the people the question of calling
one; while the major part allow the legislature to mature specific amendments to
be submitted to the people separately, and these become a part of the constitution
if adopted by the requisite vote.
When the late rebellion had been put down by the military forces of the United
States, and the State governments which constituted a part of the di"loyal system had been displaced, serious questions were raised as to the proper steps to
be taken in order to restore the States to theit· harmonious relations to the Union.
These questions, and the controver~y over them, constituted an important part of
the history of our country during the administration of President Johnson; but
u it is the hope aml trust of our people that the occasion for discussing such
questions will never arise again, we do not occupy space with them in this work.
It suffices for the present to say, that Congress claimed, insisted upon, and
enforced the right to prescribe the steps to be taken and the conditions to be
observed in order to restore these States to their former positions in the Union,
and the right also to determine when the prescribed conditions had been complied with, 110 as to entitle them to representation in Congress.

[ 35]
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convention which forms it. Certain things are to be looked for

• 34
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in all these instruments; though even as to these there is great

variety, not only of substance, but also in the minuteness of their

provisions to meet particular cases.

I. We are to expect a general framework of government to be

designed, under which the sovereignty of the people is to be exer-

cised by representatives chosen for the purpose, in such manner

as the instrument provides, and with such reservations as it

makes.

II. Generally the qualiﬁcations for the right of suffrage will

be declared, as well as the conditions under which it shall be

exercised.

III. Separate departments will be created for the exercise of

legislative, executive, and judicial power, and care taken to keep

the three as separate and distinct as possible, except so far as

each is made a check upon the other to keep it within proper

bounds, or to prevent hasty and improvident action. The

[* 35] executive *‘is a check upon the legislature in the veto

power, which most States allow ; the legislature is a check

upon both the other departments through its power to prescribe

rules for the exercise of their authority, and through its power

to impeach their officers; and the judiciary is a check upon the

laws.
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legislature by means of its authority to annul unconstitutional

IV. Local self-government having always been a part of the

English and American systems, we shall look for its recognition in

any such instrument. And even if not expressly recognized, it is

still to be understood that all these instruments are framed with

its present existence and anticipated continuance in view.

V. We shall also expect a declaration of rights for the protec-

tion of individuals and minorities. This declaration usually con-

tains the following classes of provisions : --

1. Those declaratory of the general principles of republican

government; such as, that all freemen, when they form a social

compact, are equal, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to ex-

clusive, separate public emoluments or privileges from the com-

munity, but in consideration of public services ; that absolute,

arbitrary power over the lives, liberty, and property of freemen

exists nowhere in a republic, not even in the largest majority;

that all power is inherent in the people, and all free governments

[ 36]

convention which forms it. Certain things are to be looked for
in all these instruments ; though even as to these there is great
variety, not only of substance, but also in the minuteness of their
provisions to meet particular cases.
I. We are to expect a general framework of government to be
designed, under which the sovereignty of the people is to be exercised by representatives chosen for the purpose, in such manner
as the instrument provides, and with such reservations as it
makes.
II. Generally the qualifications for the right of suffrage will
be declared, as well as the conditions under which it shall be
exercised.
III. Separate departments will be created for the exercise of
legislative, executive, and judicial power, and care taken to keep
the three as separate and distinct as possible, except so far as
each is made a check upon the other to keep it within proper
bounds, or to prevent hasty and improvident action. The
[• 35] executive • is a check upon the legislature in the veto
power, which most States allow; the legislature is a check
upon both the other departments through its power to prescribe
rules for the exercise of their authority, and through its power
to impeach their officers ; and the judiciary is a check upon the
legislature by means of its authority to annul unconstitutional
laws.
IV. Local self-government having always been a part of the
English and American systems, we shall look for its recognition in
any such instrument. .And even if not expressly recognized, it is
still to be understood that all these instruments are framed with
its present existence and anticipated continuance in view.
V. We shall also expect a declaration of rights for the protection of individuals and minorities. This declaration usually contains the following classes of provisions : 1. Those declaratory of the general principles of republican
government; such as, that all freemen, when they form a social
compact, are equal, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive, separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services; that absolute,
arbitrary power over the lives, liberty, and property of freemen
exists nowhere in a republic, not even in the largest majority;
that all power is inherent in the people, and all free governments
[ 36]
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are founded on their authority, and instituted for their peace,
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safety, happiness, security, and the protection of property; that

for the advancement of these ends they have at all times an in-

alienable and indefeasible right to alter, reform, or abolish their

government in such manner as they may think proper; that all

elections shall be free and equal; that no power of suspending

the laws shall be exercised except by the legislature or its author-

ity; that standing armies are not to be maintained in time of

peace; that representation shall be in proportion to population;

that the people shall have the right freely to assemble to consult

of the common good, to instruct their representatives, and petition

for redress of grievances ; and the like.

2. Those declaratory of the fundamental rights of the citizen:

as that all men are by nature free and independent, and have cer-

tain inalicnable rights, among which are those of enjoying and

defending life and liberty, acquiring. possessing, and protecting

property, and pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness; that

the right to property is before and higher than any consti-

tutional " sanction; that the free exercise and enjoyment of [* 36]

religions profession and worship, without discrimination

or preference, shall for ever be allowed ; that every man may freely

speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being re-
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sponsible for the abuse of that right; that every man may bear

arms for the defence of himself and of the State; that the right

of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and

etfects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be

violated, nor shall soldiers be quartered upon citizens in time of

peace ; and the like.

3. Those declaratory of the principles which insure to the citi-

zen an impartial trial, and protect him in his life, liberty, and

property against the arbitrary action of those in authority: as that

no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed; that the

right to trial by jury shall be preserved ; that excessive bail shall

not be required, nor excessive punishments inﬂicted; that no per-

son shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the same

offence, nor be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness

against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property with-

out due process of law; that private property shall not be taken for

public use without compensation ; and the like.

Other clauses are sometimes added declaratory of the principles

[311

are founded on their authority, and instituted for their peace,
safety, happiness, security, and the protection of property; that
for the advancement of these ends they have at all times an inalienable and indefeasible right to alter, reform, or abolish their
government in such manner as they may think proper ; that all
elections shall be free and equal; that no power of suspending
the laws shall be exercised except by the legislature or its authority ; that standing armies are not to be maintained in time of
peace; that representation shall be in proportion to population ;
that tho people shall have the right freely to assemble to consult
of the common good, to instruct their representatives, and petition
for redress of grievances ; and the like.
2. Those declaratory of the fundamental rights of the citizen:
as that all men are by naturo free and independent, and have certain inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and
defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting
property, and pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness ; that
the right to property is before and higher than any constitutional • sanction ; that the free exercise and enjoyment of [• 36]
religious profession and worship, without discrimination
or preference, shall for ever be allowed ; that every man may freely
speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right ; that every man may bear
arms for the defence of himself and of the State ; that the right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated, nor shall soldiers be quartered upon citizens in time of
peace ; and the like.
3. Those declaratory of the principles which insure to the citizen an impartial trial, and protect him in his life, liberty, and
property against the arbitrary action of those in authority: as that
no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed; that the
right to trial by jury shall be preserved ; that excessive bail shall
not be required, nor excessive punishments inflicted; that no person shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offence, nor be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; that private pwperty shall not be taken for
public use without compensation ; and the like.
Other clauses are sometimes added declaratory of the principles

[ 37]
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of morality and virtue; and it is also sometimes expressly de-
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clared—what indeed is implied without the declaration-— that

every thing in the declaration of rights contained is excepted out of

the general powers of government, and all laws contrary thereto

shall be void.

Many other things are commonly found in these charters of

government ;1 but since, while they continue in force, they are to

remain absolute and unchangeable rules of action and decision, it

is obvious that they should not be made to embrace within their

iron grasp those subjects in regard to which the policy or interest

of the State or of its people may vary from time to time, and

which are therefore more properly left to the control of the legis-

lature, which can more easily and speedily make the required

changes.

In considering State constitutions we must not commit the mis-

take of supposing that, because individual rights are guarded and

protected by them, they must also be considered as owing their

origin to them. These instruments measure the powers of the

rulers, but they do not measure the rights of the gov-

[*‘ 37] erned. *‘“ What is a constitution, and what are its ob-

jects? It is easier to tell what it is not than what it is.

It is not the beginning of a community, nor the origin of private
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rights; it is not the fountain of law, nor the incipient state of gov-

ernment; it is not the cause, but consequence, of personal and

political freedom; it grants no rights to the people, but is the crea-

ture of their power, the instrument of their convenience. Designed

for their protection in the enjoyment of the rights and powers

which they possessed before the constitution was made, it is but

the framework of the political government, and necessarily based

upon the pre-existing condition of laws, rights, habits, and modes

of thought. There is nothing primitive in it: it is all derived

from a known source. It presupposes an organized society, law,

' “ This, then, is the oﬂice of a written constitution: to delegate to various

public functionaries such of the powers of government as the people do not

intend to exercise for themselves; to classify these powers, according to their

nature, and to commit them to separate agents; to provide for the choice of these

agents by the people; to ascertain, limit, and deﬁne the extent of the authority

thus delegated; and to reserve to the people their sovereignty over all things not

expressly committed to their representatives." E. P. Hurlbut in Human Rights

and their Political Guaranties. \

[38]

of morality and virtue ; and it is also sometimes expressly declared- what indeed is implied without the declaration- that
every thing in the declaration of rights contained is excepted out of
the general powers of government, and all laws contrary thereto
shall be void.
Many other things are commonly found in these charters of
government; 1 but since, while they continue in force, they are to
remain absolute and unchangeable rules of action and decision, it
is obvious that tl1ey should not be made to embrace within their
iron grasp those subjects in regard to which the policy or interest
of the State or of its people may vary from time to time, and
which are therefore more properly left to the control of the legislature, which can more easily and speedily make the required
changes.
In considering State constitutions we must not commit the mistake of supposing that, because individual rights are guarded and
protected by them, they must also be considered as owing their
origin to them. These instruments measure the powers of the
rulers, but they do not measure the rights of the gov[* 37] erned. •" What is a constitution, and what are its objects? It is easier to tell what it is not than what it is.
It is not the beginning of a community, nor the origin of private .
rights; it is not the fountain of law, nor the incipient state of government; it is not the cause, but consequence, of personal and
political freedom; it grants no rights to the people, but is the creature of their power, the instrument of their convenience. Designed
for theit· protection in the enjoyment of the rights and powers
which they possessed before the constitution was made, it is but
the framework of the political government, and necessarily based
upon the prc.existing condition of laws, rights, habits, and modes
of thought. There is nothing primitive in it: it is all derived
from a known source. It presupposes an organized society, law,
1 "This, then, is the office of a written constitution: to rlelegate to various
public functionaries such of the powers of government as the people do not
intend to exercise for themselves; to classifY these powers, according to their
nature, and to commit them to separate agents; to provide for the choice of these
agents by the people; to ascertain, limit, and define the extent of the authority
thus delegated; and to reserve to the people their sovereignty over all things not
expressly committed to their representatives." E. P. Hurlbut in Human Rights
and their Political Guaranties.

[ 38]
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order, property, personal freedom, a. love of political liberty, and

enough of cultivated intelligence to know how to guard it against

the encroachments of tyranny. A written constitution is in every

instance a limitation upon the powers of government in the hands

of agents; for there never was a written republican constitution

which delegated to functionaries all the latent powers which lie

dormant in every nation, and are boundless in extent, and incapa-

ble of deﬁnition.” 1

' Hamilton v. St. Louis County Court, 15 Mo. 13, per Bates, arguendo. And

see Matter of Oliver Lee & Co.’s Bank, 21 N. Y. 9. “ Written constitutions

sanctify and conﬁrm great principles, but the latter are prior in existence to the

former.” 2 Webster’s \Vorks, 392. See, also, 1 Bl. Com. 124.

order, property, personal freedom, a love of political liberty, and
enough of cultivated intelligence to know how to guard it against
the encroachments of tyranny. A written constitution is in every
instance a limitation upon the powers of government in the hands
of agents; for there never was a written republican constitution
which delegated to functionaries all the latent powers which lie
dormant in every nation, and are boundless in extent, and incapable of definition." I

[39]

Hamilton "· St. Louis County Court, 15 Mo. 13, per Bates, arguendo. And
see Matter of Oliver Lee & Co.'s Bank, 21 N. Y. 9. "Written constitutions
sanctify and confirm great principles, but the latter are prior in existence to the
former." 2 Webster's Works, 392. See, also, 1 Bl. Com. 124.
1
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or ms consrnucrron or sure CONSTITUTIONS.

THE deﬁciencies of human language are such that if written

instruments were always carefully drawn, and by persons skilled

in the use of words, we should not be surprised to ﬁnd their mean-

ing often drawn in question, or at least to meet with difficulties in

their practical application. But these diﬂiculties are greatly

increased when draughtsmen are careless or incompetent; and they

multiply rapidly when the instruments are to be applied, not only

[• 38]

•CHAPTER IV.

to the subjects directly within the contemplation of those who

framed them, but also to a great variety of new circumstances

which could not have been anticipated, but which must neverthe-

OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS.

less be governed by the general rules which the instruments estab-

lish. Moreover, the different points of view from which diﬂerent

interests regard these instruments, incline them to different views

of the instruments themselves. All these circumstances tend to

render the subjects of interpretation and construction prominent in

the practical administration of the law, and often suggest questions

of no little diﬂieulty.

Interpretation differs from construction in that the former “ is the

act of ﬁnding out the true sense of any form of words; that is, the
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sense which their author intended to convey; and of enabling oth-

ers to derive from them the same idea which the author intended

to convey. Construction, on the other hand, is the drawing of con-

clusions respecting subjects that lie beyond the direct expressions

of the text, from elements known from and given in the text ; con-

clusions which are in the spirit, though not in the letter of the

text. Interpretation only takes place if the text conveys some

meaning or other. But construction is resorted to when, in com-

paring two diﬂerent writings of the same individual, or two differ-

ent enactments by the same legislative body, there is found

contradiction where there was evidently no intention of such con-

tradiction one of another, or where it happens that part of a writ-

[401

THE deficiencies of human language are such that if written
instruments were always carefully drawn, and by persons skilled
in the use of words, we should not be surprised to find their meaning often drawn in question, or at least to meet with difficulties in
their practical application. But these difficulties are greatly
increased when draughtsmen are careless or incompetent; and they
multiply rapidly when the instruments are to be applied, not only
to the subjects directly within the contemplation of those who
framed them, but also to a great variety of new circumstances
which could not have been anticipated, but which must nevertheless be governed by the general rules which the instruments establish. Moreover, the different points of view from which different
interests regard these instruments, incline them to different views
of the instruments themselves. All these circumstances tend to
render the subjects of interpretation and construction prominent in
the practical administration of the law, and often suggest questions
of no little difficulty.
Interpretation differs from construction in that the former " is the
act of finding out the true sense of any form of words ; that is, the
sense which their author intended to convey; and of enabling others to derive from them the same idea which the author intended
to convey. Construction, on the other hand, is the drawing of conclusions respecting subjects that lie beyond the direct expr·essions
of the text, from elements known from and given in the text; conclusions which are in the spirit, though not in the letter of the
text. Interpretation only takes place if the text conveys some
meaning or other. But construction is resorted to when, in comparing two different writings of the same individual, or two different enactments by the same legislative body, there is found
contradiction where there was evidently no intention of such contradiction one of another, or where it happens that part of a writ[ 40]
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ing or declaration contradicts the rest. When this is the case,

CH. IV.]

CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS.

and the nature of the document or declaration, or whatever else it

may be, is such as not to allow us to consider the whole as being

invalidated by a partial or other contradiction, then resort must be

had to construction; so, too, if found to act in cases which have

not been foreseen by the framers of those rules, by which we are

nevertheless obliged, for some binding reason, faithfully to regulate

as well as we can our action respecting the unforeseen case.” 1 In

common use, however, the word construction is generally employed

in tl1e law in a sense embracing all that is properly covered by

both when used in a sense strictly and technically correct; and

we shall so employ it in the present chapter.

From the earliest periods in the history of * written law, [* 39]

rules of construction, sometimes based upon sound rea-

son, and seeking the real intent of the instrument, and at other

times altogether arbitrary or fanciful, have been laid down by

those who have assumed to instruct in the law, or who have been

called upon to administer it, by the aid of which the meaning of

the instrument was to be resolved. Some of these rules have been

applied to particular classes of instruments only; others are more

general in their application, and so far as they are sound, may be

made use of in any case where the meaning of a writing is in dis-
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pute. To such of these as seem important in constitutional law

we shall refer, and illustrate them by references to reported cases,

where they have been applied.

A few preliminary words may not be out of place, upon the

questions, who are to apply these rules; what person, body, or

department is to enforce the construction; and how far a deter-

mination, when once made, is to be binding upon other persons,

bodies, or departments.

We have already seen that we are to expect in every constitu-

tion an apportionment of the powers of government. We shall

also ﬁnd certain duties imposed upon the several departments, as

well as upon speciﬁed oﬂicers in each, and we shall likewise dis-

‘ Lieber, Legal and Political Hermeneutics. See Smith on Stat. and Const.

Construction, 600. Bouvier deﬁnes the two terms succinctly as follows: “ Inter-

pretation, the discovery and representation of the true meaning of any signs used

to convey ideas.” “ Construction, in practice, determining the meaning and

application as to the case in question of the provisions of a constitution, statute,

will, or other instrument, or of an oral agreement." Law Die.

[ 41 ]

ing or declaration contradicts the rest. When this is the case,
and the nature of the document or declaration, or whatever else it
may be, is such as not to allow us to consider the whole as being
invalidated by a partial or other contradiction, then resort must be
had to construction ; so, too, if found to act in cases which have
not been foreseen by the framers of those rules, by which we are
nevertheless obliged, for some binding reason, faithfully to ;regulate
as well as we can our action respecting the unforeseen case." 1 In
common use, however, the word construction is generally employed
in the law in a sense embracing all that is properly covered by
both when used in a sense strictly and technically correct; and
we shall so employ it in the present chapter.
From the earliest periods in the history of • written law, [* 39]
rules of constructioa, sometimes based upon sound reason, and seeking the real intent of the instrument, and at other
times altogether arbitrary or fanciful, have been laid down by
those who have assumed to instruct in the law, or who have been
called upon to administer it, uy the aid of which the meaning of
the instrument was to be resolved. Some of these rules have been
applied tQ particular classes of instruments only ; others arc more
general in their application, and so far as they are sound, may be
made use of in any case where the meaning of a writing is in dispute. To such of these as seem important in constitutional law
we shall refer, and illustrate them by references to reported cases,
where they have been applied.
A few preliminary words may not be out of place, upon the
questions, who are to apply these rules ; what person, body, or
department is to enforce the construction; and how far a determination, when once made, is to be binding upon other persons,
bodies, or departments.
We have already seen that we are to expect in every constitution an apportionment of the powers of government. We shall
also find certain duties imposed upon the several departments, as
well as upon specified officers in each, and we shall likewise dis1 Lieber, L<>gal and Political Hermeneutics.
See Smith on Stat. and Const.
Con!ltruc::tion, 600. Bouvier defines the two terms succinctly as follows: "Interpretation, the disco,·ery and representation of the truo meaning of any signs used
to convey ideas." "Construction, in practice, determining the meaning and
application as to the case in question of the provisions of a constitution, statute,
will, or other instrument, or of an oral agreement." Law Die.

[ 41]
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cover that the constitution has sought to hedge about their action
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in various ways, with a view to the protection of individual rights,

and the proper separation of duties. And wherever any one is

called upon to perform any constitutional duty, or to do any act

in respect to which it can be supposed that the constitution has

spoken, it is obvious that a question of construction may at once

arise, upon which some one must decide before the duty is per-

formed or the act done. From the very nature of the case, this

decision must commonly be made by the person, body, or depart-

ment upon whom the duty is devolved, or from whom the act

is required.

Let us suppose that the constitution requires of the

[* 40] legislature, ‘that, in establishing municipal corporations, it

shall restrict their powers of taxation; and a city charter

is proposed which conﬁnes the right of taxation to the raising of

money for certain speciﬁed purposes, but in regard to those.pur-

poses leaves it unlimited; or which allows to the municipality

unlimited choice of purposes, but restricts the rate; or which

permits persons to be taxed indeﬁnitely, but limits the taxation of

property: in either of these cases the question at once arises,

whether the limitation in the charter is such a restriction as the

constitution intends. Let us suppose, again, that a board of su-
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pervisors is, by the constitution, authorized to borrow money upon

the credit of the county for any county purpose, and they are

asked to issue bonds in order to purchase stock in some railway

company which proposes to construct a road across the county;

the proposition is met with the query, Is this a county purpose,

and can the issue of bonds be regarded as a borrowing of money,

within the meaning of the people as expressed in the constitu-

tion? And once again; let us suppose that the governor is

empowered to convene the legislature on extraordinary occasions,

and he is requested to do so in order to provide for a class of

private claims whose holders are urgent; can this with any pro-

priety be deemed an extraordinary occasion ?

In these and the like cases our constitutions have provided no

tribunal for the speciﬁc duty of solving in advance the questions

which arise. In a few of the States, indeed, the legislative de-

partment has been empowered by the constitution to ‘call upon

the courts for their opinion upon the constitutional validity of a

proposed law, in order that, if it be adjudged without warrant,

[42]

cover that the constitution has sought to hedge about their action
in various ways, with a view to tho protection of individual rights,
and the proper separation of duties. And wherever any one is
called upon to perform any constitutional duty, or to do any act
in respect to which it can be supposed that the constitution has
spoken, it is obvious that n. question of construction may at once
arise, upon which some one must decide before the duty is per·
formed or the act done. From the very nature of the case, this
decision must commonly be made by the person, body, or department upon whom the duty is devolved, or from whom the act
is required.
Let us suppose that the constitution requires of the
[* 40] legislature, *that, in establishing municipal c01·porations, it
shall l'estrict their powers of taxation ; and a city cluu-ter
is proposed which confines the right of taxation to the raising of
money for certain specified purposes, but in regard to those . purposes leaves it unlimited; or which allows to the municipality
unlimited choice of purposes, but restricts the rate; or which
permits persons to be taxed indefinitely, but limits the taxation of
property : in either of these cases the question at once arises,
whether the limitation in the charter is such a restriction as the
constitution intends. Let us suppose, again, that a board of supervisors is, by the constitution, authorized to borrow money upon
the credit of the county for any county purpose, and they are
asked to issue bonds in order to purchase stock in some rail way
company which proposes to construct a road across tho county;
the proposition is met with the query, Is this a county purpose,
and can the issue of bonds bo regarded as a borrowing of money,
within the meaning of the people as expressed in the constitution ? And once again ; let us suppose that the goveruor is
empowered to convene the legislature on extraordinary occasions,
and he is requested to do so itt order to provide for a class of
private claims whose holders are urgent; can this with any propriety be deemed an extraordinary occasion ?
In these and the like cases our constitutions have provided no
tribunal for the specific duty of solving in advance the questions
which arise. In a few of th~ States, indeed, the legislative department has been empowered by the constitution to· call upon
the courts for their opinion upon tho constitutional validity of a
proposed law, in order that, if it be adjudged without warrant,
[ 42]
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the legislature may abstain from enacting it.1 But those pro-

CH. IV.]
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visions arc not often to be met with, and judicial decisions, espe-

cially upon delicate and difficult questions of constitutional law,

can seldom be entirely satisfactory when made, as they com-

monly will be under such calls, without the beneﬁt of argument

at the bar, and of that light upon the points involved

which might "‘ be afforded by counsel learned in the law, [* 41]

and interested in giving them a thorough investigation.

It follows, therefore, that every department of the government

and every oﬂicial of every department may at any time, when a

duty is to be performed, be required to pass upon a question of

constitutional construction.” Sometimes the case will be such

that the decision when made must, from the nature of things, be

conclusive and subject to no appeal or review, however erroneous

it may be in the opinion of other departments or other oﬁicers;

but in other cases the same question may be required to be passed

upon again before the duty is completely performed. The ﬁrst of

these classes is where, by the constitution, a particular question is

plainly addressed to the discretion or judgment of some one

department or oﬁicer, so that the interference of any other de-

partment or officer, with a view to the substitution of its own

discretion or judgment in the place of that to which the consti-
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tution has conﬁded the decision, would be impertinent and intru-

sive. Under every constitution eases of this description are to

be met with; and though it will sometimes be found difficult to

classify them, there can be no doubt, when the case is properly

determined to be one of this character, that the rule must pre-

vail which makes the decision ﬁnal.

' ‘ By the constitutions of Maine, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts, the

judges of the Supreme Court are required, when called upon by the govcmor,

council, or either house of the legislature, to give their opinions “upon impor-

tant questions of law, and upon solemn occasions." In Missouri, they are to

give their opinions “ upon important questions of constitutional law, and upon

solemn occasions.”

' “ It is argued that the legislature cannot give a construction to the constitu-

tion rclative to private rights secured by it. It is true that the legislature, in

consequence of their construction of the constitution, cannot make laws repug-

nant to it. But every department of government, invested with certain consti-

tutional powers, must, in the ﬁrst instance, but not exclusively, be the judge of

its powers, or it could not act.” Parsons, Ch. J., in Kendall v. Inhabitants of

Kingston, 5 Mass. 533.

the legislature may abstain from enacting it.1 But those provisions aro not often to be met with, and judicial decisions, especially upon delicate and difficult questions of constitutional law,
can seldom be entirely satisfactory when made, as they commonly will be under such calls, without the benefit of argument
at the bar, and of that ligh,t upon the points involved
which might • be afforded by counsel learned in the law, [• 41]
and interested in giving them a thorough investigation.
It follows, therefore, that every department of the government
and every official of every department may at any time, when a
duty is to be performed, be required to pass upon a question of
constitutional construction.2 Sometimes the case will be such
that the decision when made must, from the nature of things, be
conclusive and sul~ect to no appeal or review, however erroneous
it may be in the opinion of other departments or other officers;
but in other cases the same question may be required to be passed
upon again before the duty is completely performed. The first of
these classes is where, by the constitution, a particular question is
plainly addressed to the discretion or judgment of some one
department or officer, so that the interference of any other department or officer, with a view to the substitution of its own
discretion or judgment in the place of that to which the constitution has confided the decision, would be impertinent and intrusive. Under every constitution cases of this description are to
be met with ; and though it will sometimes be found difficult to
classify them, there can be no doubt, when the case is properly
determined to be one of this character, that the rule must prevail which makes the decision final.

[43 1

• 1 By the constitutions of Maine, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts, the
judges of the Supreme Court are required, whtm called upon by the goycmor,
council, or either house of the legislature, to give their opinions "upon important questions of law, and upon solemn occasions." In Missouri, they are to
give their opinions "upon important questions of constitutional law, and upon
solemn occasions."
1 " It is argued that the legislature cannot give a construction to the constitution relative to private rights secured by it. It is true that the legislature, in
consequence of their construction of the constitution, cannot make laws repugnant to it. But every department of government, invested with certain constitutional powers, must, in the first instance, but not exclusively, be the judge of
its powers, or it coul<l not act." Parsons, Ch. J., in Kendall v. Inhabitants of
Kingston, 5 Mass. 633.

[ 43]
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We will suppose, again, that the constitution empowers the

• 41

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

(CH. IV •

executive to convene the legislature on extraordinary occasions,

and does not in terms authorize the intervention of any one else

in determining what is and what is not such an occasion in the

constitutional sense; it is obvious that the question is addressed

exclusively to the executive judgment, and neither the legislature

nor the judicial department can intervene to compel action if he

decide against it, or to enjoin action if, in his opinion, the proper

occasion has arisen.‘ And again, if, by the constitution,

[* 42] ’* laws are to take etfect at a speciﬁed time after their pas-

sage, unless the legislature, for urgent reasons, shall

otherwise order, we must perceive at once that the legislature

alone is competent to pass upon the urgency of the alleged rea-

sons.” And to take a judicial instance: If a court is required to

give an accused person a trial at the ﬁrst term after indictment,

unless good cause be shown for continuance, it is obvious that the

question of good cause is one for the court alone to pass upon,

and that its judgment when exercised is, and must be from the

' In exercising his power to call out the militia in certain exigencies, the Presi-

dent is the exclusive and ﬁnal judge when the exigency has arisen. Martin v.

Mott, 12 Wheat. 29.

’ In Gillinwater v. Mississippi & Atlantic Railroad Co. 13 Ill. 1, it was urged
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that a certain restriction imposed upon railroad corporations by the general rail-

road law was a violation of the provision of the constitution which enjoins it upon

the legislature “to encourage internal improvements by passing liberal general

laws of incorporation for that purpose.” The court say of this provision: “ This

is a constitutional command to the legislature, as obligatory on it as any other of

We will suppose, again, that the constitution empowers the
executive to convene the legislature on extraordinary occasions,
and does not in terms authorize the intervention of any one else
in determining what is and what is not such an occasion in the
constitutional sense; it is obvious that the question is addressed
exclusively to the executive jndgment, and neither the legislature
nor the judicial department can intervene to compel action if he
decide against it, or to enjoin action if, in his opinion, the proper
occasion has arisen. 1 And again, if, by the constitution,
(* 42] *laws are to take effect at a specified time after their passage, unless the legislature, for urgent reasons, shall
otherwise order, we must perceive at once that the legislature
alone is competent to pass upon the urgency of tho alleged reasons.2 And to take a judicial instance: If a court is required to
give an accused person a trial at the first term after indictment,
unless good cause be shown for continuance, it is obvious that the
question of good cause is one for the court alone to pass upon,
and that its judgment when exercised is, and must be from the

the provisions of that instrument; but it is one which cannot be enforced by the

courts ofjustice. It addresses itself to the legislature alone, and it is not for us

to say whether it has obeyed the behcstin its true spirit. Whether the provisions

of this law are liberal, and tend to encourage internal improvements, is matter of

opinion, about which men may diﬁ'er; and as we have no authority to revise legis-

lative action on the subject, it would not become us to express our views in rela-

tion to it. The law makes no provision for the construction of canals and turn-

pike roads, and yet they are as much internal improvements as railroads, and we

might as well be asked to extend what we might consider the liberal provisions of

this law to them, because they are embraced in the constitutional provision, asto

ask us to disregard such provisions of it as we might regard as illiberal. The ar-

gument proceeds upon the idea that we should consider that as done which ought

to be done; but that principle has no application here. Like laws upon other

subjects within legislative jurisdiction, it is for the courts to say what the law is,

not what it should be.“ It is clear that courts cannot interfere with matters of

legislative discretion. Maloy v. Marietta, 11 Ohio, N. s. 639.

[441

1 In exercising his power to call out the militia in certain exigencies, the President is the exclusive and final judge when the exigency bas arisen. Martin v.
Mott, 12 Wheat.. 29.
1 In Gillinwater v. :Mississippi & Atlantic Railroad Co. 13 Ill. 1, it was urged
that a certain restriction imposed upon railroad corporations by the general railroad law was a violation of the provision of the constitution which enjoins it upon
the legislature " to encourage internal improvements by passing liberal general
laws of incorporation for that purpose." The court say of this provision: " This
is a constitutional command to the legislature, as obligatory on it as any other of
the provisions of that instrument; but it is one which cannot be enforced by the
courts of justice. It addresses itself to the legislature alone, and it is not for us
to say whether it has obeyed the behest in its true spirit. Whether the provisions
of this law are liberal, and tend to encourage internal improvements, is matter of
opinion, about which men may differ; and as we have no authority to r<>vise legislative action on the subject, it would not become us to express our views in relation to it. The law makes no provision for the construction of canals and turnpike roads, and yet they are as much internal improvements as railroads, and we
might as wdl be asked to extend what we might consider the liberal provisions of
this law to them, because they are embraced in the constitutional provision, as to
ask us to disregard such provisions of it as we might regard as illiberal. Tbe ar·
gument proceed~ upon the idea that we should consider that as done which ought
to be done ; but that prindple has no application here. Like laws upon other
subjt cts within legislative jurisdiction, it is for the courts to say what the law is,
not what it should be." It is clear that courts cannot interf~re with matters of
legislative discretion. Maloy v. Marietta, 11 Ohio, N. s. 639.

[ 44]
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nature of the case, ﬁnal. And when in any of these and similar
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cases the decision is once made, other departments or other

oﬂicers, whatever may have been their own opinions, must assume

the decision to be correct, and ‘are not at liberty to raise any

question concerning it, unless some duty is devolved upon them

which presents the same question anew.

But there are cases where the question of construction is

equally addressed to two or more departments of the govern-

ment, and it then becomes important to know whether the de-

cision by one is binding upon the others, or whether each is to

act upon its own judgment. Let us suppose once more that the

governor, being empowered by the constitution to convene

the ‘legislature upon extraordinary occasions, has re- [’* 43]

garded a particular event as being such an occasion, and

has issued his proclamation calling them together with a view to

the enactment of some particular legislation which the event

seems to call for, and which he speciﬁes in his proclamation.

Now the legislature are to enact laws upon their own view of ne-

cessity and expediency; and they will refuse to pass the desired

statute if they regard it as unwise or unimportant. But in so

doing they indirectly review the governor’s decision, as in refus-

ing to pass the law they also decide that the speciﬁc event was
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not one calling for action on their part. In such a case it is clear

that, while the decision of the governor is ﬁnal so far as to require

the legislature to meet, it is not ﬁnal in any sense that would bind

the legislative department to accept and act upon it when they are

called to enter upon the performance of their duty in the making

of laws.

So also there are cases where, after the two houses of the legis-

lature have passed upon the question, their decision is in a certain

sense subject to review by the governor. If a bill is introduced

the constitutionality of which is disputed, the passage of the bill

by the two houses must be regarded as the expression of their

judgment that, if approved, it will be a valid law. But if the

constitution confers upon the governor a veto power, the same

question of constitutional authority will be brought by the bill be-

fore him, since it is manifestly his duty to withhold approval from

any bill which, in his opinion, the legislature ought not for any

reason to pass. And what reason so valid as that the constitution

confers upon them no authority to that end‘? In all these and the

s [451

nature of the case, final. And when in any of these and similar
cases the decision is once made, other departments or other
officers, whatever may have been their own opinions, must assume
the decision to be correct, and ·are not at liberty to raise any
question concerning it, unless some duty is devolved upon them
which presents the same question anew.
But there are cases where the question of construction is
equally addressed to two or more departments of the government, and it then becomes important to know whether the decision by one is binding upon the others, or whether each is to
act upon its own judgment. Let us suppose once more that the
governor, being empowered by the constitution to convene
the * legislature upon extraordinary occasions, bas re- [* 43]
garded a particular event as being such an occasion, and
has issued his proclamation calling them together with a view to
the enactment of some particular legislation which the event
Ht!ems to call for, and which he specifies in hi~ proclamation.
Now the legislature are to enact laws upon their own view of necessity and expediency ; and they will refuse to pass the desired
statute if they regard it as unwise or unimportant. But in so
doing they indirectly review the governor's decision, as in refusing to pass the law they also decide that the specific event was
not one calling for action on their part. In such a case it is clear
that, while the decision of the governor is final so far as to require
the legislature to meet, it is not final in any sense that would bind
the legislative department to accept and act upon it when they are
called to enter upon the performance of their duty in the making
of laws.
So also there are cases where, after the two houses of the legislature have passed upon the question, their decision is in a certain
sense subject to review by the governor. If a bill is introduced
the constitutionality of which is disputed, the passage of the bill
by the two houses must be regarded as the expression of their
judgment that, if approved, it will be a valid law. But if the
constitution confers upon the governor a veto power, the same
question of constitutional authority wiU be brought by the bill before biro, since it is manifestly bis duty to withhold approval from
any bill which, in his opinion, the legislature ought not for any
reason to pass. .And what reason so valid as that the constitution
confers upon them no authority to that end? In all these and the
[ 45]
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like cases, each department must act upon its own judgment, and

(CR. IV.

cannot be required to do that which it regards as a violation of the

constitution, on the ground solely that another department which,

in the course of the discharge of its own duty, was called upon

ﬁrst to act, has reached the conclusion that it will not be violated

by the proposed action.

But setting aside now those cases to which we have referred,

where from the nature of things, and perhaps from explicit terms

of the constitution, the judgment of the department or officer

acting must be ﬁnal, we shall ﬁnd the general rule to be, that

whenever an act is done which may become the subject of a proceed-

ing in court, any question of constitutional authority that

[" 44] might have been raised when the act was done will be "‘ open

for consideration in such proceeding, and that as the courts

must ﬁnally settle the controversy, so also will they ﬁnally deter-

mine the question of constitutional law.

For the constitution of the State is higher in authority than any

law, direction, or decree made by any body or any oﬂicer assuming

to act under it, since such body or oﬂicer must exercise a dele-

gated authority, and one that must necessarily be subservient to

the instrument by which the delegation is made. In any case of

conﬂict the fundamental law must govern, and the act in conﬂict
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with it must be treated as of no legal validity. But no mode has

yet been devised by which these questions of conﬂict are to be dis-

cussed and settled as abstract questions, and their determination

is necessary or practicable only when public or private rights

would be affected thereby. They then become the subject of legal

controversy, and legal controversies must be settled by the courts.

The courts have thus devolved upon them the duty to pass upon

the constitutional validity, sometimes of legislative, and some-

times of executive acts. And as judicial tribunals have authority,

not only to judge, but alsoto enforce their judgments, the result

of a decision against the constitutionality of a legislative or

executive act will be to render it invalid through the enforce-

ment of the paramount law in the controversy which has raised

the question} .

' “ VVhen laws conﬂict in actual cases, they [the courts] must decide which is

the superior law, and which must yield; and as we have seen that, according to

our principles, every oﬂicer remains answerable for what he oﬂicially does, a citi-

zen, believing that the law he enforces is incompatible with the superior law, the

[46]

like cases, each department must act upon its own jndgment, and
cannot be required to do that which it regards as a violation of the
constitution, on the ground solely that another department which,
in the course of the discharge of its own duty, was called upon
first to act, has reached the conclusion that it will not be violated
by the proposed action.
But setting aside now those cases to which we have referred,
where from the nature of things, and perhaps ft·om explicit terms
of the constitution, the judgment of the department or officer .
acting must be final, we shall find the general rule to be, that
whenever an act is done which may become the subject of a proceeding in court, any question of constitutional authority that
[* 44] might have been raised when the act was done will be • open
for consideration in such proceeding, and that as tho courts
must finally settle the controversy, so also will they finally determine the question of constitutional law.
For the constitution of tho State is higher in authority than any
law, direction, or decree made by any body or any officer assuming
to act under it, since such body or officer must exercise a delegated authority, and one that must necessarily bQ subservient to
the instrument by which the delegation is made. In any case of
conflict the fundamental law must govern, and the act in conflict
with it must be treated as of no legal validity. But no mode has
yet been devised by which these questions of conflict are to be discussed and settled as abstract questions, and their determination
is necessary or practicable only when public or private rights
would be affected thereby. They then become the subject of legal
controversy, and legal controversies must be settled by the courts.
The courts have thus devolved upon them the duty to pass upon
the constitutional validity, sometimes of legislative, and sometimes of executive acts. And as judicial tribunals have authority,
not only to judge, but also ·to enforce their judgments, the result
of a decision against the constitutionality of a legislative or
executive act will be to render it invalid through the enforcement of the paramount law in the controversy which has raised
the question.1
1 "When laws conflict in actual cases, they [the courts] must decide which is
the superior law, and which must yield; and as we have seen that, according to
our principles, every officer remains answerable for what he officially doe!!, a l'itizen, bdieving that the law he enforces is incompatible with the superior law, the

[ 46]
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" The same conclusion is reached by stating in eonsecu- [* 45]
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tive order a few familiar maxims of the law. The adminis-

tration of public justice is referred to the courts. To perform this

duty, the ﬁrst requisite is to ascertain the facts, and the next to de-

termine the law that is applicable. The constitution is the funda-

mental law of the State, in opposition to which any other law, or any

direction or decree, must be inoperative and void. If, therefore,

such other law, direction, or decree seems to be applicable to the

facts, but on comparison with the fundamental lawit is found to be

in conﬂict, the court, in declaring what the law of the ease is, must

necessarily determine its invalidity, and thereby in effect annul

it.‘ The right and the power of the courts to do this are so plain,

constitution simply sues the ofﬁcer before the proper court as having unlawfully

aggrieved him in the particular case. - The court, bound to do justice to every

one, is bound also to decide this case as a simple case of conﬂicting laws. The

court does not decide directly upon the doings of the legislature. It simply de-

cides for the case in hand, whether there actually are conflicting laws, and if so

which is the higher law that demands obedience, when both may not be obeyed

at the same time. its, however, this decision becomes the leading decision for

all future cases of the same import, until, indeed, proper and legitimate authority

should reverse it, the question of constitutionality is virtually decided, and it is

decided in a natural, easy, legitimate, and safe manner, according to the prin-
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ciplc of the supremacy of the law, and the dependence of justice. It is one of

the most interesting and important evolutions of the government of law, and one

of the greatest protections of the citizen. It may well be called a very jewel of

Anglican liberty, and one of the best fruits of our political civilization.” Licber,_

Civil Liberty and Self-Government.

“ lvhenever a law which the judge holds to be unconstitutional is argued in a

tribunal of the United States, he may refuse to admit it as a rule; this power is

the only one which is peculiar to the American magistrate, but it gives rise to

immense political inﬂuence. Few laws can escape the searching anal_\ sis; for

there are few which are not prejudicial to some private interest or other, and

none which may not be brought before a court of justice by the choice of par-

ties, or by the necessity of the case. But from the time that a judge has refused

to apply any given law in a case, that law loses a portion of its moral sanction.

The persons to whose interest it is prejudicial learn that means exist for evading

its authority; and similar suits are multiplied until it becomes powerless. One

of two alternatives must then be resorted to, — the people must alter the con-

stitution, or the legislature must repeal the law.” De Tocqueville, Democracy

in America, c. 6.

‘ “It is idle to say that the authority of each branch of the government is

deﬁned and limited by the constitution, if there be not an independent power

able and willing to enforce the limitations. Experience proves that the consti-

tution is thoughtlcssly but habitually violated; and the sacriﬁce of individual

rights is too remotely connected with the objects and contests of the masses to

[47]

• 'l'hc same conclusion is reached by stating in consecu- [* 45]
tive order a few familiar maxims of the law. The administration of public justice is referred to the courts. To perform this
duty, the first requisite is to ascertain the facts, and the next to determine the law that is applicable. The constitution is the fundamental law of the State, in opposition to which any other law, or any
direction or decree, must be inoperative and void. If, therefore,
such other law, direction, or decree seems to be applicable to ·the
facts, but on comparison with the fundamental law it is found to be
in conflict, the court, in declaring what the law of the case is, must
necessarily determine its invalidity, and thereby in effect annul
it. 1 The right and the power of the courts to do this are so plain,
constitution simply sues the officer before the proper court as having unlawfully
aggrieved him in the particular case . . The court, bound to do justice to every
one, is bound also to dec.:ide tLis case as a simple case of conflicting laws. The
court does not decide directly upon the doings of the legi~lature. It simply decides for the case in hand, whether there actually are conflicting laws, and if so
which is the higher law that demands obedience, when both may not be obeyed
at the same time. As, however, this de<"ision becomes the leading dedsion for
all future cases of the same import, until, indeed, proper and legitimate authority
should reverse it, the question of constitutionality is virtually decided, anti it is
decided in a natural, easy, legitimate, and safu manner, according to the principle of the supremacy of the law, and the dependence of justice. It is one of
the most interesting and important evolutions of the government of law, and one
of the greatest protections of the citizen. It may well be called a \"ery jewel of
Anglican liberty, and one of the best fruits of our political civilization." Lieber,.
Civil Liberty and Self-Government.
"Whenever a law which the judge holds to be unconstitutional is argued in a
tribunal of the United States, he may refuse to admit it as a rule; this power is
the only one which is peculiar to the American magistrate, but it gi\'es ri~e to
immense political influence. Few Jaws can escape the searching anal~ sis; for
there are few which are not prejudicial to some private interest or other, and
none which may not be brought before a court of justice by the choice of parties, or by the necessity of the case. But from the time that a judge has refused
to apply any given law in a l•ase, that law loses a portion of its moral sanction.
The persons to whose interest it is prejudicial learn that means exist for e\·ading
its authority; and similar suits are multiplied until it becomes powerless. One
of two alternatives must then be resorted to, -the people must alter the constitution, or the legislature must repeal the law." De Tocqueville, Democracy
in America, c. 6.
·
1 " It is idle to say that the authority of each branch of the government is
defined and limited by the constitution, if there be not an independent power
able and willing to enforce the limitations. Experience proves that the con,titution is thoughtlessly but habitually violated; and the sacrifice of individual
rights is too remotely connected with the objects and contests of the masses to

[ 47]
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[* 46] *and the duty is so generally—-we may almost say‘uni-
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versally—conceded, that we should not be justified in

wearying the patience of the reader i|1 quoting from the very

[* 46] • and the duty is so generally- we may almost say 'uni-

numerous authorities upon the subject}

attract their attention. From its very position it is apparent that the conserva-

tive power is lodged in the judiciary, which, in the exercise of its undoubted

rights, is bound to meet any emergency; else causes would be decided, not only

by the legislature, but sometimes without hearing or evidence.” Per Gibson, Ch.

versally- conceded, that we should not be justified in
wearying the patience of the reader in quoting from the very
numerous authorities upon the subject.l

J., in De Chastellux v. Fairchild, 15 Penn. St. 18.

“Nor will this conclusion, to use the language of one of our most eminent

jurists and statesmen, by any means suppose a superiority of the judicial to the

legislative power. It will only be supposing that the power of the people is

superior to both; and that where the will of the legislature, declared in its stat-

utes, stands in opposition to that declared by the people in the constitution, the

judges ought to be governed by the latter rather than the former. They ought

to regulate their decisions by the fundamental laws rather than by those which

are not fundamental. Neither would we, in doing this, be understood as im-

pugning the honest intentions, or sacred regard to justice, which we most cheer-

fully accord to the legislature. But to be above error is to possess an entire

attribute of the Deity; and to spurn its correction, is to reduce to the same

degraded level the most noble and the meanest of his works.” Bates v. Kimball,

2 Chip. 77.
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" Without the limitations and restraints usually found in written constitutions,

the government could have no elements of permanence and durability; and the

distribution of its powers and the vesting their exercise in separate departments

would be an idle ceremony.” Brown, J ., in People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 558.

_ ‘ 1 Kent, 500-507; Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137; VVebster on the

Independence of the Judiciary, Vllorks, Vol. III. p. 29. In this speech Mr. \Veb-

ster has forcibly set forth the necessity of leaving with the courts the power to

enforce constitutional restrictions. “ It cannot be denied,” says he, “ that one

great object of written constitutions is, to keep the departments of government

as distinct as possible; and for this purpose to impose restraints designed to

have that effect. And it is equally true that there is no department on which it

is more necessary to impose restraints than upon the legislature. The tendency

of things is almost always to augment the power of that department in its rela-

tion to the judiciary. The judiciary is composed of few persons, and those not

such as mix habitually in the pursuits and objects which most engage public men.

They are not, or never should he, political men. They have often unpleasant

duties to perform, and their conduct is often liable to be canvassed and censured

where their reasons for it are not known or cannot be understood. The legisla-

ture holds the public purse. It ﬁxes the compensation of all other departments ;

it applies as well as raises all revenue. It is a numerous body, and necessarily

carries along with it a great force of public opinion. Its members are public

men, in constant contact with one another and with their constituents. It would

seem to be plain enough that, without constitutional provisions which should be

ﬁxed and certain, such a department, in case of excitement, would be able to

[48]

attract their attention. From its very position it is apparent that the conservative power is lodged in the judiciary, which, in the exercise of its undoubted
rights, is bound to meet any emergency; else causes would be decided, not only
by the legislature, but sometimes without hearing or evidence." Per Gibson, Ch.
J ., in De Chastellux v. :Fairchild, 15 Penn. St. 18.
" Nor will this conclusion, to use the language of one of our most eminent
jurists and statesmen, by any means suppose a superiority of the judicial to the
legislative power. It will only be supposing that the power of the people is
superior to both; and that where the will of the legislature, declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that declared by the people in the constitution, the
judges ought to be governed by the latter rather than the former. They ought
to regulate their decisions by the fundamental laws rather than by tbosn which
are not fundamental. Neither woultl we, in doing this, be understood as impugning the honest intentions, or sacred regard to justice, which we most cheerfully accord to the legislature. But to be above error is to possess an entire
attribute of the Deity; and to spurn its correction, is to reduce to the same
degraded level the most noble and the meanest of his works." Bates v. Kimball,
2 Chip. 77.
" Without the limitations and restraints usually found in written constitutions,
the government could have no elements of permanence and durability; and the
distribution of its powers and the vesting their exercise in separate departments
would be an idle ceremony." Broten, J., in People v. Draper, 15 N.Y. 558.
1 1 Kent, 500-507; Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137 ; Webster on the
independence of the Judiciary, \Yorks, Vol. III. p. 29. In this speech Mr. Webster bas forcibly set forth the necessity of leaving with the courts the power to
enforce constitutional restrictions. "It cannot be denied," says he, "that one
great object of written constitutions is, to keep the departments of government
as distinct as possible ; and for this purpose to impose restraints designed to
have that effect. And it is equally true that there is no department on whieh it
is more necessary to impose restraints than upon the legislature. The tendency
of things is almost always to augment the power of that department in its relation to the judiciary. The judiciary is composed of few persons, and those not
such as mix habitually in the pursuits and objects which most engage public men.
They are not, or never should be, political men. They have often unpleasant
duties to perform, and their conduct is often liable to be canvassed and censured
where their reasons for it are not known or cannot be understood. The legislature holds the public purse. It fixes the compensation of all other departments ;
it applies as well as raises all revenue. It is a numerous body, and necessarily
carries along with it a great force of public opinion. Its members are 1mblic
men, in constant contact with one another and with their constituen~s. It would
seem to be plain enough that, without constitutional provisions which should be
fixed and certain, such a department, in case of excitement, would be able to
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" The Doctrine of res adjudicate and stare decisis. [" 47]

CH. IV.)

CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS.

But a question which has arisen and been passed upon in one

case may arise again in another, or it may present itself under

different circumstances before some other department of the gov-

• Tl1e Doctrine of reB adjudicata and stare decisis.

[• 47]

ernment. Will the principle once declared be held conclusive

upon other courts and other departments,‘ or does it settle only

the particular controversy, and may a different decision be looked

upon as possible in any new controversy that may arise? These

questions resolve themselves into two others: When can a matter

be said to be res adjudicate? and what is the extent of the doc-

trine known in the books as stare decisis?

And as to the ﬁrst, we understand the rule to be, that a deci-

sion once made in a case, by the highest court empowered to pass

upon it, is conclusive upon the parties to the controversy and

their privies, who are not allowed afterwards to revive it in a new

proceeding for the purpose of raising the same or any other ques-

tions. The matter in controversy has become res judicata, a

thing deﬁnitely settled by judicial decision; and the judgment

of the court imports absolute verity. Whatever the question in-

volved,-whether the interpretation of a private contract, the

legality of an individual act, or the validity of a legislative enact-

ment,—the rule of ﬁnality is the same. The controversy has
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been adjudged, and once ﬁnally passed upon is never to be re-

newed} It must frequently happen, therefore, that a question

encroach on the judiciary.” “ The constitution being the supreme law, it follows,

of course, that every act of the legislature contrary to that law must be void.

But who shall decide this question? Shall the legislature itself decide it? If

so, then the constitution ceases to be a legal, and becomes only a moral restraint

upon the legislature. If they, and they only, are to judge whether their acts be

conformable to the constitution, then the constitution is admonitory or advisory

only, not legally binding; because if the construction of it rests wholly with

them, their discretion, in particular cases, may be in favor of very erroneous

and dangerous constructions. Hence the courts of law, necessarily, when the

case arises, must decide on the validity of particular acts.” “ \Vithout this check,

no certain limitation could exist on the exercise of legislative power.” See also,

as to the dangers of legislative encroachments, De Tocqueville, Democracy in

But a question which has arisen and been passed upon in one
case may arise again in another, or it may present itself under
difforent circumstances before some other department of the government. Will the principle once declared be held conclusive
upon other courts and other departments,, or does it settle only
the particular controversy, and may a different decision be looked
upon as possible in any new controversy that may arise? These
questions resolve themselves into two others: When can a matter
be said to be res adjudicata? and what is the extent of the doctrine known in the books as stare decisis?
And as to the first, we understand the rule to be, that a decision once made in a case, by the highest court empowered to pass
upon it, is conclusive upon the parties to the controversy and
their privies, who are not allowed afterwards to revive it in a uew
proceeding for the purpose of raising tho same or any other questions. The matter in controversy has become res judicata, a
thing definitely settled by judicial decision; and the judgment
of the court imports absolute verity. Whatever the question involved,- whether the int~rpretation of a private contract, the
legality of an individual act, or the validity of a legislative enactment,- the rule of finality is tho same. The controversy has
been adjudged, and once finally passed upon is never to be renewed.1 It must frequently happen, therefore, that a question

America, c. 6. The legislature, though possessing a larger share of power, no

more represents the sovereignty of the people than either of the other depart-

ments; it derives its authority from the same high source. Bailey v. Philadel-

phia, &c., Railroad Co. 4 Harr. 402; lVhittington v. Polk, 1 H. & J. 244.

‘ Duchess of Kingston’s Case, 2 Smith’s Lead. Cas. 424; Etheridge v. Osborn,

4 [ 49 ]

encroach on the judiciary." "The constitution being the supreme law, it follows,
of course, that every act of the legislature contrary to that law must be void.
But who shall decide this question? Shall the legi~:~lature it.~elf decide it? If
so, then the constitution ceases to be a legal, and becomes only a moral restraint
upon the legislature. If they, and they only, are to judge whether their acts be
conformable to the constitution, then the constitution i:. admonitory or advisory
only, not legally binding; because if the construction of it rests wholly with
them, their discretion, in particular ca~es, may be in favor of very erroneous
and dangerous constructions. Hence the courts of law, necessarily, when the
case arises, must decide on the validity of particular acts." " 'Vithout this check,
no certain limitation could exist on the exercise of legislative power." See also,
as to the dangers of legislative encroachments, De Tocqueville, Democracy in
America, c. 6. The legislature, though possessing a larger share of power, no
more represents the sovereignty of the people than either of the other departments; it derives its authority from the same high source. Bailey v. Philadelphia, &c., Railroad Co. 4 Harr. 402; Whittington v. Polk, 1 H. & J. 244.
1 Duchess of Kingston's Case, 2 Smith's Lead. Cas. 424; Etheridge v. O:sborn,
4
[ 49]

‘ 47 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CI-I. IV.

of constitutional law will be decided in a private litigation, and
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the parties to the controversy, and all others subsequently acquir-

ing rights under them, in the subject-matter of the suit, will

thereby become absolutely and for ever precluded from renewing

the question in respect to the matter then involved. The rule

of eonclusiveness to this extent is one of the most inﬂexi-

[* 48] ble principles * of the law; insomuch that even if it were

subsequently held by the courts that the decision in the

particular case was erroneous, such holding would not authorize

the reopening of the old controversy in order that the ﬁnal conclu-

sion might be applied thereto.‘

But if important principles of constitutional law can be thus

disposed of in suits involving only private rights, and when

private individuals and their counsel alone are heard, it becomes

of interest to know how far, if at all, other individuals and the

public at large are affected by the decision. And here it will be

discovered that quite a. different rule prevails, and that a judi-

cial decision has no such force of absolute eonclusiveness as to

other parties as it is allowed to possess between the parties to

the litigation in which the decision has been made, and those

who have succeeded to their rights.

12 \Vend. 399; Hayes v. Reese, 34 Barb. 151; Hyatt v. Bates, 35 Barb. 308;
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Harris v. Harris, 36 Barb. 88; Young v. Black, 7 Cranch, 567; Chapman v.

Smith, 16 How. 114; VVales v. Lyon, 2 Mich. 276; Prentiss v. Holbrook, 2 Mich.

372; Van Kleek o. Eggleston, 7 Mich. 511 ; Newberry v. Trowbridge, 13 Mich.

278; Crandall v. James, 6 R. I. 144; Babcock v. Camp, 12 Ohio, N. s. 11;

VVarncr v. Scott, 39 Penn. St. 274; Kerr v. Union Bank, 18 Mil. 396; Eimer v.

Richards, 25 Ill. 289; \Vright v. Leclaire, 3 Iowa, 241; \Vhittaker 0. Johnson

County, 12 Iowa, 595; Peay v. Duncan, 20 Ark. 85: Madox v. Graham, 2 Met.

(Ky.) 56; George v. Gillespie, 1 Greene (Iowa), 421; Clark v. Sammons, 12

Iowa, 368; Taylor v. Chambers, 1 Iowa, 124; Skelding v. \Vhitney, 3 \Vend.

of constitutional law will be decided in a private litigation, and
the par·ties to the controversy, and all others subsequently acquiring rights under them, in the subject-matter of the suit, will
thereby become absolutely and for ever precluded from renewing
the question in respect to the matter then involved. The rule
of conclusiveness to this extent is one of the most inflexi[• 48] ble principles • of the law; insomuch that even if it were
subsequently held by the courts that the decision in the
particular case was erroneous, such holding would not author·ize
the reopening of the old controversy in order that the final conclusion might be applied thereto.!
But if important principles of constitutional law can be thus
disposed of in suits involving only private rights, and when
private individuals and their counsel alone arc heard, it becomes
of interest to know how far, if at all, other individuals and the
public at large are affected by the decision. And here it will be
discovered that quite a different rule prevails, and that a judicial decision has no such force of absolute conclusiveness as to
other parties as it is allowed to possess between the parties to
the litigation in which the decision has been made, and those
who have succeeded to their rights.

154; Aurora City v. West, 7 Wal. 82. A judgment, however, is conclusive as

an estoppel as to those facts without the existence and proof of which it could

not have been rendered; and if it might have been given on any one of several

grounds, it is conclusive between the parties as to neither of them. Lea v. Lea,

97 Mass. 493. And see Dickinson v. Hayes, 31 Conn. 417; Church v. Chapin,

35 Vt. 223; Packet Co. 0. Sickles, 5 \Vsl. 580.

' Mt-Lean v. Hugarin, 13 Johns. 184; Morgan v. Plumb, 9 Wend. 287;

Wilrler v. Case, 16 Wend. 583; Baker v. Rand, 13 Barb. 152; Kelley v. Pike,

5 Cush. 484; Hart v. Jewett, 11 Iowa, 276; Colburn v. \Voodworth, 31 Barb.

381 ; Newbcrry iv. Trowbridge, 13 Mich. 278; Skildin v. Herrick, 3 \Vend. 154;

Brockway v. Kinney, 2 Johns. 210; Platner v. Best, 11 Johns. 530; Phillips v.

Berick, 16 Johns. 136; Page v. Fowler, 37 Cal. 100.

\
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12 Wend. 399; Hayes "· Reese, 84 Barb. 151; Hyatt v. Rates, 35 Barb. 308;
Harris v. Harris, 36 Barb. 88; Young v. Black, 7 Cranch, 1567; Chapman v.
~mitb, 16 How. 114; Wales v. Lyon, 2 Mich. 276; Prentiss v. Holbrook, 2 Mich.
372; Van Kleek v. Eggleston, 7 Mich. 511; Newberry v. Trowbridge, 13 Mich.
278; Crandall v. James, 6 R. I. 144; Babcock v. Camp, 12 Ohio, N. s. 11;
Warner v. Scott, 39 Penn. St. 274; Kerr t•. Union Bank, 18 1\Itl. 396; Eimer v.
Richads, 25 Ill. 289; Wright v. Leclaire, 3 Iowa, 241; Whittaker v. Johnson
County, 12 Iowa. 595; Peay v. Duncan, 20 Ark. 85: l\:ladox v. Graham, 2 Met.
(Ky.) l>6; George v. Gillespie, 1 Greene (Iowa), 421; Clark v. Sammons, 12
Iowa, 368; Taylor "· Chambers, 1 Iowa, 124; Skelding 11. Whitney, 8 Wend.
154; Aurora City 11. West, 7 W al. 82. A judgment., however, is conclusive as
an estoppel as to those facts without the existence and proof of which it could
not have been rendered; and if it might have been given on any one of several
grounds, it is conclusive between the parties as to neither of them. Lea v. Lea,
97 Mass. 493. And see Dickinson v. Hayes, 31 Conn. 417; Church v. Chapin,
·
85 Vt. 223; Packet Co. v. Sickles, 5 Wal. 580.
1 l\lcLean v. Hugarin, 13 Johns. 184; Morgan "· Plumb, 9 Wend. 287 ;
Wilder v. Case, 16 Wend. 583; Baker 11. Rand, 13 Barb. 152; Kelley v. Pike,
5 Cush. 484; Hart v. Jewett, 11 Iowa, 276; Colburn v. \Voodworth, 31 Barb.
881; Newberry v. Trowbridge, 13 1\lich. 278; Skildin v. Herrick, 3 Wend. 154;
Brockway"· Kinney, 2 .Johns. 210; Platner v. Best, 11 Johns. 530; l'hillips v.
Berick, 16 Johns. 136; Page v. Fowler, 87 Cal. 100.

[50]
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A party is estopped by a judgment against him from disputing

CH. IV.)

CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS.

its correctness, so far as the point directly involved in the case

was concerned, whether the reasons upon which it was based were

sound or not, and even if no reasons were given therefor. And if

the parties themselves are estopped, so also should be all those

who, since the decision, claim to have acquired interests in the

subject-matter of the judgment from or under the parties, as per-

sonal representatives, heirs-at-law, donees, or purchasers, and who

are therefore considered in the law as privies. But if strangers

who have no interest in that subject-matter are to be in like man-

ner concluded, because their controversics are supposed to involve

the same question of law, we shall not only be forced into a series

of endless inquiries, often resulting in little satisfaction, in order

to ascertain whether the question is the same, but we shall also be

met by the query, whether we are not concluding parties by deci-

sions which others have obtained in ﬁctitious controversies and by

collusion, or suﬁ'ered to pass without sufficient consideration and

discussion, and which might have been given otherwise had these

parties had an opportunity of being heard.

‘We have already seen that the force of a judgment [* 49]

does not depend upon the reasons given therefor, or upon

the circumstance that any were or were not given. If there were,
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they may have covered portions of the controversy only, or they

may have had such reference to facts peculiar to that case, that in

any other controversy, though somewhat similar in its facts, and

apparently resembling it in its legal bearings, grave doubts might

arise whether it ought to fall within the same general principle.

If one judgment was absolutely to conclude the parties to any

similar controversy, we ought at least to be able to look into the

judicial mind, in order that we might ascertain of a surety that all

those facts which inﬂuence the questions of law were substantially

the same in each, and we ought also to be able to see that the ﬁrst

litigation was conducted in entire good faith, and that all those

considerations were presented to the court which could properly

have weight in the construction and application of the law. All

these things, however, are manifestly impossible; and the law

therefore wisely excludes judgments from being used to the preju-

dice of strangers to the controversy, and restricts their conclusive-

[51]

A party is estopped by a judgment against him from disputing
its correctness, so far as the point directly involved in the case
was concerned, whether the reasons upon which it was based were
sound or not, and even if no reasons were given therefor. And if
the parties themselves are estopped, so also should be all those
who, since the decision, claim to have acquired interests in the
subject-matter of the judgment from or under the parties, as personal representatives, heirs-at-law, donees, or purchasers, and who
are therefore considered in the law as privies. But if strangers
who have no interest in that subject-matter are to be in like manner concluded, because their controversies are supposed to involve
the same question of law, we shall not only be forced into a series
of endless inquiries, often resulting in little satisfaction, in order
to ascertain whether the question is the same, but we shall also be
met by the query, whether we are not concluding parties by decisions which others have obtained in fictitious controversies and by
collusion, or suffered to pass without sufficient consideration and
discussion, and which might have been given otherwise had these
parties had an opportunity of being heard.
• We have already seen that the force of a judgment [• 49]
does not depend upon the reasons given therefor, or upon
the circumstance that any were or were not given. If there were,
they may have covered portions of the controversy only, or they
may have had such reference to facts peculiar to that case, that in
any other controversy, though somewhat similar in its facts, and
appar~ntly resembling it in its legal bearings, grave doubts might
arise whether it ought to fall within the same general principle.
If one judgment was absolutely to conclude the parties to any
similar controversy, we ought at least to be able to look into the
judicial mind, in order that we might ascertain of a surety that all
those facts which influence the questions of law were substantially
the same in each, and we ought also to be able to see that the first
litigation was conducted in entire good faith, and that all those
consi.derations were presented to the court which could properly
have weight in the construction and application of tlae law. All
these things, however, are manifestly impossible; and the law
therefore wisely excludes judgments from being used to the prejudice of strangers to the controversy, and restricts their conclusive-

[51]
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ness to parties thereto and their privies} Even parties and privies

• 49

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

(CH. IV •

are bound only so far as regards the subject-matter then involved,

and would be at liberty to raise the same questions anew in a dis-

tinct controversy affecting some distinct subject-matter?

All judgments, however, are supposed to apply the existing law

to the facts of the case; and the reasons which are suﬂicient to

inﬂuence the court to a particular conclusion in one case ought to

be sufficient to bring it or any other court to the same conclusion

in all other like cases where no modiﬁcation of the law has inter-

vened. There would thus be uniform rules for the administration

of justice, and the same measure that is meted out

[* 50] "‘ to one would be received by all others. And even if the

same or any other court, in a subsequent case, should be

in doubt concerning the correctness of the decision which has been

made, there are consequences of a very grave character to be con-

templated and weighed before the experiment of disregarding it

should be ventured upon. That state of things, when judicial

decisions conﬂict, so that a citizen is always at a loss in regard to

his rights and his duties, is a very serious evil; and the alterna-

tive of accepting adjudged cases as precedents in future controver-

sies resting upon analogous facts, and brought within the same

reasons, is obviously preferable. Precedents, therefore, become
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important, and counsel are allowed and expected to call the atten-

tion of the court to them, not as concluding controversies, but as

guides to the judicial mind. Chancellor Kent says: “A solem11

decision upon a point of law-arising in any given case becomes an

authority in a like case, because it is the highest evidencelwhich

we can have of the law applicable to the subject, and the judges

are bound to follow that decision so long as it stands unreversed,

‘ Burrill v. West, 2 N. H. 190; Davis v. Wood, 1 Wheat. 6; Jackson v.

Vedder, 3 Johns. 8; Case v. Reeve, 14 Johns. 79 ; Alexander v. Taylor, 4 Denio,

302; Van Bokkelin v. Ingersoll, 5 \Vend. 315; Smith v. Ballantyne, 10 Paige,

101; Orphan House v. Lawrence, 11 Paige, 80; Thomas v. Hubbell, 15 N. Y.

405; Wood v. Stephen, 1 Serg. & R. 175; Peterson v. Lothrop, 34 Penn. St.

223; Twambly v. Henley, 4 Mass. 441; Este v. Strong, 2 Ohio, 401; Cowles v.

Harts, 3 Conn. 516; Floyd v. Mintsey, 5 Rich. 361; Riggins’s Ex’rs v. Brown,

12 Geo. 271; Persons v. Jones, ib. 371.

' Van Alstine v. Railroad Co. 34 Barb. 28; Taylor v. McCracken, 2 Blackf.

260; Cook v. Vimont, 6 T. B. Monr. 284.

[52] '

ness to parties thereto and their privies.1 Even parties and privies
are bound only so far as regards the subject-matter then involved,
and would be at liberty to raise the same questions anew in a. distinct controversy affecting some distinct subject-ma.tter.2
All judgments, however, are supposed to apply the existing law
to the facts of the case; and the reasons which are sufficient to
influence the c9urt to a particular conclusion in one case ought to
be sufficient to brlng it or any other court to the same conclusion
in all other like cases where no modification of the law has intervened. There would thus be uniform rules for the administration
of justice, and the same measure that is meted out
[• 50] • to one would be received by all others. And even if the
same or any other court, in a. subsequent case, should be
in doubt concerning the correctness of the decision which has been
made, there are consequences of a. very grave character to be contemplated and weighed before the experiment of disregarding it
should be ventured upon. That state of things, when Judicial
decisions conflict, so that a. citizen is always at a loss in regard to
his rights and his duties, is a. very serious evil; and the alternative of accepting adjudged cases as precedents in future controversies resting upon analogous facts, and brought within the same
reasons, is obviously preferable. Precedents, therefore, become
important, and counsel are allowed and expected to call the attention of the court to them, not as concluding controversies, but as
guides to the judicial mind. Chancellor Kent says : " A solemn
decision upon a point of law arising in any given case becomes an
authority in a like case, because it is the highest evidence· which
we can have of the law applicable to the subject, and the judges
are bound to follow that decision so long as it stands unreversed,
1 Burrill v. West, 2 N. H . 190; Davis v. Wood, 1 Wheat. 6; Jackson v.
Vedder, 8 Johns. 8; Case t~. Reeve, 14 Johns. 79; Alexander"· Taylor, 4 Denio,
802; Van Bokkelin v. Ingersoll, 5 Wend. 815; Smith "· Ballantyne, 10 Paige,
101; Orphan House"· Lawrence, 11 Paige, 80; Thomas"· Hubbell, 15 N.Y.
405; Wood v. Stephen, 1 Serg. & R. 175; Peterson "· Lothrop, 84 Penn. St.
228; Twambly "· Henley, 4 Mass. 441; Este v. Strong, 2 Ohio, 401; Cowles "·
Harts, 8 Conn. 516; Floyd v. Mintsey, 5 Rich. 361 ; Riggins's Ex'rs "· Brown,
12 Geo. 271; Persons"· Jones, ib. 871.
1 Van Alstine "· Railroad Co. 34 Barb. 28; Taylor "· McCracken, 2 Blackf.
260; Cook v. Vimont, 6 T. B. Monr. 284:.

[52]

ca. 1v.] consraocrrou or srars consrmmons. * 50

• 50

unless it can be shown that the law was misunderstood or misap-

plied in that particular ease. If a decision has been made upon

CH. IV.]

CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS.

solemn argument and mature deliberation, the presumption is in

favor of its correctness, and the community have a right to regard

it as a just declaration or exposition of the law, and to regulate

their actions and contracts by it. It would therefore be extremely

inconvenient to the public if precedents were not duly regarded,

and implicitly followed. It is by the notoriety and stability of

such rules that professional men can give safe advice to those who

consult them, and people in general can venture to buy and trust,

and to deal with each other. If judicial decisions were to be

lightly disregarded, we should disturb and unsettle the great land-

marks of property. When a rule has once been deliberately

adopted and declared, it ought not to be disturbed unless by a.

court of appeal or review, and never by the same court, except for

very urgent reasons, and upon a clear manifestation of error; and

if the practice were otherwise, it would be leaving us in a perplex-

ing uncertainty as to the law.” 1

‘ 1 Kent, 475. And see Cro. Jae. 527; Goodtitle v. Otway, 7 T. R. 416;

Selby v. Bardons, 3 B. 8: Ad. 17; Fletcher v. Lord Somers, 3 Bing. 588; Ander-

son v. Jackson, 16 Johns. 402; Goodell v. Jackson, 20 Johns. 722; Bates v.

Releyea, 23 “fend. 340; Emerson v. Atwater, 7 Mich. 12; Nelson v. Allen, 1
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Yerg. 376; Palmer v. Lawrence, 5 N. Y. 389; Knceland v. Milwaukee, 15 Wis.

458; Boon v. Bowers, 30 Miss. 246; Rex v. Cox, 2 Burr. 787; King v. Younger,

5 T. R. 450; Hammond v. Anderson, 4 B. & P. 69; Broom’s Maxims, 109. Dr.

Lieber thinks the doctrine of the precedent especially valuable in a free country.

“Liberty and steady progression require the principle of the precedent in all

unless it can be shown that the law was misunderstood or misapplied in that particular case. If a decision has been made upon.
solemn argument and mature deliberation, the presumption is in
favor of it.~ correctness, and the community have a right to regard
it as a just declaration or exposition of the law, and to regulate
their actions and contracts by it. It would therefore be extremely
inconvenient to the public if precedents were not duly regarded,
and implicitly followed. It is by the notoriety and stability of
such rules that professional men can give safe advice to those who
consult them, and people in genet·al can venture to buy and trust,
and to deal with each other. If judicial decisions were to be
lightly disregarded, we should disturb and unsettle the great landmarks of property. When a rule has once been deliberately
adopted and declared, it ought not to be disturbed unless by a
court of appeal or review, and never by the same court, except for
very urgent reasons, and upon a clear manifestation of error; and
if the practice were otherwise, it would be leaving us in a perplexing uncertainty as to the law." I

spheres. It is one of the roots with which the tree of liberty fastens in the soil

ofreal life, and through which it receives the sap of fresh existence. It is the

weapon by which interference is warded oil‘. The principle of the precedent is

eminently philosophical. The English Constitution would not have developed

itselfwithout it. What is called the English Constitution consists of the funda-

mentals of the British polity, laid down in custom, precedent, decisions, and stat-

utes; and the common law in it is a far greater portion than the statute law.

The English Constitution is chieﬂy a common-law constitution; and this reﬂex

of a continuous society in a continuous law is more truly philosophical than the

theoretic and systematic, but lifeless constitutions of recent France." Civ. Lib.

and Self-Gov. See also his chapter on precedents in the Hermeneutics. In

Nelson v. Allen, 1 Yerg. 376, where the constitutionality’ of the “Betterment

Law ” came under consideration, the court (While, J.) say : “ Whatever might

be my own opinion upon this question, not to assent to its settlement now, after

two solemn decisions of this court, the last made upwards of fourteen years ago,

and not only no opposing decision, but no attempt even by any case, during all

[53]

1 Kent, !75. And see Cro. ,Jac. 527; Goodtitle v. Otway, 7 T. R. 416;
Selby"· Bardons, 3 B. & Ad. 17 ; Fletcher v. Lord Somers, 3 Bing. 588 ; Anderl!on "· Jackson, 16 Johns. 402; Goodell v. •Jackson, 20 Johns. 722; Bates " ·
Releyea, 23 Wend. 340; Emerson v. Atwater, 7 1\lich. 12; Nelson v. Allen, 1
Yerg. 376; Palmer"· Lawrence, 5 N. Y. 389; Kneeland v. Milwaukee, 15 Wis.
458; Boon "· Bowers, 30 .Miss. 246; Rex v. Cox, 2 Burr. 787; King v. Younger,
5 T . R. 450; Hammond v. Anderson, 4 B . & P. 69; Broom's .Maxims, 109. Dr.
Lieber thinks the doctrine of the precedent especially valuable in a free country.
" Liberty and steady progression require the principle of the precedent in all
spheres. It is one of the roots with which the tree of liberty fastens in the soil
of real life, and through which it receives the sap of fresh existence. It is the
weapon by which interference is warded off. The principle of the precedent ia
eminently philosophical. The English Constitution would not have developed
itselfwithout it. What is called the English Constitution consists of the fundamentals of the British polity, laid down in custom, precedent, decisions, and statutes ; and the common law in it is a far greater portion than the statute law.
The English Constitution is chiefly a common-law constitution; and this reflex
of a continuous eociety in a continuous law is more truly philosophical than the
theoretic and systematic, but lifdess constitutions of rel"ent Franec." Civ. Lib.
and Sclf-Gov. See also his chapter on precedents in the Hermeneutics. In
Nelson "· Allen, 1 Yerg. 3i6, where the constitutionality' of th<! " Betterment
Law" came under consideration, the court ( W!tile, .J.) say : " Whatc,·cr might
be my own opinion upon this question, not to assent to its settlement now, after
two solemn decisions of this court, the last made upwards of fourtel'n years ago,
and not only no opposing decision, but no attempt e,·en by any case, during all
1
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[* 51] ‘The doctrine of stare decisis, however, is only applica-
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

(CH. IV•

. ble, in its full force, within the territorial jurisdiction of

["‘ 52] the courts making ‘the decisions, since there alone can

such decisions be regarded as having established any

rules. Rulings made under a similar legal system elsewhere may

be cited and respected for their reasons, but are not necessarily to

be accepted as guides except in so far as those reasons commend

themselves to the judicial mind} Great Britain and the thirteen

original States had each substantially the same system of common

law originally, and a decision now by one of the higher courts of

Great Britain as to what the common law is upon any point is cer-

tainly entitled to great respect in any of the States, though not

necessarily to be accepted as binding authority any more than the

decisions in any one of the other States upon the same point. It

gives us the opinions of able judges as to what the law is, but its

force as an authoritative declaration must be conﬁned to the conn-

this time, to call the point again in controversy, forming a complete acquiescence,

would be, at the least, inconsistent, perhaps mischievous, and uncalled for by s.

correct discharge of oﬂicial duty. Much respect has always been paid to the

contemporaneous construction of statutes, and a forbidding caution hath always

accompanied any approach towards unsettling it, dictated no doubt by easily

foreseen consequences attending_a sudden change of a rule of property, neces-
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sarily introductory at least of confusion, increased litigation, and the disturbance

of the peace of society. The most able judges and the greatest names on the

[*51]

• The doctrine of stare decisis, however, is only applicable, in its full force, within the territorial jurisdiction of
[* 52] the courts making * the decisions, since there alone can
such decisions be regarded as having established any
. rules. Rulings made under a similar legal system elsewhere may
be cited and respected for their reasons, but are not necessarily to
be accepted as guides except in so far as those reasons commend
themselves to the judicial mind.l Great Britain and the thirteen
original States had each substantially the same system of common
law originally, and a decision now by one of the higher courts of
Great Britain as to what the common law is upon any point is certainly entitled to great respect in any of the States, though not
necessarily to be accepted ns binding authority any more than the
decisions in any one of the other States upon the same point. It
gives us the opinions of able judges as to what the law is, but its
force as an authoritative declaration must be confined to the coun-

bench have held this view of the subject, and occasionally expressed themselves

to that effect, either tacitly or openly, intimating that if they had held a part in

the ﬁrst construction they would have been of a different opinion; but the con-

struction having been made, they give their assent thereto. Thus Lord Ellen-

borough, in 2 East, 302, remarks: ' I think it is better to abide by that deter-

mination, than to introduce uncertainty into this branch of the law, it being often

more important to have the rule settled, than to determine what it shall be. I

am not, however, convinced by the reasoning in this case, and if the point were

new I should think otherwise.’ Lord Marzqﬁeld, in 1 Burr. 419, says: ‘ Where

solemn determinations acquiesced under had settled precise cases, and s. rule of

property, they ought, for the sake of certainty, to be observed, as if they had

originally formed a part of the text of the statute.’ And Sir James Jllartfﬁeld,

in 4 B. & P. 69, says: ‘I do not know how to distinguish this from the case

before decided in the court. It is of greater consequence that the law should be

as uniform as possible, than that the equitable claim of an individual should be

attended to.’" And see People v. Cicottc, 16 Mich. 283.

A judgment rendered by a court is authority notwithstanding it was one given

under the law of necessity, in consequence of an equal division of the court,

Regina v. Millis, 13 M. & VV. 261; Durant v. Essex Co. 7 Wal. 107.

‘ Caldwell v. Gale, 11 Mich. 77.

[54]

this time, to call the point again in controversy, forming a complete acquiescence,
would be, at the least, inconsistent, perhaps mischievous, and uncalled for by a
correct discharge of official duty. Much respect has always been paid to the
contemporaneous construction of statutes, and a forbidding caution hath always
accompanied any approach towards unsettling it, dictated no doubt by easily
foreseen consequences attending,a sudden change of a rule of property, necessarily introductory at least of confusion, increased litigation, and the disturbance
of the p~ace of society. The most able judges and the greatest names on the
bench have held this view of the subject, and occasionally expressed themselves
to that cffcd, either tacitly or openly, intimating that if they bad held a part in
the first construetion they would have been of a different opinion ; but the construetion having been made, they give their assent thereto. Thus Lord Ellenborough, in 2 East, 302, remarks: • I think it is better to abide by that determination, than to introduce uncertainty into this branch of the law, it being often
more important to have the rule settled, than to determine what it shall be. I
am not, however, convinced by the reasoning in this case, and if the point were
new I should think otherwise.' Lord Man.'!fteld, in 1 Burr. 419, says: 'Where
11olemn determinations acquiesced under had setlled precise cases, and a rule of
property, they ought, for the sake of certainty, to be observed, as if they had
originally formed a part of the text of the statute.' And Sir James Man..'!fteld,
in 4 B. & P. 69, says: 'I do not know bow to distinguish this from the case
before decided in the court. It is of greater consequence that the law should be
as uniform as possible, than that the equitable claim of an individual should be
attended to."' And see People v. Cicottc, 16 Mich. 283.
A judgment rendered by a court is authority notwithstanding it was one given
under the law of necessity, in consequence of an equal division of the court,
Regina v. Millis, 13 1\I. & W. 261; Durant v. Essex Co. 7 Wal. 107.
1 Caldwell v. Gale, 11 Mich. 77.
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try for which the court sits and judges. But an English decision

CH. IV.]
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before the Revolution is in the direct line of authority ; and where

a particular statute or clause of the constitution has been adopted

in one State from the statutes or constitution of another, after a

judicial construction had been put upon it in such last-mentioned

State, _it is but just to regard the construction to have been

adopted, as well as the words, and all the mischiefs of disregard-

ing precedents would follow as legitimately here as in any other

case!

It will of course sometimes happen that a court will ﬁnd a

former decision so unfounded in law, so unreasonable in its deduc-

tions, or so mischievous in its consequences, as to feel compelled

to disregard it. Before doing so, however, it will be well to con-

sider whether the point involved is such as to have become a rule

of property, so that titles have been acquired in reliance upon it,

and vested rights will be disturbed by any change; for in such a

case it may be better that the correction of the error be left

to the legislature, which can control its action so *as to [* 53]

make it prospective only, and thus prevent unjust conse-

quences?

' Commonwealth v. Hartnett, 3 Gray, 4-50; Bond v. Appleton, 8 Mass. 472;

Rutland v. Mendon, 1 Pick. 154; Campbell 1:. Quinlin, 3 Seam. 288; Little v.
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Smith, 4 Seam. 402; Riggs v. \Vilton, 13 Ill. 15; Ingraham v. Regan, 23 Miss.

213; Tyler v. Tyler, 19 Ill. 151; Pcnnock v. Dialogue, 2 Pet. 18; Adams v.

Field, 21 Vt. 266; Turnpike Co. 1:. People, 9 Barb. 167; Drennan v. People,

10 Mich. 169; Myrick v. Hasey, 27 Me. 9; People v. Coleman, 4 Cal. 46;

Attorney-General v. Brunst, 3 \Vis. 787; Langdon v. Applegate, 5 Ind. 327.

But it does not necessarily follow that the prior decision construing the law must

be inﬁexibly followed, since the circumstances in the State adopting it may he

so different as to require a different construction. Little v. Smith, 4 Seam. 402;

try for which the court sits and judges. But an English decision
before the Revolution is in the direct line of authority; and where
a particular statute or clause of the constitution has been adopted
in one State from the statutes or constitution of another, after a
judicial construction had been put upon it in such last-mentioned
State, . it is but just to regard the construction to have been
adopted, as well as the words, and all the mischiefs of disregarding precedents would foilow as legitimately here as in any other
case.1
It will of course sometimes happen that a court will find a
former decision so unfounded in law, so unreasonable in it~ deductions, or so mischievous in its consequences, as to feel compelled
to disregard it. Before doing so, however, it will be well to consider whether the point involved is such as to have become a rule
of property, so that titles have been acquired in reliance upon it,
and vested rights will be disturbed by any change; for in such a
case it may be better that the correction of tho error be left
to the legislature, which can control its action so • as to [*53]
make it prospective only, and thus prevent unjust consequences.2

Lessee of Gray v. Askew, 3 Ohio, 479. '

' “ After an erroneous decision touching rights of property has been followed

thirty or forty years, and even a much less time, the courts cannot retrace their

steps without committiaga new error nearly as great as the one at the ﬁrst."

Bronson, J., in Sparrow v. Kingman, 1 N. Y. 260. See also Emerson v. Atwa-

ter, 7 Mich. 12. “ It is true that when a principle of law, doubtful in its char-

acter or uncertain in the subject-matter of its application, has been settled by a

series of judicial decisions, and acquiesced in for a considerable time, and impor-

tant rights and interests have become established under such decisions, courts

will hesitate long before they will attempt to overturn the result so long estab-

lished. But when it is apparently indifferent which of two or more rules is

adopted, the one which shall have been adopted by judicial sanction will be

adhered to, though it may not, at the moment, appear to be the preferable rule.

[551

Commonwealth"· Hartnett, 8 Gray, 450; Bond "· Appleton, ~ 1\lnss. 472;
Rutland "· Mendon, 1 Pick. 154; Campbell v. Quinlin, 3 Scam. 288; Little "·
Smith, 4 Scam. 402; Riggs v. Wilton, 13 Ill. 15; Ingraham v. Regan, 23 Miss.
213; Tyler "· Tyler, 19 Ill. 151 ; Pennock v. Dialogue, 2 Pet. 18; Adams "·
Field, 21 Vt. 266; Turnpike Co. v. P~ople, 9 Barb. 167; Dr~nnan v. People,
10 Mich. 169; Myrick v. Hascy, 27 1\Ie. 9; People v. Coleman, 4 Cal. 46;
Attorney-General "· Brunst, 3 Wis. 787; Langdon "· Applegate, 5 Ind. 827.
But it does not necessarily follow that the prior decision construing the law must
be inflexibly followed, since the circumstances in the State adopting it may be
so different as to require a different construction. Little v. Smith, 4 Scam. 402;
Lessee of Gray v. Askew, 3 Ohio, 479.
•
1 " After an erroneous decision touching rights of property has been followed
thirty or forty years, and even a much less time, the courts cannot retrace their
steps without committing a ne\v error nearly as great as the one at the first."
Bronson, J., in Sparrow v. Kingman, 1 N.Y. 260. See also Emerson v. Atwater, 7 Mich. 12. "It is true that when a principle of law, doubtful in its eharacter or uncertain in the subject-matter of its application, has been settled by a
series of judicial decisions, and acquiesced in for a considerable time, and important rights and interests have become established under such deci5ions, courts
will hesitate long before they will attempt to overturn the result so long established. But when it is apparently indifferent which of two or more rules is
adopted, the one which shall have been adopted by judicial sanction will be
adhered to, though it may not, at the moment, appear to be the prefi!rable rule.
1
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Whenever the case is such that judicial decisions which have

• 53
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been made are to be accepted as law, and followed by the courts

in future cases, it is equally to be expected that they will be fol-

lowed by other departments of the government also. Indeed in

the great majority of cases the officers of other departments have

no option; for the courts possess the power to enforce the_ir con-

struction of the law as well as to declare it; and a failure to

accept and follow it in one case would only create necessity for

new litigation with similar result. Nevertheless, there are excep-

tions to this rule which embrace all those cases where new action

is asked of another department, which that department is at lib-

erty to grant or refuse for any reasons which it may regard as

sufficient. We cannot conceive that, because the courts have

declared an expiring corporation to have been constitutionally

created, the legislature would be bound to renew its charter, or

the executive to sign an act for that purpose, if doubtful of the

constitutional authority, even though no other adverse reasons ex-

isted. In the enactment of laws the legislature must act upon its

own reasons; mixed motives of power, justice, and policy inﬂu-

ence its action; and it is always justiﬁable and laudable to lean

against a violation of the constitution. Indeed cases must some-

times occur when a court should refrain from declaring a
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[*‘ 54] statute ‘unconstitutional, because not clearly satisﬁed

that it is so, when if the judges were to act as legislators

upon the question of its enactment, they ought with the same

views to withhold their assent, from grave doubts upon that subject.

The duty is different in the two cases, and presumptions may control

in one which do not exist in the other. But those cases where new

But when a question involving important public or private rights, extend-

ing through all coining time, has been passed upon on a single occasion, and

which decision can in no just sense be said to have been acquiesced in, it is not

only the right, but the duty of the court, when properly called upon, to re-exam-

ine the questions involved, and again subject them to judicial scrutiny. ‘Vs are

by no means unmindful of the salutary tendency of the rule stare decilsis, but at

the same time we cannot be unmindful of the lessons furnished by our own

consciousness, as well as by judicial history, of the liability to error and the

advantages of review.” Per Smith, J., Pratt v. Brown, 3 Wis. 609. And see

Kneeland v. Milwaukee, 15 Wis. 458 ;’ Taylor v. French, 19 Vt. 49; Bellows v.

Parsons, 13 N. H. 256; Hannel v. Smith, 15 Ohio, 134; Day v. Munson, 14

Ohio, N. s. 488; Green Castle, &c., Co. v. State, 28 Ind. 382; Harrow v. Myers,

29 Ind. 469.

Whenever the case is such that judicial decisions which have
been made are to be accepted as law, and followed by the courts
in future cases, it is equally to be expected that they will be followed by other departments of the government also. Indeed in
the great majority of cases the officers of other departments have
no option ; for the courts possess the power to enforce the~r construction of the law as well as to declare it; and a failure to
accept and follow it in one case would only create necessity for
new litigation with similar result. Nevertheless, there are exceptions to this rule which embrace all those cases where new action
is asked of another department, which that department is at libet·ty to grant or refuse for any reasons which it may regard as
sufficient. We cannot conceive that, because the courts have
declared an expiring ·corporation to have been constitutionally
created, the legislature would be bound to renew its charter, or
the executive to sign an net for that purpose, if doubtful of the
constitutional authority, even though no other adverse reasons existed. In the enactment of laws the legislature must act upon its
own reasons; mixed motives of power, justice, and policy influence its action; and it is always justifiable and laudable to lean
against a violation of the constitution. Indeed cases must sometimes occur when a court should refrain from declaring a
[• 54] statute • unconstitutional, because not clearly satisfied
that it is so, when if the judges were to act as legislators
upon the question of its enactment, they ought with the same
views to withhold their assent, from grave doubts upon that subject.
The duty is different in the two cases, and presumptions may control
in one which do not exist in the other. But those cases where new

[561

But when a question involving important public or private rights, extending through all coming time, has been passed upon on a single occasion, and
which decision can in no just sense be said to have been acquiesced in, it is not
only the right, but the duty of the court, when properly called upon, to re-l'xamine the questions involved, and again subject them to judi<:ial scrutiny. We are
by no means unmindful of the salutary tendency of the rule Btare deciaiB, but at
tfle same time we cannot be unmindful of the lessons furnished by our own
consciousness, as well as by judicial history, of the liability to error and the
advantagea of review." Per Smith, J., Pratt "· Brown, 3 Wis. 609. And see
Kneeland v. Milwaukee, 15 Wi~. 458; Taylor v. French, 19 Vt. 49; Bellows "·
Parsons, 13 N. H. 256; Hannel "· Smith, 15 Ohio, 13-!; Day v. Munson, 14
Ohio, N. s. 488; Green Castle, &c., Co. v. State, 28 Ind. 882; Harrow v. Myers,
29 Ind. 469.
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legislation is sought stand by themselves, and are not precedents for
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those which involve only considerations concerning the constitu-

tional validity of existing enactments. The general acceptance of

judicial decisions as authoritative, by each and all, can alone pre-

vent confusion, doubt, and uncertainty, and any other course is

incompatible with a. true government of law.

Construction to be Uniform.

A cardinal rule in dealing with written instruments is that

they are to receive an unvarying interpretation, and that their

practical construction is to be uniform. A constitution is not to

be made to mean one thing at one time, and another at some sub-

legislation is sought stand by themselves, and are not precedents for
those which involve only considerations concerning the constitutional validity of existing enactments. The general acceptance of
judicial decisions as authoritative, by each and all, can alone prevent confusion, doubt, and uncertainty, and any other course is
incompatible with a true government of law.

sequent time when the circumstances may have so changed as

perhaps to make a different rule in the case seem desirable. A

principal share of the beneﬁt expected from written constitutions

Construction to be Uniform.

would be lost if the rules they established were so ﬂexible as to

bend to circumstances or be modiﬁed by public opinion. It is

with special reference to the varying moods of public opinion, and

with a view to putting the fundamentals of government beyond

their control, that these instruments are framed; and there can

be no such steady and imperceptible change in their rules as in-

heres in the principles of the common law. Those beneﬁcent

maxims of the common law which guard person and property
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have grown and expanded until they mean vastly more to us than

they did to our ancestors, and are more minute, particular, and

pervading in their protections; and we may conﬁdently look

forward in the future to still further modiﬁcations in the direc-

tion of improvement. Public sentiment and action eﬂ'ect such

changes, and the courts recognize them ; but a court or legislature

which should allow a change in public sentiment to inﬂuence

it in giving construction to a written constitution not warranted

by the intention of its founders, would be justly chargeable with

reckless disregard of otﬁcial oath and public duty; and if its course

could become a precedent, these instruments would be of

* little avail. The violence of public passion is quite as [* 55]

likely to be in the direction of oppression as in any other ;

and the necessity for bills of rights in our fundamental laws lies

mainly in the danger that the legislature will be inﬂuenced by

temporary excitements and passions among the people to adopt

. [57]

A cardinal rule in dealing with written instruments is that
they are to receive an unvarying interpretation, and that their
practical construction is to be uniform. A constitution is not to
be made to mean one thing at one time, and another at some subsequent time when the circumstances may have so changed as
perhaps to make a different rule in the case seem desirable. A
principal share of the benefit expected from written constitutions
would be lost if the rules they established were so flexible as to
bend to circumstances or be modified by public opinion. It is
with special reference to the varying moods of public opinion, and
with a view to putting the fundamentals of government beyond
their control, that these instruments arc framed; and there can
be no such steady and imperceptible change in their rules as inheres in the principles of the common law. Those beneficent
maxims of the common law which guard person and property
have grown and expanded until they mean vastly more to us than
they did to our ancestors, and are more minute, particular, and
pervading in their protections; and we may confidently look
forward in the future to still further modifications in the direction of improvement. Public sentiment and action effect such
changes, and the courts recognize them; but a court or legislature
which should allow a change in public sentiment to influence
it in giving construction to a written constitution not warranted
by the intention of its founders, would be justly chargeable with
.reckless disregard of official oath and public duty; and if its course
could become a precedent, these instruments would be of
• little avail. The violence of public passion is quite as [• 55]
likely to be in the direction of oppression as in any other ;
and the necessity for bills of rights in our fundamental laws lies
mainly in the danger that the legisla.ture will be influenced by
temporary excitements and passions among the people to adopt

[57]
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oppressive enactments. What a court is to do, therefore, is to

• 55

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
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declare the law as written, leaving it to the people themselves

to make such changes as new circumstances may require} The

meaning of the constitution is ﬁxed when it is adopted, and it is

not different at any subsequent time when a. court has occasion

to pass upon it.”

The Intent to govern.

The object of construction, as applied to a written constitution,

is to give effect to the intent of the people in adopting it. In the

case of all written laws, it is the intent of the lawgiver that is to

be enforced. But this intent is to be found in the instrument

oppressive enactm~nts. What a court is to do, tT1crefore, is to
declare the law as written, leaving it to the people themselves
to make such changes as new circumstances may require. 1 The
meaning of the constitution is fixed when it is adopted, and it is
not different at any subsequent time when a court has occasion
to pass upon it.2

itself. It is to be presumed that language has been employed

The Intent to govern.

with sufficient precision to convey it, and unless examination de-

monstrates that the presumption does not hold good in the partic-

ular case, nothing will remain except to enforce it. “ Where a

law is plain and unambiguous, whether it be expressed in general

or limited terms, the legislature should be intended to mean what

they have plainly expressed, and consequently no room is left for

construction.”3 Possible or even probable meanings, when one

‘ People v. Morrell, 21 Wend. 584; Newell v. People, 7 N. Y. 109; McKoan

v. Devries, 3 Barb. 196.

' Campbell, J., in People v. Blodgett, 13 Mich. 138.
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3 United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 399; Bosley v. Mattingley, 14 B. Monr.

89; Sturgis 1:. Crowninshield, 4 \Vheat. 202; Schooner Paulina‘s Cargo v. United

States, 7 Cranch, 60; Ogden v. Strong, 2 Paine, C. C. 584; United States v.

Ragsdale, 1 Hemp. 497; Southwark Bank v. Commonwealth, 26 Penn. St. 446;

Ingalls v. Cole, 47 Me. 530; McCluskey v. Cromwell, 11 N. Y. 593; Furman v.

New York, 5 Sandf. 16; Newell v. People, 7 N.Y. 83; People v. N. Y. Central

R.R. Co. 24 N. Y. 492; Bidwell v. VVhittaker, 1 Mich. 479; Alexander v.

Worthington, 5 Md. 471; Cantwell v. Owens, 14 Md. 215; Case v. Wildiidge,

41nd. 51; Spencer v. State, 5 Ind. 49; Putnam v. Flint, 10 Pick. 504; Heirs

The object of construction, as applied to a written constitution,
is to give effect to the intent of the people in adopting it. In the
case of all written laws, it is the intent of the lawgiver that is to
be enforced. But this intent is to be found in the instrument
itself. It is to be presumed that language has been employed
with sufficient precision to con>ey it, and unless examination demonstrates that the presumption does not holJ good in the particular case, nothing will remain except to enforce it. " Where a
law is plain and unambiguous, whether it be expressed in general
or limited terms, the legislature should be intended to mean what
they have plainly expressed, and consequently no room is ldt for
construction." 3 Possible or even probable meanings, when ono

of Ludlow v. Johnson, 3 Ohio, 553; District Township v. Dubuque, 7 Iowa,

262; Pattison v. Yuba, 13 Cal. 175; Ezekiel v. Dixon, 3 Kelly, 146; In re

Murphy, 3 Zab. 180; Attorney-General v. Detroit & Erin P. R. Co. W'al. Ch.

394; Smith v. Thursby, 28 Md. 244; State v. Bladsdel, 4 Nev. 241; State v.

Doron, 5 Nev. 399. The remarks of Mr. Justice Bronson in People v. Purdy,

2 Hill, 35, are very forcible in showing the impolicy and danger of looking

beyond the instrument itself to ascertain its meaning, when the terms employed

are positive and free from all ambiguity. “ It is said that the Constitution does

notlextend to public corporations, and therefore a majority vote was sufﬁcient.

I do not so read the Constitution. The language of the clause is: ‘ The assent

[58]

People v. Morrell, 21 Wend. 584; Newell v. People, 7 N.Y. 109; McKoan
"· Devries, 8 Barb. 196.
1 Campbell, J., in People v. Blodgett, 13 1\Iicb. 188.
~ United States"· Fi~her, 2 Crancb, 399; Bosley v. Mattingley, 14 B. Moor.
89; Sturgis v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 202; Schooner Paulina's Cargo v. United
States, 7 Cranch, 60; Ogden v. Strong, 2 Paine, C. C. 58!; United States v.
Ragsdale, 1 Hemp. 497 ; Southwark Bank v. Commonwealth, 26 Penn. St. 446 ;
Ingalls v. Cole, 47 Me. 580; McCluskey v. Cromwell, 11 N. Y. 593; Furman v.
New York, 5 Sandf. 16; Newell v. People, 7 N.Y. 83 ; People v. N. Y. Central
R.:a. Co. 24 N. Y. 492; Bidwell v. Whittaker, 1 Mich. 4i9; Alexander t·.
Worthington, 5 Md. 471; Cantwell v. Owens, 14 Md. 215; Case v. Wihhiclgc,
4: Ind. 51; Spencer v~ State, 5 Ind. 49; Putnam v. Flint, 10 Pick. 50!; Heirs
of Ludlow v. Johnson, 3 Ohio, 553; District Township v. Dubuque, 7 Iowa,
262; Pattison v. Yuba, 18 Cal. 175; Ezekiel v. Dixon, 3 Kelly, 146; In re
Murphy, 3 Zab. 180; Attorney·General v. Detroit & Erin P.R. Co. 'Val. Ch.
394; Smith v. Tbursby, 28 Md. 244; State v. Bladsdel, 4 Nev. 241 ; State v.
Doron, 5 Nev. 899. The remarks of Mr. Justice Broru(Jn in Pl'ople v. Purdy,
2 Hill, 35, are very forcible in showing the impolicy and danger of looking
beyond the instrument itself to ascertain its meaning, when the terms employed
arc positive and free from all ambiguity. "It is said that the Constitution does
not'extend to public corporations, and therefore a majority vote was suffh:ient.
I do not so read the Constitution. The language of the clause is : ' The assen~
1

[58]
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is "plainly declared in the instrument itself, the courts [* 56]

CH. IV.]

CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS.

are not at liberty to search for elsewhere.

of two-thirds of the members elected to each branch of the legislature shall be

requisite to every bill creating, continuing, altering, or renewing any body politic

or corporate.’ These words are as broad in their signiﬁcation as any which

is • plaiuly declared in the instrument itself, the courts
are not at liberty to search for elsewhere.

[• 56]

could have been selected for the occasion from our vocabulary, and there is not

a syllable in the whole instrument tending in the slightestdegree to limit or

quality the universality of the language. If the clause can be so construed that

it shall not extend alike to all corporations, whether public or private, it may

then, I think, be set down as an established fact that the English language is too

poor for the framing of fundamental laws which shall limit the powers of the

legislative branch of the government. No one has, I believe, pretended that

the Constitution, looking at that alone, can be restricted to any particular class

or description of corporations. But it is said that we may look beyond the in-

strument for the purpose of ascertaining the mischief against which the clause

was directed, and thus restrict its operation. But who shall tell us what that

mischief was? Although most men in public life are old enough to remember

the time when the Constitution was framed and adopted, they are not agreed

conceming the particular evils against which this clause was directed. Some

suppose the clause was intended to guard against legislative corruption, and

others that it was aimed at monopolies. Some are of opinion that it only extends

to private without touching public corporations, while others suppose that it only
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restricts the power of the legislature when creating a single corporation, and not

when they are made by the hundred. In this way a solemn instrument — for so

I think the Constitution should be considered—is made to mean one thing by

one man and something else by another, until, in the end, it is in danger of being

rendered a mere dead letter; and that, too, where the language is so plain and

explicit that it is impossible to mean more than one thing, unless we ﬁrst lose

sight of the instrument itself, and allow ourselves to roam at large in the bound-

less ﬁelds of speculation. For one, I dare not venture upon such a course.

VVritten constitutions of government will soon come to be regarded as of little

value if their injunctions may be thus lightly overlooked; and the experiment of

setting a boundary to power will prove a failure. \Ve are not at liberty to pre-

sume that the framers of the Constitution, or the people who adopted it, did not

understand the force of language." See also same case, 4 Ilill, 384, and State

u. King, 44 Mo. 285. Another Court has said: “This power of construe-

tion in courts is a mighty one, and, unrestrained by settled rules, would tend to

throw a painful uncertainty over the eﬂ'ect that might be given to the most plainly

worded statutes, and render courts, in reality, the legislative power of the State.

Instances are not wanting to conﬁrm this. Judge-made law has overrode the

legislative department. It was the boast of Chief Justice Pemberlon, one of the

judges of the despot Charles II., and not the worst even of those times, that he

had entirely outdone the Parliament in making law. We think that system of

jurisprudence best and safest which controls most by ﬁxed rules, and leaves least

to the discretion of the judge; a doctrine constituting one of the points of supe-

riority in the common law over that system which has been administered in

France, where authorities had no force, and the law of each case was what the
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of two-thirds of the members elected to each branch of the legislature shall be
requisite to e.:ery bill creating, continuing, altering, or renewing any body politic
or corporate.' These words are as broad in their signification as any which
could hne been selected for the occasion from our vocabulary, and there is not
a llyllable in the whole instrument tending in the slightest· degree to limit or
quali(v the universality of the language. If the clause can be so construed that
it shall not extend alike to all corporations, whether public or private, it may
then, I think, be set down as an established fact that the English language is too
poor for the framing of fundamental laws which shall limit the powers of the
legislative branch of the government. No ·one has, I believe, pretended that
the Constitution, looking at that alone, can be restricted to any particular class
or description of corporations. But it is said that we may look beyond the in·
strument for the purpose of ascertaining the mischief agaimt whil·h the clause
was directed, and thus restrict its operation. But who shall tell us what that
mischief was? Although most men in public life are old enough to remember
the time when the Constitution was framed and adopted, they are not agreed
concerning the particular evils against which this clause was directed. Some
suppose the clause was intended to guard against legislative corruption, and
others that it was aimed at monopolies. Some are of opinion that it only extends
to pri,·ate without touching public corporations, while others suppose that it only
ref>tricts the power of the legislature when creating a single corporation, and not
when they are made by the hundred. In this way a solemn instrument- for so
I think the Constitution should be considered- is made to mean one thing by
one man and something else by another, until, in the end, it is in danger of being
rendered a mere dead letter; and that, too, where the language is so plain and
explicit that it is impossible to mean more than one thing, unless we first lose
sight of the instrument itself, and allow ourselves to roam at large in the bound·
less fields of speculation. For one, I dare not venture upon such a course.
Written constitutions of governml'nt will soon come to be regarded as of little
value if their injunctions may be thus lightly overlooked; and the experiment of
setting a boundary to power will prove a failure. '\Ve are not at liberty to pre·
sume that the framers of the Constit1,1tion, or the people who adopted it, did not
understand the force of language." See also same case, 4 Hill, 88!, and State
t'. King, 44 Mo. 285.
Another Court bas said: "This power of construction in courts is a mighty one, and, unrestrained by settled rules, would tend to
throw a painful uncertainty over the effect that might be given to the most plainly
wonled statutes, and render courts, in reality, the legislative power of the State.
Instances are not wauting to confirm thi~. Judge·made law has overrode the
legislative department. It was the boast of Chief Justice Ptmberton, one of the
judges of the despot Charles II., and not the worst even of those times, that he
had entirely outdone the Parliament in making law. We think that system of
jurisprudence best and saft!st which controls most by fixeu rules, and leaves least
to the discretion of the judge; a doctrine constituting one of the points of superiority in the common law over that system which has been administered in
:France, where authorities had no force, and the law of each case was what the
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[*‘ 57] * “ Whether we are considering an agreement between
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parties, a statute, or a constitution, with a view to its in-

terpretation, the thing which we are to seek is the thought which it

expresses. To ascertain this, the ﬁrst resort in all cases is to the

natural signiﬁcation of the words employed, in the order of gram-

matical arrangement in which the framers of the instrument have

placed them; If thus regarded the words embody a deﬁnite mean-

ing, which involves no absurdity and no contradiction between

diﬂerent parts of the same writing, then that meaning, apparent

on the face of the instrument, is the one which alone we are at

liberty to say was intended to‘ be conveyed. In such a case there

is no room for construction. That which the words declare is the

meaning of the instrument, and neither courts nor legislatures

have a. right to add to or take away from that meaning.” 1

The whole Instrument to be examined.

Nor is it lightly to be inferred that any portion of a written law

is so ambiguous as to require extrinsic aid in its construction.

Every such instrument is adopted as a whole, and a clause which,

standing by itself, might seem of doubtful import, may yet be

made plain by comparison with other clauses or portions of the

same law. It is therefore a rule of construction, that the u-hole is

*" Whether we are considering an agreement between
parties, a statute, or a constitution, with a view to its interpretation, the thing which we are to seek is the thought which it
expresses. To ascertain this, the fit·st resort in all cases is to the
natural signification of the words employed, in the order of grammatical arrangement in which the framers of the instrument have
placed them. If thus regarded the words embody a definite meaning, which involves no absurdity and no contradiction between
different parts of the same writing, then that meaning, apparent
on the face of the instrument, is the one which alone we are at
liberty to say was intended to be conveyed. In such a case there
is no room for construction. That which the words declare is the
meaning of the instrument, and neither courts nor legislatures
have a right to add to or take away from that meaning." 1
[*57]

to be examined with a view to arriving at the true 2'~ntentz'on of
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each part; and this Sir Edward Coke regardspthe most natural

and genuine method of expounding a statute? “If any section

[of a law] be intricate, obscure, or doubtful, the proper mode of

discovering its true meaning is by comparing it with the other

judge of the case saw ﬁt to make it. VVe admit that the exercise of an unlimited

discretion may, in a particular instance, be attended with a salutary result; still

history informs us that it has often been thelcase that the‘ arbitrary discretion of

a judge was the law ofa tyrant, and warns us that it may be so again.” Spencer

v. State, 5 Ind. 76. “ Judge-made law,” as here employed, is that made by

judicial decisions which construe away the meaning of statutes, or ﬁnd meanings

in them the legislature never held. The phrase is sometimes used as meaning,

simply, the law that becomes established by precedent. The uses and necessity

of judicial legislation are considered at length by Mr. Austin, in his Province

of Jurisprudence.

‘ Newell v. People, 7 N. Y. 97. And see Den v. Reid, 10 Pet. 524; Green-

castle Township v. Black, 5 Ind. 569; Bartlett v. Morris, 9 Port. 266; Leonard

v. l|Viseman, 31 Md. 204, perBarlol, Ch. J. ; McAdoo v. Benbow, 63 N. C. 464;

The whole Instrume-nt to be examined.
Nor is it lightly to be inferred that any portion of a written law
is so ambiguous as to require extrinsic aid in its construction.
Every such instrument is adopted as a whole, and a clause which,
standing by itself, might seem of doubtful import, may yet be
made plain by comparison with other clauses or portions of the
same law. It is therefore a rule of construction, that the U'hole is
to be examined with a view to arriving at the true intention of
each part; and this Sir Edward Coke regards the most natural
and genuine method of expounding a statute.2 " If any section
[of a law] be intricate, obscure, or doubtful, the proper mode of
discovering its true meaning is by comparing it with the other

Broom’s Maxims (5th Am. ed.), 551, marg.

’ Co. Lit. 381, a.
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judge of the case saw fit to make it. 'Ve admit that the exercise of an unlimited
diseretion may, in a particular instance, be attended with a salutary result; still
history informs us that it has often been the· case that the arbitrary discretion of
a judge was the law of a tyrant, and warns us that it may be so again." Spencer
v. State, 5 Ind. 76. "Judge-made law," as here employed, is that made by
judicial decitiions which construe away the meaning of statutes, or find meanings
in them the legislature never held. The phrase is sometimes used as meaning,
simply, the law that becomes established by precedent. Themes and necessity
of judicial lPgislation are considered at length by l'rlr. Austin, in his Province
of Jurisprudence.
1 Newell v. People, 7 N. Y. 97.
And see Den v. Reid, 10 Pet. 524; Greencastle Township v. Black, 5 Ind. 569 ; Bartlett v. Morris, 9 Port. 266 ; Leonard
v. 'Viseman, 31l'rld. 204, per Bartol, Ch. J.; McAdoo v. Benbo,v, 63 N.C. 464;
Broom's Maxims (5th Am. ed.), 551, marg.
1 Co. Lit. 381, a.
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sections, and ﬁnding out the sense of one clause by the words or
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obvious intent of another.”1 And in making this comparison it

is not to be supposed that any words have been employed without

occasion, or without intent that they should have effect as

part of "* the law. The rule applicable here is, that qﬁect [* 58]

is to be given, if possible, to the whole instrument, and to

every section and clause. If different portions seem to conﬂict,

the courts must harmonize them, if practicable, and lean in favor

of a construction which will render every word operative, rather

than one which may make some idle and nugatory?

This rule is especially applicable to written constitutions, in

which the people will be presumed to have expressed themselves

in careful and measured terms, corresponding with the immense

importance of the powers delegated, leaving as little as possible to

implication.“ It is scarcely conceivable that a case can arise

where a court would be justiﬁable in declaring any portion of a

written constitution nugatory because of ambiguity. One part

may qualify another so as to restrict its operation, or apply it

otherwise than the natural construction would require if it stood

by itself; but one part is not to be allowed to defeat another, if

by any reasonable construction the two can be made to stand to-

gether.4
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In interpreting clauses we must presume that words have been

employed in their natural and ordinary meaning. Says Marslzall,

Ch. J .: “ The framers of the Constitution, and the people who

' Stowell v. Lord Zouch, Plowd. 365; Broom’s Maxims, 521.

' Attorney-General v. Detroit and Erin Plank Road Co. 2 Mich. 138; People

o. Burns, 5 Mich. 114; District Township v. Dubuque, 7 Iowa, 262; Manly v.

State, 7 Md. 135; Parkinson v. State, 14 Md. 184; Belleville Railroad Co. o.

Gregory, 15 Ill. 20:, Ogden v. Strong, 2 Paine, C. C. 584; Ryegate‘v. Wards-

boro, 30 Vt. 746; Brooks v. Mobile School Commissioners, 31 Ala. 227; Den

v. Dubois, 1 Harrison, 285; Den v. Schenck, 3 Halst. 34.

° Wolcott v. “Tigton, 7 Ind. 49; People v. Purdy, 2 Hill, 36, per Bronson, J. ;

Greencastle Township v. Black, 5 Ind. 570; Green v. Weller, 32 Miss. 650.

‘ It is a general rule, in the construction of writings, that, u. general intent

appearing, it shall control the particular intent; but this rule must sometimes

give way, and effect must be given to a particular intent plainly expressed in one

sections, and finding out the sense of one clause by the words or
obvious intent of another." 1 And in making this comparison it
is not to be supposed that any words have been employed without
occMion, or without intent that they should have effect as
part of • the law. The rule applicable here is, that effect [• 58]
is to be given, if possible, to the whole instrument, and to
every section and clause. If different portions seem to conflict,
the courts must harmonize them, if practicable, and lean in favor
of a construction which will render every word operative, rather
than one which may make some idle and nugatory.2
This rule is especially applicable to written constitutions, in
which the people will be presumed to have expressed themselves
in careful and measured terms, corresponding with the immense
importance of the powers delegated, leaving as little as possible to
implication. 3 It is scarcely conceivable that a case can arise
where a court would be justifiable in declaring any portion of a
written constitution nugatory because of ambiguity. One part
may qualify another so as to restrict its operation, or apply it
otherwise than the natural construction would require if it stood
by itself; but one part is not to be allowed to defeat another, if
by any reasonable construction the two can be made to stand together.4
In interpreting clauses we must presume that words have been
employed in tlteir natural and ordinary meaning. Says Mars/tall,
Ch. J. : " The framers of the Constitution, and the people who

part of a constitution, though apparently opposed to a general intent deduced

from other parts. \Varren v. Sherman, 5 Texas, 441. In Quick v. Whitewater

Township, 7 Ind. 570, it was said that if two provisions of awritten constitution

are irreconcilably repugnant, that which is last in order of time and in local posi-

tion is to be preferred.
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Stowell v. Lord Zouch, Plowd. 865; Broom's Maxims, 521.
' Attorney-General v. Detroit and Erin Plank Road Co. 2 .Mich. 138; People
v. Burns, 5 1\lich. 114; District Township v. Dubuque, 7 Iowa, 2G2; Manly v.
State, 7 1\Id. 135; Parkinson v. State, 14 Md. 184; Belleville Railroad Co. v.
Gregory, 15 Ill. 20; Ogden t1. Strong, 2 Paine, C. C. 58!; Ryegate'v. Wardsboro, 30 Vt. 746; Brooks t1. Mobile School Commissioners, 31 Ala. 227; Den
v. Dubois, 1 Harri:~on, 285; Den v. Schenck, 3 Haist. 34.
3 Wolcott v. Wigton, 7 Ind. 49; People v. Purdy, 2 Hill, 86, per Bronson, J.;
Greencastle Township"· Black, 5 Ind. 670; Green"· Weller, 82 l'tfiss. 650.
4 It is a general rule, in the construction of writings, that, a general intent
appearing, it shall control the particular intent; but this rule must sometimes
give way, and effect must be given to a particular intent plainly expre~sed in one
part of a constitution, though apparently opposed to a general intent deduced
from other parts. Warren t1. Shennan, 5 Texas, 441. In Quick "·Whitewater
Township, 7 Ind. 570, it was said that if two provisions of a written constitution
are irreconcilably repugnant, that which is last in order of time and in local position is to be preferred.
1
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adopted it, must be understood to have employed words in their

• 58
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natural sense, and to have understood what they meant.” 1 This

is but saying that no forced or unnatural construction is to be put

upon their language; and it seems so obvious a truism

[* 59] that one "‘expects to see it universally accepted without

question ; but the attempt is so often made by interested

subtlety and ingenious reﬁnement to induce the courts to force

from these instruments a meaning which their framers never held,

that it frequently becomes necessary to re-declare this fundamen-

tal maxim.“ Narrow and technical reasoning is misplaced when

it is brought to bear upon an instrument framed by the people

themselves, for themselves, and designed as a chart upon which

every man, learned and unlearned, may be able to trace the lead-

ing principles of government.

But it must not be forgotten, in construing our constitutions,

that in many particulars they are but the legitimate successors of

‘ Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 \Vhcat. 188.

’ State v. Mace, 5 Md. 337; Manly v. State, 7 Md. 135; Green v. Weller,

32 Miss. 650; Greencastle Township v. Black, 5 Ind. 570; People v. N. Y. Cen-

tral Railroad Co. 34 Barb. 137, and 24 N. Y. 488; Story on Const. § 453.

" The true sense in which words are used in a statute is to be ascertained gen-

erally by taking them in their ordinary and popular signiﬁcation, or if they be
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terms of art, in their technical signiﬁcation. But it is also a cardinal rule of

exposition, that the intention is to be deduced from the whole and every part of

adopted it, must be understood to have employed words in their
natural sense, and to have understood what they meant." 1 This
is but saying that no forced or unnatural construction is to be put
upon their language ; and it seems so obvious a truism
[*59] that one • expects to see it universally accepted without
question ; but the attempt is so often made by interested
subtlety and ingenious refinement to induce the courts to force
from these instruments a meaning which their framers never held,
that it frequently becomes necessary to re-declare this fundamental maxim.~ Narrow and technical reasoning is misplaced when
it is brought to bear upon an instrument framed by the people
themselves, for themselves, and designed as a chart upon which
every man, learned and unlearned, may be able to trace the leading principles of government.
But it must not be forgotten, in construing our constitutions,
that in many particulars they are but the legitimate successors of

the statute, taken and compared together, from the words of the context, and

such a construction adopted as will best effectuate the intention of the lawgiver.

One part is referred to in order to help the construction of another, and the

intent of the legislature is not to be collected from any particular expression,

but from a general view of the whole act. Dwarris, 658, 698, 702, 703. And

when it appears that the framers have used a word in a particular sense gener-

ally in the act, it will be presumed that it was intended to be used in the same

sense throughout the act, unless an intention to give it a different signiﬁcation

plainly appears in the particular part of the act alleged to be an exception to

the general meaning indicated. Ibid. 704, at seq. \Vhen words are used to which

the legislature has given a plain and'deﬁnite import in the act, it would be dan-

gerous to put upon them a construction which would amount to holding that the

legislature did not mean what it has expressed. It follows from these principles

that the statute itself furnishes the best means of its own exposition; and if the

sense in which words were intended to be used can be clearly ascertained from

all its parts and provisions, the intention thus indicated shall prevail, without

resorting to other means of aiding in the construction. And these familiar rules

of construction apply with at least as much force to the construction of written

constitutions as to statutes; the former being presumed to be framed with much

greater care and consideration than the latter." Green v. Weller, 32 Miss. 678.
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1 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 188.
' State v. Mace, 51\IJ. 33i; Manly v. State, 7 Md. 135; Green v. Weller,
321\li:>s. 650; Greeneastle Township v. Black, 5 Ind. biO; People v. N.Y. Central Railroad Co. 34: Barb. 137, and 24 N. Y. 488; Story on Con~t. § 453.
"The true sense in which words are used in a. statute is to be ascertained generally by taking them in their ordinary and popular signification, or if they be
terms of art, in their technical signifi~.:ation. But it is also a cardinal rule of
exposition, that the intention is to be deduced from the whole and every part of
the statute, taken and compared together, from the word" of the context, and
such a construction adopted as will best eff~ctuate the intention of the lawgiver.
One part is reft'rred to in order to help the construction of another, and the
intent of the legislature is not to be collected from any particular expre~sion,
but from a general view of the whole act. Dwarris, 658, 698, 702, i03. And
when it appears that the framers have used a word in a. particular sense generally in the act, it will be presumed that it was intended to he used iri the same
sense thronghout the act, unless a.n intention to give it a different signification
plainly appears in the particular part of the act alleged to be an exception to
the general meaning indicated. Ibid. 704, et seq. 'When words are used to which
the legislature has given a plain and' definite import in the act, it woula. be dangerous to put upon them a construction which would amount to holding that the
legislature did not mean what it has expressed. It follows from these principles
that the statute itself furnishes the best means of its own exposition; and if the
sense in which words were intended to he used can be clearly ascertained ft-om
all its parts and provisions, the intention thus indicated shall prevail, without
resorting to other means of aiding in the construl-tion. And these familiar rules
of construction apply with at least a.s much force to the construction of written
constitutions all to statutes; the former being presumed to be framed with much
greater care and consideration than the latter." Green v. Weller, 32 Miss. 678.
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the great charters of English liberty, whose provisions
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of the rights of the subject have acquired a well-unde1'sm<)lQ_J1¢:‘ﬁt\',_-;~.

3

".

ing, which the people must be supposed to have had‘ ' “Q42? \

adopting them. We cannot understand these provisions u

understand their history; and when we ﬁnd them ex-

pressed in ‘technical words, and words of art, we must [* 60]

suppose these words to be employed in their technical

sense. When the constitution speaks of an ea: post facto law, it

means a law technically known by that designation; the meaning

of the phrase having become deﬁned in the history of constitu-

tional law, and being so familiar to the people that it is not neces-

sary to employ language of a more popular character to designate

it. The technical sense in these cases is the sense popularly un-

derstood, because that is the sense ﬁxed upon the words in legal

and constitutional history where they have been employed for the

protection of popular rights.‘

The Common Law to be kept in View.

In the same connection it may be remarked that the constitu-

tions are to be construed in the light of the common law, and of the

fact that its rules are still left in force. By this we do not mean
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‘ It is quite possible, however, in applying constitutional maxims, to overlook

entirely the reason upon which they rest, and “considering merely the letter, go

the great charters of English liberty, whose provisions ~
of the rights of the subject have acquired a well-unders~i.~~··,
ing, which the people must be supposed to have had' ~~~ .'
adopting them. We cannot understand these provisions ~e·-'
· understand their history; and when we find them expressed in • technical words, and words of art, we must [• 60]
suppose these words to be employed in their technical
sense. When the constitution speaks of an ex poBtjacto law, it
means a law technically known by that designation ; the meaning
of the phrase having become defined in the history of constitutional law, and being so familiar to the people that it is not necessary to employ language of "a more popular character to designate
it. The technical sense in these cases is the sense popularly understood, because that is the sense fixed upon the words in legal
and constitutional history where they have been employed for the
protection of popular rights. 1

but skin decp into the meaning.“ On the great debate on the motion for with-

drawing the conﬁdence of Parliament from the ministers, after the surrcnder of

The Common Law to be kept in View.

Cornwallis, —a debate which called out the best abilities of Fox and Pitt as well

as of the ministry, and necessarily led to the discussion of the primary principle

in free government, that taxation and representation shall go together, —Sir

James Mariott rose, and with great gravity proceeded to say, that if taxation

and representation were to go hand in hand, then Britain had an undoubted

In the same connection it may be remarked that the constitutions are to be construed in the light of the common law, and of the
fact that its rules are still left in force. By this we do not mean

right to tax America, because she was represented in the British Parliament.

She was represented by the members for the county of Kent, of which the thir-

teen provinces were a part and parcel; for in their charters they were to hold of

the manor of Greenwich in Kent, of which manor they were by charter to be

parcel! The opinion, it is said, “ raised a very loud laugh,” but Sir James con-

tinued to support it, and concluded by declaring that he would give the motion

a hearty negative. Thus would he have settled a great principle of constitu-

tional right, for which a seven years’ bloody war had been waged, by putting it

in the form of a meaningless legal ﬁction. Hansard‘s Debates, Vol. XXIL,

p. 1184. Lord Mahon, following Lord Campbell, refers the origin of this won-

derful argument to Mr. Hardinge, a \Velsh judge, and nephew of Lord Camden.

7 Mahon’s Hist. 139. He was said to have been a good lawyer, but must have

read the history of his country to little purpose.

. [63]

1 It is quite possible, however, in applying constitutional maxims, to overlook
entirely the reason upon which they rest, and ''considering merely the letter, go
but skin de(•p into the meaning." On the great debate on the motion for withdrawing the confidence or Parliament from the ministers, after the I!Urrl·nder of
Cornwallis, - a debate which called out the best abilities of Fox and Pitt as well
&I! of the ministry, and necessarily led to the discussion of the primary principle
in free government, that taxation and representation Bhall go together,- Sir
James 1\Iariott rose, and with great gravity proceeded to say, that if taxation
and representation were to go hand in band, then Britain bad an undoubted
right to tax America, because she was represented in the British Parliament.
She was represented by the members for the county of Kent, of which the thirteen provinces were a part and parcel; for in their charters they were to hold of
the manor of Greenwich in Kent, of which manor they were by charter to be
pared! Tb~ opinion, it is said, " raised a very loud laugh," but Sir James continued to support it, and concluded by dedaring that he would give the motion
a hearty negative. Thus would he have settled a great prineiple of constitutional right, for which a seven years' bloody war had been waged, by putting it
in the fonn of a meaningless legal fiction. Hansard's Debates, Vol. XXII.,
p. 1184. Lord Mahon, following Lord Campbell, refers the origin of this wonderful argument to :Mr. Hardinge, a Welsh judge, and nephew of Lord Camden.
7 Mahon's Hist. 139. He was said to have been a good lawyer, but must have
read the history of his country to little purpose .

•
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that the common law is to control the constitution, or that the

[CH. IV.

latter is to be warped and perverted in its meaning in order that

no inroads, or as few as possible, may be made in the system of

common-law rules, but only that for its deﬁnitions we are to draw

from that great fountain, and that, in judging what it means,

[*‘ 61] we ‘are to keep in mind that it is not the beginning of

law for the State, but that it assumes the existence of a

well-understood system, which is still to remain in force and be

administered, but under such limitations and restrictions as that

instrument imposes. It is a maxim with the courts that statutes

in derogation of the common law shall be construed strictly;1 a

maxim which we fear is sometimes perverted to the overthrow of

the legislative intent; but the same maxim could seldom be prop-

erly applied to constitutions. When these instruments assume to

make any change in the common law, the change designed is gen-

erally a radical one; but as they do not go minutely into particu-

lars, like the statutes, it will sometimes be easy to defeat a provis-

ion, if courts are at liberty to say that they will presume against

any intention to alter the common law further than is expressly

declared. A reasonable construction is what such an instrument

demands and should receive; and the real question is, what the

people meant, and not how meaningless their words can be made
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by the application of arbitrary rules?

‘ Broom's Maxims, 33; Sedg. on Stat. & Const. Law, 313.

' Under a clause of the Constitution of Michigan which provided that " the

real and personal estate of every female acquired before marriage, and all prop-

erty to which she may afterwards become entitled, by gift, grant, inheritance, or

devise, shall be and remain the estate and property of such female, and shall not

be liable for the debts, obligations, or engagements of her husband, and may be

devised or bequeathed by her as if she were unmarried,” it was held that a mar-

ried woman could not sell her personal property without the consent of her

husband, inasmuch as the power to do so was not expressly conferred, and the

clause, being in derogation of the common law, was not to be extended by con-

struction. Brown v. Fiﬁeld, 4 Mich. 322. The danger of applying arbitrary

that the common law is to control the constitution, or that the
latter is to be warped and perverted in its meaning in order that
no inroads, or as few as possible, may be made in the system of
common-law rules, but only that for its definitions we are to draw
from that great fountain, and that, in judging what it means,
[* 61] we • are to keep in mind that it is not the beginning of
law for the State, but that it assumes the existence of a
well-understood system, which is still to remain in force and be
administered, but under such limitations and restrictions as that
instrument imposes. It is a maxim with the courts that statutes
in derogation of the common law shaJI be construed strictly ; 1 a
maxim which we fear is sometimes perverted to the overthrow of
the legislative intent; but the same maxim could seldom be properly applied to constitutions. When these instruments assume to
make any change in the common law, the change designed is generally a radical one; but as they do not go minutely into particulars, like the statutes, it will sometimes be easy to defeat a provision, if courts are at liberty to say that they will presume against
any intention to alter the common law further than is expressly
declared. A reasonable construction is what such an instrument
demands and should receive; and the real question is, what the
people meant, and not how meaningless their words can be made
by the application of arbitrary rules. 2

rules in the construction of constitutional principles might well, as it seems to us,

be illustrated by this case. For while on the one hand it might be contended

that, as a provision in derogation of the common law, the one quoted should

receive a strict construction, on the other hand it might be insisted with perhaps

equal reason that, as a remedial provision, in furtherance of natural right and

justice, it should be liberally construed, to effect the beneﬁcial purpose had in

view. Thus arbitrary rules, of directly opposite tendency and force, would be

contending for the mastery in the same case. The subsequent decisions under

[641 '

Broom's Maxims, 88; Sedg. on Stat. & Const. Law, 813.
Under a clause of the Constitution of :Michigan which provided that "the
real and personal estate of every female acquired before marriage, and all property to which she may afterwards become entitled, by gift, grant, inheritance, or
devise, shall be and remain the estate and property of such female, and shall not
be liable for the debts, obligations, or engagements of her husband, and may be
devised or bequeathed by her as if she were unmarried," it was held that a married woman could not sell her personal property without the consent of her
husband, inasmuch as the power to do so was not expressly conferred, and the
clause, being in derogation of the common law, was not to be extended by construction. Brown v. Fifield, 4 1\lich. 322. The danger of applying arbitrary
rules in the construction of constitutional principles might well, as it seems to us,
be illustrated by this case. For while on the one hand it might be contended
that, as a provision in derogation of the common law, the one quoted should
receive a strict construction, on the other hand it might be insisted with perhaps
equal reason that, as a remedial provision, in furtherance of natural right and
justice, it should be liberally construed, to effect the beneficial purpose had in
view. Thus arbitrary rules, of directly opposite tendency and force, would be
contending for the mastery in the same case. The subsequent decisions under
1

1
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* As a general thing, it is to be supposed that the same [* 62]
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word is used in the same sense wherever it occurs in a

constitution. Here again, however, great caution must be observed

in applying an arbitrary rule; for, as Mr. Story has well observed,

"‘ It does not follow, either logically or grammatically, that because a

word is found in one connection in the Constitution with a deﬁnite

sense, therefore the same sense is to be adopted in every other

connection in which it occurs. This would be to suppose that the

framers weighed only the force of single words, as philologists or

critics, and not whole clauses and objects, as statesmen and prac-

tical reasoners. And yet nothing has been more common than to

subject the Constitution to this narrow and mischievous criticism}

Men of ingenious and subtle minds, who seek for symmetry and

harmony in language, having found in the Constitution a word

used in some sense, which falls in with their favorite theory of

interpreting it, have made that the standard by which to measure

its use in every other part of the instrument. They have thus

stretched it, as it were, on the bed of Procrustes, lopping oﬂ‘ its

meaning when it seemed too large for their purposes, and extend-

ing it when it seemed too short. They have thus distortbd it to

the most unnatural shapes, and crippled where they have sought

only to adjust its proportions according to their own opinions.”2
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And he gives many instances where, in the national Constitution,

the same word is very plainly used with different meanings. So

that, while the rule may be sound as one of presumption merely,

its force is but slight, and it must readily give way to a diﬁ"erent

intent appearing in the instrument. '

the same provision do not appear to have followed this lead. See \Vhite v. Zane,

10 Mich. 333; McKee 1'. \Vilcox, 11 Mich. 358; Farr v. Sherman, 11 Mich. 33;

\Vatson v. Thurber, 11 Mich. 457; Burdeno 0. Amperse, 14 Mich. 91; Tong v.

Marvin, 15 Mich. 60; Tillman v. Shackleton, 15 Mich. 447. The common law

is certainly to be kept in view in the interpretation of such a clause, since other-

wise we do not ascertain the evil designed to be remedied, and perhaps are not

able to fully understand and explain the terms employed; but it is to be looked

at with a view to the real intent, rather than for the purpose of arbitrarily

restraining it. '

' See remarks of Johnson, J., in Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 290.

' Story on Const. § 454. And see Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 19.
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• As a general thing, it is to be supposed that the same [• 62]
word is used in the same sense wherever it occurs in a
constitution. Here again, however, great caution must be observed
in applying an arbitrary rule; for, as Mr. Story has well observed,
"' It docs not follow, either logically or grammatically, that because a
word is found in one connection in the Constitution with a definite
sense, therefore the same sense is to be adopted in every other
connection in which it occurs. This would be to suppose that the
framers weighed only the force of single words, as philologists or
critics, and not whole clauses and objects, as statesmen and practical reasoners. And yet nothing has been more common than to
subject the Constitution to this narrow and mischievous criticism. 1
Men of ingenious and subtle minds, who seek for symmetry and
harmony in language, having found in the Constitution a word
used in some sense, which falls in with their favorite theory of
interpreting it, have made that the standard by which to measure
its use in every other part of the instrument. They have thus
stretched it, as it were, on the bed of Procrustes, lopping off its
meaning when it seemed too large for their purposes, and extending it when it seemed too short. They have thus distorted it to
the most unnatural shapes, and crippled where they have sought
only to adjust its proportions according to their own opinions." 2
And he gives many instances where, in the national Constitution,
the same word is very plainly used with different meanings. So
that, while the rule may be sound as one of presumption merely'
its force is but slight, and it must readily give way to a different
intent appearing in the instrument.
the same provision do not appear to have followed this lead. See \Vhite "· Zane,
10 liich. 333; McKee t•. Wilcox, 11 :Mich. 3.58; Farr "· Sherman, 11 Mich. 33;
Watson"· Thurber, 11 Mich. 4l>7; Burdeno "· Amperse, 14 Mich. 91; Tong "·
Marvin, 15 Mich. 60; Tillman v. Shackleton, 15 l\Iich. 447. The common law
is certainly to be kept in view in the interpretation of sul·h a clause, since otherwise we do not ascertain the evil designed to be remedied, and perhaps are not
able to fully understand and explain the terms employed; but it is to be looked
at with a view to the real intent, rather than for the purpose of arbitrarily
restraining it.
1 See remark!! of John&an, J., in Ogden"· Saunders, 12 Wheat. 290.
1 Story on Const. § 4b!.
And ace Cherokee Nation"· Georgia, 6 Pet. 19.
6
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(CH. IV •

Operation to be Prospective.

We shall venture also to express the opinion that a constitution

Operation UJ be Prospective.

should operate prospectively only, unless the words employed show

a clear intention that it should have a retrospective eﬁ"ect. This

is the rule in regard to statutes, and it is “one of such obvious

convenience and justice, that it must always be adhered to in the

construction of statutes, unless there is something on the face of

the enactment putting it beyond doubt that the legislature meant

it to operate retrospectively.” 1 Retrospective legislation,

[* 63] except "when designed to cure formal defects, or other-

wise operate remedially, is commonly objectionable in

principle, and apt to result in injustice; and it is a sound rule of

construction which refuses lightly to imply an intent to enact it.

And we are aware of no reasons applicable to ordinary legislation

which do not, upon this point, apply equally well to constitutions.”

' Moon v. Durden, 2 Exch. 22. See Dash v. Van Kleek, 7 Johns. 477;

Sayre v._Wisner, 8 Wend. 661; State v. Atwood, 11 Wis. 422; Hastings v.

Lane, 3 Shep. 134; Brown v. Wilcox, 14 S. & M. 127; Price 1:. Mott, 52 Penn.

St. 315; Ea: parte Graham, 13 Rich. 277; Broom‘s Maxims, 28.

' In Allbyer v. State, 10 Ohio, N. S. 588, a question arose under the provision

of the constitution that “ all laws of a general nature shall have a uniform opera-
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tion throughout the State." Another clause provided that all laws then in force,

not inconsistent with the constitution, should continue in force until amended or

We shall venture also to express the opinion that a constitution
slwuld operate prospectively only~ unless the words employed show
a clear intention that it should have a retrospective effect. This
is the rule in regard to statutes, and it is " one of such obvious
convenience and justice, that it must always be adhered to in the
construction of statutes, unless there is something on the face of
the enactment putting it beyond doubt that the legislature meant
it to operate retrospectively." 1 Retrospective legislation,
[• 63] except • when designed to cure formal defects, or otherwise operate remedially, is commonly objectionable in
principle, and apt to result in injustice ; and it is a sound rule of
construction which refuses lightly to imply an intent to enact it.
And we are aware of no reasons applicable to ordinary legislation
which do not, upon this point, apply equally well to constitutions.2

repealed. Allbyer was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment under a crimes

act previously in force, applicable to Hamilton County only, and the question

was, whether that act was not inconsistent with the provision above quoted, and

therefore repealed by it. The court held that the provision quoted evidently had

regard to future and not to past legislation, and therefore was not repealed. A

similar decision was made in State v. Barbee, 3 Ind. 258. See also State v.

Thompson, 2 Kansas, 432; Slack o. Maysville, &c., R.R. Co. 13 B. Monr. 1;

State v. Macon County Court, 41 Mo. 453. In Matter of Oliver Lee & Co.’s

Bank, 21 N. Y. 12, Denio, J., says: “ The rule laid down in Dash v. Van Kleek,

7 Johns. 477, and other cases of that class, by which the courts are admonished

to avoid, if possible, such an interpretation as would give a statute a retrospect-

ive operation, has but a limited application, if any, to the construction of a con-

stitution. When, therefore, _we read in the provision under consideration, that

the stockholders of every banking corporation shall be subject to a certain lia-

bility, we are to attribute to the language its natural meaning, without inquiring

whether private interests may not be prejudiced by such a sweeping mandate."

The remark was obiter, as it was found that enough appeared in the constitution

to show clearly that it was intended to apply to existing, as well as to subse-

quently created banking institutions.

[66]

Moon o. Durden, 2 Exch. 22. See Dash o. Van Kleek, 7 Johns. 477;
Sayre o. Wisner, 8 Wend. 661; State v. Atwood, 11 Wis. 422; Hastings o.
J..ane, 8 Shep. 184; Brown o. Wilcox, 14 S. & M. 127; Price v. Mott, 52 Penn.
St. 815; Ez parte Graham, 18 Rich. 277; Broom'a Maxims, 28.
1 In Allbyer "· State, 10 Ohio, N. s. 588, a question arose under the provision
of the constitution that "all laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation throughout the State." Another clause provided that alllawd then in foree,
not inconsistent with the constitution, shouJd continue in force until amended or
repealed. Allbyer was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment under a crimes
act previously in force, applicable to Hamilton County only, and the question
was, whether that act was noll inconsistent with the provision above quoted, and
therefore repealed t>y it. The court held that the provision quoted evidently had
regard to future and not to past legislation, and therefore was not repealed. A
similar deci~ion was made in State o. Barbee, 8 Ind. 258. See also State v.
Thompson, 2 Kansas, 432 ; Slack o. May1wille, &c., R.R. Co. 18 B. Monr. 1;
State"· Macon County Court, 41 Mo. 4.58. In Matter of Oliver Lee & Co.'s
Bank, 21 N.Y. 12, Denio, J., says: "The rule laid down in Dash o. Van Kleek,
7 Johns. 417, and other cases of that class, by which the courts are admonished
to avoid, if possible, such an interpretation as would give a statute a retrospective operation, has but a limited application, if any, to the construction of a constitution. When, therefore, "e read in the provision under consideration, that
the stockholders of every banking corporation shall be subject to a certain liability, we are to attribute to the language its natural meaning, without inquiring
whether private interests may not be prejudiced by such a sweeping mandate."
The remark was obiter, as it was found that enough appeared in the constitution
to show cle.;Lrly that it was intended to apply to existing, as well as to subsequently created banking institutions.
1
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Implications.

OK. IV.]

CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS.

The implications from the provisions of a. constitution are some-

times exceedingly important, and have large inﬂuence upon its

construction. In regard to the Constitution of the United States

the rule has been laid down, that where a general power is con-

ferred or duty enjoined, every particular ,power necessary for the

Implications.

exercise of the one, or the performance of the other, is also con-

ferred} The same rule has been applied to the State constitution,

with an important modiﬁcation, by the Supreme Court of Illinois.

“That other powers than those expressly granted may be, and

often are, conferred by implication, is too well settled to

be * doubted. Under every constitution implication must [* 64]

be resorted to, in order to carry out the general grants of

power. A constitution cannot from its very nature enter into a

minute speciﬁcation of all the minor powers naturally and obvi-

ously included-in and ﬂowing from the great and important ones

which are expressly granted. It is therefore established as a gen-

eral rule, that when a constitution gives a general power, or enjoins

a duty, it also gives, by implication, every particular power neces-

sary for the exercise of the one or the enjoyment of the other.

The implication under this rule, however, must be a necessary, not

a conjectural or argumentative one. And it is further modified by
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another rule, that where the means for the exercise of a granted

power are given, no other or different means can be implied, as

being more eﬂective or convenient.” 2 The rule applies to the ex-

ercise of power by all departments and all oﬂicers, and will be

touched upon incidentally hereafter.

Akin to this is the rule that “ where a power is granted in gen-

eral terms, the power is _to be construed as co-extensive with the

terms, unless some clear restriction upon it is deducible [ex-

pressly or by implication] from the context.”3 This rule has

been so frequently applied in restraining the legislature from en-

croaching upon the grant of power to the judiciary, that we shall

‘ Story on Const. § 430. See also United States v. Fisher, 2 Crunch, 358;

McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 428. ,

' Field v. People, 2 Scam. 83. See Fletcher v. Oliver, 25 Ark. 298.

' Story on Const. §§ 424-426.

[ 67 ]

The implications from the provisions of a constitution are sometimes exceedingly important, and have large influence upon its
construction. In regard to the Constitution of the United States
the rule has been laid down, that where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular ,power necessary for the
exercise of the one, or the performance of the other, is also conferred.1 The same rule has been applied to the State constitution,
with an important modification, by the Supreme Court of Illinois.
"That other powers than those expressly granted may be, and
often are, conferred by implication, is too well settled to
be • doubted. Under every constitution implication must [• 64]
he resorted to, in order to carry out the general grants of
power. A constitution cannot from its very nature enter into a
minute specification of all the minor powers naturally and obviously included·in and flowing from the great and important ones
which are expressly granted. It is therefore established as a general rule, that when a constitution gives a general power, or enjoins
a duty, it also gives, by implication, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the enjoyment of the other.
The implication under this rule, however, must be a necessary, not
a conjectural or argumentative one. And it is further modified by
another rule, that where the means for the exercise of a granted
power are given, no other or different means can be implied, as
being more effective or convenient." 2 The rule applies to the exercise of power by all departments and all officers, and will be
touched upon incidentally hereafter.
Akin to this is the rule that " where a power is granted in general terms, the power is .to be construed as co-extensive with the
terms, unless some clear restriction upon it is deducible [expressly or by implication] from tfie context." 3 This rule has
been so frequently applied in restraining the legislature from encroaching upon the grant of power to the judiciary, that we shall
1 Story on Const. § 430.
See also United States "· Fisher, 2 Cranch, 3b8;
McCulloch "· Maryland, 4 Wheat. 428.
1 Field"· People, 2 Scam. 83.
See Fletcher"· Oliver, 25 Ark. 298.
:a Story on Const. §§ 424-426.
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content ourselves in this place with a reference to the cases col-

• 64
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lected upon this subject and given in another chapter.

Another rule of construction is, that when the constitution de-

ﬁnes the circumstances under which a right may be exercised or

a penalty imposed, the speciﬁcation is an implied prohibition

against legislative interference, to add to the condition, or to ex-

tend the penalty to other cases. On this ground it has been held

by the Supreme Court of Maryland, that where the constitution

deﬁned the qualiﬁcations of an oﬁicer, it was not in the power of

the legislature to change or superadd to them, unless the power to

do so was expressly or by necessary implication conferred by the

constitution itself}

[* 65] " The Light which the'Pm71ose to be accomplished may

aﬂord in Constmwtion.

The considerations thus far suggested are such as have no regard

to extrinsic circumstances, but are those by the aid of which we

seek to arrive at the meaning of the constitution from an examina-

tion of the words employed. It is possible, however, that after we

shall have made use of all the lights which the instrument itself

content ourselves in this place with a reference to the cases collected upon this subject and given in another chapter.
Another rule of construction is, that when the constitution defines the circumstances under which a right may be exercised or
a penalty imposed, the specification is an implied prohibition
against legislative interference, to add to the condition, or to extend the penalty to other cases. On this ground it has been held
by the Supreme Court of Maryland, that where the constitution
defined the qualifications of an officer, it was not in the power of
the legislature to change or superadd to them, unless the power to
do so was expressly or by necessary implication conferred by the
constitution itself.!

affords, there may still be doubts to clear up and ambiguities to

explain. Then, and only then, are we warranted in seeking else-

[• 65]

• The Light u•hich the· Purpose to be accomplished may

where for aid. We are not to import difficulties into a constitution,

afford in Construction.
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by a consideration of extrinsic facts, when none appear upon its

face. If, however, a difﬁculty really exists, which an examination

of every part of the instrument does not enable us to remove,

there are certain extrinsic aids which may be resorted to, and

which are more or less satisfactory in the light they aﬂbrd.

Among these aids is, a contemplation of the object to be accomplished

or the mischief designed to be remedied or guarded against by the

clause in which the ambiguity 'is met _with.2 “ When we once

know the reason which alone determined the will of the law-mak-

‘ Thomas v. Owens, 4 Md. 189. To the ame etfect see Matter of Dorsey,

7 Port. 293. So the legislature cannot add to the constitutional qualiﬁcations of

voters. Bison v. Farr, 24 Ark. 161; St. Joseph, &c., R.R. Co. v. Buchanan

County Court, 39 Mo. 485; State v. \Villiams, 5 Wis. 308; Monroe v. Collins,

17 Ohio, N. s. 665; State v. Symonds, 57 Me. 148; State v. Staten, 6 Cold.

243; Davis v. McKeeby, 5 Nev. 369; McCaﬁ'erty v. Guyer, 57 Penn. St. 109.

’ Alexander v. Worthington, 5 Md. 471; District Township v. Dubuque, 7

Iowa, 262.

[68]

The considerations thus far suggested are such as have no regard
to extrinsic circumstances, but are those by the aid of which we
seek to arrive at the meaning of the constitution from an examination of the words employed. It is possible, however, that after we
shall have made use of all the lights which the instrument itself
affords, there may still be doubts to clear up and ambiguities to
explain. Then, and only then, are we warranted in seeking elsewhere for aid. We are not to import difficulties into a constitution,
by a consideration of extrinsic facts, when none appear upon its
face. If, however, a difficulty really exists, which an examination
of every part of the instrument does not enable us to remove,
there are certain extrinsic aids which may be resorted to, and
which are more or less satisfactory in the light they afford.
Among these aids is, a contemplation of the ob;'ect to be accomplished
or the mischief designed to be remedied or guarded against by the
clause in which the ambiguity· is met ,with.2 "When we once
know the reason which alone determined the will of the law-mak1 Thomas v. Owens, 4 :Md. 189.
To the same effect see Matter of Dorsey,
7 Port. 293. So the legislature cannot add to the constitutional qualifications of ..
voters. Rison v. Farr, 24 Ark. 161; St. Joseph, &c., R.R. Co. v. Buchanan
County Court, 39 1\lo. 485; State v. Williams, 6 Wis. 308; Monroe v. Collins,
17 Ohio, N. s . 665; State "· Symonds, 57 Me. 148; State v. Staten, 6 Cold.
243; Davis v. McKeeby, 5 Nev. 369; McCafferty v. Guyer, 57 Penn. St. 109.
1 Alexander v. Worthington, 5 Md. 471 ; District Township v. Dubuque, 7
Iowa, 262.
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ers, we ought to interpret and apply the words used in a manner

CB. IV.)

CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS.

suitable and consonant to that reason, and as will be best calcu-

lated to effectuate the intent. Great cant-ion should always be

observed in the application of this rule to particular given cases ;

that is, we ought always to be certain that we do know, and have

actually ascertained, the true and only reason which induced the

act. It is never allowable to indulge in vague and uncertain con-

jecture, or in supposed reasons and views of the framers of an act,

where there are none known with any degree of certainty.” 1 The

prior state of the law will sometimes furnish the clue to the real

meaning of the ambiguous provision,” and it is especially impor-

tant to look into it if the constitution is the successor to another,

and in the particular in question essential changes have apparently

been made.”

" Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention. [" 66]

When the inquiry is directed to ascertaining the mischief de-

signed to be remedied, or the purpose sought to be accomplished by

a particular provision, it may be proper to examine the proceedings

of the convention which framed the instrument? Where the

proceedings clearly point out the purpose of the provision, the aid

will be valuable and satisfactory; but where the question is one of

ers, we ought to interpret and apply the words used in a manner
suitable and consonant to that reason, and as will be best calculated to effectuate the intent. Great caution should always be
observed in the application of this rule to particular given cases ;
that is, we ought always to be certain that we do know, and have
actually ascertained, the true and only reason which induced the
act. It is never allowable to indulge in vague and uncertain conjecture, or in supposed reasons and views of the framers of an act,
where there are none known with any degree of certainty." 1 The
prior state of the law will sometimes furnish the clue to the real
meaning of the ambiguous provision,2 and it is especially important to look into it if the constitution is the successor to another,
and in the particular in question essential changes have apparently
been made.a

abstract meaning, it will be difficult to derive from this source
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much reliable assistance in interpretation. Every member of such

• Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention.

a convention acts upon such motives and reasons as inﬂuence him

[•66]

personally, and the motions and debates do not necessarily indicate

the purpose of a majority of a convention in adopting a particular

clause. It is quite possible for a clause to appear so clear and

unambiguous to the members of a convention as to require neither

discussion nor illustration; and the few remarks made concerning

it in the convention might have a plain tendency to lead directly

' Smith on Stat. and Const. Construction, 634. See also remarks of Bronson,

J., in Purdy 0. People, 2 Hill, 35-37.

' Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 376; Henry v. Tilson, 21 Vt. 485; Hamilton v.

St. Louis County Court, 15 Mo. 30; Story on Const. § 428.

' People v. Blodgett, 13 Mich. 147.

' Per Walworth, Chancellor, Coutant v. People, 11 \Vend. 518, and Clark v.

People, 26 Wcnd. 602; Per Bronson, J ., Purdy v. People, 2 Hill, 37; People

v. N. Y. Central Railroad Co. 24 N. Y. 496. See State v. Kennon, 7 Ohio,

x. s. 563.

[ 69]

When the inquiry is directed to ascertaining the mischief designed to be remedied, or the purpose sought to be accomplished by
a particular provision, it may be proper to examine the proceedings
of the convention which framed the instrument.' Where the
proceedings clearly point out the purpose of the provision, the aid
will be valuable and satisfactory; but where the question is one of
abstract meaning, it will be difficult to derive from this source
much reliable assistance in interpretation. Every member of such
a convention acts upon such motives and reasons as influence him
personally, and the motions and debates do not necessarily indicate
the purpose of a majority of a. convention in adopting a particular
clause. It is quite possible for a clause to appeat· so clear and
unambiguous to the members of a convention as to require neither
discussion nor illustration ; and the few remarks made concerning
it in the convention might have a plain tendency to lead directly
1

Smith on Stat. and Const. Construction, 63!.

See also remarks of Bromon,

J., in Purdy e. People, 2 Hill, 36-37.
1 Baltimore "· State, 15 Md. 876; Henry e. Tilson, 21 Vt. 485; Hamilton e.
St. Louis County Court, 15 Mo. 30; Story on Const. § 428.
1 People e. Blodgett, 13 Mich. 147.
• Per Walworth, Chancellor, Coutant v. People, 11 Wend. 518, and Clark 17.
People, 26 Wend. 602; Per Bro1UJOTI, J., Purdy e. People, 2 Hill, 37; People
e. N.Y. Central Railroad Co. 24 N. Y. 496. See State e. Kennon, 7 Ohio,
N. 8. 563.
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away from the meaning in the minds of the majority. It is equally

• 66
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possible for a part of the members to accept a clause in one sense

and a part in another. And even if we were certain we had

attained to the meaning of the convention, it is by no means to be

allowed a controlling force, especially if that meaning appears not

to be the one which the words would most naturally and obviously

convey} For as the constitution does not derive its force from the

convention which framed, but from the people who ratiﬁed it, the

intent to be arrived at is that of the people, and it is not to be

supposed that they have looked for any dark or abstruse meaning

in the words employed, but rather that they have accepted them in

the sense most obvious to the common understanding, and ratiﬁed

the instrument in the belief that that was the sense designed to be

conveyed.“ These proceedings therefore are less conclusive of the

proper construction of the instrument than are legislative proceed-

ings of the proper construction of a statute; since in the

["‘ 67] latter case it is the intent of the ‘legislature we seek,

' while in the former we are endcavoring to arrive at the

intent of the people through the discussions and deliberations of

their representatives. The history of the calling of the convention,

the causes which led to it, and the discussions and issues before

the people at the time of the election of the delegates, will some-
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times be quite as instructive and satisfactory as any thing to be

gathered from the proceedings of the convention.

Contemporaneous and Practical Construction.

An important question which now suggests itself is this: How

far the contemporaneous construction, or the subsequent practical

construction of any particular provision of the constitution, is to

have weight with the courts when the time arrives at which a

judicial decision becomes necessary. Contemporaneous construc-

tion may consist simply in the understanding with which the

people received it at the time, or in the acts done in putting it in

operation, and which necessarily assume that it is to be construed

in a particular way. In the ﬁrst case it can have very little force,

because the evidences of the public understanding, when nothing

away from the meaning in the minds of the majority. It is equally
possible for a part of the members to accept a clause in one sense
and a part in another. And even if we were certain we had
attained to the meaning of the convention, it is by no means to be
allowed a controlling force, especially if that meaning appears not
to be the one which the words would most naturally and obviously
eonvey. 1 For as the constitution does not derive its force from the
convention which framed, but from the people who ratified it, the
intent to be arrived at is that of the people, and it is not to be
supposed that they have looked for any dark or abstruse meaning
in the words employed, but rather that they have accepted them in
the sense most obvious to the common understanding, and ratified
the instrument in the belief that that was the sense designed to be
conveyed.2 These proceedings therefore are less conclusive of the
proper construction of the instrument than are legislative proceedings of the proper construction of a statute ; since in the
[• 67] latter case it is the intent of the *legislature we seek,
· while in the former we are endeavoring to arrive at the
intent of the people through the discussions and deliberations of
their representatives. The history of the calling of the convention,
the causes which led to it, and the discussions and issues before
the people at the time of the election of the delegates, will sometimes be quite as instructive and satisfactory as any thing to be
gathered from the proceedings of the convention.

l Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Minn. 126. And see Eakin v. Racob, 12 S. & R. 352;

Aldridge v. Williams, 3 How. 1; State v. Doron, 5 Nev. 399.

’ State v. Mace, 5 Md. 348; Manly v. State, 7 Md. 147.

[70]

Contemporaneous and Practical Construction.

An important question which now suggests itself is this: How
far the contemporaneous construction, or the subsequent practical
construction of any particular provision of the constitution, is to
have weight with the courts when the time arrives at which a
judicial decision becomes necessary. Contemporaneous construction may consist simply in the understanding with which the
people received it at the time, or in the acts done in putting it in
operation, and which necessarily assume that it is to be construed
in a particular way. In the first caso it can have very little force,
because the evidences of the public understanding, when nothing
1 Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Minn. 126. And see Eakin "· Racob, 12 S. & R. 8.'>2;
Aldridge v. Williams, 3 How. 1; State v. Doron, 5 Nev. 399.
1 State "· Mace, 5 Md. 348; Manly v. State, 7 Md. 147.

[ 70]
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has been done under the provision in question, must always

CH. IV.]

CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS.

necessarily be vague and indecisive. But where there has been a

practical construction, which has been acquiesced in for a consider-

able period, considerations in favor of adhering to this construction

sometimes present themselves to the courts with a plausibility and

force which it is not easy to resist. Indeed, where a particular

construction has been generally accepted as correct, and especially

when this has occurred contemporaneously with the adoption of

the constitution, and by those who had opportunity to understand

the intention of the instrument, it is not to be denied that a. strong

presumption exists that the construction rightly interprets the

intention. Especially where this has been given by officers in the

discharge of their duty, and rights have accrued in reliance upon

it, which would be divested by a decision that the construction was

erroneous, the argument ab inconvenimti is sometimes allowed to

have very great weight.

The Supreme Court of the United States has had frequent

occasion to consider this question. In Stewart v. Laird, 1 decided

in 1803, that court sustained the authority of its members to sit as

circuit judges on the ground of a practical construction,

'* commencing with the organization of the government. In [* 68]

Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee,” Justice Story, after holding that
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the appellate power of the United States extends to cases pending

in the State courts, and that the 25th section of the Judiciary Act,

which authorized its exercise, was supported by the letter and

spirit of the Constitution, proceeds to say: “ Strong as this

conclusion stands upon the general language of the Constitution, it

may still derive support from other sources. It is an historical

fact, that this exposition of the Constitution, extending its appellate

power to State courts, was, previous to its adoption, uniformly and

publicly avowed by its friends, and admitted by its enemies, as the

basis of their respective reasonings both in and out of the State

conventions. It is an historical fact, that at the time when the

Judiciary Act was submitted to the deliberations of the First

Congress, composed, as it was, not only of men of great learning

and ability, but of men who had actedia principal part in fram-

ing, supporting, or opposing that Constitution, the same exposition

was explicitly declared and admitted by the friends and by the

' 1 Cranch, 299. ' 1 Wheat. 351.

[ '11 1

bas been done under the provision in question, must always
necessarily be vague and indecisive. But where there has been a
practical construction, which has been acquiesced in for a considerable period, considerations in favor of adhering to this construction
sometimes present themselves to the courts with a plausibility and
force which it is not easy to resist. Indeed, where a particular
construction has been generally accepted as correct, and especially
when this has occurred contemporaneously with the adoption of
the constitution, and by those who had opportunity to understand
the intention of the instrument, it is not to be denied that a strong
presumption exists that the construction rightly interprets the
intention. Especially where this has been given by officers in the
discharge of their duty, and rights have accrued in reliance upon
it, which would be divested by a decision that the construction was
erroneous, the argument ab ineonvenienti is sometimes allowed to
have very great weight.
The Supreme Court of the United States has had frequent
occasion to consider this question. In Stewart t'. Laird, 1 decided
in 1803, that court sustained the authority of its members to sit as
circuit judges on the ground of a practical construction,
• commencing with the organization of the government. In [• 68]
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,2 Justice Story, after holding that
the appellate power of the United States extends to cases pending
in the State courts, and that the 25th section of the Judiciary Act,
which authorized its exercise, was supported by the letter and
spirit of the Constitution, proceeds to say: " Strong as this
conclusion stands upon the general language of the Constitution, it
may still derive support from other sources. It is an historical
fact, that this exposition of the Constitution, extending its appellate
power to State courts, was, previous to its adoption, uniformly and
publicly avowed by its friends, and admitted by its enemies, as the
basis of their respective reasonings both in and out of the State
conventions. It is an historical fact, that at the time when the
Judiciary Act was submitted to the deliberations of the First
Congress, composed, as it was, not only of men of great learning
and ability, but of men who had acted· a principal part in fram·
ing, supporting, or opposing that Constitution, the same exposition
wa.s explicitly declared and admitted by the friends and by the
1

1 Crancb, 299.

• 1 Wheat. 351.
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opponents of that system. It is an historical fact, that the

• 68
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Supreme Court of the United States have from time to time

sustained this appellate jurisdiction in a great variety of cases,

brought from the tribunals of many of the most important States

in the Union, and that no State tribunal has ever breathed a

judicial doubt on the subject, or declined to obey the mandate of

the Supreme Court until the present occasion. This weight of

contemporaneous exposition by all parties, this acquiescence by

enlightened State courts, and these judicial decisions by the

Supreme Court through so long a period, do, as we think, place

the doctrine upon a foundation of authority which cannot be

shaken without delivering over the subject to perpetual and

irremediable doubts.” The same doctrine was subsequently sup-

ported by Chief Justice Zlfarshall in a case involving the same

point, and in which he says that “great weight has always been

attached, and very rightly attached, to contemporaneous ex-

position.” 1

In Bank of United States v. Halstead2 the question was made,

whether the laws of the United States authorizing the courts of

the Union so to alter the form of process of execution used in the

Supreme Courts of the States in September, 1789, as to

[* 69] subject to *exccution lands and other property not thus
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subject by the State laws in force at that time, were consti-

tutional; and Mr. Justice Thompson, in language similar to that of

Chief Justice Marshall in the preceding case, says: “ If any doubt

existed whether the act of 1792 vests such power in the courts, or

with respect to its constitutionality, the practical construction

given to it ought to have great weight in determining both

questions.” And ‘Mr. Justice Johnson assigns a reason for this

in a subsequent case : “Every candid mind will admit that this is

'a very different thing from contending that the frequent repetition

of wrong will create a right. It proceeds upon the presumption

that the contemporaries of the Constitution have claims to our

deference on the question of right, because they had the best

opportunities of informing themselves of the understanding of the

framers of the Constitution, and of the sense put upon it by the

people when it was adopted by them.” 3

-. ‘ Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 418. ’ 10 Wheat. 63.

' Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 290. See Pike v. Megoun, 44 Mo. 499;

State v. Parkinson, 5 Nev. 15.

[72]

opponents of that system. It is an historical fact, that the
Supreme Court of the United States have from time to time
sustained this appellate jurisdiction in a great variety of cases,
brought from the tribunals of many of the most important States
in the Union, and that no State tribunal has ever breatl~ed a
judicial doubt on the subject, or declined to obey the mandate of
the Supreme Court until the present occasion. This weight of
contemporaneous exposition by all parties, this acquiescence by
enlightened State courts, and these judicial decisions by the
Supreme Court through so long a period, do, as we think, place
the doctrine upon a foundation of authority which cannot be
shaken without delivering over the subject to perpetual and
irremediable doubts." The same doctrine was subsequently supported by Chief Justice Mars/tall in a case involving the same
point, and in which he says that "great weight has always been
attached, and very rightly attached, to contemporaneous exposition." 1
In Bank of United States v. Halstead 2 the question was made,
whether the laws of the United States authorizing the courts of
the Union so to alter the form of process of execution used in the
Supreme Courts of the States in September, 1789, as to
[• 69] subject to • execution lands and other property not thus
subject by the State laws in force at that time, were constitutional; and Mr. Justice Thompson, in language similar to that of
Chief Justice Mars/tall in the preceding case, says: "If any doubt
existed whether the act of 1792 vests such power in the courts, or
with respect to itR constitutionality, the practical construction
given to it ought to have great weight in determining both
questions." And ·Mr. Justice Johnson assigns a reason for this
in a subsequent case : "Every candid mind will admit that this is
·a very different thing from contending that the frequent repetition
of wrong will create a right. It proceeds upon the presumption
that the contemporaries of the Constitution have claims to our
deference on the question of right, because they had the best
opportunities of informing themselves of the understanding of the
framers of the Constitution, and of the sense put upon it by the
people when it was adopted by them." a
1 10 Wheat. 63.
Cohen11 v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 418.
Ogden t!. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 290. See Pike 11. Megoun, 44 Mo. 499;
State v. Parkinson, 5 Nev. 15.
. 1
1
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Great deference has been paid in all cases to the action of the

CH. IV.]
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executive department, where its officers have been called upon,

under the responsibilities of their official oaths, to inaugurate a

new system, and where it is to be presumed, they have carefully

and ‘conscientiously weighed all considerations, and endeavored to

keep within the letter and the spirit of the Constitution. If the

question involved is really one of doubt, the force of their judg-

ment, especially in view of the injurious consequences that may

result from disregarding it, is fairly entitled to turn the scale in

the judicial mind.‘ .

Where, however, no ambiguity or doubt appears in the law, we

think the same rule obtains here as in other cases, that the court

should conﬁne its attention to the law, and not allow extrinsic

circumstances to introduce a difficulty where the language is plain.

To allow force to a practical construction in such a case would be

to suffer manifest perversions to defeat the evident pur-

pose of the"‘law-makers. “Contemporary construction [“ 70]

. . . can never abrogate the text; it can never fritter

away its obvious sense; it can never narrow down its true limita-

tions; it can never enlarge its natural boundaries.”2 While we

conceive this to be the true and only safe rule, we shall be obliged

to confess that some of the cases appear, on ﬁrst reading, not to
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have observed these limitations. In the case ﬁrst cited of Stewart

v. Laird,“ the practical construction was regarded as conclusive.

To the objection that the judges of the Supreme Court had no

right to sit as circuit judges, the court say: “It is suﬁicient to

observe that practice and acquiescence under it for a period of sev-

eral years, commencing with the organization of the judicial sys-

tem, affords an irresistible answer, and has indeed ﬁxed the

' Union Insurance Co. v. Hoge, 21 How. 66; Edward’s Lessee v. Darby, 12

W'heat. 210; Hughes v. Hughes, 4 T. B. Monr. 42; Chambers v. Fisk, 22 Texas,

504; Britton v. Ferry, 14 Mich. 66; Plumtncr v. Plummer, 37 Miss. 185; Bur-

gess v. Pue, 2 Gill, 11; State v. Mayhew, ib. 487; Coutant v. People, 11 \Vend.

511; Baltimore v. Stale, 15 Md. 376; Farmers and Mechanics Bank v. Smith,

3 S. & R. 63; Norris v. Clymer, 2 Penn. St. 277; Moers v. City of Reading,

21 Penn. St. 188; “Washington v. Murray, 4 Cal. 388; Surgett v. Lapice, 8 How.

68; Bissell v. Pcnrose, ib. 336; Troup v.‘ Haight, Hopk. 267.

' Story on Const. § 407. And see Evans v. Myers, 25 Penn. St. 116;

Sadler v. Langham, 34 Ala. 311; Barnes v. First Parish in Falmouth, 6 Mqss.

417.

' 1 Cranch, 299.
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1

Great deference has been paid in all cases to the action of the
executive department, where its officers have been called upon,
under the responsibilities of their official oaths, to inaugurate a
new system, and where it is to be presumed, they have carefully
and ·conscientiously weighed all considerations, and endeavored to
keep within the letter and the spirit of the Constitution. If the
question involved is really one of doubt, the force of theit· judgment, especially in view of the injurious consequences that may
result from disregarding it, is fairly entitled to turn the scale in
the judicial mind. 1
Where, however, no ambiguity or doubt appears in the law, we
think the same rule obtains here as in other cases, that the court
should confine its attention to the law, and not allow extrinsic
circuqistances to introduce a difficulty where the language is plain.
To allow force to a practical construction in such a case would be
to suffer manifest perversions to defeat the evident purpose of the •law-makers. " Contemporary construction [• 70]
. . . can never abrogate the text ; it can never fritter
away its obvious sense ; it can never narrow down its true limitations ; it can never enlarge its natural boundaries." 2 While we
conceive this to be the true and only safe rule, we shall be obliged
to confess that some of the cases appear, on first reading, not to
have observed these limitations. In the case first cited of Stewart
v. Laird,3 the practical construction was regarded as conclusive.
To the objection that the judges of the Supreme Court had no
right to sit as circujt judges, the court say: " It is sufficient to
observe that practice and acquiescence under it for a period of several years, commencing with the organization of the judicial system, affords an irresistible answer, and has indeed fixed the
1 Union Insurance Co. v. Hoge, 21 How. 66; Edward's Lessee!'. Darby, 12
Wheat. 210; Hughes!'. Hughes, 4 T. B. 1\[onr. 42; Chambers!'. Fisk, 22 Texas,
504; Britton !'. Ferry, 14 Mich. 66; Plummer v. Plummer, 37 Miss. 185; Burgess !'. Pue, 2 Gill, 11; State !'.1\Iayhew, ib. 487; Coutant!'. People, 11 'Vend.
511 ; Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 376; Farmers and Mechanics Bank v. Smith,
3 S. & R. 68; Norris v. Clymer, 2 Penn. St. 277; Moers !'. City of Reading,
21 Penn. St. 188; Washington !'. Murray, 4 Cal. 388; Surgett !'. Lapice, 8 How.
68; Bissell v. Penrose, ib. 336; Troup v: Haight, Hopk. 267.
• Story on Const. § 407. And see Evans v. Myers, 25 Penn. St. 116;
Sadler!'. Langham, 34 Ala. 811; Barnes !'. First Parish in Falmouth, 6 Mus.
417.
•
a 1 Cranch, 299.
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construction. It is a contemporary interpretation of the most

(cH. IV.

forcible nature. This practical exposition is too strong and obsti-

nate to be shaken or controlled. Of course the question is at rest,

and ought not now to be disturbed.” This is certainly very strong

language; but that of a very similar character was used by the

Supreme Court of Massachusetts in one case where large and val-

uable estates depended upon a particular construction of a statute,

and very great mischief would follow from changing it. The court

said that, “although if it were now res integra, it might be very

diﬁicult to maintain such a construction, yet at this day the argu-

ment ab inconve-nienti applies with great weight. We cannot sha_ke

a principle which in practice has so long and so extensively pre-

vailed. If the practice originated in error, yet the error is now so

common that it must have the force of law. The legal ground on

which this provision is now supported is, that long and continued

usage furnishes a contemporaneous construction which must pre-

vail over the mere technical import of the words.’*1 Language

nearly as strong was also used by the Supreme Court of Maryland,

where the point involved was the possession of a certain power by

the legislature, which it had constantly exercised for nearly seventy

years.”

It is believed, however, that in each of these cases an examina-
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tion of the Constitution left in the minds of the judges

["' 71] sufficient * doubt upon the question of its violation to war-

rant their looking elsewhere for aids in interpretation,

and that the cases are not in conﬂict with the general rule as

above laid down. Acquiesccnce for no length of time can legalize

a clear usurpation of power, where the people have plainly ex-

pressed their will in the constitution, and appointed judicial tribu-

nals to enforce it. A power is frequently yielded to merely

because it is claimed, and it may be exercised for a long period,

in violation of the constitutional prohibition, without the mischief

which the Constitution was designed to guard against appearing,

' Rogers v. Goodwin, 2 Mass. 478.

' State v. Mayhew, 2 Gill, 487. In Essex Co. v. Paciﬁc Mills, 14 Allen, 389,

the Supreme Court of Massachusetts expressed the opinion that the constitu-

tionality of the acts of Congress making treasury notes a legal tender, ought not

to be treated by a State court as open to discussion after the notes had practi-

cally constituted the currency of the country for ﬁve years. At a still later day,

however, the Supreme Court of the United States held these acts void.

["141

construction. It is a contemporary interpretation of the most
forcible nature. This practical exposition is too strong and obstinate to be shaken or controlled. Of course the question is at rest,
and ought not now to be disturbed." This is certainly very s~rong
language; but that of a very similar character was used by the
Supt·eme Court of Massachusetts in one case where large and -raluable estates depended upon a particular construction of a statuto,
and very great mischief would follow from changing it. The court
said that, " although if it were now res integra, it might be very
difficult to maintain such a construction, yet at this day the argument ab ineonvenienti applies with great weight. We cannot sha.ke
a principle which in practice has so long and so extensively prevailed. If the practice originated in error, yet the ert·or is now so
common that it must have the force of law. The legal grotJnd on
which this provision is now supported is, that long and continued
usage furnishes a contemporaneous construction which must prevail over the mere technical import of the words.''" 1 Language
nearly as strong was also used by the Supreme Court of :Maryland,
where the point involved was the possession of a certain power by
the legislature, which it had constantly exercised for nearly seventy
years.2
It is believed, however, that in each of these cases an examination of the Constitution left in the minds of the judges
[* 71] sufficient • doubt upon the question of its violation to warrant their looking elsewhere for aids in interpretation,
and that the cases are not in conflict with the general rule as
above laid down. Acquiescence for no length of time can legalize
a clear usurpation of power, where the people have plainly expressed their will in the constitution, and appointed judicial tribunals to enforce it. A power is frequently yielded to merely
because it is claimed, and it may be exercised for a long period,
in violation of the constitutional prohibition, without the mischief
which the Constitution was designed to guard against appearing,
Rogers v. Goodwin, 2 Mass. 478.
State v. Mayhew, 2 Gill, 487. In E~sex Co."· Pacific Mills, 14 Allen, 3S9,
the Supreme Court of Massachusetts expressed the opinion that the constitutionality of the acts of Co11gress making trea~ury notes a legal tender, ought not
to be treated by a State court as open to discussion after the note~ had pradicat'ty constituted the currency of the country for five years. At a still later day,
however, the Supreme Court of the United States held these acts void.
1

1
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or without any one being sufficiently interested in the subject to
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raise the question; but these circumstances cannot be allowed to

sanction a clear infraction of the Constitution.1 We think we allow

to contemporary and practical construction its full legitimate force

when we suffer it, where it is clear and uniform, to solve in its

own favor the doubts which arise on reading the instrument to be

construed?

‘ See further, on this subject, the case of Sadler v. Langham, 34 Ala. 311,

334.

' There are cases which clearly go further than any we have quoted, and

which sustain legislative action which they hold to be usurpation, on the sole

ground of long acquiescence. Thus in Brigham v. Miller, 17 Ohio, 446, the

or without any one being sufficiently interested in the subject to
raise the question ; but these circumstances cannot be allowed to
sanction a clear infraction of the Constitution.1 We thiuk we allow
to contemporary and practical construction its full legitimate force
when we suffer it, where it is clear and uniform, to solve in its
own favor the doubts which arise on reading the instrument to be
construed.2

question was, Has the legislature power to grant divorces? The court say:

1
“Our legislature have assumed and exercised this power for a period of more

than forty years, although a clear and palpable assumption oi‘ power, and an

encroachment upon the judicial department, in violation of the Constitution. To

deny this long-exercised power, and declare all the consequences resulting from

it void, is pregnant with fearful consequences. If it affected only the rights of

property, we should not hesitate; but second marriages have been contracted

and children born, and it would bastardize all these, although born under the

sanction of an apparent wedlock, authorized by an act of the legislature before

they were born, and in consequence of which the relation was formed which gave
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them birth. On account of these children, and for them only, we hesitate.

And in view of this, we arc constrained to content ourselves with simply declar-

ing that the exercise of the power of granting divorces, on the part of the legis-

lature, is unwarranted and unconstitutional, an encroachment upon the duties of

the judiciary, and a striking down of the dearest rights of individuals, without

authority of law. \Ve trust we have said enough to vindicate the Constitution,

and feel conﬁdent that no department of state has any disposition to violate it,

and that the evil will cease.” So in Johnson v. Joliet and Chicago Railroad Co.

23 Ill. 207, the question was whether railroad corporations could be created by

special law, without a special declaration by way of preamble that the object to

be accomplished could not be attained by general law. The court say: “ It is

now too late to make this objection, since by the action of the General Assembly

under this clause, special acts have been so long the order of the day and the

ruling passion with every legislature which has convened under the Constitution,

until their acts of this description ﬁll a huge and misshapen volume, and impor-

tant and valuable rights are claimed under them. The clause has been wholly

disregarded, and it would now produce far-spread ruin to declare such acts un-

constitutional and void. It is now safer and more just to all parties, to declare

that it must he understood, that in the opinion of the General Assembly, at the

time of passing the special act, its object could not be attained under the general

law, and this without any recital by way of preamble, as in the act to incorpo-

rate the Central Railroad Company. That preamble was placed there by the

writer of this opinion, and a strict compliance with this clause of the Constitu-

tion would have rendered it necessary in every subsequent act. But the legisla-

[75]

See further, on this subject, the case of Sadler c. Langham, 34 Ala. 311,

834.
1 There are cases which clearly go further than any we havl' quoted, and
which sustain legislative action which they hold to be uaurpation, on the sole
~round of long acquiescence. Thus in Brigham c. Miller, 17 Ohio, 446, the
question was, Has the legislature power to grant divorces? The court say:
" Our legislature have assumed and exercised this power for a period of more
than forty years, although a clear and palpable assumption of power, and an
encroachment upon the judicial department, in violation of the Constitution. To
deny this long-exercised power, and declare all the consequences resulting from
it void, is pregnant with fearful consequences. If it affected only the rights of
property, we should not hesitate; but second marriages have been contracted
and children born, and it would bastardize all these, although born under the
sanction of an apparent wedlock, authorized by an act of the legislature before
they were born, and in consequence of which thP. relation was formed which gave
them birth. On account of these children, and for them only, we hesitate.
And in view of this, we arc constrained to content ourselves with simply declaring that the exercise of the power of granting divorces, on the part of the legislature, is unwarranted and unconstitutional, an encroachment upon the duties of
the judiciary, and a striking down of the dearest rights of individuals, without
authority of law. 'Vc trust we have said enough to vindicate the Constitution,
and feel confident that no department of state has any disposition to violate it,
and that the evil will cease." So in Johnson c. Joliet and Chicago Railroad Co.
23 Ill. 207, the question was whether railroad corporations could be created by
BpCCial law, without a special declaration by way of preamble that the object to
be accomplished could not be attaint•d by general law. The court say: "It is
now too late to make this objection, since by the action of the General Assembly
under this dause, special acts have been so long the order of the day and the
ruling passion with every legi~lature which has convened under the Constitution,
until their acts of this description fill a huge and misshapen volume, and important and valuable rights are claimed under them. The clause has been wholly
dis!'f'gardl'd, and it would now produce far-spread ruin to declare such acts unconstitutional and void. It is now safer and more just to all parties, to declare
that it must be understood, that in the opinion of the General Assembly, at the
time of passing the special a!'t, its object could not be attained under the general •
llnr, and this without any recital by way of preamble, al! in the act to incorporate the Central Railroad Company. That preamble wu placed there by .the
wrikr of this opinion, and a strict compliance with this clause of the Constitution would have rendered it necessary in every subsequent act. But the legisla-
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[* 72] * Unjust Provisions.

[CH. IV.

We have elsewhere expressed the opinion that a statute cannot

be declared void because opposed to a supposed general intent

ture, in their wisdom, have thought differently, and have acted differently, until

now our special legislation and its mischiefs are beyond recovery or remedy."

[* 72]

• Unjust Provisions.

These cases certainly presented very strong motives for declaring the law to be

what it was not; but it would have been interesting and useful if either of these

learned courts had enumerated the evils that must be placed in the opposite scale

when the question is whether a constitutional rule shall be disregarded; not the

We have elsewhere expressed the opinion that a statute cannot
be declared void because opposed to a supposed general intent

least of which is, the encouragement of a disposition on the part of legislative

bodies to set aside constitutional restrictions, in the belief that, if the unconsti-

tutional law can once be put in force, and large interests enlisted under it, the

courts will not venture to declare it void, but will submit to the usurpation, no

matter how gross and daring. \Ve agree with the Supreme Court of Indiana,

that in construing constitutions, courts have nothing to do with the argument ab

incnnvenienti, and should not “ bend the Constitution to suit the law of the hour.”

Greencastle Township v. Black, 5 Ind. 565; and with Bronson, Ch. J ., in what

he says in Oakley 0. Aspinwall, 3 N. Y. 568: " It is highly probable that incon-

veniences will result from following the Constitution as it is written. But that

consideration can have no force with me. It is not for us, but for those who

made the instrument, to supply its defects. If the legislature or the courts may

take that oflice upon themselves, or if, under color of construction, or upon any
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other specious ground, they may depart from that which is plainly declared, the

people may well despair of ever being able to set any boundary to the powers of

the government. \Vritten constitutions will be more than useless. Believing as

I do that the success of free institutions depends upon a rigid adherence to the

fundamental law, I have never yielded to considerations of expediency in ex-

pounding it. There is always some plausible reason for latitudinarian construc-

tions which are resorted to for the purpose of acquiring power; some evil to be

avoided or some good to be attained by pushing the powers of the government

beyond their legitimate boundary. It is by yielding to such inﬂuences that con-

stitutions are gradually undermined and ﬁnally overthrown. My rule has ever

been to follow the fundamental law as it is written, regardless of consequences.

If the law does not work well, the people can amend it; and inconveniences can

be borne long enough to await that process. But if the legislature or the courts

undertake to cure defects by forced and unnatural constructions, they inﬂict a

wound upon the Constitution which nothing can heal. One step taken by the

legislature or the judiciary, in enlarging the powers of the government, opens

the door for another which will be sure to follow; and so the process goes on

until all respect for the fundamental law is lost, and the powers of the govern-

ment are just what those in authority please to call them.” Whether there may

not be circumstances under which the State can be held justly estopped from

alleging the invalidity of its own action in apportioning the political divisions of the

State, and imposing burdens on citizens, where such action has been acquiesced

[76]

ture, in their wiRdom, have thought differently, and have acted differently, until
now our special legislation and its mischiefs are beyond recovery or remedy."
These cases certainly presented very strong motives for declaring the law to be
what it was not; but it would have been interesting and useful if either of these
learned courts had enumerated the evils that must be placed in the opposite scale
when the question is whether a constitutional rule shall be disregarded; not the
least of which is, the encouragement of a disposition on the part of legislative
bodies to set aside constitutional restrictions, in the belief that, if the unconstitutional law can once be put in force, and large interests enlisted uRder it, the
courts will. not venture to declare it void, but will submit to the usurpation, no
matter bow gross and daring. 'Ve agree with the Supreme Court of Indiana,
that in construing constitutions, courts have nothing to do with the argument ah
inconvenie~lti, aud should not "bend the Constitution to suit the law of the hour."
Greencastle Township v. Black, 5 Ind. 565; and with B1·onson, Ch. J., in what
be says in Oakley v. Aspinwall, 3 N.Y. 568: "It is highly probable that inconveniences will result from following the Constitution as it is written. But that
consideration can have no force with me. It is not for us, but for those who
made the instrument, t<> supply its defects. If the legislature or the courts may
take that office upon themielves, or if, under color of construction, or upon any
other specious ground, they may depart from that which is plainly declared, the
people may well despair of ever being able to set arty boundary to the powers of
the government. 'Vritten constitutions will be more than useless. Believing as
I do that the success of free institutions depends upon a rigid adherence to the
fundamental law, I have never yielded to considerations of expediency in expounding it. There is always some plausible reason for latitudinarian constructions which are resorted to for the purpose of acquiring power; some evil to be
avoided or some good to be attained by pushing the powers of the government
beyond their legitimate boundary. It is by yielding to such influences that conetitutions are gradually undermined and finally overthrown. My rule has ever
been to follow the fundamental law as it is writ.ten, regardless of consequences.
If the law does not work well, the people can amend it ; and inconveniences can
be borne long enough to await that process. But if the legislature or the court&
undertake to cure defects by forced and unnatural constructions, they inflict a
wound upon the Constitution which nothing can heal. One step taken by the
legislature or the judiciary, in enlarging the powers of the government, opens
the door for another which will be sure to follow ; and so the process goes on
• until all respect for the fundamental law is lost, and the powers of the government are just what those in authority please to call them." Whether there may
not be circumstances under which the State can be held justly estopped from
alleging the invalidity of its own action in apportioning the political divisions of the
State, and imposing burdens on citizens, where such action has been acquiesced

[ 76]

ca. 1v.] CONSTRUCTION or srxrs CONSTITUTIONS. * 73

or ‘spirit which it is thought pervades or lies concealed ["‘ 73]
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in the Constitution, but wholly unexpressed, or because,

in the opinion of the court, it violates fundamental rights or

principles, if it was passed in the exercise of a power which the

Constitution confers. Still less will the injustice of a constitu-

tional provision authorize the courts to disregard it, or indirectly

to annnl it by construing it away. It is quite possible that the

people may, under the inﬂuence of temporary prejudice, or mis-

taken view of public policy, incorporate provisions in their charter

of government, infringing upon the right of the individual man, or

upon principles which ought to be regarded as sacred and funda-

mental in republican government; and quite possible also that

obnoxious classes may be unjustly disfranchised. The remedy for

such injustice must rest with the people themselves, through an

amendment of their work when better counsels prevail. Such pro-

visions, when free from doubt, must receive the same construction

as any other. We do not say, however, that if a clause should be

found in a constitution which should appear at ﬁrst blush to de-

mand a construction leading to monstrous and absurd conse-

quences, it might not be the duty of the court to question and

cross-question such clause closely, with a view to discover in it, if

possible, some other meaning more consistent with the general
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purposes and aims of these instruments. When such a case arises,

it will be time to consider it.‘

Duty in Case of Doubt.

But when all the legitimate lights for ascertaining the mean-

ing of the Constitution have been made use of, it may still happen

that the construction remains a matter of doubt. In such a case

it seems clear that every one called upon to act where, in

his ‘opinion, the proposed action would be of doubtful [“‘ 74]

constitutionality, is bound upon the doubt alone to abstain

from acting. Whoever derives power from the Constitution to

perform any public function, is disloyal to that instrument, and

grossly derelict in duty, if he does that which he is not reasonably

in for a considerable period, and rights have been acquired through bearing the

or • spirit which it is thought pervades or lies concealed [* 73]
in the Constitution, but wholly unexpressed, or because,
in the opinion of the court, it violates fundamental rights or
principles, if it was passed in the exercise of a power which the
Constitution confers. Still less will the injustice of a constitutional provision authorize the courts to disregard it, or indirectly
to annul it by construing it away. It is quite possible that the
people may, under the influence of temporary prejudice, or mistaken view of public policy, incorporate provisions in their charter
of government, infringing upon the right of the individual man, or
upon principles which ought to be regarded as sacred and fundamental in republican government; and quite possible also that
obnoxious classes may be unjustly disfranchised. The remedy for
such injustice must rest with the people themselves, through an
amendment of their work when better counsels prevail. Such provisions, when free from doubt, must receive the same construction
as any other. We do not say, however, that if a clause should be
found in a constitution which should appear at first blush to demand a construction leading to monstrous and absurd consequences, it might not be the duty of the court to question and
cross-question such clause closely, with a view to discover in it, if
possible, some other meaning more consistent with the general
purposes and aims of these instruments. When such a case arises,
it will be time to consider it. 1

burdens under it, see Ramsey v. People, 19 N. Y. 41; People v. Maynard, 15

Mich. 470; Kneeland v. Milwaukee, 15 Wis. 454.

' McMullen v. Hodge, 5 Texas, 3-1. See Clarke v. Irwin, 5 Nev. 111.

Duty in Case of Doubt.

[77]

But when all the legitimate lights for ascertaining the meaning of the Constitution have been made usc of, it may still happen
that the construction remains a matter of doubt. In such a case
it seems clear that every one called upon to act where, in
his • opinion, the proposed action would be of doubtful [* 74]
constitutionality, is bound upon the doubt alone to abstain
from acting. Whoever derives power from the Constitution to
perform any public function, is disloyal to that instrument, and
grossly derelict in duty, if he does that which he is not reasonably
in for a considerable period, and rights haYe been acquired through bearing the
burdens under it, see Ramsey "· People, 19 N. Y. 41; People "· Maynard, 15
Mich. 470; Kneeland "· Milwaukee, 15 Wis. 454.
1 McMullen"· Hodge, 5 Texas, 34.
See Clarke"· Irwin, 5 Nev. 111.

[ 77]

" 74 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [cr1. IV.

satisﬁed the Constitution permits. Whether the power be legisla-

• 74

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

[CH. IV•

tive, executive, or judicial, there is manifest disregard of constitu-

tional and moral obligation by one who, having taken an oath to

observe that instrument, takes part in an action which he cannot

say he believes to be no violation of its provisions. A doubt of the

constitutionality of any proposed legislative enactment should in

any case be reason suﬁicient for refusing to adopt it; and, if legis-

lators do not act upon this principle, the reasons upon which are

based the judicial decisions sustaining legislation in very many

cases will cease to be of force.

Directory and Zﬂandatory Provisions.

The important question sometimes presents itself, whether we

are authorized in any case, when the meaning of a clause of the

Constitution is arrived at, to give it such practical construction as

will leave it optional with the department or oﬁicer to which it is

addressed to obey it or not as he shall see ﬁt. In respect to

satisfied the Constitution permits. Whether the power be legislative, executive, or judicial, there is manifest disregard of constitutional and moral obligation by one who, having taken an oath to
observe that instrument, takes part in an action which he cannot
say he believes to be no violation of its provisions. A doubt of the
constitutionality of any proposed legislative enactment should in
any case be reason sufficient for refusing to adopt it; and, if legislators do not act upon this principle, the reasons upon which are
based the judicial decisions sustaining legislation in very many
cases will cease to be of force.

statutes it has long been settled that particular provisions may be

regarded as directory merely ; by which is meant that they are to

JJirectory and Mandawry Provisions.

be considered as giving directions which ought to be followed, but

not as so limiting the power in respect to which the directions are

given that it cannot be eﬂectually exercised without observing

them. The force of many of the decisions on this subject will be
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readily assented to by all ; while others are sometimes thought to

go to the extent of nullifying the intent of the legislature in

essential particulars. It is not our purpose to examine the several

cases critically, or to attempt—what we deem impossible—to

reconcile them all; but we shall content ourselves with quoting

from a few, with a view, if practicable, to ascertaining some line of

principle upon which they can be classiﬁed.

There are cases where, whether a statute was to be regarded as

merely directory or not, was made to depend upon the employing

or failing to employ negative words which imported that the act

should be done in a particular manner or time, and not

[*75] *otherwise.1 The use of such words is often very con-

clusive of an intent to impose a limitation; but their

‘ Slayton v. Hulings, 7 Ind. 144; King v. Inhabitants of St. Gregory, 2 Ad.

& El. 99; King v. Inhabitants of Hipswell, 8 B. & C. 466.

[181 s

The important question sometimes presents itself, whether we
are authorized in any case, when the meaning of a clause of the
Constitution is arrived at, to give it such practical construction as
will leave it optional with the department or officer to which it is
addressed to obey it or not as he shall see fit. In respect to
statutes it has long been settled that particular provisions may be
regarded as direcwry merely ; by which is meant that they are to
be considered as giving directions which ottght to be followed, but
not as so limiting the power in respect to which the directions are
given that it cannot be effectually exercised without observing
them. The force of many of the decisions on this subject will be
readily assented to by all ; while others are sometimes thought to
go to the extent of nullifying the intent of the legislature in
essential particulars. It is not our purpose to examine the several
cases critically, or to attempt-what we deem impossible-to
reconcile them all; but we shall content ourselves with quoting
from a few, with a view, if practicable, to ascertaining some liue of
principle upon which they can be classified.
There are cases where, whether a statute was to be regarded as
merely directory or not, was made to depend upon the employing
or failing to employ negati"·e words which imported that the act
should be done in a particular manner or time, and not
[•75] •otherwise.1 The use of such words is often very conclusive of an intent to impose a limitation; but their
1

Slayton v. Hulings, 7 Ind. 144; King v. Inhabitant.! of St. Gregory, 2 Ad.

& El. 99; King v. Inhabitants of Hipswell, 8 B. & C. 466.
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absence is by no means equally conclusive that the statute was not
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destined to be mandatory} Lord Mansyield would have the

question whether mandatory or not depend upon whether that

which was directed to be done was or was not of the essence of the

thing required? The Supreme Court of New York, in an opinion

afterwards approved by the Court of Appeals, laid down the rule as

one settled by authority, that “ statutes directing the mode of

proceeding by public oﬂicers are directory, and are not regarded as

essential to the validity of the proceedings themselves, unless it be

so declared in the statute.”3 This rule strikes us as very general,

and as likely to include within its scope, in many cases, things

which are of the very essence of the proceeding. The questions in

that case were questions of irregularity under election laws, not in

any way hindering the complete expression of the will of the

electors; and the court was doubtless right in holding that the

election was not to be avoided for a failure in the oﬁicers appointed

for its conduct to comply in all respects with the directions of the

statute there in question. The same court in another case say:

“ Statutory requisitions are deemed directory only when they

relate to some immaterial matter, where a compliance is a matter

of convenience rather than of substance.”4 The Supreme Court

of Michigan, in a case involving the validity of proceedings on the
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sale of lands for taxes, laid down the rule that “ what the law

requires to be done for the protection of the tax-payer is mandatory,

and cannot be regarded as directory merely.” 5 A similar rule was

recognized in a recent case in Illinois. Commissioners had been

appointed to ascertain and assess the damage and recompense due

to the owners of land which might be taken, on the real estate of

the persons beneﬁted by a certain local improvement, in proportion

as nearly as might be to the beneﬁts resulting to each. By the

statute, when the assessment was completed, the com-

missioners were to sign and return the same to the *‘ city [* 76]

council within forty days of their appointment. This

' District Township v. Dubuque, 7 Iowa, 284.

' Rex v. Locksdale, 1 Burr. 447.

' People v. Cook, 14 Barb. 290; same case, 8 N. Y. 67.

‘ People v. Schermerhorn, 19 Barb. 558. If a statute imposes a duty and

gives the means of performing that duty, it must be held to be mandatory.

Veazie v. China, 50 Me. 518.

~" Clark v. Crane, 5 Mich. 154. See also Shawnee County v. Carter, 2 Kan-

sas, 115.

[ 19 1

absence is by no means equally conclusive that the statute was not
destined to be mandatory. 1 Lord Mansfield would have the
question whether mandatory or not depend upon whether that
which was directed to be done waH or was not of the essence of the
thing required. 2 The Supreme Court of New York, in an opinion
afterwards approved by the Court of Appeals, laid down the rule as
one settled by authority, that "statutes directing the mode of
proceeding by public officers are directory, and are not regarded as
essential to the validity of the proceedings themselves, unless it be
so declared in the statute." a This rule strikes us as very general,
and as likely to include within its scope, in many cases, things
which are of the very essence of the proceeding. The questions in
that case were questions of irregularit.y under election laws, not in
any way hindering the complete expression of the will of the
electors ; and the court was doubtless right in holding that the
election was not to be avoided for a failure in the officers appointed
for its conduct to comply in all respects with the directions of the
statute there in question. The same court in another case say:
"Statutory requisitions are deemed directory only when they
relate to some immaterial matter, where a compliance is a matter
of convenience rather than of substance." 4 The Supreme Court
of Michigan, in a case involving the validity of proceedings on the
sale of lands for taxes, laid down the rule that " what the law
requires to be done for the protection of the tax-payer is mandatory,
and cannot be regarded as directory merely." 5 A similar rule was
recognized in a recent case in Illinois. Commissioners had been
appointed to ascertain and assess the damage and recompense due
to the owners of land which might be taken, on the real estate of
the persons benefited by a certain local improvement, in proportion
as nearly as might be to the benefits resulting to each. By the
statute, when the assessment was completed, the commissioners were to sign and return the same to the • city [* 76]
council within forty days of their appointment. This
1 District Township "· Dubuque, 7 Iowa, 284.
' Rex"· Lockfdale, 1 Burr. 447.
• People"· Cook, 14 Barb. 290; same case, 8 N.Y. 67.
4 People " · Schermerhorn, 19 Barb. 558.
If a statute imposes a duty and
gives the means of performing that duty, it must be held to be mandatory.
Veazie"· China, 50 Me. 518.
6 Clark "· Crane, o Mich. 154.
See also Shawnee County "· Carter, 2 Kan1&8, 115.
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provision was not complied with, but return was made afterwards,

• 76

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

(CH. IV •

and the question was raised as to its validity when thus made. In

the opinion of the court, this question was to be decided by

ascertaining whether any advantage would be lost, or right

destroyed, or beneﬁt sacriﬁced, either to the public or to any

individual, by holding the provision directory. After remarking

that they had held an assessment under the general revenue law,

returned after the time appointed by law, as void, because the

person assessed would lose the beneﬁt of an appeal from the

assessment,‘ they say of the statute before the court: “ There are

no negative words used declaring that the functions of the

commissioners shall cease after the expiration of the forty days, or

that they shall not make their return after that time; nor have we

been able to discover the least right, beneﬁt, or advantage which

the property owner could derive from having the return made

within that time, and not after. No time is limited and made

dependent on that time, within which the owner of the property

may apply to have the assessment reviewed or corrected. The

next section requires the clerk to give ten days’ notice that the

assessment has been returned, specifying the day when objections

may be made to the assessment before the common council by

parties interested, which hearing may be adjourned from day to
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day; and the common council is empowered in its discretion to

conﬁrm or annul the assessment altogether, or to refer it back to

the same commissioners, or to others to be by them appointed. As

the property owner has the same time and opportunity to prepare

himself to object to the assessment and have it corrected, whether

the return be made before or after the expiration of the forty days,

the case differs from that of Chestnut v. Marsh,” at the very point

on which that case turned. Nor is there any other portion of the

chapter which we have discovered, bringing it within the principle

of that case, which is the well-recognized rule in allthe books.” 3

The rule is nowhere more clearly stated than by Chief Justice

Shaw, in Torrey v. Milbury,4 which was also a tax case.

[" 77] “In ‘considering the various statutes regulating the as-

sessment of taxes, and the measures preliminary thereto,

it is not always easy to distinguish which are conditions precedent

‘ Marsh v. Chestnut, 14 Ill. 223. ’ Ibid.

' Wheeler v. Chicago, 24 Ill. 108. ‘ 21 Pick. 67.

[80]

provision was not complied with, but return was made afterwards,
and the question was raised as to its validity when thus made. In
the opinion of the court, this question was to be decided by
ascertaining whether any advantage would be lost, or right
destroyed, or benefit sacrificed, either to the public or to any
individual, by holding the provision directory. After remarking
that they had held an assessment under the general revenue law,
returned after the time appointed by law, as void, because the
person assessed would lose the benefit of an appeal from the
assessment,1 they say of the statute before the court: "There are
no negative words used declaring that the functions of the
commissioners shall cease after the expiration of the forty days, or
that they shall not make their return after that time ; nor have we
been able to discover the least l"ight, benefit, or advantage which
the property owner could derive from having the return made
within that time, and not after. No time is limited and made
dependent on that time, within which the owner of the property
may apply to have the assessment reviewed or corrected. The
next section requires the clerk to give ten days' notice that the
assessment has been returned, specifying the day when objections
may be made to the assessment before the common council by
parties interested, which hearing may be adjourned from day to
day; and the common council is empowered in its discretion to
confirm or annul the assessment altogether, or to refer it hack to
the same commissioners, or to others to be by them appointed. As
the property owner has the same time and opportunity to prepare
himself to object to the assessment and have it corrected, whether
the return be made before or after the expiration of the forty days,
the case differs from that of Chestnut v. Marsh,2 at the very point
on which that case turned. Nor is there any other portion of the
chapter which we have discovered, bringing it within the principle
of that case, which is the well-recognized rule in all the books." 3
The rule is nowhere more clearly stated than by Chief Justice
Sltaw, in Torrey v. Milbury,4 which was also a tax case.
[•77] " In • considering the various statutes regulating the assessment of taxes, and the measures preliminary thereto,
it is not always easy to distinguish which are conditions precedent
1 Marsh v. Chestnut, 14 TIL 223.
• Wheeler v. Chicago, 24 Ill. 108.

[ 80]

1 Ibid.
• 21 Pick. 67.
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to the legality and validity of the tax, and which are directory
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CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS.

merely, and do not constitute conditions. One rule is very plain

and well settled, that all those measures that are intended for the

security of the citizen, for insuring equality of taxation, and to

enable every one to know with reasonable certainty for what polls

and for what real estate he is taxed, and for what all those who are

liable with him are taxed, are conditions precedent; and if they

are not observed, he is not legally taxed; and he may resist it in

any of the modes authorized by law for contesting the validity of

the tax. But many regulations are made by statutes designed for

the information of assessors and oﬂicers, and intended to promote

me_thod, system, and uniformityin the modes of proceeding, a com-

pliance or non-compliance with which does in no respect affect the

rights of tax-paying citizens. These may be considered directory.

Officers may be liable to legal animadversion, perhaps to punish-

ment, for not observing them; but yet their observance is 11ot a

condition precedent to the validity of the tax.”

We shall quote further only from a single other case upon this

point. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in considering the

validity of a statute not published within the time required by law,

“ understand the doctrine concerning directory statutes to be this:

that where there is no substantial reason why the thing to be done
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might not as well be done after the time prescribed as before, no

presumption that by allowing it to be so done it may work an

injury or wrong, nothing in the act itself, or in other acts relating

to the same subject-matter, indicating that the legislature did not

intend that it should rather be done after the time prescribed than

not to be done at all, there the courts assume that the intent was,

that if not done within the time prescribed it might be done after-

wards. But when any of these reasons intervene, then the limit is

established.” 1

These cases perhaps sufficiently indicate the rules, so far as any

of general application can be declared, which are to be made use of

in determining whether the provisions of a statute are mandatory

or directory. Those directions which are not of the essence of the

thing to be done, but which are given with a view merely

‘ to the proper, orderly, and prompt conduct of the ["* 78]

business, and by a failure to obey which the rights of those

' State v. Lean, 9 Wis. 292.

6 [811

to the legality and validity of the tax, and whicll are directory
merely, and do not constitute conditions. One rule is very plain
and well settled, that all those measures that are intended for the
security of" the citizen, for insuring equality of taxation, and to
enable every one to know with reasonable certainty for what polls
and for what real estate he is taxed, and for what all those who are
liable with him are taxed, are conditions precedent; aud if they
are not observed, he is not legally taxed ; and be may resist it in
any of the modes authorized by law for contesting the validity of
the tax. But many regulations are made by statutes designed for
the information of assessors and officers, and intended to promote
m~thod, system, and uniformity in the modes of proceeding, a compliance or non-compliance with which does in no respect affect the
rights of tax-paying citizens. These may be considered directory.
Officers may be liable to legal animadversion, perhaps to punishment, for not observing them; but yet their observance is not a
condition precedent to the validity of the tax."
We shall quote further only from a single other case upon this
point. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in considering the
validity of a statute not published within the time required by law,
" understand the doctrine concerning directory statutes to be this:
that where there is no substantial reason why the thing to be done
might not as well be done after the time prescribed as before, no
presumption that by allowing it to be so done it may work an
injury or wrong, nothing in the act itself, or in other acts relating
to the same subject-matter, indicating that the legislature did not
intend that it should rather be done after the time prescribed than
not to be done at all, there the courts assume that the intent was,
that if not done within the time prescribed it might be done afterwards. But when any of these reasons intervene, then the limit is
established." I
These cases perhaps sufficiently indicate the rules, so far as any
of general application can be declared, which are to be made use of
in determining whether the provisions of a statute are mandatory
or directory. Those directions which are not of the essence of the
thing to be done, but which are given with a view merely
• to the proper, orderly, and prompt conduct of the (* 78]
business, and by a failure to obey which the rights of those
1

State v. Lean, 9 Wis. 292.
6
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

interested will not be prejudiced, are not commonly to be regarded

(CH. IV.

as mandatory; and if the act is performed, but not in the time or

in the precise mode indicated, it may still be sufficient, if that

which is done accomplishes the substantial purpose of the statute.‘

But this rule presupposes that no negative words are employed in

the statute which expressly or by necessary implication forbid the

doing of the act at any other time or in any other manner than as

directed. Even as thus laid down and restricted, the doctrine is

one to be applied with much circumspection; for it is not to be

denied that the courts have sometimes, in their anxiety to sustain

the proceedings of careless or incompetent oﬂicers, gone very far

in substituting a judicial view of what was essential for that

declared by the legislature.”

But the courts tread upon very dangerous ground when they

venture to apply the rules which distinguish directory and manda-

tory statutes to the provisions of a constitution. Constitutions do

not usually undertake to prescribe mere rules of proceeding,

except when such rules are looked upon as essential to the thing

to be done; and they must then be regarded in the light of limita-

tions upon the power to be exercised. It is the province of an

instrument of this solemn and permanent character to establish

those fundamental maxims, and ﬁx those unvarying rules, by
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‘ The following, in addition to those cited, are some of the cases in this coun-

try in which statutes have been declared directory only: Pond v. Negus, 3 Mass.

230; \Villiams v. School District, 21 Pick. 75; City of Lowell v. Hadley, 8 Met.

180; Holland v. Osgood, 8 Vt. 280; Corliss v. Corliss, ib. 390; People v. Allen,

6 Wend. 486; Marchant v. Langworthy, 6 Hill, 646; Ea: parte Heath, 3 Hill,

43; People v. Holley, 12 VVend. 481; Jackson v. Young, 5 Cow. 269; Striker

v. Kelley, 7 Hill, 9; People v. Peck, 11 Wend. 604; Matter of Mohawk and

Hudson Railroad Co. 19 Vi/end. 143; People v. Runkel, 9 Johns. 147; Gale v.

Mead, 2 Denio, 160; Doughty v. Hope, 3 Denio, 252; Elmendorf v. Mayor, &c.,

of New York, 25 Wend. 696; Thames Manufacturing Co. v. Lathrop, 7 Conn.

550; Colt v. Eves, 12 Conn. 243; People v. Doe, 1 Mich. 451; Parks v. Good-

interested will not be prejudiced, are not commonly to be regarded
as mandatory ; and if the act is performed, but not in the time or
in the precise mode indicated, it may still be sufficient, if that
which is done accomplishes the substantial purpose of the statute.1
But this rule presupposes that no negative words are employed in
the statute which expressly or by necessary implication forbid the
doing of the act at any other time or in any other manner than as
directed. Even as thus laid down and restricted, the doctrine is
one to be applied with much circumspection ; for it is not to be
denied that the courts have sometimes, in their anxiety to sustain
the proceedings of careless or incompetent officers, gone very far
in substituting a judicial view of what was essential for that
declared by the legislature.2
But the courts tread upon very dangerous ground when they
venture to apply the rules which distinguish directory and mandatory statutes to the provisions of a constitution. Constitutions do
not usually undertake to prescribe mere rules of proceeding,
except when such rules are looked upon as essential to the thing
to be done; and they must then be regarded in the light of limitations upon the power to be exercised. It is the province of an
instrument of this solemn and permanent character to establish
those fundamental maxims, and fix those w1varying rules, by

win, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 56; Hickey 0. Hinsdale, 8 Mich. 267'; People v. Hartwell,

12 Mich. 508; State v. McGinley, 4 Ind. 7; Slayton v. Hulings, 7 Ind. 144;

New Orleans v. St. Rowes, 9 La. An. 573; Edwards v. James, 13 Texas, 52;

State v. Click, 2 Ala. 26; Savage v. Walshe, 26 Ala. 620; Webster v. French,

12 Ill. 302; McKim v. VVeller, 11 Cal. 47; State v. Co. Commissioners of Bal-

timore, 29 Md. 516. The list might easily be largely increased.

' See upon this subject the remarks of Mr. Sedgwick in his work on Statu-

wry and Constitutional Law, p. 875, and those of Hubbard, J ., in Briggs v.

Georgia, 15 Vt. 72.

[82]

1 The following, in addition to those cited, are some of the cues in this country in which statutes have been declared directory only: Pond v. Negus, 3 Mass.
230; Williams v. School District, 21 Pick. 75; City of Lowell v. Hadley, 8 Met.
180; Holland v. Osgood, 8 Vt. 280; Corliss v. Corliss, ib. 390; People v. Alit>n,
6 Wend. 486; Marchant v. Langworthy, 6 Hill, 646; Ex parte Heath, 3 Hill,
43; People v. Holley, 12 Wend. 481; Jackson v. Young, 5 Cow. 269; Striker
v. Kelley, 7 Hill, 9; People v. Peck, 11 Wend. 604; Matter of Mohawk and
Hudson Railroad Co. 19 Wend. 148; People v. Runkel, 9 Johns. 147; Gale v.
Mt>ad, 2 Denio, 160; Doughty v. Hope, 3 Denio, 252; Elmendorf v. M~·or, &c.,
of New York, 25 Wend. 696; Thames Manufacturing Co. v. Lathrop, 7 Conn.
650; Colt v. Eves, 12 Conn. 243; People v. Doe, 1 Mich. 4f>1; Parks v. Goodwin, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 56; Hickey v. Hinsdale, 8 Mich. 267·; People v. Hartwell,
12 Mich. 508; State v. McGinley, 4 Ind. 7; Slayton v. Hulings, 7 Ind. 144;
Yew Orleans v. St. Rowes, 9 La. An. 573; Edwards v. James, 13 Texas, 52;
State v. Click, 2 Ala. 26 ; Savage v. W alshe, 26 Ala. 620; W ebater v. French,
12 Ill. 802; McKim v. Weller, 11 Cal. 47; State "· Co. Commissioners of Baltimore, 29 Md. 516. The list might easily be largdy increased.
1 See upon this subject the remarks of Mr. Sedgwick in his work on Statutory and Constitutional Law, p. 375, and those of Hubbard, J., in Briggs v.
Georgia, 15 Vt. 72.
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which all ‘departments of the government must at all [* 79]

times shape their conduct; and if it descends to prescribing

CB. IV.]

• 78

CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS.

mere rules of order in unessential matters, it is lowering the proper

dignity of such an instrument, and usurping the proper province of

ordinary legislation. We are not therefore to expect to ﬁnd in a

constitution provisions which the people, in adopting it, have not

regarded as of high importance, and worthy to be embraced in an

instrument which, for a time at least, is to control alike the

government and the governed, and to form a standard by which is

to be measured the power which can be exercised as well by the

delegateas by the sovereign people themselves. If directions are

given respecting the times or modes of proceeding in which a

power should be exercised, there is at least a strong presumption

that the people designed it should be exercised in that time and

mode only; and we impute to the people a want of due appreciation

of the purpose and proper province of such an instrument, when

we infer that such directions are given to any other end. Especially

when, as has been already said, it is but fair to presume that 'the

people in their constitution have expressed themselves in careful

and measured terms, corresponding with the immense importance

of the powers delegated, and with a view to leave as little as

possible to implication.‘
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There are some cases, however, where the doctrine of directory

statutes has been applied to constitutional provisions; but they are

at variance with the weight of authority upon the precise points

considered, and we do not think, therefore, we should be warranted

in saying that the judicial decisions as they now stand sanction

the application. In delivering the opinion of the New York Court

of Appeals in one case, Mr. Justice Willard had occasion to

consider the constitutional provision, that on the ﬁnal passage of a

bill the question shall be taken by ayes and noes, which shall be

duly entered upon the journals ; and he expressed the opinion that

it was only directory to the legislature.’ The remark was obiter

dictum, as the court had already decided that the provision had

been fully complied with; and those familiar with the reasons

‘ Wolcott v. Wigtou, 7 Ind. 49; Per Bronson, J., in People v. Purdy, 2 Hill,

36; Grecncastle Township v. Black, 5 Ind. 566; Opinions of Judges, 6 Shep.

458. See People 1:. Lawrence, 86 Barb. 177.

' People v. Supervisors of Chenango, 8 N. Y. 328.

[83]

which all • departments of the government must at all [* 79]
times shape their conduct; and if it descends to prescribing
mere rules of order in unessential matters, it is lowering the proper
dignity of such an instrument, and usurping the proper province of
ordinary legislation. We are not therefore to expect to find in a
constitution provisions which the people, in adopting it, have not
regarded as of high importance, and worthy to be embraced in an
instrument which, for a time at least, is to control alike the
government and the governed, and to form a sta.ndard by which is
to be measured the power which can be exercised as well by the
delegate as by the soYereign people themselYes. If directions are
given respecting the times or modes of proceeding in which a
power should be exercised, there is at least a strong presumption
that the people designed it should be exercised in that time and
mode only; and we impute to the people a want of due appreciation
of the purpose and proper province of such an instrument, when
we infer that such directions are giYen to any other end. Especially
when, as has been already said, it is but fair to presume that · the
people in their constitution have expressed themselves in careful
and measured terms, corresponding with the immense importance
of the powers delegated, and with a view to leave as little as
possible to implication.1
There are some cases, however, where the doctrine of directory
statutes has been applied to constitutional provisions; but they are
at variance with the weight of authority upon the precise points
considered, and we do not think, therefore, we should. be warranted
in saying that the judicial decisions as they now stand sanction
the application. In delivering the opinion of the New York Court
of Appeals in one case, :Mr. J nstice Willard had occasion to
consider the constitutional provision, that on the final passage of a
bill the question shall be taken by ayes and noes, which shall be
duly entered upon the journals ; and he expressed the opinion that
it was only directory to the legislature.2 The remark was obiter
dictum, as the court had already decided that the provision had
been fully complied with; and those familiar with the reasons
Wolcott v. Wigton, 7 Ind. 49; Per Bronson, J., in People 11. Purdy, 2 Hill,
86; Grecm·aatle Township o. Blal'k, [j Ind. 566; Opinions of Judges, 6 Shep.
458. See People"· Lawrence, 36 Barb. 177.
' People "· Supervisors of Chenango, 8 N. Y. 828.
1
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which have induced the insertion of this clause in our

• 79

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

[CH. IV •

[" 80] * constitutions will not readily concede that its sole design

was to establisha mere rule of order for legislative pro-

ceedings, which might be followed or not at discretion. Mr. Chief

Justice Thurman, of Ohio, in a case not calling for a discussion of

which have induced the insertion of this clause in our

[* 80] • constitutions will not readily concede that its sole design

the subject, has considered a statute whose validity was assailed on

the ground that it was not passed in the mode prescribed by the

Constitution. “By the term mode,” he says, “ I do not mean to

include the authority in which the law-making power resides, or the

number of votes a bill must receive to become a law. That the

power to make laws is vested in the Assembly alone, and that no

act has any force that was not passed by the number of votes

required by the Constitution, are nearly, or quite, self-evident

propositions. These essentials relate to the authority by which,

rather than the mode in which, laws are to be made. N ow

to secure the careful exercise of this power, and for other good

reasons, the Constitution prescribes or recognizes certain things to

be done in the enactment of laws, which things form a course or

mode of legislative procedure. Thus we ﬁnd, inter alia, the

provision that every bill shall be fully and distinctly read on three

different days, unless, in case of urgency, three-fourths of the house

in which it shall be pending shall dispense with this rule. This is

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:19 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105011581
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

an important provision without doubt, but, nevertheless, there is

much reason for saying that it is merely directory in its character,

and that its observance by the Assembly is secured by their sense

of duty and ofﬁcial oaths, and not by any supervisory power of the

courts. Any other construction, we incline to think, would load

to very absurd and alarming'consequences. If it is in the power

of every court (and if one has the power, every one has it) to

inquire whether a bill that passed the Assembly was “ fully ” and

“ distinctly ” read three times in each house, and to hold it

invalid if, upon any reading, a word was accidentally omitted, or the

reading was indistinct, it would obviously be impossible to know

what is the statute law of the State. Now the requisition that bills

shall be fully and distinctly read is just as imperative as that

requiring them to be read three times; and as both relate to the

mode of procedure merely, it would be diﬂicult to ﬁnd any

suﬂicient reason why a violation of one of them would be less fatal

to an act than a violation of the other.” 1

‘ Miller v. State, 3 Ohio, N. s. 483.

[ 84 ]

was to establish a mere rule of order for legislative proceedings, which might be followed or not at discretion. Mr. Chief
Justice Thurman, of Ohio, in a case not calling for a discussion of
the subject, has considered a statute whose validity was assailed on
the ground that it was not passed in the mode prescribed by the
Constitution. '' By tho term mode," he says, 11 I do not mean to
include the authority in which the law-making power resides, or the
number of votes a bill must receive to become a law. That the
power to make laws is vested in the Assembly alone, and that no
act has any force that was not passed by the number of votes
required by the Constitution, are nearly, or quite, self-evident
propositions. These essentials relate to the authority by which,
rather than the mode in which, laws are to be made. Now
to secure the careful exercise of this power, and for other good
reasons, the Constitution prescribes or recognizes certain things to
be done in the enactment of laws, which things form a course or
mode of legislative procedure. Thus we find, inter alia, the
provision that every bill shall be fully and distinctly read on three
different days, unless, in case of urgency, three-fourths of the house
in which it shall be pending shall dispense with this rule. This is
an important provision without doubt, but, nevertheless, there is
much reason for saying that it is merely directory in its character,
and that its observance by the Assembly is secured by their sense
of duty and official oaths, and not by any supervisory power of the
courts. Any other construction, we incline to think, would lead
to very absurd and alarming' consequences. If it is in the power
of every court (and if one has the power, every one has it) to
inquire whether a bill that passed the Assembly was "f~lly" and
" distinctly " read three times in each house, and to hold it
invalid if, upon any reading, a word was accidentally omitted, or the
reading was indistinct, it would obviously be impossible to know
what is the statute law of the State. Now the requisition that bills
shall be fully and distinctly read is just as imperative as that
requiring them to be read three times; and as both relate to the
mode of procedure merely, it would be difficult to find any
sufficient reason why a violation of one of them would be less fatal
to an act than a violation of the other." 1
1

[ 84]

Miller t~. State, 3 Ohio,

N.

s. 483.

on. rv.] CONSTRUCTION or srars consrirurrous. * 80

A requirement that a law shall be read distinctly, whether

CH. IV.)

• 80

CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS.

‘mandatory or directory, is, from the very nature of the ["‘ 81]

case, addressed to the judgment of the legislative body,

whose decision as to what reading is sufficiently distinct to be a

compliance cannot be subject to review. But in the absence of

authority to the contrary, we should not have supposed that the

requirement of three successive readings on different days stood

upon the same footing.‘ To this extent a deﬁnite and certain rule

is capable of being, and has been, laid down, which can be literally

obeyed; and the legislative body cannot suppose or adjudge it to

have been done if the fact is otherwise. The requirement has an

important purpose, in making legislators proceed in their action

with caution and deliberation; and there cannot often be difficulty

in ascertaining from the legislative records, themselves if the

constitution has been violated in this particular. There is,

therefore, no inherent difficulty in the question being reached and

passed upon by the courts in the ordinary mode, if it is decided

that the constitution intends legislation shall be reached through

the three readings, and not otherwise.

The opinion above quoted was recognized as law by the Supreme

Court of Ohio in a case soon after decided. In that case the court

proceed to say: “The . . . provision . . . that no bill shall con-
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tain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in

its title, is also made a permanent rule in the introduction and

passage of bills through the houses. The subject of the bill is

required to be clearly expressed in the title for the purpose of

advising members of its subject, when voting in cases in which the

reading has been dispensed with by a two-thirds vote. The

provision that a bill shall contain but one subject was to prevent

combinations by which various and distinct matters of legislation

should gain a support which they could not if presented separately.

As a rule of proceeding in the General Assembly, it is manifestly

an important one. But if it was intended to effect any practical

object for the beneﬁt of the people in the examination, construction,

or operation of acts passed and published, we are unable to

perceive it. The title of an act may indicate to the reader its

subject, and under the rule each act would contain one subject. To

suppose that for such a purpose the Constitutional Convention

‘ See People v. Campbell,‘ 3 Gilm. 466; McCulloch v. State, 11 Ind. 432.

[ 851

A requirement that a law shall be read distinctly, whether
• mandatory or directory, is, from the very nature of the [• 81]
case, addressed to the judgment of the legislative body,
whose decision as to what reading is sufficiently distinct to be a
compliance cannot be subject to review. But in the absence of
authority to the contrary, we should not have supposed that the
requirement of three successive readings on different days stood
upon the same footing. 1 To this extent a definite and certain rule
is capable of being, and has been, laid down, which can be literally
obeyed; and the legislative body cannot suppose or adjudge it to
have been done if the fact is othet·wise. The requirement has an
important purpose, in making legislators proceed in their action
with caution and deliberation; and there cannot often be difficulty
in ascertaining from the legislative records. themselves if the
constitution has been violated in this particular. There is,
therefore, no inherent difficulty in the question being reached and
passed upon by the courts in the ordinary mode, if it is decided
that the constitution intends legislation shall be reached through
the three readings, and not otherwise.
The opinion above quoted was recognized as law by the Supreme
Court of Ohio in a case soon after decided. In that case the court
proceed to say : " The ... provision ... that no bill shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in
its title, is also made a permanent rule in the introduction and
passage of bills through the houAes. The subject of the bill is
required to be clearly expressed in the title for tho purpose of
advising members of its subject, when voting in cases in which the
reading has been dispensed with by a two-thirds vote. The
provision that a bill shall contain but one subject was to prevent
combinations by which various and distinct matters of legislation
should gain a support which they could not if presented separately.
As a rule of proceeding in the General Assembly, it is manifestly
an important one. But if it was intended to effect any practical
object for the benefit of the people in the examination, construction,
or operation of acts passed and published, we are unable to
perceive it. The title of an act may indicate to the reader its
subject, and under the rule each act would contain one subject. To
suppose that for such a purpose the Constitutional Convention
1

See People o. Campbell,· S Gilm. 466 ; McCulloch v. State, 11 Ind. 432.

[ 85]
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adopted the rule under consideration, would impute to them a most

• 81

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

[cu.

IV.

minute provision for a very imperfect heading of the

[‘ 82] chapters of laws and their subdivision. This ‘provision

being intended to operate upon bills in their progress

through the General Assembly, it must be held to be directory

only. It relates to bills, and not to acts. It would be most

mischievous in practice to make the validity of every law depend

upon the judgment of every judicial tribunal of the State, as to

whether an act or a bill contained more than one subject, or

whether this one subject was clearly expressed in the title of the

act or bill. Such a question would be decided according to the

mental precision and mental discipline of each justice of the peace

and judge. No practical beneﬁt could arise from such inquiries.

We are therefore of opinion that in general the only safeguard

against the violation of these rules of the houses is their regard

for, and their oath to support, the constitution of the State. We

say, in general, the only safeguard; for whether a manifestly gross

and fraudulent violation of these rules might authorize the court

to pronounce a law unconstitutional, it is unnecessary to determine.

It is to be presumed no such case will ever occur.” 1

If the prevailing doctrine of the courts were in accord with this

decision, it might become important to consider whether the object
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of the clause in question, as here disclosed, was not of such a

character as to make the provision mandatory even in a statute.

But we shall not enter upon that subject here, as elsewhere we

shall have occasion to refer to decisions made by the highest

judicial tribunals in nearly all of the States, recognizing similar

provisions as mandatory, and to be enforced by the courts. And

we concur fully in what was said by Mr. Justice Emmet, in

speaking of this very provision, that “it will be found upon full

consideration to be diﬁicult to treat any constitutional provision as

merely directory and not imperative.” 2 _ And with what is said by

Mr. Justice Lumpkin, as to the duty of the courts: “ It has been

‘ Pim v. Nicholson, 6 Ohio, N. s. 179. See also the case of “Washington v.

Murray, 4 Cal. 388, for similar views. In Hill v. Boyland, 40 Miss. 618, a pro-

vision requiring of all oﬁicers an oath to support the constitution, was held not

to invalidate the acts of officials who had neglected to take such an oath. And

in McPherson v. Leonard, 29 Md. 377, the provision that the style of all laws

shall be, “Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Maryland,” was held

directory.

’ People v. Lawrence, 36 Barb. 186.
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adopted the rule under consideration, would impute to them a most
minute provision for a very imperfect heading of the
[• 82] chapters of laws and their subdivision. This • provision
being intended to operate upon bills in their progress
through the General Assembly, it must be held to be directory
only. It relates to bills, and not to acts. It would be most
mischievous in practice to make the validity of every law depend
upon the judgment of every judicial tribunal of the State, as to
whether an act or a bill contained more than one subject, or
whether this one subject was clearly expressed in the title of the
act or bill. Such a question would be decided according to the
mental precision and mental discipline of each justice of the peace
and judge. No practical benefit could arise from such inquiries.
We are therefore of opinion that in general the only safeguat·d
against the violation of these rules of the houses is their regard
for, and their oath to support, the constitution of the State. 'Ve
say, in gmeral, the only safeguard ; for whether a manifestly gross
and fraudulent violation of these rules might authorize the court
to pronounce a law unconstitutional, it is unnecessary to determine.
It is to be presumed no such case will ever occur." 1
If the prevailing doctrine of the courts were in accord with this
decision, it might become important to consider whether the object
of the clause in question, as here disclosed, was not of such a
character as to make the provision mandatory even in a statute.
But we shall not enter upon that subject here, as elsewhere we
shall have occasion to refer to decisions made by the highest
judicial tribunals in nearly all of the States, recognizing similar
provisions as mandatory, and to be enforced by the courts. And
we concur fully in what was said by Mr. Justice Emmot, in
speaking of this very provision, that "it will be found upon full
consideration to be difficult to treat any constitutional provision as
merely directory and not imperative." 2 • And with what is said by
Mr. Justice Lumpkin, as to the duty of the courts: "It has been
1 Pim v. Nicholson, 6 Ohio, N. s. 179.
See also the case of 'Washington v.
:Murray, 4 Cal. 388, for similar views. In Hill"· Boyland, 40 ~!iss. 618, a provision requiring of all officers an oath to support the constitution, was held not
to invalidate the acts of officials who had neglected to take such an oath. And
in McPherson v. Leonard, 29 Md. 377, the provision that the style of all laws
shall be, "Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Maryland," was held
directory.
' People v. Lawrence, 86 Barb. 186.
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suggested that the prohibition in the seventeenth section of the ﬁrst
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article of the constitution, ‘ Nor shall any law or ordinance pass

containing any matter different from what is expressed in the title

thereof,’ is directory only to the legislative and executive or law-

making departments of the government. But we do not so

understand it. On the contrary, we consider it as much a

‘matter of judicial cognizance as any other provision in [* 83]

that instrument. If the courts would refuse to execute a

law suspending the writ of habeas corpus when the public safety did

not require it, a law violatory of the freedom of the press, or trial

by jury, neither would they enforce a statute which contained mat-

ter different from what was expressed in the title thereof.” 1

We have thus indicated some of the rules which we think are

to be observed in the construction of constitutions. It will be

perceived that we have not thought it important to quote’ and to

dwell upon those arbitrary rules to which so much attention is

sometimes given, and which savor rather of the closet than of

practical life. Our observation would lead us to the conclusion

that they are more often resorted to as aids in ingenious attempts

to make the constitution seem to say what it does not, than with

a view to make that instrument express its real intent. All exter-

nal aids, and especially all arbitrary rules, applied to instruments
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of this popular character, are of very uncertain value; and we do

not regard it as out of place to repeat here what we have had

occasion already to say in the course of this chapter, that they

are to be made use of with hesitation, and only with much

circumspection.”

1 Protho v. Orr, 12 Geo. 86. See also Opinions of Judges, 6 Shep. 458;

Indiana Central Railroad Co. v. Potts,'7 Ind. 683; People v. Starne, 35 Ill. 121;

State v. Miller, 45 Mo. -195; \Veaver v. Lapsley, 43 Ala. 224.

' See People v. Cowles, 13 N. Y. 360, per Johnson, J.; Temple v. Mead,

4 Vt. 540, per Williams, J . “In construing so important an instrument as a

constitution, especially those parts which affect the vital principle of republican

government, the elective franchise, or the manner of exercising it, we are not,

on the one hand, to indulge ingenious speculations which may lead us wide from

the true sense and spirit of the instrument, nor, on the other, to apply to it such

narrow and constrained views as may exclude the real object and intent of those

who framed it. \Ve are to suppose that the authors of such an instrument had

a thorough knowledge of the force and extent of the words they employ; that

suggested that the prohibition in the seventeenth section of the first
article of the constitution, ' Nor shall any law or ordinance pass
containing any matter different from what is expressed in the title
thereof,' is directory only to the legislative and executive or lawmaking departments of the government. But we do not so
understand it. On the contrary, we consider it as much a
• matter of judicial cognizance as any other provision in [• 83]
that instrument. If the courts would refuse to execute a
law suspending the writ of ltabeas corpus when the public safety did
not require it, a law violatory of the freedom of the press, or trial
by jury, neither would they enforce a statute which contained matter different from what was expressed in the title thereof." 1
We have thus indicated some of the rules which we think are
to be observed in the construction of constitutions. It will be
perceived that we have not thought it important to quote and to
dwell upon those arbitrary rules to which so much attention is
sometimes given, and which savor rather of the closet than of
practical life. Our observation would lead us to the conclusion
that they are more often resorted to as aids in ingenious attempts
to make the constitution seem to say what it does not, than with
a view to make that instrument express its real intent. AU external aids, and especially all arbitrary rules, applied to instruments
of this popular character, are of very uncertain value; and we do
not regard it as out of place to repeat here what we have had
occasion already to say in the course of this chapter, that they
are to be made use of with hesitation, and only with much
circumspection.:~

they had a beneﬁcial end and purpose in view; and that, more especially in any

apparent restriction upon the mode of exercising the right of suffrage, there was

I

[87]

Protho v. Orr, 12 Geo. 86. See also Opinions of Judges, 6 Shep. 458;
Indiana Central Railroad Co. v. Potts,"7 Ind. 688; People v. Starne, 35 lil. 121;
State v. Miller, 45 Mo. 495; Weaver"· Lapsley, 43 Ala. 224.
1 Sec People "· Cowles, 13 N.Y. 360, per Johnson, J.; Temple v. :Mead,
4 Vt. 540, per Williama, J. "In constrding so important an instrument as a
constitution, especially those parts which affect the vital principle of republican
government, the elective franchise, or the manner of exercising it, we are not,
on the one band, to indulge ingenious speculations \vhich may lead us wide from
the true sense and spirit of the instrument, nor, on the other, to apply to it such
narrow and constrained views as may exclude the real object and intent of those
who framed it. 'Ve are to suppose that the authors of such an instrument had
a thorough knowledge of the force and extent of the words they employ; that
they bad a beneficial end and purpose in view; and that, more especially in any
apparent restriction upon the mode of exercising the right of suffrage, there waa
1

[ 87]
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some existing or anticipated evil which it was their purpose to avoid. If an en-

• 83
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(CH. IV •

larged sense of any particular form of expression should be necessary to accom-

plish so great an object as a convenient exercise of the fundamental privilege or

right, — that of election, —such sense must be attributed. \Ve are to suppose

that those who were delegated to the great business of distributing the powers

which emanated from the sovereignty of the people, and to the establishment of

the rules for the perpetual security of the rights of person and property, had the

wisdom to adapt their language to future as well as existing emergencies, so that

words competent to the then existing state of the community, and at the same

time capable of being expanded to embrace more extensive relations, should not

be restrained to their more obvious and immediate sense, if, consistently with the

general object of the authors and the true principles of the compact, they can be

extended to other relations and circumstances which an improved state of society

may produce. Qui hwret in litera hazret in cortice is a familiar maxim of the law.

The letter killeth, but the spirit maketh alive, is the more forcible expression of

Scripture.” Parker, Ch. J ., in Henshaw v. Foster, 9 Pick. 316.

[38]

some existing or anticipated evil which it was their purpose to avoid. If an enlarged sense of any particular form of expression should be 1lecessary to accomplish so great an object as a convenient exercise of the fundamental privilege or
right, -that of election, -such sense must be attributed. \Ve are to suppose
that those who were delegated to the great business of distributing the powers
which emanated from the sovereignty of the people, and to the establishment of
the rules for the perpetual security of the rights of person and property, had the
wisdom to adapt their language to future as well as existing emergencies, so that
words competent to the then exi~ting state of the community, aml at the same
time capable of being expanded to embrace more extensive relations, should not
be restrained to their more obvious and immediate sense, if, consistently with the
general object of the authors and the true principles of the compact, they can be
extended to other relations and circumstances which an improved state of society
may produce. Qui hceret in litera hceret in cortice is a familiar maxim of the law.
The letter killetb, but the spirit maketh alive, is the more forcible expression of
Scripture." Parker, Ch. J., in Henshaw v. Foster, 9 Pick. 316.
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POWERS EXERCISED BY LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT.

•

85

or ran POWERS WHICH THE LEGISLATIVE nsrxartrsnr MAY EXERCISE.

IN considering the powers which may be exercised by the legis-

lative department of one of the American States, it is natural that

we should recur to those possessed by the Parliament of Great

Britain, after which, in a measure, the American legislatures have

been modelled, and from which we derive our legislative usages

and customs, or parliamentary common law, as well as the prece-

•CHAPTER V.

[•85]

dents by which the exercise of legislative power in this country

has been governed. It is natural, also, that we should incline to

OF THE POWERS WHICH THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTl'IIENT MAY EXERCISE.

measure the power of the legislative department in America by

the power of the like department in Britain; and to concede

without reﬂection that whatever the legislature of the country

from which we derive our laws could do, might also be done by

the department created for the exercise of legislative authority

in this country. But to guard against being misled by a compari-

son between the two, we must bear in mind the important dis-

tinction already pointed out, that with the Parliament rests prac-

tically the sovereignty of the country, so that it may exercise all the

powers of the government if it wills so to do; while on the other

hand the legislatures of the American States are not the sovereign

authority, and, though vested with the exercise of one branch of
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the sovereignty, they are nevertheless, in wielding it, hedged in

on all sides by important limitations, some of which are imposed

in express terms, and others by implications which are equally im-

perative.

“ The power and jurisdiction of Parliament,” says Sir Edward

Coke,‘ “is so transcendent and absolute, that it cannot be con-

ﬁned, either for persons or causes, within any bounds. And of

this high court it may truly be said: ‘ Si antiquitatem spectes,

est vetustissima; si dignitatem est honoratissima; si jurisdic-

tioncm, est capaeissima.’ It hath sovereign and uncontrolled

authority in the making, conﬁrming, enlarging, restraining, abro-

' 4 Inst. 36. '

[ 39 ]

IN considering the powers which may be exercised by the legislative department of one of the American States, it is natural that
we should recur to those possessed by the Parliament of Great
Britain, after which, in a measure, the American legislatures have
been modelled, and from which we derive our legislative usages
and customs, or parliamentary common law, as well as the precedents by which the exercise of legislative power in this country
has been governed. It is natural, also, that we should incline to
measure the power of the legislative department in America by
the power of the like department in Britain ; and to concede
without reflection that whatever the legislature of the country
from which we derive our laws could do, might also be done by
the department created for the exercise of legislative authority
in this country. But to guard against being misled by a comparison between the two, we must bear in mind the important distinction already pointed out, that with the Parliament rests practically the sovereignty of the country, so that it may exercise all the
powers of the government if it wills so to do; while on the other
hand the legislatures of the American States are not the sovereign
authority, and, though vested with the exercise of one branch of
the sovereignty, they are nevertheless, in wielding it, hedged in
on all sides by important limitations, some of which are imposed
in express terms, and others by implications which are equally imperative.
" The power and jurisdiction of Parliament," says Sir Edward
C'oke,1 ''is so transcendent and absolute, that it cannot be confined, either for persons or causes, within any bounds. .And of
this high court it may truly be said: ' Si antiquitatem spectes,
est vetustissima; si dignitatem est honoratissima ; si jurisdictionem, est capacissima.' It hath sovereign and uncontrolled
authority in the making, confirming, enlarging, restraining, abro1

4 Inst. 86.

[ 89]
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

gating, repealing, reviving, and expounding of laws, concerning

[cH. v.

matters of all possible denominations, ecclesiastical or

[‘*86] temporal, " civil, military, maritime, or criminal; this

being the place where that absolute despotic power, which

must in all governments reside somewhere, is entrusted by the

constitution of these kingdoms. All mischiefs and grievances,

operations and remedies, that transcend the ordinary course of the

laws, are within the reach of this extraordinary tribunal. It can

regulate or new-model the succession to the Crown, as was done in

the reign of Henry VIII, and William III. It can alter the

established religion of the land; as was done in a. variety of

instances, in the reign of King Henry VIII. and his three children.

It can change and create afresh even the constitution of the king-

dom and of Parliaments themselves, as was done by the Act of

Union, and the several statutes for triennial and septennial elec-

tions. It can, in short, do every thing that is not naturally impos-

sible ; and therefore some have not scrnpled to call its power, by a

ﬁgure rather too bold, the omnipotence of Parliament. True it is,

that what the Parliament doth, no authority upon earth can undo;

so that it is a matter most essential to the liberties of this king-

dom that such members be delegated to this important trust as are

most eminent for their probity, their fortitude, and their knowl-
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edge; for it was a known apothegm of the great Lord Treasurer

Burleigh, ‘that England could never be ruined but by a Parlia-

ment’; and as Sir Matthew Hale observes: ‘This being the highest

and greatest court, over which none other can have jurisdiction

in the kingdom, if by any means a misgovernment should fall

upon it, the subjects of this kingdom are left without all manner

of remedy.’ ” 1

The strong language in which the complete jurisdiction of

Parliament is here described is certainly inapplicable to any

a.uthority in the American States, unless it be to the people of

the States when met in their primary capacity for the formation

of their fundamental law; and even then there rest upon them

the restraints of the Constitution of the United States, which

bind them as absolutely as they do the governments which they

create. It becomes important, therefore, to ascertain in what

respect the State legislatures resemble the Parliament in the

‘ 1 Bl. Com. 160.

p[901

gating, repealing, revi\"ing, and expounding of laws, concerning
matters of all possible denominations, ecclesiastical or
[• 86] temporal, • civil, military, maritime, or criminal; this
being the place where that absolute despotic power, which
must in all governments reside somewhere, is entrusted by the
constitution of these kingdoms. All mischiefs and grievances,
operations and remedies, that transcend the ordinary course of the
laws, are within the reach of this extraordinary tribunal. It can
regulate or new-model the succession to the Crown, as was done in
the reign of Henry VIII. and William Ill. It can alter the
established religion or the land; as was done in a variety of
instances, in the reign of King Henry VIII. and his three children.
It can change and create afresh even the constitution of the kingdom and of Parliaments themselves, as was done by the Act of
Union, and the several statutes for triennial and septennial elec1 tions.
It can, in short, do every thing that is not naturally impossible; and therefore some have not scrupled to call its power, by a
figure rather too bold, the omnipotence of Parliament. True it is,
that what the Parliament doth, no authority upon earth can undo;
so that it is a matter most essential to the liberties of this kingdom that such members be delegated to this important trust as are
most eminent for their probity, their fortitude, and their knowledge ; for it was a known apothegm of the great Lord Treasurer
Burleigh, ' that England could never be ruined but by a Parliament'; and as Sir Matthew Hale observes: 'This being the highest
and greatest court, over which none other can have jurisdiction.
in the kingdom, if by any means a misgovernment should fall
upon it, the subjects of this kingdom are left without all manner
of remedy.'" 1
The strong language in which the complete jurisdiction of
Parliament is here described is certainly inapplicable to any
authority in the American States, unless it be to the people of
the States when met in their primary capacity for the formation
of their fundamental law; and even then there rest upon them
the restraints of the Constitution of the United States, which
bind them as absolutely as they do the governments which they
create. H becomes important, therefore, to ascertain in what
respect the State legislatures resemble the Parliament in the
1

[ 90]

1 Bl. Com. 160.
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powers they exercise, and how far we may extend the comparison
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86

without losing sight of the fundamental ideas and principles of

the American system.

‘The ﬁrst and most notable diﬂerence is that to which [“ 87]

we have already alluded, and which springs from the dif-

ferent theory on which the British Constitution rests. When Par-

liament is recognized as possessing the sovereign power of the

country, it is evident that the resemblance between it and Ameri-

can legislatures in regard to their ultimate powers cannot be car-

ried very far. The American legislatures only exercise a certain

portion of the sovereign power. The sovereignty is in the people ;

and the legislatures which they have created are only to discharge

a trust of which they have been made a depository, but with well-

deﬁned restrictions.

Upon this difference it is to be observed, that while Parliament,

to any extent it may choose, may exercise judicial authority, one

of the most noticeable features in American constitutional law

is, the care taken to separate legislative, executive, and judicial

functions. It has evidently been the intention of the people in

every State that the exercise of each should rest with a separate

department. The different classes of power have been appor-

tioned to different departments; and this being all done by the
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same instrument, there is an implied exclusion of each department

from exercising the functions conferred upon the others.

There are two fundamental rules by which we may measure the

extent of the legislative authority in the States : —

1. In creating a. legislative department and conferring upon it

the legislative power, the people must be understood to have con-

ferred the full and complete power as it rests in, and may be exer-

cised by, the sovereign power of any country, subject only to such

restrictions as they may have seen ﬁt to impose, and to the limita-

tions which are contained in the Constitution of the United States.

The legislative department is not made a special agency, for the

exercise of speciﬁcally deﬁned legislative powers, but is entrusted

with the general authority to make laws at discretion.

2. But the apportionment to this department of legislative

power does not sanction the exercise of executive or judicial

functions, except in those cases, warranted by parliamentary usage,

where they are incidental, necessary, or proper to the exercise of

legislative authority, or where the constitution itself, in speciﬁed

[91]

powers they exercise, and how far we may extend the comparison
without losing sight of the fundamental ideas and principles of
the American system.
• The first and most notable difference is that to which [• 87]
we have already alluded, and which springs from the different theory on which the British Constitution rests. When Parliament is recognized as possessing the sovereign power of the
country, it is evident that the resemblance between it and American legislatures in regard to their ultimate powers cannot be carried very far. The American legislatures only exercise a certain
portion of the sovereign power. The sovereignty is in the people ;
and the legislatures which they have created are only to discharge
a trust of which they have been made a depository, but with welldefined restrictions.
Upon this difference it is to be observed, that while Parliament,
to any extent it may choose, may exercise judicial authority, one
of the most noticeable features in American constitutional law
is, the care taken to separate legislative, executive, and judicial
functions. It has evidently been the intention of the people in
every State that the exercise of each should rest with a separate
department. The different classes of power have been apportioned to different departments ; and this being all done by the
same instrument, there is an implied exclusion of each department
from exercising the functions conferred upon the others.
There are two fundamental rules by which we may measure the
extent of the legislative authority in the States:1. In creating a legislative department and conferring upon it
the legislative power, the people must be understood to have conferred the full and complete power as it rests in, and may be exercised by, the sovereign power of any country, subject only to such
restrictions as they may have seen fit to impose, and to the limitations which arc contained in the Constitution of the United States.
The legislative department is not made a special agency, for the
exercise of specifically defined legislative powers, but is entrusted
with the general authority to make laws at discretion.
2. But the apportionment to this department of legislative
power does not sanction the exercise of executive or judicial
functions, except in those cases, warranted by parliamentary usage,
where they are incidental, necessary, or proper to the exercise of
legislative authority, or where the constitution itself, in specified
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cases, may expressly permit it. Executive power is so intimately

• 87

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

[cH. v.

connected with legislative, that it is not easy to draw a line of

separation; but the grant of the judicial power to the

["' 88] department ‘created for the purpose of exercising it must

be regarded as an exclusive grant, covering the whole

power, subject only to the limitations which the constitutions

impose, and to the incidental exceptions before referred to.

While, therefore, the American legislatures may exercise the legis-

lative powers which the Parliament of Great Britain wields, except

as restrictions are imposed, they are at the same time excluded

from other functions which may be, and sometimes habitually are,

exercised by the Parliament.

“The people in framing the constitution,” says Denio, Ch. J .,

“committed to the legislature the whole law-making power of

the State, which they did not expressly or impliedly withhold.

Plenary power in the legislature, for all purposes of civil‘ govern-

ment, is the rule. A prohibition to exercise a particular power is

an exception. In inquiring, therefore, whether a given statute is

constitutional, it is for those who question its validity to show that

it is forbidden. I do not mean that the power must be expressly

inhibited, for there are but few positive restraints upon the legisla-

tive power contained in the instrument. The ﬁrst article lays
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down the ancient limitations which have always been considered

essential in a constitutional government, whether monarchical

or popular; and there are scattered through the instrument a few

other provisions in restraint of legislative authority. But the

afﬁrmative prescriptions and the general arrangements of the

constitution are far more fruitful of restraints upon the legisla-

ture. Every positive direction contains an implication against

every thing contrary to it, or which would frustrate or disappoint

the purpose of that provision. The frame of the government, the

grant of legislative power itself, the organization of the executive

authority, the erection of the principal courts of justice, create

implied limitations upon the law-making authority as strong as

though a negative was expressed in each instance; but indepen-

dently of these restraints, express or implied, every subject within

the scope of civil government is liable to be dealt with by the legis-

lature.”1

‘ People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 548.
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cases, may expressly permit it. Executive power is so intimately
connected with legislative, that it is not easy to draw a line of
separation ; but the grant of the judicial power to the
[• 88] department • created for the purpose of exercising it must
be regarded as an exclusive grant, covering the whole
power, subject only to the limitations which the constitutions
impose, and to the incidental exceptions before referred to.
While, therefore, the American legislatures may exercise the legislative powers which the Parliament of Great Britain wields, except
as restrictions are imposed, they are at the same time excluded
from other functions which may be, and sometimes habitually are,
exercised by the Parliament.
"The people in framing the constitution," says Denio, Ch. J.,
" committed to the legislature the whole law-making power of
the State, which they did not expressly or impliedly withhold.
Plenary power in the legislature, for all purposes of civil government, is the rule. A prohibition to exercise a particular power is
an exception. In inquiring, therefore, whether a given statute is
constitutional, it is for those who question its validity to show that
it is forbidden. I do not mean that the power must be expressly
inhibited, for there are but few positive restraints upon the legislative power contained in the instrument. The first article lays
down the ancient limitations which have always been considered
essential in a constitutional government, whether monarchical
or popular; and there are scattered through the instrument a few
other provisions in restraint of legislative authority. But the
affirmative prescriptions and the general arrangements of the
constitution are far more fruitful of restraints upon the legislature. Every positive direction contains an implication against
every thing contrary to it, or which would frustrate or disappoint
the purpose of that provision. The frame of the government, the
grant of legislative power itself, the organization of the executive
. authority, the erection of the principal court.~ of justice, create
implied limitations upon the law-making authority as strong as
though a negative was expressed iu each instance ; but iudcpcudeutly of these restraints, express or implied, every subject within
the scope of civil government is liable to be dealt with by the legislature." 1
1
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“It has never been questioned, so far as I know,” says Redﬁeld,
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Ch. J ., “ that the American legislatures have the same unlimited

power in regard to legislation which resides in the British Parlia-

ment, except where they are restrained by written consti-

tutions. *"That must be conceded, I think, to be a funda- ["‘ 89]

mental principle in the political organization of the

American States. We cannot well comprehend how, upon princi-

ple_, it should be otherwise. The people must, of course, possess

all legislative power originally. They have committed this in the

most general and unlimited manner to the several State legisla-

tures, saving only such restrictions as are imposed by the Consti-

tution of the United States, or of the particular State in question.”1

“I entertain no doubt,” says Comstock, J., “that aside from

the special limitations of the Constitution, the legislature cannot

exercise powers which are in their nature essentially judicial or

executive. These are, by the Constitution, distributed to other

departments of the government. It is only the ‘legislative power’

which is vested in the senate and assembly. But where the con-

stitution is silent, and there is no clear usurpation of the powers

distributed to other departments, I think there would be great

difficulty and great danger in attempting to deﬁne the limits of

this ipower. Chief Justice Marshall said: ‘ How far the power of
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giving the law may involve every other power, in cases where the

constitution is silent, never has been, and perhaps never can be,

deﬁnitely stated.” That very eminent judge felt the difﬁculty;

but the danger was less apparent then than it is now, when theo-

ries, alleged to be founded in natural reason or inalienable rights,

but subversive of the just and necessary powers of government,

attract the belief of considerable classes of men, and when too

much reverence for government and law is certainly among the

least of the perils to which our institutions are exposed. I am

reluctant to enter upon this ﬁeld of inquiry, satisﬁed, as I am,

that no rule can be laid down in terms which may not contain the

germ of great mischief to society, by giving to private opinion and

' Thorpe v. Rutland & Burlington Railroad Co., 27 Vt. 142. See also Leg-

gett v. Hunter, 19 N. Y. 445; Cochran v. Van Surlay, 20 Wend. 36.3; People

v. Morrell, 21 Wend. 563; Sears v. Cottrell, 5 Mich. 251; Mason v. Wait, 4

Scam. 134; People v. Supervisors of Orange, 27 Barb. 593; Taylor v. Porter,

4 Hill, 144, per Bronson, J .

' Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 136.
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" It has never been questioned, so far as I knowt says Redfield,
Ch. J., "that the American legislatures have the same unlimited
power in regard to legislation which resides in the British Parliament, except where they are restrained by written constitutions. • That must be conceded, I think, to be a funda- [• 89]
mental principle in the political organization of the
American States. We cannot well comprehend how, upon principl~, it should be otherwise. The people must, of course, possess
all legislative power originally. They have committed this in the
most general and unlimited manner to the several State legislatures, saving only such restrictions as are imposed by the Constitution of the United States, or of the particular State in question." 1
"I entertain no doubt," says Comstock, J., "that aside from
the special limitations of the Constitution, the legislature cannot
exercise powers which are in their nature essentially judicial or
executive. These are, by the Constitution, distributed to other
departments of the government. It is only the ' legislative power'
which is vested in the senate and assembly. But where the constitution is silent, and there is no clear usurpation of the powers
distributed to other departments, I think there would be great
difficulty and great danger in attempting to define the limits of
this ~power. Chief Justice Marshall said : ' How far the power of
giving the law may involve every other power, in cases where the
constitution is silent, never has been, and perhaps never can be,
definitely stated.' 2 That very eminent judge felt the difficulty;
but the danger was less apparent then than it is now, when theories, alleged to be founded in natural reason or inalienable rights,
but -subversive of the just and necessary powers of government,
attract the belief of considerable classes of men, and when too
much reverence for government and law is certainly among the
least of the perils to which our institutions are exposed. I am
reluctant to enter upon this field of inquiry, satisfied, as I am,
that no rule can be laid down in terms which may not contain the
germ of great mischief to society, by giving to private opinion and
1 Thorpe"· Rutland & Burlington Railroad Co., 27 Vt. 142.
See also Leggett v. Hunter, 19 N.Y. 445; Cochran v. Van Surlay, 20 Wend. 86i>; People
v. Morrell, 21 Wend. 563; Sears "· Cottrell, 5 Mich. 251 ; Mason v. Wait, 4
Scam. 134; l'eople "· Supervisors of Orange, 27 Barb. 598; Taylor "· Porter,
4 Hill, 144, per Brmuton, J.
1 Fletcher"· Peck, 6 Cranch, 186.
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speculation a license to oppose themselves to the just and legiti-
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mate powers of government.” 1

Numerous other opinions might be cited to the same

[‘* 90] effect with “‘those from which we have here quoted; but

as we shall have occasion to refer to them elsewhere, in

considering the circumstances under which a statute may be

declared unconstitutional, we shall refrain from further references

in this place. Nor shall we enter upon a discussion of the ques-

tion suggested by Chief Justice Marshall as above quoted ; 2 since,

however interesting it may be as an abstract question, it is made

practically unimportant by the careful separation of duties between

the several departments of the government which has been made

by each of the State constitutions. Had no such separation been

made, the disposal of executive and judicial duties must have

devolved upon the department vested with the general authority

to make laws ;3 but assuming them to be apportioned already, we

are only at liberty to liken the power of the State legislature to

that of the Parliament, when it confines its action to an exercise

of legislative functions; and such authority as is in its nature

either executive or judicial is beyond its constitutional powers,

with the few exceptions to which we have already referred.

It will be important therefore to consider those cases where
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legislation has been questioned as encroaching upon judicial

authority; and to this end it may be useful, at the outset, to en-

deavor to deﬁne legislative and judicial power respectively, that

we may the better be enabled to point out the proper line of dis-

tinction when questions arise in their practical application to

actual cases.

The legislative power is the authority, under the Constitution, to

make laws, and to alter and repeal them. Laws, in the sense in

which the word is here employed, are rules of civil conduct, or

‘ \Vynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 391.

’ The power to distribute the judicial power, except so far as that has been

done by the constitution, rests with the legislature; but when the constitution

has conferred it upon certain speciﬁed courts, this must be understood to embrace

the whole judicial power, and the legislature cannot vest any portion of it else-

where. State v. Maynard, 14 Ill. 420; Gibson v. Emerson, 2 Eng. 173; Chand-

ler v. Nash, 5 Mich. 409.

’ Calder v. Bull, 2 Root, 350, and 3 Dall. 386; Ross v. \Vhitman, 6 Cal. 361 ;

Smith v. Judge, 17 Cal. 547; per Patterson, J., in Cooper v. Telfair, 4 Dall. 19;

Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304.

\
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speculation a license to oppose themselves to the just and legitimate powers of government." 1
Numerous other opinions might be cited to the same
[* 90] effect with • those from which we have here quoted; but
as we shall have occasion to refer to them elsewhere, in
considering the circumstances under which a statute may be
declared unconstituti01ial, we shall refrain from further references
in this place. Nor shall we enter upon a discussion of the question suggested by Chief Justice Marshall as above quoted; 2 since,
however interesting it may be as an abstract question, it is made
practically unimportant by the careful separation of duties between
the several departments of the government which has been made
by each of the State constitutions. Had no such separation been
made, the disposal of executive and judicial duties must have
devolved upon the department vested with the general authority
to make laws ; 3 but assuming them to be apportioned alread.h we
are only at liberty to liken the power of the State legislature to
that of the Padinment, when it confines its action to an exercise
of legislative functions; and such authority as is in its nature
either executive or judicial is beyond its constitutional powers,
with the few exceptions to which we have already referred.
It will be important therefore to consider those cases where
legislation has been questioned as encroaching upon judicial
authority ; and to this end it may be u.seful, at the outset, to endeavor to define legislative and judicial power respecth•ely, tl.tat'
we may the better be enabled to point out the proper line of distinction when questions arise in their practical application to
actual cases.
The legislative power is the authority, under the Constitution, to
make laws, and to alter and repeal them. Laws, in the sense in
which the word is here employed, are rules of ch·il conduct, or
'Vynehamer "· People, 13 N. Y. 391.
The power to distribute the judidal power, except so far as that has been
done by the conMtitution, rests with the legislature; but when the constitution
has conferred it upon certain specified courts, this must be understood to embrace
the whole judicial power, and the legislature cannot vest any portion of it elsewhere. State v. Maynard, 14 Ill. 420; Gibson v. Emerson, 2 Eng. 173; Chandler v. Nash, 5 Mich. 409.
a Calder v. Bull, 2 Root, 350, and 3 Dall. 886; Ross v. Whitman, 6 Cal. 361 ;
Smith v. Judge, 17 Cal. 547; per Patterson, J., in Cooper 1'. Telfair, 4 Dall. 19;
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304.
1

1
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statutes, which the legislative will has prescribed. “ The laws of
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* 90

a State,” observes Mr. Justice Story, “are more usually under-

stood to mean the rules and enactments promulgated by the legis-

lative authority thereof, or long-established local customs

having ‘the force of 1aws.”1 “The difference between [* 91]

the departments undoubtedly is, that the legislature

makes, the executive executes, and the judiciary construes, the

law.”2 And it is said that that which distinguishes a judicial

from a legislative act is, that the one is a determination of what

the existing law is in relation to some existing thing already done

or happened, while the other is a predetcrmination of what the law

shall be for the regulation of all future cases falling under its pro-

visions.” And in another case it is said: “ The legislative power

extends only to the making of laws, and in its exercise it is limited

and restrained by the paramount authority of the Federal and

State constitutions. It cannot directly reach the property or

vested rights of the citizen by providing for their forfeiture or

transfer to another, without trial and judgment in the courts: for

to do so would be the exercise of a power which belongs to another

branch of the government, and is forbidden to the legislative/’4

“That is not legislation which adjudicates in a particular case,

prescribes the rule contrary to the general law, and orders it to be
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enforced. Such power assimilates itself more closely to despotic

rule than any other attribute of government.” 5

On the other hand, to adjudicate upon, and protect, the rights

and interests of individual citizens, and to that end to construe

and apply the laws, is the peculiar province of the judicial depart-

ment.“ “No particular definition of judicial power,” says Wood-

‘ Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 18.

’ Per Marshall, Ch. J .. in Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 46; Per Gibson,

Ch. J., in Greenough v. Greenough, 11 Penn. St. 494. See State v. Gleason,

12 Fla. 190.

‘ Bates v. Kimball, 2 Chip. 77.

‘ Newland v. Marsh, 19 Ill. 382.

' Ervine’s Appeal, 16 Penn. St. 266. See also Greenough v. Greenough, 11

Penn. St. 494; Dechastellux v. Fairchild, 15 Penn. St. 18.

‘ Cincinnati, &c. Railroad Co. v. Commissioners of Clinton Co. 1 Ohio

N. s. 81. See also King o. Dedham Bank, 1.5 Mass. 454; Gordon v. Ingraham,

1 Grant’s Cases, 152; People o. Supervisors of New York, 16 N. Y. 432; Beebe

v. State, 6 Ind. 515; Greenough v. Greenough, 11 Penn. St. 494; Taylor v.

Place, 4 R. I. 324. In State o. Adams, 44 Mo. 570, s. legislative act which

statutes, which the legislative will has prescribed. "The laws of
a State," obset·ves :Mr. Justice Story," are more usually understood to mean the rules and enactments promulgated by the legislative authority thereof, or long-established local customs
having • the force of laws." 1 " The difference between [* 91]
the departments undoubtedly is, that the legislature
makes, the executive executes, and the judiciary construes, the
law." 2 And it is said that that which distinguishes a judicial
from a legislative act is, that the one is a determination of what
the existing law is in relation to some existing thing already done
or happened, while the other is a predetermination of what the law
shall be for the regulation of all future cases falling under its provisions.8 And in another case it is said: "The legislative power
extends only to the making of laws, and in its exercise it is limited
and restrained by the paramount authority of the Federal and
State constitutions. It cannot directly reach the property or
vested rights of the, citizen by providing for their forfeiture or
transfer to another, without trial and judgment in the courts: for
to do so would bo the exercise of a power which belongs to another
branch of the government, and is forbidden to the legislative." 4
"That is not legislation which adjudicates in a particular case,
prescribes the rule contrary to the general law, and orders it to be
enforced. Such power assimilates itself more closely to despotic
rule than any other attribute of government." 5
Ou the other band, to adjudicate upon, and protect, the rights
and inte1·ests of individual citizens, and to that end to construe
and apply the laws, is the peculiar province of the judicial department.6 "No particular definition of judicial power," says Wood-
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Swif\ 11. Tyson, 16 Pet. 18.
Per Marshall, Ch. J., in Wayman 11. Southard, 10 Wheat. 46; Per GibtJon,
Ch. J., in Greenough~'· Greenough, 11 Penn. St. 49!. See State v. Gleason,
12 !o'la. 190.
, Bates 11. Kimball, 2 Chip. 77.
• Newland 11. Marsh, 19 Ill. 882.
1 Enine's Appeal, 16 Penn. St. 266.
See also Greenough ~'·Greenough, 11
Penn. St. 494; Dechastellux v. Fairchild, 15 Penn. St. 18.
• Cincinnati, &c. Railroad Co. "· Commissioners of Clinton Co. 1 Ohio
N. 8. 81. See also King 11. Dedham Bank, 15 :Mass. 454; Gordon 11. Ingraham,
1 Grant's Caat!s, 152; People"· Supervisors of New York, 16 N.Y. 432; Beebe
11. State, 6 Ind. 515; Greenough 11. Greenough, 11 Penn. St. 494; Taylor 11.
Place, 4 R. I. 824. In State 11. Adams, 44 Mo. 670, a legialative act which
1

1
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bury, J ., “is given in the constitution [of New Hampshire], and,

• 91

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

[cH. v.

considering the general nature of the instrument, none was to be

expected. Critical statements of the meanings in which all im-

portant words were employed would have swollen into volumes;

and when those words possessed a customary signiﬁcation, a deﬁ-

nition of them would have been useless. But‘powers

[* 92] judicial,’ *‘ judiciary powers,’ and ‘judicatures’ are all

phrases. used in the constitution; and though not particu-

larly deﬁned, are still so used to designate with clearness that

department of government which it was intended should inter-

pret and administer the laws. On general principles, therefore,

those inquiries, deliberations, orders, and decrees, which are

peculiar to such a department, must in their nature be judicial

acts. Nor can they be both judicial and legislative; because a

marked difference exists between the employment of judicial and

legislative tribunals. The former decide upon the legality of

claims and conduct, and the latter make rules upon which, in con-

nection with the constitution, those decisions should be founded.

It is the province of judges to determine what is the law upon

existing cases. In ﬁne, the law is applied by the one, and made

by the other. To do the ﬁrst, therefore,—to compare the claims

of parties with the law of the land before established,—-is in its
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nature a judicial act. But to do the last—t0 pass new rules for

the regulation of new controversies—is in its nature a legislative

act; and if these rules interfere with the past, or the present, and

do not look wholly to the future, they violate the deﬁnition of a

law as ‘ a rule of civil conduct ; ’ 1 because no rule of conduct can

with consistency operate upon what occurred before the rule itself

was promulgated.

“It is the province of judicial power, also, to decide private

disputes between or concerning persons; but of legislative power

to regulate public concerns, and to make laws for the beneﬁt and

welfare of the State. Nor does the passage of private statutes

conﬂict with these principles ; because such statutes, when lawful,

are enacted on petition, or by the consent of all concerned; or else

declared certain college otﬁcers to have vacated their oﬁices by failure to take

an oath prescribed by a previous act, and which proceeded to appoint successors,

was held void as an exercise of judicial power.

‘ 1 B1. Com. 44.
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bury, J., "is given in the constitution [of New Hampshire], and,
considering the general nature of the instrument, none was to be
expected. Critical statements of the meanings in which all important words were employed would have swollen into volumes ;
and when those words possessed a customary signification, a definition of them would have been useless. But 'powers
[• 92] judicial,' • 'judiciary powers,' and 'judicatures ' are all
phrases used in the constitution; and though not particularly defined, are still so used to designate with clearness that
department of government which it was intended should interpret and administer the laws. On general principles, therefore,
those inquiries, deliberations, orders, and decrees, which are
peculiar to such a department, must in their nature be judicial
acts. Nor can they be both judicial and legislative; because a
marked difference exists between the employment of judicial and
legislative tribunals. The former decide upon the legality of
claims and conduct, and the latter make rules upon which, in connection with the constitution, those decisions should be founded.
It is the province of judges to determine what is the law upon
existing cases. In fine, the law is applied by the one, and made
by the other. To do the first, therefore,- to compare the claims
of parties with the law of the laud before established,- is in its
nature a judicial act. But to do the last- to pass new rules for
the regulation of new controversies- is in its nature a legislative
act; and if these rules interfere with the past, or the present, and
do not look wholly to the future, they violate the definition of a
law as 'a rule of civil conduct;' 1 because no rule of conduct can
with consistency operate upon what occurred before the rule itself
was promulgated.
"It is the province of judicial power, also, to decide private
disputes between or concerning persons; but of legislative power
to regulate public concerns, and to make laws for the benefit and
welfare of the State. Nor does the passage of private statutes
conflict with these principles; because such statutes, when lawful,
are enacted on petition, or by the consent of all concerned ; or else
declared certain college officers to have vacated their offices by failure to take
an oath prescribed by a previous act, and which proceeded to appoint successors,
was held void as an exercise of judicial power.
1 1 Bl. Com. 44.
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they forbear to interfere with past transactions and vested

CH. V.)
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rights.”‘

With these deﬁnitions and explanations, we shall now proceed

to consider some of the cases in which the courts have attempted

to draw the line of distinction between the proper functions of the

legislative and judicial departments, in cases where it has been

claimed that the legislature have exceeded their power by invading

the domain of judicial authority.

“ Declaratory Statutes. [* 93]

Legislation is either introductory of new rules, or it is de-

claratory of existing rules. “ A declaratory statute is one which

is passed in order to put an end to a doubt as to what is the com-

mon law, or the meaning of another statute, and which declares

they forbear to interfere with past transactions and vested
rights." 1
With these definitions and explanations, we shall now proceed
to consider some of the cases in which the courts have attempted
to draw the line of distinction between the proper functions of the
legislath·e aud judicial departments, in cases where it has been
claimed that the legislature have exceeded their power by invading
the domain of judicial authority.

what it is and ever has been.“ Such a statute, therefore, is always

in a certain sense retrospective ; because it assumes to determine

what the law was before it was passed ; and as a declaratory statute

is important only in those cases where doubts have already arisen,

[* 93]

• IJeclaratory Statutes.

the statute, when passed, may be found to declare the law to be

different from what it has already been adjudged to be by the

courts. Thus Mr. Fox’s Libel Act declared that, by the law of

England, juries were judges of the law in prosecutions for libel; it

did not purport to introduce a new rule, but to declare a rule
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already and always in force. Yet previous to the passage of this

act the courts had repeatedly held that the jury in these cases were

only to pass upon the fact of publication and the truth of

the innueudoes; and whether the publication was libcllous or not

was a question of law which addressed itself exclusively to the

court. Thus the legislature declared the law to be what the courts

had declared it was not. So in the State of New York, after the

courts had held that insurance companies were taxable to a certain

extent under an existing statute, the legislature passed another

act, declaring that such companies_ were only taxable at a certain

other rate ; and it was thereby declared that such was the intention

‘ Merrill v. Sherbume, 1 N. H. 204. See Jones v. Perry, 10 Ycrg. 69; Tay-

lor v. Porter, 4 Hill, 144; Ogden v. Blackledge, 2 Cranch, 272; Dash v. Van

Kleek, 7 Johns. 498; Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Pet. 657; Leland v. Wilkinson,

10 Pet. 297.

' Bouv. Law Dic. “ Statute.”

7 [97]

Legislation is either introductory of new rules, or it is declaratory of existiug rules. "A declaratory statute is one which
is passed in order to put an end to a doubt as to what is the common law, or the meaning of another statute, and which declares
what it is and ever has been.2 Such a statute, therefore, is always
in a certain sense ret1·ospective; because it assumes to determine
what the law was before it was passed; and as a declaratory statute
is important only in those cases where doubts have ah·eady arisen,
the statute, when passed, may be found to declare the law to be
different from what it has already been adjudged to be by the
courts. Thus Mr. Fox's Libel Act declared that, by the law of
England, juries were judges of the law in prosecutions for liiJel ; it
did not purport to introduce a new rule, but to declare a rule
already and always in force. Yet previous to the passage of this
act the courts had repeatedly held that the jury in these cases were
only to pass upon the fact of publication and the truth of
the innuendoes; and whether the publication was libellous or not
was a question of law which addressed itself exclUI~ively to the
court. Thus the legi8latm·e declared the law to be what the courts
had declared it was not. So in the State of New York, after the
courts had held that insurance companies were taxable ton certain
extent under an existing statute, the legislature passed another
act, declaring that such companim~ were only taxaiJle at a c01tain
other rate; and it was thereby declared that such was the intention
1 l\lerrill v. Sherburne, 1 N.H. 20!.
Sec Jones v. Perry, lOYorg. 69; Taylor 11. Purtt'r, 4 Hill, 144; Ogden 11. Blackledge, 2 Cranch, 2i2; Dash 11. Van
Klt•ek, 1 Johns. 49~; Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 P11t. 657; Leland "·Wilkinson,
10 Pet. 297.
1 Bouv. Law Die. " Statute."

7
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

and true construction of the original statute} In these cases it

[cH. v.

will be perceived that the courts, in the due exercise of their

authority as interpreters of the laws, have declared what the rule

established by the common law or by statute is, and that the

legislature has then interposed, put its own construction upon the

existing law, and in effect declared the judicial interpretation to be

unfounded and unwarrantable. The courts in these cases have

clearly kept within the proper limits of their jurisdiction, and if

they have erred, the error has been one of judgment only, and has

not extended to usurpation of power. Was the legislature also

within the limits of its authority when it passed the declaratory

statute ?

[“‘ 94] *The decision of this question must depend upon the

practical application which is sought to be made of the

declaratory statute, and whether it is designed to have practically

a retrospective operation, or only to establish a construction of the

doubtful law for the determination of cases that may arise in the

future. It is always competent to change an existing law by a

declaratory statute; and where it is only to operate upon future

cases, it is no objection to its validity that it assumes the law to

have been in the past what it is now declared that it shall be in the

future. But the legislative action cannot be made to retroact upon
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past controversies, and to reverse decisions which the courts, in the

exercise of their undoubted authority, have made; for this would

not only be the exercise of judicial power, but it would be its

exercise in the most objectionable and offensive form, since the

legislature would in effect sit as a court of review to which parties

might appeal when dissatisﬁed with the rulings of the courts.”

‘ People v. Supervisors of New York, 16 N. Y. 424.

' In several ditferent cases the courts of Pennsylvania had decided that a

testator’s mark to his name, at the foot of a testamentary paper, but without

proof that the name was written by his express direction, was not the signature

required by the statute, and the legislature, to use the language of Chief Justice

Gibson, “ declared, in order to overrule it, that every last will and testament

heretofore made, or hereafter to be made, except such as may have been fully

adjudicated prior to the passage of this act, to which the testator‘s name is sub-

scribed by his direction, or to which the testator has made his mark or cross, shall

be deemed and taken to be valid. How this mandate to the courts to establish

a particular interpretation of a particular statute, can be taken for any thing else

than an exercise of judicial power in settling a question of interpretation, I know

not The judiciary had certainly recognized a legislative interpretation of a

and true construction of the original statute.l In these cases it
will be perceived that the courts, in the due exercise of their
authority as interpreters of the laws, have declared what the rule
established by the common law or by statute is, and that the
legislature has then interposed, put its own construction upon the
existing law, and in effect declared the judicial interpretation to be
unfounded and unwarrantable. The courts in these cases have
clearly kept within the proper limits of their jurisdiction, and if
they have erred, the error has been one of judgment only, and has
not extended to usurpation of power. Was the legislature also
within the limits of its authority when it passed the declaratory
statute?
[• 94]
• The decision of this question must depend upon the
practical application which is sought to be made of the
declaratory statute, and whether it is designed to have practically
a retrospective operation, or only to establish a construction of the
doubtful law for the determination of cases that may arise in the
future. It is always competent to change an existing law by a
declaratory statute; and where it is only to operate upon future
eases, it is no objection to its validity that it assumes the law to
have been in the past what it is now declared that it shall be in the
future. Bnt the legislative action cannot be made to retroact upon
past controversies, and to reverse decisions which the courts, in the
exercise of their undoubted authority, have made; for this would
not only be the exercise of judicial power, but it would be its
exercise in the most objectionable and offensive form, since the
legislature would in effect sit as a court of review to which parties
might appeal when dissatisfied with the rulings of the courts.2

[98]

People v. Supervisors of New York, 16 N . Y. 424.
In several different cases the courts of Pennsylvania had decided that a
testator's mark to his name, at the foot of a testamentary paper, but without
proof that the name was written by his express direction, was not the signature
required by the statute, and the legislature, to use the language of Chief Justice
Gibson, " declared, in order to overrule it, that every last will and testament
heretofore made, or hereafter to be made, except such as may have been fully
adjudicated prior to the passage of this act, to which the testator's name is subscribed by his direction, or to which the testator has made his mark or cross, shall
be deemed and taken to be valid. How this mandate to the courts to establish
a particular interpretation of a particular statute, can be taken for any thing else
than an exercise of judicial power in settling a question of interpretation, I know
not The judiciary had certainly recognized a legislative interpretation of a
1

1
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As the legislature cannot set aside the construction of the law
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already applied by the courts to actual cases, neither can it compel

the courts for the future to adopt a particular construction of a law

which the legislature permits to remain in force. “To declare

what the law is, or has been, is a judicial power; to declare what

the law shall be, is legislative. One of the fundamental principles

of all our governments is, that the legislative power

" shall be separate from the judicial): 1 If the legislature [* 95]

would prescribe a different rule for the future from that

which the courts enforce, it must be done by statute, and cannot be

done by a mandate to the courts, which leaves the law unchanged,

but seeks to compel the courts to construe and apply it, not

according to the judicial, but according to the legislative

judgment.” But in l any case the substance of the legislative

action should be regarded rather than the form; and if it appears

to be the intention to establish by declaratory statute a rule of

conduct for the future, the courts should accept and act upon it,

without too nicely inquiring whether the mode by which the new

rule is established is the best, most decorous and suitable that

could have been adopted or not.

If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the

courts, by requiring of them a construction of the law according to
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its own views, it is very plain it cannot do so directly, by setting

aside their judgments, compelling them to grant new trials,

ordering the discharge of offenders,“ or directing what particular

statute before it had itself acted, and consequently before a purchaser had been

misled by its judgent; but he might have paid for a title on the unmistakable

meaning of plain words; and for the legislature subsequently to distort or per-

vert it, and to enact that white meant black, or that black meant white, would

in the same degree be an exercise of arbitrary and unconstitutional power.”

Greenough v. Greenough, 11 Penn. St. 494. The act in this case was held void

so far as its operation was retrospective, but valid as to future cases. And see

Reiser v. Tell Association, 39 Penn. St- 137. .

' Dash v. Van Kleek, 7 Johns. 498, per Thompson, J .; Ogden v. Blackledge,

2 Cranch, 272.

' Governor v. Porter, 5 Humph. 165; People v. Supervisors, &c., 16 N. Y.

424; Reiser v. Tell Association, 39 Penn. St. 137; O‘Conner v. Warner, 4 \rV.

As the legislature cannot set aside the construction of the law
already applied by the courts to actual cases, neither can it compel
the courts for the future to adopt a particular construction of a law
which the legislature permits to remain in force. " To declare
what the law is, or has been, is a judicial power ; to declare what
the law shall be, is legislative. One of the fundamental principles
of all our governments is, that the legislative power
• shall be separate from the judicial." 1 If the legislature [• 95]
would prescribe a different rule for the future from that
which the courts enforce, it must be done by statute, and cannot be
done by a mandate to the courts, which leaves the law unchanged,
but seeks to compel the courts to construe and apply it, not
according to the judicial, but according to the legislative
judgment.2 But in· any case the substance of the legislative
action should be regarded rather than the form; and if it appears
to be the intention to establish by declaratory statute a rule of
conduct for the future, the courts should accept and act upon it,
without too nicely inquiring whether the mode by which the new
rule is established is the best, most decorous and suitable that
could have been adopted or not.
If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the
courts, by requiring of them a construction of the law according to
its own views, it is very plain it cannot do so directly, by setting
aside their judgments, compelling them to grant new trials,
ordering the discharge of offenders,3 or directing what particular

& S. 227; Lambertson v. Hogan, 2 Penn. St. 25.

' In State v. Fleming, 7 Humph. 152, a legislative resolve that " no ﬁne, for-

feiture, or imprisonment, should be imposed or recovered under the act of 1837

[then in force], and that all causes pending in any of the courts for such offence

should be dismissed,” was held void as an invasion of judicial authority. The

[99]

statute before it had itself acted, and consequently before a purchaser had been
misled by its judgment ; but he might have paid for a title on the unmistakable
meaning of plain words; and for the legislature subsequently to distort or pervert it, and to enact that white meant black, or that black meant white, would
in the same degree be an exercise of arbitrary and uncon11titutional power."
Greenough t1. Greenough, 11 Penn. St. 494. The act in this case was held void
so far as its operation was retrospective, but valid as to future cases. And see
Reiser"· Tell Association, 39 Penn. St. 137.
1 Dash"· Van Kleek, 7 Johns. 498, per Thompson, J.; Ogden v. Blackledge,
2 Cranch, 272.
1 Governor t1. Porter, 5 Humph. 165; People v. Supervisors, &c., 16 N.Y.
424; Reiser v. Tell Association, 89 Penn. St. 137; O'Conner v. Warner, 4 )V.
& S. 227 ; Lampertson v. Hogan, 2 Penn. St. 25.
1 In State v. Fleming, 7 Humph. 152, a legislative resolve that "no fine, forfeiture, or imprisonment, should be imposed or recovered under the act of 1837
[then in force], and that all causes pending in any of the courts for such offence
should be dismissed," was held void as an invasion of judicial authority. The
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steps shall be taken in the progress of a judicial inquiry)

• 95

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

[cH. v.

[*‘ 96] *‘ And as a court must act as an organized body of judges,

and, where differences of opinion arise, they can only

decide by majorities, it has been held that it would not be in the

power of the legislature to provide that, in certain contingencies,

the opinion of the minority of a. court, vested with power by the

constitution, should prevail, so that the decision of the court

in such cases should be rendered against the judgment of its

members?

legislature cannot declare a forfeiture of a right to act as curators of a college.

State v. Adams, 44 Mo. 570. But to take away by statute a statutory right of

appeal is not an exercise of judicial authority. Ex parte McCardle, 7 \Val.

506. And it has been held that a statute allowing an appeal in a particular case

was valid. Prout v. Berry, 2 Gill, 147; State v. Northern Central R.R. Co.

steps shall be taken in the progress of a. judicial inquiry.I
[• 96] • .And as a court must act as an organized body of judges,
and, where differences of opinion arise, they can only
decide by majorities, it has been held that it would not be in the
power of the legislature to provide that, in certain contingencies,
the opinion of the minority of a. court, vested with power by the
constitution, should prevail, so that the decision of the court
in such cases should be rendered against the judgment of its
members.2

18 Md. J93. But see cases cited in next note.

‘ Opinions of Judges on the Dorr case, 3 R. I. 299. In the ease of Picquet,

Appellant, 5 Pick. 64, the Judge of Probate had ordered letters of administration

to issue to an applicant therefor, on his giving bond in the penal sum of $50,000,

with sureties within the Commonwealth, for the faithful performance of his duties.

He was unable to give the bond, and applied to the legislature for relief. There-

upon a resolve was passed “empowering” the Judge of Probate to grant the

letters of administration, provided the petitioner should give bond with his
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brother, a resident of Paris, France, as surety, and “ that such bond should be

in lieu of any and all bond or bonds by any law or statute in this Commonwealth

now in force required," &c. The Judge of Probate refused to grant the letters

on the terms speciﬁed in this resolve, and the Supreme Court, while holding that

it was not compulsory upon him, also declared their opinion that, if it were so, it

would be inoperative and void. In Bradford u. Brooks, 2 Aik. 284, it was de-

cided that the legislature had no power to revive a commission for proving claims

against an estate after it had once expired. See also Bagg‘s Appeal, 43 Penn.

St. 512. In Hill v. Sunderland, 3 Vt. 507; and Burch v. Newberry, 10 N. Y.

374, it was held that the legislature had no power to grant to parties a right to

appeal after it was gone under the general law. Besides the authorities referred

to, to show that the legislature cannot grant a new trial, see Lewis v. \Vebb,

3 Greenl. 326; Durham v. Lewiston, 4 Greenl. 140; Bates v. Kimball, 2 Chip.

77; Staniford v. Barry, 1 Aik. 314; Merrill v. Sherburne, 1 N. H. 199; Dechas-

tellux v. Fairchild, 15 Penn. St. 18; Taylor v. Place, 4 R. I. 324; Young v.

State Bank, 4 Ind. 301; Lanier v. Gallatas, 13 La. An. l75; Miller v. State, S Gill,

145; Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 515; Atkinson v. Dunlap, 50 Me. 111; \Veaver

v. Lapsley, 43 Ala. 224; Saunders v. Cabaniss, ib. 173. In Burt v. \Villiams,

24 Ark. 91, it was held that the granting of continuances of pending cases was

the exercise of judicial authority, and a. legislative act assuming to do this was

void.

' In Clapp v. Ely, 3Dutch, 622, it was luld that a statute which provided that

no judgment of the Supreme Court should be reversed by the Court of Errors

[100]

legi~lature cannot deelare a forfeiture of a right to act as curators of a college.
State v. Adams, 44 Mo. 570. But to take away by statute a statutory right of
appeal is not an exercise of judicial authority. Ex parte McCardle, 7 W al.
506. And it bas been held that a statute allowing an appeal in a particular case
was valid. Prout v. Berry, 2 Gill, 147; State "· Northern Central R.R. Co.
18 Md. .193. But see cases cited in next note.
1 Opinions of Judges on the Dorr case, 8 R. I. 299.
In the case of Picquet,
Appellant, 5 Pick. 64, the J udgc of Probate had ordered letteFs of administration
to issue to an applicant therefor, on his giving bond in the penal sum of $50,000,
with sureties within the Commonwealth, for the faithful performance of his duties.
He was unable to ~ive the bond, and applied to the legislature for relief. Thereupon a resolve was passed "empowering" the Judge of Probate to grant the
letters of administration, provided the petitioner should give bond with his
brother, a resident of Paris, :FraneP., as surety, and "that such bond should be
in lieu of any and all bond or bonds by any law or statute in this Commonwealth
now in force required," &c. The Judge of Probate refused to grant the letters
on the terms ~pecifi.ed in this resolve, and the Supreme Court, while holding that
it was not compulsory upon him, also declared their opinion that, if it were so, it
would be inoperative and void. In Bradford v. Brooks, 2 Aik. 284, it was decided that the legislature had no power to revive a commission for proving claiiDll
against an estate after it had once expired. See also Bagg's Appeal, 4lJ Penn.
St. 512. In Hill v. Sunderland, 3 Vt. 507; and Burch v. Newberry, 10 N.Y.
874, it was held that the legislature had no power to grant to parties a right to
appeal after it was gone under the general law. Besides the authorities referred
to, to show that the legi11lature cannot grant a new trial, see Lewis "· Webb,
8 Green!. 326; Durham v. Lewiston, 4 Greenl. 140; Bates v. Kimball, 2 Chip.
77; Staniford v. Barry, 1 Ai~. 314; M~rrill v. Sherburne, 1 N.H. 199; Dechastellux v. Fairchild, lb Penn. St. 18; Taylor v. Place, 4 R. I. 324; Young " ·
State Bank, 4 Ind. 301; Lanier v. Gallatas, 18 La. An. 175; Miller v. State, 8 Gill,
145; Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 515; Atkinson v. Dunlap, 50 Me. 111; Weaver
tl. Lapsley, 4;1 Ala. 224; Saunders "· Cabaniss, ib. 173. In Burt v. Williams,
24 Ark. 91, it was ht!ld that the grantil"!g of continuance• of pending cases was
the exercise of judicial authority, and a legislative act assuming to do this waa
void.
1 In Clapp v. Ely, 8Dutch, 622, it was htld that a statute which provided that
no judgment of the Supreme Co~rt should be reversed by the Court of Errors
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Nor is it in the power of the legislature to bind individuals by a
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recital of facts in a statute, to be used as evidence against the

parties interested. A recital of facts in the preamble of a statute

may perhaps be evidence, where it relates to matters of a public

nature, as that riots or disorders exist in a certain part of the

country ;1 but where the facts concern the rights of individuals,

the legislature cannot adjudicate upon them. As private statutes

are generally obtained on the application of some party interested,

and are put in form to suit his wishes, perhaps their exclusion

from being made evidence against any other party would result

from other general principles; but it is clear that the recital could

have no force, except as a judicial ﬁnding of facts; and that

such ﬁnding is not within the legislative pi'OVlllG8.2

‘We come now to a class of cases in regard to which ['* 97]

there has been serious contrariety of opinion; springing

from the fact, perhaps, that the purpose sought to be accomplished

by the statutes is generally effected by judicial proceedings, so that

if the statutes are not a direct invasion of judicial authority, they

at least cover ground which the courts usually occupy under gen-

eral laws which confer the jurisdiction upon them. We refer to

Statutes conferring Power upon Guardians and other Trustees to

sell Lands.
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Whenever it becomes necessary or proper to sell the estate of

a decedent for the payment of debts, or of a lunatic or other

incompetent person for the same purpose, or for future support,

or of a minor to provide the means for his education and nurture,

or for the more proﬁtable investment of the proceeds, or of ten-

ants in common to effectuate a partition between them, it will

and Appeals, unless a majority of those members of the -court who were com-

petent to sit on the hearing and decision should concur in the reversal, was

Nor is it in the power of the legislature to bind individuals by a
recital of facts in a statute, to be used as evidence agaiw'lt the
parties interested. A recital oC facts in the preamble of a statute
may perhaps be evidence, where it relates to matters of a public
nature, as that riots or disorders exist in a certain part of the
country ; 1 but where the facts concern the rights of individuals,
the legislature cannot adjudicate upon them. As private statutes
are generally obtained on the application of some party interested,
and are put in form to suit his wishes, perhaps their exclusion
from being made evidence against any other party would result
from other general principles; but it is clear that the recital could
have no force, except as a judicial finding of facts; and that
such finding is not within the legislative province.2
• We come now to a class of cases in regard to which [*97]
there has been serious contrariety of opinion; springing
from the fact, perhaps, that the purpose sought to be accomplished
by the statutes is generally effected by judicial proceedings, so that
if the statutes are not a direct invasion of judicial authority, they
at least cover ground which the courts usually occupy under general laws which confer the jurisdiction upon them. We refer to

unconstitutional. Its effect would be, if the court were not full, to make the

opinion of the minority in favor of aﬂirmance control that of the majority in

favor of reversal, unless the latter were a majority of the whole court. Such a

provision in the constitution might be proper and unexceptionable; but if the

constitution has created a Court of Appeals, without any restriction of this char-

acter, the ruling of this case is that the legislature cannot impose it. The court

was nearly equally divided, standing seven to six.

' Rex v. Sutton, 4 M. & S. 532.

' Elmendorf v. Carmichael, 3 Litt. 478; Parmelee v. Thompson, 7 Hill, 80.

[ 101 ]

Statutes conferring Power upon G~ardians and other Trustees to
sell Lands.
Whenever it becomes necessary or proper to sell the estate of
a decedent for the payment of debts, or of a lunatic or other
incompetent person for the same purpose, or for future support,
or of a minor to provide the means for his education and nurture,
or for the more profitable investment of the proceeds, or of tenants in common to effectuate a partition between them, it will
and Appeals, unless a majority of those members of the ·court who were competent to sit on the hearing and decision should concur in the reversal, was
unconstitutional. Its effect would be, if the court were not full, to make the
opinion of the minority in favor of affirmance control that of the majority in
favor of reversal, unless the latter were a majority of the whole court. Such a
provision in the constitution might be proper and unexceptionable; but if the
constitution has creatl'd a Court of Appeals, without any restriction of this character, the ruling- of this 1~nse is that the legislature cannot impose it. The court
was nearly equally divided, standing seven to six.
1 Rex t'. Sutton, ,i M. & S. 532.
t Elmendorf v. Carmichael, 3 Litt. 478; Parmelee v. Thompson, 7 Hill, 80.
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probably be found in every State that some court is vested with

jurisdiction to make the necessary order, if the facts seem to

render it important after a hearing of the parties in interest.

The case is eminently one for judicial investigation. There are

facts to be inquired into, in regard to which it is always possible

that disputes may arise; the party in interest is often incompetent

to act on his own behalf, and his interest is carefully to be

inquired into and guarded ; and as the proceeding will usually be

ea: parts, there is more than the ordinary opportunity for fraud

upon the party interested, as well as upon the authority which

grants permission. It is highly and peculiarly proper, therefore,

that by general laws judicial inquiry should be provided for

these cases, and that these laws should provide for notice to all

proper parties, and an opportunity for the presentation of any

facts which might bear upon the propriety of granting the applica-

tions.

But it will sometimes be found that the general laws provided

for these cases are not applicable to some which arise; or if appli-

cable, that they do not always accomplish fully all that seems

desirable; and in these cases, and perhaps also in some others

without similar excuse, it has not been unusual for legislative au-
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thority to intervene, and by special statute to grant the power

which, under the general law, is granted by the courts.

[* 98] The * power to pass such statutes has often been disputed,

and it may be well to see upon what basis of authority as

well as of reason it rests.

If in fact judicial inquiry is essential in these cases, it would

seem clear that such statutes must be ineffectual and void. But

if judicial inquiry is not essential, and the legislature may confer

the power of sale in such a case upon an ex parte presentation of

evidence, or upon the representations of the parties without any

proof whatever, then we must consider the general laws to be

passed, not because the cases fall within the province of judicial

action, but because the courts can more conveniently consider,

and properly, safely, and inexpensively pass upon such cases, than

the legislative body, where the power primarily rests}

‘ There are constitutional provisions in Kentucky,Virginia, Missouri, Oregon,

Nevada, Indiana, Maryland, New Jersey, Arkansas, Florida, and Michigan, for-

bidding special laws licensing the sale of the lands of minors and other persons

under legal disability. Perhaps the general provision in some other constitu-
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probably be found in every State that some court is vested with
jurisdiction to make the necessary order, if the facts seem to
render it important after a hearing of the parties in interest.
The case is eminently one for judicial investigation. There are
facts to be inquired into, in regard to which it is always possible
that disputes may arise; the party in interest is often incompetent
to act on his own behalf, and his interest is carefully to be
inquired into and guarded; and as the proceeding will usually be
ex parte, there is more than the ordinary opportunity for fraud
upon the party interested, as well as upon the authority which
grants permission. It is highly and peculiarly proper, therefore,
that by general laws judicial inquiry should be provided for
these cases, and that these laws should provide for notice to all
proper parties, and an opportunity for the presentation of any
facts which might bear upon the propriety of granting the applica·
tions.
But it will sometimes be found that the general laws provided
for these cases are not applicable to some which arise; or if applicable, that they do not always accomplish fully all that seems
desirable; and in these cases, and perhaps also in some others
without similar excuse, it has not been ut,msual for legislative au·
thority to intervene, and by special statute to grant the power
which, under the general law, is granted by the courts.
[* 98] The *power to pass such statutes has often been disputed,
and it may be well to see upon what basis of authority as
well as of reason it rests.
If in fact judicial inquiry is essential in these cases, it would
seem clear that such statutes must be ineffectual and void. But
if judicial inquiry is not essential, and the legislature may confer
the power of sale in such a case upon an ex parte presentation of
evidence, or upon the representations of the parties without any
proof whatever, then we must consider the general laws to be
passed, not because the cases fall within the province of judicial
action, but because the courts can mot·e conveniently consider,
and properly, safely, and inexpensively pass upon such cases, than
the legislative body, where the power primarily rests.l
1 There are constitutional provisions in Kentucky, Virginia, Missouri, Oregon,
Nevada, Indiana, Maryland, New Jersey, Arkansas, Florida, and Miehigan, forbidding special laws licensing the sale of the lands of minors and other persons
under legal disability. Perhaps the general provision in some other constitu-
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The rule upon this subject, as we deduce it from the authorities,
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seems to be this: If theparty standing in position of trustee

applies for permission to make the sale, for a purpose apparently

for the interest of the cestui que trust, and there are no adverse

interests to be considered and adjudicated, the case is not one

which requires judicial action, but it is optional with the legisla-

ture to grant the relief by statute, or to refer the case to the

courts for consideration, according as the one course or the other,

on considerations of policy, may seem desirable.

In the case of Rice '0. Parkman} it appeared that, certain mi-

nors having become entitled to real estate by descent from their

mother, the legislature passed a special statute empowering their

father as guardian for them, and, after giving bond to the judge

of probate, to sell and convey the lands, and put the proceeds at

interest on good security for the beneﬁt of the minor owners.

A sale was made accordingly; but the children, after coining of

age, brought suit against the party claiming under the sale, insist-

ing that the special statute was void. There was in force at the

time this special statute was passed a general statute, under which

license might have been granted by the courts; but it was held

that this general law did not deprive the legislature of that

full " and complete control over such cases which it would [* 99]
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have possessed had no such statute existed. “If,” say

the court, “ the power by which the resolve authorizing the sale in

this case was passed were of a judicial nature, it would be very

clear that it could not have been exercised by the legislature with-

out violating an express provision of the constitution. But it

does not seem to us to be of this description of power; for it was

not a case of controversy between party and party, nor is there

any decree or judgment affecting the title to property. The

only object of the authority granted by the legislature was to trans-

mute real into personal estate, for purposes beneﬁcial to all who

were interested therein. This is a. power frequently exercised by

the legislature of this State, since the adoption of the constitution,

and by the legislature of the province and of the colony, while

under the sovereignty of Great Britain, analogous to the power

exercised by the British Parliament on similar subjects, time out

tions, forbidding special laws in cases where a general law could be made appli-

cable, might also be held to exclude such special authorization.

‘ 16 Mass. 326. ‘

[ 103 ]

The rule upon this subject, as we deduce it from the authorities,
seems to be this: If the· party standing in position of trustee
applies for permission to make the sale, for a purpose apparently
for the interest of the cestui que trust, and there are no adverse
interests to be cousideted and adjudicated, the case is not one
which requires judicial action, but it is optional with the legislature to grant the relief by statute, or to refer the case to the
courts for consideration, according as the one course or the other,
on considerations of policy, may seem desirable.
In the case of Rice v. Parkman,1 it appeared that, certain minors having become entitled to real estate by descent from their
mother, the legislature passed a special statute empowering their
father as guardian for them, and, after giving bond to the judge
of probate, to sell and convey the lands, and put the proceeds ;Lt
interest on good security for the benefit of the minor owners.
A sale was made accordingly; but the children, after coming of
age, brought suit against the party claiming under the sale, insisting that the special statute was void. There was in force at the
time this special statute was passed a general statute, under which
license might have been granted by the courts; but it was held
that this general law did not deprive the legislature of that
full • and complete control over such cases which it would [* 99]
have possessed had no such statute existed. " If," say
the court, "the power by which the resolve authorizing the sale in
this case was passed were of a judicial nature, it would be very
clear that it could not have been exercised by the legislature without violating an express provision of the constitution. But it
does not seem to us to be of this description of power; for it was
not a case of controversy between party and party, nor is there
any dect·ee or judgment affecting the title to property. The
only object of the authority granted by the legislature was to transmute real into personal estate, for purposes beneficial to all who
were interested therein. This is a power frequently exercised by
the legislature of this State, since the adoption of the constitution,
and by the legislature of the province and of the colony, while
under the sovereignty of Great Britain, analogous to the power
exercised by the British Parliament on similar subjects, time out
tions, forbidding special laws in cases where a general law could be made applicable, might also be held to exrlude such special authorization.
1 16 Masa. 326.
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of mind. Indeed, it seems absolutely necessary for the interest of

those who, by the general rules of law, are incapacitated from dis-

posing of their property, that a power should exist somewhere of

converting lands into money. For otherwise many minors might

suffer, although havinrr property; it not bei'ng in a condition to yield

an income This power must rest in the legislature, in this Com-

monwealth , that body being alone competent to act as the general

guardian and protector of those who are disabled to act for them-

selves

“ I d dl d l

t was un oubte y wise to e egate this autlioiity to other

bodies, whose sessions are regular and constant and whose struc-

tpfre may enable them more easily to understand the merits of the

lai application brought before them But it does not fol-

IQ of law, it is judicial in its character For aught we see,

autlioiity might have been given to the selcctmeii of

each town, or to the clerks or registers of the counties, it being a
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mere ministerial act, certainly requiring discretion, and some-

times knowledge of law, for its due exercise, but still partaking

in no degree of the characteristics of judicial power. It is doubt-

less included in the general authority granted by the people to

the legislature by the constitution. For full power and authority

is given from time to time to make, ordain, and establish all

manner of wholesome and reasonable orders, laws, stat-

[’*100] utes, and ordinances, directions and restrictions (so as

the same be not repugnant or contrary to the constitu-

tion), as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the

Commonwealth, and of the subjects thereof. No one imagines

that, under this general authority, the legislature could deprive a

citizen of his estate, or impair any valuable contract in which he

might be interested. But there seems to be no reason to doubt

that, upon his application, or the application of those who properly

represent him if disabled from acting himself, a beneﬁcial change

of his estate, or a sale of it for purposes necessary and convenient

for the lawful owner, is a just and proper subject for the exercise

of that authority. It is, in fact, protecting him in his property,

which the legislature is bound to do, and enabling him to derive

subsistence, comfort, and education from property which might oth-

erwise be wholly useless during that period of life when it might

be most beneﬁcially employed. '
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of mind. Indeed, it seems absolutely necessuy for the interest of
those who, by the general rules of law, are incapacitated from disposing of their property, that a power should exist somewhere of
converting lands into money. For otherwise many minors might
suffer, although having property; it not being in a condition to yield
an income. This power must rest in the legislature, in this Commonwealth; that body being alone competent to act as the general
guardian and protector of those who are disabled to act for themselves.
"It was undoubtedly wise to delegate this authority to other
bodies, whose sessions are regular and constant, and whose struc:~e may enable them more easily to understand the merits of the
~.,;Ba\~lar application brought before them. But it does not fol~!~, because the power has been delegated by the legislature
~~~l~f of law, it is judicial in its character. For aught we see,
.. !!,91c authority might have been given to the selectmen of
each town, or to. the clerks or registers of the counties, it being n
mere ministerial act, certainly requiring discretion, and sometimes knowledge of law, for its due exercise, but still partaking
in no degree of the characteristics of judicial power. It is doubt;..
less included in the general authority granted by the people to
the legislature by the constitution. For full power and authority
is given from time to time to make, ordain, and establish all
manner of wholesome and reasonable orders, laws, stat[•100] utes, and ordinances, directions and restrictions (so as
the same be not repugnant or contrary to the constitution), as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
Commonwealth, and of the subjects thereof. No one imagines
that, under this general authority, the legis)ature could deprive a
citizen of his estate, or impair atiy valuable contract in which he
might be interested. But there seems to be no reason to doubt
that, upon his application, or the application of those who properly
represent him if disabled from acting himself, a beneficial change
of his estate, or a sale of it for purposes necessary and convenient
for the lawful owner, is a just and proper subject for the exercise
of that authority. It is, in fact, protecting him in his propCI·ty,
which the legislature is bound to do, and enabling him to derive
subsistence, comfort, and education from property which might otherwise be wholly useless during that period of life when it might
be most beneficially employed.
[ 104]
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“If this be not true, then the general laws, under which so

many estates of minors, persons non compos mentis, and others,

have been sold and converted into money, are unauthorized by

the constitution, and void. For the courts derive their authority

from the legislature, and, it not being of a judicial nature, if the

legislature had it not, they could not communicate it to any

other body. Thus, if there were no power to relieve those from

actual distress who had unproductive property, and were dis-

abled from conveying it themselves, it would seem that one of the

most essential objects of government—that of providing for the

welfare of the citizens ——would be lost. But the argument which

has most weight on the part of the defendants is, that the legisla-

ture has exercised its power over this subject in the only co_nsti-

tutional way, by establishing a general provision; and that, having

done this, their authority has ceased, they having no right to

interfere in particular eases. And if the question were one of

expediency only, we should perhaps be convinced by the argu-

ment, that it would be better for all such applications to be made

to the courts empowered to sustain them. But as a question of

right, we think the argument fails. The constituent, when he
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has delegated an authority without an interest, may do the act

himself which he has authorized another to do; and especially

when that constituent is the legislature, and is not prohibited

by the constitution from exercising the authority. In-

deed, the '*whole authority might be revoked, and the [* 101]

legislature ‘resume the burden of the business to itself, if

in its wisdom it should determine that the common welfare required

it. It is not legislation which must be by general acts and rules,

but the use of a parental or tutorial power, for purposes of kind-

ness, without interfering with or prejudice to the rights of any but

those who apply for speciﬁc relief. The title of strangers is not in

any degree affected by such an interposition.”

A similar statute was sustained by the Court for the Correction

of Errors in New York. “It is clearly,” says the Chancellor,

“ within the powers of the legislature, as parens patriw, to prescribe

such rules and regulations as it may deem proper for the superin-

tendence, disposition, and management of the property and eﬂects

of infants, lunatics, and other persons who are incapable of managing

their own affairs. But even that power cannot constitutionally be

so far extended as to transfer the beneﬁcial use of the property to

[ 105 ]
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this be not true, then the general laws, under which so
many estates of minors, persons non compos mentis, and others,
ltave been sold and converted into money, are unauthorized by
the constitution, and void. For the courts derive their authority
from the legislature, and, it not being of a judicial nature, if the
legislature had it not, they could not communicate it to any
other body. Thus, if there were no power to relieve those from
actual distress who had unproductive property, and were disabled from conveying it themselves, it would seem that one of the
most essential objects of government- that of providing for the
welfare of the citizens- would be lost. But the argument which
has most weight on the part of the defendants is, that the legislature has exercised its power over this subject in the only eQnst~
tutional way, by establishing a general provision ; and that, having
done this, their authority has ceased, they having no right to
interfere in particular cases. And if the question were one of
expediency only, we should perhaps be convinc~d by the argument, that it would be better fm· all svch applications to be made
to the courts empowered to sustain them. But as a question of
right, we think the argument fails. The constituent, when he
has delegated an authority without an interest, may do the act
himself which he ha~ authorized another to do; and especially
when that constituent is the legislature, and is not prohibited
by the constitution from exercising the authority. Indeed, the • whole authority might be revoked, and the [•101]
legislature resume the burden of the business to itself, if
in its wisdom it should determine that the common welfare required
it. It is not legislation which must be by general acts and rules,
but the use of a parental or tutorial power, for purposes of kindness, without interfering with or prejudice to the rights of any but
those who apply for specific relief. The title of strangers is not in
any dcgreo affected by such au interposition."
A similar statute was sustained by the Court for the Correction
of Errors in New York. " It is clearly,'' says the Chancellor,
" within the powers of the legislature, as parens patria!, to prescribe
such rules and regulations as it may deem proper for the superintendence, disposition, and management of the property and effects
of infants, lunatics, and other persons who are incapable of managing
their own affairs. But even that power cannot constitutionally be
so far extended as to transfer tho beneficial usc of the property to
[ 105]
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another person, except in those cases where it can legally be

• 101 .

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
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presumed the owner of the property would himself have given the

use of his property to the other, if he had been in a. situation to act

for himself, as in the case of a provision out of the estate of an

infant or lunatic for the support of an indigent parent or other

near relative.” 1

‘ Cochran v. Van Surlay, 20 Wend. 373. See the same case in the Supreme

Court, sub nom. Clarke v. Van Surlay, 15 Wend. 436. See also Suydam v.

Williamson, 24 How. 427; Williamson v. Suydam, 6 \Val. 723; Heirs of Hol-

man v. Bank of Norfolk, 12 Ala. 369; Florentine v. Barton, 2 VVal. 210. In

another person, except in those cases where it can legally be
presumed the owner of the property would himself have given the
use of his property to the other, if he had been in a situation to act
for himself, as in the case of a provision out of the estate of an
infant or lunatic for the support of an indigent parent or other
near relative." I

Opinions of the Judges, 4 N. H. 572, the validity of such a special statute, under

the constitution of New Hampshire was denied. The judges say: “ The objec-

tion to the exercise of such a power by the legislature is, that it is in its nature

both legislative and judicial. It is the province of the legislature to prescribe the

rule of law, but to apply it to particular cases is the business of the courts of law.

And the thirty-eighth article in the Bill of Rights declares that ‘ in the government

of the State the three essential powers thereof, to wit, the legislative, executive, and

judicial, ought to be kept as separate from, and independent of, each other as the

nature of a free government will admit, or as consistent with that chain of con-

nection that binds the whole fabric of the constitution in one indissoluble bond of

union and amity.’ The exercise of’ such a power by the legislature can never be

necessary. By the existing laws, judges of probate have very extensive juris-
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diction to license the sale of real estate of minors by their guardians. If the

jurisdiction of the judges of probate be not suﬂiciently extensive to reach all

proper cases, it may be a good reason why that jurisdiction should be extended,

but can hardly be deemed a suﬁicicnt reason for the particular interposition of the

legislature in an individual case. If there be a defect in the laws, they should be

amended. Under our institutions all men are viewed as equal, entitled to enjoy

equal privileges, and to be governed by equal laws. If it be ﬁt and proper that

license should be given to one guardian, under particular circumstances, to sell

the estate of his ward, it is ﬁt and proper that all other guardians should, under

similar circumstances, have the same license. This is the very genius and spirit

of our institutions. And we are of opinion that an act of the legislature to

authorize the sale of the land of a particular minor by his guardian cannot be

easily reconciled with the spirit of the article in the Bill of Rights which we have

just cited. It is true that the grant of. such a license by the legislature to the

guardian is intended as a privilege and a beneﬁt to the ward. But by the law of

the land no minor is capable of assenting to a sale of his real estate in such a

manner as to bind himself. And no guardian is permitted by the same law to

determine when the estate of his ward ought and when it ought not to be sold.

In the contemplation of the law, the one has not suﬁicient discretion to judge of

the propriety and expediency of a sale of his estate, and the other is not to be

intrusted with the power ofjudging. Such being the general law of the land, it

is presumable that the legislature would be unwilling to rest the justification of an

act authorizing the sale of a minor‘s estate upon any assent which the guardian

or the minor could give in the proceeding. The question then is, as it seems to

[106]

1 Cochran v. Van Surlay, 20 Wend. 373.
See the same case in the Supreme
Court, sub nom. Clarke v. Van Surlay, 15 Wend. 436. See also Suydam o.
Williamson, 24 How. 427; Williamson v. Suydam, 6 \Val. 723; Heirs of Holman v. Bank of Norfolk, 12 Ala. 369; Florentine v. Barton, 2 W al. 210. In
Opinions of the Judges, 4 N. H. 572, the validity of such a special statute, under
the constitution of New Hampshire was denied. The judges say: "The objection to the exercise of such a power by the legislature is, that it is in its nature
both legislative and jutlicial. It is the province of the legislature to prescribe the
rule oflaw, but to apply it to particular cases is the business of the courts oflaw.
And the thirty-eighth article in the Bill of Rights declares that 'in the government
of the State the three essential powers thereof, to wit, the legislative, executi \"e, and
judicial, ought to be kept as separate from, and independent of, each other as the
nature of a free government will admit, or as consistent with that chain of connection that binds the \vhole fabric of the constitution in one indissoluble bond of
union and amity.' The exercise of such a power by the legislature can never be
necessary. By the existing laws, judges of probate have very extensive jurisdiction to license the sale of real estate of minors by their guardians. If the
jurisdiction of the judges of probate be not sufficiently extensive t.o reach all
proper cases, it may be a good reason why that jurisdiction should be extended,
but can hardly be deemed a sufficient reason for the particular interposition of the
legislature in an individual case. If there be a defect in the laws, they should bo
amended. Under our institutions all men are viewed as equal, entitled to enjoy
equal privileges, and to be governed by equal laws. If it be fit and proper that
license should be given to one guardian, under particular circumstances, to sell
the estate of his ward, it is fit and proper that all other guardians should, under
similar circumstances, have the same license. This is the very genius and spirit
of our institutions. And we arc of opinion that an act of the legislature to
authorize the sale of the land of a particular minor by his guardian cannot he
easily reconciled with the spirit of the article in the Bill of Rights which we have
just cited. It is true that the grant of. such a license by the legislature to the
guardian is intended as a privilege and a benefit to the ward. But by the law of
the land no minor is capable of assenting to a sale of his real estate in such a
manner as to bind himself. And no guardian is permitted by the same law to
determine when the estate of his ward ought and when it ought not to be sold.
In the contemplation of the law, the one has not sufficient discretion to judge of
the propriety and expediency of a sale of his estate, and the other is not to be
intrusted with the power ofjudging. Such being the general law of the land, it
is presumable that the legislature would be unwilling to rest the justification of an
act authorizing the sale of a minor's estate upon any assent which the guardian
or the minor could give in the proceeding. The question then is, as it seems to
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In Ohio, a special act of the legislature authorizing commis-

sioners to make sale of lands held in fee tail, by devisees under a

will, in order to cut 0ﬁ' the entailment and effect a partition

between them,— the statute being applied for by the mother of the

devisees and the executor of the will, and on behalf of the

devisees, -— was held not obnoxious to constitutional objection, and

as sustainable on immemorial legislative usage, and on the same

ground which would support general laws for the same purpose.‘

In a case in the Supreme Court of the United States, where an

executrix who had proved a will in New Hampshire made sale of

lands without authority in Rhode Island, for the purpose of

satisfying debts against the estate, a subsequent act of the

Rhode Island legislature, "‘ conﬁrming the sale, was held [“‘ 103]

not an encroachment upon the judicial power. The land,

it was said, descended to the heirs subject to a lien for the payment

of debts, and there is nothing in the nature of the act of authorizing

a sale to satisfy the lien, which requires that it should be performed

by a judicial tribunal, or that it should be performed by a delegate

rather than by the legislature itself. It is remedial in its nature,

to give effect to existing rights.“ The case showed the actual

existence of debts, and indeed a judicial license for the sale of
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lands to satisfy them had been granted in New Hampshire before

the sale was made. The decision was afterwards followed in a.

carefully considered case in the same court.” In each of these

cases it is assumed that the legislature does not by the special

statute determine the existence or amount of the debts, and

us, Can a ward be deprived of his inheritance without his consent by an act of

the legislature which is intended to apply to no other individual? The ﬁfteenth

artiele of the Bill of Rights declares that no subject shall be deprived of his prop-

erty but by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land. Can an act of the

legislature, intended to authorize one man to sell the land of another without his

consent, be ‘ the law of the land’ in a free country? If the question proposed

to us can be resolved into these questions, as it appears to us it may, we feel en-

tirely conﬁdent that the representatives of the people of this State will agree

with us in the opinion we feel ourselves bound to express on the question sub-

mitted to us, that the legislature cannot authorize a guardian of minors, by a

special act or resolve, to make avalid conveyance of the real estate of his wards.”

' Carroll v. Lessee of Olmsted, 16 Ohio, 251.

• The same ruling has been made in analogous cases. [ *102]
In Ohio, a special act of the legislature authorizing commissioners to make sale of lands held in fee tail, by devisees under a
will, in order to cut off the entailment and effect a partition
between them,- the statute being applied for by the mother of the
deYisecs and the executor of the will, and on behalf of the
devisees,- was held not obnoxious to constitutional objection, and
as sustainable on immemorial legislative usage, and on the same
ground which would support general laws for the same purpose.'
In a case in the Supreme Court of the United States, where an
executrix who had proved a will in New Hampshire made sale of
lands without auth01·ity in Rhode Island, for the purpose of
satisfying debts against the estate, a subsequent act of the
Rhode Island legislature, • confirming the sale, was held [*103]
not an encroachment upon the judicial power. The land,
it was said, descended to the heirs subject to a lien for the payme1!t
of debts, and there is nothing in the nature of the act of authorizing
a sale to satisfy the lien, which requires that it should be performed
by a judicial t'ribunal, or that it should be performed by a delegate
rather than by the legislature itself. It is remedial in its nature,
to give effect to existing rights.2 The case showed the actual
existence of debts, and indeed a judicial license for the sale of
lands to satisfy them had been granted in New Hampshire before
the sale was made. The decision was afterwards followed in a
carefully considered case in the same court.8 In each of these
cases it is assumed that the legislature does not by the special
statute determine the existence or amount of the debts, and

' “Tilkinson v. Leland, 2 Pet. 660.

‘ Watkins v. Holman‘s Lessee, 16 Pet. 25-60. See also Florentine v. Bar-

ton, 2 Wal. 210; Doe v. Douglass, 8 Blackf. 10.
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us, Can a ward be deprived of his inheritance without his consent by an act of
the lt>gisln.ture which is intended to apply to no other individual? The fifteenth
article of the Bill of Rights declares that no subject shall be deprived of his property but by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land. Can an act of the
legislature, intended to authorize one man to sell the land of another without his
consent, be • the law of the land' in a free country? If the question proposed
to u.s can be resolved into these questions, as it appears to us it may, we feel entirely confident that the representatives of the people of this State will agree
with us in the opinion we feel ourselves bound to express on the question submitted to us, that the legislature cannot authorize a guardian of minors, by a
special act or resoh·e, to make a valid conveyance of the real estate ofhis wards."
1 Carroll t1. Lessee ofOlm:~ted, 16 Ohio, 251.
' Wilkinson t1. Leland, 2 Pet. 660.
1 Watkins t1. Holman's Lessee, 16 Pet. 25-60.
See also Florentine t1. Barton, 2 W al. 210; Doe t1. Douglass, 8 Blackf. 10.
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disputes concerning them would be determinable in the usual

[cu. v.

modes. Many other decisions have been made to the same elfcct.1

This species of legislation may perhaps be properly called prero-

gative remedial legislation. It hears and determines no rights; it

deprives no one of his property. It simply authorizes one’s real

estate to be turned into personal, on the application of the person

representing his interest, and under suc_h circumstances that the

consent of theowner, if capable of giving it, would be presumed.

It is in the nature of the grant of a privilege to one person, which

at the same time affects injurionsly the rights of no other?

But a different case is presented when the legislature assumes to

~ authorize a person who does not occupy a ﬁduciary relation

[* 104] to "‘ the owner, to make sale of real estate, to satisfy

demands which he asserts, but which are not judicially

determined, or for any other purpose not connected with the con-

venience or necessity ofthe owner himself. An act of the legislature

of Illinois undertook to empower 'a party who had applied for it to

make sale of the lands pertaining to the estate of a deceased

person, in order to raise a certain speciﬁed sum of money which the

legislature assumed to be due to him and another person, for

moneys by them advanced and liabilities incurred on behalf of the

estate, and to apply the same to the extinguishment of their claims.
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Now it is evident that this act was in the nature of a judicial

decree, passed on the application of parties adverse in interest to

the estate, and in etfect adjudging a certain amount to be due them,

and ordering lands to be sold for its satisfaction. As was well said

‘ Thurston v. Thurston, 6R. I. 296; \Villiamson v. “Tilliamson, 3 S. & M. 715;

McComb v. Gilkey, 29 Miss. 146; Boon 1:. Bowers, 30 Miss. 246; Stewart v. Grif-

ﬁth, 33 Mo. 13; Estep v. Hutchman, 14 S. & R. 435; Snowhill 0. Snowhill, 2

Green, Ch. 20; Dorsey v. Gilbert, 11 G. & J. 87; Norris v. Clymer, 2 Penn. St.

277; Coleman v. Carr, Walker, 258; Davison v. Johonnot, 7 M'et. 388; Towle v.

Forney, 14 N. Y. 423; Leggett v. Hunter, 19 N. Y. 445; Kibby v. Chetwood‘s

Adnfrs, 4 '1‘. B. Monr. 94; Shehanls Heirs v. Barnett’s Heirs, 6 T. B. Monr.

594; Davis v. State Bank, 7 Ind. 316. In Moore v. Maxwell, 18 Ark. 469, a

special statute authorizing the administrator of one who held the mere naked

legal title to convey to the owner of the equitable title was held valid. In Stan-

ley v. Colt, 5 Wal. 119, an act permitting the sale of real estate which had been

devised to charitable uses was sustained—no dlV8l‘:lOl'I of the gift being made.

disputes concerning them would be determinable in the usual
modes. Many other decisions have been made to the same effect.1
This species of legislation may perhaps be properly called prerogative remedial legislation. It hears and determines no rights; it
deprives no one or his property. It simply authorizes one's real
estate to be turned into personal, on the application of the person
representing his interest, and under su~h circumstances that the
consent of the' owner, if capable of gil'ing it, would be presumed.
It is in the nature of the grant of a privilege to one person, which
at the same time affects injuriously the rights of no other.2
But a different case is presented when the legislature assumes to
authorize a person who does not occupy a fiduciary relation
[*104] to • the owner, to make sale of real estate, to satisfy
demands which he asserts, but which are not judicially
determined, or for any other purpose not connected with the convenience or necessity of the owner himself. An act of the legislature
of Illinois undertook to empower 'a party who had applied for it to
make sale of the lands pertaining to the estate of a deceased
person, in order to raise a certain specified sum of m~ney which the
legislature assumed to be due to him and another person, for
moneys by them advanced and liabilities incurred on behalf of the
estate, and to apply the same to the extinguishment of their claim~.
Now it is evident that this act was in the nature of a judicial
decree, passed on the application of parties ad\·erse in interest to
the estate, and in effect adjudging a certain amount to be due them,
and ordering lauds to be sold for its satisfaction. As was well said

" Itwould be equally competent for the legislature to authorize a person under

legal disahility——e. g. an infant—to convey his estate, as to authorize it to be

conveyed by guardian. McComb v. Gilkey, 29 Miss. 146.

[108]

Thurston v. Thurston, 6 R.I. 296; Williamson"· Williamson, 8 S. & 'M. 715;
McComb "· Gilkl•y, 29 Miss. 146; Boon"· Bowers, 30 Miss. 2-16; Stewart v. Griffith, 33 Mo. 13; Estep v. Hutchman, U S. & R. 435; Snowllill v. Snow hill, 2
Green, Ch. 20; Dorsey v. Gilbert, 11 G. & J. 87; Norris v. Clymer, 2 Penn. St.
277; Coleman v. Carr, Walker, 258; Davison v. J ohonnot, 7 Afet. 388; Tuwle v.
Forney, 14 N. Y. 423; L'ej:(gett v. Hunter, 19 N. Y. 445; Kibby"· Chetwoml's
Adm'rs, 4 T . B. Monr. 94; Shehan's Heirs "· Barnett'11 Heirs, 6 T. B. Monr.
594; Davis v. State Bank, 7 Ind. 316. In Moore v. :Maxwell, 18 Ark. 469, a
special statute authorizing the administrator of one who held the mere naked
legal title to convey to the owner of the equitable title was held valid. In Stanley v. Colt, 5 Wal. 119, an act permitting the sale of real estate which hatl been
devised to charitable uses was sustained- no di,•errion of the gift being made.
' It would be equally competent for the legislature to authorize a person under
legal disability-e. g. an infant-to convey his e~tate, as to authorize it to be
conveyed by guardian. McComb "· Gilkey, 29 Miss. 146.
1

[ 108]

ca. v.]' rowans EXERCISED BY LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT. * 104

by the Supreme Court of Illinois, in adjudging the act void: “If
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this is not the exercise of a power of inquiry into, and adetermina-

tion of facts, between debtor and creditor, and that, too, ea: parte

and summary in its character, we are at a loss to understand the

meaning of terms; nay, that it is adjudging and directing the ap-

plication of one person’s property to another, on a claim of

indebtedness, without notice to, or hearing of, the parties whose

estate is divested by the act. That the exercise of such power is

in its nature clearly judicial we think too apparent to need

argument to illustrate its truth. It is so self-evident from the facts

disclosed that it proves itself.”1

‘A case in harmony with the one last referred to was [“ 105]

decided by the Supreme Court of Michigan. Under the

act of Congress “for the relief of citizens of towns upon the lands

‘ Lane v. Dorman, 3 Scam. 242. In Dubois a. McLean, 4MeLean, 486, Judge

Pope assumes that the case of Lane v. Dorman decides a special act, authorizing

an executor to sell lands of the testator to pay debts against his estate, would

be unconstitutional. \Ve do not so understand that decision. On the contrary,

another case in the same volume, Edwards v. P- pi, p. 465, fully sustains the

cases before decided, distinguishing them from Lane v. Dorman. But that indeed

is also done in the principal case, where the court, after referring to similar cases

by the Supreme Court of Illinois, in adjudging the act void : " If
this is not the exercise of a power of inquiry into, and a determination of facts, between debtor and creditor, and that, too, ex parte
and summary in its character, we are at a loss to understand the
meaning of -terms; nay, that it is adjudging and directing the application of one person's property to another, on a claim of
indebtedness, without notice to, or hearing of, the parties whose
estate is divested by the act. That the exercise of such power is
in its nature clearly judicial we think too apparent to need
argument to illustrate its truth. It is so self-evident from the facts
disclosed that it proves itself." 1
• A case in harmony with the one last referred to was [•105]
decic.lcd by the Supreme Court of Michigan. Under the
act of Congress "for the relief of citizens of towns upon the lands

in Kentucky, say: “ These cases are clearly distingtlislled from the case at bar.
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The acts were for the beneﬁt of all the creditors of the estates, without distinc-

tion; and in one case, in addition, for the purpose of perfecting titles contracted

to be made by the intestate. The claims of the creditors of the intestate were to

be established by judicial or other satisfactory legal proceedings, and, in truth

in the case last cited, the commissioners were nothing more than special com-

missioners. The legislative department, in passing these acts, investigated

nothing, nor did an act which could be deemed a judicial inquiry. It neither

examined proof, nor determined the nature or extent of claims; it merely au-

thorized the application of the real estate to the payment of debts generally

discriminating in favor of no one creditor, and giving no one a preference over

another. Not so in the case before us; the amount is investigated and ascer-

tained, and the sale is directed for the beneﬁt of two persons exclusively. The

proceeds are to be applied to the payment of such claims and none other, for

liabilities said to be incurred but not liquidated or satisﬁed; and those, too,

created after the death of the intestate." See also Mason v. Wait, 4 Scam. 127-

134. The case of Estep v. Hutchman, 14 S. & R. 435, would seem to be

more open to question on this point than any of the others before cited. It was

the case of a special statute, authorizing the guardian of infant heirs to con-

vey their lands in satisfaction of a contract made by their ancestor; and

which was sustained. Compare this with Jones v. Perry, 10 Yerg. 69, where

an act authorizing a guardian to sell lands to pay the ancestor‘s debts was hcld

void.

[109]

1 Lnne 11. Dorman, 3 Scam. 242. In Dubois v.l\IcLean, 4McLean, 486, Judge
Pope assumes that the case of Lane v. Dorman decides a special act, authorizing
an executor to sell lands of the testator to pay debts against his estate, would
be unconstitutional. "\Ve do not so understand that decision. On the contrary,
another case in the Bame volume, :Edwards v. p, p !, p. 465, fully sustains the
cases before decided, distingui11hing them from Lane v. Dorman. But th11t indt•ed
is also done in the principal case, where the court, after referring to similar casu
in Kentucky, say: "These cases are clearly di~tingui~hed from the t•ase at bar.
Tbe acts were for the benefit of all the creditors of the estates, without distinction; and in one case, in addition, for the purpose of perfecting title11 contraL·tcd
to be made by the intestate. The claims of the creditors of the intt-state were to
be established by judil·ial or other sati~factory legal proceedings, and, in truth
in the case last cited, the commis:sioncrs were nothing more than special commtsstoners. The legislative department, in passing these acts, investigated
nothing, nor did an act which could be deemed a judicial inquiry. It neither
examined proof, nor determined the nature or extent of claims ; it merely authorized the applieation of the real e~tate to the payment of debts generally
discriminating in favor of no one creditor, and gi\·ing no one a prefert•nt·e over
another. Not so in the case before us; the amount is im·estigated and ascertained, and the sale is directed for the benefit of two persons exclubively. The
proceed11 are to be applied to the payment of ~uch claims und none other, for
liabilities said to be incurred but not liquidated or satisfied; and those, too,
created after the death of the intestate." See also Mason v. "\Vait, 4 Scam. 12713!. The case of Estep v. Hutebruan, 14 S. & R. 435, would seem to be
more open to question on this point than any of the others before cited. It was
the case of a special statute, authorizing the guardian of infant heirs to convey their lands in sati8faction of a contract wade by their ancestor; and
which was tiustained. Compare this with Jones t!. Perry, 10 Yerg. 59, where
an act authorizing a guardian to sell lands to pay the ancestor's debts was held

VOld.
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of the United States, under certain circumstances,” approved May

• 105
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23, 1844, and which provided that the trust under said act should

be conducted under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed

by the legislative authority of the State,” &c., the legislature passed

an act authorizing the trustee to give deeds to a person named

therein, and those claiming under him ; thus undertaking to dispose

of the whole trust to the person thus named and his grantees, and

authorizing no one else to be considered or to receive any relief.

This was very plainly an attempted adjudication upon the rights of

the parties concerned ; it did not establish regulations for the

administration of the trust, but it adjudged the trust property to

certain claimants exclusively, in disregard of any rights which

might exist in others ; and it was therefore declared to he

[“* 106] void.‘ And it has also been held that, whether a * corpo-

ration has been guilty of abuse of authority under its

‘ Cash, Appellant, 6 Mich. 193. The case of Powers v. Bergen, 6 N. Y. 358,

is perhaps to be referred to another principle than that of encroachment upon

judicial authority. That was a case where the legislature, by special act, had

undertaken to authorize the sale of property, not for the purpose of satisfying

liens upon it, or of meeting or in any way providing for the necessities or

wants of the owners, but solely, after paying expenses, for the investment of

the proceeds. It appears from that case that the executors under the will of the
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former owner held the lands in trust for a daughter of the testator during her

of the United States, under certain circumstances," approved :May
23, 1844, and which provided that the trust under said act should
be conducted under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed
by the legislative authority of the State," &c., the legislature passed
an act authorizing the trustee to give deeds to a person named
therein, and those claiming under him ; thus undertaking to dispose
of the whole trust to the person thus named and his grantees, and
authorizing no one else to be considered or to receh·e any relief.
This was very plainly an attempted adjudication upon the rights of
the parties concerned; it did not establish regulations for the
administration of the trust, but it adjudged the trust property to
certain claimants exclusively, in disregard of any rights which
might exist in others; and it was therefore declared to be
[•t06] void. 1 And it has also been held that, whether a * corporation has been guilty of abuse of authority under its

natural life, with a vested remainder in fee in her two children. The special act

assumed to empower them to sell and convey the complete fee, and apply the

proceeds,ﬁr.9i, to the payment of their commissions, costs, and expenses ; second,

to the discharge of assessments, liens, charges, and incumbrances on the land,

of which, however, none were shown to exist; and, third, to invest the proceeds

and pay over the income, after deducting taxes and charges, to the daughter

during her life, and alter her dccease to convey, assign, or pay over the same to the

persons who would be entitled under the will. The court regarded this as an un-

authorized interference with private property upon no necessity, and altogether

void, as depriving the owners of their property contrary to the “law of the land.”

At the same time the authority of those cases, where it has been held that the

legislature, acting as the guardian and protector of those who are disabled to act

for themselves by reason of infancy, lunacy, or other like cause, may constitution-

ally pass either general or private laws, under which an eﬂ'ectual disposition of

their property might be made, was not questioned. The court cite, with appa.r~

ent approval, the cases, among others, of Rice v. Parkman, 16 Mass. 326; Coch-

ran v. Van Surlay, 20 “fend. 365; and Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Pet. 657. The

case of Ervine’s Appeal, 16 Penn. St. 256, was similar, in the principles involved,

to Powers v. Bergen, and was decided in the same way. See also Kneass’s Ap-

peal, 31 Penn. St. 87, and compare with Ker 0. Kitchen, 17 Penn. St. 438;

Martin's Appeal, 23 Penn. St. 437; Tharp v. Fleming, 1 Houston, 592.

[110]

Cash, AppPJiant, 6 Mich. 193. The case of Powers t1. Bergen, 6 N.Y. 358,
is perhaps to be referred to another principle than that of encroachment upon
judicial authority. That was a case where the legislature, by special act, had
undertaken to authorize the sale of property, not for the purpose of satisfying
liens upon it, or of meeting or in any way providing for the necessities or
wants of the owners, but solely, after paying expenses, for the investment of
the proceeds. It appears from that case that the executors under the will of the
fom1er owner held the lands in trust for a daughter of the testator during her
natural life, with a vested remainder in fee in her two children. The special act
assumed to empower them to sell and convey the complete fee, and apply the
proceeds, first, to the payment of their commissions, costs, and expenses ; second,
to the discharge of assessments, liens, charges, and incumbrances on the land,
of which, however, none were shown to exist; and, tltird, to invest the proceeds
and pay over the income, after deducting taxes and charges, to the daughter
during her life, and after her decease to convey, assign, or pay over the same to the
persons who would be entitled under the will. The court regarded this as an unauthorized interft!rence with prh·ate property upon no necessity, and altogether
void, as depriving the owners of their property contrary to the "law of the land."
At the same time the authority of those cases, where it has been held that the
legislature, acting as the guardian and protector of those who are disabled to act
for themselves by reason of infancy, lunacy, or other like cause, may constitutionally pass either general or private laws, under which an effectual disposition of
their property might be made, was not questioned. The court cite, with apparent approya), the cases, among others, of Rice v. Parkman, 16 Mass. 326; Cochran v. Van Surlay, 20 Wend. 365; and Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Pet. 657. The
case of Ervine's Appeal, 16 Penn. St. 256, was similar, in the principles involved,
to Powers v. Bergen, and was decided in the same way. See also Kneass's Ap·
peal, 31 Penn. St. 87, and compare with Ker v. Kitchen, 17 Penn. St. 438;
Martin's Appeal, 23 Penn. St. 437; Tharp t1. Fleming, 1 Houston, 592.
1
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charter, so as justly to subject it to forfeiture} and whether a
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widow is entitled to dower in a speciﬁed parcel of land,” are judicial

questions which cannot be decided by the legislature. In these

cases there are necessarily adverse parties ; the questions that would

arise are essentially judicial, and over which the courts possess

jurisdiction at the common law ; and it is presumable that legisla-

tive acts of this character must have been adopted carelessly, and

without a due consideration of the proper boundaries which mark

the separation of legislative from judicial duties.”

* We have elsewhere referred to a number of cases where ['* 107]

statutes have been held unobjectionable which validated

legal proceedings, notwithstanding irregularities apparent in them.‘

These statutes may as properly be made applicable to judicial as

to ministerial proceedings; and although, when they refer to

such proceedings, they may at ﬁrst seem like an interference with

judicial authority, yet if they are only in aid of judicial proceed-

‘ State v. Noyes, 47 Me. 189; Campbell v.Union Bank, 6 How. (Miss) 661;

Canal Co. v. Railroad Co. 4 G. & J. 122; Regents of University v. \Villiams, 9

G. & J . 365. In Miners Bank of Dubuque v. United States, 1 Morris, 482, a

clause in a charter authorizing the legislature to repeal it for any abuse or mis-

user of corporate privileges was held to refer the question of abuse to the legisla-

tive judgment. The appointment of a receiver by the legislature for an insol-
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vent bank was sustained in Carey v. Giles, 9 Geo. 253.

' Edwards v. Pope, 3 Scam. 465.

charter, so as justly to subject it to forfeiture,! and whether a
widow is entitled to dower in a specified parcel of land/.a are judicial
questions which cannot be decided by the legislature. In these
cases there are necessarily adverse parties; the questions that would
arise are essentially judicial, and over which the courts possess
jurisdiction at the common law; and it is presumable that legislative acts of this character must have been adopted carelessly, and
without a due consideration of the proper boundaries which mark
the separation of legislative from judicial duties.8
• We have elsewhere referred to a number of cases where [*107]
statutes have been held unobjectionable which validated
legal proceedings, notwithstanding irregularities apparent in them. 4
These statutes may as properly be made applicable to judicial as
to ministerial proceedings ; and although, when they refer to
such proceedings, they may at first seem like an interference with
judicial authority, yet if they are only in aid of judicial proceed-

' The injustice and dangerous character of legislation of this description are

well stated by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania: “ \Vhen, in the exercise of

proper legislative powers, general laws are enacted which bear, or may bear, on

the whole community, if they are unjust and against the spirit of the ‘constitu-

tion, the whole community will be interested to procure their repeal by a voice

potential. And that is the great security for just and fair legislation. But

when individuals are selected from the mass, and laws are enacted aﬁecting

their property, without summons or notice, at the instigation of an interested

party, who is to stand up for them, thus isolated from the mass, in injury and in-

justice, or where are they to seek relief from such acts of despotic power? They

have no refuge but in the courts, the only secure place for determining conﬂict-

ing rights by due course of law. But if the judiciary give way, and, in the lan-

guage of the Chief Justice in Greenough v. Greenough, in 11 Penn. St. 494,

‘ confesses itself too weak to stand against the antagonism of the legislature and

the bar,’ one independent co-ordinate branch of the government will become the

subservient handmaid of the other, and a quiet, insidious revolution will be

effected in the administration of the government, whilst its form on paper re-

mains the same.” Ervine’s Appeal, 16 Penn. St. 268.

‘ See posl, pp. 371-381.
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State"· Noyes, 47 Me. 189; Campbell v. Union Bank, (j How. (Miss.) 661;
Canal Co. "· Railroad Co. 4 G. & J. 122; Regents of University v. Williams, 9
G. & J. 365. In Miners Bank of Dubuque r:. United States, 1 Morris, 482, a
clause in a charter authorizing the legislature to repeal it for any abuse or misuser of corporate priYileges was held to refer the question of abuse to the legislati,·e judgment. The appointment of a receiver by the legislature for an insolvent bank was sustained in Cnrey v. Giles, 9 Geo. 253.
1 Edwards v. Pope, 3 Scam. 465.
a The injustice and dangerous character of legislation of this description are
welll!tated by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania: "\Vhen, in the exercise of
proper legislative powers, general laws are enacted which bear, or may bear, on
the whole community, if they are unjust and against the spirit of the constitution, the whole community will be interested to procure their repeal by a voice
potential. And that is the great security for just and fair legislation. But
when individuals are selected from the mass, and laws are enacted affecting
their property, without summons or notice, at the instigation of an interested
party, who is to stand up for them, thus isolated from the mass, in injury and injustice, or where are they to seek relief from such acts of despotic power? They
have no refuge but in the courts, the only secure place for determining conflicting rights by due course of law. But if the judiciary give way, and, in the language of the Chief Justice in Greenough v. Greenough, in 11 Penn. St. 494,
• confesses itself too weak to stand against the antagonism of the legi~laturc and
the bar,' one independent co-ordinate branch of the government will become the
subservient handmaid of the other, and a quiet, insidious revolution will be
effected in the administration of the government, whilst its form on paper remains the same." Ervine's Appeal, 16 Penn. St. 268.
4 See post, pp. 371-381.
1
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ings, and tend to their support by precluding parties from taking

[cH. v.

advantage of errors which do not affect their substantial rights,

they cannot be obnoxious to the charge of usurping judicial power.

The legislature does, or may, prescribe the rules under which the

judicial power is exercised by the courts; and in doing so, it may

dispense with any of those formalities which are not essential to

the jurisdiction of the court; and whatever it may dispense with

by statute anterior to the proceedings, we believe it may also dis-

pense with by statute after the proceedings have been taken, if the

court has failed to observe any of those formalities. But it would

not be competent for the legislature to authorize a court to pro-

ceed and adjudicate upon the rights of parties, without giving

them an opportunity to be heard before it; and, for the same rea-

son, it would be _incompetent'for it, by retrospective legislation, to

make valid proceedings which had been had in the courts, but

which were void for want of jurisdiction over the parties. Such a

legislative enactment would be doubly objectionable: ﬁrst, as an

exercise of judicial power, since, the proceedings in court being

void, it would be the statute alone which would constitute an

adjudication upon the rights of the parties; and, second, because,

in all judicial proceedings, notice to parties and an opportunity

to defend are essential,—both of which they would be deprived
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of in such a. case} And for like reasons a statute validating

' In McDaniel v. Corrcll, 19 Ill. 226, it appeared that a statute had been passed

to make valid certain legal proceedings by which an allcgcd will was adjudged

void, and which were had against non-resident defendants, over whom the courts

had obtained no jurisdiction. The court say: " If it was competent for the legis-

lature to make a void proceeding valid, then it has been done in this case.

Upon this qut-stion_we cannot for a moment doubt or hesitate. They can no

more impart a binding eﬁicacy lo a void proceeding, than thcy can take one man's

property from him and give it to another. Indeed, to do the one is to accomplish

the olhcr. By the decree in this case the will in question was declared void,

and, consequently, if effect be given to the decree, the legacies given to those

absent defendants by the will are taken from them and given to others, according

ings, and tend to their support by precluding parties from taking
advantage of errors which do I\Ot affect their substantial rights,
they cannot be obnoxious to the charge of usurping judicial power.
The legislature does, or may, prescribe the rules under which the
judicial power is exercised by the courts ; and in doing so, it may
dispense with any of those formalities which are not essential to
the jurisdiction of the court; and whatever it may dispense with
by statute anterior to the proceedings, we believe it may also dispense with by statute after the proceedings have been taken, if the
court has failed to observe any of those formalities. But it would
not bo competent for the legislature to authorize a court to prOceed and adjudicate upon the rights of parties, without giving
them an opportunity to be heard before it; and, for the same rcason, it would be _incompetent-for it, by retrospective legislation, to
make valid proceedings which had been had in the courts, but
which were void for want of jurisdiction over the parties. Such a
legislative enactment would be doubly objectionable: first, as an
exercise of judicial power, since, the proceedings in court being
void, it would Lc the statute alone which would constitute an
adjudication upon the rights of the parties; and, 1econd, l.tecause,
in all judicial proceedings, notice to parties and an opportunity
to defend are essential,- both of which they would be deprived
of iu such a case.1 And for like reasons a statute validating

to our statute of descents. Until the passage of ‘he act in question, they wcre

not bound by the verdict of the jury in this case, and it could not form the basis

of a valid decree. Had the decree bcen rendered before the passage of the ac-'t, it

would have been as cotnpetcnt to make that valid as it was to validate the ante-

cedent proceedings upon which alone the decree could rest. The want of juris-

diction over the defendants was as fatal to the one as it could be to the other. If

we assume the act to be valid, then the legacies which before belonged to the

legatecs have now ceased to be theirs, and this result has been brought about

[112] A

1 In McDaniel v. Corrdl, 19 Ill. 226, it appeart>d that a statute had been passed
to make valid certain legal proct>P-dings by whit·h an allt•gt-d will was adjudgt·d
void, and whit·h were had against non-resident defend11nte, over whom the t·ourts
had obtaiued no juri~diction. The court say: "If it was competent for the legis~
lature to make a void proceeding ,-alid, then it has been done in this case.
Upon this question we l'&nnot for a moment douLt or hesitate. They can . no
more impart a Lindi~g efficacy to a void proceedin~, than tht~y can tak~ one man's
property f~om him and give it to another. Incleecl, to do the one ill to at·compli:sh
the otht·r. By the decree in this case the will in qut'stion was dedared void,
and, consequently, if effect be given to the decree, the l..gacies given to those
ab~eut defcnd11nts by the will are taken from them and given to other11, according
to our ~tatute of descents. Until the pusage of • he att in question 1 they were
not bound by the verdil't of the jury in this case, and it ('Ould not form the basis •
of a valid dl·Cree. Had the decree bt·en rtondered before the passage of the
it
wouhl have bel'n as compet1·nt to make that valid as it W&:l to validate the antecedent prot~ccdings upon which alone the decree t•ould re~t. The want of jurisdit"tion onr the defend!lDI8 was as fatal to the one as it could be to the othe1·. ff
we assume the act to be valid, then tlse legacies which before belonged to the
legatees have uow ceased to be theirs, and this result lwl been brought about

act.
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proceedings * had before an intruder into a judicial oﬂice, [* 108]

POWERS EXERCISED BY LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT.
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before whom no one is authorized or required to appear,

proceedings • had before an intruder into a judicial office, [*108]
before whom no one is authorized or required to appear,
and who could have jurisdiction neither of the parties nor of the
subject-matter, would also be void .I

and who could have jurisdiction neither of the parties nor of the

subject-matter, would also be void.1

by the legislative act alone. The effect of the act upon them is precisely the

same as if it had declared in direct terms that the legacies bequeathed by this will

to these defendants should not go to them, but should descend to the heirs-at-law

of the testator, according to our law of descents. This it will not be pretended

that they could do directly, and they had no more authority to do it indirectly,

by making proceedings binding upon them which were void in law.”

' In Denny v. Mattoon, 2 Allen, 361, a judge in insolvency had made certain

orders in a case pending in another jurisdiction, and which the courts subse-

quently declared to be void. The legislature then passed an act declaring that

t

they “ are hereby conﬁrmed, and the same shall be taken and deemed good and

valid in law, to all intents and purposes whatsoever.” On the question of the

validity of this act the court say: “ The precise question is, whether it can be

held to operate so as to confer a jurisdiction over parties and proceedings which

it has been judicially determined does not exist, and give validity to acts and pro-

cesses which have been adjudged void. The statement of this question seems to

us to suggest the obvious and decisive objection to any construction of the statute

which would lead to such a conclusion. It would be a direct exercise by ‘the
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legislature of a power in its nature clearly judicial, from the use of which it is

izpressly prohibited by the thirtieth article of the Declaration of Rights. The

e which marks and separates judicial from legislative duties and functions is

often indistinct and uncertain, and it is sometimes diﬁicult to decide within which

of the two classes a particular subject falls. All statutes of a declaratory nature,

which are designed to interpret or give a meaning to previous enactments, or to

conﬁrm the rights of parties either under their own contracts or growing out of

the proceedings of courts or public bodies, which lack legal validity, involve in

a certain sense the exercise of a judicial power. They operate upon subjects

which might properly comewithin the cognizance of the courts and form the

basis of judicial consideration and judgment. But they may, nevertheless, be sup-

ported as being within the legitimate sphere of legislative action, on the ground

that they do not declare or determine, but only conﬁrm rights; that they give

effect to the acts of parties according to their intent; that they furnish new and

more eﬁicacious remedies, or create a more beneﬁcial interest or tenure, or, by

supplying defects and curing informalities in the proceedings of courts, or of

public officers acting within the scope of their authority, they give elfect to acts to

which there was the express or implied assent of the parties interested. Statutes

which are intended to accomplish such purposes do not necessarily invade the

province, or directly interfere with the action of judicial tribunals. But if we adopt

the broadest and most comprehensive view of the power of the legislature, we

must.place some limit beyond which the authority of the legislature cannot go

withozit trenching on the clear and well-deﬁned boundaries of judicial power."

“ Although it may be diﬁicult, if not impossible, to lay down any general rule

which may serve to determine, in all cases, whether the limits of constitutional

_ 8 [ 113 ]

~

by the legislative act alone. The effect of the act upon them is precisely the
same as if it had declared in direct terms that the legacies bequeathed by this will
to these defendants should not go to them, but should descend to the heirs-at-law
of the testator, according to our law of descents. This it will not be pretended
that they could do directly, and they had no more authority to do it indirectly,
by making proceedings binding upon them which were void in law."
1 In Denny 11. Mattoon, 2 Allen, 361, a judge in insolvency had made certain
orders in a case pending in another jurisdiction, and which the courts subsequently declared to be void. The legislature then passed ~n act declaring that
they " are hereby confirmed, and the same shall be taken a·nd deemed good and
valid in law, to all intents and purposes whatsoever." On the question of the
validity of this act the court say : " The precise question is, whether it can be
held to operate so as t.o confer a jurisdiction over parties and proceedings which
it has been judicially determined does not exist, and give validity to acts and processes which have been adjudged void. The statement of this question seema to
us ~ suggest the obvious and decisive objection to any construction of the statute
which would lead to such a conclusion. It would be a direct exercise by 'the
legislature of a power in its nature clearly judicial, from the use of which it is
~xpressly prohibited by the thirtieth article of the Declaration of Rjghts. The
~e which marks and separates judicial from legislative duties and functions is
often indistinct and uncertain, and it is sometimes difficult to decide within which
of the two classes a particular $ubject falls. All statutes of a declaratory nature,
which are designed to interpret or give a meaning to previous enactments, or to
confirm the rights of parties either under their own contracts or growing out of
the pro~<eedings of courts or public bodies, which lack legal validity, involve in
a certain sense the exercise of a judicial power. They operate upon subjects
which might properly come. within the cognizance of the courts and form the
basis of judicial consideration and judgment. But they may, nevertheless, be supported as being within the legi~imate sphere of legislative action, on the ground
that they do not declare or determine, but only confirm rights; that they give
effect to the acts of parties according to their intent; that they furnish new and
more efficacious remedie11. or create a more beneficial interest or tenure, or, by
aopplying defe~ and curing informalities in the proceedings of courts, or of
public officers acting within the scope of their authority, they give effect to acts to
which there was the express or implied assent of the parties interested. Statutes
which are intended to accomplish such purposes do not necessarily invade the
province, or directly interfere with the action of judicial tribunals. But if we adopt
the broadeat and most comprehensive view of the power of the legislature, we
must• place 110me limit beyond which the authority of the legislature cannot go
without trenching on the cleJU" and well-defined boundaries of judicial power."
" Although it may be difficult, if not impossible, to lay down any general rule
which may serve to determine, in 411 cases, whether the limits of constitutional
8
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
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[“ 109] ' Legislative Divorces.

There is another class of cases in which it would seem that

action ought to be referred exclusively to the judicial tribunals,

• Legulative Divorces.

but in respect to which the prevailing doctrine seems to be,

[*110]' that the legislature "‘ has complete control unless specially

restrained by the State constitution. The granting of di-

vorces from the bonds of matrimony was not conﬁded to the courts

in England, and from the earliest days the Colonial and State leg-

islatures in this country have assumed to possess the same power

over the subject which was possessed by the Parliament, and from

time to time they have passed special laws declaring a dissolution

of the bonds of matrimony in special cases. Now it is clear that

“ the question of diwrce involves investigations which are properly

of a judicial nature, and the jurisdiction over divorces ought to be

restraint are overstepped by the exercise by one branch of the government of

powers exclusively delegated to another, it certainly is practicable to apply to

each ease as it arises some test by which to ascertain whether this fundamental

principle is violated. If, for example, the practical operation of a statute is to

determine adversary suits pending between party and party, by substituting in

place of the well-settled rules of law the arbitrary will of the legislature, and

thereby controlling the action of the tribunal before which the suits are pending,
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no one can doubt that it would be an unauthorized act of legislation, because it

There is another class of cases in which it would seem that
action ought to be referred exclusively to the judicial tribunals,
but in respect to which the prevailing doctrin~ seems to be,
[•not that the legislature. has complete control unless specially
restrained by the State constitution. The granting of divorces from the bonds of matrimony was not confided to the courts
in England, and from the earliest days the Colonial and State legislatures in this country have assm:ped to posse~s the same power
over the subject which was possessed by the Parliament, and from
time to time they have passed special laws declaring a dissolution
of the bonds of matrimony in special cases. Now it is clear that
"the question of dhwrce involves investigations which are properly
of a judicial nature, and the jurisdiction over divorces ought to be

directly infringes on the peculiar and appropriate functions of the judiciary. It

is the exclusive province of the courts of justice to apply established principles

to cases within their jurisdiction, and to enforce their jurisdiction by rendering

judgments and executing them by suitable process. The legislature have no

power to interfere with this jurisdiction in such manner as to change the decision

of cases pending before courts, or to impair or set aside their judgments, or to

take cases out of the settled course of judicial proceeding. It is on this principle

that it has been held, that the legislature have no power to grant a new trial or

direct a rehearing of a cause which has been once judicially settled. The right

to a review, or to try anew facts which have been determined by a verdict or

decree, depends on ﬁxed and well-settled principles, which it is the duty of the

court to apply in the exercise of a sound judgment and discretion. These can-

not be regulated or governed by legislative action. Taylor v. Place, 4 R. I. 324,

337; Lewis v. \Vebb, 3 Me. 326; Dechastellux v. Fairchild, 15 Penn. St. 18.

A fortiori, an act of the legislature cannot set aside or amend ﬁnal judgments

or decrees.” The court further consider the general subject at length, and

adjudge the particular enactment under consideration void, both as an exercise of

judicial authority, and also because, in declaring valid the void proceedings in

insolvency against the debtor, under which assignees had been appointed, it took

away from the debtor his property, “ not by due process of law or the law of the

land, but by an arbitrary exercise of legislative will.”

[114]

restraint are overstepped by the exercise by one branch of the government of
powers exclusively delegated to another, it certainly is practicable to apply to
each case as it arises some test by which to ascertain whether this fundamental
principle is violated. If, for example, the practical opt'ration of a statute is to
determine adversary suits pending between party and party, by substituting in
place of the well-settled rnles of law the arbitrary will of the legislature, and
thereby controlling the action of the tribunal before which the suits are pending,
no one can doubt that it would be an unauthorized act of legislation, because it
directly infringes on the peculiar and appropriate functions of the judiciary. It
is the exclusive province of the courts of justice to apply established principles
to cases within their jurisdiction, and to enforce their jur~sdiction by rendering
judgments and executing them by suitable process. The legislature have no
power to interfere with this jurisdiction in such manner as to change the decision
of cases pending before courts, or to impair or set aside their judgments, or to
take eases out of the settled course of judicial proceeding. It is on this principle
that it bas been held, that the legislature have no power to grant a new trial or
direct a rehearing of a cause which bas been once judicially settled. The right
to a review, or to try anew facts which have been determined by a verdict or
decree, depends on fixed and well-settled principles, which it is the duty of the
court to apply in the exercise of a sound judgment and discretion. These cannot be regulated or governed by legislative action. Taylor 11. Place, 4 R. I. 324,
887; Lewis 11. Webb, S Me. 826; Dechastellux v. Fairchild, 16 Penn. St. 18.
.A fortiori, an act of the legislature cannot set aside or amend final judgments
or decrees." The court further consider the general subject at length, and
adjudge the particular enactment under consideration void, both as an exercise of
judicial authority, and also because, in decla1·ing valid the void proceedings in
insolvency against the debtor, under which assignees had been appointed, it took
away from the debtor his property, "not by due process of law or the law of the
land, but by an arbitrary exercise of legislative will."

[ 114]

•
ca. v.] POWERS EXEBCISED BY LEGISLATIVE nnraarunur. “* 110

conﬁned exclusively to the judicial tribunals, under the limitations

to be prescribed by law;”1 and so strong is the general convic-

CH. V.]

POWERS EXERCISED BY LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT.

•uo

tion of this fact, that the people in framing their constitutions, in

a majority of the States, have positively forbidden any such special

laws?

' 2 Kent, 106. See Levins u. Sleator, 2 Greene (Iowa), 607.

* The following are constitutional provisions: — Alabama : Divorces from the

bonds of matrimony shall not be granted but in the cases by law provided for,

and by suit in chancery; but decrees in chancery for divorce shall be ﬁnal, un-

less appealed from in thelmannér prescribed by law, within three months from the

confined exclusively to the judicjal tribunals, under the limitations
to be prescribed by law ; " 1 and so strong is the general conviction of tl}is fact, that the people in framing their constitutions, in
a majority of the States, have positively forbidden any such special
laws.2

date of the enrolment thereof. Arkansas : The General Assembly shall not

have power to pap any bill of divorce, but may prescribe by law the manner in

which such cases may be investigated in the courts of justice, and ilivorces granted.

California: N o divorce shall be granted by the legislature. The provision is

the same or similar in Iowa, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada,

Nebraska, Oregon, New Jersey, Texas, and Wisconsin. Florida : Divorces from

the bonds of matrimony shall not be allowed but by the judgment of a court, as

shall be prescribed by law. Georgia : The Superior Court shall have exclusive

jurisdiction in all cases of divorce, both total and partial. Illinois: The Gen-

eral Assembly shall um pass . . . special laws . . . for granting divorces-. Kan-

sas: And power to grant divorces is vested in the District Courts subject to

regulations by law. Kentucky : The General Assembly shall have no power to
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grant divorces, . . . but by general laws shall confer such powers on the courts

of justice. Louisiana : The legislature may enact general laws regulating the . . .

granting of divorce; but no special laws shall be enacted relating to particular

or individual cases. Massachusetts : All causes of marriage, divorce, and alimony

. . . shall be heard and determined by the Governor and Council, until the legis-

lature shall by law make other provision. Mississippi : Divorces from the bonds

of matrimony shall not be granted but in cases provided for by law, and by

suit in chancery. New Hampshire : All causes of marriage, divorce, and alimony

. . . shall be heard and tried by the Superior Court, until the legislature shall

by law make other provision. New York : N o law shall be passed abridging the

right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the govemmcnt, or any

department thereof, nor shall any divorce be granted otherwise than by due

judicial proceedings. North Carolina: The General Assembly shall have power

to pass general laws regulating divorce and alimony, but shall not have power to

grant a divorce or secure alimony in any particular case. Ohio: The General

Assembly shall grant no divorce, nor exercise any judicial power, not herein

expressly conferred. Pennsylvania: The legislature shall not have power to

enact laws annulling the contract of marriage in any casc where by law the courts

of this Commonwealth are, or hereafter maybe, empowered to decree a divorce.

Tennessee : The legislature shall have no power to grant divorces,'but may author-

ize the courts of justice to grant them for such causes as may be speciﬁed by

law; but such laws shall be general and uniform in their operation throughout

the State. Virginia: The legislature shall confer on the courts the power to

grant divorces, . . . but shall not, by special legislation, grant relief in such

[115]

1 2 Kent, 106.
See Levins ll. Sleator, 2 Greene (Iowa), 607.
constitutional p~ovisions : - Alabama: Divorces from the
' The following
bonds of matrimony shall not be granted but in the cases by law provided for,
and by suit in chancery; but decrees in chancery for divorce shall be final, unlc~s appealed from in the' manner prescribed by law, within three months from the
date of the enrolment thereof. Arkansas : The General Assemblr shall not
have power to pa.., any bill of divorce, but may prescribe by law the manner in
which such cases may be investigated in the courts of justice, and ilivorces granted.
Califomia: No divorce ~hall be granted by the legislature. The provision is
the same or similar in Iowa, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada,
Nebraska, Oregon, New Jersey, Texas, and Wisconsin. Florida: Divorces from
the bonds of matrimony shall not be allowed but by the judgment of a court, as
shall be prescribed by law. Georgia: The Superior Court shall have exclusive
jurisdiction in all cases of divorce, both total and partial. lllino~: The General Assembly shall not pass . . . special laws . . . for granting divorces·. Kan.tJ.Y: And power to grant divorces is vested in the District Courts subject to
regulations by law. Kentucky: The General Assembly shall have no power to
grant divorces, . . . but by general laws shall confer such powers on the courts
of justice. Louisiana: The legislature may enact general laws regulating the . . .
granting of divorce ; but no special laws shall be enacted relating to particular
or individual cases. Massachusetts: All causes of marriage, divorce, and alimony
. . . shall be heard and determined by the Governor and Council, until the legis·
lature shall by law make other provision. Mississippi: Divorces from the bonds
of matrimony shall not be granted but in ca~es provided for by law, and by
snit in chancery. New Hampshire: All causes of marriage, divorce, and alimony
• . . shall be heard and tried by the Superior Court, until the legislature shall
by law make other provision. New York: No law shall be passed abridging the
right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government, or any
department thereof, nor shall any divorce be granted otherwise than by due
judicial proceedings. North Carolina: The General Assembly shall have power
to pass general laws regulating divorce and alimony, but shall not have power to
graut a divorce or secure alimony in any particular case. Ohio: The General
Assembly shall grant no divorce, nor exercise any judicial power, not herein
expressly conferred. Pennsylvania : The legislature shall not have power to
enact laws annulling thtJ contract of marriage in any case where by law the courts
of this Commonwealth are, or hereafter may 'be, empowered to decree a divorce.
Tennessee: The legislature shall have no power to grant divorces,' but may author-ize the courts of justice to grant them for such causes as may be specified by
law; but such laws shall be general and uniform in their operation throughout
the State. Virginia: The legislature shall confer on the courts the power to
grant divorces, . . . but shall not, by special legislation, grant relief in such

are
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[*111] ‘Of the judicial decisions on the subject of legislative

*111

CONSTITUTIONAL LIHITATIONS.

[CB. V.

power over divorces there seem to be three classes of cases.

The doctrine of theiﬁrst class seems to be this: The granting of a

divorce may be either a legislative or a judicial act, according as

the legislature shall refer its consideration to the courts, or reserve

it to itself. The legislature has the same full control over the sta-

tus of husband and wife which it possesses. over the other domestic

relations, and may permit or prohibit it according to its own views

of what is for the interest of the parties or the good of the public.

In dissolving the relation, it proceeds upon such reasons as to it

seem sutﬁcient; and if inquiry is made intothe facts of the past,

it is no more than is needful when any change of the law is con-

templated, with a view to the establishment of more salutary rules

for the future. The inquiry, therefore, is not judicial in its nature,

and it is not essential that there be any particular ﬁnding of mis-

conduct or unﬁtness in the parties. As in other cases of legisla-

tive action, the reasons or the motives of the legislature cannot be

inquired into; the relation which the law permjtted before is now

forbidden, and the parties are absolved from the obligations grow-

ing out of that relation which continued so long as the relation

existed, but which necessarily cease with its termination. Mar-

riage is not a contract, but a status ; the parties cannot have vested
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rights of property in a domestic relation; therefore the legislative

act does not come under condemnation as depriving parties

[' 112] of * rights contrary to the law of the land, but, as in other

cases within the scope of the legislative authority, the leg-

islative will must be regarded as suﬂicient reason for the rule

which it promulgates}

cases, or in any other case of which the courts or other tribunals may have juris-

diction. Missouri: The legislature shall not pass special laws divorcing any

named parties. Under the Constitution of Michigan it was held that, as the

legislature was prohibited from granting divorces, they could pass no special act

authorizing the courts to divorce for a cause which was not a legal cause for

divorce under the general laws. Teft 1:. Teft, 3 Mich. 67. See also Clark v.

Clark, 10 N. H. 387. r

‘ The leading case on this subject is Starr v. Pease, 8 Conn. 541. On the

question whether a divorce is necessarily a judicial act, the court say: “ A fur-

ther objection is urged against this act; viz., that, by the new constitution of 1818,

there is an entire separation of the legislative and judicial departments, and that

the legislature can now pass no act or resolution not clearly warranted by that

(*111]

• Of the judicial decisions on the subject of legislative
power over divorces there seem to be three classes of cases.
The doctrine of the· first class seems to be this : The granting of a
divorce may be either a legislative or a judicial act, according as
the legislature shall refer its consideration to the courts, or reserve
it to itself. The legislature has the saQle full control over the status of husband and wife which it possesses. over the other domestic
relations, and may permit or prohibit it according to its own views
of what is for the interest of the parties or the good of the public.
In dissolving the relation, it proceeds upon such reasons as to it
seem sufficient; and if inquiry is made into the facts of the past,
it is no more than is needful when any change of the law is contemplated, with a view to the establishment of more salutary rules
for the future. The inquiry, therefore, is not judicial in its nature,
and it is not essential that there be any particular finding of misconduct or unfitness in the parties. As in other cases of legislative action, the reasons or the motives of the legislature cannot be
inquired into; the relation which the law permjtted before is now
forbidden, and the parties are absolved from the obligations growing out of that relation which continued so long as the relation
existed, but which necessarily cease with its termination. :Marriage is not a contract, but a status; the parties cannot have vested
rights of property in a domestic relation ; therefore the legislative
act does not come under condemnation as depriving parties
[*112] of • rights contrary to the law of the land, but, as in other
cases within the scope of the legislative authority, the legislative will must be regarded as sufficient reason for the rule
which it promulgates.l

constitution; that the constitution is a grant of power, and not a limitation of

[116]

cases, or in any other case of which the courts or other tribunals may have jurisdiction. Missouri : The legislature shall not pass special laws divorcing any
named parties. Under the Constitution of Michigan it was held that, as the
legislature was prohibited from granting divorces, they ~ould pass no special act
authorizing the courts to divorce for a cause which was not a legal cause for
divorce under the general laws. Teft v. Teft, 3 Mich. 67. See also Clark "·
Clark, 10 N. H. 387.
1 The leading case on this subject is Starr v. Pease, 8 Conn. 541.
On the
question whether a divorce is necessarily a judicial act, the court say: "A further objection is urged against this act; viz., that, by the new constitution of 1818,
there is an entire separation of the legislative and judicial department~. and that
the legislature can now pass no act or resolution not clearly warranted by that
constitution; that the constitution is a grant of power, and not a limitation of

[ 116]
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‘The second class of cases to which we have alluded [* 113]

CB. V.J
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hold that divorce is a. judicial act in those cases upon

which the general laws confer on the courts power to adjudicate;

powers already possessed; and, in short, that there is no reserved power in the

legislature since the adoption of this constitution. Precisely the opposite of this

is true. From the settlement of the State there have been certain fundamental

• The second olass of cases to which we have alluded [ • 113 ]
hold that divorce is a. judicial act in those cases upon
which the general laws confer on the courts power to adjudicate ;

rules by which power has been exercised. These rules were embodied in an

instrument called by some'a constitution, by others a charter. All agree that it

was the ﬁrst constitution ever made in Connecticut, and made, too, by the people

themselves. It gav.e very extensive powers to the legislature, and left too much

(for it left every thing almost) to their will. The constitution of 1818 proposed

to, and in fact -did, liinit that will. It adopted certain general principles by a

preamble called a Declaration of Rights; provided for the election and appoint-

ment of certain organs of the government, such as the legislative, executive, and

judicial departments; and imposed upon them certain restraints. It found the

State sovereign and independent, with a legislative power capable of making all

laws necessary for the good of the people, not forbidden by the Constitution of

the United States, nor opposed to the sound maxims of legislation; and it left

them in the same condition, except so far as limitations were provided. There

is now and has been a law in force on the subject of divorces. The law was

passed a hundred and thirty years ago. It provides for divorces a vinculo matri-

monii in four cases; viz., adultery, fraudulent contract, wilful desertion, and seven
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years‘ absence unheard of. The law has remained in substance the same as it

was when enacted in 1667. During all this period the legislature has interfered

like the Parliament of Great Britain, and passed special acts of divorce a vin-

culo matrimonii ,' and at almost every session since the Constitution of the United

States went into operation, now forty-two years, and for the thirteen years of

the existence of the Constitution of Connecticut, such acts have been, in multi-

plied cases, passed and sanctioned by the constituted authorities of our State.

We are not at liberty to inquire into the wisdom of our existing law upon this

subject; nor into the expediency of such frequent interference of the legislature.

We can only inquire into the constitutionality of the act under consideration.

The power is not prohibited either by the Constitution of the United States or

by that of this State. In view of the appalling consequences of declaring the

general law of the State, or the repeated acts of our legislature, unconstitutional

and void, consequences easily perceived, but not easily expressed,—such as

bastardizing the issue and subjecting the parties to punishment for adultery, -

the court should come to the result only on a solemn conviction that their oaths

of office and these constitutions imperiously demand it. Feeling myself no such

conviction, I cannot pronounce the act void.” Per Daggett, J ., Hosmer, Ch. J .,

and Bissell, J ., concurring. Peters, J ., dissented. Upon the same subject, see

Crane v. Meginnis, 1 G. & J. 463; lVright v. “fright, 2 Md. 429; Gaines v.

Gaines, 9 B. Monr. 295; Cabell v. Cabell, 1 Met. (Ky.) 319; Dickson v. Dick-

son, 1 Yerg. 110; Melizet’s Appeal, 17 Penn. St. 449; (‘ronise v. Cronise. 54

Penn. St. 255; Adams v. Palmer, 51 Me. 480; Townsend v. Griffin, 4 Harr.

440; Noel v. Ewing, 9 Ind. 37; and the examination of the whole subject by

Mr. Bishop, in his work on Marriage and Divorce.
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power!! already possessed ; and, ill short, that there is no reserved power in the
legislature since the adoption of this constitution. Precisely the opposite of this
is true. From the settlement of the State there have been certain fundamental
rules by which power has been exetcised. These rules were embodied in an
instrument called by some"& constitution, by others a charter. All agree that it
was the first co~stituti~~ ever made in Connect.icut, and made, too, by the people
themselves. It gav.e very extensive powers to the legislature, and left. too much
(for it left every thing almost) to their will. The constitution of 1818 proposed
to, and in {'act -did, limit that will. It adopted certain general principles by a
preamble called a D(\claration of Rights; provided for the election and appointment of certain organs of the government, such as the legislative, executive, and
judicial departments; and imposed upon them certain restraints. It found the
State sovereign and independent, with a legislative power capable of making all
laws necessary for the good of the people, not forbidden by the Constitution of
the United States, nor opposed to the sound maxims of legislation; and it left.
·them in the same condition, except so far as limitations were provided. There
is now and has been a law in force on the subject of divorces. The law waa
passed a hundred and thirty yean ago. It provides for divorces a vinculo matrimonii in four cases; viz., adultery, fraudulent contract, wilful desertion, and seven
yean' absence unheard of. The law has remained in substance the same as it
was when enacted in 1667. During all this period the legislature has interfered
like the Parliament of Great Britain, and passed special acts of divorce a vinculo matrimonii; and at almost every session since the Constitution of the United
States went into operation, now forty-two years, and for the thirteen years of
the exist.ence of the Constitution of Connecticut, such acts have been, in multiplied cases, passed and sanctioned by the constituted authorities of our State.
We are not at liberty to inquire into the wisdom of our existing law upon this
subject; nor into the expediency of such frequent int.erference of the legislature.
We can only inquire into the constitutionality of the act under consideration.
The power is not prohibited either by the Constitution of the United States or
by that of this State. In view of the appalling consequences of declaring the
general law of the State, or the repeated acts of our legislature, unconstitutional
and void, consequences easily perceived, but not easily expressed,- such aa
bastardizing the issue and subjecting the parties to punishment for adultery,the court should come to the result only on a solemn conviction that their oaths
of office and these constitutions imperiously demand it. Feeling myself no such
conviction, I cannot pronounce the act void." Per Daggett, J., Hosmer, Ch. J .•
and BiaseU, J., concurring. P.eters, J., dissent.ed. Upon the same subject, see
Crane "· 1\leginnis, 1 G. & J. 463; Wright "· Wright, 2 :Md. 429; Gaines "·
Gaines, 9 B. Monr. 295; Cabell r. Cabell, 1 Met. (Ky.) 319; Dickson v. Dickeon, 1 Yerg. 110; Melizet's Appeal. 17 Penn. St. 449; Cronise v. Cronise, 54
Peon. St. 255; Adams v. Palmer, 51 Me. 480; Townsend v. Griffin, 4 Harr.
«0; Noel "· Ewing, 9 Ind. 37; and the examination of the whole subject by
Mr. BiBbop, in his work on Marriage and Divorce.
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and that consequently in those cases the legislature cannot pass

[CH. V.

special laws, but its full control over the relation of marriage will

leave it at liberty to grant divorces in other cases, for such causes

as shall appear to its wisdom to justify them}

A third class of cases deny altogether the authority of these

special legislative enactments, and declare the act of divorce to

be in its nature judicial, and not properly within the province of

the legislative power.’ The most of these decisions, however,

lay more or less stress upon clauses in the constitutions other

than those which in general terms separate the legislative and

judicial functions, and some of them would perhaps have been

diﬁerently decided but for those other clauses. But it is safe to

say, that the general sentiment in the legal profession is against

the rightfulness of special legislative divorces; and it is believed

that, if the question could originally have been considered by the

courts, unembarrassed by any considerations of long acquiescence,

and of the serious consequences which must result from aﬂirming

their unlawfulness, after so many had been granted and new

relations formed, it is highly probable that these enactments would,

have been held to be usurpations of judicial authority, and we

should have been spared the necessity for the special constitu-

tional provisions which have since been introduced. Fortunately,
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these provisions render the question now discussed of little prac-

tical importance; at the same time that they refer the

[* 114] decision *upon applications for divorce to those tribunals

which must proceed upon inquiry, and cannot condemn

Without a hearing.3

The force of a legislative divorce must in any case be conﬁned

' Levins v. Sleator, 2 Greene (Iowa), 604; Opinions of Judges, 16 Me. 479;

Adams v. Palmer, 51 Me. 480. See also Townsend v. Griﬂin, 4 Harr. 440. In

a well-reasoned case in Kentucky, it was held that a legislative divorce, ob-

tained on the application of one of the parties while suit for divorce was pend-

ing in a court of competent jurisdiction, would not affect the rights to property

of the other, growing out of the relation. Gaines v. Gaines, 9 B. Monr. 295.

' Brigham v. Miller, 17 Ohio, 445; Clark v. Clark, 10 N. H. 380; Ponder

v. Graham, 4 Flor. 23; State v. Fry, 4 Mo. 120; Bryson v. Campbell, 12 Mo.

498; Bryson v. Bryson, 17 Mo. 590. See also Jones v. Jones, 12 Penn. St.

853, 354.

5 If marriage is a natural right, then it would seem that any particular mar-

riage that parties might lawfully form they must have a lawful right to continue

and that consequently in those cases the legislature cannot pass
special laws, but its full control over the relation of marriage will
leave it at liberty to grant divorces in other cases, for such causes
as shall appear to its wisdom to justify them.1
A third class of cases deny altogether the authority of these
special legislative eno.ctments, and declare the act of divorce to
be in its nature judicial, and not properly within the province of
the legislative power.2 The most of these decisions, however,
lay more or less stress upon clauses in the constitutions other
than those which in general terms separate the legislative and
judicial functions, and some of them would perhaps have been
differently decided but for those other clauses. But it is safe to
say, that the general sentiment in the legal profession is against
the rightfulness of special legislative divorces; and it is believed
that, if the question could originally have been considered by the
courts, unembarrassed by any considerations of long acquiescence,
and of the serious consequences which must result from affirming
_ their unlawfulness, after so many had been granted and new
relations formed, it is highly pro~able that these enactments would,
have been held to be usurpations of judicial authority, and we
should have been spared the necessity for the special constitutional provisions which have since been introduced. Fortunately,
these provisions render the question now discussed of little practical importance; at the same time that they refer the
[•114] decision • upon applications for divorce to those tribunals
which must proceed upon inquiry, and cannot condemn
without a hearing.a
The force of a legislative divorce must in any case be confined

in, unless by misbehavior they subject themselves to a forfeiture of the right.

And if the legislature can annul the relation in one case, without any ﬁnding

[ 118]

1 Levins"· Sleator, 2 Greene (Iowa), 604; Opinions of Judges, 16 1\Ie. 479;
Adams v. Palmer, 511\Ie. 480. See also Townsend"· Griffin, 4 Harr. 440. In
a well-reasoned case in Kentucky, it was held that a legislative divorce, obtained on the application of one of the parties while suit for divorce was pending in a court of competent jurisdiction, would not affect the rights to property
of the other, growing out of the relation. Gaines v. Gaines, 9 B. 1\lonr. 295.
1 Brigham "· Miller, 17 Ohio, 445; Clark v. Clark, 10 N . H. 380; Ponder
v. Graham, 4 Flor. 23; State "·Fry, 4 Mo. 120; Bryson v. Campbell, 12 Mo.
498; Bryson v. Bryson, 17 Mo. 590. See also Jones "· Jones, 12 Penn. St.
853, 354.
3 If marriage is a natural right, then it would seem that any particular marriage that parties might lawfully form they must have a lawful right to continue
in, unless by misbeha,·ior they subject themselves to a forfeiture of the right.
And if the legislature can annul the relation in one cast.>, without any finding
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ground that it merely lays down a rule of conduct for the parties

to observe towards each other for the future. It cannot inquire

into the past, with a view to punish the parties for their offences

against the marriage relation, except so far as the divorce itself

can be regarded as a punishment. It cannot order the payment of

alimony, for that would be a judgment ; 1 it cannot adjudge upon

conﬂicting claims to property between the parties, but it must leave

all questions of this character to the courts. Those rights of

property which depend upon the continued existence of the relation

will be terminated by the dissolution, but only as in any other case

rights in the future may be incidentally affected by a change in

the law.”

Legislative Encroachments upon Executive Power.

If it is difficult to point out the precise boundary which sep-

arates legislative from judicial duties, it is still more difficult to

discriminate, in particular cases, between what is properly legis-

-lative and what is properly executive duty. The authority that

makes the laws has large discretion in determining the means

through which they shall be executed; and the perform-

to a dissolution of the relation; it can only be justified on the
ground that it merely lays down a rule of conduct for the parties
to observe towards each other for the future. It cannot inquire
into the past, with a view to punish the parties for their offences
against the marriage relation, except so far as the divorce itself
can be regarded as a punishment. It cannot order the payment of
alimony, for that would be a judgment; 1 it cannot adjudge upon
conflicting claims to property between the parties, but it must leave
all questions of this character to the courts. Those rights of
property which depend upon the continued existence of the relation
will be terminated by the dissolution, but only as in any other case
rights in the future may be incidentally affected by a change in
the law. 2

ance of * many duties which they may provide for by law, [* 115]

they may refer either to the chief executive of the State,

Legislative Encroachments upon Executive Power.
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or, at their option, to any other executive or ministerial oﬂicer, or

even to a person specially named for the duty. What can be deﬁ-

nitely said on this subject is this: That such powers as are specially

conferred by the constitution upon the governor, or upon any

speciﬁed officer, the legislature cannot authorize to be performed

that a breach of the marriage contract has been committed, than it would seem

that they might annul it in every case, and even prohibit all parties from entering

into the same relation in the future. The recognition of a full and complete

control of the relation in the legislature, to be exercised at its will, leads in-

evitably to this conclusion; so that, under the “ rightful powers of legislation“

which our constitutions confer upon the legislative department, a relation essen-

tialto organized civil society might be abrogated entirely. Single legislative

divorces are but single steps towards this barbarism which the application of the

same principle to every individual case, by a general law, would necessarily bring

upon us. See what is said by the Supreme Court of Missouri in Bryson v. Bry-

son. 17 Mo. 593, 594.

' Crane v. Meginnis, 1 G. & J. 463.

’ Starr o. Pease, 8 Conn. 545.

[ 119]

If it is difficult to point out the precise boundary which separates legislative from judicial duties, it is still more difficult to
discriminate, in particular cases, between what is properly legis• lative and what is properly executive duty. The authority that
makes the laws has large discretion in determining the means
through which they shall be executed; and the performance of • many duties which they may provide for by law, [•115]
they may refer either to the chief executive of the State,
or, at their option, to any other executive or ministerial officer, or
even to a person specially named for the duty. What can be definitely said on this subject is this: That such powers as are specially
conferred by the constitution upon the governor, or upon any
specified officer, the legislature cannot authorize to be performed
that a breach of the marriage contract has been committed, then it would seem
that they might annul it in every case, and even prohibit all parties from entering
into the same relation in the future. The recognition of a full and complete
control of the relation in the legislature, to be exercised at its will, leads inevitably to this conclusion ; so that, under the " rightful powers of legislation "
which our constitutions confer upon the legislative department, a relation essential to organized civil society might be abrogated entirely. Single legislative
divorces are but single steps towards this barbarism which the application of the
same principle to every individual case, by a general law, would necessarily bring
upon us. See what iB said by the Supreme Court of Missouri in Bryson v. Bryson, 17 Mo. 593, 594.
1 Crane tl. Meginnis, 1 G. & J. 463.
t Starr fl. Pease, 8 Conn. 645.
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by any other oﬂicer or authority; and from those duties which the

[cu. v.

constitution requires of him he cannot be excused by law} But

other powers or duties the executive cannot exercise or assume

except by legislative authority, and the power which in its discre-

tion it confers it may also withhold or confer in other directions.’

Whether in those cases where power is given by the constitution

to the governor, the legislature have the same authority to make

rules for the exercise of the power, that they have to make rules

to govern the proceedings in the courts, may perhaps

["‘ 116] be a question.“ It would seem *that this must depend

1 Attorney-General v. Brown, 1 Wis. 522. “Whatever power or duty is

expressly given to, or imposed upon, the executive department, is altogether free

from the interference of the other branches of the government. Especially is

this the case where the subject is committed to the discretion of the chief executive

oﬁicer, either by the constitution or by the laws. So long as the power is vested

by any other officer or authority; and from those duties which the
constitution requires of him he cannot be excused by law.1 But
other powers or duties the executive cannot exercise or assume
except by legislative authority, and the power which in its discretion it confers it may also withhold or confer in other directions.2
Whether in those cases where power is given by the constitution
to the governor, the legislature have the same authority to make
rules for the exercise of the power, that they have to make rules
to govern the proceedings in the courts, may perhaps
[•116] be a question. a It would seem *that this must depend

in him, it is to be by him exercised, and no other branch of the government can

control its exercise.” Under the Constitution of Ohio, which forbids the exercise

of any appointing power by the legislature, except as therein authorized. it was

held that the legislature could not, by law, constitute certain designated persons

a State board, with power to appoint commissioners of the State House, and

directors of the penitentiary, and to remove such directors for cause. State v.

Kennon, 7 Ohio, N. s. 546. And see Davis v. State, 7 Md. 161.

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:19 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105011581
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

* “ In deciding this question [as to the authority of the governor], recurrence

must be had to the constitution. That furnishes the only rule by which the court

can be governed. That is the charter of the governor’s authority. All the pow-

ers delegated to him by, or in accordance with that instrument, he is entitled to

exercise, and no others. The constitution is a limitation upon the powers of the

legislative department of the government, but it is to be regarded as a grant of

powers to the other departments. Neither the executive nor the judiciary,

therefore, can exercise any authority or power except such as is clearly granted

by the constitution.” Field v. People, 2 Scam. 80.

' Whether the legislature can constitutionally remit a ﬁne, when the pardon-

ing power is vested in the governor by the constitution, has been made a question;

and the cases of Haley v. Clarke, 26 Ala. 489, and People v. Bircham, 12 Cal.

50, are opposed to each other upon the point. If the ﬁne is payable to the

State, perhaps the legislature should be considered as having the same right to

discharge it that they would have to release any other debtor to the State from

his obligation. In Morgan v. Buﬂington, 21 Mo. 549, it was held that the State

Auditor was not obliged to accept as conclusive the certiﬁcate from the Speaker

of the House as to the sum due a member of the House for attendance upon it,

but that he might lawfully inquire whether the amount had been actually earned

by attendance or not. The legislative rule, therefore, cannot go to the extent

of compelling an executive oﬂicer to do something else than his duty, under any

pretence of regulation. The power to pardon offenders is vested by the several

State constitutions in the governor. It is not, however, a power which neces-

[120]

1 Attorney-General tl. Brown, 1 Wis. 522.
"Whatever power or duty is
expressly given to, or imposed upon, the executive department, is altogether free
from the interference of the other branches of the government. Especially is
this the case where the subject is committed to the discretion of the chief executive
officer, either by the constitution or by the laws. So long as the power is vested
in him, it is to be by him exercised, and no other branch of the government can
control its exercise." Under the Constitution of Ohio, which forbids the exercise
of any appointing power by the legislature, except as therein authorized, it was
held that the legislature could not, by law, constitute certain designated persons
a State board, with power to appoint commissioners of the State House, and
directors of the penitentiary, and to remove such directors for cause. State tl.
Kennon, 7 Ohio, N. s. 546. And see Davis v. State, 7 1\ld. 161.
1 " In deciding this question [as to the authority of the governor], recurrence
must be had to the constitution. That furnishes the only rule by which the court
can be governed. That is the charter of the governor's authority. All the powers delegated to him by, or in accordance with that instrument, he is entitled to
exercise, and no others. The constitution is a limitation upon the powers of the
legislative department of the government, but it is to be regarded as a grant of
powers to the other departments. Neither the executive nor the judiciary,
therefore, can exercise any authority or power except such as is clearly granted
by the constitution." Field v. People, 2 Scam. 80.
1 Whether the legislature can constitutionally remit a fine, when the pardoning power is vested in the governor by the constitution, has been made a question ;
and the cases of Haley "· Clarke, 26 Ala. 489, and People v. Bir<:ham, 12 Cal.
50, are opposed to each other upon the point. If the fine is payable to the
State, perhaps the legislature should be considered as having the same right to
discharge it that they would have to release any other debtor to the State from
his obligation. In Morgan tl. Buffington, 21 1\lo. 549, it was l1eld that the State
Auditor was not obliged to accept as conclusive the certificate from the Speaker
of the House as to the sum due a member of the House for attendance upon it,
but that he might lawfully inquire whether the amount had been actually earned
by attendance or not. The legislative rule, therefore, cannot go to the extent
of compelling an executive officer to do something else than his duty, under any
pretence of regulation. The power to pardon offenders is vested by the several
State constitutions in the governor. It is not, however, a power which neces-
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tion whether the constitution, in conferring it, has furnished a

suﬂicient rule for its exercise. If complete power to pardon is

conferred upon the executive, it may be doubted if the legislature

can impose restrictions under the name of rules or regulations;

but when the governor is made commander-in-chief of the military

forces of the State, his authority must be exercised under such

proper rules as the legislature may prescribe, because the military

forces are themselves under the control of the legislature, and

military law is prescribed by that department. There would be

this clear limitation upon the power of the legislature to prescribe

rules for the executive department, that they must not be such as,

under pretence of regulation, divest the executive of, or preclude

his exercising, any of his constitutional prerogatives or powers.

Those matters which the constitution speciﬁcally conﬁdes to him

the legislature cannot directly or indirectly take from his control.

Delegating Legislative Power.

One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the

power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be

delegated by that department to any other body or authority.

Where the sovereign power of the State has located the authority,

there it must remain; and by the constitutional agency
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alone ‘the laws must be made until the constitution [*117]

itself is changed. The power to whose judgment, wis-

generally upon the nature of the power, and upon the question whether the constitution, in conferring it, has furnished a
sufficient rule for its exercise. If complete power to pardon is
conferred upon the executive, it may be doubted if the legislature
can impose restrictions under the name of rules or regulations ;
but when the governor is made commander-in-chief of the military
forces of the State, his authority must be exercised under such
proper rules as the legislature may prescribe, because the military
forces are themselves under the control of the legislature, and
military law is prescribed by that department. There would be
this clear limitation upon the power of the legislature to prescribe
rules for the executive department, that they must not be such as,
under pretence of regulation, divest the executive of, or preclude
his exercising, any of his constitutional prerogatives or powers.
Those matters which the constitution specifically confides to him
the legislature cannot directly or indirectly take from his control.

dom, and patriotism this high prerogative has been intrusted

cannot relieve itself of the responsibility by choosing other agen-

cies upon which the power shall be devolved, nor can it substitute

Delegating Legislative Power.

sarily inheres in the executive. State v. Dunning, 9 Ind. 22. And several of

the State constitutions have provided that it shall be exercised under such regu-

lations as shall be prescribed by law. There are provisions more or less broad

to this purport in those of Kansas, Florida, Alabama, Arkansas, Texas, Mississippi,

Oregon, Indiana, Iowa, and Virginia. In State v. Dunning, 9 Ind. 20, an act of

the legislature requiring the applicant for the remission of a ﬁne or forfeiture

to forward to the governor, with his application, the opinion of certain county

oﬂicers as to the propriety of the remission, was sustained as an act within

the power conferred by the constitution upon the legislature to prescribe regu-

lations in these cases. And see Branham v. Lange, 16 Ind. 500. The power

to reprieve is not included in the power to pardon. Ea: parte Howard, 17 N. H.

545.

[121]

One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the
power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be
delegated by that department to any other body or authority.
Where the sovereign power of the State has located the authority,
there it must remain; and by the constitutional agency
alone • the laws must be made until the constitution [*117]
itself is changed. The power to whose judgment, wisdom, and patriotism this high prerogative ha·s been intrusted
cannot relieve itself of the responsibility by choosing other agencies upon which the power shall be devolved, nor can it substitute
sarily inheres in the executive. State v. Dunning, 9 Ind. 22. And several of
the State constitutions have provided that it shall be exercised under such regulations as shall be prescribed by law. There are provisions more or less broad
to this purport in those of Kansas, Florida, Alabama, Arkansas, Texas, Mississippi,
Oregon, Indiana, Iowa, and Virginia. In State v. Dunning, 9 Ind. 20, an act of
the legislature requiring the applicant for the remission of a fine or forfeiture
to forward to the governor, with his application, the opinion of certain county
officers as to the propriety of the remission, was su~tained as an act within
the power confetTed by the constitution upon the legislature to prescribe regulations in these cases. And see Branham 11. Lange, 16 Ind. 500. The power
to reprieve is not included in the power to pardon. Ex parte Howard, 17 N.H.
M5.
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the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism of any other body for those

to which alone the people have seen ﬁt to conﬁde this sovereign

trust} '

But it is not always essential that a legislative act should be a

completed statute which must in any event take effect as law, at the

time it leaves the hands of the legislative department. A statute

may be conditional, and its taking effect may be made to depend

upon some subsequent event? Affirmative legislation may in some

cases be adopted, of which the parties interested are at liberty to

avail themselves or not at their option. A private act of incor-

poration cannot be forced upon the corporators; they may refuse

the franchise if they so choose.8 In these cases the leg-

[* 118] islative * act is regarded as complete when it has passed

through the constitutional formalities necessary to per-

fected legislation, notwithstanding its actually going into operation

‘ “ These are the bounds which the trust that is put in them by the society, and

the law of God and nature, have set to the legislative power of every common-

wealth. in all forms of government : —

“ First. They are to govern by promulgated established laws, not to be varied

in particular cases, but to have one rule for rich and poor, for the favorite at

court and the countryman at plough.

“ Secondly. These laws also ought to be designed for no other end ultimately

the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism of any other body for those
to which alone the people have seen fit to confide this sovereign
·
trust. 1
But it i.E! not always essential that a legislative act should be a
completed statute which must in any event take effect as law, at the
time it leaves the hands of the legislative department. A statute
may be cmditional, and its taking effect may be made to depend
upon some subsequent event.2 Affirmative legislation may in some
cases be adopted, of which the parties interested are at liberty to
avail themselves or not at their option. A private act of incorporation cannot be forced upon the corporators ; they may refuse
the franchise if they so choose.8 In these cases the leg[•118] islative • act is regarded as complete when it has passed
through the constitutional formalities necessary to perfected legislation, notwithstanding its actually going into operation
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but the good of the people.

“ Tlzirdly. They must not raise taxes on the property of the people without

the consent of the people, given by themselves or their deputies. And this

properl_v concerns only such governments where the legislative is always in being,

or at least where the people have not reserved any part of the legislative to

deputies, to be from time to time chosen by themselves.

“ Fouzﬂzly. The legislative neither must nor can transfer the power of making

laws to anybody else, or place it anywhere but where the people have.” Locke

on Civil Government, § 142.

‘ That legislative power cannot be delegated, see Thorne v. Cramer, 15 Barb.

112 ; Bradley v. Baxter, ib. 122; Barto 1.1. Himrod, 8 N. Y. 483; People v. Stout,

23 Barb. 349; Rice 0. Foster, 4 Harr. 479; Santo v. State, 2 Iowa, 165; Gee-

brick v. State, 5 Iowa, 491; State v. Beneke, 9 Iowa, 203; People v. Collins,

3-Mich. 243; Railroad Co. 1:. Commissioners of Clinton County, 1 Ohio, N. s.

77; Parker v. Commonwealth, 6 Penn. St. 507; Commonwealth v. Me\Villiams,

11 Penn. St. 61 ; Maize v. State, 4 Ind. 342; Meshmeier v. State, 11 Ind. 482;

State 11. Parker, 26 Vt. 362; State v. Swisher, 17 Texas, 441; State v. Copeland,

3 R. 1. ss; State 1;. Wilcoir, 45 Mo. 458.

' Brig Aurora v. United States, 7 Crunch, 382; Bull v. Read, 13 Grat. 78;

State v. Parker, 26 Vt. 357; Peck v. Weddell, 17 Ohio, N. s. 271; State v.

Kirkley, 29 Md. 85.

‘ Angeli and Ames on Corp. § 81.

[ 122 ]

These are the bounds which the trust that is put in them by the society, and
the law of God and nature, have set to the legislative power of every commonwealth, in all form& of government : " Fi1·st. They are to govern by promulgated established laws, not to be varied
in parti<:ular cases, but to have one rule for rich and poor, for the favorite at
court and the countryman at plough.
"Secondly. These laws also ought to be designed for no other end ultimately
but the good of the people.
" Thirdly. They must not raise taxes on the property of the people without
the consent of the people, given by themselves or their deputies. And this
proper!~· roncerns only such governments where the legislative is alwayll in being,
or at least where the people have not reserved any part of the legislative to
deputies, to be from time to time chosen by themselves.
"Fourthly. The legislative neither must nor can transfer the power of making
laws to anybody else, or place it anywhere but where the people have." Locke
on Civil Government, § 142.
• That legislative power cannot be delegated, see Thome v. Cramer,-15 Barb.
112; Bradley v. Baxter, ib.122; Barto v. Himrod, 8 N.Y. 483; People v. Stout,
23 Barb. 349; Rice v. Foster, 4 Harr. 479; Santo v. St.ate, 2 Iowa, 165; Geebrick v. State, 5 Iowa, 491; State v. Beneke, 9 Iowa, 203; People v. Collins,
8 . Mich. 243; Railroad Co. v. Commissioners of Clinton County, 1 Ohio, N. s.
77; Parker v. Commonwealth, 6 Penn. St. 507; Commonwealth v. Mc"Williama,
11 Penn. St. 61 ; Maize v. State, 4 Ind. 842; Mesbmeier v. State, 11 Ind. 482;
State v. Parker, 26 Vt. 862; State v. Swi11her, 17 Texas, 441; State v. Copeland,
s R. I. 33; State v. Wilcox, 45 Mo. 458.
1 Brig Aurora v. United States, 7 Cranch, 382; Bull v. Read, 18 Grat. 78;
State v. Parker, 26 Vt. 857; Peck v. Weddell, 17 Ohio, N. s. 271; State v.
Kirkley, 29 Md. 85.
1 Angell and Ames on Corp. § 81.
1 "
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as law may depend upon its subsequent acceptance. We have

CB. V.)

POWERS EXERCISED BY LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT.

elsewhere spoken of municipal corporations, and of the powers of

legislation which may be and commonly are bestowed upon them,

and the bestowal of which is not to be considered as trenching

upon the maxim that legislative power is not to be delegated, since

that maxim is to be understood in the light of the immemorial

practice of this country and of England, which has always recog-

nized the propriety of vesting in the municipal organizations cer-

tain powers of local regulation, in respect to which the parties

immediately interested may fairly be supposed more competent to

judge of their needs than any central authority. As municipal

organizations are mere auxiliaries of the State government in the

important business of municipal rule, the legislature may create

them at will from its own views of propriety or necessity, and

without consulting the parties interested; and it also possesses the

like power to abolish them, without stopping to inquire what may

be the desire of the corporators on that subject}

Nevertheless, as the corporators have a special and peculiar

interest in the terms and conditions of the charter, in the powers

conferred and liabilities imposed, as well as in the general ques-

tion whether they shall originally be or afterwards remain incor-

porated at all or not, and as the burdens of municipal government
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must rest upon their shoulders, and especially as by becoming

incorporated they are held, in law, to contract to discharge the

duties the charter imposes, it seems eminently proper that their

voice should be heard on the question of their incorporation, and

that their decision should be conclusive, unless, for strong reasons

of State policy or local necessity, it should seem important for the

State to overrule the opinion of the local majority. The right to

refer any legislation of this character to the people peculiarly

interested does not seem to be questioned, and the reference is by

no means unusual.’

' City of Patterson v. Society, &c., 4 Zab. 385 ; Cheany v. Hooser, 9 B. Monr.

330; Berlin v. Gorham, 34 N. H. 266. The question ofa levee tax may lawfully

be referred to the voters of the district of territory over which it is proposed to

spread the tax, regardless of municipal divisions. Alcorn v. Hamer, 38 Miss.

652. And see in general, Angeli and Ames on Corp. §31 and note; also post,

pp. 190-192.

’ Bull v. Read, 13 Grat. 78; Corning v. Greene, 23 Barb. 33; Morford v.

Unger, 8 Iowa, 82; City of Patterson v. Society, &c., 4 Zab. 385; Gorham

v. Springﬁeld. 21 Me. 58; Commonwealth v. Judges of Quarter Sessions, 8 Penn.

[ 123 ]

as law may depend upon its subsequent acceptance. We have
elsewhere spoken of municipal corporations, and of the powers of
legislation which may be and commonly are bestowed upon them,
and the bestowal of which is not to be considered as trenching
upon the maxim that legislative power is not to be delegated, since
that maxim is to be understood in the light of the immemorial
practice of this country and of England, which has always recognized the propriety of vesting in the municipal organizations certain powers of local regulation, in respect to which the parties
immediately interested may fairly be supposed more competent to
judge of their needs than any central authority. As municipal
organizations are mere auxiliaries of the State government in the
important business of municipal rule, the legislature may create
them at will from its own views of propriety or necessity, and
without consulting the parties interested ; and it also possesses the
like power to abolish them, without stopping to inquire what may
be the desire of the corporators on that subject. 1
Nevertheless, as the corporators have a special aud peculiar
interest iJi the terms and conditions of the charter, in the powers
conferred and liabilities imposed, as well as in the general question whether they shall originally be or afterwards remain incorporated at all or not, and as the burdens of municipal government
must rest upon their shoulders, and .especially as by becoming
incorporated they are held, in law, to contract to discharge the
duties the charter imposes, it seems eminently proper that their
voice should be heard on the question of their incorporation, and
that their decision should be conclusive, unless, for strong reasons
of State policy or local necessity, it should seem important for the
State to overrule the opinion of the local majority. The right to
refer any legislation of this character to the people peculiarly
interested does not seem to be questioned, and the reference is by
no means unusual.2
City of Patterson v. Society, &c., 4 Zab. 385; Cheany v. Hooser, 9 B. Monr.
830; Berlin v. Gorham, 34 N. H. 266. The question of a levee tax may lawfully
be referred to the voters of the district of territory over which it is proposed to
sprt>ad the tax, regardless of municipal divisions. Alcorn v. Hamer, 38 Miss.
652. And see in general, Angell and Ames on Corp. § 31 and note; also post,
pp. 190-192.
1 Bull v. Read, 13 Grat. 78; Corning "· Greene, 28 Barb. 38; Morford "·
Unger, 8 Iowa, 82; City of Patterson v. Society, &c., 4 Zab. 385; Gorham
"· Springfield, 21 Me. 58; Commonwealth"· Judges of Quarter Sessions, 8 Penn.
1
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[’* 119] * For the like reasons the question whether a. county or

*119

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

[cH. v.

township shall be divided and a new one formed} or two

townships or school districts formerly one be reunited,” or a county

seat located at a particular place, or after its location removed

elsewhere,3 or themunicipality contract particular debts, or engage

in " a ‘particular improvement,‘ is always a question which may

St. 391; Commonwealth v. Painter, 10 Penn. St. 214; Call v. Chadbourne, 46

Me. 206; State v. Scott, 17 Mo. 521; State v. lvilcox, 45 Mo. 458; Hobart v.

Supervisors, &c., 17 Cal. 23; Bank of Chenango v. Brown, 26 N. Y. 467;

Steward v. Jefferson, 3 Harr. 335; Burgess v. Pue, 2 Gill, 11. The right to

[* 119]

• For the like reasons the question whether a county or
township shall be divided and a new one formed,1 or two
townships or school districts formerly one be reunited,2 or a county
seat located at a particular place, or after its location removed
elsewhere,3 or the municipality contract particular debts, or engage
in· a 'particular improvement,• is always a question which may

refer to the people of several municipalities the question of their consolidation

was disputed in Smith v. McCarthy, 56 Penn. St. 359, but sustained by the

court.

' State v. Reynolds, 5 Gilm. 1.

’ Commonwealth v. Judges, &c., 8 Penn. St. 391; Call v. Chadbourne, 46

Me. 206.

“ Commonwealth v. Painter, 10 Penn. St. 214.

‘ The following are cases in which municipal subscriptions to works of inter-

nal improvement, under statutes empowering them to be made, have been sus-

tained: Goddin v. Crump, 8 Leigh, 120; Bridgeport v. Housatonic Railroad

Co. 15 Conn. 475; Thomas v. Leland, 24 \Vend. 65; Clarke v. Rochester, 24

Barb. 446; Benson v. Mayor, &c., of Albany, 24 Barb. 248; Corning v. Greene,
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23 Barb. 33; Grant v. Courter, 24 Barb. 232; Starin v. Genoa, 29 Barb. 442,

and 23 N. Y. 439; Bank of Rome v. Village of Rome, 18 N. Y. 38; Pretty-

man v. Supervisors, &c., 19 Ill. 406; Robertson v. Rockford, 21 Ill. 451; John-

son v. Stack, 24 Ill. 75; Perkins'v. Perkins, ib. 208; Bushnell v. Beloit, 10 Ivis.

195; Clark v. Jancsville, ib. 136; Stein v. Mobile, 24 Ala. 591; Mayor of \Ve-

tumpka vl \Vinter, 29 Ala. 651; Pattison v. Yuba, 18 Cal. 175; Blanding v.

Burr, ib. 343; Hobart v. Supervisors, &c., 17 Cal. 23; Dubuque County v.

Railroad Co. 4 Greene (Iowa), 1; State v. Bissell, ib. 328; Clapp v. Cedar

County, 5 Iowa, 15; Gaines v. Robb, 8 Iowa, 193; McMillen v. Boyles, 6 Iowa,

304; Taylor v. Newberne, 2 Jones Eq. 141; Caldwell v. Justices of Burke, 4

Jones Eq. 323; Louisville, &c., Railroad Co. v. Davidson, 1 Sneed, 637; Nichol

v. Mayor of Nashville, 9 Humph. 252; Railroad Co. v. Commissioners of Clinton

Co. 1 Ohio, N. s. 77; Trustees of Paris v. Cherry, 8 Ohio, N. s. 564; Cass

v. Dillon, 2 Ohio, N. s. 607; State v. Commissioners of Clinton Co. 6 Ohio,

N. s. 280; State v. Van Horne, 7 Ohio, N. s. 327; State v. Trustees of Union,

8 Ohio, N. s. 394; Trustees, &c. v. Shoemaker, 12 Ohio, N. s. 624; State v.

Commissioners of Hancock, 12 Ohio, N. s. 596; Powers v. Dougherty Co. 23

Geo. 65; San Antonio v. Jones, 28 Texas, 19; Commonwealth v. McWilliams,

11 Penn. St. 61; Sharplcss v. Mayor, &c., 21 Penn. St. 147; Moers v. Reading,

ib. 188; Talbot v. Dent, 9 B. Monr. 526; Slack v. Railroad Co. 13 B. Monr. 1;

City of St. Louis v. Alexander, 23 Mo. 483; City ofAnrora v. West, 9 Ind. 74;

Cotton 11. Commissioners of Leon, 6 Flor. 610; Copes v. Charleston, 10 Rich.

491 ; Commissioners of Knox County v. Aspinwall, 21 How. 539, and 24 How.

326; Same v. \Val|ace, 21 How. 547; Zabriske v. Railroad Co. 23 How. 381;

[124]

St. 391; Commonwealth v. Painter, 10 Penn. St. 214; Call " · Chadbourne, 46
Me. 206; State "· Scott, 17 Mo. 521; State v. Wilcox, 45 Mo. 458; Hobart v.
Supervisors, &c., 17 Cal. 23; Bank of Chenango "· Brown, 26 N. Y. 467;
Steward v. Jefferson, 3 Harr. 335; Burgess v. Pue, 2 Gill, 11. The right to
refer to the people of several municipalities the question of their consolidation
was disputed in Smith v. McCarthy, 56 Penn. St. 359, but sustained by the
court.
1 State "· Reynolds, 5 Gilm. 1.
1 Commonwealth v. Judges, &c., 8 Penn. St. 391; Call v. Chadbourne, 46
Me. 206.
3 Commonwealth v. Painter, 10 Penn. St. 214.
• The following are cases in which municipal subscriptions to works of internal improvement, under statutes empowering them to be made, have been sustained: Goddin "· Crump, 8 Leigh, 120; Bridgeport "· Housatonic Railroad
Co. 15 Conn. 475; Thomas v. Leland, 24 Wend. 65; Clarke v. Rochester, 24:
Barb. 446; Benson v. Mayor, &c., of Albany, 24 Barb. 248; Corning v. Greene,
23 Barb. 33; Grant v. Courter, 24 Barb. 232; Starin v. Genoa, 29 Barb. 442,
and 23 N.Y. 439; Bank of Rome v. Village of Rome, 18 N.Y. 38; Prettyman v. Supervisors, &c., 19 Ill. 406; Robertson v. Rockford, 211ll. 451; Johnson v. Stack, 24 Ill. 75; Perkins·v. Perkins, ib. 208; Bushnell v. Beloit, 10 Wis.
195; Clark v. Janesville, ib. 136; Stein v. Mobile, 24 Ala. 591; Mayor of Wetumpka v: Winter, 29 Ala. 651; Pattison "· Yuba, 18 Cal. 175; Blanding "·
Burr, ib. 343; Hobart v. Supervisors, &c., 17 Cal. 23; Dubuque County v.
Railroad Co. 4 Greene (Iowa), 1; State v. Bissell, ib. 328; Clapp v. Cedar
County, 5 Iowa, 15; Gaines v. Robb, 8 Iowa, 193; McMillen v. Boyles, 6 Iowa,
304; Taylor v. Newberne, 2 Jones Eq. 141; Caldwell v. Justices of Burke, 4
Jones Eq. 323; Louisville, &c., Railroad Co. v. Davidson, 1 Sneed, 637; Nichol
v. Mayor of Nashville, 9 Humph. 252; Railroad Co."· Commissioners of Clinton
Co. 1 Ohio, N. s. 77; Trustees of Paris v. Cherry, M Ohio, N. s. 564:; Cass
v. Dillon, 2 Ohio, N. s. 607; State v. Commissioners of Clinton Co. 6 Ohio,
N. s. 280; State v. Van Horne, 7 Ohio, N. s. 327; State v. Trustees of Union,
8 Ohio, N. 8. 394; Trustees, &c. v. Shoemaker, 12 Ohio, N. 8. 624; State v.
Commissioners of Hancock, 12 Ohio, N. s. 596; Powers v. Dougherty Co. 23
Geo. 65; San Antonio v. Jones, 28 Texas, 19; Commonwealth v. McWilliams,
11 Penn. St. 61; Sharpless v. Mayor, &c., 21 Penn. St. 147; Moers v. Reading,
ib. 188; Talbot v. Dent, 9 B. Monr. 526; Slack v. Railroad Co. 13 B. Monr. 1;
City of St. Louis"· Alexander, 23 Mo. 483; City of Aurora v. West, 9 Ind. 74;
Cotton v. Commissioners of Leon, 6 Flor. 610; Copes v. Charleston, 10 Rich.
491; Commissioners of Knox County v. Aspinwall, 21 How. 539, and 24 How.
326; Same v. Wallace, 21 How. 547; Zabriske v. Railroad Co. 28 How. 881;
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with propriety be referred to the voters of the municipality for
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•

]19

decision.

The question then arises, whether that which may be

done in * reference to any municipal organization within [*‘ 120]

the State may not also be done in reference to the State

at large? May not any law framed for the State at large be made

conditional on an acceptance by the people at large, declared

through the ballot-box? If it is not unconstitutional to delegate

to a single locality the power to decide whether it will be governed

by a particular charter, must it not quite as clearly be within the

power of the legislature to refer to the people at large, from whom

all power is derived, the decision upon any proposed statute aﬂ‘ect-

ing the whole State? And can that be called a delegation of power

which consists only in the agent or trustee referring back to the

principal the ﬁnal decision in a case where the principal is the party

concerned, and where perhaps there are questions of policy and

propriety involved which no authority can decide so satisfactorily

and so conclusively as the principal to whom they are referred.

If the decision of these questions is to depend upon the weight

of judicial authority up to the present time, it must be held that

there is no power to refer the adoption or rejection of a general law

to the people of the State, any more than there is to refer it to any
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other authority. The prevailing doctrine in the courts appears to

be, that, except in those cases where, by the constitution, the

people have expressly reserved to themselves a power of decision,

the function of legislation cannot be exercised by them, even to the

extent of accepting or rejecting a law which has been framed for

their consideration. “ The exercise of this power by the people in

other cases is not expressly and in terms prohibited by the consti-

tution, but it is forbidden by necessary and unavoidable implication.

The Senate and Assembly are the only bodies of men clothed with

Arney v. Mayor, &c., 24 How. 365; Gclpecke v. Dubuque, 1 W'al. 175; Thomp-

son v. Lee County, 3 Wal. 327; Rogers v. Burlington, ib. 654; Butler v. Dun-

ham, 27 Ill. 474; Gibbons v. Mobile & Great Northern Railroad Co. 36 Ala.

410; St. Joseph, &c., Railroad C0. v. Buchanan Co. Court, 39 Mo. 485; State

v. Linn Co. Court, 44 Mo. 504. In several of them the power to authorize the

municipalities to decide upon such subscriptions has been contested as a delega-

tion of legislative authority, but the courts — even those which hold the subscrip-

tions void on other grounds — do not look upon these cases as being obnoxious

to the constitutional principle referred to in the text. [ 125 ]

with propriety be referred to the voters of the municipality for
decision.
The question then arises, whether that which may be
done in • reference to any municipal organization within [•120]
the State may not also be done in reference to the State
at large? May not any law framed for the State at large be made
conditional on an acceptance by the people at large, declared
through the ballot-box? If it is not unconstitutional to delegate
to a single locality the power to decide whether it will be governed
by a particular charter, must it not quite as clearly be within the
power of the legislature to refer to the people at large, from whom
all power is derived, the decision upon any prop_osed statute affecting the whole State? And can that be called a delegation of power
which consists only in the agent or trustee referring back to the
principal the final decision in a case where the principal is the party
concerned, and where perhaps there are questions of policy and
propriety involved which no authority can decide so satisfactorily
and so conclusively as the principal to whom they are referred.
If the decision of these questions is to depend upon the weight
of judicial authority up to the present time, it must be held that
there is no power to refer the adoption or rejection of a general law
to the people of the State, any more than there is to refer it to any
other authority. The prevailing doctrine in the courts appears to
be, that, except in those cases where, by the constitution, the
people have expressly reserved to themselves a power of decision,
the function of legislation cannot be exercised by them, even to the
extent of accepting or rejecting a law which has been framed for
their consideratio~. " The exercise of this power by the people in
other cases is not expressly and in terms prohibited by the constitution, but it is forbidden by necessary and unavoidable implication.
The Senate and Assembly are the only bodies of men clothed with
Arney"· :Mayor, &c., 24 How. 365; Gclpecke "·Dubuque, 1 'Val. 175; Thompson"· Lee County, 3 Wal. 327; Rogers"· Burlington, ib. 654; Butler "· Dunham, 27 Til. 474; Gibbons o. Mobile & Great Northern Railroad Co. 36 Ala.
410; St. Joseph, &c., Railroad Co. v. Buchanan Co. Court, 39 Mo. 485; State
"· Linn Co. Court, 44 Mo. 604. In several of them the power to authorize the
municipalities to decide upon such subscriptions has been contested as a delegation of legislative authority, but the courts- even those which hold the subscriptions void on other grounds- do not look upon these cases as being obnoxious
to the constitutional principle referred to in the text.

[ 125]
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

the power of general legislation. They possess the entire power,

(CH.

V.

with the exception above stated. The people reserved no part of it

to themselves [with that exception], and can therefore exercise it

in no other case.” It is therefore held that the legislature have no

power to submit a proposed law to the people, nor have the people

power to bind each other by acting upon it. They voluntarily

surrendered that power when they adopted the constitution. The

government of the State is democratic, but it is a representative

democracy, and in passing general laws the people act only through

their representatives in the legislature}

[*121] *Nor, it seems, can such legislation be sustained as

legislation of a conditional character, whose force is to

depend upon the happening of some future event, or upon some

future change of circumstances. “ The event or change of circum-

stances on which a law may be made to take effect must be such

as, in the judgment of the legislature, aﬂ“ects the question of the

expediency of the law; an event on which the expediency of the law

in the opinion of the law-makers depends. On this question of

expediency, the legislature must exercise its own judgment

definitively and ﬁnally. When a law is made to take effect upon

the happening of such an event, the legislature in effect declare the

law inexpedient if the event should not happen, but expedient if it
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should happen. They appeal to no other man or men to judge for

them in relation to its present or future expediency. They exer-

cise that power themselves, and then perform the duty which the

1 Per Ruggles, Ch. J., in Barto v. Himrod, 8 N. Y. 489. It is worthy of con-

sideration, however, whether there is any thing in the reference of a statute to

the people for acceptance or rejection which is inconsistent with the representa-

tive system of government. To refer it to the people to frame and agree upon

a statute for themselves would be equally impracticable and inconsistent with

the representative system; but to take the opinion of the people upon a bill

already framed by representatives and submitted to them, is not only practicable,

but is in precise accordance with the mode in which the constitution of the State

is adopted, and with the action which is taken in many other cases. The repre-

sentative in these cases has fulﬁlled precisely those functions which the people as

a democracy could not fulﬁl; and where the case has reached a stage when the

body of the people can act without confusion, the representative has stepped

the power of general legislation. They possess the entire power,
with the exception above stated. The people reserved no part of it
to themselves [with that exception], and can therefore exercise it
in no other case." It is therefore held that the legislature have no
power to submit a proposed law to the people, nor have the people
power to bind each other by acting upon it. They voluntarily
surrendered that power when they adopted the constitution. The
government of the State is democratic, but it is a representative
democracy, and in passing general laws the people act only through
their representatives in the legislature. 1
[•121]
*Nor, it seems, can such legislation be sustained as
legislation of a conditional character, whose force is to
depend upon tho happening of some future event, or upon some
future change of circumstances. " The event or change of circumstances on which a law may be made to take effect must be such
as, in the judgment of the legislature, affects the question of the
expediency of the law; an event on which the expediency of the law
in the opinion of the law-makers depends. On this question of
expediency, the legislature must exercise its own judgment
definitively and finally. When a law is made to take effect upon
the happening of such an event, the legislature in effect declare the
law inexpedient if the event should not happen, but expedient if it
should happen. They appeal to no other man or men to judge for
them in relation to its present or future expediency. They exercise that power themselves, and then perform the duty which the

aside to allow their opinion to be expressed. The legislature is not attempting

in such a case to delegate its authority to a new agency, but the trustee, vested

with a large discretionary authority, is taking the opinion of the principal upon

the necessity, policy, or propriety of an act which is to govern the principal

himself.

[126 _]

1 Per Rugglt!$, Ch. J., in Barto v. Himrod, 8 N.Y. 489. It i~ worthy of consideration, however, whether there is any thing in the reference of a statute to
the people for acceptance or rejection which is inconsistent with the representative ~ystem of government. To refer it to the people to frame and agree upon
a statute for themselves would be equally impracticable and inconsistent with
the representative system ; but to take the opinion of the people upon a bill
already framed by representatives and submitted to them, is not only practicable,
but is in precise accordance with the mode in which the constitution of the State
is adopted, and with the action which is taken in many other cases. The representative in these cases bas fulfilled precisely those functions which the people as
a democracy could not fulfil; and where the case bas reached a stage when the
body of the people can act without confusion, the representative has stepped
aside to allow their opinion to be expressed. The legislature is not attempting
in such a case to delegate its authority to a new agency, but the trustee, vested
with a large discretionary authority, is taking the opinion of the principal upon
the necessity, policy, or propriety of an act which is to govern the principal
himself.
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constitution imposes upon them.” But it was held that in the case
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of the submission of a proposed free-school law to the people, no

such event or change of circumstances affecting the expediency of

the law was expected to happen. The wisdom or expediency of the

School Act, abstractly considered, did not depend on the vote of the

people. If it was unwise or inexpedient before that vote was taken,

it was equally so afterwards. The event on which the act was to

take effect was nothing else than the vote of the people on the

identical question which the constitution makes it the duty of the

legislature itself to decide. The legislature has no power

to make a statute dependent on such a ‘contingency, [*‘ 122]

because it would be conﬁding to others that legislative

discretion which they are bound to exercise themselves, and which

they cannot delegate or commit to any other man or men to be

exercised}

‘ Per Ruggles, Ch. J., in Barto v. Himrod, 8 N. Y. 490. And see Santo v.

State, 2 Iowa, 165; State v. Beneke, 9 Iowa, 203; State v. Swisher, 17 Texas,

441; State v. Field, 17 Mo. 529; Bank of Chenango v. Brown, 26 N. Y. 470;

People v. Stout, 23 Barb. 349; State v. Wilcox, 45 Mo. 458. But upon this

point there is great force in what is said by Red/ield, Ch. J . in State v. Parker,

26 Vt. 357: “ If the operation of a law may fairly be made to depend upon a

future contingency, then, in my apprehension, it makes no essential difference
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what is the nature of the contingency, so it be an equal and fair one, a moral and

legal one, not opposed to sound policy, and so far connected with the object and

purpose of the statute as notto be a mere idle and arbitrary one. And to us the

contingency, upon which the present statute was to be suspended until another

legislature should meet and have opportunity of reconsidering it, was not only

proper and legal, and just and moral, but highly commendable and creditable to

the legislature who passed the statute; for at the very threshold of inquiry into

the expediency of such a law lies the other and more important inquiry, Are the

people prepared for such a law? Can it be successfully enforced? These ques-

tions being answered in the affirmative, he must be a bold man who would even

vote against the law; and something more must he be who would, after it had

been passed with that assurance, be willing to embarrass its operation or rejoice

at its defeat.

“Alter a full examination of the arguments by which it is attempted to be

sustained that statutes made dependent upon such contingencies are not valid

laws, and a good deal of study and reﬂection, I must declare that I am fully

convinced—— although at ﬁrst, without much examination, somewhat inclined to

the same opinion — that the opinion is the result of false analogies, and so founded

upon a latent fallacy. It seems to me that the distinction attempted between

the contingency of a popular vote and other future contingencies is without all

just foundation in sound policy or sound reasoning, and that it has too often been

made more from necessity than choice, —rather to escape from an overwhelming

analogy than from any obvious difference in principle in the two classes of cases;
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constitution imposes upon them." But it was held that in the case
of the submi&.sion of a proposed free-school law to the people, no
such event or change of circumstances affecting the expediency of
the law was expected to happen. The wisdom or expediency of the
School Act, abstractly considered, did not depend on the vote of the
people. If it was unwise or inexpedient before that vote was taken,
it was equally so afterwards. The event on which the act was to
take effect was nothing else than the vote of the people on the
identical question which the constitution makes it the duty of the
legislature itself to decide. The legislature has no power
to make a statute dependent on such a • contingency, [* 122]
because it would be confiding to others that legislative
discretion which they are bound to exercise themselves, and which
they cannot delegate or commit to any other man or men to be
exercised. 1
1 Per Rugglea, Cb. J., in Barto v. Himrod, 8 N.Y. 490.
And see Santo"·
State, 2 Iowa, 165; State v. Beneke, 9 Iowa, 203; State"· Swisher, 17 Texas,
441; State"· Field, 17 Mo. 529; Bank of Chenango "· Brown, 26 N. Y. 470;
People t'. Stout, 23 Barb. 349; State "· Wilcox, 4ti Mo. 4b8. But upon this
point there is great force in what is said by Redfield, Ch. J. in State v. Parker,
26 Vt. 307: " If the operation of a law may fairly be made to depend upon a
future contingency, then, in my apprehension, it makes no essential difference
what is the nature of the contiogeney, so it be an equal and fair one, a moral and
legal one, not opposed to sound policy, and so far connected with the object and
purpose of the Htatute as not to be a mere idle and arbitrary one. And to us the
contingency, upon which the present statute was to be suspended until another
legislature should meet and have opportunity of reconsidering it, was not only
proper and legal, ancl just and moral, but highly commendable and creditable to
the legislature who passed the statute: for at the very threshold of inquiry into
the expediency of such a law lies the other and more important inquiry, Are the
people prepared for such a law P Can it be successfully enforced ? These questions being answered in the affirmative, he must be a bold man who would even
vote against the law; and something more must he be who would, after it had
been passed with that assurancl', be willing to embarrass its operation or rejoice
a\ its defeat.
"Arter a full examination of the arguments by which it is attempted to be
sustained that statutes made dependent upon such contingencies are not valid
laws, and a good deal of study and refiection, I must declare that I am fully
convinced- although at first, without much examination, somewhat inclined to
the same opinion -that the opinion b the result of false analogies, and so founded
upon a latent fallacy. It seems to me that the distinction attempted between
the contingency of a popular vote and other future cootingencie~ is without all
just foundation in sound policy or sound reasoning, and that it has too often been
made more from necessity than choice,- rather to escape from an overwhelming
analogy than from any obvious difference in principle in the two classes of cases;
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[* 123] ‘The same reasons which preclude the original enact-
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ment of a law from being referred to the people would

render it equally incompetent to refer to their decision the ques-

tion, whether an existing law should be repealed. If the one is

“ a plain surrender to the people of the law-making power,” so also

is the other} It would seem, however, that if a legislative act is,

by its terms, to take effect in any contingency, it is not unconstitu-

tional to make the time when it shall take effect depend upon the

event of a popular vote being for or against it,—-the time of its

going into operation being postponed to a later day in the latter

contingency.’ It would also seem that if the question of the

acceptance or rejection of a municipal charter can be referred to

the voters of the locality specially interested, it would be equally

competent to refer to them the question whether a State law estab-

lishing a particular police regulation should be of force in such

locality or not. Municipal charters refer most questions of local

for . . . one may ﬁnd any number of cases in the legislation of Congress, where

statutes have been made dependent upon the shifting character of the revenue

laws, or the navigation laws, or commercial rules, edicts, or restrictions of other

countries. In some, perhaps, these laws are made by representative bodies, or,

it may be, by the people of these States, and in others by the lords of the treas-

ury, or the boards of trade, or by the proclamation of the sovereign; and in all
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these cases no question can be made of the perfect legality of our acts of Congress

being made dependent upon such contingencies. It is, in fact, the only possible

[•123]

• The same reasons which preclude the original enactment of a law from being referred to the people would
render it equally incompetent to refer to their decision the question, whether an existing law should be repealed. If the one is
"a plain surrender to the people of the law-making power," so also
is the other. 1 It would seem, however, that if a legislative act is,
by its terms, to take effect in any contingency, it is not unconstitutional to make the time when it shall take effect depend upon the
event of a popular vote being for or against it,- the time of its
going into operation being postponed to a later day in the latter
contingency.2 It would also seem that if the question of the
acceptance or rejection of a municipal charter can be referred to
the voters of the locality specially interested, it would be equally
competent to refer to them the question whether a State law establishing a particular police regulation should be of force in such
locality or not. Municipal charters refer most questions of local

mode of meeting them, unless Congress is kept constantly in session. The same

is true of acts of Congress by which power is vested in the President to levy

troops or draw money from the public treasury, upon the contingency of a decla-

ration or an act of war committed by some foreign state, empire, kingdom, prince,

or potentate. If these illustrations are not sufﬁcient to show the fallacy of the

argument, more would not avail." See also State v. Noyes, 10 Fost. 292; Bull

v. Read, 13 Grat. 78; Johnson v. Rich, 9 Barb. 680; State v. Reynolds, 5 Gilm.

1; Robinson v. Bidwell, 22 Cal. 349.

‘ Geebrick v. State, 5 Iowa, 491 ; Rice v. Foster, 4 Harr. 492; Parker v. Com-

monwealth, 6 Penn. St. 507.

2 State v. Parker, 26 Vt. 357. The act under consideration in that case was,

by its terms, to take effect on the second Tuesday of March after its passage,

unless the people, to whose votes it was submitted, should declare against it, in

which case it should take effect in the following December. The case was dis-

tinguished from Barto v. Himrod, 8 N. Y. 483, and the act sustained. At the

same time the court express their dissent from the reasoning upon which the New

York case rests. In People v. Collins, 3 Mich. 343, the courtwas equally divided

in a case similar to that in Vermont, except that in the Michigan case the law,

which was passed and submitted to the people in 1853, was not to go into effect

until 1870, if the vote of the people was against it.

[128]

for . . . one may find any number of cases in the legislation of Congress, where
statutes have been made dependent upon the shifting character of the revenue
laws, or the navigation laws, or commercial rules, edicts, or restrictions of other
countries. In some, perhaps, these laws are made by representative bodies, or,
it may be, by the people of these States, and in others by the lords of the treasury, or the boards of trade, or by the proclamation of the sovereign ; and in all
these cases no question can be made of the perfect legality of our acts of Congress
being made dependent upon such contingencies. It is, in fact, the only poHible
mode of meeting them, unless Congress is kept constantly in session. The same
is true of acts of Congress by which power is Tested in the President to levy
troops or draw money from the public treasury, upon the contingency of a declaration or an act of war committed by some foreign state, empire, kingdom, prince,
or potentate. If these illustrations are not sufficient to show the fallacy of the
argument, more would not avail.,' See also State v. Noyes, 10 Fost. 292; Bull
v. Read, 13 Grat. 78; Johnson v. Rich, 9 Barb. 680; State v. Reynolds, [) Gilm.
1; Robinson v. Bidwell, 22 Cal. 349.
1 Geebrick v. State, 5 Iowa, 491; Rice v. Foster, 4 Harr. 492; Parker v. Commonwealth, 6 Penn. St. 507.
2 State v. Parker, 26 Vt. 357.
The act und~r consideration in that case was,
by its terms, to take effect on the second Tuesday of March after its passage,
unless the people, to whose votes it was submitted, should declare against it, in
which case it should take effect in the following December. The case was dis·
tinguished from Barto v. Himrod, 8 N. Y. 483, and the act sustained. At the
same time the court express their dissent from the reasoning upon which the New
York case rests. In People v. Collins, 3 Mich. 343, the court was equally divided
in a case similar to that in Vermont, except that in the Michigan case the law,
which was passed and submitted to the people in 1853, was not to go into effect
untill870, if the vote of the people was against it.
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government, including police regulations, to the local authorities;

on the supposition that they are better able to decide for them-

selves upon the needs, as well as the sentiments, of their constitu-

ents, than the legislature possibly can be, and are therefore more

competent to judge what local regulations are important, and also

how far the local sentiment will assist in their enforcement. The

same reasons would apply in favor of permitting the people of the

locality to accept or reject for themselves a particular police regu-

lation, since this is only allowing them less extensive powers of

local government than a municipal charter would confer; and the

fact that the rule of law on that subject might be diﬂerent

in diiferent * localities, according as the people accepted or [‘ 124]

rejected the regulation, would not seem to affect the princi-

ple, when the same result is brought about by the different regula-

tions which municipal corporations establish for themselves in the

exercise of an undisputed authority} It is not to be denied,

however, that there is considerable authority against the right of

legislative delegation in these cases.

The legislature of Delaware, in 1847, passed an act to authorize

the citizens of the several counties of the State to decide by ballot

whether the license to retail intoxicating liquors should be permit-

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:19 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105011581
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

ted. By this act a general election was to be held: and if a

1 In New Hampshire an act was passed declaring bowling-alleys, situate within

twenty-ﬁve rods of a dwelling-house, nuisances; but the statute was to be in

force only in those towns in which it should be adopted in town meeting. In

State v. Noyes, 10 Fost. 293, this act was held to be constitutional. “ Assuming,”

say the court, “ that the legislature has the right to confer the power of local

regulation upon cities and towns, that is, the power to pass ordinances and by-

laws, in such terms and with such provisions, in the classes of cases to which the

power extends, as they may think proper, it seems to us hardly possible seriously

to contend that the legislature may not confer the power to adopt within such

government, including police regulations, to the local authorities;
on the supposition that they are better able to decide for themselves upon the needs, as well as the sentiments, of their constituents, than the legislature possibly can be, and are therefore more
competent to judge what local regulations are important, and also
how far the local sentiment will assist in their enforcement. The
same reasons would apply in favor of permitting the people of the
locality to accept or reject for themselves a particular police regulation, since this is only allowing them less extensive powers of
local government than a municipal charter would confer; and the
fact that the rule of law on that subject might be different
in different *localities, according as the people accepted or [*124]
rejected the regulation, would not seem to affect the principle, when the same result is brought about by the different regulations which municipal corporations establish for themselves in the
exercise of an undisputed authority.1 It is not to be denied,
however, that there is considerable authority against the right of
legislative delegation in these cases.
The legislature of Delaware, in 1847, passed an act to authorize
the citizens of the several counties of the State to decide by ballot
whether the license to retail intoxicating liquors should be permi~
ted. By this act a general election was to be held: and if a

municipality a law drawn up and framed by themselves. If they may pass a

law authorizing towns to make ordinances to punish the keeping of billiard-rooms,

bowling-alleys, and other places of gambling, they may surely pass laws to punish

the same acts, subject to be adopted by the town before they can be of force in

it." And it seems to us diﬂicult to answer this reasoning, if it be conﬁned to such

laws as fall within the proper province of local government, and which are there-

fore usually referred to the judgment of the municipal authorities or their constit-

uency. A similar question arose in Smith v. Village of Adrian, 1 Mich. 495, but

was not decided. In Bank of Chenango v. Brown, 26 N. Y. 467, it was held

competent to authorize the electors of an incorporated village to determine for

themselves what sections of the general act for the incorporation of villages should

apply to their village.

9 [ 129 ]

1 ln New Hampshire an act was passed declaring bowling-alleys, situate within
twenty-five rods of a dwelling-house, nuisances; but the statute was to be in
force only in those towns in which it should be adopted in town meeting. In
State v. Noyes, 10 Fost. 293, this act was held to be constitutional. "Assuming,"
say the court, " that the legislature has the right to confer the power of local
regulation upon cities and towns, that is, the power to pass ordinances and bylaws, in such terms and with such provisions, in the classes of cases to which the
power extends, as they may think proper, it seems to us hardly possible seriously
to contend that the legislature may not confer the power to adopt within such
municipality a law drawn up and framed by themselves. If they may pass a
law authorizing towns to make ordinances to punish the keeping of billiard-rooms,
bowling-alleys, and other places of gambling, they may surely pass laws to punish
the same acts, subject to be adopted by the town before they can be of force in
it." And it seems to us difficult to answer this reasoning, if it be confined to such
laws as fall within the proper province of local government, and which are therefore usually referred to the judgment of the municipal authorities or tht!ir constituency. A similar question arose in Smith"· Village of Adrian, 1 :Mich. -HI5, but
was not decided. In Bank of Chenango "·Brown, 26 N.Y. 467, it was held
competent to authorize the electors of an incorporated village to determine for
themselves what sections of the general act for the incorporation of villages should
apply to their village.

9
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majority of votes in any county should be cast against license, it

should not thereafter be lawful for any person to retail intoxicat-

ing liquors within such county; but if the majority should be cast

in favor of license, then licenses might be granted in the county

so voting, in the manner and under the regulations in said act

prescribed. The Court of Errors and Appeals of that State held

this act void, as an attempted delegation of the trust to make laws,

and upon the same reasons which support the cases before cited,

where acts have been held void which referred to the people of the

State for approval a law of general application.‘ The same de-

cision was made near the same time by the Supreme

[* 125] " Court of Pennsylvania} followed afterwards in an elabo-

rate opinion by the Supreme Court of Iowa?

By statute in Indiana it was enacted that no person should

retail spirituous liquors, except for sacramental, mechanical, chem-

ical, medicinal, or culinary purposes, without the consent of the

majority of the legal voters of the proper township who might cast

their votes for license at the April election, nor without ﬁling with

the county auditor a bond as therein provided; upon the ﬁling of

which the auditor was to issue to the person ﬁling the same a

license to retail spirituous liquors, which was to be good for one
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year from the day of the election. This act was held void upon

similar reasons to those above quoted.‘ This case follows the

decisions in Pennsylvania and Delawaref and it has since been

followed by another decision of the Supreme Court of that State,

except that while in the ﬁrst case only that portion of the statute

which provided for submission to the people was held void, in the

later case that unconstitutional provision was held to aﬂect the

whole statute with inﬁrmity, and render the whole invalid.“

Irrepealable Laws.

Similar reasons to those which forbid the legislative department

of the State from delegating its authority will also forbid its pass-

' Rice v. Foster, 4 Harr. 479.

’ Parker v. Commonwealth, 6 Penn. St. 507.

’ Geebrick v. State, 5 Iowa, 495.

‘ Maize v. State, 4 Ind. 342.

’ Parker v. Commonwealth, 6 Penn. St. 507; Rice v. Foster, 4 Harr. 479.

See also State o. Field, 17 Mo. 529; Commonwealth v. McWilliams, 11 Penn.

St. 61 ; State v. Copeland, 3 R. I. 33.

‘ Meshmeier v. State, 11 Ind. 484.
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majority of votes in any county should be cast against license, it
should not thereafter be lawful for any person to retail intoxicating liquors within such county; but if the majority should be cast
in favor of licen~e, then licenses might be granted in the county
so voting, in the manner and under the regulations in said act
prescribed. The Court of Errors and Appeals of that State held
this act void, as an attempted delegation of the trust to make laws,
and upon the same reasons which support the cases before cited,
where acts have been held void which referred to the people of the
State for approval a law of general application. 1 The same decision was made near the same time by the Supreme
[•125] • Court of Pennsylvania,2 followed afterwards in an elaborate opinion by the Supreme Court of lowa. 3
By statute in Indiana it was enacted that no person should
retail spirituous liquors, except for sacramental, mechanical, chemical, medicinal, or culinary purposes, without the consent of the
majority of the legal voters of the proper township who might cast
their votes for liceuse at the .April election, nor without filing with
the county auditor a bond as therein pro,ided; upon the filing of
which the auditor was to issue to the person filing the same a
license to retail spirituous liquors, which was to pe good for one
year from the day of the election. This act was held void upon
similar reas01is to those above quoted.4 This case follow~ the
decisions in Pennsylvania and Delaware,5 and it has since been
followed by another decision of the Supreme Court of that State,
except that while in the first case only that portion of the statute
which provided for submission to the people was held void, in the
later case that unconstitutional provision was held to affect the
whole statute with infirmity, and render the whole invalid.6

Irrepealable Laws.
Similar reasons to those which forbid the legislative department
of the State from delegating its authority will also forbid its pass• Rice "· Foster, 4 Harr. 479.
Parker "· Commonwealth, 6 Penn. St. 507.
1 Geebrick v. State, 5 Iowa, 495.
4 l\1aize v. St.ate, 4 Ind. 342.
~ Parker v. Commonwealth, 6 Penn. St. 507; Rice v. Foster, 4 Harr. 479.
See also State v. Field, 17 l\Io. 529; Commonwealth v. McWilliams, 11 Penn.
St. 61; State v. Copeland, 3 R. I. 33.
8 Meshmeier v. State, 11 Ind. 484.
2
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islative authority, has prescribed to its exercise any limitations

which the people saw ﬁt to impose; and no other power than the

people can superadd other limitations. To say that the legislature

may pass irrepealable laws, is to say that it may alter the very

constitution from which it derives its authority; since in so far as

one legislature could bind a subsequent one by its enactments, it

could in the same degree reduce the legislative power of its succes-

sors, and the process might be repeated until, one by one, the sub-

jects of legislation would be excluded altogether from

their control, and the constitutional provision, that the "* leg- [* 126]

islative power shall be vested in two houses, would be to a

greater or less degree rendered ineﬁ'ectnal.1

“Acts of Parliament,” says Blackstone, “derogatory to the

power of subsequent Parliaments, bind not; so the statute 11

Henry VII. c. 1, which directs that no person for assisting a

king dc faicto shall be attainted of treason by act of Parliament or

otherwise, is held to be good only as to common prosecutions for

high treason, but it will not restrain or clog any parliamentary

attainder. Because the legislature, being in truth the sovereign

power, is always of equal, and always of absolute authority; it

acknowledges no superior upon earth, which the prior legislature
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must have been if its ordinances could bind a subsequent Parlia-

ment. And upon the same principle, Cicero, in his letters to Atti-

cus, treats with a proper contempt those restraining clauses which

endeavor to tie up the hands of succeeding legislatures. ‘ When

' “ Unlike the decision of a court, a legislative act does not bind a subsequent

legislature. Each body possesses the same power, and has a right to exercise

the same discretion. Measures, though often rejected, may receive legislative

sanction. There is no mode by which a legislative act can be made irrepealable,

except it assume the form and substance of a contract. If in any line of

legislation, a permanent character could be given to acts, the most injurious

consequences would result to the country. Its policy would become ﬁxed and

unchangeable on great national interests, which might retard, if not destroy, the

public prosperity. Every legislative body, unless restricted by the constitution,

may modify or abolish the acts of its predecessors; whether it would be wise to

do so, is a matter for legislative discretion.“ Bloomer v. Stolley, 5 McLean,

161. See this subject considered in Wall v. State, 28 Ind. 150. In Kellogg v.

ing any irrepealable law. The constitution, in conferring the legislative authority, has prescribed to its exercise any limitations
which the people saw fit to impose; and no other power than the
people can superadd other limitations. To say that the legislature
may pass irrepealable laws, is to say that it may alter the very
constitution from which it derives its authority; since in so far as
one legislature could bind a subsequent one by its enactments, it
could in the same degree reduce the legislative power of its successors, and the process might be repeated until, one by one, the subjects of legislation would be excluded altogether from
their control, and the constitutional provision, that the •leg- [•126]
islative power shall be vested in two houses, would be to a
greater or less degree rendered ineffectuaJ.l
" Acts of Parliament," says Blackstone, "derogatory to the
power of subsequent Parliaments, bind not; so the statute 11
Henry VII. c. 1, which directs that no person for assisting a
king de facto shall be attainted of treason by act of Parliament or
otherwise, is held to be good only as to common prosecutions for
high treason, but it will not restrain or clog any parliamentary
attainder. Because the legislature, being in truth the sovereign
power, is always of equal, and always of absolute authority; it
acknowletlges no superior upon earth, which the prior legislature
must have been if its ordinances could bind a subsequent Parliament. .And upon the same princi plc, Cicero, in his letters to Atticus, treats with a proper contempt those restraining clauses which
endeavor to tie up the hands of succeeding legislatures. ' When

Oshkosh, 14 Wis. 623, it was held that one legislature could not bind a future

one to a particular mode of repeal.

[131]

1 "Unlike the decision of a court, a legislative act does not bind a subsequent
legislature. Each body possesses the same power, and has a right to exercise
the same discretion. Measures, though often rejected, may receive legislative
sanction. There is no mode by wbi<.·h a legi~lati,·e act can be made irrepealable,
exct>pt it assume the form and substance of a contr11.ct. If in any line of
legislation, a. permanent character could be given to acts, the most injurious
consequences would result to the country. Its policy would become 1i.xed and
unchangeable on great national interests, which might retard, if not destroy, the
public prosperity. Every legislative body, unless restricted by the constitution,
may modify or abolish the acts of its predecessors; whether it would be wi:lc to
do so, is a matter for legislative discretion.'' Bloomer v. Stolley, 5 .Md-ea.n,
161. Sec this subject considered in Wall v. State, 23 Ind. 150. In Kellogg v.
O~hkosb, 14 Wis. 623, it was held that one legislature could not bind a future
one to a particular mod~ of repeal.
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you repeal the law itself,’ says he, ‘you at the same time repeal

the prohibitory clause which guards against such repeal.’ ” 1

Although this reasoning does not in all its particulars apply to

the American legislatures, the principle applicable in each case is

the same. There is a modiﬁcation of the principle, however, by

an important provision of the Constitution of the United States,

forbidding the States from passing any laws impairing the obliga-

tion of contracts. Legislative acts are sometimes in substance

contracts between the State and the party who is to derive some

right under them, and they are not the less under the protection

of the clause quoted because of having assumed this form. Char-

ters of incorporation, except those of a municipal character,—

and _which as we have already seen are mere agencies of

[*127] government,—*are held to be contracts between the State

and the corporators, and not subject to modiﬁcation or

change by the act of the State alone, except as may be authorized

by the terms of the charters themselves? And it now seems to be

settled, by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United

States, that a State, by contract to that eﬁ"ect, based upon a con-

sideration, may exempt the property of an individual or corpora-

tion from taxation for any speciﬁed period or permanently. And
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it is also settled, by the same decisions, that where a charter con-

taining an exemption from taxes, or an agreement that the taxes

shall be to a speciﬁed amount only, is accepted by the corporators,

the exemption is presumed to be upon suﬂicient consideration,

and consequently binding upon the State?

‘ 1 Bl. Com. 90.

' Dartmouth College v. \Voodward, 4 Wheat. 518; Planters Bank v. Sharp,

6 HOW. 301.

i‘ Gordon v. Appeal Tax Court, 3 How. 133; New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Crancb,

164; Piqua Branch Bank v. Knoop, 16 How. 369; Ohio Life Ins. and Trust Co.

v. Debolt, 16 How. 416, 432; Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331; Mechanics and

Traders Bank v. Debolt, 18 How. 381 ; J etferson Branch Bank v. Skelly, 1 Black,

436. See also Hunsaker v. \Vright, 30 Ill. 146 ; Spooner v. McConnell, 1 McLean,

347. The right of a State legislature to grant away the right of taxation, which

is one of the essential attributes of sovereignty, has been strenuously denied.

Debolt v. Ohio Life Ins. and Trust Co. 1 Ohio, N. s. 568; Mechanics and

you repeal the law itself,' says he, 'you at the same time repeal
the prohibitory clause which guards against such repeal.'" 1
Although this reasoning does not in all its particulars apply to
the American legislatures, the principle applicable in each case is
the same. There is a modification of the principle, however, by
an important provision of the Constitution of the United States,
forbidding the States from passing any laws impairing the obligation of contracts. Legislative acts are sometimes in substance
contracts between the State and the party who is to derive some
right under them, and they are not the less under the protection
of the clause quoted because of having assumed this form. Charters of incorporation, except those of a municipal character,and .which as we have already seen are mere agencfes of
[*127] government,-• are held to be contracts between the State
and the corporators, and not subject to modification or
change by the act of the State alone, except as may be authorized
by the terms of the charters themselves.2 And it now seems to be
settled, by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States, that a State, by contract to that effect, based upon a consideration, may exempt the property of an individual or corporation from taxation for any specified period or permanently. And
it is also settled, by the same decisions, that where a charter containing an exemption from taxes, or an agreement that the taxes
shall be to a specified amount only, is accepted by the corporators,
the exemption is presumed to be upon sufficient consideration,
and consequently binding upon the State.3

Traders Bank v. Debolt, ib. 591; Brewster v. Hough, 10 N. H. 143; Mott v.

Pennsylvania Railroad Co. 30 Penn. St. 9. And see Thorpe v. Rutland and B.

Railroad Co. 27 Vt. 146. In Brick Presbyterian Church v. Mayor, &c., of

New York, 5 Cow. 538, it was held that a municipal corporation had no power,
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1 Bl. Com. 90.
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518; Planters Bank v. Sharp,
6 How. 301.
3 Gordon v. Appeal Tax Court, 3 How. 133; New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch,
164; Piqua Branch Bank v. Knoop, 16 How. 369; Ohio Life Ins. and Trust Co.
v. Debolt, Hi How. 416, 432 ; Dodge 11. Woolsey, 18 How. 331; Mechanics and
Traders Bank v. Debolt, 18 How. 381; Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly, 1 Black,
436. See also Hunsaker v. ·wright, 30 Ill. 146; Spooner v. McConnell, 11\IcLean,
347. The right of 11. State legislature to grant away the right of taxation, which
is one of the essential attributes of sovereignty, has been strenuously denied.
Debolt v. Ohio Life Ins. and Trust Co. 1 Ohio, N. s. 063; :Mechanics and
Traders Bank v. Debolt, ib. 591; Brewster v. Hough, 10 N.H. 143; Mott v.
Pennsylvania Railroad Co. 30 Penn. St. 9. And see Thorpe v. Rutland and B.
Railroad Co. 27 Vt. 146. In Brick Presbyterian Church v. Mayor, &c., of
New York, 6 Cow. 038, it was held that a municipal corporation had no power,
1

1
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Territorial Limitation to State Legislative Authority.

CH. V.]

POWERS EXERCISED BY LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT.
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The legislative authority of every State must spend its

force ' within the territorial limits of the State. The [* 128]

legislature of one State cannot make laws by which people

outside the State must govern their actions, except as they may have

occasion to resort to the remedies which the State provides, or to

Territorial Limitation to State Legislative Autltority.

deal with property situated within the State. It can have no

authority upon the high seas beyond State lines, because there is

the point of contact with other nations, and all international ques-

tions belong to the national government.‘ It cannot provide for the

punishment as crimes of acts committed beyond the State boundary,

because such acts, if offences at all, must be offences against the

sovereignty within whose limits they have been done.” But if the

consequences of an unlawful act committed outside the State have

reached their ultimate and injurious result within it, it seems that

the perpetrator may be punished as an oﬂ'ender against such

State.”

as a party, to make a contract which should control or embarrass its discharge

of legislative duties. And see post, p. 206. In Coats v. Mayor, &c., of New

York, 7 Cow. 585, it was decided that though a municipal corporation grant lands

for cemetery purposes, and covenant for their quiet enjoyment, it will not thereby

be estopped afterwards to forbid the use of the land, by by-law, for that purpose,
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when such use becomes or is likely to become a nuisance. See also, on the

same subject, Morgan n. Smith, 4 Minn. 104; Hamrick v. Rouse, 17 Geo. 56,

where it was held that the legislature could not bind its successors not to remove

a county seat; Bass v. Fontleroy, 11 Texas, 698; Shaw v. Macon, 21 Geo. 280;

Regents of University v. \Villiams, 9 G. & J . 390; Mott v. Pennsylvania Rail-

road Co. 30 Penn. St. 9. In Bank of Republic v. Hamilton, 21 Ill. 53, it was

The legislative authority of every State must spend its
force • within the territorial limits of the State. The [•128]
legislature of one State cannot make laws by which people
outside the State must govern their actions, except as they may have
occasion to resort to the remedies which the State provides, or to
deal with property situated within the State. It can have no
authority upon the high seas beyond State lines, because there is
the point of contact with other nations, and all international questions belong to the national government. 1 It cannot provide for the
punishment as crimes of acts committed beyond the State boundary,
because such acts, if offences at all, must be offences against the
sovereignty within whose limits they have been done. 2 But if the
consequences of an unlawful act committed outside the State have
reached their ultimate and injurious result within it, it seems that
the perpetrator may be punished as an offender against such
State.3

held that, in construing a statute, it will not be intended that the legislature

designed to abandon its right as to taxation. This subject is considered fur-

ther, post, pp. 280-284.

' 1 Bish. Cr. La'w, § 120.

' State v. Knight, 2 Hayw. 109; People v. Merrill, 2Park. Cr. R. 590;

Adams v. People, 1 N. Y. 173; Tyler v. People, 8 Mich. 320; Morrissey v.

People, 11 Mich. 327; Bromley v. People, 7 Mich. 472; State v. Main, 16 Wis.

398.

' In Tyler v. People, 8 Mich. 320, it was held constitutional to punish in

Michigan a homicide committed by a mortal blow in Canadian waters, from which

death resulted in the State. In Morrissey v. People, 11 Mich. 327, the court

was divided on the question whether the State could lawfully provide for the

punishment of persons who, having committed larceny abroad, brought the stolen

[ 133 ]

as a party, to make a contract which should control or embarrass its discharge
of legislative duties. And see post, p. 206. In Coats v. Mayor, &c., of New
York, 7 Cow. 585, it was decided that though a municipal corporation grant lands
for cemetery purposes, and covenant for their quiet enjoyment, it will not thereby
be estopped afterwards to forbid the use of the land, by by-law, for that purpose,
when such use becomes or is likely to become a nuisance. See also, on the
same subject, Morgan !1. Smith, 4 :Minn. 104:; Hamrick v. Rouse, 17 Geo. 56,
where it was held that the legislature could not bind its successors not to remove
a county seat; Bass !1. Fontleroy, 11 Texas, 698; Shaw v. Macon, 21 Geo. 280;
Regents of University v. Williams, 9 G. & J. 390; Mott v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co. 30 Penn. St. 9. In Bank of Republic v. Hamilton, 21 lll. 53, it was
held that, in construing a statute, it will not be intended that the legislature
designed to abandon its right as to taxation. This subject is considered fU!'ther, post, pp. 280-284.
1 1 Bish. Cr. Law, § 120.
' State v. Knight, 2 Hayw. 109; People "'· Merrill, 2 Park. Cr. R. 590;
Adams v. People, 1 N.Y. 173; Tyler v. People, 8 Mich. 320; Morrissey v.
People, 11 Mich. 327; Bromley v. People, 7 Mich. 472; State v. Main, 16 Wis.
398.
• In T~·ler !1. People, 8 Mich. 320, it was held constitutional to punish in
Michigan a homicide committed by a mortal blow in Canadian waters, from which
dP-&th resulted in the State. In Morrissey v. People, 11 Mich. 327, the court
was divided on the question whether the State could lawfully provide for the
punishment of persons who, having committed larceny abroad, brought the stolen
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS,

Other Limitations of Legislative Authority.

[ca. v.

Besides the limitations of legislative authority to which we have

referred, others exist which do not seem to call for special remark.

Some of these are prescribed by constitutions} but

Other Limitations of Legislative Authority.

[‘ 129] ‘ others spring from the very nature of free government.

The latter must depend for their enforcement upon legis-

lative wisdom, discretion, and conscience. The legislature is to

make laws for the public good, and not for the beneﬁt of individuals.

It has control of the public moneys, and should provide for dis-

bursing them only for public purposes. Taxes should only be

levied for those purposes which properly constitute a public

burden. But what is for the public good, and what are public

purposes, and what does properly constitute a public burden, are

questions which the legislature must decide upon its own judgment,

and in respect to which it is vested with a large discretion which

cannot be controlled by the courts, except perhaps where its action

is clearly evasive, and where, under pretence of a lawful authority,

it has asumed to exercise one that is unlawful. Where the power

which is exercised is legislative in its character, the courts can en-

force only those limitations which the constitution imposes, and not

those implied restrictions which, resting in theory only, the people

have been satisﬁed to leave to the judgment, patriotism, and sense
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of justice of their representatives.

property within the State. And see Bromley v. People, 7 Mich. 472; State v.

Main, 16 VVis. 398.

1 The restrictions upon State legislative authority are much more extensive in

some constitutions than in others. The Constitution of Missouri has the following

provision: “The General Assembly shall not pass special laws divorcing any

named parties, or declaring any named person of age, or authorizing any named

minor t'o sell, lease, or encumber his or her property, or providing for the sale

of the real estate of any named minor or other person laboring under legal

disability, by any executor, administrator, guardian, trustee, or other person, or

establishing, locating, altering the course, or effecting the construction of roads,

or the building or repairing of bridges, or establishing, altering, or vacating any

street, avenue, or alley in any city or town, or extending the time for the assess-

Besides the limitations of legislative authority to which we have
referred, others exist which do not seem to call for special remark.
Some of these are prescribed by constitutions,1 but
[•129] • others spring from the very nature of free government.
The latter must depend for their enforcement upon legis~
lative wisdom, discretion, and conscience. The legislature is to
make laws for the public good, and not for the benefit of individuals.
It has control of the public moneys, and should provide for disbursing them only for public purposes. Taxes should only be
levied for those purposes which properly constitute a public
burden. But what is for the public good, and what are public
purposes, and what does properly constitute a public burden, are
questions which the legislature must decide upon its own judgment,
and in respect to which it is vested with a large discretion which
cannot be controlled by the courts, except perhaps where its action
is clearly evasive, and where, under pretence of a lawful authority,
it has assumed to exercise one that is unlawful. Where the power
which is exercised is legislative in its character, the courts can enforce only those limitations which the constitution imposes, and not
those implied restrictions which, resting in theory only, the people
have been satisfied to leave to the judgment, patriotism, and sense
of justice of their representatives.

ment or collection of taxes, or otherwise relieving any assessor or collector of

taxes from the due performance of his oﬂicial duties, or giving effect to informal

or invalid wills or deeds, or legalizing, except as against the State, the unautho1~

ized or invalid acts of any oﬁicer, or granting to any individual or company the

right to lay down railroad tracks in the streets of any city or town, or exempting

any property of any named person or corporation from taxation. The General
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property within the State. And see Bromley v. People, 7 :1\Iich. 472; State v.
Main, 16 Wis. 398.
1 The restrictions upon State legislative authority are much more extensive in
some constitutions than in others. The Constitution of Missouri has the following
provision: "The General Assembly shall not pass special laws divorcing any
named parties, or declaring any named person of age, or authorizing any named
minor to sdl, lease, or encumber his or her property, or proviuing for the sale
of the real estate of any named minor or other person laboring unllcr legal
disability, by any executor, administrator, guardian, trustee, or other person, or
establishing, locating, altering the course, or effecting the construction of roads,
or the building or repairing of bridges, or establishing, altering, or vacating any
street, avenue, or alley in any city or town, or extending the time for the assess·
ment or collection of taxes, or otherwise relieving any assessor or collector of
taxes from the due performance of his official duties, or giving effect to informal
or invalid wills or deeds, or legalizing, except as against the State, the unauthorized or invalid acts of any officer, or granting to any individual or company the
right to lay down railroad tracks in the streets of any city or town, or exempting
any property of any named person or corporation from taxation. The General
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Assembly shall pass no special law for any case for which provision can be made

CH.

v.)

POWERS EXERmSED BY LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT.

by a general law, but shall pass general laws providing, so far as it may deem

necessary, for the cases enumerated in this section, and for all other cases where

a general law can be made applicable.” Constitution of Missouri, art. 4, § 27.

We should suppose that so stringent a provision would, in some of these cases,

lead to the passage of general laws of doubtful utility in order to remedy the

hardships of particular cases. As to when a general law can be made appli-

cable, see Thomas v. Board of Commissioners, 5 Ind. 4; State v. Squires, 26

Iowa, 340; Johnson v. Railroad Co. 23 Ill. 202. In State v. Hitchcock, 1 Kan-

sas, 178, it was held that the constitutional provision, that “ in all cases where a

general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted,” left a dis-

cretion with the legislature to determine the cases in which special laws should

be passed. See to the same effect, Gentile 0. State, 29 Ind. 409, overruling

Thomas v. Board of Commissioners, supra. A constitutional provision that

requires all laws of a general nature to have uniform operation throughout the

State, is complied with in a statute applicable to all cities of a certain class hav-

ing less than one hundred thousand inhabitants, though in fact there be but one

city in the State of that class. Welker v. Potter, 18 Ohio, N. s. 85. See fur-

ther, Bourland v. Hildreth, 26 Cal. 162; Brooks v. Hyde, 37 Cal. 366; McAurich

v. Mississippi, &c., R.R. Co. 20 Iowa, 338; Rice v. State, 8 Kansas, 141;

Jackson v. Shawl, 29 Cal. 267; Gentile v. State, 29 Ind. 409; State v. Park-

inson, 5 Nev. 15.
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Assembly shall pass no special law for any case for which provision can be made
by a general law, but shall pass general laws providing, so far as it may deem
necessary, for the cases enumerated in this section, and for all other cases where
a general law can be made applicable." Constitution of l\Iissouri, art. 4, § 27.
We should suppose that so stringent a provision would, in some of these cases,
lead to the passage of general laws of doubtful utility in order to remedy the
hardshfps of particular cases. As to when a general law can be made applicable, see Thomas "· Board of Commissioners, 5 Ind. 4; State tl. Squires, 26
Iowa, 340; Johnson v. Railroad Co. 23 Ill. 202. In State tl. Hitchcock, 1 Kansas, li8, it was held that the constitutional provision, that " in all cases where a
general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted," left a discretion with the legislature to determine the cases in which special laws should
be passed. See to the same effect, Gentile tl. State, 29 Ind. 409, overruling
Thomas "· Board of Commissioners, supra. A constitutional provision that
requires all laws of a general nature to have uniform operation throughout the
State, is complied with in a statute applicable to all cities of a certain class having less than one hundred thousand inhabitants, though in fact there be but one
city in the State of that class. ·welker v. Potter, 18 Ohio, N. s. 85. See ful'ther, Bourland v. Hildreth, 26 Cal. 162; Brooks v. Hyde, 37 Cal. 366 ; McAurich
t'. Mississippi, &c., R.R. Co. 20 Iowa, 338; Rice v. State, 8 Kansas, 141;
Jackson "· Shawl, 29 Cal. 267; Gerttile t'. State, 29 Ind. 409; State v. Parkinson, 5 Nev. 15.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

[CH. VI •

OF THE ENACTMENT OF LAWS.

WHEN the supreme power of a country is wielded by a single

man, or by a single body of men, few questions can arise in the

courts concerning the manner of its exercise, and any discussion of

rules by which it is to be governed, in the enactment of laws, can be

of very little practical value. For whenever the sovereign power

expresses its will that a certain rule shall be established, that

*CHAPTER VI.

[*130]

expression must be conclusive, whether such forms have been

observed in making the declaration as are customary and proper or

OF THE ENACTMENT OF LAWS.

not. We may query whether the will has been declared; we may

•

question and cross-question the words employed, to ascertain the

real sense that they express ; we may doubt and hesitate as to the

intent ;‘ but when discovered, it must govern, and it is idle to talk

of forms that should have surrounded the expression, but do not.

But when the legislative power of a State is to be exercised by a

department composed of two branches, or as, in most of the

American States, of three branches, and these branches have their

several duties marked out and prescribed by the law to which they

owe their origin, and which provides for the exercise of their

powers in certain modes and under certain forms, there are other

questions to arise than those of the mere intent of the law-makers,
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and sometimes forms become of the last importance. For in such

case not only is it important that the will of the law-makers be

clearly expressed, but it is also essential that it be expressed in

due form of law; since nothing becomes law simply and solely be-

cause men who possess the legislative power will that it shall be,

unless they express their determination to that effect, in the mode

pointed out by the instrument which invests them with the power,

and under all the forms which that instrument has rendered

essential. And if, when the constitution was adopted, there were

known and settled rules and usages, forming a part of the law of

the country, in reference to which the constitution has evidently

been framed, and these rules and usages required the observance of

particular forms, the constitution itself must also be understood as
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WHEN the supreme power of a country is wielded by a single
man, or by a single body of men, few questions can arise in the
courts concerning the manner of its exercise, and any discussion of
rules by which it is to be governed, in the enactment of laws, can be
of very little practical value. For whenever the sovereign power
expresses its will that a certain rule shall be established, that
expression must be conclusive, whether such forms have been
observed in making the declaration as are customary and proper or
not. We may query whether the will has been declared; we may
question and cross-question the words employed, to ascertain the
real sense that they express ; we may doubt and hesitate as to the
intent ;' but when discovered, it must govern, and it is idle tO talk
of forms that should have surrounded the expression, but do not.
But when the legislative power of a State is to be exercised by a
department composed of two branches, or as, in most of the
American States, of three branches, and these branches have their
several duties marked out and prescribed by the law to which they
owe their origin, and which provides for the exercise of their
powers in certain modes and under certain forms, there are other
questions to arise than those of the mere intent of the law-makers,
and sometimes forms become of the last importance. For in such
case not only is it important that the will of the law-makers be
clearly expressed, but it is also essential that it be expressed in
due form of law; since nothing becomes law simply and solely because men who possess the legislative power will that it shall be,'
unless they express their determination to that effect, in the mode
pointed out by the instrument which invests them with the power,
and under all the forms which that instrument has rendered
essential. And if, whon the constitution was adopted, there were
known and settled rules and usages, forming a part of the law of
the country, in reference to which the constitution has evidently
been framed, and these rules and usages required the observance of
particular forms, the constitution itself must also be understood as
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requiring them, because in assuming their existence, and
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OF THE ENACTMENT OF J,A.WS.

being ‘framed with reference to them, it has in etfect [*‘ 131]

adopted them as a part of itself, as much as if they were

expressly incorporated in its provisions. Where, for an instance,

the legislative power is to be exercised by two houses, and by

settled and well-understood parliamentary law, these two houses

are to hold separate sessions for their deliberations, and the deter-

mination of the one upon a proposed law is to be submitted to the

separate determination of the other, the constitution, in providing

for two houses, has evidently spoken in reference to this settled

custom, incorporating it as a rule of constitutional interpretation ;

so that it would require no prohibitory clause to forbid the two

houses from combining in one, and jointly enacting laws by the

vote of a. majority of all. All those rules which are of the essentials

of law-making must be observed and followed ; and it is only the

customary rules of order and routine, such as in every deliberative

body are always understood to be under its control, and subject to

constant change at its will, that the constitution can be understood

to have left as matters of discretion, to belestablished, modiﬁed, or

abolished by the bodies for whose government in nonessential

matters they exist.

Of the two Houses of the Legislature.‘
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In the enactment of laws the two houses of the legislature are

of equal importance, dignity, and power, and the steps which result

in laws may originate indiﬁferently in either. This is the general

rule ; but as one body is more numerous than the other and more

directly represents the people, and in many of the States, is

renewed more often by elections, the power to originate all money

bills, or bills for the raising of revenue, is left exclusively, by the

constitutions of some of the States, with this body, in accordance

with the custom in England which does not permit bills of this

requiring them, because in assuming their existence, and
beiug *framed with reference to them, it has in effect [*131]
adopted them as a part of itself, as much as if they were
expressly incorporated in its provisions. Where, for an instance,
the legislative power is to be exercised by two houses, and by
settled and well-understood parliamentary law, these two houses
are to hold separate sessions for their deliberations, and the determination of the one upon a proposed law is to be submitted to the
separate determination of the other, the constitution, in providing
for two houses, has evidently spoken in reference to this settled
custom, incorporating it as a rule of constitutional interpretation ;
so that it would require no prohibitory clause to forbid the two
houses from combining in one, and jointly enacting laws by the
vote of a majority of all. All those rules which are of the essentials
of law-making must be observed and followed ; and it is only the
customary rules of order and routine, such as in every deliberative
body are always understood to be under its control, and subject to
constant change at its will, that the constitution can be understood
to have left as matters of discretion, to be established, modified, or
abolished by the bodies for whose government in non-essential
matters they exist.

character to originate with the House of Lords.” To these

‘ The wisdom of a. division of the legislative department has been demon-

strated by the leading writers on constitutional law, as well as by general expe-

OJ the two Houses of tlte Legislature.!

rience. Sce De Lolme, Const. of England, b. 2, c. 3; Federalist, No. 22; 1

Kent, 208; Story on Const. §§ 54-5—570. The early experiments in Pennsylvania

and Georgia, based on Franklin's views, for which see his \Vorks, Vol. V. p. 165,

are the only ones made by any of the American States with a single house.

’ There are provisions in the Constitutions of Massachusetts, Delaware, Min-
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In the enactment of laws the two houses of the legislature are
of equal importance, dignity, and power, and the steps which result
in laws may originate indifferently in either. This is the general
rule; but as one body is more numerous than the other and more
directly represents the people, and in many of the States, is
renewed more often by elections, the power to originate all money
bills, or bills for the raising of revenue, is left exclusively, by the
constitutions of some of the States, with this body, in accordance
with the custom in England which does not permit bills of this
character to originate with the House of Lords. 2 To these
1 The wisdom of a division of the legislative department has been demonstrated by the leading writers on constitutional law, as well as by general experience. See De Lolme, Const. of England, b. 2, c. 3; Federalist, No. 22; 1
Kent, 208; Story on Const. §§ 545-570. The early experiments in Pennsylvania
and Georgia, based on Franklin's views, for which see his Works, Vol. V. p.l65,
arc the only ones made by any of the American States with a single bouse.
' There are provisions in the Constitutions of 1\lassachusetts, Delaware, Min·
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[* 132] *" bills, however, the other house may propose alterations,
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(CH. VI.

and they require the assent of that house to their passage,

the same as other bills. The time for the meeting of the legisla-

ture will be such time as is ﬁxed by the constitution or by statute;

but it may be called together by the executive in special session as

the constitution may prescribe, and the two houses may also

adjourn any general session to a. time ﬁxed by them for the holding

of a special session, if an agreement to that effect can be arrived

at; and if not, power is conferred by a majority of the constitutions

upon the executive to prorogue and adjourn them. And if the

executive in any case undertake to exercise this power to prorogue

and adjourn, on the assumption thata disagreement exists between

the two houses which warrants his interference, and his action is

acquiesced in by those bodies, who thereupon cease to hold their

regular sessions, the legislature must be held in law to have

adjourned, and no inquiry can be entered upon as to the rightful-

ness of the governor’s assumption that such a disagreement

existed} ‘

nesota, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,

Vermont, Indiana, Oregon, Kentucky, Louisiana, and Maine, requiring revenue

bills to originate in the more popular branch of the legislature, but allowing the

Senate the power of amendment usual in other cases. During the second ses-
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sion of the forty-ﬁrst Congress, the House of Representatives by their vote

denied the right of the Senate under the Constitution to originate a bill repealing

a law imposing taxes; but the Senate did not assent to this conclusion. In

England the Lords are not allowed to amend money hills, and by resolutions of

5th and 6th July, 1860, the Commons deny their right even to reject them.

[•132] • bills, however, the other house may propose alterations,
and they require the assent of that house to their passage,
the same as other bills. The time for the meeting of the legislature will be such time as is fixed by the constitution or by statute;
but it may be called together by the executive in special session as
the constitution may prescribe, and the two houses may also
adjourn any general session to a time fixed by them for the holding
of a special session, if an agreement to that effect can be arrived
at; and if not, power is conferred by a majority of the constitutions
upon the executive to prorogue and adjourn them. And if the
executive in any case undertake to exercise this power to prorogue
and adjourn, on the assumption that a disagreement exists between
the two houses which warrants his interference, and his action is
acquiesced in by those bodies, who thereupon cease to hold their
regular sessions, the legislature must be held in law to have
adjourned, and no inquiry can be entered upon as to the rightfulness of the governor's assumption that such a disagreement
existed.1

‘ This question became important and was passed upon in People v. Hatch,

33 Ill. 9. The Senate had passed a resolution for an adjournment of the session

sine die on a day named, which was amended by the House by ﬁxing a dilferent

day. The Senate refused to concur, and the House then passed a, resolution

expressing a desire to recede from its action in amending the resolution, and

requesting a return of the resolution by the Senate. \Vhile matters stood thus,

the governor, assuming that such a disagreement existed as empowered him to

interfere, sent in his proclamation, declaring the legislature adjourned to a day

named, and which was at the very end of the oﬂieial term of the members. The

message created excitement; it does not seem to have been at once acquiesced

in, and a protest against the governor‘s authority was entered upon the journal ;

but for eleven days in one house and twelve in the other no entries were made

upon their journals, and it was unquestionable that practically they had acqui-

esced in the action of the governor, and adjourned. At the expiration of the

twelve days, a portion of the members came together again, and it was claimed

by them that the message of the governor was without authority, and the two
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nesota, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
Vermont, Indiana, Oregon, Kentucky, Louisiana, and Maine, requiring revenue
bills to originate in the more popular branch of the legislature, but allowing the
Senate the power of amendment usual in other cases. During the second session of the forty-first Congress, the House of Representatiyes by their YOte
denied the right of the Senate under the Constitution to originate a bill repealing
a law imposing taxes; but the Senate did not assent to this concltlllion. In
England the Lor<ls are not allowed to amend money bills, and by resolutions of
5th and 6th July, 1860, the Commons deny their right even to reject them.
1 This question became important and was passed upon in People v. Hatch,
83 Ill. 9. The Senate had passed a resolution for an adjournment of the session
&ine die on a day named, which was amended by the House by fixing a different
day. The Senate refused to concur, and the House then passed a. resolution
expressing a desire to recede from its action in amending the reso'lution, and
requeMting a return of the resolution by the Senate. 'Vbile matters stood thus,
the governor, assuming that such a disagreement existed as empowered him to
interfere, sent in his proclamation, declaring the legislature adjourned to a day
named, an<l which was at the very end of the official term of the members. The
message created excitement; it does not seem to have been at once acquiesced
in, and a protest against the governor's autho1·ity was entered upon the journal ;
but for eleven days in one bouse and twelYe in the other no entries were made
upon their journals, and it was unquestionable that practically they had acquiesced in the action of the governor, and adjourned. At the expiration of the
twelve days, a portion of the members came together again, and it was claimed
by them that the message of the governor was without authority, and the two
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‘There are certain matters which each house deter- [*133]
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mines for itself, and in respect to which its decision is

conclusive. It chooses its own officers, except where, by constitu-

tion or statute, it is otherwise provided; it determines its own

rules of proceeding, it decides upon the election and qualiﬁcation

of its own members} These powers it is obviously proper should

rest with the body immediately interested, as essential to enable it

to enter upon and proceed with its legislative functions, without

liability to interruption and confusion. In determining questions

concerning contested seats, the house will exercise judicial power,

but generally in accordance with a course of practice which has

sprung from precedents in similar cases, and no other authority is

at liberty to interfere.

Each house has also the power to punish members for disor-

derly behavior, and other coutempts of its authority, as well as to

expel a member for any cause which seems to the body to render

it unﬁt that he continue to occupy one of its seats. This power

is generally enumerated in the constitution among those which

the two houses may exercise, but it need not be speciﬁed in that

instrument, since it would exist whether expressly conferred or

not. It is “ a necessary and incidental power, to enable the house

to perform its high functions, and is necessary to the safety of
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the State. It is a power of protection. A member may be phys-

ically, mentally, or morally wholly unﬁt; he may be affected with a

contagious disease, or insane, or noisy, violent, and disorderly, or in

houses must be considered as having been, in point of law, in session during the

intervening period, and that consequently any bills which had before been passed

by them and sent to the governor for his approval, and which he had not returned

within ten days, Sundays excepted, had become laws under the constitution.

The Supreme Court held that, as the two houses had practically acquiesced in

the action of the governor, the session had come to an end, and that the mem-

bers had no power to re-convene on their own motion, as had been attempted.

The case is a very full and valuable one on several points pertaining to legisla-

tive proceedings and authority.

‘ In People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481, it was held that the correctness of a

decision by one of the houses, that certain persons had been chosen members,

could not be inquired into by the courts. In that case a law was assailed as void,

• There are certain matters which each house deter- [*133]
mines for itself, and in respect to which its decision is
conclusive. It chooses its own officers, except where, by constitution or statute, it is otherwise provided ; it determines its own
rules of proceeding, it decides upon the election and qualification
of its own members. 1 These powers it is obviously proper should
rest with the body immediately interested, as essential to enable it
to enter upon and proceed with its legislative functions, without
liability to interruption and confusion. In determining questions
concerning contested seats, the house will exercise judicial power,
but generally in accordance with a course of practice which has
sprung from precedents in similar cases, and no other authority is
at liberty to interfere.
Each house has also the power to punish members for disorderly behavior, and other contempts of its authority, as well as to
expel a member for any cause which seems to the body to render
it unfit that he continue to occupy one of its seats. This power
is generally enumerated in the constitution among those which
the two houses may exercise, but it need not be specified in that
instrument, since it would exist whether expressly conferred or
not. It is "a necessary and incidental power, to enable the house
to perform its high functions, and is necessary to the safety of
the State. It is a power of protection. A member may be physically, mentally, or morally wholly unfit; he may be affected with a
contagious disease, or insane, or noisy, violent, and disorderly, or in

on the ground that a portion of the members who voted for it, and without whose

votes it would not have had the requisite majority, had been given their seats in

the House in deﬁance of law, and to the exclusion of others who had a majority

of legal votes. See the same principle in State v. Jarrett, 17 Md. 309. See

also Lamb v. Lynd, 44 Penn. St. 336.
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houses must" be considered as having been, in point of law, in session during the
intervening period, and that consequently any bills which had before been passed
by them and sent to the governor for his approval, and which be bad not returned
within ten days, Sundays excepted, bad become laws under the constitution.
The Supreme Court held that, as the two houses bad practically acquit!sced in
the action of the governor, the session had come to an end, and that the memben had no power to re-convene on their own motion, as bad been attempted.
The case is a very full and valuable one on several points pertaining to legislative proceedings and authority.
1 In People ~'· Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481, it was held that the correctness of a
decision by one of the houses, that certain persons bad peen chosen members,
could not be inquired into by the courts. In that case a law was assailed as void,
on the ground that a portion of the members who voted for it, and without whose
"VOtes it would not have had the requisite majority, had been given their seats in
the House in defiance of law, and to the exclusion of others who had a majority
of legal votes. See the same principle in State ~'·Jarrett, 17 Md. 309. See
also Lamb r. Lynd, 44 Penn. St. 336.
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the habit of using profane, obscene, and abusive language.” And,

• 133
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“independently of parliamentary customs and usages, our legisla-

tive houses have the power to protect themselves by the punish-

ment and expulsion of a member”; and the courts cannot inquire

into the justice of the decision, or even so much as examine the

proceedings to see whether opportunity for defence was furnished

, or not.1 .

[* 134] * Each house may also punish contempts of its authority

by other persons, without express authority from the con-

stitution therefor ;2 but where imprisonment is imposed as a pun-

ishment, it must terminate with the ﬁnal adjournment of the house,

and if the prisoner be not then discharged by its order, he may be

released on habeas corpus.“

By common parliamentary law, the members of the legislature

are privileged from arrest on civil process during the session of

that body, and for a reasonable time before and after to enable

them to go to and return from the same. By the constitutions of

some of the States this privilege has been enlarged, so as to

exempt the persons of legislators from any service of civil process,‘

and in others their estates are exempt from attachment for some

prescribed period.“ For any arrest contrary to the parliamentary

law or to these provisions, the house of which the person arrested
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is a member may give summary relief by ordering his discharge,

‘ Hiss v. Bartlett, 3 Gray, 468. And see Anderson v. Dunn, 6 \Vheat. 204.

2 Anderson v. Dunn, 6 \Vheat. 204; Burdett v. Abbott, 14 East, 1; Stock-

dale v. Hansard, 9 Ad. & El. 231; Burnham v.Morissey, 1-1 Gray,‘226; State

v. Matthews, 37 N. H. 450.

3 Jel’ferson’s Manual, § 18; Priehard’s Case, 1 Lev. 165.

‘ “ Senators and representatives shall, in all eases except treason, felony, or

breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest. They shall not be subject to

any civil process during the session of the legislature, or for ﬁfteen days next

before the commencement and after the termination of each session.” Const. of

Mich. art. 4, § 7. The same exemption from civil process is found in the Con-

stitution of Kansas, art. 2, § 22; in that of Nebraska, art. 2, § 15; and in that

the habit of using profane, obscene, and abusive language." And,
"independently of parliamentary customs and usages, our legislative houses have the power to protect themselves by the punishment and expulsion of a member"; and the courts cannot inquire
into the justice of the decision, or even so much as examine the
proceedings to see whether opportunity for defence was furnished
or not.1
[*134]
• Each house may also punish contempts of its authority
by other persons, without express authority from the constitution therefor; 2 but where imprisonment is imposed as a punishment, it must terminate with the final adjournment of the house,
and if the prisoner be not then discharged by its order, he may be
released on ltabeas corpus.a
By common parliamentary law, the members of the legislature
are privileged from arrest on civil process during the session of
that body, and for a reasonable time before and after to enable
them to go to and return from the same. By the constitutions of
some of the States this privilege has been enlarged, so as to
exempt the persons of legislators from any service of civil process,•
and in others their estates are exempt from attachment for some
prescribed period.6 For any arrest contrary to the parliamentary
law or to these provisions, the house of which the person arrested
is a member may give summary relief by ordering his discharge,

of Tennessee, art. 1, § 13. Exemption from arrest is not violated by the service

of citations or declarations in civil cases. Gentry v. Grifﬁth, 27 Texas, 461 ; Case

v. Rorabacker, 15 Mich. 537.

° The Constitution of Rhode Island provides that “ the person of every mem-

ber of the General Assembly shall be exempt from arrest, and his estate from

attachment, in any civil action, during the session of the General Assembly, and

two days before the commencement and two days after the termination thereof,

and all process served contrary hereto shall be void." Art. 4, § 5.

[140] _

Hiss v. Bartlett, 3 Gray, 468. And see Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204.
Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204; Burdett v. Abbott, 14 East, 1; Stockdale v. Hansard, 9 Ad. & El. 231; Burnham v. Morissey, 14 Gray, '226; State
v . .Matthews, 37 N.H. 450.
3 Jcfterson's :Manual, § 18; Prichard's Case, 1 Lev. 165.
• "Senators and representatives shall, in all cases except treason, felony, or
breach of the peace, be prh·ileged from arrest. They shall not be subject to
any civil process during the session of the legislature, or for fifteen days next
before the commencement and after the termination of each session." Con8t. of
Mich. art. 4, § 7. The same exemption from civil process is found in the Constitution of Kansas, art. 2, § 22; in tl.tat of :Nebraska, art. 2, § 15; and in that
of Tennessee, art. 1, § 13. Exemption from arrest is not violated by the service
of citations or declaratiQns in civil cases. Gentry v. Griffith, 27 Texas, 461 ; Case
v. Rorabacker, 15 :Mich. 537.
6 The Constitution of Rhode Island provides that " the person of every member of the General Assembly shall be exempt from arrest, and his estate from
attachment, in any civil action, during the session of the General Assembly, and
two days before the commencement and two days after the termination thereof,
and all process served contrary hereto shall be void." Art. 4, § 5.
1

2
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and if the order is not complied with, by punishing the persons
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concerned in the arrest as for a contempt of its authority. The

remedy of the member, however, is not conﬁned to this mode of

relief. His privilege is not the privilege of the house merely, but

of the people, and is conferred to enable him to discharge the trust

conﬁded to him by his constituents ;1 and if the house neglect to

interfere, the court from which the process issued should set it

aside on the facts being represented, and any court or ofﬁcer

having authority to issue writs of habeas corpus may also

* inquire into the case, and release the party from the un- [* 135]

lawful impriS0nm6nt.2

Each house must also be allowed to proceed in its own way in

the collection of such information as may seem important to a

proper discharge of its functions, and whenever it is deemed

desirable that witnesses should be examined, the power and

authority to do so is very properly referred to a committee, with

any such powers short of ﬁnal legislative or judicial action as

may seem necessary or expedient in the particular case. Such a

committee has no authority to sit during a recess of the house

which has appointed it, without its permission to that effect; but

the house is at liberty to confer such authority if it see ﬁt.3 A

refusal to appear or to testify before such committee, or to pro-
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duce books or papers, would be a contempt of the house;4 but

the committee cannot punish for contempts; it can only report

the conduct of the offending party to the house for its action.

The power of the committee will terminate with the ﬁnal dissolu-

tion of the house appointing it.

Each house keeps a journal of its proceedings, which is a public

record, and of which the courts are at liberty to take judicial

notice? If it should appear from these journals that any act did

' Coflin v. Collin, 4 Mass. 27.

' On this subject, Cushing on Law and Practice of Parliamentary Assemblies,

§§ 546-597, will be consulted with proﬁt.

3 Branham v. Lange, 16 Ind. 497; Marshall v. Harwood, 7 Md. 466. See

also parliamentary cases, 5 Grey, 374; 9 Grey, 350; 1 Chandler, 50.

‘ Burnham v. Morrissey, 14 Gray, 226.

' Spangler v. Jacoby, 14 Ill. 297; Miller v. State, 3 Ohio, N. s. 475; People

v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481 ; Southwark Bank v. Commonwealth, 2 Penn. St. 446 ;

McCulloch v. State, 11 Ind. 430; State v. Moﬁitt, 5 Ohio, 358; Turley v. Logan

Co. 17 Ill. 151; People v. Supervisors of Chenango, 8 N. Y. 317; Jones v.

Hutchinson, 43 Ill. 721.
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and if the order is not complied with, by punishing the persons
concerned in the arrest as for a contempt of its authority. The
remedy of the member, however, is not confined to this mode of
relief. His privilege is not the privilege of the house merely, but
of the people, and is conferred to enable him to discharge the trust
confided to him by his constituents; 1 and if the house neglect to
interfere, the court from which the process issued should set it
aside on the facts being represented, and any court or officer
having authority to issue writs of habeas corpus may also
• inquire into the case, and release the party from the un- [*135]
lawful imprisonment.2
Each house must also be allowed to proceed in its own way in
the collection of such information as may seem important to a
proper discharge of its functions, and whenever it is deemed
desirable that witnesses should be examined, the power and
authority to do so is very properly referred to a committee, with
any such powers short of final legislative or judicial action as
may seem necessary or expedient in the particular case. Such a
committee has no authority to sit during a recess of the house
which has appointed it, without its permission to that effect; but
the house is at liberty to confer such authority if it see fit.a A
refusal to appear or to testify before such committee, or to produce books or papers, would be a contempt of the house ; 4 but
the committee cannot punish for contempts; it can only report
the conduct of the offending party to the house for its action.
The power of the committee will terminate with the final dissolution of the house appointing it.
Each house keeps a journal of its proceedings, which is a public
record, and ~f which the courts are at liberty to take judicial
notice.6 If it should appear from these journals that any act did
Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 27.
On this subject, Cushing on Law and Practice of Parliamentary Assemblies,
§§ 546-597, will be consulted with profit.
3 Branham v. Lange, 16 Ind. 497; Marshall v. Harwood, 7 Md. 466.
See
also parliamentary cases, 5 Grey, 374; 9 Grey, 350; 1 Chandler, 50.
4 Burnham"· Morrissey, 14 Gray, 226.
• Spangler v. Jacoby, 14 Til. 297; Miller "· State, 3 Ohio, N. s. 475; People
"·Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481; Soutbwark Bank"· Commonwealth, 2 Penn. St. 446;
McCulloch u. State, 11 Ind. 430; State v. 1\Ioffitt, 5 Ohio, 358; Turley v. Logan
Co. 17 Ill. 151; People o. Supervisors of Chenango, 8 N.Y. 317; Jones v.
Hutchinson, 43 lll. 721.
1

1
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not receive the requisite majority, or that in respect to it the legis-

(CH. VI.

lature did not follow any requirement of the constitution, or that

in any other respect the act was not constitutionally adopted,

the courts may act upon this evidence, and adjudge the statute

void.‘ But whenever it is acting in the apparent performance

of legal functions, every reasonable presumption is to be made

in favor of the action of a legislative body; it will not be pre-

sumed in any ease, from the mere silence of the journals, that

either house has exceeded its authority, or disregarded a

[* 136] ‘constitutional requirement in the passage of legislative

acts, unless where the constitution has expressly required

the journals to show the action taken, as, for instance, where it

requires the yeas and nays to be entered? -

The law also seeks to cast its protection around legislative ses-

sions, and to shield them against corrupt and improper inﬂuences,

by making void all contracts which have for their object to inﬂu-

ence legislation in any other manner than by such open and pub-

lic presentation of facts and arguments and appeals to reason as

are recognized as proper and legitimate with all public bodies.

While counsel may be properly employed to present the reasons

in favor of any public measure to the body authorized to pass

upon it, or to any of its committees empowered to collect facts
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and hear arguments, and parties interested may lawfully contract

to pay for this service, yet to secretly approach the members of

such a body with a view to inﬂuence their action, at a time and

in a manner that do not allow the presentation of opposite views,

is improper and unfair to the opposing interest; and a contract

to pay for this irregular and improper service would not be en-

forced by the law.3

‘ See cases cited in preceding note. Also Prescott v. Trustees of Ill. & Mich.

Canal, 19 lll. 324. The case of Sherman v. Story, 30 Cal. 253, appears to be

contra.

’ Miller v. State, 3 Ohio, N. s. 475; McCulloch 0. State, 11 Ind. 424; Super-

visors v. People, 25 Ill. 181.

’ This whole subject was very fully considered in the case of Frost v. Inhabi-

tants of Belmont, 6 Allen, 152, which was a bill ﬁled to restrain the payment by

the town of demands to the amount of nearly $9000, which the town had voted

to pay as expenses in obtaining their act of incorporation. By the court, Chap-

man, J.: “It is to be regretted that any persons should have attempted to

procure an act of legislation in this Commonwealth, by such means as some of

these items indicate. By the regular course of legislation, organs are provided

[ 142 ]

not receive the requisite majority, or that in respect to it the legislature did not follow any requirement of the constitution, or that
in any other respect the act was not constitutionally adopted,
the courts may act upon this evidence, and adjudge the statute
void. 1 But whenever it is acting in the apparent performance
of legal functions, every reasonable presumption is to be made
in favor of the action of a legislative body ; it will not be presumed in any case, from the mere silence of the journals, that
either house has exceeded its authority, or disregarde<! a
[•136] • constitutional requirement in the passage of legislative
acts, unless where the constitution has expressly required
the journals to show the action taken, as, for instance, where it
requires the yeas and nays to be entered.2
The law also seeks to cast its protection around legislative sessions, and to shield them against corrupt and improper influences,
by making void all contracts which have for their object to influence legislation in any other manner than by such open and public presenta~ion of facts and arguments and appeals to reason as
are recognized as proper and legitimate with all public bodies.
While counsel may be properly employed to present the reasons
in favor of any public measure to the body authorized to pass
upon it, or to any of its committees empowered to collect facts
and hear arguments, and parties interested may lawfully contract
to pay for this service, yet to secretly approach the members of
such a body with a view to influence their action, at a time and
in a manner that do not allow the presentation of opposite views,
is improper and unfair to the opposing interest; and a contract
to pay for this irregular and improper service would not be en•
forced by the law.a
1 See ca.qes cited in preceding note.
Also Prescott "· Trustees of Ill. & Mich.
Canal, 19 Ill. 324. The case of Sherman v. Story, 30 Cal. 253, appears to be
cont1·a.
1 l\Iiller "·State, 3 Ohio, N. s. 475; l\IcCulloch v. State, 11 Ind. 424; Supervisors v. People, 25 Ill. 181.
3 This whole subject was very fully considered in the case of Frost v. Inhabitants of Belmont, 6 Allen, ll>2, which was a bill filed to restrain the payment by
the town of demands to the amount of nearly $9000, which the town had voted
to pay as expenses in obtaining their act of incorporation. By the court, Cltapmatl, J.: "It is to be regretted that any persons should have att.empted to
procure an act of legislation in this Commonwealth, by such means u some of
these items indicate. By the regular course of legislation, organs are provided

[ 142]
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Any member may introduce a bill in the house to which he

belongs, in accordance with its rules; and this he may do

through which any parties may fairly and openly approach the legislature, and

be heard with proofs and arguments respecting any legislative acts which they

• The Introduction and Passage of Bills.

[•137]

may be interested in, whether public or private. These organs are the various

committees appointed to consider and report upon the matters to be acted upon

by the whole body. \Vhen private interests are to be affected, notice is given

of the hearings before these committees; and thus opportunity is given to

Any member may introduce a bill in the house to which he
belongs, in accordance with its rules ; and this he may do

adverse parties to meet face to face and obtain a fair and open hearing. And

though these committees properly dispense with many of the rules which regu-

late hearings before judicial tribunals, yet common fairness requires that neither

party shall be permitted to have secret consultations, and exercise secret inﬂu-

ences that are kept from the knowledge of the other party. The business of

‘ lobby members ’ is not to go fairly and openly before the committees, and present

statements, proofs, and arguments that the other side has an opportunity to meet

and refute, if they are wrong, but to go secretly to the members and ply them

with statements and arguments that the other side cannot openly meet, however

erroneous they may be, and to bring illegitimate inﬂuences to bear upon them.

If the ‘lobby member ’ is selected because of his political or personal inﬂuence,

it aggravates the wrong. If his business is to unite various interests by means

of projects that are called ‘log rolling,‘ it is still worse. The practice of pro-
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curing members of the legislature to act under the inﬂuence of what they have

eaten and drank at houses of entertainment tends to render those who yield to

such inﬂuences wholly unﬁt to act in such cases. They are disqualiﬁed from

acting fairly towards interested parties or towards the public. The tendency

and object of these inﬂuences are to obtain by corruption what it is supposed

cannot be obtained fairly.

“ It is a well-established principle, that all contracts which are opposed to

public policy, and to open, upright, and fair dealing, are illegal and void. The

principle was fully discussed in Fuller v. Dame, 18 Pick. 472. In several other

States it has been applied to cases quite analogous to the present case.

“In Pingrey v. \Vashburn, 1 Aiken, 264, it was held in Vermont that an

agreement, on the part of a corporation, to grant to individuals certain privileges

in consideration that they would withdraw their opposition to the passage of a

legislative act touching the interests of the corporation, is against sound policy,

prejudicial to just and correct legislation, and void. In Gulick v. Ward, 5 Halst.

87,'it was decided in New Jersey that a contract which contravenes an act of

Congress, and tends to defraud the United States, is void. A. had agreed to

give B. $100, on condition that B. would forbear to propose or offer himself

to the Postmaster-General to carry the mail on a certain mail route, and it was

held that the contract was against public policy and void. The general principle

as to contracts contravening public policy was discussed in that case at mud:

lengh. In \Vood v. McCann, 6 Dana, 366, the defendant had employed the
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through which any parties may fairly and openly approach the legislature, and
be heard with proof:~ and arguments respecting any legislative acts which they
may be interested in, whether public or private. These organs are the various
committees appointed to considt.'r and report upon the matters to be acted upon
by the whole body. When private interests are to be affected, notice is given
of the hearings before these committees; and thus opportunity is given to
ad,·erse parties to meet face to face and obtain a fair and open hearing. And
though these committees properly uispense with many of the rule8 which regulate hearings before judicial tribunals, yet common fllirness requires that neither
party shall be permitted to have set~ret consultations, and exercise secret influences that are kept from the knowleuge of the other party. The business of
' lobby members' is not to go fairly and openly before the committees, and present
statements, proofs, and argument:~ that the other side has an opportunity to meet
and refute, if they are wrong, but to go secretly to the members and ply them
with statements and arguml•nts that the other side cannot openly meet, however
erroneous they may be, and to bring illt>gitimate influences to bear upon them.
If the 'lobby member' is selerted because or his political or personal influence,
it aggravates the wrong. If his business is to unite various interests by means
of projects that are called ' log rolling,' it is still worse. The practice of procuring members of the legislature to act under the influence of what they have
eaten and drank at houses of E'ntertainment tends to render those who yield to
auch influences wholly unfit to act in such cases. They are di~qualified from
acting fairly towards interested parties or towards the public. The tendency
and object of these influences are to obtain by corruption what it is supposed
cannot be obtained fairly .
.. It is a well-established principle, that all contracts which are opposed to
public policy, and to open, upright, and fair dealing, are illegal and void. The
principle was fully discus~ed in Fuller "· Dame, 18 Pick. 472. In several other
States it has been applied to cases quite analogous to the present case.
"In Pingrey "· \Vashburn, 1 Aiken, 26-l, it was held in Vennont that an
agreement, on the part of a corporation, to grant to individuals certain privileges
in consideration that they would withdraw their opposition to t.be passage of a
legislative act touching the interest:! of the corporation, is against sound policy,
prejudicial to just and correct lt>gislation, and void. In Gulick "· Ward, 5 Haist.
87, 'it was decided in New Jersey that a contract which contravenes an aet of
Congress, and tends to dcrraud the United States, is Toid. A. had a.,<rreed to
give B. $100, on condition that B. would forbear to propose or offer himself
to the Postmaster-General to carry the mail on a certain n1ail route, and it was
held that the contract was against public policy and void. The general principle
as to contra~ts contravening public policy was di~cussed in that case at much
length. In Wood "· McCann, 6 Dana, 366, the defendant had employed the
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constitution, the law, or the rules of the house forbid.

plaintiff to assist him in obtaining a legislative act in Kentucky legalizing his

divorce from a former wife, and his marriage with his present wife. The court

say: ‘ A lawyer may be entitled to compensation for writing a petition, or even

[• 138] at any • time when the house is in session, unless the
constitution, the law, or the rules of the house forbid.

for making a public argument before the legislature or a committee thereof;

but the law should not hold him or any other person to a recompense for exer-

cising any personal inﬂuence in any way, in any act of legislation. It is certainly

important to just and wise legislation, and therefore to the most essential interest

of the public, that the legislature should be perfectly free from any extraneous

inﬂuence which may either corrupt or deceive the members, or any of them.‘

“ In Clippinger v. Hepbaugh, 5 Watts & S. 315, it was decided in Pennsyl-

vania that a contract to procure or endeavor to procure the passage of an act of

the legislature, by using personal inﬂuence with the members, or by any sinister

means, was void, as being inconsistent with public policy and the integrity of

our political institutions. And an agreement for a contingent fee to be paid on

the passage of a legislative act was held to be illegal and void, because it would

be a strong incentive to the exercise of personal and sinister inﬂuences to effect

the object.

“The subject has been twice adjudicated upon in New York. In Harris v.

Roof, 10 Barb. 489, the Supreme Court held that one could not recover for ser-

vices performed in going to see individual members of the house, to get them to
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aid in voting for a private claim, the services not being performed before the

house as a body, nor before its authorized committees. In Sedgwick v. Stanton,

4 Kernan, 289, the Court of Appeals held the same doctrine, and stated its proper

limits. Selden, J ., makes the following comments on the case of Harris v. Roof:

‘ Now the court did not mean by this decision to hold that one who has a claim

against the State may not employ competent persons to aid him in properly pre-

senting such claim to the legislature, and in supporting it with the necessary

proofs and arguments. Mr. Justice Hand, who delivered the opinion of the court,

very justly distinguishes between services of the nature of those rendered in that

case, and the procuring and preparing the necessary documents in support of a

claim, or acting as counsel before the legislature or some committee appointed

by that body. Persons may, no doubt, be employed to conduct an application to

the legislature, as well as to conduct a suit at law ; and may contract for and re-

ceive pay for their services in preparing documents, collecting evidence, making

statements of facts, or preparing and making oral or written arguments, provided

all these are used or designed to be used before the legislature or some committee

thereof as a body; but they cannot, with propriety, be employed to exert their

personal inﬂuence with individual members, or to labor in any form privately with

such members out of the legislative halls. \Vhatever is laid before the legislature

in writing, or spoken openly or publicly in its presence or that of a committee, if

false in fact, may be disproved, or if wrong in argument may be refuted; but

that which is whispered into the private ear of individual members is frequently

beyond the reach of correction. The point of objection in this class of cases then

is, the personal and private nature of the services to be rendered.’
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plaintiff to assist him in obtaining a legislative act in Kentucky legalizing his
divorce from a former wife, and his marriage with his present wife. The court
say: • A lawyer may be entitled to compensation for writin~ a petition, or even
for making a public argument before the legislature or a committee thereof;
but the law should not hold him or any other person to a recompense for exer-cising any personal influence in any way, in any act of legislation. It is certainly
important to just and wise legislation, and therefore to the most essential interest
of the public, that the legislature should be perfectly free from any extraneous
influence which may either corrupt or deceive the members, or any of them.'
"In Clippinger v. Hepbaugh, 5 Watts & S. 315, it was decided in Pennsylvania that a contract to procure or endeavor to procure the passage of an act of
the legislature, by using personal influence with the members, or by any sinister
means, was void, as being inconsistent with public policy and the integrity of
our political institutions. And an agreement for a contingent fee to be paid on
the passage of a legislative act was held to be illegal and void, because it would
be a strong incentive to the exercise of personal ami sinister influences to effect
the object.
"The subject has been twice adjudicated upon in New York. In Harris D.
Roof, 10 Barb. 489, the Supreme Court held that one could not recover for services performed in going to sec individual members of the house, to get them to
aid in voting for a private claim, the services not being performed before the
house as a body, nor before its authorized committees. In Sedgwick v. Stanton,
4 Kernan, 289, the Court of Appeals held the same doctrine, and stated its proper
limits. Selden, J., makes the following comments on the case of Harris"· Roof:
• Now the court did not mean by this decision to hold that one who has a claim
against the State may not employ competent persons to aid him in properly presenting such claim to the legislature, and in supporting it with the necessary
proofs and arguments. 1\Ir. Justice Hand, who delivered the opinion of the court,
very justly distiuguishcs between services of the nature of those rendered in that
case, and the procuring and preparing the necessary documents in support of a
claim, or acting as counsel before the legislature or some committee appointed
by that body. Persons may, no doubt, be employed to conduct an application to
the legislature, as well as to conduct a suit at law ; and may contract for and receive pay for their services in preparing documents, collecting evidence, making
statements of facts, or preparing and making oral or written arguments, provided
all these are used or designed to be used before the legislature or some committee
thereof as a body; but they cannot, with propriety, be employed to exert their
personal influence with individual members, or to labor in any form privately ~th
such members out of the legislative halls. Whatever is laid before the legislature
in writing, or spoken openly or publicly in ita presence or that of a committee, if
false in fact, may be disproved, or if wrong in argument may be refuted ; but
that which is whispered into the private car of individual members is frequently
beyond the reach of correction. The point of objection in this class of cases then
is, the personal and private nature of the services to be rendered.'
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The Constitution of Michigan "‘ provides that no new bill [* 139]
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shall be introduced into either house of the legislature

after the ﬁrst ﬁfty days of the session shall have expired ;1 and the

Constitution of Maryland provides that no bill shall originate in

either house within the last ten days of the session.” The purpose

of these clauses is to prevent hasty-and improvident legislation,

and to compel, so far as any previous law can accomplish that

result, the careful examination of proposed laws, or at least the

affording of opportunity for that purpose ; which will not always be

done when bills may be introduced up to the very hour of adjourn-

ment, and, with the concurrence of the proper majority, put

immediately upon their passage?

“ In Fuller v. Dame, cited above, Shaw, Ch. J ., recognizes the well-established

right to contract and pay for professional services when the promisee is to act as

attorney and counsel, but remarks that ‘ the fact appearing that persons do so act

prevents any injurious effects from such proceeding. Such counsel is considered

as standing in the place of his principal, and his arguments and representations

are weighed and considered accordingly.’ He also admits the right of disinter-

ested persons to volunteer advice; as when a person is about to make a will, one

The Constitution of :Michigan • provides that no new bill [*139]
shall be introduced into either house of the legislature
after the first fifty days of the session shall have expired; 1 and the
Constitution of Maryland provides that no bill shall originate in
either house within the last ten days of the session.2 The purpose
of these clauses is to prevent hasty-and improvident legislation,
and to compel, so far as any previous law can accomplish that
result, the careful examination of proposed laws, or at least the
affording of opportunity for that purpose ; which will not always be
done when bills may be introduced up to the very hour of adjournment, and, with the concurrence of the proper majority, put
immediately upon their passage.2

may represent to him the propriety and expediency of making a bequest to a par-

ticular person; and so may one volunteer advice to another to marry another

person; but a promise to pay for such service is void.
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“ Applying the principles stated in these cases to the bills which the town voted

to pay, it is manifest that some of the money was expended for objects that are

contrary to public policy, and of a most reprehensible character, and which could

not, therefore, form a legal consideration for a contract.”

See further a full discussion of the same subject, and reaching the same con-

clusion, by Mr. Justice Grier, in Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. 16 How.

314. See also Hatzﬁeld v. Gulden, 7 Watts, 152; Frankfort v. Winterport, 54

Me. 250. A contract to assist by money and inﬂuence to secure the election of

a. candidate to a public oﬁice in consideration of a share of its emoluments, in the

event of election, is void as opposed to public policy, and if voluntarily rescinded

by the parties, a recovery cannot be had of the moneys advanced under it. Mar-

tin v. \Vade, 37 Cal. 168. '

' Art. 4-, § 28. ’ Art. 3, § 26.

' A practice has sprung up of evading these constitutional provisions by intro

ducing a new bill after the time has expired when it may constitutionally be

done, as an amendment to some pending bill, the whole of which, except the

enacting clause, is struck out to make way for it. Thus, the member who thinks

he may possibly have occasion for the introduction of a new bill after the consti-

tutional period has expired, takes care to introduce sham bills in due season

which he can use as stocks to graft upon, and which he uses inespcctive of their

character or contents. The sham bill is perhaps a bill to incorporate the city of

Siam. One of the member’! constituents applies to him for legislative permission

10 [ 145 ]

"In Fuller t~. Dame, cited above, Shaw, Ch. J., recognizes the well-established
right to contract and pay for professional services when the promisee is to act as
attomey and counsel, but remarks that ' the fact appearing that persons do so act
pre,·ents any injurious effects from such proceeding. Such counsel is considered
as standing in the place of his principal, and his arguments and representations
are weighed and considered accordin~tlY.' He also admits the right of disinterested persons to volunteer advice ; as when a person is about to make a will, one
may represent to him the propriety and expediency of making a bequest to a particular person; and so may one volunteer advice to another to marry another
person ; but a promise to pay for such service is void.
" Applying the principles stated in these cases to the bills which the town voted
to pay, it is manifest that some of the money was expended for objects that are
contrary to public policy, and of a most reprehensible character, and which could
not, therefore, form a legal consideration for a contract.''
See further a full discussion of the same subject, and reaching the same conclusion, by Mr. Justice Grier, in Marshall tl. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. 16 How.
814. See also Hatzfield 17. Gulden, 7 Watts, 152; Frankfort 17. Winterport, 54
Me. 250. A contract to assist by money and influence to Sf'CUre the election of
a candidate to a public office in consideration of a share of its emoluments, in the
event of election, is void as opposed to public policy, and if voluntarily rescinded
by the parties, a recovery cannot be had of the moneys advanced under it. Martin "· Wade, 37 Cal. 168.
1 Art. 3, § 26.
1 Art. 4, § 28.
3 A practice has sprung up of evading these constitutional provisions by intro
ducing
new bill after the time has expired when it may constitutionally be
done, as an amendment to some pending bill, the whole of which, except the
enacting clause, is struck out to make way for it. Thus, the member who thinks
he may possibly have occasion for the introduction of a new bill after the constitutional period has expired, takes care to introduce sham bills in due season
which he can use as stocks to graft upon, and which he uses irrespective of their
character or contents. The sham bill is perhap~ a bill to incorporate the city of
Siam. One of the member's constituents applies to him for legislative permission
10
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For the same reason it is required by the constitutions of several
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of the States, that no bill shall have the force of law until on three

several days it be read in each house, and free discussion allowed

thereon; unless, in case of urgency, four-ﬁfths or some other

speciﬁed majority of the house shall deem it expedient to dispense

with this rule. The journals which each house keeps of its

proceedings ought to show whether this rule is complied with or

not; but in case they do not, the passage in the manner provided

by the constitution must be presumed, in accordance with the

general rule which presumes the proper discharge of official

[’* 140] duty} * As to what shall constitute a reading of a bill, it

seems to be held suﬁicient to read the written instrument

that is adopted by the two houses ; and if any thing else becomes law

to construct a dam across the Wild Cat River. Forthwith, by amendment, the

bill entitled a bill to incorporate the city of Siam has all alter the enacting clause

stricken out, and it is made to provide, as its sole object, that John Doe may con-

struct a dam across the Wild Cat. \Vitl1 this title and in this form it is passed;

but the house then considerately amends the title to correspond with the purpose

of the bill, and the law is passed, and the constitution at the same time saved!

This dodge is so transparent, and so clearly in violation of the constitution, and

For the same reason it is required by the constitutions of several
of the States, that no bill shall have the force of law until on three
several days it be read in each house, and free discussion allowed
thereon ; unless, in case of urgency, four-fifths or some other
specified majority of the house shall deem it expedient to dispense
with this rule. The journals which each house keeps of its
proceedings ought to show whether this rule is complied with or
not; but in case they do not, the passage in the manner provided
by the constitution must be presumed, in accordance with the
general rule which presumes the proper discharge of official
· [•140] duty .I • As to what shall constitute a reading of a bill, it
seems to be held sufficient to read the written instrument
that is adopted by the two houses; and if any thing else becomes law

the evidence at the same time so fully spread upon the record, that it is a matter

of surprise to ﬁnd it so often resorted to.
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' Supervisors of Schuyler Co. v. People, 25 Ill. 181; Miller v. State, 3 Ohio,

rt. s. 480. In People 12. Starne, 35 Ill. 121, it is said the courts should not

enforce a legislative act unless there is record evidence, from the journals of the

two houses, that every material requirement of the constitution has been satisﬁed.

The clause in the Constitution of Ohio is: “ Every bill shall be fully and dis-

tinctly read on three different days, unless, in case of urgency, three-fourths of

the house in which it shall be pending shall dispense with this rule ”; and in Mil-

ler v. State, 3 Ohio, N. s. 481, and Pim v. Nicholson, 6 Ohio, N. s. 178, this

provision was held to be merely directory. The distinctness with which any bill

must be read cannot possibly be deﬁned by any law; and it must always, from

the necessity of the case, rest with the house to determine ﬁnally whether in this

particular the constitution has been complied with or not; but the rule respect-

ing three several readings on different days is speciﬁc, and capable of being

precisely complied with, and we do not see how, even under the rules applied to

statutes, it can be regarded as directory merely, provided it has a purpose beyond

the mere regular and orderly transaction of business. That it has such a pur-

pose, that it is designed to prevent hasty and improvident legislation, and is

therefore not a mere rule of order, but one of protection to the public interests

and to the citizens at large, is very clear; and independent of the question whether

deﬁnite constitutional principles can be dispensed with in any case on the ground

of their being merely directory, we cannot see how this can be treated as any

thing but mandatory. See People v. Campbell, 3 Gilm. 466; McCulloch v.

State, 11 Ind. 424.
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to construct a dam across the Wild Cat River. Forthwith, by amendment, the
bill entitled a bill to incorporate the city of Siam has all after the enacting clause
stricken out, and it is made to provide, as its sole object, that John Doe may construct a dam across the Wild Cat. With this title and in this form it is passed;
but the bouse then considerately amends the title to correspond with the purpose
of the bill, and the law is passed, and the constitution at the same time saved!
This dodge is so transparent, and so clearly in violation of the constitution, and
the evidence at the same time so fully spread upon the record, that it is a matter
of surprise to find it so often resorted to.
1 Supervisors of Schuyler Co. v. People, 25 lll. 181; Miller v. State, S Ohio,
N. s. 480. In People v. Starne, 35 Ill. 121, it is said the courts should not
enforce a legislative act unless there is record evidence, from the journals of the
two houses, that every material requirement of the constitution bas been satisfied.
The clause in the Constitution of Ohio is : " Every bill shall be fully and distinctly read on three different days, unlt>ss, in case of urgency, three-fourths of
the house in which it shall be pending shall dispense with this rule " ; and in 1\Iiller v. State, 3 Ohio, N. s. 481, and Pim v. Nicholson, 6 Ohio, N. s. li8, this
proYision was held to be merely directory. The distinctness with which any bill
must be read cannot possibly be defined by any law; and it must always, from
tbe necessity of the case, rest with the house to determine finally whether in this
particular the constitution has been complied with or not; but the rule respecting three several readings on different days is specific, and capable of being
precisely complied with, and we do not see how, even under the rules applied to
statutes, it can be regarded as directory merely, provided it bas a purpose beyond
the mere regular and orderly transaction of business. That it has such a purpose, that it is designed to prevent hasty and improvident legislation, and is
therefore not a mere rule of order, but one of protection to the public interests
and to the citizens at large, is very clear; and independent of tbe question whether
definite constitutional principles can be dispensed with in any case on the ground
of their being merely directory, we cannot see how this can be treated as any
thing but mandatory. See People 11. Campbell, 3 Gilm. 466; McCulloch "·
State, 11 Ind. 424.
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in consequence of its passage, and by reason of being referred

to in it, it is nevertheless not essential that it be read with the
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reading of the bill.1 Thus, a statute which incorporated a military

company by reference to its constitution and by-laws, was held valid,

notwithstanding the constitution and by-laws, which would acquire

the force of law by its passage, were not read in the two houses as a

part of it.” But there cannot be many cases, we should suppose,

to which this ruling wouldibe applicable.

It is also provided in the constitutions of some of the States, that

on the ﬁnal passage of every bill the yeas and nays shall be entered

on the journal. Such a provision is designed to serve an important

purpose in compelling each member present to assume as well as

to feel his due share of responsibility in legislation; and also in

furnishing deﬁnite and conclusive evidence whether the bill has

been passed by the requisite majority or not. “ The constitution

prescribes this as the test by which to determine whether the

requisite number of members vote in the aﬂirmative. The oﬂice of

the journal is to record the proceedings of the house, and authen-

ticate and preserve the same. It must appear on the face of

the journal that the bill passed by a constitutional majority.

These directions are all clearly imperative. They are

" expressly enjoined by the fundamental law, and cannot be [* 141]
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dispensed with by the legislature.” a

For the vote required in the passage of any particular law,

the reader is referred to the constitution of his State. A sim-

ple majority of a quorum is suﬁicient, unless the constitution

establishes some other rule ; and where, by the constitution, a two-

thirds or three-fourths vote is made essential to the passage of any

particular class of bills, two-thirds or three-fourths of a quorum

‘ Dew v. Cunningham, 28 Ala. 466.

’ Bibb County Loan Association v. Richards, 21 Geo. 592.

3 Spanglerv. Jacoby, 14 Ill. 297; Supervisors of Schuyler Co. v. People, 25

Ill. 183. There have been cases, as we happen to know, in which several bills

have been put on their passage together, the yeas and nays being once called for

them all, though the journal is made to state falsely a separate vote on each. We

need hardly say that this is a manifest violation of the constitution, which requires

separate action in every case, and that when resorted to, it is usually for the pur-

pose of avoiding another provision of the constitution which seeks to preclude

“log-rolling” legislation, by forbidding the incorporation of distinct measures

in one and the same statute.
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in consequence of its passage, and by reason of being referred
to in it, it is nevertheless not essential that it be read with the
reading of the bill.l Thus, a statute which incorporated a military
company by reference to its constitution and by-laws, was held valid,
notwithstanding the constitution and by-laws, which would acquire
the force of law by its passage, were not read in the two houses as a
part of it.2 But there cannot be many cases, we should suppose,
to which this ruling would be applicable.
It is also provided in the constitutions of some of the States, that
on the final passage of every bill the yeas and nays shall be entered
on the journal. Such a provision is designed to serve an important
purpose in compelling each member present to assume as well as
to feel his due share of responsibility in legislation ; and also in
furnishing definite and conclusive evidence whether the bill has
been passed by the requisite majority or not. "The constitution
prescribes this as the test by which to determine whether tho
requisite number of members vote in the affirmative. The office of
the journal is to record the proceedings of the house, and authenticate and preserve the same. It must appear on the face of
the journal that the bill passed by a constitutional majority.
These directions are all clearly imperative. They are
• expressly enjoined by the fundamental law, and cannot be [• 141]
dispensed with by the legislature." a
For the vote required in the passage of any particular law,
the reader is referred to the constitution of his State. A simple majority of a quorum is sufficient, unless the constitution
establishes some other rule; and where, by the constitution, a twothirds or three-fourths vote is made essential to the passage of any
particular class of bills, two-thirds or three-fourths of a quorum
Dew "· Cunningham, 28 Ala. 466.
Bibb County Loan Association"· Richards, 21 Geo. 592.
1 Spangler"· Jacoby, 14 lll. 297; Supervisors of Schuyler Co. "· People, 25
Til. 183. There have been cases, as we happen to know, in which several billa
have been put on their passage together, the yeas and nays being once called for
them all, though the journal is made to state falsely a separate vote on each. We
need hardly say that this is a manifest violation of the constitution, which rcquirea
separate action in every case, and that when resorted to, it is usually for the purpose of avoiding another provision of the constitution which seeks to preclude
"log-rolling" legislation, by forbidding the incorporation of distinct measures
in one and the same statute.
1

1
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will be understood, unless it is expressly declared that this propor-
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tion of all the members, or of all those elected, shall be

requisite}

The Title of a Statute.

The title of an act was formerly considered no part of it; and

although it might be looked to as a guide to the intent of the law-

will be understood, unless it is expressly declared that this proportion of all the members, or of all those elected, shall be
requisite. 1

makers when the body of the statute appeared to be in any respect

Tlte Title of a Statute.

ambiguous or doubtful} yet it could not enlarge or restrain the

provisions of the act itself,” and the latter might therefore be

good when that-and the title were in conﬂict. The reason for this

was that aneiently titles were not preﬁxed at all, and when after-

wards they came to be introduced, they were usually prepared by

the clerk of the house in which the hill ﬁrst passed, and attracted

but little attention from the members. They indicated the clerk’s

understanding of the contents or purpose of the bills, rather than

that of the house; and they therefore were justly regarded as

furnishing very little insight into the legislative intention. Titles

to legislative acts, however, have recently, in some States, come to

possess very great importance, by reason of constitutional pro-

visions, which not only require that they shall correctly indicate

the purpose of the law, but which absolutely make the title to

control, and exclude every thing from eﬁfect and operation as law
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which is incorporated in the body of the act but is not within the

purpose indicated by the title. These provisions are given in the

note, and it will readily be perceived that they make a very great

change in the law.*

' Southworth v. Palmyra & Jacksonburg Railroad Co. 2 Mich. 287; State v.

McBride, 4 Mo. 303. Where a majority of all the members elected is required

in the passage of a law, an ineligible person is not on that account to be excluded

in the count. Satterlee v. San Francisco, 22 Cal. 314.

' United States v. Palmer, 3 VVheat. 610; Burgett v. Burgett, 1 Ohio, 480;

Eastman v. McAlpin, 1 Kelley, 157; Cohen v. Barrett, 5 Cal. 195. See Dwarris

on Statutes, 502.

' Hadden v. The Collector, 5 Wal. 107.

‘ The Constitutions of Minnesota, Kansas, Maryland, Kentucky, Nebraska,

Ohio, and Pennsylvania provide that “ no law shall embrace more than one sub-

ject, which shall be expressed in its title.” Those of Michigan, Louisiana, and

Texas are the same, substituting the word object for subject. The Constitutions

of South Carolina, Alabama, Tennessee, Maryland, and California contain similar

The title of an act was formerly considered no part of it; and
although it might be looked to as a guide to the intent of the lawmakers when the body of the statute appeared to be in any respect
ambiguous or doubtful,2 yet it could not enlarge or restrain the
provisions of the act itself,3 and the latter might therefore be
good when that ·and the title were in conflict. The reason for this
was that anciently titles were not prefixed at all, and when afterwards they came to be introduced, they were usually prepared by
the clerk of the house in which the bill first passed, and attracted
but little attention from the members. They indicated the clerk's
understanding of the contents or purpose of the bills, rather than
that of the house ; and they therefore were justly regarded as
furnishing very little insight into the legislative intention. Titles
to legislative acts, however, have recently, in some States, come to
possess very great importance, by reason of constitutional provisions, which not only require that they shall correctly indicate
the purpose of the law, but which absolutely make the title to
control, and exclude every thing from effect and operation as la'v
which is incorporated in the body of the act but is not within the
purpose indicated by the title. These provisions are given in the
note, and it will readily be perceived that they make a very great
change in the law .•

provisions. The Constitution of New Jersey provides that, “ to avoid improper
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1 Southworth v. Palmyra & Jacksonburg Railroad Co. 2 Mich. 287; State v.
McBride, 4 Mo. 303. Where a majority of all the members elected is required
in the passage of a law, an ineligible person is not on that account. to be excluded
in the count. Satterlee v. San Francisco, 22 Cal. 314.
1 United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610; Burgett v. Burgett, 1 Ohio, 480;
Eastman v. McAlpin, 1 Kelley, 157; Cohen "· Barrett, 5 Cal. 195, See Dwarris
on Statutes, 502.
' Hadden v. The Collector, 5 Wal. 107.
c The Constitutions of Minnesota, Kansu, Maryland, Kentucky, Nebraska,
Ohio, and Ptmnsylvania provide that" no law shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title." Those of Michigan, Louisiana, and
Texas are the same, substituting the word object for stlbject. The Constitutions
of South Carolina, Alabama, T~nnessee, Maryland, and California contain similar
provisions. The Constitution of New Jersey provides that, "to avoid improper
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‘In considering these provisions it is important to re- [" 142]
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gard,—

1. The evils designed to be remedied. The Constitution of

New Jersey refers to these as “the improper inﬂuences which

may result from intermixing in one and the same act such

things as have no proper relation to each other.” In the

language of the Supreme Court of Louisiana, speaking of the

former practice: “ The title of an act often afforded no clue to its

contents. Important general principles were found placed in acts

private or local in their operation; provisions concerning matters

of practice or judicial proceedings were sometimes included in

the same statute with matters entirely foreign to them, the result

of which was that on many important subjects the statute law

had become almost unintelligible, as they whose duty it has been

to examine or act under it can well testify. To prevent any fur-

ther accumulation to this chaotic mass was the object of the

constitutional provision under consider-ation.”1 The Supreme

Court of Michigan say: “The history and purpose of this con-

stitutional provision are too well understood to require

any ‘ elucidation at our hands. The practice of bringing [* 143]

together into one bill subjects diverse in their nature and

inﬂuences which may result from intermixing in one and the same act such things
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as have no proper relation to each other, every law shall embrace but one object,

and that shall be expressed in the title." The Constitution of Missouri contains

a similar provision, with the addition, that, “if any subject embrac'ed in an act

be not expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as

is not so expressed.” The Constitutions of Indiana and Iowa provide that " every

act shall embrace but one subject, and matters properly connected therewith,

which subject shall be expressed in the title. But if any subject shall be embraced

in an act which shall not be expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as

to so much thereof as shall not be expressed in the title." The Constitution of

• In considering these provisions it is important to re- [•142]
gard,1. Tlte evils designed to be remedied. The Constitution of
New Jersey refers to these as "the improper influences which
may result from intermixing in one and the same act such
things as have no proper relation to each other." In the
language of the Supreme Court of Louisiana, speaking of the
former practice: "The title of an act often afforded no clue to its
contents. Important general principles were found placed in acts
private or local in their operation ; provisions concerning matters
of practice or judicial proceedings were sometimes included in
the same statute with matters entirely foreign to t\lem, the result
of which was that on many important subjects the statute law
had become almost unintelligible, as they whose duty it has been
to examine or act under it can well testify. To prevent any further accumulation to this chaotic mass was the object of the
constitutional provision under considet-ation.'' 1 The Supreme
Court of Michigan say: "The history and purpose of this constitutional provision are too well understood to require
any • elucidation at our hands. The practice of bringing [*143]
together into one bill subjects diverse in their nature and

Nevada provides that “ every law enacted by the legislature shall embrace but

one subject, and matters properly connected therewith, which subject shall be

brieﬂy expressed in the title." The Constitutions of New York and \Visconsin,

provide that “no private or local bill which may be passed by the legislature

shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall he expressed in the title."

The Constitution of Illinois is in this regard nearly identical with that of Missouri.

Whether the word object is to have any diﬁerent construction from the word sub-

ject, as used in these provisions, is a question which may some time require dis-

cussion; but as it is evidently employed for precisely the same purpose, it would

seem that it ought not to have. Compare Hingle v. State, 24 Ind. 28, and People

v. Lawrence, 36 Barb. 192.

1 \Valker v. Caldwell, 4 La. An. 298. See Fletcher 12. Oliver, 25 Ark. 298.
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influences which may result from intennixing in one and the ume act such things
as have no proper relation to each other, every law shall embrace but one object,
and that shall be expr~ssed in the title." The Constitution of Missouri contains
a similar provision, with the addition, that, " if any subject embraced in an act
be not expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as
is not so expressed." The Constitutions of Indiana and Iowa provide that " every
act shall embrace but one subject, and matters properly connected therewith,
which subject shall be expressed in the title. But if any subject shall be embraced
in an act which shall not be expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as
to so much thereof as shall not be expressed in the title." The Constitution of
Nevada provides that "every law enacted by the legislature shall embrace but
one subject, and matters properly connected therewith, which subject shall be
briefly expressed in the title." The Constitutions of New York: and 'Visconsin,
provide that "no private or local bill which may be passed by the legislature
shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title."
The Constitution of Illinois is in this regard nearly identical with that of Missouri.
Whether the word object is to have any different construction from the word h'UOject, as used in these provisions, is a que~tion which may some time require discussion ; but as it is evidently employed for precisely the same purpose, it would
seem that it ought not to have. Compare Hingle v. State, 24 Ind. 28, and People
"·Lawrence, 36 Barb. 192.
1 Walker v. Caldwell, 4 La. An. 298.
See Fletcher"· Oliver, 25 Ark. 298.
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having no necessary connection, with a. view to combine in their
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favor the advocates of all, and thus secure the passage of several

measures, no one of which could succeed upon its own merits, was

one both corruptive of the legislator and dangerous to the State.

It was scarcely more so, however, than another practice, also

intended to be remedied by this provision, by which, through

dexterous management, clauses were inserted in bills of which the

titles gave no intimation, and their passage secured through legis-

lative bodies whose members were not generally aware of their

intention and effect. There was no design by this clause to em-

barrass legislation, by making laws unnecessarily restrictive in their

scope and operation, and thus multiplying their number; but the

framers of the constitution meant to put an end to legislation of

the vicious character referred to, which was little less than a fraud

upon the public, and to require that in every case the proposed

measure should stand upon its own merits, and that the legislature

should be fairly satisﬁed of its design when required to pass upon

it.” 1 The Court of Appeals of New York declare the object of this

provision to be “that neither the members of the legislature nor

the people should be misled by the title.” 2 The Supreme Court

of Iowa say: “The intent of this provision of the constitution

was, to prevent the union, in the same act, of incongruous matters,
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and of objects having no connection, no relation. And with this

it was designed to prevent surprise in legislation, by having matter

of one nature embraced in a bill whose title expressed another.” 3

And similar expressions will be found in many other reported

cases.4 It may therefore be assumed as settled that the purpose

of these provisions was: ﬁrst, to prevent hedge-podge, or “log-

rolling” legislation; second, to prevent surprise or fraud upon

the legislature, by means of provisions in bills of which

[* 1-14] the titles *‘ gave no intimation, and which might therefore

' People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 494. And see Board of Supervisors v. Heenan,

2 Minn. 336; Davis v. Bank of Fulton, 31 Geo. 69; St. Louis v. Tiefel, 42 Mo.

578.

’ Sun Mutual Insurance Co. v.§Mayor, &c., of New York, 8 N. Y. 253.

3 State v. County Judge of Davis Co. 2 Iowa, 282.

‘ See Conner v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 5 N. Y. 293; Davis v. State, 7 Md.

151. The Supreme Court of Indiana also understand the provision in the con-

stitution of that State to be designed, among other things, to assist in the codiﬁ-

cation of the laws. Indiana Central Railroad Co. v. Potts, 7 Ind. 685; Hingle

v. State, 24 Ind. 28.

Q
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having no necessary connection, with a view to combine in their
favor the advocates of all, and thus secure the passage of several
measures, no one of which could succeed upon its own merits, was
one both corruptive of the legislator and dangerous to the State.
It was scarcely more so, however, than another practice, also
intended to be remedied by this provision, by which, through
dexterous management, clauses were inserted in hills of which the
titles gave no intimation, and their passage secured through legislative bodies whose members were not generally aware of their
intention and effect. There was no design by this clause to embarrass legislation, by making laws unnecessarily restrictive in their
scope and ope~ation, and thus multiplying their number; but the
framers of the constitution meant to put an end to legislation of
the vicious character referred to, which was little less than a fraud
upon the public, and to require that in every case the proposed
measure should stand upou its own merits, and that the legislature
should be fairly satisfied of its design when required to pass upon
it." 1 The Court of Appeals of New York declare the object of this
provision to be " that neither the members of the legislature nor
the people should be misled by the title." 2 The Supreme Court
of Iowa say : "The intent of this provision of the constitution
was, to prevent the union, in the same act, of incongruous matters,
and of objects having no connection, no relation. And with this
it was designed to prevent surprise in legislation, by having matter
of one nature embraced in a bill whose title expressed another." s
And similar expressions will be found in many other reported
cases.4 It may therefore be assumed as settled that the purpose
of these provisions was: first, to prevent hodge-podge, or " logrolling" legislation ; second, to prevent surprise or fraud upon
the legislature, by means of provisions in bills of which
[•144] the titles • gave no intimation, and which might therefore
I People v. Mahaney, 131\lich. 49!.
And see Board or Supervisors v. Heenan,
2 Minn. 336; Davis!'. Bank of Fulton, 31 Geo. 69; St. Louis v. Tiefel, 42 Mo.
678.
1 Sun Mutual Insurance Co. v.~Iayor, &c., of New York, 8 N.Y. 253.
3 State t~. County Judge of Davis Co. 2 Iowa, 282.
• See Conner t~. Mayor, &c., of New York, 5 N.Y. 293 ; Davis v. State, 7 Md.
151. The Supreme Court of Indiana also understand the provision in the constitution of that State to be designed, among other things, to assist in the codification of the laws. Indiana Central Railroad Co. v. Potts, 7 Ind. 685; Hingle
"· State, 24 Ind. 28.
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be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and,
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third, to fairly apprise the people, through such publication

of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subjects of

legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have

opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition or otherwise, if

they shall so desire.

2. The particularity required in stating the object. The gen-

eral purpose of these provisions is accomplished when a law has

but one general object, which is fairly indicated by its title. To

require every end and means necessary or convenient for the

accomplishment of this general object to be provided for by a

separate act relating to that alone, would not only be unreason-

able, but would actually render legislation impossible. It has

accordingly been held that the title of “an act to establish a

police government for the city of Detroit,” was not objectionable

for its generality, and that all matters properly connected with

the establishment and efficiency of such a government, including

taxation for its support, and courts for the examination and trial

of offenders, might constitutionally be included in the bill under

this general title. Under any different ruling it was said, “the

police government of a city could not be organized without a dis-

tinct act for each speciﬁc duty to be devolved upon it, and these
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could not be passed until a multitude of other statutes had taken

the same duties from other officers before performing them. And

these several statutes, fragmentary as they must necessarily be,

would often fail of the intended object, from the inherent diffi-

culty in expressing the legislative will when restricted to such

narrow bounds.” 1 The generality of a title is therefore no objec-

tion to it, so long as it is not made a cover to legislation incongruous

in itself, and which by no fair intendment can be considered

as having a necessary or proper connection? The legislature

must determine for itself how broad and comprehensive shall be

the object of a statute, and how much particularity shall be

employed in the title in deﬁning it.“ One thing, however, is

‘ People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 495. See also Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa, 82,

and \Vhiting v. Mount Pleasant, 11 Iowa, 482; Bright v. McCulloch, 27 Ind.

223; Mayor, &c., of Annapolis v. State, 30 Md. 112; State v. Union, 38 N. J.

354.

‘ Indiana Central Railroad Co. v. Potts, 7 Ind. 681.

‘ In State v. Powers, 14 Ind. 195, an act came under consideration the title
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be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and,
third, to fairly apprise the people, through such publication
of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subjects of
legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have
opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition or otherwise, if
they shall so desire.
2. Tile particularity required in stating tlte object. The general purpose of these provisions is accomplished when a law has
but one general object, which is fairly indicated by its title. To
require every end and means necessary or convenient for the
accomplishment of this general object to be provided for by a
separate act relating to that alone, would not only be unreasonable, but would actually render legislation impossible. It has
accordingly been held that the title of "an act to establish a
police government for the city of Detroit," was not objectionable
for its generality, and that all matters properly connected with
the establishment and efficiency of such a goYernment, including
taxation for its support, and courts for the examination and trial
of offenders, might constitutionally be included in the bill und.e r
this general title. Under any differeu~ ruling it was said," the
police government of a city could not be organized without a distinct act for each specific duty to be devolved upon it, and these
could not be passed until a multitude of other statutes had taken
the same duties from other officers before performing them. And
these se\"eral statutes, fragmentary as they must necessarily be,
would often fail of the intended object, from the inherent difficulty in expressing the legislative will when restricted to such
narrow bounds." 1 The generality of a title is therefore no objection to it, so long as it is not made a cover to legislation incongruous
in itself, and which by no fair intendment can be considered
as having a necessary or proper conuection. 2 The legislature
must determine for itself how broad and comprehensive shall be
the object of a statute, and how much particularity shall be
employed in the title in defining it.3 One thing, howe\"er, is
People v. :Mahaney, 13 Mich. 495. See also Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa, 82,
and Whiting v. Mount Pleasant, 11 Iowa, 482; Bright v. McCulloch, 27 Ind.
223; Mayor, &c., of Annapolis v. State, 30 l\ld. 112; State 11. Union, 33 N.J.
3.')-l.
1 Indiana Central Railroad Co. v. Potts, 7 Ind. 681.
2 In State v. Powers, 14 Ind. 195: an act came under consideration the title
1
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[* 145] very *" plain ; that the use of the words “ other purposes,”

[cu.

VI•

which has heretofore been so common in the title to acts,

with a view to cover any and every thing, whether connected with

the main purpose indicated by the title or not, can no longer be of

any avail where these provisions exist. As was said by the Su-

preme Court of New York, in a case where these words had been

made use of in the title to a local bill: “The words ‘for other

purposes ’ must be laid out of consideration. They express

nothing, and amount to nothing as a compliance with this consti-

tutional requirement. Nothing which the act could not embrace

without them can be brought in by their aid.” 1

3. What is embraced by the title. The repeal of a statute on a

given subject, it is held, is properly connected with the subject-

matter of a new statute on the same subject; and therefore a

repealing section in the new statute is valid, notwithstanding

the title is silent on that subject? So an act to incorporate a rail-

to which was, “ An act to amend the ﬁrst section of an act entitled ‘An act

conceming licenses to vend foreign merchandise, to exhibit any caravan, men-

agerie, circus, rope and wire dancing puppet-shows, and legerdemain,’ approved

June 15, 1852, and for the encouragement of agriculture, and concerning the

licensing of stock and exchange brokers.” It was held that the subject of the

act was licenses, and that it was not unconstitutional as containing more than
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one subject. But it was held also that, as the licenses which it authorized and

required were speciﬁed in the title, the act could embrace no others, and conse-

(*145] very • plain; that the use of the words" other purposes,"
which has heretofore been so common in the title to acts,
with a view to cover any and every thing, whether connected with
the main purpose indicated by the title or not, can no longer be of
any avail where these provisions exist. As was said by the Supreme Court of New York, in a case where these words had been
made use of in the title to a local bill : " The words ' for other
purposes ' must be laid out of consideration. They express
nothing, and amount to nothing as a compliance with this constitutional requirement. Nothing which the act could not embrace
without them can be brought in by their aid." 1
3. What is embraced by the title. The repeal of a statute on a
given subject, it is held, is properly connected with the subjectmatter of a new statute on the same subject; and therefore a
repealing section in the new statute is valid, notwithstanding
the title is silent on that subject.2 So an act to incorporate a rail-

quently a provision in the act requiring concerts to be licensed was void. In

State v. County Judge of Davis County, 2 Iowa, 280, the act in question was

entitled “ An act in relation to certain State roads therein named.” It contained

sixty-six sections, in which it established some forty-six roads, vacated some, and

provided for the re-location of others. The court sustained the act. “The

object of an act may be broader or narrower, more or less extensive; and the

broader it is, the more particulars will it embrace. . . . There is undoubtedly

great objection to uniting so many particulars in one act, but so long as they are

of the same nature, and come legitimately under one general determination or

object, we cannot say that the act is unconstitutional.” P. 284. Upon this sub-

ject see Indiana Central Railroad Co. v. Potts, 7 Ind. 684, where it is considered

at length. Also Brewster v. Syracuse, 19 N. Y. 116; Hall v. Bunte, 20 Ind.

304. An act entitled “ An act ﬁxing the time and mode of electing State printer,

deﬁning his duties, ﬁxing compensation, and repealing all laws coming in conﬂict

with this act," was sustained in Walker v. Dunham, 17 Ind. 483.

' Town of Fishkill v. Fishkill and Beekman Plank Road Co. 22 Barb. 642.

See, to the same effect, Ryerson v. Utley, 16 Mich. 269; St. Louis v. Tiefel, 42

Mo. 578. An act entitled “ An act to repeal certain acts therein named," is

void. People v. Mellen, 32 Ill. 181.

” Gabbert v. Railroad Co. 11 Ind. 365. The constitution under which this
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to which was, "An act to amend the first section of an act entitled • An act
concerning licenses to vend foreign merchandise, to exhibit any caravan, menagerie, circus, rope and wire dancing puppet-shows, and legerdemain,' approved
June 15, 1852, and for the encouragement of agriculture, and concerning the
licensing of stock and exchange brokers." It was held that the subject of the
act was licenses, and that it was not unconstitutional as containing more than
one subject. But it was held also that, as the licenses which it authorized and
required were specified in the title, the act could embrace no others, and consequently a provision in the act requiring concerts to be licensed was void. In
State v. County Judge of Davis County, 2 Iowa, 280, the act in question was
entitled "An act in relation to certain State roads therein named." It contained
sixty-six seetions, in which it e11tablished some forty-six roads, vacated some, and
provided for the re-location of others. The court sustained the act. " The
object of an act may be broader or narrower, more or less extensive; and the
broader it is, the more particulars will it embrace. • . . There is undoubtedly
great objection to uniting s!> many particulars in one act, but so long as they are
of the same nature, and come legitimately under one general detennination or
object, we cannot say that the act is unconstitutional." P. 284. Upon this subject see Indiana Central Railroad Co. t~. Potts, 7 Ind. 684, where it is considered
at length. Also Brewster t~. Syracuse, 19 N.Y. 116; Hall "· Bunte, 20 Ind.
804. An act entitled " An act fixing the time and mode of electing State printer,
defining his duties, fixing compensation, and repealing all laws coming in conflict
with this act," was sustained in Walker v. Dunbsm, 17 Ind. 483.
1 Town of Fishkill v. Fishkill and Beekman Plank Road Co. 22 Barb. 642.
See, to the same effect, Ryerson v. Utley, 16 Mich. 269; St. Louis v. Tiefel, 42
Mo. 578. An act entitled " An act to repeal certain acts therein named," is
Toid. People v. Mellen, 32 Ill. 181.
1 Gabbert v. Railroad Co. 11 Ind. 865.
The constitution under which this
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road “ company, it has been held, may authorize counties to [* 146]
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subscribe to its stock, or otherwise aid the construction of

the road} So an act to incorporate the Firemen’s Benevolent Asso-

ciation may lawfully include under this title provisions for levying a

tax upon the income of foreign insurance companies, at the place

of its location, for the beneﬁt of the corporation? So an act to

provide a homestead for widows and children was held valid,

though what it provided for was the pecuniary means suﬁicient to

purchase a l10II16Sl303.d.3 So an act “ to regulate proceedings in the

county court” was held to properly embrace a provision giving an

appeal to the District Court, and regulating the proceedings therein

on the appeal.‘ So an act entitled “ an act for the more uniform

doing of township business ” may properly provide for the organi-

zation of townships.“ So it is held that the changing of the boun-

daries of existing counties is a matter properly connected with

the subject of forming new counties out of those existing.“ So a

provision for the organization and sitting of courts in new counties

is properly connected with the subject of the formation of such

counties, and may be included in “ an act to authorize the form-

ation of new counties, and to change county boundaries.” 7 Many

other cases are referred to in the note which will further illustrate

the views of the courts upon this subject. There has been a general
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decision was made required the law to contain but one subject, and matters

properly connected therewith ,' but the same decision was made under the New

York constitution, which omits the words here italicized; and it may well be

doubted whether the legal effect of the provision is varied by the addition of

those words. See Guilford v. Cornell, 18 Barb. 640.

‘ Supervisors, &c. v. People, 25 Ill. 181. So a provision for the costs on

appeal from a justice, is properly connected with the subject of an act entitled

of “the election and qualiﬁcation of justices of the peace, and deﬁning their

jurisdiction, powers, and duties in civil cases.” Robinson v. Skipworth, 23 Ind.

311.

road • company, it has been held, may authorize counties to (*146]
subscribe to its stock, or otherwise aid the construction of
the road.1 So an act to incorporate the Firemen's Benevolent Association may lawfully include under this title provisions for levying a
tax upon the income of foreign insurance companies, at the place
of its location, for the benefit of the corporation.2 So an act to
provide a homestead for widows and children was held valid,
though what it provided for was the pecuniary means sufficient to
purchase a homestead.3 So an act" to regulate proceedings in the
county court" was held to properly embrace a provision giving an
appeal to the District Court, and regulating the proceedings therein
on the appenl.4 So an act entitled " an act for the more uniform
doing of township business " may properly provide for the organization of townships.6 So it is held that the changing of the boundaries of existing counties is a matter properly connected with
the subject of forming new counties out of those existing.6 So a
provision for the organization and sitting of courts in new counties
is properly connected with the subject of the formation of such
counties, and may be included in " an act to authorize the formation of new counties, and to change county boundaries." 7 Many
other cases are referred to in the note which will further illustrate
the views of the courts upon this subject. There has been a general

' F iremen's Association v. Lounsbury, 21 Ill. 511.

' Succession of Lanzetti, 9 La. An. 329.

‘ Murphey v. Menard, 11 Texas, 673.

" Clinton v. Draper, 14 Ind. 295.

‘ Haggard v. Hawkins, 14 Ind. 299. And see Duncombe v. Prindle, 12

Iowa, 1.

’ Brandon v. State, 16 Ind. 197. In this case, and also in State v. Bowers,

14 Ind. 198, it was held that if the title to an original act is suﬁicient to embrace

the matters covered by the provisions of an act amendatory thereof, it is un-

necessary to inquire whether the title of an amendatory act would, of itself, be

suﬂicient. And see Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa, 82.
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decision was made required the law to contain but one subject, and matters
properly connected therewith ; but the 11ame decision was made under the New
York constitution, which omits the words here italicized; and it may well be
doubted whether the legal effect of the provision is varied by the addition of
those words. See Guilford v. Cornell, 18 Barb. 640.
1 Supervisors, &c. 11. People, 25 TIL 181. So a provision for the costs on
appeal from a justice, is properly connected with the subject of an act entitled
of "the election and qualification of justices of the peace, and defining their
jurisdiction, powers, and duties in civil cases." Robinson 11. Skipworth, 23 Ind.

311.
Firemen's Association 11. Lounsbury, 21 Til. 511.
Succession of Lanzetti, 9 La. An. 329.
4 Murphey 11. 1\Ienard, 11 Texas, 673.
6 Clinton"· Draper, 14 Ind. 295.
• Haggard 11. Hawkins, U Ind. 299. And see Duncombe 11. Prindle, 12
Iowa, 1.
7 Brandon "· State, 16 Ind. 197.
In this case, and also in State 11. Bowers,
14 Ind. 198, it was held that if the title to an original act is sufficient to embrace
the matters covered by the provisions of an act amendatory thereof, it is unnecessary to inquire whether the title of an amendatory act would, of itself, be
sufficient. And see Morford 11. Unger, 8 Iowa, 82.
1
1

[ 153]

*" 146 cossrrrurromn LIMITATIONS. [011. VI.

CONSTITUTIONAL LUIITATIONS.

disposition to construe the constitutional provision liberally, rather

[ca. vr.

than to embarrass legislation by a construction whose strictness is

unnecessary to the accomplishment of the beneﬁcial purposes for

which it has been adopted}

‘ Green v. Mayor, &c., R. M. Charlt. 368; Martin v. Broach, 6 Geo. 21;

Protho v. Orr, 12 Geo. 36; Wheeler v. State, 23 Geo. 9; Hill v. Commissioners,

22 Geo. 203; Jones v. Columbus, 25 Geo. 610; Denham v. Holeman, 26 Geo.

disposition to construe the constitutional provision liberally, rather
than to embarrass legislation by a construction whose strictness is
unnecessary to the accomplishment of the beneficial purposes for
which it has been adopted. 1

182; Cannon v. Hemphill, 7 Texas, 184; Battle v. Howard, 13 Texas, 345;

Robinson v. State, 15 Texas, 311 ; Conner v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 2 Sandf.

355, and 5 N. Y. 285; Fishkill v. Plank Road Co. 22 Barb. 634; Brewster v.

Syracuse, 19 N. Y. 116; People v. McCann, 16 N. Y. 58; Williams v. People,

24 N. Y. 405; People v. Lawrence, 36 Barb. 177; Sharp v. Mayor, &c., of New

York, 31 Barb. 572; Davis v. State, 7 Md. 51; Keller v. State, 11 Md. 525;

Parkinson v. State, 14 Md. 184; Bossier 1:. Steele, 13 La. An. 433; Lazfon v.

Dufoe, 9 La. An. 329; State v. Harrison, 11 La. An. 722; Williams v. Payson,

14 La. An. 7; Fletcher 1:. Oliver, 25 Ark. 298; Mewherter v. Price, 11 Ind. 199;

Gabbert v. Railroad Co. ib. 365; Railroad Co. v. \Vhiteneck, 8 Ind. 217 ; Wil-

kins v. Miller, 9 Ind. 100; Foley v. State, ib. 363; Gillespie v. State, rib. 380;

Henry v. Henry, 13 Ind. 250; Igoe v. State, 14 Ind. 239; Haggard v. Hawkins,

ib. 299; Reed v. State, 12 Ind. 641; Sturgeon v. Hitchens, 22 Ind. 107; Lauer

v. State, ib. 461; Central Plank Road Co. v. Hannaman, ib. 484; Gifford v.

Railroad Co. 2 Stockt. 171; Johnson v. Higgins, 3 Met. (Ky.) 566; Chiles
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v. Drake, 2 Met. (Ky.) 146; Louisville, &c., Co. v. Ballard, ib. 165; Phillips v.

Covington, &c., Co. ib. 219; Chiles v. Monroe, 4 Met. (Ky.) 72; Common-

wealth v. Dewey, 15 Grat. 1 ; Whiting v. Mount Pleasant, 11 Iowa, 482; Tuttle

v. Strout, 7 Minn. 465; Supervisors, &c. v. Heenan, 2 Minn. 330; Railroad Co.

v. Gregory, 15 Ill. 20; People v. Mellen, 32 Ill. 181 ; Cutlip v. Sheriff, 3 \V. Va.

588; McAunich v. Mississippi, &c., R..R. Co. 20 Iowa, 338; State v. Gut, 13

Minn. 341. -

In Davis v. Woolnough, 9 Iowa, 104, an act entitled “An act for revising

and consolidating the laws incorporating the city of Dubuque, and to_ establish

a city court therein,” was held to express by its title but one object, which

was, the revising and consolidating the laws incorporating the city; and the

city court, not being an unusual tribunal in such a municipality, might be pro-

vided for by the act, whether mentioned in the title or not. “ An act to enable

the supervisors of the city and county of New York to raise money by tax,”

provided for raising money to pay judgments then existing, and also any there-

after to be recovered; and it also contained the further provision, that whenever

the controller of the city should have reason to believe that any judgment then

of record or thereafter obtained had been obtained by collusion, or was founded

in fraud, he should take the proper and necessary means to open and reverse the

same, &c. This provision was held constitutional, as properly connected with

the subject indicated by the title, and necessary to conﬁne the payments of the

tax to the objects for which the moneys were intended to be raised. Sharp v.

Mayor, &c., of New York, 31 Barb. 572. In O‘Leary v. Cook Co. 2811]. 534,

it was held that a clause in an act incorporating a college, prohibiting the sale
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1 Green v. Mayor, &c., R. M. Charlt. 368; Martin v. Broach, 6 Geo. 21 ;
Protho v. Orr, 12 Geo. 36; Wheeler v. State, 23 Geo. 9; Hill v. Commissioners,
22 Geo. 203; Jones v. Columbus, 25 Geo. 610; Denham v. Holeman, 26 Geo.
182; Cannon v. Hemphill, 7 Texas, 184; Battle v. Howard, 13 Texas, 3-!5 ;
Robinson v. State, 15 Texas, 311 ; Conner v.l\fayor, &c., of New York, 2 Sandf.
355, and 5 N.Y. 285; Fishkill v. Plank Road Co. 22 Barb. 634; Brewster v.
Syracuse, 19 N.Y. 116; People v.l\IcCann, 16 N. Y.58; Williams v. People,
24 N.Y. 405; People v. Lawrence, 36 Barb. 177; Sharp v. Mayor, &c., of New
York, 31 Barb. 572; Davis v. State, 7 Md. 51; Keller v. State, 11 Md. 525;
Parkinson v. State, 14 Md. 184; Bossier v. Steele, 13 La. An. 433; Lrefon v.
Dufoe, 9 La. An. 329; State v. Harrison, 11 La. An. 722; Williams t•. Payson,
14 La. An. 7; Fletcher v. Oliver, 25 Ark. 298; Mcwherter v. Price, 11 Ind. 199;
Gaubert v. Railroad Co. ib. 365; Railroad Co. v. Whiteneck, 8 Ind. 217 ; Wilkins v. Miller, 9 Ind. 100; Foley v. State, ib. 363; Gillespie v. State, ib. 380;
Henry v. Henry, 13 Ind. 250; Igoe v. State, 14 Ind. 239; Haggard v. Hawkins,
ib. 299; Reed v. State, 12 Ind. 6·!1; Sturgeon v. Hitchens, 22 Ind. 107; Lauer
v. State, ib. 461; Central Plank Road Co. v. Hannaman, ib. 484; Gilford v.
Railroad Co. 2 Stockt. 171; Johnson v. Higgins, 3 Met. (Ky.) 566; Chiles
v. Drake, 21\let. (Ky.) 146; Louisville, &c., Co. v. Ballard, ib. 165; Phillips v.
Covington, &c., Co. ib. 219; Chiles v. Monroe, 4 1\Iet. (Ky.) 72; Commonwealth v. Dewey, 15 Grat. 1; Whiting v. Mount Pleasant, 11 Iowa, 482; Tuttle
v. Strout, 7 Minn. 465; Supervisors, &c. v. Heenan, 2 Minn. 330; Railroad Co.
v. Gregory, 15 Ill. 20; People v.l\Icllen, 32 Ill. 181; Cutlip v. Sheriff, 3 W.Va.
588; McAunich v. Mississippi, &c., R.R. Co. 20 Iowa, 338; State v. Gut, 13
Minn. 341.
In Davis t?. Woolnough, 9 Iowa, 10!, an act entitled "An act for revising
and consolidating the laws incorporating the city of Dubuque, and to. establish
a city court therein," was held to express by its title but one object, which
was, the revising and consolidating the laws incorporating the city; and the
city court, not being an unusual tribunal in such a municipality, might be provided for by the act, whether mentioned in the title or not. "An act to enable
the supervisors of the city and county of New York to raise money by tax,"
provided for raising money to pay judgments then existing, and also any thereafter to be recovered; and it also contained the further provision, that whenever
the controller of the city should have reason to believe that any judgment then
of record or thereafter obtained had been obtained by collusion, or was founded
in fraud, he should take the proper and necessary means to open and reverse the
same, &c. This provision was held constitutional, as properly connected with
the subject indicated by the title, and necessary to confine the payments of the
tax to the objects for which the moneys were intended to be raised. Sharp v.
Mayor, &c., of New York, 31 Barb. 572. In O'Leary v. Cook Co. 28 Ill. 53!,
it was held that a clause in an act incorporating a college, prohibiting the sale
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" 4. The eﬂect if the title embrace more than one object. [‘* 147]
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Perhaps in those States where this constitutional provision

is limited ‘in its operation to private and local bills, it [* 148]

might be held that an act was not void for embracing two

or more objects which were indicated by its title, provided one of

them only was of a. private and local nature. It has been held in

New York that a local bill was not void because embracing general

provisions also;1 and if they may constitutionally be embraced in

the act, it is presumed they may also be constitutionally embraced

in the title. But if the title to the act actually indicates, and the

act itself actually embraces, two distinct objects, when the consti-

tution says it shall embrace but one, the whole act must be treated

as void, from the manifest impossibility in the court choosing

between the two, and holding the act valid as to the one and void

as to the other.

5. The effect where the act is broader than the title. But if the

act is broader than the title, it may happen that one part of it can

stand because indicated by the title, while as to the object not in-

of ardent spirits within a distance of four miles, was so germane to the primary

object of the charter as to be properly included within it. By the ﬁrst section

of “an act for the relief of the creditors of the Lockport and Niagara Falls

Railroad Company,” it was made the duty of the president of "the corporation, or
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one of the directors to he appointed by the president, to ‘advertise and sell the

real and personal estate, including the franchise of the company, at public auction

to the highest bidder. It was then declared that the sale should be absolute,

and that it should vest in the purchaser or purchasers of the property, real or

personal, of the company, all the franchise, rights, and privileges of the cor-

• 4. The effect if tlte title embrace more titan one object. [*147]
Perhaps in those States where this constitutional provision
is limited • in its operation to private and local bills, it [*148]
might be held that an act was not void for embracing two
or more objects which were indicated by its title, provided one of
them only was of a private and local nature. It has been held in
New York that a local bill was not void because embracing general
provisions also; 1 and if they may constitutionally be embraced in
the act, it is presumed they may also be constitutionally embraced
in the title. But if the title to the act actually indicates, and the
act itself actually embraces, two distinct objects, when the constitution says it shall embrace but one, the whole act must be treated
as void, from the manifest impossibility in the court choosing
between the two, and holding the act valid as to the one and void
as to the other.
5. Tlze effect where the act is broader than the title. But if the
act is broader than the title, it may happen that one part of it can
stand because indicated by the title, while as to the object not in-

poration," as fully and as absolutely as the same were then possessed by the

company. The money arising from the sale, after paying costs, was to be applied,

ﬁrst, to the payment of a certain judgment, and then to other liens according

to priority; and the surplus, if any, was to be divided ratably among the other

creditors, and then if there should be an overplus, it was to be divided ratably

among the then stockholders. By the second section of the act, it was declared

that the purchaser or purchasers should have the right to sell and distribute

stock to the full amount which was authorized by the act of incorporation, and

the several amendments thereto; and to appoint an election, choose directors,

and organize a corporation anew, with the same powers as the existing company.

There was then a proviso, that nothing in the act should impair or affect the

subscriptions for new fstock, or the obligations or liabilities of the company

which had been made or incurred in the extension of the road from Lockport to

Rochester, &c. The whole act was held to be constitutional. Mosier v. Hilton,

15 Barb. 657.

' People 0. McCann, 16 N. Y. 58.
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of ardent spirits within a distance of four miles, was so germane to the primary
object of the charter as to be properly included within it. By the first section
of "an act for the relief of the creditors of the Lockport and Niagara Falls
Railroad Company," it was made the duty of the president of· the corporation, or
one of the directors to be appointed by the president, to ·advertise and sell the
real and personal estate, including the franchise of the company, at public auction
to the highest bidder. It was then declared that the sale should be absolute,
and that it should vest in the purchaser or purchasers of the property, real or
personal, of the compAny, all the franchise, rights, and privileges of the corporation; as fully and as absolutely as the same were then possessed by the
company. The money arising from the sale, after paying costs, was to be applied,
£rst, to the payment of a certain judgment, and then to other liens according
to priority; and the surplus, if any, was to be divided ratably among the other
creditors, and then if there should be an overplus, it was to be divided ratably
among the then stockholders. By the second section of the act, it was declared
that the purchaser or purcha~ers should have the right to sell and distribute
stock to the full amount which was authorized by the act of incorporation, and
the several amendments thereto ; and to appoint an election, choose directors,
and organize a corporation anew, with the same powers as the existing company.
There was then a proviso, that nothing in the act should impair or affect the
subscriptions for new ~stock, or the obligations or liabilities of the company
which had been made or incurred in the extension of the road from Lockport to
Ro(·hester, &c. The whole act was held to be constitutional. Mosier 11. Hilton,
15 Barh. 657.
1 People 11. McCann, 16 N.Y. 58.
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dicated by the title it must fail. Some of the State constitutions,
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it will be perceived, have declared that this shall be the rule ; but

the declaration was unnecessary ; as the general rule, that so much

of the act as is not in conﬂict with the constitution must be sus-

tained, would have required the same declaration from the courts.

If by striking from the act all that relates to the object not

indicated by the title, that which is left is complete _in itself,

sensible, capable of being executed, and wholly independent of that

which is rejected, it must be sustained as constitutional.

[*1-19] *The principal questions in each case will therefore be,

whether the act is in truth broader than the title; and if

so, then whether the other objects in the act are so intimately

connected with the one indicated by the title that the portion of the

act relating to them cannot be rejected, and leave a complete and

sensible enactment which is capable of being executed.

As the legislature may make the title to an act as restrictive as

they please, it is obvious that they may sometimes so frame it as

to preclude many matters being included in the act which might

with entire propriety have been embraced in one enactment with

the matters indicated by the title, but which must now be excluded,

because the title has been made unnecessarily restrictive. The

courts cannot enlarge the scope of the title ; they are vested with
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no dispensing power; the constitution has made the title the con-

clusive index to the legislative intent as to what shall have

operation; it is no answer to say that the title might have been

made more comprehensive, if in fact the legislature have not seen

ﬁt to make it so. Thus, “ An act concerning promissory notes and

bills of exchange” provided that all promissory notes, bills of

exchange, or other instruments in writing, for the payment of

money, or for the delivery of speciﬁc articles, or to convey property,

or to perform any other stipulation therein mentioned, should be

negotiable, and assignees of the same might sue thereon in their

own names. It was held that this act was void, as to all the

instruments mentioned therein except promissory notes and

bills of exchange;1 though it is obvious that it would have

been easy to frame a title to the act which would have em-

braced them all, and which would have been unobjectionable.

It has also been held that an act for the preservation of

the Muskegon River Improvement could not lawfully provide

‘ Mewherter v. Price, 11 Ind. 199.
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dicated by the title it must fail. Some of the State constitutions,
it will be perceived, have declared that this shall be the rule; but
the declaration was unnecessary ; as the general rule, that so much
of the act as is not in conflict with the constitution must be sustained, would have required the same declaration from the courts.
If by striking from the act all that relates to the object not
indicated by the title, that which is left is complete .in itself,
sensible, capable of being executed, and wholly independent of that
which is rejected, it must be sustained as constitutional.
[*149] • The principal questions in each case will therefore be,
whether the act is in truth broader than the title; and if
so, then whether the other objects in the act are so intimately
connected with the one indicated by the title that the portion of the
act relating to them cannot be rejected, and leave a complete and
sensible enactment which is capable of being executed.
As the legislature may make the title to an act as restrictive as
they please, it is obvious that they may sometimes so frame it as
to preclude many matters being included in the act which might
with entire propriety have been embraced in one enactment with
the matters indicated by the title, but which must now be excluded,
because the title has been made unnecessarily restrictive. The
courts cannot enlarge the scope of the title; they are vested with
no dispensing power; the constitution has made the title the conclusive index to the legislative intent as to what shall have
operation; it is no answer to say that the title might have been
made more comprehensive, if in fact the legislature have not seen
fit to make it so. Thus, " An act concerning promissory notes and
bills of exchange " provided that all promissory notes, bills of
exchange, or other instruments in writing, for the payment of
money, or for tho delivery of specific articles, or to convey property,
or to perform any other stipulation therein mentioned, should be
negotiable, and assignees of the same might sue thereon in their
own names. It was held that this act was void, as to all the
instruments mentioned therein except promissory notes and
bills of exchange ; 1 though it is obvious that it would have
been easy to frame a title to the act which would have embraced them all, and which would have been unobjectionable.
It has also been held that an act for the preservation of
the Muskegon River Improvement could not lawfully provide
1
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1\-fewherter v. Price, 11 Ind. 199.
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for the levy and collection of tolls for the payment of the

CH. VI.]

*149

OF THE ENACTMENT OF LAWB.

expense of constructing the improvement, as the operation of

the act was carefully limited by its title to the future.‘ So also it

has been held that “an act to limit the number of grand jurors»

and to point out the mode of their selection, deﬁning their

jurisdiction, and repealing all laws inconsistent therewith,” could

not constitutionally contain provisions which should authorize

a defendant in a criminal case, on a trial for any offence,

to be found guilty of any lesser offence necessarily

‘included therein? These cases must suﬂice upon this [* 150]

point; though the cases before referred to will furnish

many similar illustrations.

In all we have said upon this subject we have assumed the con-

stitutional provision to be mandatory. Such has been the view of

the courts almost without exception. In California, however, a

different view has been taken, the court saying: “ We regard this

section of the constitution as merely directory ; and, if we were in-

clined to a different opinion, would be careful how we lent

ourselves to a construction which must in eﬂ'ect obliterate almost

every law from the statute-book, unhinge the business and destroy

the labor of the last three years. The ﬁrst legislature that met

under the constitution seems to have considered this section as
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directory ; and almost every act of that and the subsequent sessions

would be obnoxious to this objection. The contemporaneous

exposition of the ﬁrst legislature, adopted or acquiesced in by

every subsequent legislature, and tacitly assented to by the courts,

taken in connection with the fact that rights have grown up under

it, so that it has become a rule of property, must govern our

decision.” 3 Similar views have also been expressed in the State

of Ohio.‘ These cases, and especially what is said by the Califor-

nia court, bring forcibly before our minds a fact, which cannot be

‘ Ryerson v. Utley, 16 Mich. 269. See further \Veaver v. Lapsley, 43 Ala.

229; Tuscaloosa Bridge Co. v. Olmstead, 41 Ala. 9; Stuart v. Kinsella, 14 Minn.

524. In Cutlip v. Sheriﬂ‘, 3 W. Va. 588, it was hold that if an act embraces two

objects, only one of which is speciﬁed in the title, the whole is void; but this

is opposed to the authorities generally. '

’ Foley v. State, ,9 Ind. 863; Gillespie v. State, ib. 380. See also Indiana

Cent. Railroad Co. v. Potts, 7 Ind. 681; State v. Squires, 26 Iowa, 340; State

v. Lafayette Co. Court, 41 Mo. 39.

' Washington 0. Murray, 4 Cal. 388.

‘ Miller v. State, 3 Ohio, N. s. 475; Pim v. Nicholson, 6 Ohio, N. s. 177.
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for the levy and collection of tolls for the payment of the
expense of constructing the improvement, as the operation of
the act was carefully limited by its title to the future.l So also it
has been held that " an act to limit the number of grand jurors,
and to point out the mode of their selection, defining their
jurisdiction, and repealing all laws inconsistent therewith," could
not constitutionally contain provisions which should authorize
a defendant in a criminal case, on a trial for any offence,
to be found guilty of any lesser offence necessarily
• included therein. 2 These cases must suffice upon this [*150]
point; though the cases before referred to will furnish
many similar illustrations.
In all we have said upon this subject we have assumed the constitutional provision to be mandatory. Such has been the view of
the courts almost without exception. In California, however, a
different view has been taken, the court saying: " We regard this
section of the constitution as merely directory; and, if we were inclined to a different opinion, would be careful how we lent
ourselves to a construction which must in effect obliterate almost
every law from the statute-book, unhinge the business and destroy
the labor of the last three years. The first legislature that met
under the constitution seems to have considered this section as
directory ; and almost every act of that and the subsequent sessions
would bo obnoxious to this objection. The contemporaneous
exposition of the first legislature, adopted or acquiesced in by
every subsequent legislature, and tacitly assented to by the courts,
taken in connection with the fact that rights have grown up under
it, so that it has become a rule of property, must govern our
decision." 3 Similar views have also been expressed in the State
of Ohio.• These cases, and especially what is said by the California court, bring forcibly before our minds a fact, which cannot be
Ryerson "· Utley, 16 Mich. 269. See further Weaver"· Lapsley, 43 Ala.
229; Tuscaloosa Bridge Co."· Olmstead, 41 Ala. 9; Stuart"· Kinsella, 14 Minn.
524. In Cutlip "· Sheriff, 3 W. Va. 588, it was held that if an act embraces two
objects, only one of which is specified in the title, the whole is void; but this
is opposed to the authorities generally.
,
1 Foley "· State, .9 Ind. 363; Gillespie 1'. State, ,·b. 380.
See also Indiana
Cent. Railroad Co. "· Potts, 7 Ind. 681; State "· Squires, 26 Iowa, 340; State
1'. Lafayette Co. Court, 41 Mo. 39.
a Washington"· Murray, 4 Cal. 388.
• Miller"· State, 8 Ohio, N. 8. 476; Pim "·Nicholson, 6 Ohio, N. 8. 177.
1
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kept out of view in considering this subject, and which has a very

[CH. VI.

important bearing upon the precise point which these decisions

cover. The fact is this: that whatever constitutional provision can

be looked upon as directory merely is very likely to be treated by

legislature as if it was devoid even of moral obligation, and to be

therefore habitually disregarded. To say that a provision is

direct0ry' seems, with many persons, to be equivalent to saying

that it is not law at all. That this ought not to be so must be con-

ceded ; that it is so we have abundant reason and good authority

for saying. If, therefore, a constitutional provision is to be enforced

at all, it must be treated as mandatory. And if the legislature l1abit-

ually disregard it, it seems to us that there is all the more urgent

necessity that the courts should enforce it. And it also

[’* 151] seems to us that there are few evils which * can he inﬂict-

ed by a strict adherence to the law, so great as that which

is done by the habitual disregard, by any department of the

government, of a plain requirement of that instrument from which

it derives its authority, and which ought, therefore, to be scrupu-

lously observed and obeyed. Upon this subject we need only refer

here to what we have said concerning it in another p1ace.1

Amemiatory Statutes.

It has also been deemed important, in some of the States, to
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provide by their constitutions, that “ no act shall ever be revised

or amended by mere reference to its title; but the act revised or

section amended shall be set forth and published at full length.” 2

Upon this provision an important query arises. Does it mean

‘ Ante. p. 74.

' This is the provision as it is found in the Constitutions of Indiana, Nevada,

Oregon, Texas, and Virginia. In Kansas, Ohio, Nebraska, Michigan, Louisiana,

kept out of view iu considering this subject, and which has a very
important bearing upon the precise point which these decisions
cover. The fact is this: that whatever constitutional provision can
be looked upon as directory merely is very likely to be treated by
legislature as if it was devoid even of moral obligation, and to be
therefore habitually disregarded. To say that a provision is
directory' seems, with many persons, to be equivalent to saying
that it is not law at all. That this ought not to be so must be conceded ; that it is so we have abundant reason and good authority
for saying. If, therefore, a constitutional provision is to be enforced
at all, it must be treated as mandatory. And if the legislature habitually disregard it, it seems to us that there is all the more urgent
necessity that the courts should enforce it. And it also
[•151] seems to us that there are few ev~ls which • can he inflicted by a strict adherence to the law, so great as that which
is done by the habitual disregard, by any department of the
government, of a plain requirement of that instrument from which
it derives its authority, and which ought, therefore, to be scrupulously observed and obeyed. Upon this subject we need only refer
here to what we have said concerning it in another place. 1

Wisconsin, Missouri, and Maryland there are provisions of similar import. In

Tennessee the provision is: " All acts which revive, repeal, or amend former

laws, shall recite in their caption or otherwise, the title or substance of the law

Amendatory Statutes.

repealed, revived, or amended.” Art. 1, § 17.

In Texas it appears to be held that the legislature may repeal a deﬁnite por-

tion of a section without the re-enactment of the section with such portion omitted.

Chambers v. State, 25 Texas, 307. But qucere of this. Any portion of a section

amended which is not contained in the amendatory section as set forth and pub-

ﬁshed is repealed. State v. Ingersoll, 17 Wis. 631.

[158 ]

It has also been deemed important, in some of the States, to
provide by their constitutions, that "no act shall ever be revised
or amended by mere reference to its title ; but the act revised or
section amended shall be set forth and published at full length." a
Upon this provision an important query arises. Does it mean
.Ante, P· 74.
This is the provision as it is found in the Constitutions. of Indiana, Nevada,
Oregon, Texas, and Virginia. In Kansas, Ohio, Nebraska, Michigan, Louisiana,
Wisconsin, Missouri, and Maryland there are provisions of similar import. In
Tennessee the provision is : " All acts which revive, repeal, or amend fonner
laws, shall recite in their caption or otherwise, the title or substance of the law
repealed, revived, or amended." Art. 1, § 17.
In Texas it appears to be held that the legislature may repeal a definite portion of a section without the re·enactment of the section with such portion omitted.
Chambers v. State, 25 Texas, 307. But qurere of this. Any portion of a section
amended which is not contained in the amendatory section as set forth and published is repealed. State v. Ingersoll, 17 Wis. 631.
I

1
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that the act or section revised or amended shall be set forth and

CH. VI.]
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published at full length as it stood before, or does it mean only

that it shall be set forth and published at full lengthas amended

or revised? Upon this question perhaps a consideration of the

purpose of the provision may throw some light. “The mischief

designed to be remedied was the enactment of amendatory stat-

utes in terms so blind that legislators themselves were sometimes

deceived in regard to their eﬁects, and the public, from the diﬁi-

culty in making the necessary examination and comparison, failed

to become apprised of the changes made in the laws. An

amendatory act which purported only to insert certain words, or to

substitute one phrase for another in an act or section which was

only'referred to, but not published, was well calculated to mis-

lead the careless as to its effect, and was, perhaps, sometimes

drawn in that form for the express purpose. Endless confusion

was thus introduced into the law, and the constitution wisely pro-

hibited such legislation.”1 If this is a correct view of the pur-

pose of the provision, it does not seem to be at all important to

its accomplishment that the old law should be republished, if the

aw as amended is given in full, with such reference to the old

law as will show for what the new law is substituted.

Nevertheless,‘ it has been decided in Louisiana that the ["‘ 152]
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constitution requires the old law to be set forth and pub-

lished ;’ and the courts of Indiana, assuming the provision in their

own constitution to be taken from that of Louisiana after the deci-

sions referred to had been made, at one time adopted and followed

them as precedents.“ It is believed, however, that the general

understanding of the provision in question is diﬂerent, and that it

is fully complied with in letter and spirit, if the act or section

revised or amended is set forth and published as revised or amended,

and that any thing more only tends to render the statute unneces-

sarily cumbrous! Statutes which amend others by implication,

however, are not within this provision; and it is not essential that

‘ People v. Mahaney, 18 Mich. 497.

’ Walker v. Caldwell, 4 La. An. 297; Heirs of Duverge v. Salter, 5 La. An.

94.

J Langdon v. Applegate, 5 Ind. 327; Rogers v. State, 6 Ind. 31. These

cases were overruled in Greencastle, &c., Co. v. State, 28 Ind. 382.

‘ Sec Tuscaloosa Bridge Co. v. Olmstead, 41 Ala. 9; People v. Pritchard, 20

Mich. i
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that the act or section revised or amended shall be set forth and
published at full length as it stood before, or does it mean only
that it shall be set forth and published at full length. as amended
or revised? Upon this question perhaps a consideration of the
purpose of the provision may throw some light. " The mischief
designed to be remedied was the enactment of amendatory sta~
utes in terms so blind that legislators themselves were sometimes
deceived in regard to their effects, and the public, from the difficulty in making the necessary examination and comparison, failed
to become apprised of the changes made in the laws. An
amendatory act which purported only to insert certain words, or to
substitute one phrase for another in an act or section wlrich was
only' referred to, but not published, was well calculated to mislead the careless as to its effect, and was, perhaps, sometimes
drawn in that form for the express purpose. Endless confusion
was thus introduced into the law, and the constitution wisely prohibited such legislation." 1 If this is a correct view of the purpose of the provision, it does not seem to be at all important to
its accomplishment that the old law should be republished, if the
aw as amended is given in full, with such reference to the old
law as will show for what the new law is substituted.
Kevertheless,• it has been decided in Louisiana that the [*152]
constitution requires the old law to be set forth and· published ; 2 and the courts of Indiana, assuming the provision in their
own constitution to be taken from that of Louisiana after the decisions referred to had been made, at one time adopted and followed
them as precedents.3 It is believed, however, that the general
understanding of the provision in question is different, and that it
is fully complied with in letter and spirit, if the act or section
revised or amended is set forth and published as revised or amended,
and that any thing more only tends to render the statute unnecessarily cumbrous. 4 Statutes which amend others by implication,
however, are not within this provision; and it is not essential that
1

1

People 11. Mahaney, 18 1\lich. 497.
Walker 11. Caldwell, 4 La. An. 297; Heirs of Duverge "· Salter, 5 La. An.

94.
3 Langdon 11. Applegate, 5 Ind. 827; Rogers 11. State, 6 Ind. 31. These
cases were overruled in Greencastle, &c., Co. 11. State, 28 Ind. 882.
4 Sec Tuscaloosa Bridge Co. 11. Olmstead, 41 Ala. 9; People v. Pritchard, 20
Mich.
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they even refer to the acts or sections which by implication they

[CH. VI.

amend} _,

It was a parliamentary rule that a statute should not be re-

pealed at the same session of its enactment, unless a clause per-

mitting it was inserted in the statute itself ;2 but this rule did

not apply to repeals by implication,“ and it is possibly not recog-

nized in this country at all, except where it is incorporated in the

State constitution.‘

Signing of Bills.

When a bill has passed the two houses, it is engrossed for the

signatures of the presiding officers. This is a constitutional re-

quirement in most of the States, and therefore cannot be‘ dis-

pensed with; though, in the absence of any such requirement, it

they even refer to the acts or sections which by implication they
amend.1
It was a parliamentary rule that a statute should not be repealed at the same session of its enactment, unless a clause permitting it was inserted in the statute itself; 2 but this rule did
not apply to repeals by implication,8 and it is possibly not recognized in this country at all; except where it is incorporated in the
State constitution.'

would seem not to be essential.“ And if, by the consti-

Signing of Bills.

[*153] tution of " the State, the governor is a. component part of

the legislature, the bill is then presented to him for his

approval.

Approval of Laws.

The qualiﬁed veto power of the governor is regulated by the

constitutions of those States which allow it, and little need be

said here beyond referring to the constitutional provisions for

information concerning them. It has been held that if the gov-
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ernor, by statute, was entitled to one day, previous to the adjourn-

ment of the legislature, for the examination and approval of laws,

‘ People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 496; Spencer v. State, 5 Ind. 41 ; Branham 0.

Lange, 16 Ind. 497; Lehman v. McBride, 15 Ohio, N. s. 573. Repeals by im-

plication, however, are not favored. Ibid. And see Naylor v. Field, 5 Dutch.

When a bill has passed the two houses, it is engrossed for the
signatures of the presiding officers. This is a constitutional requirement in most of the States, and therefore cannot be' dispensed with; though, in the absence of any such requirement, it
would seem not to be essential.5 And if, by the consti[ *153] tution of • the State, the governor is a component part of
the legislature, the bill is then presented to him for his
approval.

287; State v. Berry, 12 Iowa, 58; Attorney-General v. Brown, 1 \Vis. 525;

Approval of Laws.

Dodge v. Gridley, 10 Ohio, 177; Hirn v. State, 1 Ohio, N. s. 20; McCool v.

Smith, 1 Black, 459; New Orleans v. Southern Bank, 15 La. An. 89; Blain v.

Bailey, 25 Ind. 165; Swann v. Buck, 40 Miss. 268; Davis v. State, 7 Md. 151;

State v. The Treasurer, 41 Mo. 16.

* Dwarris on Statutes, Vol. I. p. 269; Sedgw. on Stat. and Const. Law, 122,;

Smith on Stat. and Const. Construction, 908.

’ Ibid. And see Spencer v. State, 5 Ind. 41.

‘ Spencer v. State, 5 Ind. 41; Attorney—General v. Brown, 1 Wis. 513; Smith

on Stat. and Const. Construction, 908; Mobile & Ohio Railroad C0. v. State, 29

Ala. 573.

The qualified veto power of the governor is regulated by the
constitutions of those States which allow it, and little need be
said here beyond referring to the constitutional provisions for
information concerning them. It bas been held that if the governor, by statute, was entitled to one day, previous to the adjournment of the legislature, for the examination and approval of laws,

' Speer v. Plank Road Co. 22 Penn. St. 376.

Q .~ "
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1 People o. Mahaney, 131t!ich. 496; Spencer v. State, 5 Ind. 41; Branham"·
Lange, 16 Ind. 497; Lehman v. McBride, 16 Ohio, N. s. 573. Repeals by implication, however, are not favored. Ibid. And see Na);lor v. Field, 5 Dutch.
287; State v. Berry, 12 Iowa, 58; Attorney-General v. Brown, 1 Wis. 525;
Dodge o. Gridley, 10 Ohio, 177; Hirn v. State, 1 Ohio, N. s. 20; :McCool v.
Smith, 1 Black, 459; New Orleans v. Southern Bank, 15 La. An. 89; Blain v.
Bailey, 25 Ind. 165; Swann v. Buck, 40 Miss. 268; Davis v. State, 7 Md. 151;
State v. The Treasurer, 41 Mo. 16.
1 Dwarris on Statutes, Vol. I. p. 269; Sedgw. on Stat. and Const. Law,122;
Smith on Stat. and Const. Construction, 908.
1 Ibid.
And see Spencer"· State, 6 Ind. 41.
• Spencer "· State, 5 Ind. 41 ; Attorney-General v. Brown, 1 Wis. lHS; Smith
on Stat. and Const. Construction, 908; Mobile & Ohio Railroad Co. o. State, 29
Ala. 573.
• Speer v. Plank Road Co. 22 Penn. St. 376.
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this is to be understood as a full day of twenty-four hours, before
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*153

the'hour of the ﬁnal adjournment.‘ It has also been held that,

in the approval of laws, the governor is a component part of the

legislature, and that unless the constitution allows further time

for the purpose, he must exercise his power of approval before

the two houses adjourn, or his act will be void.’ But under a

provision of the constitution of Minnesota, that the governor‘ may

approve and sign “ within three days of the adjournment of the

legislature any act passed during the last three days of the ses-

sion,” it has been held that Sundays were not to be included as

a part of the prescribed time;3 and under the constitution of

New York, which provided that, “if any bill shall not be returned

by the governor within ten days, Sundays excepted, after it shall

have been presented to him, the same shall be a law, in like man-

ner as if he had signed it, unless the legislature shall, by their

adjournment, prevent its return, in which ease it shall not be a

1aw,” it was held that the governor might sign a bill after the

adjournment, at any time within the ten days! The governor’s

approval is not complete until the bill has passed beyond his

control * by the constitutional and customary mode of leg- [*‘ 154]

' Hyde v. White, 24 Texas, 137. The ﬁve days allowed in New Hampshire

for the govemor to return bills which have not received his assentf include days
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on which the legislature is not in session, if it has not ﬁnally adjourned. Opinions

of Judges, 45 N. H. 607. But the day of presenting the bill to the governor

should be excluded. Ibid.

Neither house can, without the consent of the other, recall a bill after its

transmission to the governor. People 2:. Devlin, 33 N. Y. 269.

The delivery of a bill passed by the two houses to the secretary of the com-

monwealth according to custom, is not a presentation to the governor for his

approval, within the meaning of the constitutional clause which limits him to a

this is to be understood as a full day of twenty-four hours, before
the· hour of the final adjournment} It has also been held that,
in the approval of laws, the governor is a component part of the
legislature, and that unless the constitution allows further time
for the purpose, he must exercise his power of approval before
the two houses adjourn, or his act will be void.2 But under a
provision of the constitution of Minnesota, that the governor- may .
approve and sign " within three days of the adjournment of the
legislature any act passed during the last three days of the session," it has been held that Sundays were not to be included as
a part of the prescribed time ; 3 and under the constitution of
New York, which provided that, "if any bill shall not be returned
by the governor within ten days, Sundays excepted, after it shall
have been presented to him, the same shall be a law, in like manner as if he had signed it, unlesR the legislature shall, by their
adjournment, prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a
law," it was held that the governor might sign a bill after the
adjournment, at any time within the ten days. 4 The governor's .
approval is not complete until the bill has passed beyond his
control* by the constitutional and customary mode of leg- [*154]

certain number of days after the presentation of the bill to veto it. Opinions of

the Justices, 99 Mass. 636.

' Fowler v. Peirce, 2 Cal. 165. The court also held in this case that, notwith-

standing an act purported to have been approved before the actual adjournment,

it was competent to show by parol evidence that the actual approval was not

until the next day. In support of this ruling, People v. Purdy, 2 Hill, 31, was

cited, where it was held that the court might go behind the statute-book and in-

quire whether an act to which a two-thirds vote was essential had constitutionally

passed. That, however, would not be in direct contradiction of the record,

but it would be inquiring into a fact concerning which the statute was silent, and

other records supplied the needed information.

‘ Stinson v. Smith, 8 Minn. 366.

‘ People v. Bowen, 30 Barb. 24.
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1 Hyde v. White, 24 Texas, 137.
The five days allowed in New Hampshire
for the governor to return bills which have not received his assent! include days
on which the legislature is not in session, if it has not finally adjourned. Opinions
of Judges, 45 N.H. 607. But the day of presenting the bill to the governor
should be excluded. Ibid.
Neither house can, without the consent of the other, recall a bill after its
transmi~sion to the governor. People v. Devlin, 38 N.Y. 269.
The delivery of a bill passed by the two houses to the secretary of the commonwealth according to custom, is not a presentation to the governor for his
approval, within the meaning of the constitutional clause which limits him to a
certain number of days after the presentation of the bill to veto it. Opinions of
the Justices, !19 Mass. 636.
1 Fowler v. Peirce, 2 Cal. 165.
The court also held in this case that, notwithstanding an act purported to have been approved before the actual adjournment,
it was competent to show by parol evidence that the actual approval was not
until the next day. In support of this ruling, People v. Purdy, 2 Hill, 31, was
cited, where it was held that the court might go behind the statute-book and inquire whether an act. to which a two-thirds vote was essential had constitutionally
passed. That, however, would not be in direct contradiction of the record,
but it would be inquiring into a fiLet concerning which the statute was silent, and
other records supplied the needed information.
3 Stinson v. Smith, 8 1\linn. 366.
' People "· Bowen, 30 Barb. 24.
11
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islation ; and at any time prior to that he may reconsider and retract

[CH. VI.

any approval previously made} His disapproval of a. bill is com-

municated to the house in which it originated, with his reasons;

and it is there reconsidered, and may be again passed over the

veto by such vote as the constitution prescribes?

‘ People v. Hatch, 19 Ill. 283. An act apportioning the representatives was

passed by the legislature and transmitted to the governor, who signed his appro-

val thereon by mistake, supposing at the time that he was subscribing one of

several other bills then lying before him, and claiming his otﬁeial attention ; his

islation ; and at any time prior to that he may reconsider and retract
any approval previously made.1 His disapproval of a bill is communicated to the house in which it originated, with his reasons;
and it is there reconsidered, and may be again passed over the
veto by such vote as the constitution prescribes.2

private secretary thereupon reported the bill to the legislature as approved, not

by the special direction of the governor, nor with his knowledge or special assent,

but merely in his usual routine of customary duty, the governor not being con-

scious that he had placed his signature to the bill until after information was

brought to him of its having been reported approved; whereupon he sent a mes-

sage to the speaker of the house to which it was reported, stating that it had

been inadvertently signed and not approved, and on the same day completed a

veto message of the bill which was partially written at the time of signing his

approval, and transmitted it to the house where the bill originated, having ﬁrst

erased his signature and approval. It was held that the bill had not become a

law. It had never passed out of the governor's possession after it was received

by him until alter he had erased his signature and approval, and the court was

of opinion that it did not pass from his control until it had become a law by the
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lapse often days under the constitution, or by his depositing it with his approval

in the olﬁce of the secretary of state. It had long been the practice of the gov-

ernor to report, formerly through the secretary of state, but recently through his

private secretary, to the house where bills originated, his approval of them; but

this was only a matter of formal courtesy, and not a proceeding necessary to the

making or imparting vitality to the law. By it no act could become a law which

without it would not be a law. Had the governor returned the bill itself to the

house. with his message of approval, it would have passed beyond his control,

and the approval could not have been retracted, unless the bill had been with-

drawn by consent of the house; and the same result would have followed his

ﬁling the bill with the secretary of state with his approval subscribed.

The constitution of Indiana provides, art. 5, § 14, that, “ if any bill shall not

be returned by the governor within three days, Sundays excepted, after it shall

have been presented to him, it shall be a law without his signature, unless the

general adjournment shall prevent its return; in which case it shall be a law

unless the governor, within ﬁve days next alter the adjournment, shall ﬁle such

bill with his objections thereto, in the oﬁiee of the secretary of state,” &c. Under

this provision it was held that where the governor, on the day of the ﬁnal ad-

journment of the legislature, and after the adjournment, ﬁled a bill received that

day, in the oﬁice of the secretary of state, without approval or objections thereto,

it thereby became a law, and he could not ﬁle objections afterwards. Tarlton v.

Peggs, 18 Ind. 24.

' A bill which, as approved and signed, differs in important particulars from

the one signed, is no law. Jones v. Hutchinson, 43 Ala. 721.

[162]

1 People v. Hatch, 19 Dl. 283.
An act apportioning the representatives was
passed by the legialature and transmitted to the governor, who signed his approval thereon by mistake, supposing at the time that he was subscribing one of
several other bills then lying before him, and claiming his official attention ; his
private secretary thereupon reported the bill to the legislature as approved, not
by the special direction of the governor, nor with his knowledge or special assent,
but merely in his usual routine of customary duty, the governor not being conscious that he had placed his signature to the bill until after information was
brought to him of its having been reported approved; whereupon he sent a measage to the speaker of the house to which it was reported, stating that it had
been inadvertently signed and not approved, and on the same day completed a
veto message of the bill which was partially written at the time of signing his
approval, and transmitted it to the bouse where the bill originated, having first
erased his signature and approval. It was held that the bill had not become a
law. It had never passed out of the governor's possession after it was received
by him until after he had erased his signature and approval, and the court was
of opinion that it did not pass from his control until it had become a law by the
lapse of ten days under the constitution, or by his depositing it with his approval
in the office of the secretary of state. It had long been the practice of the governor to report, formerly through the secretary of sbte, but recently through his
private secretary, to the house where bills originated, his approval of them; but
this was only a matter of formal courtesy, and not a proceeding necessary to the
making or imparting vitality to the law. By it no act could become a law which
without it would not be a law. Had the governor returned the bill itself to the
house, with his message of approval, it would have passed beyond his control,
and the appronl could not have been retracted, unless the bill had been withdrawn by consent of the house; and the same result would have followed hia
filing the bill with the secretary of state with his approval subscribed.
The constitution of Indiana provides, art. 5, § 14, that, "if any bill shall not
be returned by the governor within three days; Sundays excepted, after it shall
have been presented to him, it shall be a law without bi,. signature, unless the
general adjournment shall prevent its return ; in which case it shall be a law
unless the governor, within five days next after the adjournment, shall file such
bill with his objections thereto, in the office of the secretary of state," &c. Under
this provision it was held that where the governor, on the day of the final adjournment of the legislature, and after the adjournment, filed a bill received that
day, in the office of the secretary of state, without approval or objections thereto,
it thereby became a law, and he could not file objections afterwards. Tarlton v.
Peggs, 18 Ind. 24.
1 A bill which, as approved and signed, differs in important particulars from
the one signed, is no law. Jones v. Hutchinson, 43 Ala. 721.
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*0ther Powers of the Governor. ["' 155]

The power of the governor as a. branch of the legislative de-

partment is almost exclusively conﬁned to the approval of bills.

As executive, he communicates to the two houses infortnation

concerning the condition of the State, and may recommend

• Otlter Powers of the Governor.

measures to their consideration, but he cannot originate or intro-

duce bills. He may convene the legislature in extra session

whenever extraordinary occasion seems to have arisen; but their

powers when convened are not conﬁned to a consideration of the

subjects to which their attention is called by his proclamation or

his message, and they may legislate on any subject as at the

regular sessions.‘ An exception to this statement exists in those

States where, by the express terms of the constitution, it is pro-

vided that when convened in extra session the legislature shall

consider no subject except that for which they were specially

If the governor sends back a bill which has been submitted to him, stating

that he cannot act upon it because of some supposed informality in its passage,

this is in etfect an objection to the bill, and it can only become a law by further

action of the legislature, even though the governor may have been mistaken as

to the supposed informality. Birdsall v. Carrick, 3 Nev. 154.

In practice the veto power, although very great and exceedingly important in
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this country, is obsolete in Great Britain, and no king now ventures to resort to

it. As the Ministry must at all times he in accord with the House of‘ Commons,

—except where the responsibility is taken of dissolving the Parliament and

appealing to the people, — it must follow that any bill which the two houses have

The power of the governor as a branch of the legislative department is almost exclusively confined to the approval of bills.
As executive, he communicates to the two houses information
concerning the condition of the State, and may recommend
measures to their consideration, but he cannot originate or introduce bills. He may convene the legislature in extra session
whenever extraordinary occasion seems to have arisen; but their
powers when convened are not confined to a consideration of the
subjects to which their attention is called by his proclamation or
his message, and they may legislate on any subject as at the
regular sessions. 1 An exception to this statement exists in those
States where, by the express terms of the constitution, it is provided that wh~n convened in extra session the legislature shall
consider no subject except that for which they were specially

passed must be approved by the monarch. The approval has become a matter

of course, and the governing power in Great Britain is substantially in the House

of Commons. 1 Bl. Com. 184-5, and notes.

‘ The constitution of Iowa, art. 4,§ 11, provides that the governor “ may,

on extraordinary occasions, convene the Genera §nbly by proclamation, and

shall state to both houses, when assembled, thgilii-pose for which they have been

convened.“ It was held in Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa, 82, that the General

Assembly, when thus convened, were not conﬁned in their legislation to the pur-

poses speciﬁed in the message. “ When lawfully convened, whether in virtue of

the provision in the constitution or the governor’s proclamation, it is the ‘ General

Assembly‘ of the State, in which the full and exclusive legislative authority of

the State is vested. lvhere its business at such session is not restricted by some

constitutional provision, the General Assembly may enact any law at a special or

extra session that it might at a regular session. Its powers, not being derived

from the governor's proclamation, are not conﬁned to the special purpose for

which it may have been convened by him.”
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If the governor sends back a bill which bas been submitted to him, stating
that he cannot act upon it beca!Jse of some supposed informality in its passage,
this is in effect an obje<:tion to the bill, and it can only become a law by further
action of the legislature, even though the governor may have been mistaken u
to the supposed informality. Birdsall v. Carrick, 3 Nev. 1M.
In practice the veto power, although very great and exceedingly important in
this country, is obsolete in Great Britain, and no king now ventures to resort to
it. As the Ministry must at all times be in accord with the House of Commons,
- except where the responsibility is taken of dissolving the Parliament and
appealing to the people, - it must follow that any bill which the two houses have
passed must be approved by the monarch. The approval has become a matter
of course, and the governing power in Great Britain is substantially in the House
of Commons. 1 Bl. Com. 184-5, and notes.
1 The constitution of Iowa, art. 4, § 11, provid('s that the governor "may,
on extraordinary occasions, convene the Genera\.A~bly by proclamation, and
shall state to both houses, when assembled, th~urpose for which they have been
convened." It was held in Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa, 82, that the General
Assembly, when thus convened, were not confined in their legislation to the purposes specified in the message. "When lawfully convened, whether in virtue of
the provision in the constitution or the governor's proclamation, it is the 'General
Assembly' of the State, in which the full and exclusive legislative authority of
the State is vested. Where its businesl! at such session is not restricted by some
constitutional provision, the General Assembly may enact any law at a special or
extra session that it might at a regular session. Its powers, not being derived
from the governor's proclamation, are not confined to the special purpose for
which it may have been convened by him."
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called together, or which may have been submitted to them by

special message of the governor}

When Acts are to take Eﬁect.

The old rule was that statutes, unless otherwise ordered,took

called together, or which may have been submitted to them by
special message of the governor. 1

effect from the ﬁrst day of the session on which they were

[* 156] passed ;2 "‘ but this rule was purely arbitrary, based upon

When Acts are to take Effect.

no good reason, and frequently working very serious

injustice. The present rule is that an act takes eﬂect from the

time when the formalities of enactment are actually complete

under the constitution, unless it is otherwise ordered, or unless

there is some constitutional or statutory rule on the subject

which prescribes otherwise. By the constitution of MlSBlSSippi,3

“ no law of a general nature, unless otherwise provided, shall be

enforced until sixty days after the passage thereof.” By the

constitution of Illinois,‘ no act of the General Assembly shall

take effect until the ﬁrst day of July next after its passage, unless

in case of emergency (which emergency shall be expressed in

the preamble or body of the act) the General Assembly shall,

by a vote of two thirds of all the members elected to each house,

otherwise direct. By the constitution of Michigan,5 no public

act shall take effect, or be in force, until the expiration of ninety

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:19 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105011581
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

days from the end of the session at which the same is passed,

unless the legislature shall otherwise direct by a two-thirds vote

of the members elected to each house. These and similar pro-

visions are designed to secure, as far as possible, the public

promulgation of the law before parties are bound to take notice

of and act under it, and to obviate the injustice of a rule which

should compel parties at their peril to know and obey a law of

which, in the nature of things, they could not possibly have heard;

they give to all parties the full constitutional period in which to

become acquainted with the terms of the statutes which are passed,

except when the legislature has otherwise directed; a11d no one

is bound to govern his conduct by the new law until that period

‘ Provisions to this effect will be found in the constitutions of Illinois, 1\ﬁchi-

gan, Missouri, and Nevada; perhaps in some others.

’ 1 Lev. 91; Latless v. Holmes, 4 T. R. 660. This is changed by 33 Geo.

III. e. 13, by which statutes since passed take eifect from the day when they

receive the royal assent, unless otherwise ordered therein.

= Art, 7, § 6. ‘ Art. 3, § 23. - ° Art. 4, § 20.

[164]

The old rule was that statutes, unless otherwise ordered, took
effect from the first day of the session on which they were
[•156] passed; 2 • but this rule was purely arbitrary, based upon
no good reason, and frequently working very serious
injustice. The present rule is that an act takes effect from the
time when the formalities of enactment are actually complete
under the constitution, unless it is otherwise ordered, or unless
there is some constitutional or statutory rule on the subject
which prescribes otherwise. By the constitution of Mississippi,8
" no law of a general nature, unless otherwise provided, shall be
enforced until sixty days after the passage thereof." By the
constitution of Illinois,4 no act of the General Assembly shall
take effect until the first day of July next after its passage, unless
in case of emergency (which emergency shall be expressed in
the preamble or body of the act) the General Assembly shall,
by a vote of two thirds of all the members elected to eacli house,
otherwise direct. By the constitution of Michigan,6 no public
act shall take effect, or be in force, until the expiration of ninety
days from the end of the session at which the same is passed,
unless the legislature shall otherwise direct by a two-thirds vote
of the members elected to each house. These and similar provisions are designed to secure, as far as possible, the public
promulgation of the law before parties are bound to take notice
of and act under it, and to obviate the injustice of a rule which
should compel parties at their peril to know and obey a law of
which, in the nature of things, they could not possibly have heard;
they give to all parties the full constitutional period in which to
become acquainted with the terms of the statutes which are passed,
except when the legislature has otherwise directed ; and no one
is bound to govern his conduct by the new law until that period
1 Provisions to this effect will be found in the constitutions of Illinois, Michigan, Missouri, and Nevada; perhaps in some others.
1 1 Lev. 91; Latless v. Holmes, 4 T. R. 660.
Tbis is changed by 33 Geo.
III. c. 13, by which statutes since passed take effect from the day when they
receive the royal assent, unless otherwise ordered therein.
4 Art. 8, § 28.
6 Art. 4, § 20.
a Art. 7, § 6.
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OF THE ENACTMENT OF LAWS.

has elapsed} And the fact that, by the terms of the statute,

something is to be done under it before the expiration of the

constitutional period for it to take effect, will not amount to a leg-

islative direction that the act shall take effect at that time, if the

act itself is silent as to the period when it shall go into opera-

tion.2

‘The constitution of Indiana provides” that “no act [*157]

shall take eﬂ'ect until the same shall have been published

and circulated in the several counties of this State, by authority,

except in case of emergency ; which emergency shall be declared

in the preamble, or in the body of the law.” Unless the

emergency is thus declared, it is plain that the act cannot take

earlier eﬁect.‘ But the courts will not inquire too nicely into the

mode of publication. If the laws are distributed in bound vol-

umes, in a manner and shape not substantially contrary to the

statute on that subject, and by the proper authority, it will be

held suﬂicient, notwithstanding a failure to comply with some

of the directory provisions of the statute on the subject of

publication.“

‘ Price v. Hopkin, 13 Mich. 318. See, however, Smith v. Morrison, 22 Pick.

430; Stine v. Bennett, 13 Minn. 153. Where a law has failed to take eﬂ'ect for

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:19 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105011581
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

want of publication, all parties are chargeable with notice of that fact. Clark

0. Janesville, 10 Wis. 136.

’ Supervisors of _Iroquois C0. v. Keady, 34 Ill. 293. An act for the removal

of a county seat provided for taking the vote of the electors of the county upon

it on the 17th of March, 1863, at which time the legislature had not adjourned.

It was not expressly declared in the act at what time it should take etfect, and it

has elnpsed. 1 And the fact that, by the terms of the statute,
something is to be done under it before the expiration of the
constitutional period for it to take effect, will not amount to a legislative direction that the act shall take effect at that time, if the
act itself is silent as to the period when it shall go into operation.2
* The constitution of Indiana provides 8 that " no act [*157]
shall take effect until the same shall have been published
and circulated in the several counties of this State, by authority,
except in case of emergency ; which emergency shall be declared
in the preamble, or in the body of the law."
Unless the
emergency is thus declared, it is plain that the act cannot take
earlier effect.4 But the courts will not inquire too nicely into the
mode of publication. If the laws are distributed in bound volumes, in a manner and shape not substantially contrary to the
statute on that subject, and by the proper authority, it will be
held sufficient, notwithstanding a failure to comply with some
of the directory provisions of the statute on the subject of
publication.6

was therefore held that it would not take effect until sixty days from the end of

the session, and a votc of the electors taken on the 17th of March was void.

And it was also held in this case, and in Wheeler v. Chubbuck, 16 Ill. 361, that

" the direction must be made in a clear, distinct, and unequivocal provision, and

could not be helped out by any sort of intendment or implication," and that the

act must all take effect at once, and not by piecemeal.

° Art. 4, § 28.

‘ Carpenter v. Montgomery, 7 Blackf. 415; Hendricksou v. Hendrickson, 7

Ind. 13; Mark v. State, 15 Ind. 98. The legislature must necessarily in these

cases be judge of the existence of the emergency. Carpenter v. Montgomery,

supra. The constitution of Tennessee provides that “ N 0 law of a general

nature shall take eﬂ'ect until forty days after its passage, unless the same, or the

caption, shall state that the public welfare requires that it should take effect

sooner.” Art. 1, § 20. - ‘

‘ State v. Bailey, 16 Ind. 46. See further, as to this constitutional provision,

Jones v. Cavins, 4 Ind. 305.
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Price v. Hopkin, 18 l\fich. 3Ul. See, however, Smith v. Morrison, 22 Pick.
430; Stine v. Bennett, 13 Minn. 153. Where a law has failed to take effeet for
want of publication, all parties are chargeable with notice of that fact. Clark
v. Janesville, 10 Wis. 136.
' Supervisors of ,Iroquois Co. v. Keady, 34 Til. 293. An act for the removal
of a county seat provided for taking the vote of the electors of the county upon
it on the 17th of March, 1863, at which time the legislature had not adjourned.
It was not expressly declared in the act at what time it should take effect, and it
was therefore held that it would not take effect until sixty days from the end of
the session, and a vote of the electors taken on the lith of March was void.
And it was also held in this case, and in Wheeler v. Chubbuck, 16 Ill. 361, that
"t-he direction must be made in a clear, distinct, and unequivocal provision, and
could not be helped out by any sort of intendment or implication," and that the
act must all take effect at once, and not by piecemeal.
3 Art. 4, § 28.
• Carpenter v. Montgomery, 7 Blackf. 415; Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, 7
Ind. 13 ; Mark v. State, 15 Ind. 98. The legislature must necessarily in these
cases be judge of the existence of the emergency. Carpenter v. Montgomery,
mpra. The constitution of Tennessee provides that "No law of a general
nature shall take effect until forty days after its passage, unless the same, or the
caption, shall state that the public welfare requires that it should take effect
eooner." Art. 1, § 20.
6 State "· Bailey, 16 Ind. 46.
See further, as to this constitutional provision,
Jones "· Cavins, 4: Ind. 305.
1
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The constitution of Wisconsin, on the other hand, providesl
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that “no general law shall be in force until published”; thus

leaving the time when it should take eﬂ'ect to depend, not alone

upon the legislative direction, but upon the further fact of publi-

cation. But what shall be the mode of publication seems to be

left to the legislative determination. It has been held, however,

that a. general law was to be regarded as published although

printed in the volume of private laws, instead of the volume of

public laws as the statute of the State would require? But an

unauthorized publication — as, for example, of an act for the in-

corporation of a city in two local papers instead of the State

paper — is no publication in the constitutional sense?

[* 158] “‘ The constitution of Iowa provides that “no law of the

General Assembly, passed at a regular session, of a public

nature, shall take eﬂ'ect until the fourth day of July next after the

passage thereof. Laws passed at a special session shall take

effect ninety days after the adjournment of the General Assembly

by which they were passed. If the General Assembly shall deem

any law of immediate importance, they may provide that the same

shall take effect by publication in newspapers in the State.”4

Under this section it is not competent for the legislature to

confer upon the governor the discretionary power which the
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constitution gives to that body, to ﬁx an earlier day for the law to

take eﬂ'ect.5

* Art. 7, § 21.

" Matter of Boyle, 9 Wis. 264. Under this provision it has been decided that

a law establishing a municipal court in a city is a general law. Matter of Boyle,

supra. Also a statute for the removal of acounty seat. State v. Lean, 9 VVis.

279. Also a statute incorporating a municipality, or authorizing it to issue bonds

in aid of a railroad. Clark v. Janesville, 10 Wis. 136. And see Scott v. Clark,

1 Iowa, 70.

’ Clark v. Janesville, 10 VVis. 136. See further, Mills v. Jefferson, 20 \Vis.

50.

‘ Art. 3, § 26.

° Scott v. Clark, 1 Iowa, 70; Pilkey v. Gleason, ib. 522.

The constitution of Wisconsin, on the other hand, provides 1
that "no general law shall be in force until published" ; thus
leaving the time when it should take effect to depend, not alone
upon the legislative direction, but upon the further fact of publication. But what shall be the mode of publication seems to be
left to the legislative determination. It has been held, however,
that a general law was to be regarded as publislted although
printed in the volume of private laws, instead of the volume of
public laws as the statute of the State would require. 2 But an
unauthorized publication - as, for example, of an act for the incorporation of a city in two local papers instead of the State
paper- is no publication in the constitutional sense. 3
[*158] • The constitut~on of Iowa provides that "no law of the
General Assembly, passed at a regular session, of a public
nature, shall take effect until the fourth day of July next after the
passage thereof. Laws passed at a special session shall take
effect ninety days after the adjournment of the General Assembly
by which they were passed. If the General Assembly shall deem
any law of immediate importance, they may provide that the same
shall take effect by publication in newspapers in the State." 4
Under this section it is not competent for the legislature to
confer upon the governor the discretionary power which the
constitution gives to that body, to fix an earlier day for the law to
take effect.6
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Art. 7, § 21.
Matter of Boyle, 9 Wis. 264. Under this provision it has been decided that
a law establishing a muni;:ipal court in a city is a general law. Matter of Boyle,
supra. Also a statute for the removal of a county seat. State v. Lean, 9 "'is.
279. Also a statute incorporating a municipality, or authorizing it to issue bonds
in aid of a railroad. Clark v. Janesville, 10 'Wis. 186. And see Scott v. Clark,
1 Iowa, 70.
3 Clark v. Janesville, 10 \Vis. 186.
See further, Mills v. Jefferson, 20 '\Vis.
I

1

50.

• Art. 3, § 26.
& Scott v. Clark, 1 Iowa, 70; Pilkey v. Gleason, ib. 522.
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DECLARING STATUTES UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

*159

OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH A LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT

MAY BE DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Ws have now examined somewhat brieﬂy the legislative power

of the State, and the bounds which expressly or by implication are

set to it, and also some of the conditions necessary to its proper

and valid exercise. In so doing it has been made apparent that,

under some circumstances, it may become the duty of the courts to

declare that what the legislaturehas assumed to enact is void,

*CHAPTER VII.

[*159]

either from want of constitutional power to enact it, or because the

constitutional forms or conditions have not been observed. In the

further examination of our subject, it will be important to consider

what the circumstances are under which the courts will feel im-

OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH A LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT
MAY BE DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

pelled to exercise this high prerogative, and what precautions

should be observed before assuming to do so.

It must be evident to any one that the power to declare a legisla-

tive enactment void is one which the judge, conscious of the

fallibility of the human judgment, will shrink from exercising in

any case where he can conscientiously and with due regard to duty

and oﬂicial oath decline the responsibility. The legislative and

judicial are co-ordinate departments of the government, of equal

dignity; each is alike supreme in the exercise of its proper
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functions, and cannot directly or indirectly, while acting within the

limits of its authority, be subjected to the control or supervision of

the other, without an unwarrantable assumption by that other of

power which, by the constitution, is not conferred upon it. The

constitution apportions the powers of government, but it does not

make any one of the threedepartments subordinate to another,

when exercising the trust committed to it. The courts may declare

legislative enactments unconstitutional and void in some cases, but

not because the judicial power is superior in degree or dignity to

the legislative. Being required to declare what the law is in the

cases which come before them, they must enforce the con-

stitution as the paramount law, whenever a legislative "‘ en- [* 160]
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WE have now examined somewhat briefly the legislative power
of the State, and the bounds which expressly or by implication are
set to it, and also some of the conditions necessary to its proper
and valid exercise. In so doing it has been made apparent that,
under some circumstances, it may become the duty of the courts to
declare that what the legislature · has assumed to enact is void,
either from want of constitutional power to enact it, or because the
constitutional forms or conditions have not been observed. In the
further examination of our subject, it will be important to consider
what the ciTcumstances are under which the courts will feel impelled to exercise this high prerogative, and what precautions
should be observed before assuming to do so.
It must be evident to any one that the power to declare a legislative enactment void is one which the judge, conscious of the
fallibility of the human judgment, will shrink from exercising in
any case where he can conscientiously and with due regard to duty
and official oath decline the responsibility. The legislative and
judicial are co-ordinate departments of the government, of equal
dignity; each is alike supreme in the exercise of its proper
functions, and cannot directly or indirectly, while acting within the
limits of its authority, be subjected to the control or supervision of
the othet·, without an unwarrantable assumption by that other of
power which, by the constitution, is not conferred upon it. The
constitution apportions the powers of government, but it does not
make any one of the three.departments subordinate to another,
when exercising the trust committed to it. The courts may declare
legislative enactments unconstitutional and void in some cases, but
not because the judicial power is superior in degree or dignity to
the legislative. Being required to declare what the law is in the
cases which come before them, they must enforce the constitution as the paramount law, whenever a legislative • en- [• 160]
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actment comes in conﬂict with it.1 But the courts sit, not

*160
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to review or revise the legislative action, but to enforce the

legislative will ; and it is only where they ﬁnd that the legislature

has failed to keep within its constitutional limits, that they are at

liberty to disregard its action ; and in doing so, they only do what

every private citizen may do in respect to the mandates of the

courts when the judges assume to act and to render judgments or

decrees without jurisdiction. “ In exercising this high authority,

the judges claim no judicial supremacy; they are only the adminis-

trators of the public will. If an act of the legislature is held void,

it is not because the judges have any control over the legislative

power, but because the act is forbidden by the constitution, and

because the will of the people, which is therein declared, is

paramount to that of their representatives expressed in any

law.” 2

Nevertheless, in declaring a law unconstitutional, a court must

necessarily cover the same ground which has already been covered

by the legislative department in deciding upon the propriety of

enacting the "law, and they mustindirectly overrule the decision of

that co-ordinate department. The task is therefore a delicate one,

and only to be entered upon with reluctance and hesitation. It is

a solemn act in any case to declare that that body of men to whom
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the people have committed the sovereign function of making the

laws for the commonwealth, have deliberately disregarded the

limitations imposed upon this delegated authority, and usurped

power which the people have been careful to withhold; and it is

almost equally so when the act which is adjudged to be unconstitu-

tional appears to be chargeable rather to careless and improvident

action, or error in judgment, than to intentional disregard of

obligation. But the duty to do this in a proper case, though at one

time doubted, and by some persons persistently denied, it is now

generally agreed that the courts cannot properly decline, and in its

performance they seldom fail of proper support if they proceed with

due caution and circumspection, and under a proper sense as well

of their own responsibility, as of the respect due to the action and

judgment of the law-makers.3

‘ Rice 11'. State, 7 Ind. 334; Bloodgood v. Mohawk and Hudson Railroad Co.

18 “Tend. 53.

’ Lindsay v. Commissioners, &c., 2 Bay, 61.

' There are at least two cases in American judicial history where judges have
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actment comes in conflict with it. 1 But the courts sit, not
to review or revise the legislative action, but to enforce the
legislative will ; and it is only where they find that the legislature
has failed to keep within its constitutional limits, that they are at
liberty to disregard its action ; and in doing so, they only do what
every private citizen may do in respect to the mandates of the
courts when the judges assume to act and to render judgments or
decrees without jurisdiction. "In exercising this high authority,
the judges claim no judicial supremacy; they are only the administrators of the public will. If au act of the legislature is held void,
it is not because the judges have any control over the legislative
power, but because the act is forbidden by the constitution, and
because the will of the people, which is therein declared, is
paramount to that of their representatives expressed in any
law." 2
Nevertheless, in declaring a law unconstitutional, a court must
necessarily cover the same ground which has already been covered
by the legislative depat'tment in deciding upon the propriety of
enacting the ·law, and they must indirectly ovet·rule the decision of
that co-ordinate department. The task is therefore a delicate one,
and only to be entered upon with reluctance and hesitation. It is
a solemn act in any case to declare that that body of men to whom
the people have committed the sovereign function of making the
laws for the commonwealth, have deliberately disregarded the
limitations imposed upon this delegated authority, and usurped
power which the people have been careful to withhold ; and it is
almost equally so when the act which is adjudged to be unconstitutional appears to be chargeable rat.her to careless and improvident
action, or error in judgment, than to intentional disregard of
obligation. But the duty to do this in a proper case, though at one
time doubted, aud by some persons persistently denied, it is now
generally agreed that the courts cannot properly decline, and in its
performance they seldom fail of proper support if they proceed with
due caution and circumspection, and under a proper sense as well
of their own responsibility, as of the respect due to the action and
judgment of the law-makers.a
1 Rice v. State, 7 Ind. 334; Bloodgood L'. Mohawk and Hudson Railroad Co.
18 Wend. 53.
1 Lindsay v. Commis~ioners, &c., 2 Bay, 61.
1 There are at least two cases in American judicial history where judges have
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gested, the rule which is adopted by some courts, that they

been impeached as criminals for refusing to enforce unconstitutional enactments.

One of these—- the case of Trevett v. Weedon, decided by the Superior Court of

Rhode Island in 1786 — is particularly interesting as being the ﬁrst case in which

• I. In view of the considerations which have been sug- [• 161]
gested, the rule which is adopted by some courts, that they

a legislative enactment was declared unconstitutional and void on the ground of

incompatibility with the State constitution. Mr. Arnold, in his history of Rhode

Island, vol. 2, ch. 24, gives an account of this case; and the printed brief in

opposition to the law, and in defence of the impeached judges, is in possession

of the present writer. The act in question was one which imposed a heavy

penalty on any one who should refuse to receive on the same terms as specie the

bills of a bank chartered by the State, or who should in any way discourage

the circulation of such bills. The penalty was made collectible on summary

conviction, without jury trial ; and the act was held void on the ground that jury

trial was expressly given by the colonial charter, which then constituted the

constitution of the State. Although the judges were not removed on impeach-

ment, the legislature refused to re-elect them when their terms expired at the

end of the year, and supplanted them by more pliant tools, by whose assistance

the paper money was forced into circulation, and public and private debts extin-

guished by means of it. Concerning the other case, we copy from the Western

Law Monthly, “ Sketch of Hon. Calvin Pease,” vol. 5, p. 3, June, 1863: “ The

ﬁrst session of the Supreme Court [of Ohio] under the constitution was held at
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Warren, Trumbull County, on the ﬁrst Tuesday of June, 1803. The State was

divided into three circuits. . . . The Third Circuit of the State was composed of

the counties of Washington, Belmont, Jefferson, Columbiania, and Trumbull.

At this session of the legislature, Mr. Pease was appointed President Judge of

the Third Circuit in April, 1803, and though nearly twenty-seven years old, he

was very youthful in his appearance. He held the ofﬁce until March 4, 1810,

when he sent his resignation to Governor Huntingdon. . . . During his term of

service upon the bench many interesting questions were presented for decision,

and among thcm the constitutionality of some portion of the act of 1805, deﬁning

the duties of justices of the peace; and he decided that so much of the ﬁfth

section as gave justices of the peace jurisdiction exceeding $20, and so much of

the twenty-ninth section as prevented plaintiffs from recovering costs in actions

commenced by original writs in the Court of Common Pleas, for sums between

$20 and 850, were repugnant to the Constitution of the United States and of

the State of Ohio, and therefore null and void. . . . The clamor and abuse to which

this decision gave rise was not in the least mitigated or diminished by the circum-

stance that it was concurred in by a majority of the judges of the Supreme Court,

Messrs. Huntingdon and Tod. . . . At the session of the legislature of 1807-8,

steps were taken to impeach him and the judges of the Supreme Court who con-

curred with him; but the resolutions introduced into the house were not acted

upon during the session. But the scheme was not abandoned. At an early day

of the next session, and with almost indecent haste, a committee was appointed

to inquire into the conduct of the oﬁending judges, and with leave to exhibit

articles of impeachment, or report otherwise, as the facts might justify. The
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been impeached as criminals for refusing to enforce unconstitutional enactments.
One of these- the case of Trevett v. Weedon, decided by the Superior Court of
Rhode Island in 1786 -is particularly interesting as being the first case in which
a legislative enactment was declared unconstitutional and void on the ground of
incompatibility with the State constitution. Mr. Arnold, in his history of Rhode
Island, vol. 2, ch. 24, gives an aecount of this case; and the printed brief in
opposition to the law, and in defence of the impeached judges, is in possession
of the present writer. The act in question was one which imposed a heavy
penalty on any one who should refuse to receive on the same terms as specie the
bills of a bank chartered by the State, or who should in any way discourage
the circulation of such bills. The penalty was made collectible on summary
com·iction, without jury trial; and the act was held void on the ground that jury
trial was expressly given by the colonial charter, which then constituted the
constitution of the State. Although the judges were not removed on impeachment, the legislature refused to re·elect them when their terms expired at the
end of the year, and supplanted them by more pliant tools, by whose assistance
the paper money was forced into cireulation, and public and private debts l'xtinguishcd by means of it. Concerning the other case, we copy from the Western
Law Monthly, "Sketch of Hon. Calvin Pease," vol. 5, p. 3, June, 1863: "The
first session of the Snprcme Court [of Ohio] under the constitution was held at
Warren, Trumbull County, on the fir•t Tuesday of June, 1803. The State was
divided into three circuits. • . . The Third Circuit of the State was composed of
the counties of Washington, Belmont, Jefferson, Columbiania, and Trumbull.
At this se~sion of the legislature, l\lr. Pease was appointed President Judge of
the Third Circuit in April, 1803, and though nearly twenty-seven years old, he
was \"cry youthful in his appearance. He held the office until March 4, 1810,
when he sent his resignation to Governor Huntingdon . . . . During his term of
sen-ice upon the bench many interesting questions were presented for decision,
and among them the constitutionality of some portion of the act of 1805, defi~ing
the duties or justices of the peace ; and he decided that so much of the fifth
section as gave justices of the peace jurisdiction exceeding $20, and so much of
the twenty-ninth section as prevented plaintiffs from recovering costs in actions
commenced by original writs in the Court of Common Pleas, for sums between
$20 and $50, were repugnant to the Constitution of the United States and of
the State of Ohio, and the1·efore null and void .... The clamor and abuse to which
this decision gave rise was not in the least mitigated or diminished by the circumstance that it was concurred in by a majority of the judges of the Supreme Court,
Messrs. Huntingdon antl Tod. • . . At the session of the legislature of 1807~,
steps were taken to impeach him and the judges of the Supreme Court who concurred with him; but the resolutions introduced into the house were not acted
upon during the session. But the scheme was not abandoned. At an early day
of the nt>xt session, and with almost indecent haste, a committee was appointed
to inquire into the conduct of the offending judges, and with leave to exhibit
articles of impeachment, or report otherwise, as the facts might justify. The
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[* 162] will not * decide a legislative act to be unconstitutional by
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a majority of a bare quorum of the judges only, —- less than

a majority of all,—but will instead postpone the argument until

the bench is full, seems a very prudent and proper precaution to

be observed before entering upon questions so delicate and so

important. The beneﬁt of the wisdom and deliberation of every

judge ought to be had under circumstances so grave. Something

more than private rights are involved; the fundamental law of the

State is in question, as well as the correctness of legislative action ;

and considerations of courtesy, as well as the importance of the

question involved, should lead the court to decline to act at all, where

they cannot sustain the legislative action, until a full bench has been

consulted, and its deliberate opinion is found to be against it. But

this is a rule of propriety, not of constitutional obligation; and

committee without delay reported articles of impeachment against Messrs. Pease

and Tod, but not against Huntingdon, who in the mean time had been elected

governor of the State. . . . The articles of impeachment were preferred by the

House of Representatives on the 23d day of December, 1808. He was sum-

moned at once to appear before the Senate as a high court of impeachment, and

he promptly obeyed the summons. The managers of the prosecution on the

part of the House were Thomas Morris, afterwards Senator in Congress from

[* 162] will not *decide a legislative act to be unconstitutional by
a majority of a bare quorum of the judges only, -less than
a majority of all,- but will instead postpone the argument until
the bench is full, seems a very prudent and proper precaution to
be observed before entering upon questions so delicate and so
important. The benefit of the wisdom and deliberation of every
judge ought to be had under circumstances so grave. Something
more than private rights are involved; the fundamental law of the
State is in question, as well as the correctness of legislative action ;
and considel'ations of courtesy, as well as the importance of the
question involved, should lead the court to decline to act at all, where
they cannot sustain the legislative action, until a full bench has been
consulted, and its deliberate opinion is found to be against it. But
this is a rule of pl'opriety, not of constitutional obligation; and

Ohio, Joseph Sharp, James Pritchard, Samuel Marrett, and Othniel Tooker. . . .
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Several days were consumed in the investigation, but the trial resulted in the

acquittal of the respondent.” Sketch of Hon. George Tod, August number of

same volume: “At the session of the legislature of 1808-9, he was impeached

for concurring in decisions made by Judge Pease, in the counties of Trumbull

and Jefferson, that certain provisions of the act of the legislature, passed in

1805, deﬁning the duties of justices of the peace, were in conﬂict with the Con-

stitution of the United States and of the State of Ohio, and therefore void.

These decisions of the courts of Common Pleas and of the Supreme Court, it

was insisted, were not only an assault upon the wisdom and dignity, but also

upon the supremacy of the legislature, which passed the act in question. This

could not be endured; and the popular fury against the judges rose to a very

high pitch, and the senator from the county of Trumbull in the legislature at

that time, Calvin Cone, Esq., took no pains to soothe the oﬂended dignity of the

members of that body, or their sympathizing constituents, but pressed a con-

trary line of conduct. The judges must be brought to justice, he insisted

vehemently, and be punished, so that others might be terriﬁed by the example,

and deterred from committing similar offences in the future. The charges against

Mr. Tod were substantially the same as those against Mr. Pease. Mr. Tod was

ﬁrst tried, and acquitted. The managers of the impeachment, as well as the

result, were the same in both cases.” In the Rhode Island case, although the

judges were not removed, they were refused a re-election.
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committee without delay: reported articles of impeachment against Messrs. Pease
and Tod, but not against Huntingdon, who in the mean time had been elected
governor of the State. . . . The articles of impeachment were preferred by the
House of Representatives on the 23d day of December, 1808. He was summoned at once to appear before the Senate as a high court of impeachment, and
he promptly obeyed the summons. The managers of the prosecution on the
part of the House were Thomas Morris, afterwards Senator in Congress from
Ohio, .Joseph Sharp, James Pritchard, Samuel Marrett, and Othniel Tooker....
Several days were consumed in the investigation, but the trial resulted in the
acquittal of the respondent." Sketch of Hon. George Tod, Augu~t number of
same volume : " At the session of the legislature of 1808-9, he W11s impeaehed
for concun·ing in decision~ made by Judge Pease, in the counties of Trumbull
and Jeffi,r~on, that certain provisions of the act of the legislature, passed in
1805, defining the duties of justices of the peace, were in conflict with the Constitution of the United States and of the State of Ohio, and therefore void.
These decisions of the courts of Common Pleas and of the Supreme Court, it
was insisted, were not only an assault upon the wisdom and dignity, but also
upon the supremacy of the legislature, which passed the act in question. This
coultl not be endured; and the popular fury against the judge~ rose to a very
high pitch, and the senator from the county of Trumbull in the legislature a.t
that time, Calvin Cone, Esq., took no pains to soothe the offended dignity of the
members of that body, or their sympathizing constituents, but pressed a contrary line of conduct. The judges must be brought to justice, he insisted
vehemently, and be punished, so that others might be terrified by the example,
and deterred from committing similar offences in the future. The charges against
Mr. Tod were substantially the same as those against Mr. Pease. Mr. Tod was
first tried, and acquitted. The managers of the impeachment, as well as the
result, were the same in both cases." In the Rhode Island case, although the
judges were not removed, they were refused a re-election.
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though generally adopted and observed, each court will regulate, in
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its own discretion, its practice in this particular}

* II. Neither will a court, as a general rule, pass upon a [*‘ 163]

constitutional question, and decide a statute to be invalid,

unless a decision upon that very point becomes necessary to the

determination of the cause. “While the courts cannot shun the

discussion of constitutional questions when fairly presented, they

will not go out of their way to ﬁnd such topics. They will not seek

to draw in such weighty matters collaterally, nor on trivial occa-

sions. It is both more proper and more respectful to a co-ordinate

department to discuss constitutional questions only when that is

the very Iis mota. Thus presented and determined, the decision

carries a weight with it to which no extra-judicial disquisition is

entitled.” 2 In any case, therefore, where a constitutional question

' Briscoe v. Commonwealth Bank of Kentucky, 8 Pet. 118. It has been

intimated that inferior courts should not presume to pas upon constitutional

questions, but ought in all cases to treat statutes as valid. Ortman v. Grecnman,

4 Mich. 291. But no tribunal can exercise judicial power, unless it is to decide

according to its judgment; and it is ditﬁcult to discover any principle of justice

which can require a magistrate to enter upon the execution of a statute when he

believes it to be invalid, especially when he must thereby subject himself to

though generally adopted and observed, each court will regulate, in
its own discretion, its practice in this particular. 1
• II. Neither will a court, as a general rule, pass upon a [*163]
constitutional question, and decide a statute ~o be invalid,
unless a decision upon that very point becomes necessary to the
determination of the cause. " While the courts cannot shun the
discussion of constitutional questions when fairly presented, they
will not go out of their way to find such topics. They will not seek
to draw in such weighty matters collaterally, nor on trivial occasions. It is both more proper and more respectful to a co-ordinate
department to discuss constitutional questions only when that is
the very lis mota. Thus presented and determined, the decision
carries a weight with it to which no extra-judicial disquisition is
entitled." 2 In any case, therefore, where a constitutional question

prosecution, without any indemnity in the law if it proves to be invalid. Un-
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doubtedly when the highest courts in the land hesitate to declare a law uncon-

stitutional, and allow much weight to the legislative judgment, the inferior courts

should be still more reluctant to exercise this power, and a becoming modesty

would at least be expected of those judicial oﬁieers who have not been trained

to the investigation of legal and constitutional questions. But in any case a

judge or justice, being free from doubt in his own mind, and unfettered by any

judicial decision properly binding upon him, must follow his own sense of duty

upon constitutional as well as upon any other questions. See Miller v. State,

30hio, N. s. 483; Pim v. Nicholson, 6 Ohio, N. s. 180; Maybcrry v. Kelly,

I Kansas, 116. In the case last cited it is said: “ It is claimed by counsel for

the plaintiff in error, that the point raised by the instruction is, that inferior

courts and ministerial officers have no right to judge of the constitutionality ofa

law passed by a legislature. But is this law? If so, a court created to interpret

the law must disregard the constitution in forming its opinions. The constitution

is law,—the fundamental law,—and must as much he taken into consideration

by a justice of the peace as by any other tribunal. When two laws apparently

conﬂict, it is the duty of all courts to construe them. If the conﬂict is irrecon-

cilable, they must decide which is to prevail; and the constitution is not an

exception to this rule of construction. If a law were passed in open, ﬂagrant

violation of the constitution, should a justice of the peace regard the law, and

pay no attention to the constitutional provision? If that is his duty in a plain

case, is it less so when the construction becomes more diﬂicult? ”

' Hoover v. \Vood, 9 Ind. 287.
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Briscoe v. Commonwealth Bank of Kentucky, 8 Pet. 118. It bas been
intimated that inferior courts should not presume to pass upon constitutional
questions, but ought. in all cases to treat statutes as valid. Ortman v. Greenman,
4 .Mich. 291. But no tribunal can exercise judicial power, unless it is to decide
according to its judgment; and it is difficult to diseover any principle of justice
which can refJUire a magistrate to enter upon the execution of a statute when he
believes it to be invalid, especially when he must thereby subject himself to
prosecution, without any indemnity in the law if it proves to be invalid. Un·
doubtedly when the highest courts in the land hesitate to declare a law unconstitutional, and allow much weight to the legislative judgment, the inferior courts
shouJU be still more reluctant to exercise this power, and a becoming modesty
would at least be expected of those judicial officers who have not been trained
to the investigation of legal and constitutional questions. But in any cast! a
judge or justice, being free from doubt in his own mind, and unfettered by any
judicial decision properiy binding upon him, mu~t follow his own sense of duty
upon constitutional as well as upon any other questions. See Miller v. State,
S Ohio, N. s. 483; Pim ~'· Nicholson, 6 Ohio, N. s. 180; Mayberry v. Kelly,
1 Kansa.~, 116. In the case last cited it is said: " It is claimed by counsel for
the plamtiff in error, that the point raised by the instruction is, that inferior
court~ and ministerial officers have no right to judge of the constitutionality of a
law passed by a legislature. But is this law? If so, a court created to interpret
the law must disregard the constitution in forming its opinions. The constitution
is law,- the fundamental law,- and must as much be taken into consideration
by a justice of the peace as by any other tribunal. When two laws apparently
contlid, it is the duty of all courts to construe them. If the conflict is irreconcilable, they must decide which i:~ to prevail; and the constitution is not an
exception to this rule of construction. If a law were passed in open, flagrant
violation of the comtitution, should a justice of the peace regard the law, and
pay no attention to the constitutional provision? If that is his duty in a plain
case, is it less so when the construction becomes more difficult?"
j
Hoover v. Wood,. 9 Ind. 287.
1
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is raised, though it may be legitimately presented by the record,
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yet if the record also presents some other and clear ground upon

which the court may rest its judgment, and thereby render the

constitutional question immaterial to the case, that course will be

adopted, and the question of constitutional power will be left for

consideration until a ease arises which cannot be disposed of

without considering it, and when consequently a decision upon

such question will be unavoidable.‘

III. Nor will a court listen to an objection made to the constitu-

tionality of an act by a party whose rights it does not affect, and

who has therefore no interest in defeating it. On this ground it

has been held that the objection that a legislative act was

unconstitutional, because divesting the rights of remainder-men

against their will, could not be successfully urged by the owner of

the particular estate, and could only be made on behalf

[* 164] * of the remainder-men themselves.” And a party who has

assented to his property being taken under a statute

cannot afterwards object that the statute is in violation of a

provision in the constitution designed for the protection of private

property.“ The statute is assumed to be valid, until some one

complains whose rights it invades. “ Prima facie, and on the face

of the act itself, nothing will generally appear to show that the act
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is not valid ; and it is only when some person attempts to resist its

operation, and calls in the aid of the judicial power to pronounce it

void, as to him, his property or his rights, that the objection of un-

eonstitutionality can be presented and sustained. Respect for the

legislature, therefore, concurs with well-established principles of

law in the conclusion that such an act is not void. but voidable

only; and it follows, as a necessary legal inference from this

position, that this ground of avoidance can be taken advantage of

by those only who have a right to question the validity of the act,

and not by strangers. To this extent only is it necessary to go, in

order to secure and protect the rights of all persons against the

‘ Ea: partc Randolph, 2 Brock. 447; Frees v. Ford, 6 N. Y. 177, 178;

White v. Scott, 4 Barb. 56; Mobile and Ohio Railroad Co. v. State, 29

Ala. 573. _

’ Sinclair u.Jacl-rson, 8 Cow. 543. See also Smith v. McCarthy, 56 Penn.

St. 359.

3 Embury v. Conner, 3 N. Y. 511; Baker v. Braman, 6 Hill, 47; Mobile and

Ohio Railroad Co. v. State, 29 Ala. 586.
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is raised, though it may be legitimately presented by the record,
yet if the record also presents some other and clear ground upon
which the court may rest its judgment, and thereby render the
constitutional question immaterial to the case, that course will be
adopted, and the question of constitutional power will be left for
consideration until a case arises which cannot be disposed of
without considering it, and when consequently a decision upon
such question will be unavoidable. 1
III. Nor will a court listen to an objection made to the constitutionality of an act by a party whose rights it does not affect, and
who has therefore no interest in defeating it. On this ground it
has been held that the objection that a legislative act was
unconstitutional, because divesting the rights of remainder-men
against their will, could not be successfully urged by the owner of
the particular estate, and could only be made on behalf
[*164] • of the remainder-men themselves.2 And a party who has
assented to his property being taken under a statute
cannot afterwards object that the statute is in violation of a
provision in the constitution designed for the protection of private
property. 3 The statute is assumed to be valid, until some one
complains whose rights it invades. "Prima facie, and on the face
of the act itself, nothing will generally appear to show that the act
is not valid ; and it is only when some person attempts to resist its
operation, and calls in the aid of the judicial power to pronounce it
void, as to him, his property or his rights, that the objection of unconstitutionality can be presented and sustained. Respect for the
legislature, therefore, concurs with well-established principles of
law in the conclusion that such an act is not void, but voidable
only ; and it follows, as a necessary legal inference from this
position, that this ground of avoidance can be taken advantage of
by those only who have a right to question the validity of the act,
and not by strangers. To this extent only is it necessary to go, in
order to secure and protect the rights of all persons against the
1 Ez parte Ramlolph, 2 Brock. 447; Frees v. Ford, 6 N.Y. 177, 178;
White v. Scott, 4 Barb. 56; 1\Iobile and Ohio Railroad Co. v. State, 29
Ala. 578.
1 Sinclair v. JackBon, 8 Cow. 543.
See also Smith v. McCarthy, 56 Penn.
St. 359.
3 Embury v. Conner, 3 N.Y. 511; Baker v. Braman, 6 Hill, 47; :Mobile and
Ohio Railroad Co. v. State, 29 Ala. 586.
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unwarranted exercise of legislative power, and to this extent only,
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therefore, are courts of justice called on to interpose.” 1

IV. Nor can a court declare a statute unconstitutional and void,

solely on the ground of unjust and oppressive provisions, or

because it is supposed to violate the natural, social, or political

rights of the citizen, unless it can be shown that such injustice is

prohibited or such rights guaranteed or protected by the constitu-

tion. It is true there are some reported cases in which judges

have been understood to intimate a doctrine diﬁerent from what

is here asserted; but it will generally be found, on an examination

of those cases, that what is said is rather by way of argument and

illustration, to show the unreasonableness of putting upon consti-

tutions such a construction as would permit legislation of the

objectionable character then in question, and to induce a more

cautious and patient examination of the statute, with a view

to * discover in it, if possible, some more just and [* 165]

reasonable legislative intent, than as laying down a rule

by which courts would be at liberty to limit, according to their own

judgment and sense of justice and propriety, the extent of

legislative power in directions in which the constitution had

imposed no restraint. Mr. Justice Story, in one case, in examin-

ing the extent of power granted by the charter of Rhode Island,
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which authorized the General Assembly to make laws in the most

ample manner, “ so as such laws, &c., be not contrary and repug-

nant unto, but as near as may be agreeable to, the laws of

England, considering the nature and constitution of the place and

people there,” expresses himself thus: “ What is the true extent

of the power thus granted must be open to explanation as well by

usage as by construction of the terms in which it is given. In a

government professing to regard the great rights of personal

liberty and of property, and which is required to legislate in

subordination to the general laws of England, it would not lightly

be presumed that the great principles of Magna Charta were to be

disregarded, or that the estates of its subjects were liable to be

taken away without trial, without notice, and without offence.

‘ Wellington, Petitioner, 16 Pick. 96. And sec Hingham, &c., Turnpike Co.

v. Norfolk Co. 6 Allen, 353; De Jarnette v. Haynes, 23 Miss. 600; Sinclair v.

Jackson, 8 Cow. 543, 579; Heyward v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 8 Barb. 489;

Matter of Albany St., 11 Wend. 149; Williamson v. Carlton, 51 Me. 449; State

v. Rich, 20 Miss. 393.

I
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unwarranted exercise of legislative power, and to this e~tent only,
therefore, are courts of justice called on to interpose." I
IV. Nor can a court declare a statute unconstitutional and void,
solely on the ground of unjust and oppressive provisions, or
because it is supposed to violate the natural, social, or political
rights of the citizen, unless it can be shown that such injustice is
prohibited or such rights guaranteed or protected by the constitution. It is true there are some reported cases in which judges
have been understood to intimate a doctrine different from what
is here asserted ; but it will generally b~ found, on an examination
of those cases, that what is said is rather by way of argument and
illustration, to show the unreasonableness of putting upon constitutions such a construction as would permit legislation of the
objectionable character then in question, and to induce a more
cautious and patient examination of the statute, with a view
to • discover in it, if possible, some more just and [*165]
reasonable legislative intent, than as laying down a rule
by which courts would be at liberty to limit, according to their own
judgment and sense of justice and propriety, the extent of
legislative power in directions in which the constitution had
imposed no restraint. Mr. Justice Story, in one case, in examining the extent of power granted by the charter of Rhode Island,
which authorized the General Assembly to make laws in the most
ample manner," so as such laws, &c., be not contrary and repugnant unto, but as near as may be agreeable to, the laws of
England, considering the nature and constitution of the place and
people there," expresses himself thus: ''What is the true extent
of the power thus granted must be open to explanation ns well by
usage as by construction of the terms in which it is given. In a
government professing to regard the great rights of personal
liberty and of property, and which is required to legislate in
subordination to the general laws of England, it would not lightly
be presumed that the great principles of Magna Charta were to be
disregarded, or that the estates of its subjects were liable to be
taken away without trial, without notice, and without offence.
1 Wellington, Petitioner, 16 Pick. 96.
And see Hingham, &c., Turnpike Co.
v. Norfolk Co. 6 Allen, 353; DeJarnette !'. Haynes, 23 Miss. 600; Sinclair v.
Jackson, 8 Cow. 543, 579; Heyward v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 8 Barb. 489;
Matter of Albany St., 11 Wend. 149; Williamson"· Carlton, 51 Me. 449; State
v. Rich, 20 Miss. 393.
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Even if such authority could be deemed_to have been conﬁded by
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the charter to the General Assembly of Rhode Island, as an exer-

cise of transcendental sovereignty before the Revolution, it can

scarcely be imagined that that great event could have left the

people of that State subjected to its uncontrolled and arbitrary

exercise. That government can scarcely be deemed to be free,

where the rights of property are left solely dependent upon the will

of a legislative body, without any restraint. The fundamental

maxims of a free government seem to require that the rights

of personal liberty and private property should be held sacred. At

least no court of justice in this country would be warranted in

assuming that the power to violate and disregard them— a power

so repugnant to the common principles of justice and civil liberty

—lurkcd under any general grant of legislative authority, or ought

to be implied from any general expressions of the will of the

people. The people ought not to be presumed to part with rights

so vital to their security and well-being, without very strong and

direct expressions of such an intention.” “ We know of no case in

which alegislative act to transfer the property of A. to B., without

his consent, has ever been held a constitutional exercise of

[’* 166] legislative power in any State in **the Union. On the

contrary, it has been constantly resisted, as inconsistent
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with just principles, by every judicial tribunal in which it has been

attempted to be enforced.” 1 The question discussed by the

learned judge in this case is perceived to have been, What is the

scope of a grant of legislative power to be exercised in conformity

with the laws of England? Whatever he says is pertinent to that

1 Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Pet. G57. See also what is said by the same judge

in Terroit v. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 43. “ It is clcar that statutes passed against plain

and obvious principles of common right and common reason are absolutely null

and void, so far as they are calculated to operate against those principles.“ Ham

v. McClaws, 1 Bay, 98. But the question in that case was one of construction;

whether the court should give to a statute a construction which should make it

operate against common right and common reason. In Bowman v. Middleton. 1

Bay, 282, the court held an act which divested a man of his freehold and passed

it over to another, to be void “ as against common right as well as against Magus.

Charta.” In Regents of University v. Williams, 9 Gill & J . 365, it was said

that an act was void as opposed to fundamental principles of right and justice

inherent in the nature and spirit of the social compact. But the court had

Even if such authority could be deemed to have been confided by
the charter to the General Assembly of Rhode Island, as an exercise of transcendental sovereignty before the Revolution, it can
scarcely be imagined that tha't great event could have left the
people of that State subjected to its uncontrolled and arbitrary
exercise. That government can scarcely be deemed to be free,
where the rights of property are left solely dependent upon the will
of a legislative body, without any restraint. The fundamental
maxims of a free government seem to require that the rights
of personal liberty and private property should be held sacred. At
least no court of justice in this country would be warranted in
assuming that the power to violate and disregard them- a power
so repugnant to the common principles of justice and civil liberty
-lurked under any general grant of legislative authority, or ought
to be implied from any general expressions of the will of the
people. The people ought not to be presumed to part with rights
so vital to their security and well-being, without very strong and
direct expressions of such an intention." "We know of no case in
which a legislative act to transfer the property of A. to B., without
his consent, has ever been held a constitutional exercise of
[*166] legislative power in any State in • the Union. On the
contrary, it has been constantly resisted, as inconsistent
with just principles, by every judicial tribunal in which it has been
attempted to be enforced." 1 The question discussed by the
learned judge in this case is perceived to have been, What is the
scope of a grant of legislative power to be exercised in conformity
with the laws of England? Whatever he says is pertinent to that

already decided that the act was opposed, not only to the constitution of the

State, but to that of the United States also. See Mayor, &c., of Baltimore v. State,

15 Md. 1576.
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1 Wilkinson !'. Leland, 2 Pet. 657.
See also what is said by the same judge
in Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 43. " It is clear that statutes passed against plain
and obvious principles of common right and common reason are absolutely null
and void, so far as they are calculated to operate against those principle~." Ham
11. l\lcClaws, 1 Bay, 98. But the question in t.hat case was one of construction;
whether the court should give to a statute a construction which should make it
operate against common right and common reason. In Bowman o. Middleton. 1
Bay, 282, the court held an act which divested a man of his freehold and passed
it over to another, to be void "as against common right as well as against Magna
Charta." In Regents of University!'. Williams, 9 Gill & J. 36.5, it was said
that an act was void as opposed to fundamental principles of right and justice
inherent in the nature and spirit of the social compact. But the court had
already decided that the act was opposed, not only to the constitution of the
State, but to that of the United States also. See Mayor, &c., of Baltimore v. State,
15 Md. :.176.
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question; and the considerations he suggests are by way of
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CH. VII.)

argument, to show that the power to do certain unjust and

oppressive acts was not covered by the grant of legislative power.

It is not intimated that if they were within the grant, they would

be impliedly prohibited because unjust and oppressive.

In another case arising in the-Supreme Court of New York,

one of the judges, in considering the rights of the city of New

York to certain corporate property, has said: “The inhabitants

of thecity of New York have a vested right in the City Hall, mar-

kets, water-works, ferries, and other public property, which cannot

be taken from them any more than their individual dwellings or

storehouses. Their rights, in this respect, rest not merely upon

the constitution, but upon the great principles of eternal justice

which lie at the foundation of all free governments.”1 The great

principles of eternal justice which affected the particular case

had been incorporated in the constitution, and it therefore be-

came unnecessary to consider what would otherwise have been

the rule; nor do we understand the court as intimating any

opinion upon that subject. It was suﬂicient for the case,

to ﬁnd * that the principles of right and justice had been [* 167]

recognized and protected by the constitution, and that the

people had not assumed to confer upon the legislature a power
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to deprive the city of rights which did not come from the constitu-

tion, but from principles antecedent to and recognized by it.

So it is said by Hosmer, Ch. J., in a Connecticut case: “ With

those judges who assert the omnipotence of the legislature in all

cases Where the constitution has 11ot interposed an explicit re-

straint, I cannot agree. Should there exist— what I know is not

only an incredible supposition, but a most remote improbability—

a case of direct infraction of vested rights, too palpable to be ques-

tioned and too unjust to admit of vindication, I could not avoid

considering it as a violation of the social compact, and within the

control of the judiciary. If, for example, a law were made with-

out any cause to deprive a person of his property, or to subject

him to imprisonment, who would not question its legality, and

who would aid in carrying it into eifect? On the other hand, I

cannot harmonize with those who deny the power of the legisla-

ture, in any case, to pass laws which, with entire justice,_ operate

on antecedent legal rights. A retrospective law may be just and

‘ Benson v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 10 Barb. 244.
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question ; and the considerations he suggests are by way of
argument, to show that the power to do certain unjust and
oppressive acts was not covered by the grant of legislative power.
It is not intimated that if they were within the grant, they would
be impliedly prohibited because unjust and oppressive.
In another case arising in the. Supreme Court of New York,
one of the judges, in considering the rights of the city of New
York to certain corporate property, has said : "The inhabitants
of the city o( New York have a vested right in the City Hall, markets, water-works, ferries, and other public property, which cannot
be taken from them any more than their individual dwellings or
storehouses. Their rights, in this respect, rest not merely upon
tile constitution, but upon the great principles of eternal justice
which lie at the foundation of all free governments." 1 The great
principles of eternal justice which affected the particular case
had been incorporated in the constitution, and it therefore became unnecessary to consider what would otherwise have been
the rule; nor do we understand the court as intimating any
opinion upon that subject. It was sufficient for the case,
to find • that the principles of right and justice had been [*167]
recognized and protected by the constitution, and that the
people had not assumed to confer upon the legislature a power
to deprive the city of rights which did not come from the constitution, but from principles antecedent to and recognized by it.
So it is said by Hosmer, Ch. J ., in a Connecticut case: " With
those judges who assert the omnipotence of the legislature in all
cases where the constitution has not interposed au explicit restraint, I cannot agree. Should there exist- what I know is not
only an incredible supposition, but a most remote improbauilitya case of direct infraction of vested rights, too palpable to be questioned and too unjust to admit of vindication, I could not avoid
considering it as a violation of the social compact, and within the
control of the judiciary. If, for example, a law were made without any cause to deprive a person of his property, or to subject
him to imprisonment, who would not question its legality, and
who would aid in carrying it into effect? On the other haud, I
cannot harmonize with those who deny the power of the legislature, in any case, to pass laws which, with entire justice, operate
on antecedent legal rights. A retrospective law may be Just and
1

Benson v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 10 Barb. 244.
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reasonable, and the right of the legislature to enact one of this

(CH. VII.

description I am not speculatist enough to question.” 1 The eases

here supposed of unjust and tyrannical enactments would probably

be held not to be within the power of any legislative body in the

Union. One of them would be clearly a bill of attainder; the

other, unless it was in the nature of remedial legislation, and sus-

ceptible of being defended on that theory, would be an exercise of

judicial power, and therefore in excess of legislative authority, be-

cause not included in the apportionment of power made to that

department. No question of implied prohibition would arise in

either of these cases; but if the grant of power had covered them,

and there had been no express limitation, there would, as it seems

to us, be very great probability of unpleasant and dangerous con-

ﬂict of authority if the courts were to deny validity to legislative

action on subjects within their control, on the assumption that

the legislature had disregarded justice or sound policy. The mo-

ment a court ventures to substitute its own judgment for that of

the legislature, in any case where the constitution has vested the

legislature with power over the subject, that moment it

[* 168] enters *‘ upon a ﬁeld where it is impossible to set limits to

its authority, and where its discretion alone will measure

the extent of its interference?
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The rule of law ‘upon this subject appears to be, that, except

where the constitution has imposed limits upon the legislative

‘ Goshen v. Stonington, 4 Conn. 225.

' “If the legislature should pass a law in plain and unequivocal language,

within the general scope of their constitutional powers, I know of no authority

in this government to pronounce such an act void, merely because, in the opin-

ion of the judicial tribunals, it was contrary to the principles of natural justice;

for this would be vesting in the court a latitudinarian authority which might be

abused, and would necessarily lead to collisions between the legislative and ju-

dicial departments, dangerous to the well-being of society, or at least not in har-

mony with the structure of our ideas of natural government.” Per Rogers, J.,

in Commonwealth v. MeCloskey, 2 Rawle, 374. “All the courts can do with

odious statutes is to chasten their hardness by construction. Such is the imper-

reasonable, and the right of the legislature to enact one of this
description I am not speculatist enough to question." 1 The cases
here supposed of unjust and tyrannical enactments would probably
be held not to be within the power of any legislative body iu the
Union. One of them would be clearly a bill of attainder; the
other, unleRs it was in the nature of remedial legislation, and susceptible of being defended on that theory, would be an exercise of
judicial power, and therefore in excess of legislative authority, because not included in the apportionment of power made to that
department. No question of implied prohibition would arise in
either of these cases ; but if the grant of power had covered them,
and there had been no express limitation, there would, as it seems
to us, be very great probability of unpleasant and dangerous conflict of authority if the courts were to deny validity to legislative
action on subjects within their control, on the assumption that
the legislature had disregarded justice or sound policy. The moment a court ventures to substitute its own judgment for that of
the legislature, in any case where tho constitution has vested the
legislature with power over the subject, that moment it
[•168] enters • upon a field where it is impossible to set limits to
its authority, and where its discretion alone will measure
the extent of its interferencc.2
The rule of law·upon this subject appears to be, that, except
where the constitution has imposed limits upon the legislative

fection of the best human institutions, that, mould them as we may, a large dis-

cretion must at last be reposed somewhere. The best and in many cases the

only security is in the wisdom and integrity of public servants, and their identity

with the people. Governments cannot be administered without committing powers

in trust and conﬁdence.” Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 528, per Stuart, J. And see

Johnston v. Commonwealth, 1 Bibb, 603; Flint River Steamboat Co. v. Foster,

5 Geo. 194; State v. Kruttschnitt, 4 Nev. 178.
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Goshen "· Stonington, 4 Conn. 225.
If the legislature should pass a law in plain and unequivocal language,
within the general scope of their constitutional powers, I know of no authority
in this government to pronounce such an act void, merely because, in the opinion of t.he judicial tribunals, it was contrary to the principles of natural justice;
for this would be vesting in the court a latitudinarian authority which might be
aoused, and would necessarily lead to collisions between the legislative and judicial departments, dangerous to the well-being of society, or at least not in harmony with the structure of our ideas of natural government." Per Rogers, J.,
in Commonwealth "·McCloskey, 2 Rawle, 874. "All the courts can do with
odious statutes is to chasten their hardness by construction. Such is the imperfection of the best human institutions, that, mould them as we may, a large discretion must at last be reposed somewhere. The best and in many cases the
only ~ecurity is in the wisdom and integrity of public servants, and their identity
with the people. Governments cannot be administered without committing powers
in trust II.Jld confidence." Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 528, per Stuart, J. And see
Johnston"· Commonwealth, 1 Bibb, 608; Flint River Steamboat Co. v. Foster,
6 Geo. 194; State v. Kruttschnitt, 4 Nev. 178.
1

1 "
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power, it must be considered as practically absolute, whether it

operate according to natural justice or not in any particular case.

CH. VII.]
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The courts are not the guardians of the rights of the people of the

State, except as those rights are secured by some constitutional

provision which comes within the judicial cognizance. The protec-

tion against unwise or oppressive legislation, within constitutional

bounds, is by an appeal to the justice and patriotism of the repre-

sentatives of the people. If this fail, the people in their sovereign

capacity can correct the evil; but courts cannot assume their

rights.‘ The judiciary can only arrest the execution of a statute

when it conﬂicts with the constitution. It cannot run a race of

opinions upon points of right,'reason, and expediency with the

law-making power.’ Any legislative act which does not encroach

upon the powers apportioned to the other departments of the gov-

ernment, being primafacie valid, must be enforced, unless restric-

tions upon the legislative authority can be pointed out in the

constitution, and the case shown to come within them.”

' Bennett v. Bull, Baldw. 74.

' Perkins, J ., in Madison & Indianapolis Railroad Co. v. Vlfhiteneck, 8 Ind.

222.

3 Sill v. Village of Corning, 15 N. Y. 303; Varick v. Smith, 5 Paige, 137;

Cochran v. Van Surlay, 20 Wcnd. 365; Morris v. People, 3 Denio, 381; \Vyne-
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hamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 430; People v. Supervisors of Orange, 17 N. Y. 235;

People v. New York Central Railroad Co. 34 Barb. 138; People v. Toynbec, 2

Park. Cr. R. 490; Dow v. Norris, 4 N. H. 16; Derby Turnpike Co. v. Parks, 10

Conn. 522, 543; Hartford Bridge Co. v. Union Ferry Co. 29 Conn. 210; Holden

power, it must be considered as practically absolute, whether it
operate according to natural justice or not in any particular case.
The courts are not tho guardians of the rights of the people of the
State, except as those rights are secured by some constitutional
provision which comes within the judicial cognizance. The protection against uu wise or oppressiYe legislation, within cont~titutional
bounds, is by an appeal to the justice and patriotism of the representatives of the people. If this fail, the people in their so,·ereign
capacity can correct the evil ; but courts cannot assume their
rights.I The judiciary can only arrest the execution of a statute
when it conflicts with the constitution. It cannot run a race of
opinions upon points of right,· reason, and expediency with the
law-making power.2 Any legislative act which does not encroach
upon the powers apportioned to the other departments of the government, being prima facie valid, must be enforced, unless restrictions upon the legislative authority can be pointed out in the
constitution, and the case shown to come within theru.8

v. James, 11 Mass. 396; Norwich v. County Commissioners, 13 Pick. 60; Daw-

son v. Shaver, 1 Blackf. 206; Beauchamp v. State, 6 Blackf. 305; Doe v. Doug-

lass, 8 Blackf. 10; Maize v. State, 4 Ind. 342; Stocking v. State, 7 Ind. 327;

Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 528; Newland v. Marsh, 19 Ill. 376, 384; Bliss v. Com-

monwealth, 2 Litt. 90; State v. Ashley, 1 Ark. 513; Campbell v. Union Bank,

6 How. Miss. 672 ; Tate’s Ex‘r v. Bell, 4 Yerg. 206; \Vhittington 0. Polk, 1 Harr.

& J. 236; Norris v. Abingdon Academy, 7 Gill. & J. 7; Harrison v. State, 22

Md. 491; State v. Lyles, 1 McCord, 238; Myers u. English, 9 Cal. 341; E1:

parle Newman, ib. 502; Hobart 0. Supervisors, 17 Cal. 23; Crenshaw v. Slate

River Co. 6 Rand. 245; Lewis v. \Vebb, 3 Greenl. 326; Durham v. Lewiston,

4 Greenl. 140; Lunt’s Case, 6 Grcenl. 412; Scott v. Smart’s Ex'rs, 1 Mich. 306;

Williams v. Detroit, 2 Mich. 560; Tyler 1:. People, 8 Mich. 320; Cotton v. Com-

missioners ofLeon County, 6 Flor. 610; State v. Robinson, 1 Kansas, 27; Santo

v. State, 2 Iowa, 165; Morrison v. Springer, 15 Iowa, 304; Stoddart v. Smith,

5 Binn. 355; Moore v. Houston, 3 S. & R. 169; Braddec v. Brownﬁeld, 2 ‘V. &

S. 271 ; Harvey v. Thomas, 10 Watts, 63; Commonwealth v. Maxwell, 27 Penn.

St. 456; Carey 0. Giles, 9 Geo. 253; Macon and Western Railroad Co. v. Davis,

13 Geo. 68; Franklin Bridge Co. v. \Voo<l, 14 Geo. 80; Boston v. Cunnnins, 16
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1

1

Bennett v. Bull, BaJdw. j4,
Perkins, J., in Madison & Indianapolis Railroad Co. v. Whiteneck, 8 Ind.

222.
2 Sill v. Village of Corning, 15 N. Y. 303; Varick v. Smith, 5 Paige, 137;
Cocbran v. Van Sua·Iay, 20 Wend. 365; Morris v. People, 3 Denio, 381; Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 430; People v. Supervisors of OrangE', 17 N.Y. 235;
People v. New York Central Railroad Co. 34 Barb. 138; People v. Toynbee, 2
Park. Cr. R. 490; Dow v. Norris, 4 N.H. 16; Derby Turnpike Co. v. Parks, 10
Conn. 522, 543; Hartford Bridge Co. v. Union Ferry Co. 29 Conn. 210; Holden
"·James, 11 Mass. 3U6; Norwich v. County Commissioners, 13 Pick. 60; Dawson 11. Shaver, 1 Blackf. 206; Beauchamp v. State, 6 Blackf. 305; Doe v. Douglass, 8 Blackf. 10; Maize v. State, 4 Ind. 342; Stocking v. State, 7 Ind. 327;
Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 528; Newland v. Marsh, 19 Ill. 376, 384; Bliss v. Commonwealth, 2 Litt. 90; State v. Ashley, 1 Ark. 513; Campbell v. Union Bank,
6 How. Miss. 672; Tate's Ex'r v. Bell, 4 Ycrg. 206; Whittington v. Polk, 1 Harr.
& J. 236; Norris v. Abingdon Academy, 7 Gill. & J. 7; Harrison v. State, 22 •
:Md. 491; State v. Lyles, 1 McCord, 238; Myers v. English, 9 Cal. 341; E~
parte Newman, ib. li02; Hobart v. Supervisors, 17 Cal. 23; Crenshaw v. Slate
River Co. 6 Rand. 245; Lewis v. Webb, 3 Greenl. 326; Durbam v. Lewiston,
4 Greenl. 140; Lunt's Case, 6 Greenl. 412; Scott v. Smart's Ex'rs, 1 Mich. 306;
Williams v. Detroit, 2 Mich. 560; Tyler v. People, 8 Mich. 320; Cotton v. Com.
missioners of Leon County, 6 Flor. 610; State 11. Robinson, 1 Kansas, 27; Santo
tt. State, 2 Iowa, 16.); Morrison v. Springer, 15 Iowa, 304; Stoddart v. Smitb,
5 Binn. 3.55; Moore"· Houston, 3 S. & R. 169; Braddec v. Brownfield, 2 W. &
S. 271; Harvey v. Thomas, 10 Watts, 63; Commonwealth v. Maxwell, 27 Penn.
St. 456; Carey v. Giles, 9 Geo. 253; Macon and Western Railroad Co. v. Davis,
13 Geo. 68; Franklin Bridge Co. v. Wood, 14 Geo. 80; Boston v. Cummins, 16

12
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[" 169] ‘ V. If the courts are not at liberty to declare statutes

[ca. vrr.

void because of their apparent injustice or impolicy, neither

can they do so because they appear to the minds of the judges to

violate fundamental principles of republican government, unless it

shall be found that those principles are placed beyond legislative

encroachment by the constitution. The principles of republican

government are not a set of inﬂexible rules, vital and active in

the constitution, though unexpressed, but they are subject to

variation and modiﬁcation from motives of policy and public

necessity; and it is only in those particulars in which experience

has demonstrated any departure from the settled practice to work

injustice or confusion, that we shall discover an incorporation of

them in the constitution in such form as to make them deﬁnite

rules of action under all circumstances. It is undoubtedly a.

maxim of republican government, as we understand it, that

taxation and representation should be inseparable ; but where the

legislature interferes, as in many cases it may do, to compel taxa-

tion by a municipal corporation for local purposes, it is evident

that this maxim is applied in the case in a. much restricted

[* 170] and very imperfect sense only, since the *reprcsentati0n

of the locality taxed is but slight in the body imposing

the tax, and the burden may be imposed, not only against the pro-
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test of the local representative, but against the general opposition

of the municipality. The property of married women is taxable,

notwithstanding they are not allowed a voice in choosing repre-

sentatives.1 The maxim is not entirely lost sight of in such cases,

but its application in the particular case, and the determination

how far it ca.n properly and justly be made to yield to considerations

of policy and expediency, must rest exclusively with the law-making

power, in the absence of any deﬁnite constitutional provisions so

embodying the maxim as to make it a. limitation upon legislative

authority. It is also a maxim of republican government that local

concerns shall be managed in the local districts, which shall choose

their own administrative and police oﬂicers, and establish for them-

selves police regulations ; but this maxim is subject to such excep-

tions as the legislative power of the State shall see ﬁt to make; and

when made, it must be presumed that the public interest, con-

Geo.102; Van Horn v. Dorrance, 2 Dall. 309; Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386;

Cooper v. Telfair, 4 Dall. 18; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Crancb, 128.

‘ 1/Vheeler v. \Vall, 6 Allen, 558.

7 __ A _
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• V. If the courts are not at liberty to declare statutes

void because of their apparent injustice or impolicy, neither
can they do so because they appear to the minds of the judges to
violate fundamental principles of r!3publican government, unless it
shall be found that those principles are placed beyond legislative
encroachment by the constitution. The principles of republican
government are not a set of inflexible rules, vital and active in
the constitution, though unexpressed, but they are subject to
variation and modification from motives of policy and public
necessity; and it is only in those particulars in which experience
bas demonstrated any departure from the settled practice to work
injustice or confusion, that we shall discover an incorporation of
them in the constitution in such form as to make them definite
rules of action under all circumstances. It is undoubtedly a
maxim of republican government, as we understand it, that
taxation and representation should be inseparable; but where the
legislature interferes, as in many cases it may do, to compel taxation by a municipal corporation for local purposes, it is evident
that this maxim is applied in the case in a much restricted
[*170] and very imperfect sense only, since the *representation
of the locality taxed is but slight in the body imposing
the tax, and the burden may be imposed, not only against the protest of the local representative, but against the general opposition
of the municipality. The property of married women is taxable,
notwithstanding they are not allowed a voice in choosing representatives.1 The maxim is not entirely lost sight of in such cases,
but its application in the particular case, and the determination
how far it can properly and justly be made to yield to considerations
of policy and expediency, must rest exclusively with the law-making
power, in the absence of any definite constitutional provisions so
embodying the maxim as to make it a limitation upon legislative
•
authority. It is also a maxim of republican government that local
concerns shall be managed in the local districts, which shall choose
their own administrative and police officers, and establish for themselves police regulations ; but this maxim is subject to such exceptions as the legislative power of the State shall see fit to make; and
when made, it must be presumed that the public interest, conGeo. 102; Van Horn v. Dorrance, 2 Dall. 809; Calder v. Bull, 8 Dall. 386;
Cooper v. Telfair, 4 Dall. 18; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 128.
1 Wheeler v. Wall, 6 Allen, 558.
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venience, and protection are subserved thereby.‘ The State may

CH. VII.]

DECLARING STATUTES UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

interfere to establish new regulations against the will of the local

* 170

constituency; and if it shall think proper in any case to assume

to itself those powers of local police which should be executed by

the people immediately concerned, we must suppose it has been

done because the local administration has proved imperfect and

ineﬁicient, and a regard to the general well-being has demanded

the change. In these cases the maxims which have prevailed in

the government address themselves to the wisdom of the legis-

lature, and to adhere to themes far as possible is doubtless to

keep in the path of wisdom ; but they do not constitute restrictions

so as to warrant the other departments in treating the exceptions

which are made as unconstitutional.”

‘ People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 547. See post, p. 191-192.

' In People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 500, where the Metropolitan Police Act of

Detroit was claimed to be unconstitutional on various grounds, the court'say:

" Besides the speciﬁc objections made to the act as opposed to the provisions of

the constitution, the counsel for respondent attacks it on ‘ general principles,’ and

especially because violating fundamental principles in our system. that govern-

ments exist by consent of the governed, and that taxation and representation go

venience, and protection are subserved thereby. 1 The State may
interfere to establish new regulations against the will of the local
constituency; and if it shall think proper in any case to assume
to its.elf those powers of local police which should be executed by
the people immediately concerned, we must suppose it has been
done because the local administration has proved imperfect and
inefficient, and a regard to the general well-being has demanded
the change. In these cases the maxims which have prevailed in
the government address themselves to the wisdom of the legislature, and to adhere to them as far as possible is doubtless to
keep in the path of wisdom; but they do not constitute restrictions
so as to warrant the other departments in treating the exceptions
which are made as unconstitutiona1.2

together. The taxation under the act, it is said, is really in the hands of a police

board, a body in the choice of which the people of Detroit have no voice. This
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argument is one which might be pressed upon the legislative department with

great force, if it were true in point of fact. But as the people of Detroit are

really represented throughout, the diﬂiculty suggested can hardly be regarded as

fundamental. They were represented in the legislature which passed the act,

and had the same proportionate voice there with the other municipalities in the

State, all of which receive from that body; their powers of local government, and

such only as its wisdom shall prescribe within the constitutional limit. They were

represented in that body when the present police board were appointed by it,

and the govemor, who is hereafter to ﬁll vacancies, will be chosen by the State

at large, including their city. There is nothing in the maxim that taxation and

representation go together which requires that the body paying the tax shall alone

be consulted in its assessment; and if there were, we should ﬁnd it violated at

every turn in our system. The State legislature not only has a control in this

respect over inferior municipalities, which it exercises by general laws, but it

sometimes ﬁnds it necessary to interpose its power in special cases to prevent

unjust or burdensome taxation, as well as to compel the performance of a clear

duty. The constitution itself, by one of the clauses referred to, requires the

legislature to exercise its control over the taxation of municipal corporations, by

restricting it to what that body may regard as proper bounds. And municipal

bodies are frequently compelled most unwillingly to levy taxes for the payment

of claims, by the judgments or mandates of courts in which their representation

is quite as remote as that of the people of Detroit in this police board. It can-
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People v. Draper, 15 N.Y. 547. See post, p. 191-192.
In People v.l\Iahaney, 13 .Mich. 500, where the Metropolitan Police Act of
Detroit was claimed to be unconstitutional on various grounds, the court' say:
" Besides the specific objections made to the act as opposed to the provisions of
the constitution, the counsel for respondent attacks it on ' general principles,' and
especially because violating fundamental principles in our system, that governments exist by consent of the governed, and that taxation and representation go
together. The taxation under the act, it is said, is really in the hands of a police
board, a body in the choice of which the people of Detroit have no voice. This
argument is one which might be pressed upon the legislative department with
great force, if it were true in point of fact. But as the people of Detroit are
really represented throughout, the difficulty suggested can hardly be regarded as
fundamental. They were represented in the legislature which passed the act,
and had the same proportionate voice there with the other municipalities in the
State, all of which receive from that body; their powers of local government, and
such only as its wisdom shall prescribe within the constitutional limit. They were
represented in that body when the present police board were appointed by it,
and the governor, who is hereafter to fill vacancies, will be chosen by the State
at large, including their city. There is nothing in the maxim that taxation and
representation go together which requires that the body paying the tax shall alone
be consulted in its assessment; and if there were, we should find it violated at
every turn in our system. The State legislature not only bas a control in this
respect over inferior municipalities, which it exercises by general laws, but it
sometimes finds it necessary to interpose its power in special cases to prevent
unjust or burdensome taxation, as well as to compel the performance of a clear
duty. The constitution itself, by one of the clauses referred to, requires the
legislature to exercise its control over the taxation of municipal corporations, by
restricting it to what that body may regard as proper bounds. And municipal
bodies are frequently compelled most unwillingly to levy taxes for the payment
of claims, by the judgments or mandates of courts in which their representation
is quite as remote as that of the people of Detroit in this police board. It can1
1
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["‘ 171] “VI. Nor are the courts at liberty to declare an act

• 171

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

[ca. vu.

void, because in their opinion it is opposed to a spirit sup-

posed to pervade the constitution, but not expressed in words.

“ When the fundamental law has not limited, either in terms or by

necessary implication, the general powers conferred upon the legis-

lature, we cannot declare a limitation under the notion of having

discovered something in the spirit of the constitution which is

not even mentioned in the instrument.”1 “It is diﬂicult,” says

Mr. Senator Verplanck, “upon any general principles, to limit

the omnipotence of the sovereign legislative power by judicial

interposition, except so far as the express words of a written con-

stitution give that authority. There are indeed many dicta and

some great authorities holding that acts contrary to the ﬁrst

principles of right are void. The principle is unquestion-

[* 172] ably‘*‘sound as the governing rule of a legislature in rela-

tion to its own acts, or even those of a preceding legislature.

It also affords a safe rule of construction for courts, in the inter-

pretation of laws admitting of any" doubtful construction, to pre-

sume that the legislature could not have intended an unequal and

unjust operation of its statutes. Such a construction ought never

to be given to legislative language if it be susceptible of any other

more conformable to justice; but if the words be positive and
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without ambiguity, I can ﬁnd no authority for a court to vacate or

repeal a statute on that ground alone. But it is only in express

constitutional provisions, limiting legislative power and controlling

the temporary will of a majority, by a permanent and paramount

law, settled by the deliberate wisdom of the nation, that I can

ﬁnd a safe and solid ground for the authority of courts of justice

to declare void any legislative enactment. Any assumption of

authority beyond this would be to place in the hands of the

judiciary powers too great and too undeﬁned either for its own

security or the protection of private rights. It is therefore a

most gratifying circumstance to the friends of regulated liberty,

not therefore be said that the maxims referred to have been entirely disregarded

by the legislature in the passage of this act. But as counsel do not claim that,

in so far as they have been departed from, the constitution has been violated, we

cannot, with propriety, be asked to declare an act void on any such general

objection." And see Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 429, per Sclden, J .;

Benson v. Mayor, &c., of Albany, 2-1 Barb. 256 et seq.; Baltimore v. State, 15

Md. 376; People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 532.

' People v. Fisher, 24 Wend. 220; State v. Staten, 6 Cold. 233.
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[*171]

• VI. Nor are the courts at liberty to declare an act
void, because in their opinion it is opposed to a spirit supposed to pervade the constitution, but uot expressed in words.
" When the fundamental law has not limited, either in terms or by
necessary implication, the general powers conferred upon the legislature, we cannot declare a limitation under the notion of having
discovered something in the spirit of the constitution which is
not even ~.peutioned in the instrument." 1 "It is difficult," says
Mr. Senator Verplanck, "upon any general principles, to limit
the omnipotence of the sovereign legislative power by judicial
interposition, except so far as the express words of a written constitution give that authority. There are indeed many dicta and
some great authorities holding that acts contrary to the first
principles of right are void. The principle is unquestion[* 172] ably" • sound as the governing rule of a legislature in rele.tion to its own acts, or even those of a preceding legislature.
It also affords a safe rule of construction for courts, in the interpretation of laws admitting of any· doubtful construction, to presume that the legislature could not have intended an unequal and
unjust operation of its statutes. Such a construction ought never
to be given to legislative language if it be susceptible of any other
more conformable to justice; but if the words be positive and
without ambiguity, I can find no authority for a court to vacate or
repeal a statute on that ground alone. But it is only in express
constitutional provisions, limiting legislative power and controlling
the temporary will of a majority, by a permanent and paramount
law, settled by the deliberate wisdom of the nation, that I can
find a safe and solid ground for the authority of courts of justice
to declare void any legislative enactment. Any assumption of
authority beyond this would be to place in the hands of the
judiciary powers too great and too undefined either for its own
secu1·ity or the protection of private rights. It is therefore a
most gratifying circumstance to the friends of regulated liberty,
not thererore be said that the maxims referred to have been e~ttirely disregarded
by the legislature in the passage of this act. But as counsel do not claim that,
in so far as they have been departed from, the constitution has been violated, we
cannot, with propriety, be asked to declare an act void on any such general
objection." And see Wynehamer 11. People, 13 N. Y. 429, per Selden, J. ;
Benson v. Mayor, &c., of Albany, 24 Barb. 256 et seq.; Baltimore v. State, 15
Md. 376; People v. Draper, 15 N.Y. 532.
1 People v. Fisher, 24 Wend. 220; State v. Staten, 6 Cold. 233.
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that in every change in their constitutional polity which has yet

taken place here, whilst political power has been more widely

CH. VII.]

DECLARING STATUTES UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

*_172

diffused among the people, stronger and better-deﬁned guards

have been given to the rights of property.” And after quoting

certain express limitations, he proceeds: “ Believing that we are

to rely upon these and similar provisions as the best safeguards

of our rights, as well as the safest authorities for judicial direction,

I cannot bring myself to approve of the power of courts to annul

any law solemnly passed, either on an assumed ground of its

being contrary to natural equity, or from a broad, loose, and

vague interpretation of a constitutional provision beyond its

natural and obvious sense.” 1

The accepted theory upon this subject appears to be this: In

every sovereign State there resides an absolute and uncontrolled

power of legislation. In Great Britain this complete power rests

in the Parliament; in the American States it resides in the people

themselves as an organized body politic. But the people,

by ‘creating the Constitution of the United States, have [*‘ 173]

delegated this power as to certain subjects, and under

certain restrictions, to the Congress of the Union; and that

portion they cannot resume, except as it may be done through

amendment of the national Constitution. For the exercise of the
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legislative power, subject to this limitation, they create, by their

State constitution, a legislative department upon which they confer

it; and granting it in general terms, they must be understood to

grant the whole legislative power which they possessed, except so

far as at the same time they saw ﬁt to impose restrictions. While,

therefore, the Parliament of Britain possesses completely the abso-

lute and uncontrolled power of legislation, the legislative bodies of

the American States possess the same power, except, ﬁrst, as it

may have been limited by the Constitution of the United States;

and, second, as it may have been limited by the constitution of

the State. A legislative act cannot, therefore, be declared void,

unless its conﬂict with one of these two instruments can be pointed

out?

' Cochran v. Van Sui-lay, 20 \Vend. 381-383. See also People v. Gallagher,

4 Mich. 244; Benson v. Mayor, &c., of Albany, 24 Barb. 252 cl .veq.; Grant v.

Courter, ib. 232; Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 391, per Comslock, J.; ib.

p. 453, per Selden, J., ib. p. 477, per Johnson, J.

' People v. New York Central Railroad Co. 34 Barb. 138; Gentry v. Grif-

ﬁth, 27 Texas, 461. And see the cases cited, ante, p. 168, note 4.

[ 181]

that in every change in their constitutional polity which has yet
taken place here, whilst political power has been more widely
diffused among the people, stronger and better-defined guards
have been given to the rights of property." A.nd after quoting
certain express limitations, he proceeds: "Believing that we are
to rely upon these and similar provisions as the b~st safeguards
of our rights, as well as the safest authorities for judicial direction,
I cannot bring myself to approve of the power of courts to annul
any law solemnly passed, either on an assumed ground of its
being contrary to natural equity, or from a broad, loose, and
vague interpretation of a constitutional provision beyond its
natural and obvious sense." 1
The accepted theory upon this subject appears to be this: In
every sovereign State there resides an absolute and uncontrolled
power of legislation. In Great Britain this complete power rests
in the Parliament ; in the American States it resides in the people
themselves as an organized body politic. But the people,
by • creating the Constitution of the United States, have [*173]
delegated this power as to certain subjects, and under
certain restrictions, to the Congress of the Union; and that
portion they cannot resume, except as it may be done through
amendment of the national Constitution. For the exercise of the
legislative power, subject to this limitation, they create, by their
State constitution, a legislative department upon which they confer
it; and granting it in general terms, they must be understood to
grant the whole legislative power which they possessed, except so
far as at the same time they saw fit to impose restrictions. While,
therefore, the Parliament of Britain possesses completely the absolute and uncontrolled power of legislation, the legislative bodies of
the American States possess the same power, except, first, as it
may have been limited by the Constitution of the United States;
and, second, as it may have been limited by the constitution of
the State. A. legislative act cannot, therefore, be declared void,
unless its conflict with one of these two instruments can be pointed
out.2
1 Cochran t1. Van Surlay, 20 Wend. 381-383.
See also People v. Gallagher,
4 Mieh. 244; Benson"· Mayor, &c., of Albauy, 24 Barb. 252 et seq.; Grant v.
Courter, ib. 282; Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 391, per Comstock, J.; ib.
p. 453, per Selden, J.; ib. p. 477, per Johnson, J.
1 People v. New York Central Railroad Co. 34 Barb. 138; Gentry !1. Griffith, 27 Texas, 461. And see the cases cited, ante, p. 168, note 4.
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It is to be borne in mind, however, that there is a broad dif-

• 173

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

[CH. VII,

ference between the Constitution of the United States and the

constitutions of the States as regards the power which may be

exercised under them. The government. of the United States is

one of enumerated powers; the governments of the States are

possessed of all the general powers of legislation. When a law

of Congress is assailed as void, we look in the national Constitu-

tion to see if the grant of speciﬁed powers is broad enough to

embrace it; but when a State law is attacked on the same ground,

it is presumably valid in any case, and this presumption is a con-

clusive one, unless in the Constitution of the United States or of

the State we are able to discover that it is prohibited. We look

in the Constitution of the United States for grants of legislative

power, but in the constitution of the State to ascertain if any

limitations have been imposed upon the complete power with

which the legislative department of the State was vested in its

creation. Congress can pass no laws but such as the Constitution

authorizes either expressly or by clear implication; while the

State legislature has jurisdiction of all subjects on which its

, legislation is not prohibited} “ The law-making power of

[*174] the *State,” it is said in one case, “recognizes no re-

straints, and is bound by none, except such as are imposed
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by the Constitution. That instrument has been aptly termed a

legislative act by the people themselves in their sovereign capacity,

and is therefore the paramount law. Its object is not to grant

legislative power, but to conﬁne and restrain it. Without the

constitutional limitations, the power to make laws would be abso-

lute. These limitations are created and imposed by express words,

or arise by necessary implication. The leading feature of the con-

stitution is the separation and distribution of the powers of the

government. It takes care to separate the executive, legislative,

and judicial powers, and to deﬁne their limits. The executive can

do no legislative act, nor the legislature any executive act, and

neither can exercise judicial authority.”2

‘ Sill v. Village of Corning, 15 N. Y. 303; People v. Supervisors of Orange,

27 Barb. 593; People v. Gallagher, 4 Mich. 244; Sears v. Cottrell, 5 Mich. 257 ;

People v. New York Central Railroad Co. 24 N. Y. 497, 504; People v.

Toynbee, 2 Park. Cr. R. 490; State v. Gutierrez, 15 La. An. 190; Walpole v.

Elliott, 18 Ind. 258; Smith 12. Judge, 17 Cal. 547; Commonwealth v. Hartman,

17 Penn. St. 119; Kirby v. Shaw, 19 Penn. St. 260; \Veister v. Hade, 52 Penn.

St. 477.

’ Sill v. Corning, 15 N. Y. 303.
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It is to be borne in mind, however, that there is a broad difference between the Constitution of the United States and the
constitutions of the States as regards the power which may be
exercised under them. The government of the United States is
oue of enumerated powers; the governments of the States are
possessed of all the general powers of legislation. When a law
of Congress is assailed as void, we look in the national Constitution to see if the grant of specified powers is broad enough to
embrace it; but when a State law is attacked on the same ground,
it is presumably valid in any case, and this presumption is a conclusive one, unless in the Constitution of the United States or of
the State we are able to discover that it is prohibited. We look
in the Constitution of the United States for grantB of legislative
power, but in th~ constitution of the State to ascertain if any
limitations have been imposed upon the complete power with
which the legislative department of the State was vested in its
creation. Congress can pass no laws but such as the Constitution
authorizes either expressly or by clear implication ; while the
State legislature has jurisdiction of all subjects on which its
legislation is not prohibited.1 " The law-making power of
[*17 4] the * State," it is said in one case, " recognizes no restraints, and is bound by none, except such as are imposed
by the Constitution. That instrument has been aptly termed a
legislative act by the people themselves in their sovereign capacity,
and is therefore the paramount law. Its object is not to grant
legislative power, but to confine and restrain it. Without the
constitutional limitations1 the power to make laws would be absolute. These limitations are created and imposed by express words,
or arise by necessary implication. The leading feature of the constitution is the separation and distribution of the powers of the
government. It takes care to separate the executive, legislative,
and judicial powers, and to define their limits. The executive can
do no legislative act, nor the legislature any executive act, and
neither can exercise judicial authority." 2
Sill v. Village of Corning, 15 N.Y. SOS; People"· Supervisors of Orange,
27 Barb. 593 ; People v. Gallagher, 4 Mich. 244; Sears v. Cottrell, 5 Mich. 257;
P~ople v. New York Central Railroad Co. 24 N. Y. 497, 504; People "·
Toynbee, 2 Park. Cr. R. 490; State v. Gutien-ez, 15 La. An. 190; Walpole"·
Elliott, 18 Ind. 258; Smith v. Judge, 17 Cal. 547; Commonwealth v. Hartman,
17 Penn. St. 119; Kirby v. Shaw, 19 Penn. St. 260; Weister v. Hade, 52 Penn.
1 Sill v. Corning, 15 N. Y. 303.
Bt. 477.
1
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It does not follow, however, that in every case the courts, be-

CH. VII.]
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fore they can set aside a law as invalid, must be able to ﬁnd in

the constitution some speciﬁc inhibition which has been disre-

garded, or some express command which has been disobeyed.

Prohibitions are only important where they are in the nature of

exceptions to a general grant of power; and if the authority to

do an act has_not been granted by the sovereign to its, represent-

ative, it cannot be necessary to prohibit its being done. If in

one department was vested the whole power of the government,

it might be essential for the people, in the instrument delegating

this complete authority, to make careful and particular exception

of all those cases which it was intended to exclude from its cog-

nizance; for without such exception the government might do

whatever the people themselves, when met in their sovereign

capacity, would have power to do. But when only the legislative

power is delegated to one department, and the judicial to another,

it is not important that the one should be expressly forbidden to

try causes, or the other to make laws. The assumption of judi-

cial power by the legislature in such a case is unconstitutional,

because, though not expressly forbidden, it is nevertheless

‘inconsistent with the provisions which have conferred [* 175]

upon another department the power the legislature is
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seeking to exercise. And for similar reasons a legislative act

which should undertake to make a judge the arbiter in his own

controversies would be void, because, though in form a provision

for the exercise of judicial power, in substance it would be the

creation of an arbitrary and irresponsible authority, neither legis-

lative, executive, nor judicial, and wholly unknown to constitu-

tional government. It could not be necessary to forbid the judici-

ary to render judgment without suffering the party to make defence;

because it is implied in judicial authority that there shall be a

hearing before condemnation. Taxation cannot be arbitrary, be-

cause its very deﬁnition includes apportionment, nor can it be for

a purpose not public, because that would be a contradiction in

terms. The bills of rights in the American constitutions forbid

that parties shall be deprived of property except by the law of the

land ; but if the prohibition had been omitted, a legislative enact-

ment to pass one man’s property over to another would neverthe-

less be void. If the act proceeded upon the assumption that such

other person was justly entitled to the estate, and therefore it was

[ 183 ]

It does not follow, however, that in every case the courts, before they can set aside a law as invalid, must be able to find in
the constitution some specific inhibition which has been disregarded, or some express command which has been disobeyed.
Prohibitions are only important where they are in the nature of
exceptions to a general grant of power; and if the authority to
do an act has_not been granted by the sovereign to its. representative, it cannot be necessary to prohibit its being done. If in
one department was vested the whole power of the government,
it might be essential for the people, in the instrument delegating
this complete authority, to make careful and particular exception.
of all those cases which it was intended to exclude from its cognizance ; for without such exception the government might do
whatever the people themselves, when met in their sovereign
capacity, would have power to do. But when only the legislative
power is delegated to one department, and the judicial to another,
it is not important that the one should be expressly forbidden to
try causes, or the other to make laws. The assumption of judicial power by the legislature in such a ease is unconstitutional,
because, though not expressly forbidden, it is nevertheless
• inconsistent with the provisions which have conferred [• 175]
upon another department the power the legislature is
seeking to exercizJe. And for similar reasons a legislative act
which should undertake to make a judge the arbiter in his own
controversies would be void, because, though in form a provision
for the exercise of judicial power, in substance it would be the
creation of an arbitrary and irresponsible authority, neither legislative, executive, nor judicial, and wholly unknown to constitutional government. It could not be necessary to forbid the judiciary to render judgment without suffering the party to make defence;
because it is implied in judicial authority that there shall be a
hearing before condemnation. Taxation cannot be arbitrary, because its very definition includes apportionment, nor can it be foB
a purpose not public, because that would be a contradiction in·
terms. The bills of rights in the American constitutions forbid
that parties shall be deprived of property except by the law of the
land; but if the prohibition had been omitted, a legislative enactment to pass one man's property over to another would nevertheless be void. If the act proceeded upon the assumption that such
other person was justly entitled to the estate, and therefore it was
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transferred, it would be void, because judicial in its nature ; and if

• 175

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
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it proceeded without reasons, it would be equally void, as neither

legislative nor judicial, but a mere arbitrary ﬁat.‘ There is no

difficulty in saying that any such act, which, under pretence of

exercising one power is usurping another, is opposed to the consti-

tution and void. It is assuming a power which the people, if they

have not granted it at all, have reserved to themselves. The max-

ims of Magna Charta and the common law are the interpreters of

constitutional grants of power, and those acts which by those max-

ims the several departments of government are forbidden to do

cannot be considered within any grant or apportionment of power

which the people in general terms have made to those departments.

The Parliament of Great Britain, indeed, as possessing the

[* 176] sovereignty * of the country, has the power to disregard

fundamental principles, and pass arbitrary and unjust en-

actments; but it cannot do this rightfully, and it has the power to

do so simply because there is no written constitution from which

its authority springs or on which it depends, and by which the

courts can test the validity of its declared will. The rules which

conﬁne the discretion of Parliament within the ancient landmarks

are rules for the construction of the powers of the American leg-

islatures; and however proper and prudent it may be expressly to
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prohibit those things which are not understood to be within the

proper attributes of legislative power, such prohibition can never

be rega.rded as essential, when the extent of the power apportioned

to the legislative department is found upon examination not to be

broad enough to cover the obnoxious authority. The absence of

such prohibition cannot, by implication, confer power.

Nor, where fundamental rights are declared by the constitution,

is it necessary at the same time to prohibit the legislature, in ex-

press terms, from taking them away. The declaration is itself a

prohibition, and is inserted in the constitution for the express

‘ Bowman v. Middleton, 1 Bay, 252; Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Pet. 657; Ter-

rett v. Taylor, 9 C-ranch, 43; Ervine’s Appeal, 16 Penn. St. 266. “It is now

considered an universal and fundamental proposition in every well-regulated and

properly administered government, whether embodied ‘in a constitutional form

or not, that private property cannot be taken for a strictly private purpose at all,

nor for public without a just compensation; and that the obligation of contracts

cannot be abrogated or essentially impaired. These and other vested rights of

the citizen are held sacred and inviolable, even against the plenitude of power in

the legislative department.” Nelson, J ., in People v. Morris, 13 Wend. 328.

[ 18-1 ]

transferred, it would be void, because judicial in its nature ; and if
it proceeded without reasons, it would be equally void, as neither
legislative nor judicial, but a mere arbitrary fiat. 1 There is no
difficulty in saying that any such act, which, under pretence of
exercising one power is usurping 1mother, is opposed to the constitution and void. It is assuming a power which the people, if they
have not granted it at all, have reserved to themselves. The maxims of Magna Charta and the common law are the interpreters of
constitutional grants of power, and those acts which by those maxims the several departments of government are forbidden to do
cannot be considered within any grant or apportionment of power
which the people in general terms have made to those departments.
The Parliament of Great Britain, indeed, as possessing the
[*176] soYereignty • of the country, has the power to disregard
fundamental principles, and pass arbitrary and unjust enactments; but it cannot do this rightfully, and it has the power to
do so simply because there is no written constitution from which
its authority springs or on which it depends, and by which the
courts can test the validity of its declared will. The rules which
confine the discretion of Parliament within the ancient landmarks
are rules for the construction of the powers of the American legislatures; and however proper and prudent it may be expressly to
prohibit those things which are not understood to be within the
proper attributes of legislative power, such prohibition can never
be regarded as essential, when the extent of the power apportioned
to the legislative department is found upon examination not to be
broad enough to cover the obnoxious authority. The absence of
such prohibition cannot, by implication, confer power.
Nor, where fundamental rights are declared by the constitution,
is it necessary at the same time to prohibit the legislature, in express terms, from taking them away. The declaration is itself a.
prohibition, and is inserted in the constitution for the express
1 Bowman v. Middleton, 1 Bay, 262; Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Pet. 65i; Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 43; Ervine's Appeal, 16 Penn. St. 266. " It is now
considered an universal and fundamental proposition in every well-regulated and
properly administered government, whether embodied in a constitutional form
or not, that private property cannot be taken for a strictly private purpose at all,
nor for public without a just compensation ; and that the obligation of contracts
cannot be abrogated or essentially impaired. These and other vested rights of
the citizen are held sacred and inviolable, even against the plenitude of power in
the ll·gislative department." Nelson, J., in People v. Morris, 13 Wend. 328.
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purpose of operating as a restriction upon legislative power}

Many things, indeed, which are contained in the bills of rights to

be found in the American constitutions are not, and from the very

nature of the case cannot be, so certain and deﬁnite in character as

to form rules for judicial decisions; and they are declared rather

as guides to the legislative judgment than as marking an absolute

limitation of power. The nature of the declaration will generally

enable us to determine without diﬂiculty whether it is the one thing

or the other. If it is declared that all men are free, and no man

can be slave to another, a deﬁnite and certain rule of action is

laid down, which the courts can administer; but if it be said that

“ the blessings of a free government can only be maintained by a

ﬁrm adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, frugality, and

virtue,” we should not be likely to commit the mistake of sup-

posing that this declaration would authorize the courts to substitute

their own view of justice for that which may have impelled the

legislature to pass a particular law, or to inquire into the modera-

tion, temperance, frugality, and virtue of its members, with a view

to set aside their action, if it should appear to have been

inﬂuenced by the opposite qualities. It is plain that “ what [*‘ 177]

in the one case is a rule, in the other is an admonition
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addressed to the judgment and the conscience of all persons in

authority, as well as of the people themselves.

So the forms prescribed for legislative action are in the nature

of limitations upon its authority. The constitutional provisions

which establish them are equivalent to a declaration that the

legislative power shall be exercised under these forms, and shall not

be exercised under any other. A statute which does not observe

them will plainly be ineffectual.”

Statutes unconstitutional in Part.

It will sometimes be found that an act of the legislature is

opposed in some of its provisions to the constitution, while others,

standing by themselves, would be unobjectionable. So the forms

observed in passing it may be suﬂicient for some of the purposes

‘ Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 518. This principle is very often acted upon when

not expressly declared.

' See ante, p. 130 et seq.
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purpose of operating as a restriction upon legislative power. 1
Many things, indeed, which are contained in the bills of rights to
be found in the American constitutions are not, and from the very
nature of the case cannot be, so certain and definite in character as
to form rules for judicial decisions ; and they are declared rather
as guides to the legislative judgment than as marking an absolute
limitation of power. The nature of the declaration will generally
enable us to determine without difficulty whether it is the one thing
or the other. If it is declared that all men are free, and no man
can be slave to another, a definite and certain rule of action is
laid down, which the courts can administer; but if it be said that
" the blessil1gs of a free government can only be maintained by a
firm adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, frugality, and
virtue," we should not be likely to commit the mistake of supposing that this declaration would authorize the courts to substitute
their own view of justice for that which may have impelled the
legislature to pass a particular law, or to inquire into the moderation, temperance, frugality, and virtue of its members, with a view
to set aside their action, if it should appear to have been
infiuenced by the opposite qualities. It is plain that • what [* 177]
in the one case it~ a rule, in the other is an admonition
addressed to the judgment and the conscience of all persons in
authority, as well as of the people themselves.
So the forms prescribed for legislative action are in the nature
of limitations upon its authority. The constitutional provisions
which establish them are equivalent to a declaration that the
legislative power shall be exercised under these forms, and shall not
be exercised under any other. A statute which does not observe
them will plainly be ineffectual.2

Statutes uncomtitutional in Part.
It will sometimes be found that an act of the legislature is
opposed in some of its provisions to the constitution, while others,
standing by themselves, would be unobjectionable. So the forms
observed in passing it may be sufficient for some of the purposes
Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 518. This principle is very often actod upon when
not expressly declared .
' See ante, p. 130 et seq.
1
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sought to be accomplished by it, but insuﬂicient for others. In any

*177
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such case the portion which conflicts with the constitution, or in

regard to which the necessary conditions have not been observed,

must be treated as a nullity. Whether the other parts of the

statute must also be adjudged void because of the association must

depend upon a consideration of the object of the law, and in what

manner and to what extent the unconstitutional portion affects the

remainder. A statute, it has been said, is judicially held to be

unconstitutional, because it is not within the scope of legislative

authority ; it may either propose to accomplish something pro-

hibited by the constitution, or to accomplish some lawful, and even

laudable object, by means repugnant to the Constitution of the

United States or of the State} A statute may contain some such

provisions, and yet the same act, having received the sanction of all

branches of the legislature, and being in the form of law, may

contain other useful and salutary provisions, not obnoxious to any

just constitutional exception. It would be inconsistent with all

just principles of constitutional la.\v to adjudge these enactments

void, because they are associated in the same act, but not connected

with or dependent on others which areunconstitutional.2

[* 178] Where, therefore, a part of a * statute is unconstitutional,

‘ Commonwealth v. Clapp, 5 Gray, 100. “ A law that is unconstitutional is
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so because it is either an assumption of power not legislative in its nature, or

because it is inconsistent with some provision of the Federal or State Constitu-

tion.” Woodworth, J ., in Commonwealth v. Maxwell, 27 Penn. St. 456.

’ Commonwealth v. Clapp, 5 Gray, 100. See, to the same effect, Fisher v.

McGirr, 1 Gray, 1; Warren v. Mayor, &c., of Charlestown, 2 Gray, 84; \Vel-

lington, Petitioner, 16 Pick. 95; Commonwealth v. Hitchings, 5 Gray, 482;

Commonwealth v. Pomeroy, 5 Gray, 486; State v. Copeland, 3 R. I. 33; State v.

Snow, 3 R. I. 64; Armstrong v. Jackson, 1 Blackf. 374; Clark v. Ellis, 2 Blackf.

sought to be accomplished by it, but insufficient for others. In any
such case the portion which conflicts with the constitution, or in
regard to which the necessary conditions have not been observed,
must be treated as a nullity. Whether the other parts of the
statute must also be adjudged void because of the association must
depend upon a consideration of the object of the law, and in what
manner and to what extent the unconstitutional portion affects the
remainder. A statute, it has been said, is judicially held to be
unconstitutional, because it is not within the scope of legislative
authority ; it may either propose to accomplish something prohibited by the constitution, or to accomplish some lawful, and even
laudable object, by means repugnant to the Constitution of the
United States or of the State.1 A statute may contain some such
provisions, and yet the same act, having received the sanction of all
branches of the legislature, and being in the form of law, may
contain other useful and salutary provisions, not obnoxious to any
just constitutional exception. It would be inconsistent with all
just principles of constitutional law to adjudge these enactments
void, because they are associated in the same act, but not connected
with or dependent on others which are unconstitutional.2
[*178] Where, therefore, a part of a *statute is unconstitutional,

248; McCulloch v. State, 11 Ind. 432; People 1:. Hill, 7 Cal. 97; Lathrop v.

Mills, 19 Cal. 513; Thomson 0. Grand Gulf Railroad Co. 3 How. Miss. 240;

Campbell v. Union Bank, 6 How. Miss. 625; Mobile and Ohio Railroad Co. v.

State, 29 Ala. 573; Santo v. State, 2 Iowa, 165; State v. Cox, 3 Eng. 436;

Mayor, &c., of Savannah v. State, 4 Geo. 26; Exchange Bank v. Hines, 3 Ohio,

N. s. 1; Robinson v. Bank of Darien, 18 Geo. 65; State v. Wheeler, 25 Conn.

290; People v. Lawrence, 36 Barb. 190; Williams v. Payson, 14 La. An. 7;

Ely v. Thompson, 3 A. K. Marsh. 70; Davis v. State, 7 Md. 151; State v. Com-

missioners of Baltimore, 29 Md. 521; Bank of Hamilton v. Dudley’s Lessee, 2

Pet. 526. “ To the extent of the collision and repugnancy, the law of the State

must yield; and to that extent, and no further, it is rendered by such repug-

nancy inoperative and void.” Commonwealth v. Kimball, 24 Pick. 361, per

Shaw, Ch. J .; Norris v. Boston, 4 Met. 288.

[186]

1 Commonwealth tJ. Clapp, 5 Gray, 100.
"A law that is unconstitutional is
so because it is either an assumption of power not legislative in its nature, or
because it is inconsistent with somtl provision of the Federal or State Constitu•
tion." Woodworth, J., in Commonwealth"· Maxwell, 27 Penn. St. 456.
1 Commonwealth v. Clapp, 5 Gray, 100.
See, to the same effect, Fisher "·
McGirr, 1 Gray, 1; Warren v. Mayor, &c., of Charlestown, 2 Gray, 84; 1Vellington, Petitioner, 16 Pick. 95; Commonwealth v. Hitchings, 5 Gray, 482;
Commonwealth v. Pomeroy, 5 Gray, 486; State v. Copeland, 3 R. I. 33; State"·
Snow, 3 R. I. 64; Armstrong v. Jackson, 1 Blackf. 374; Clark v. Elli~, 2 Blackf.
248; McCulloch v. State, 11 Ind. ·132; People v. Hill, 7 Cal. 97; Lathrop "·
Mills, 19 Cal. 513; Thomson v. Grand Gulf Railroad Co. S How. Miss. 240;
Campbell v. Union Bank, 6 How. Miss. 625; Mobile and Ohio Railroad Co. t~.
State, 29 Ala. 573; Santo v. State, 2 Iowa, 165; State v. Cox, 3 Eng. 436 ;
Mayor, &c., of Savannah v. State, 4 Geo. 26; Exchange Bank v. Hines, 3 Ohio,
N. s. 1; Robinson v. Bank of Darien, 18 Geo. 65; State t7. Wheeler, 25 Conn.
290; People v. Lawrence, 36 Barb. 190; Williams v. Payson, 14 La. An. 7;
Ely v. Thompson, 3 A. K. Marsh. 70; Davis v. State, 7 Md. 151; State v. Commissioners of Baltimore, 29 Md. 521 ; Bank of Hamilton v. Dudley's Lessee, 2
Pet. 526. "To the extent of the collision and repugnancy, the law of the State
must yield; and to that extent, and no further, it is rendered by such repugnancy inoperative and void." Commonwealth v. Kimball, 24 Pick. 361, per
S/w,w, Ch. J.; Norris"· Boston, 4 Met. 288.
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that fact does not authorize the courts to declare the re-

CH. VII.)

• 178

DECLARING STATUTES UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

mainder void also, unless all the provisions are connected in

subject-matter, depending on each other, operating together for the

same purpose, or otherwise so connected together in meaning, that

it cannot be presumed the legislature would have passed the one

without the other.1 The constitutional and unconstitutional pro-

visions may even be contained in the same section, and yet be

perfectly distinct and separable, so that the ﬁrst may stand though

the last fall. The point is not whether they are contained in the

same section; for the distribution into sections is purely artiﬁcial;

but whether they are essentially and inseparably connected in sub-

stance? If, when the unconstitutional portion is stricken out,

that which remains is complete in itself, and capable of being

executed in accordance with the apparent legislative intent, wholly

independent of that which was rejected, it must be sustained. The

diﬂiculty is in determining whether the good and bad parts of the

statute are capable of being separated within the meaning of this

rule. If a statute attempts to accomplish two or more objects, and

is void as to one, it may still be in every respect complete and valid

as to the other. But if its purpose is to accomplish a single object

only, and some of its provisions are void, the whole must fail

unless sufficient remains to effect the object without the aid of
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the invalid portion? And if they are so mutually connected

' Commonwealth v. Hitchings, 5 Gray, 485.

’ Commonwealth v. Hitchings, 5 Gray, 485; Willard 12. People, 4 Scam. 470;

Eells v. People, 4 Scam. 512; Robinson v. Bidwell, 22 Cal. 379 ; State v. Easter-

brook, 3 Nev. 173.

5 Santo v. State, 2 Iowa, 165. But perhaps the doctrine of sustaining one

part of a statute when the other is void was carried to an extreme in this case.

A prohibitory liquor law had been passed which was not objectionable on consti-

tutional grounds, except that the last section provided that “ the question of pro-

hibiting the sale and manufacture of intoxicating liquor” should be submitted to

the electors of the State, and if it should appear “that a majority of the votes

cast as aforesaid, upon said question of prohibition, shall be for the prohibitory

that fact does not authorize the courts to declare the remainder void also, unless all the provisions are connected in
subject-matter, depending on each other, operating together for the
same purpose, or otherwise so connected together in meaning, that
it cannot be presumed the legislature would have passed the one
without the other. 1 The constitutional and unconstitutional pr~
visions may even be contained in the same section, and yet be
perfectly distinct and separable, so that the first may stand though
the last fall. The point is not whether they are contained in the
same section ; for the distribution into sections is purely artificial;
but whether they are essentially and inseparably connected in substance.2 If, when the unconstitutional portion is stricken out,
that which remains is complete in itself, and capable of being
executed in accordance with the apparent legislative intent, wholly
independent of that which was rejected, it must be sustained. The
difficulty is in determining whether the good and bad parts of the
statute are capable of being separated within the meaning of this
rule. If a statute attempts to accomplish two or more objects, and
is void as to one, it may still be in every respect complete and valid
as to the other. But if its purpose is to accomplish a single object
only, aud some of its provisions are void, the whole must fail
unless sufficient remains to effect the object without the aid of
the invalid portion.3 And if they are so mutually connected

liquor law, then this act shall take elfect on the ﬁrst day of July, 1855.” The

court held this to be an attempt by the legislature to shift the exercise of legis-

lative power from themselves to the people, and therefore void; but they also

held that the remainder of the act was complete without this section, and must

therefore be sustained on the rule above given. The reasoning of the court by

which they are brought to this conclusion is ingenious; but one cannot avoid

feeling, especially after reading the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Wright,

that by the decision the court gave eﬂ'ect to an act which the legislature did not

[187]

Commonw.ealth v. Hitchings, 5 Gray, 485.
Commonwealth v. Hitchings, 5 Gray, 485; Willard v. People, 4 Scam. 470;
Eells v. People, 4 Scam. 512; Robinson v. Bidwell, 22 Cal. 379; State v. Easterbrook, 3 Nev. 173.
3 Santo v. State, 2 Iowa, 165.
But perhaps the doctrine of sustaining one
part of a statute when the other is void was carried to an extreme in this case.
A prohibitory liquor law had been passed which was not objectionable on constitutional grounds, except that the last section provided that " the question of prohibiting the sale and manufacture of intoxicating liquor'' should be submi&ted to
the eledors of the State, and if it should appear " that a majority of the votes
cast as aforesaid, upon said question of prohibition, shall be for the prohibitory
liquor law, then this act shall take effect on the first day of July, 1855." The
court held this to be an attempt by the legislature to shift. the exercise of legislative power from themselves to the people, and therefore void ; but they also
held that the remainder of the act was complete without this section, and must
therefore be sustained on the rule above given. The reasoning of the court by
which they are brought to this conclusion is ingenious; but one cannot avoid
feeling, especially after reading the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Wright,
that by the decision the court gave effect to an act which the legislature did not
1

1
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[* 179] with and ’*dependent on each other, as conditions, con-

[ca.

VII.

siderations, or compensations for each other, as to warrant

the belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and if all

could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the

residue independently, then if some parts are unconstitutional, all

the provisions which are thus dependent, conditional, or connected

must fall with them.‘

It has accordingly been held where a statute submitted to the

voters of a county the question of the removal of their county seat,

and one section imposed the forfeiture of certain vested rights in

case the vote was against the removal, that this portion of the act

being void, the whole must fall, inasmuch as the whole was sub-

mitted to the electors collectively, and the threatened forfeiture

would naturally aifect the result of the vote?

And where a statute annexed to the city of Racine certain lands

previously in the township of Racine, but contained an express

provision that the lands so annexed should be taxed at a diﬁ"erent

and less rate than other lands in the city; the latter provision

being held unconstitutional, it was also held that the whole statute

must fail, inasmuch as such provision was clearly intended as a

compensation for the annexation.3

And where a statute, in order to obtain a jury of six
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[*180] persons, *‘provided for the summoning of twelve jurors,

from whom six were to be chosen and sworn, and under

the constitution the jury must consist of twelve, it was held that

the provision for reducing the number to six could not be rejected

and the statute sustained, inasmuch as this would be giving to it a

construction and eﬂ'ect different from that the legislature designed ;

and would deprive the parties of the means of obtaining impartial

jurors which the statute had intended to give.‘

design should take effect unless the result of the unconstitutional submission to

the people was in its favor. For a similar ruling, see Maize v. State, 4 Ind. 342;

overruled in Meshmeier v. State, 11 Ind. 482.

‘ \Varren v. Mayor, &c., of Charlestown, 2 Gray, 99; State v. Commissioners

of Perry County, 5 Ohio, N. s. 507; Slauson v. Racine, 13 Wis. 398; Allen

County Commissioners v. Silvers, 22 Ind. 491; Garrard Co. Court v. Navigation

Co. 10 Am. Law Reg. N. s. 160.

' State v. Commissioners of Perry County, 5 Ohio, N. s. 507. And see

Jones v. Robbins, 8 Gray, 338.

‘ Slauson v. Racine, 18 Wis. 398.

‘ Campau v. Detroit, 14 Mich. 272.

[ 188 ]

[*179] with and *dependent on each other, as conditions, considerations, or compensations for each other, as to warrant
the belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and if all
could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the
residue independently, then if some parts are unconstitutional, all
the provisions which are thus dependent, conditional, or connected
must fall with them. 1
It has accordingly been held where a statute submitted to the
voters of a county the question of the removal of their county seat,
and one section imposed the forfeiture of certain vested rights in
case the vote was against the removal, that this portion of the act
being void, the whole must fall, inasmuch as the whole was submitted to the electors collectively, and the threatened forfeiture
would naturally affect the retmlt of the vote. 2
And where a statute annexed to the city of Racine certain lands
previously in the township of Racine, but contained an express
provision that the lands so annexed should be taxed at a different
and less rate than other lands in the city ; the latter provision
being held unconstitutional, it was also held that the whole statute
must fail, inasmuch as such provision was clearly intended as a
compensation for the annexation. 3
And where a statute, in order to obtain a jury of six
[* 180] persons, • provided for the summoning of twelve jurors,
from whom six were to be chosen and sworn, and under
the constitution the jury must consist of twelve, it was held that
the provision for reducing the number to six could not be rejected
and the statute sustained, inasmuch as this would be giving to it a
construction and effect different from that the legislature designed;
and would deprive the parties of the means of obtaining impartial
jurors which the statute had intended to give. 4
design should take effect unless the result of the unconstitutional submission to
the people was in its favor. For a similar ruling, see Maize v. State, 4 Ind. 342;
overruled in 1\Ieshmeier v. State, 11 Ind. 482.
1 \Varren v. Mayor, &c., of Charlestown, 2 Gray, 99; State v. Commissioners
of Perry County, 5 Ohio, N. s. 507; Slauson v. Racine, 13 Wis. 398; Allen
County Commissioners v. Silvers, 22 Ind. 491; Garrard Co. Court v. Navigation
Co. 10 Am. Law Reg. N. s. 160.
1 State v. Commissioners of Perry County, 5 Ohio, N. s. 507.
And see
Jones v. Robbins, 8 Gray, 338.
' Slauson v. Racine, 18 Wis. 398.
' Campau v. Detroit, 14 Mich. 272.
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On the other hand,—to illustrate how intimately the valid and
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* 180

invalid portions of a statute may be associated,—a section of the

criminal code of Illinois provided that “if any person shall harbor

or secrete any negro, mulatto, or person of color, the same being

a slave or servant, owing service or labor to any other persons,

whether they reside in this State or in any other State, or Territory,

or district, within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the

United States, or shall in any wise hinder or prevent the lawful

owner or owners of such slaves or servants from retaking them in

a lawful manner, every person so offending shall be deemed guilty

of a misdemeanor,” &c., and it was-held that, although the latter

portion of the section was void within the decision in Prigg v.

Pennsylvania,1 yet that the ﬁrst portion, being a police regulation

for the preservation of order in the State, and important to its well-

being, and capable of being enforced without reference to the rest,

was not affected by the invalidity of the rest.“ ~

A legislative act may be entirely valid as to some classes of cases,

and clearly void as to others. A general law for the punishment

of offences, which should endeavor to reach, by its retroactive

operation, acts before committed, as well as to prescribe a rule of

conduct for the citizen in the future, would be void so far as it was

retrospective, but such invalidity would not affect the operation of
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the law in regard to the cases which were within the legislative

control. A law might be void as violating the obligation of exist-

ing contracts, but valid as to all contracts which should be entered

into subsequent to its passage, and which therefore would have no

legal force except such as the law itself would allow.“ In any such

case the unconstitutional law must operate as far as it can,‘

and it will not be held invalid on the objection ** of a party [*181]

whose interests are not affected by it in a manner which

the constitution forbids. If there are any exceptions to this rule,

they must be of cases only where it is evident, from a contempla-

tion of the statute and of the purpose to be accomplished by it, that

‘ 16 Pet. 539.

’ Willard v. People, 4 Scam. 470; Eells v. People, ib. 512. See Hagerstown

v. Dechert, 3'2 Md. 369.

‘ Mundy v. Monroe, 1 Mich. 68:, Cargill v. Power, 1 Mich. 869. '

‘ Baker v. Braman, 6 Hill, 47. The case of Sadler v. Langham, 34 Ala. 333,

appears to be opposed to this principle, but it also appears to us to be based

upon cases which are not applicable.

[189]

On the other hand,- to illustrate how intimately the valid and
invalid portions of a statute may be associated,- a section of the
criminal code of Illinois provided that " if any person shall harbor
or secrete any negro, mulatto, or person of color, the same being
a slave or servant, owing service or labor to any other persons,
whether they reside in this State or in any other State, or Territory,
or district, within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the
United States, or shall in any wise hinder or prevent the lawful
owner or owners of such slaves or servants from retaking them in
a lawful manner, every person so offending shall be deemed guilty
of a misdemeanor," &c., and it was. held that, although the latter
portion of the section was void within the decision in Prigg v.
Pennsylvania,1 yet that the first portion, being a police regulation
for the preservation of order in the State, and important to its wellbeing, and capable of being enforced without reference to the rest,
was not affected by the invalidity of the rest. 2
A legislative act may be entirely valid as to some classes of cases,
and clearly void as to others. A general law for the punishment
of offences, which should endeavor to reach, by its retroactive
operation, acts before committed, as well as to prescribe a rule of
conduct for the citizen in the future, would be void so far as it was
retrospective, but such invalidity would not affect the operation of
the law in regard to the cases which were within the legislative
control. A law might be void as violating the obligation of existing contracts, but valid as to all contracts which should be entered
into subsequent to its passage, and which therefore would have no
legal force except such as the law itself would allow.3 Iu any such
case the unconstitutional law must operate as far as it can,4
and it will not be held invalid on the objection • of a party [*181]
whose interests are not affected by it in a manner which
the constitution forbids. If there are any exceptions to this rule,
they must be of cases only where it is evident, from a contemplation of the statute and of the purpose to be accomplished by it, that
16 Pet. 539.
Willard v. People, 4 Scam. 470; Eells "· People, ib. 512. See Hagerstown
v. Deehert, 32 Md. 369.
' Mundy v. Monroe, 11\Iich. 68; Cargill v. Power, 1 Mieh. 869.
4 Baker t'. Braman, 6 Hill, 47.
The case of Sadler v. Langham, 34: Ala. 333,
appears to be opposed to this principle, but it also appears to us to be based
upon case& which are not applicable.
1

2
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it would not have been passed at all, except as an entirety, and
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that the general purpose of the legislature will be defeated if it shall

be held valid as to some cases and void as to others.

Waiving a Constitutional Objection’.

There are cases where a law in its application to a particular

case must be sustained, because the party who makes objection has,

it would not have been passed at all, except as an entirety, and
that the general purpose of the legislature will be defeated if it shall
be held valid as to some cases and void as to others.

by prior action, precluded himself from being heard against it.

Where a constitutional provision is designed for the protection

solely of the property rights of the citizen, it is competent for him

Waiving a Constitutional Objection.

to waive the protection, and to consent to such action as would be

invalid if taken against his will. On this ground it has been held

that an act appropriating the private property of one person for the

private purposes of another, on compensation made, was valid if he

whose property was taken assented thereto; and that he did assent

and waive the constitutional privilege, if he received the compensa-

tion awarded, or brought an action to recover it.1 So if an act

providing for the appropriation of property for a public use shall

authorize more to be taken than the use requires, although such act

would be void without the owner’s assent, yet with it all objection

on the ground of unconstitutionality is removed.“ And where

parties were authorized by statute to erect a dam across a river,

provided they should ﬁrst execute a bond to the people conditioned
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to pay such damages as each and every person might sustain in

consequence of the erection of the dam, the damages to be assessed by

a justice of the peace, and the dam was erected and damages assessed

as provided by the statute, it was held, in an action on the bond to

recover those damages, that the party erecting the dam and who had

received the beneﬁt of the statute, was precluded by his action from

contesting its validity, and could not insist upon his right to a

common-law trial by jury? In these and the like cases

[* 182] the statute must be read with ’* an implied proviso that the

party to be aﬂected shall assent thereto; and such consent

removes all obstacle, and lets the statute in to operate the same

‘ Baker v. Braman, 6 Hill, 47.

‘ Embury v. Conner, 3 N. Y. 511. And see Heyward v. Mayor, &c., of

New York, 8 Barb. 489; Mobile and Ohio Railroad Co. v. State, 29 Ala. 586.

‘ People v. Murray, 5 Hill, 468. See Lee v. Tillotson, 24 VVend. 339.
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There are cases where a law in its application to a particular
case must be sustained, because the party who makes objection has,
by prior action, precluded himself from being heard against it.
Where a constitutional provision is designed for the protection
solely of the property rights of the citizen, it is competent for him
to wai"re the protection, and to consent to such action as would be
invalid if taken against his will. On this ground it has been held
that an act appropriating the private property of one person for the
private purposes of another, on compensation made, was valid if he
whose property was taken assented thereto; and that he did assent
and waive the constitutional privilege, if he received the compensation awarded, or brought an action to recover it. 1 So if au act
providing for the appropriation of property for a public use shall
authorize more to be taken than the use requires, although such act
would be void without the owner's assent, yet with it all objection
on the ground of unconstitutionality is removed. 2 And where
parties were authorized by statute to erect a dam across a river,
provided they should first execute a bond to the people conditioned
to pay s~ch damages as each and every person might sustain in
consequence of the erection of the dam, the damages to be assessed by
ajnstice of the peace, and the dam was erected and damages assessed
as provided by the statute, it was held, in an action on the bond to
recover those damages, that the party erecting the dam and who had
received the benefit of the statute, was precluded by his action from
contesting its validity, and could not insist upon his right to a
common-law trial by jury.3 In these and the like cases
[* 182] the statute must be read with *an implied proviso that the
party to be affected shall assent thereto ; and such consent
removes all obstacle, and lets the statute in to operate the same
1 Baker v. Braman, 6 Hill, 47.
' Embury v. Conner, 3 N.Y. 511. And see Heyward v. :Mayor, &c., of
New York, 8 Barb. 489; Mobile and Ohio Railroad Co. v. State, 29 Ala. 586.
' People v. :Murray, 5 Hill, 468. See Lee v. Tillotson, 24 Wend. 339.
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as if it had in terms contained the condition} In criminal cases,

however, the doctrine that a constitutional privilege may be waived,

CH.
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must be true to a very limited extent only. A party may consent to

waive rights of property, but the trial and punishment for public

offences are not within the province of individual consent or

agreement.

Judicial Doubts on Constitutional Questions.

It has been said by an eminent jurist, that when courts are called

upon to pronounce the invalidity of an act of legislation, passed

with all the forms and ceremonies requisite to give it the force of

law, they will approach the question with great caution,examine it

as if it had in terms contained the condition.1 In criminal cases,
however, the doctrine that a constitutional privilege may be waived,
must be true to a very limited extent only. A party may consent to
waive rights of property, but the trial and punishment for public
offences are not within the province of individual consent or
agreement.

in every possible aspect, and ponder upon it as long as deliberation

and patient attention can throw any new light upon the subject,

Judicial Doubts on Constitutional Questions.

and never declare a statute void, unless the nullity and invalidity

of the act are placed, in their judgment, beyond reasonable doubt.”

A reasonable doubt must be solved in favor of the legislative

action, and the act be sustained? i

“ The question whether a law be void for its repugnancy to the

constitution is at all times a question of much delicacy, which

ought seldom, if ever, to be decided in the aﬂirmative in a doubt-

' Embury v. Conner, 3 N. Y. 518. And see Matter of Albany St. 11 Wend.

149; Chamberlain v. Lyell, 3 Mich. 448; Beecher v. Baldy, 7 Mich. 488; Mo-

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:19 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105011581
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

bile and Ohio Railroad Co. v. State, 29 Ala. 586.

’ \VeIlington, Petitioner, 16 Pick. 95, per Shaw, Ch. J. See Brown v.

Buzan, 24 lnd. 194. If an act may be valid or not according to the circum-

stances, a court would be bound to presume that such circumstances existed as

would render it valid. Talbot o. Hudson, 16 Gray, 417.

" Cooper v. Telfair, 4 Dall. 18; Dow v. Norris, 4 N. H. 16; Flint River

Steamboat Co. v. Foster, 5 Geo. 194; Carey v. Giles, 9 Geo. 253; Macon and

Western Railroad Co. v. Davis, 13 Geo. 68; Franklin Bridge Co. v. Wood, 14

Geo. 80; Kendall o. Kingston, 5 Mass. 524; Foster v. Essex Bank, 16 Mass.

245; Norwich v. County Commissioners of Hampshire, 13 Pick. 61; Hartford

Bridge Co. v. Union Ferry C0. 29 Conn. 227; Rich v. Flanders, 39 N. H. 812;

Eason v. State, 6 Eng. 481; Hedley v. Commissioners of Franklin Co. 4 Blackf.

116; Stocking v. State, 7 Ind. 327 ; La Fayette v. Jenners, 10 Ind. 79 ; Er parts

McCollum, 1 Cow. 564; Contact v. People, 11 W'end. 511; Clark o. People,

26 Wend. 606; Morris v. People, 3 Denio, 381; Baltimore v. State, 15 Md.

376; Cotton v. Commissioners of Leon Co. 6 Flor. 610; Lane v. Dorman, 3

Scam. 238; Newland v. Marsh, 19 Ill. 381; Farmers and Mechanics Bank v.

Smith, 3 S. & R. 63; VVeister 1:. Hade, 52 Penn. St. 477; Sears v. Cottrell, 5

Mich. 251; People v. Tyler, 8 Mich. 320; Allen County Commissioners v. Sil-

vers, 22 Ind. 491; State v. Robinson, 1 Kansas, 17.
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It has been said by an eminent jurist, that when courts are called
upon to pronounce the invalidity of an act of legislation, passed
with all the forms and ceremonies requisite to give it the force of
law, they will approach the question with great caution, examine it
in every possible aspect, and ponder upon it as long as deliberation
and patient attention can throw any new light upon the subject,
and never declare a statute void, unless the nullity and invalidity
of the act are placed, in their judgment, beyond reasonable doubt.2
A reasonable doubt must be solved in favor of the legislative
action, and the act be sustained.8
"The question whether a law be void for its repugnancy to tl1e
constitution is at all times a question of much delicacy, which
ought seldom, if ever, to be decided in the affirmative in a doub~
1 Embury~. Conner, 3 N.Y. 618.
And see Matter of Albany St. 11 Wend.
149; Chamberlain v. Lyell, 3 Mich. 448; Beecher "· Baldy, 7 Mich. 488; Mobile and Ohio Railroad Co. v. State, 29 Ala. 086.
1 Wellington, Petitioner, 16 Pick. 96, per Shaw, Ch. J.
See Brown "·
Buzan, 24 Ind. 194. H an act may be valid or not according to the circumstances, a court would be bound to presume that such circumt~tances existed as
would render it valid. Talbot~. Hudson, 16 Gray, 417.
~ Cooper ~. Telfair, 4 Dall. 18; Dow ~. Norris, 4 N. H. 16; Flint River
Steamboat Co. ~. Foster, 5 Geo. 194; Carey~. Giles, 9 Geo. 253; Macon and
Western Railroad Co.~. Davis, 13 Geo. 68; Franklin Bridge Co. v. Wood, 14
Geo. 80; Kendall v. Kingston, 5 Maai. 524; Foster "· Essex Bank, 16 .Mass.
245; Norwich ~. County Commissioners of Hampshire, 18 Pick. 61; Hartford
Bridge Co. v. Union Ferry Co. 29 Conn. 227; Rich v. Flanders, 39 N. H. 812;
Eason ~. State, 6 Eng. 4!H; Hedley ~. Commissioners of Franklin Co. 4 Blackf.
116; Stocking v. State, 7 Ind. 327; La Fayette~. Jenners, 10 Ind. 79; Ex parte
Mc.:Collum, 1 Cow. 564; Coutant 11. People, 11 Wend. 611; Clark v. People,
26 Wend. 606; Morris "· People, S Denio, 881; Baltimore "· State, 15 Md.
876; Cotton ~. Commissioners of Leon Co. 6 Flor. 610; Lane "· Dorman, 3
Scam. 238; Newland ~. Marsh, 19 Ill. 381; Farmers and Mechanics Bank v.
Smith, 3 S. & R. 63; Weister v. Hade, 52 Penn. St. 477; Sears v. Cottrell, 6
Mich. 251; People v. Tyler, 8 Mich. 320; Allen County Commissioners ~. Silvers, 22 Ind. 491; State~. Robinson, 1 Kansas, 17.
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ful case. The court when impelled by duty to render such a

[CH. VII.

judgment would be unworthy of its station could it be

[*‘183] unmindful *of the solemn obligation which that station

imposes; but it is not on slight implication and vague

conjecture that the legislature is to be pronounced to have

transcended its powers, and its acts to be considered as void. The

opposition between the constitution and the law should be such

that the judge feels a clear and strong conviction of their incom-

patibility with each other.”1 Mr. Justice Washington gives a

reason for this rule, which has been repeatedly recognized in

other cases which we have cited. After expressing the opinion that

the particular question there presented, and which regarded the

constitutionality of a State law, was involved in diﬁiculty and

doubt, he says: “But if I could rest myopinion in favor of the

constitutionality of the law on which the question arises, on no

other ground than this doubt so felt and acknowledged, that alone

would, in my estimation, be a satisfactory vindication of it. It is

but a decent respect due to the wisdom, the integrity, and the

patriotism of the legislative body by which any law is passed, to

presume in favor of its validity, until its violation of the constitu-

tion is proved beyond all reasonable doubt.” 2

The constitutionality of a law, then, is to be presumed, because
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the legislature, which was ﬁrst required to pass upon the question,

acting, as they must be deemed to have acted, with integrity, and

with a just desire to keep within the restrictions laid by the con-

stitution upon their action, have adjudged that it is so. They are

a co-ordinate department of the government with the judiciary,

invested with very high and responsible duties, as to some of

which their acts are not subject to judicial scrutiny, and they

legislate under the solemnity of an oﬂicial oath, which it is not to

be supposed they will disregard. ' It must, therefore, be supposed

that their own doubts of the constitutionality of their action have

been deliberately solved in its favor, so that the courts may with

some conﬁdence repose upon their conclusion as one based upon

their best judgment. For although it is plain, upon the au-

thorities, that the courts should sustain legislative action when

not clearly satisﬁed of its invalidity, it is equally plain in reason

that the legislature should abstain from adopting such action if

' Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 128, per Marshall, Ch. J.

_ ’ Ogden v. Saunders, 12 \Vheat. 270.
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ful case. The court when impelled by duty to render such a
judgment would be unworthy of its station could it be
(* 183] unmindful • of the solemn obligation which that station
imposes; but it is not on slight implication and vague
conjecture that the legislature is to be pronounced to have
transcended its powers, and its acts to be considered as void. The
opposition between the constitution and the law should be such
that the judge feels a clear and strong conviction of their incompatibility with each other." 1 Mr. Justice Washington gives a
reason for this rule, which has been repeatedly recognized in
other cases which we have cite.d. After expressing the opinion that
the particular question there presented, and which regarded the
constitutionality of a State law, was involved in difficulty and
doubt, he says: "But if I could rest my·opinion in favor of the
constitutionality of tho law on which the question arises, on no
other ground than this doubt so felt and acknowledged, that alone
would, in my estimation, be a satisfactory vindication of it. It is
but a decent respect due to the wisdom, the integrity, and the
patriotism of the legislative body by which any law is passed, to
presume in favor of its validity, until its violation of the constitution is proved beyond all reasonable doubt." 2
Th~ constitutionality of a law, then, is to be presumed, because
the legislature, which was first required to pass upon the question,
acting, as they must be deemed to have acted, with integrity, and
with a just desire to keep within the restrictions laid by the constitution upon their action, have adjudged that it is so. They are
a co-ordinate department of the government with the judiciary,
invested with very high and responsible duties, as to some of
which theit· acts arc not subject to judicial scrutiny, and they
legislate under the solemnity of an official oath, which it is not to
be supposed they will disregard. • It must, therefore, be supposed
that their own doubts of the constitutionality of their action have
been deliberately solved in its favor, so that the courts may with
some confidence repose upon their conclusion as one based upon
their best judgment. For although it is plain, upon th~ authorities, that the courts should sustain legislative action when
not clearly satisfied of its invalidity, it is equally plain in reason
that the legislature should abstain from adopting such action if
1
.

1

Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 128, per Marshall, Ch. J.
Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 270.
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not fully assured of their authority to do so. Respect for the

CH. VII.]
instrument under whichthey exercise their power should

DECLARING STATUTES UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

*183

impel the *legislature in every case to solve their doubts [*184]

in its favor, and it is only because we are to presume

they do so, that courts are warranted in giving weight in any

case to their decision. If it were understood that legislators

refrained from exercising their judgment, or that, in cases of

doubt, they allowed themselves to lean in favor of the action they

desired to accomplish, the -foundation for the cases we have cited

would be altogether taken away.

As to what the doubt shall be upon which the court is to act,

we conceive that it can make no difference whether it springs from

an endeavor to arrive at the true interpretation of the constitution,

or from a consideration of the law after/the meaning of the consti-

tution has been judicially determined. It has sometimes been

supposed that it was the duty of the court, ﬁrst, to interpret the

constitution, placing upon it a construction that must remain

unvarying, and then test the law in question by it ; and that any

other rule would lead to differing judicial decisions, if the legis-

lature should put one interpretation upon the constitution at one

time and a different one at another. But the decided cases do

not sanction this rule,1 and the diﬁiculty suggested is rather
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imaginary than real, since it is but reasonable to expect that,

where a construction has once been placed upon a constitutional

provision, it will be followed afterwards, even though its original

adoption may have sprung from deference to legislative action

rather than from settled convictions in the judicial mind.”

The duty of the court to uphold a statute when the conﬂict

between it and the constitution is not clear, and the implication

which must always exist that no violation has been intended

by the legislature, may require it in some cases, where the mean-

ing of the constitution is not in doubt, to lean in favor of such a

construction of the statute as might not at ﬁrst view seem most

obvious and natural. For as a conﬂict between the statute and the

constitution is not to be implied, it would seem to follow, where

the meaning of the constitution is clear, that the court, zf possible,

must give the statute such a construction as will enable it to have

' Sun Mutual Insurance Co. v. New York, 5 Sandf. 14; Clark v. People, 26

Wend. 606; Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 457.

’ People v. Blodgett, 13 Mich. 162.
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not fully assured of their authority to do so. Respect for tho
instrument under which they exercise their power should
impel the *legislature in every case to solve their doubts [*184]
in its favor, and it is only because we are to presume
they do so, that courts are ~arranted in giving weight in any
case to their decision. If it were understood that legislators
refrained from exercising their judgment, or that, in cases of
doubt, they allowed themselves to lean in favor of the action they
desired to accomplish, the foundation fo.r the cases we have cited
would be altogether taken away.
As to what the doubt shall be upon which the court is to act,
we conceive that it can make no difference whether it springs from
an endeavor to arrive at the true interpretation of the constitution,
or from a considemtion of the law after/the meaning of the constitution has been judicially determined. It has sometimes been
supposed that it was the duty of the court, first, to interpret the
conRtitntion, placing upon it a construction that must remain
unvarying, and then test the law in question by it ; and that any
other rule would lead to differing judicial decisions, if the legislature should put one interpretation upon the constitution at one
time and a different one at another. But the decided cases do
not sanction this rule,1 and the difficulty suggested is rather
imaginary than real, since it is but reasonable to expect that,
where a construction has once been placed upon a constitutional
provision, it will be followed afterwards, even though its original
adoption may have sprung from deference to legislative action
rather than from settled convictions in the judicial mind.2
The duty of the court to uphold a statute when the conflict
between it and the constitution is not clear, and the implication
which must always exist that no violation has been intended
by the legislature, may require it in some cases, where the meaning of the constitution is not in doubt, to lean in favor of such a
coustl'Uction of the statute as might not at first view seem most
obvious and natural. For as a conflict between the statute and the
constitution is not to be implied, it would seem to follow, where
the meaning of the constitution is clear, that tlte court, if possible,
must give the statute such a construction as will enahle it to lwve
1 Sun Mutual Insurance Co. 11. New York, 5 Sandf. 14; Clark v. People, 26
Wend. GOG; Baltimore v. State, 15 l\ld. 457.
t People v. Blodgett, 13 :Mich. 162.
18
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eject. This is only saying, in another form of words, that the

(CH. VII.

court must construe the statute in accordance with the

[*185] legislative* intent; since it is always to be presumed

‘ the legislature designed the statute to take eﬁ"ect, and

not to be a nullity.

The rule upon this subject is thus stated by the Supreme

Court of Illinois: “Wlieiiever an act of the legislature can be

so construed and applied as to avoid conﬂict with the constitution

and give it the force of law, such construction will be adopted by

the courts. Therefore, acts of the legislature, in terms retro-

spective, and which, literally interpreted, would invalidate and

destroy vested rights, are upheld by giving them prospective

operation only ; for, applied to, and operating upon, future acts

and transactions only, they are rules of property under and

subject to which the citizen acquires property rights, and are

obnoxious to no constitutional limitation ; but as retroactive laws,

they reach to and destroy existing rights, through force of the

legislative will, without a hearing or judgment of law. So will

acts of the legislature, having elements of limitation, and capable

of being so applied and administered, although the words are

broad enough to, and do, literally read, strike at the right itself,

be construed to limit and control the remedy; for as such they
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are valid, but as weapons destructive of vested rights they are

void ; and such force only will be given the acts as the legislature

could impart to them.”1

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire, where a similar ques-

tion is involved, recognizing their obligation “so to construe

every act of the legislature as to make it consistent, if it be

possible, with the provisions of the constitution,” proceed to the

examination of a statute by the same rule, “ without stopping to

inquire what construction might be warranted by the natural

import of the language used.” 2

And Harris, J ., delivering the opinion of the majority of the

Court of Appeals of New York, says: “ A legislative act is not

to be declared void upon a mere conﬂict of interpretation between

the legislative and the judicial power. Beforeproceeding to

annul, by judicial sentence, what has been enacted by the law-

making power, it should clearly appear that the act cannot be

' Newland v. Marsh, 19 Ill. 384.

’ Dow v. Norris, 4 N. H. 17.

[194]

effect. This is only saying, in another form of words, that the
court must construe the statute in accordance with the
[*185] legislative* intent; since it is always to be presumed
the legislature designed the statute to take effect, and
not to be a nullity.
The rule upon this subject is thus stated by the Supreme
Court of Illinois : '' Whenever an act of the legislature can be
so construed and applied as to avoid conflict with the constitution
and give it the force of law, such construction will be adopted hy
the courts. Therefore, acts of the legislature, in terms retrospective, and which, literally interpreted, would invalidate and
destroy vested rights, are upheld by giving them prospective
operation only ; for, applied to, and operating upon, future acts
and transactions only, they are rules of property under and
subject to which the citizen acquires property rights, and are
obnoxious to no constitutional limitation ; but as retroactive laws,
they reach to and destroy existing rights, through force of the ..
legislative will, without a hearing or judgment of law. So will
acts of the legislature, having elements of limitation, and capable
of being so applied and administered, although the words are
broad enough to, and do, literally read, strike at the right itself,
be construed to limit and control the remedy; for as such they
are valid, but as weaporrs destructive of vested rights they are
void ; and such force only will be given the acts as the legislature
could impart to them." 1
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire, where a similar question is involved, recognizing their obligation "so to construe
every act of the legislature as to make it consistent, if it be
possible, with the provisions of the constitution," proceed to the
examination of a statute by the same rule, " without stopping to
inquire what construction might be warranted by the natural
import of the language used." 2
And Harris, J., delivering the opinion of the majority of the
Court of Appeals of New York, says: "A legislative act is not
to be declared void upon a mere conflict of interpretation between
the legislative and the judicial power. Before · proceeding to
annul, by judicial sentence, what has been enacted by the lawmaking power, it should clearly appear that the act cannot be
1
1
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Newland v. Marsh, 19 Ill. 384.
Dow v. Norris, 4 N.H. 17.

cu. vn.] nncnanruc srsrurss UNCONSTITUTIONAL. * 185

supported by any reasonable intendment or allowable presump-

tion.”1 And the Supreme Court of New York consider

CH. VII.)
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this but*the application of the familiar rule, that in [*186]

the exposition of a statute, it is the duty of the court D

to seek to ascertain and carry out the intention of the legislature

in its enactment, and to give full effect to such intention, and

they are bound so to construe the statute, if practicable, as to

give it force and validity, rather than to avoid it, or render it

nugatory.”

The rule is not different when the question is whether any por-

tion of a statute is void, than when the whole is assailed. The

excess of power, if there is any, is the same in either case, and is

not to be implied in any instance.

And on this ground it has been held that where the repealing

clause in an unconstitutional statute repeals all inconsistent acts,

the repealing clause is to stand and have effect, notwithstanding

the invalidity of the rest.” But other cases hold that such repeal-

ing clause is to be understood as designed to repeal all conﬂicting

provisions, in order that those of the new statute can have effect;

and that if the statute is invalid, nothing can conﬂict with it, and

therefore nothing is repealed} Great caution is necessary in

some cases, or the rule which was designed to ascertain and
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effectuate the legislative intent will be pressed to the extreme of

giving effect to part of a statute exclusively, when the legislative

intent was that it should not stand except as a component part of

the whole.

Inquiry into Legislative lﬂotives.

From what examination has been given to this subject, it ap-

pears that whether a statute is constitutional or not is always a

question of power; that is, whether the legislature in the partic-

ular case, in respect to the subject-matter of the act. the manner in

‘ People v. Supervisors of Orange, 17 N. Y. 241.

' Clarke v. Rochester,'24 Barb. 471. See Marshall 0. Grimes, 41 Miss. 27.

J Meshmeier 0. State, 11 Ind. 489; Ely v. Thompson, 3 A. K. Marsh. 70.

‘ Shepardson v. Milwaukee and Beloit Railroad Co. 6 Wis. 605; State 0.

Judge of County Court, 11VVis. 50; Tims v. State, 26 Ala. 165; Sullivan 11.

Adams, 3 Gray, 476; Devoy v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 35 Barb. 264; Cam-

pau v. Detroit, 14 Mich. 276; Childs v. Shower, 18 Iowa, 261; Harbeck v. New

supported by any reasonable intendment or allowable presumption." 1 And the Supreme Court of New York consider
this but • the application of the familiar rule, that in [*186]
the exposition of a statute, it is the duty of the court
·
to seek to ascertain and carry out the intention of the legislature
in its enactment, and to give full effect to such intention, and
they are bound so to construe the statute, if practicable, as to
give it force and validity, rather than to avoid it, or render it
nugatory. 2
The rule is not different when the question is whether any portion of a statute is void, than when the whole is assailed. The
excess of power, if there is any, is the same in either case, and is
not to be implied in any instance.
And on this ground it has been held that where the repealing
clause in an unconstitutional statute repeals all inconsistent acts,
the repealing clause is to stand and have effect, notwithstanding
the invalidity of the rest.3 But other cases hold that such repealing clause is to be understood as designed to repeal all conflicting
provisions, in order that those of the new statute can have effect;
and that if the statute is invalid, nothing can conflict with it, and
therefore nothing is repealed. 4 Great caution is necessary in
some cases, or the rule which was designed to ascertain and
effectuate the legislative intent will be pressed to the extreme of
giving effect to part of a statute exclusively, when the legislative
intent was th.at it should not stand except as a component part of
the whole.

York, 10 Bosw. 366.

[195]

Inquiry into Legialative Motivea.
From what examination has been given to this subject, it appears that whether a statute is constitutional or not is always a
question of power; that is, whether the legislature in the particular case, in respect to the subject-matter of the act. the manner in
1 People"· Supervisors of Orange, 17 N. Y. 241.
• Clarke "· Rochester,· 24 Barb. 471. See Marshall"· Grimes, 41 Mi~s. 27.
3 Meshmeier " · State, 11 Ind. 489; Ely o. Thompson, 3 A. K. Marsh. 70.
4 Shepardson "· Milwaukee and Beloit Railroad Co. 6 Wis. 605; State "·
Judge of County Court, 11 Wis. 50; Tims "· State, 26 Ala. 165; Sullivan "·
Adams, 3 Gray, 476; Devoy"· Mayor, &c., of New York, 35 Barb. 26-!; Campau o. Detroit, 14 Mich. 276; Childs v. Shower, 18 Iowa, 261; Harbeck v. New
York, 10 Bosw. 366.
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which its object is to be accomplished, and the mode of enacting it,

[cu. m.

has kept within the constitutional limits and observed the constitu-

tional conditions. In any case in which this question is answered

in the affirmative, the courts are not at liberty to inquire into the

proper exercise of the power. They must assume that

[*187] legislative discretion has been properly exercised.‘ *If

evidence was required, it must be supposed that it was

before the legislature when the act was passed ; 2 and if any special

ﬁnding was required to warrant the passage of the particular act,

it would seem that the passage of the act itself might be held

equivalent to such ﬁnding? And although it has sometimes been

urged at the bar that the courts ought to inquire into the motives

of the legislature where fraud and corruption were alleged, and

annul their action if the allegation were ’ established, the argu-

ment has in no case been acceded to by the judiciary, and they

have never allowed the inquiry to be entered upon.’* The reasons

l People v. Lawrence, 36 Barb. 193; People v. New York Central Railroad

Co. 34 Barb. 137; Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 376.

’ De Camp v. Eveland, 19 Barb. 81.

‘ Johnson v. Joliet and Chicago Railroad Co. 23 Ill. 207. The constitution

of Illinois provided that “ corporations not possessing banking powers or priv-
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ileges may be formed under general laws, but shall not be created by special

acts, except for municipal purposes, and in cases where, in the judgment of the

which its object is to be accomplished, and the modo of enacting it,
has kept within the constitutional limits and observed the constitutional conditions. In any case in which this question is answered
in the affirmative, the courts are not at liberty to inquire into the
proper exercise of the power. They must assume that
[• 187] legislative discretion has been properly exercised.1 • If
evidence was required, it must be supposed that it was
before the legislature when the act was passed ; 2 and if any special
finding was required to warrant the passage of the particular act,
it would seem that the passage of the act itself might be held
equivalent to such finding. 8 And although it has sometimes been
urged at the bar that the courts ought to inquire into the motives
of the legislature where fraud and corruptiou. were alleged, and
annul their action if the allegation were: established, the argument has in no case been acceded to by the judiciary, and they
have never allowed the inquiry to be entered upou. 4 The reasons

General Assembly. the objects of the corporation cannot be attained under

general laws." A special charter being passed without any legislative declara-

tion that its object could not be attained under a general law, the Supreme Court

sustained it, but placed their decision mainly on the ground that the clause had

been wholly disregarded, “ and it would now produce far-spread ruin to declare

such acts unconstitutional and void.” It is very clearly intimated in the opinion,

that the legislative practice, and this decision sustaining it, did violence to the

intent of the constitution. A provision in the constitution of Indiana that “ no

act shall take etfcct until the same shall have been published and circulated in

the several counties of this State, by authority, except in case of emergency,”

adds the words, “ which emergency shall be declared in the preamble, or in the

body of the law,” thus clearly making the legislative declaration necessary.

Carpenter v. Montgomery, 7 Blsckf. 415; Mark v. State, 15 Ind. 98; Hendrick-

son v. Heudrickson, 7 Ind. 13.

‘ Sunbury and Erie Railroad Co. v. Cooper, 33 Penn‘. St. 278 ; Ex parle New-

man, 9 Cal. 502; Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 376; Johnson v. Higgins, 3 Met.

(Ky.) 566. “ The courts cannot impute to the legislature any other but public

motives for their acts.” People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 545, per Denio, Ch. J.

" \Ve are not made judges of the motives of the legislature, and the court will

not usurp the inquisitorial ofﬁce of inquiry into the bona jides of that body in

discharging its duties.” Shankland, J ., in same case, p. 555. “ The powers of
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\ People v. Lawrence, 36 Barb. 198; People v. New York Central Railroad
Co. 84 Barb. 137; Baltimore v. State, 16 Md. 876.
1 De Camp v. Eveland, 19 Barb. 81.
1 Johnson v. Joliet and Chicago Railroad Co. 23 Ill. 207.
The constitution
of Illinois provided that " corporations not possessing banking powers or privileges may be formed under general laws, but shall not be created by special
acts, except for municipal purposes, and in cases where, in the judgment of the
General Assembly. the objec-ts of the corporation cannot be attained under
general laws." A special charter being passed without any legislative declaration that its object could not be attained under a general law, the Supreme Court
sustained it, but placed their decision mainly on the ground that the clause had
been wholly disregarded, " and it would now produce far-spread ruin to declare
such acts unconstitutional and void." lt is very clearly intimated in the opinion,
that the legi~lative practice, and this decision sustaining it, did violence to the
intent of the con~titution. A provision in the constitution of Indiana that "no
act shall take effect until the same shall have been published and circulated in
the several count.ies of this State, by authority, except in case of emergency,"
adqs the words, "which emergency shall be declared in the preamble, or in the
body of the law;" thus clearly making the legislative declaration necessary.
Carpenter v. Montgomery, 7 Blackf. 415; Mark v. State, 15 Ind. 98; Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, 7 Ind. 13.
• Sunbury and Erie Railroad Co."· Cooper, 33 Penn. St. 278; Ex parte Newman, 9 Cal. 502; Baltimore "· State, 15 Md. 376; Johnson "· Higgins, 8 Met.
(Ky.) 566. "The courts cannot impute to the legislature any other but public
motives for their acts." People "· Draper, 15 N. Y. 54ii, per Denio, Ch. J.
" \Ve are not made judges of the motives of the legislature, and the court will
not usurp the inquisitorial office of inquiry into the bona fidu of that body in
discharging its duties." Shankland, J ., in same case, p. 555. " The powers of
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are the same here as those which preclude an inquiry into the

motives of the governor in the-exercise of a discretion vested in

him exclusively. He is responsible for his acts in such a case not

to the courts but to the people.‘

‘Consequences tf a Statute is Tfoid. [* 188]

When a statute is adjudged to be unconstitutional, it is as if it

had never been. Rights cannot be built up under it; contracts

are the same here as those which preclude an inquiry into the
motives of the governor in the ·exercise of a discretion vested in
him exclusively. He is responsible for his acts in such a case not
to the courts but to the people.1

which depend upon it for their consideration are void; it consti-

tutes a protection to no one who has acted under it, and no one

can be punished for having refused obedience to it before the deci-

sion was made? And what is true of an act void in toto is true

• Consequences if a Statute is Void.

[*188]

also as to any part of an act which is found to be unconstitutional,

and which, consequently, is to be regarded as having never, at any

time, been possessed of any legal force.

the three departments are not merely equal; they are exclusive in respect to the

duties assigned to each. They are absolutely independent of each other. It is

now proposed that one of the three powers shall institute an inquiry into the

conduct of another department, and form an issue to try by what motives the

legislature were governed in the enactment of a law. If this may be done, we

may also inquire by what motives the executive is induced to approve a bill or

withhold his approval, and in case of withholding it corruptly, by our mandate
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compel its approval. To institute the proposed inquiry would be a direct attack

upon the independence of the legislature, and a usurpation of power subversive

of the constitution.” Vvright v. Defrees, 8 Ind. 302, per Gookins, J. “ \Ve are

When a statute is adjudged to be unconstitutional, it is as if it
had never been. Rights cannot be built up under it; contracts
which depend upon it for their consideration are void ; it constitutes a protection to no one who has acted under it, and no one
ean be punished for having refused obedience to it before the decision was made.2 And what is true of an act void in toto is true
also as to any part of an act which is found to be unconstitutional,
and which, consequently, is to be regarded as having never, at any
time, been possessed of any legal force.

not at liberty to inquire into theqmotives of the legislature. We can only ex-

amine into its power under the constitution.” Per Chase, Ch.J., in Ezparte

McCardle, 7 Wal. 514. And see McCuIloch v. State, 11 Ind. 431.

' Attorney-General v. Brown, 1Wis. 522; “fright v. Defrees, 8 Ind. 302.

' Strong v. Daniel, 5 Ind. 348; Astrom v. Hammond, 3 McLean, 107;

Meagher v. Storey Co. 5 Nev. 244. But one acting as an oﬁicer under an un-

constitutional law was held in Commonwealth 0. McCombs, 56 Penn. St. 436, to

be an oﬂicer de facto. This could hardly be so, however, if the law creating

the oﬁice was unconstitutional. There can be no oﬂicer de facto when there is

no oﬁice. See Carleton v. People, 10 Mich. 250.
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the three departments are not merely equal; they are exclusive in respect to the
duties assigned to each. They are absolutely independent of each other. It is
DOW proposed that one of the three powers shall institute an inquiry into the
conduct of another department, and form an issue to try by what motives the
legislature were governed in the enactment of a law. If this may be done, we
may also inquire by what motives the executive is induced to approve a bill or
withhold his approval, and in case of withholding it corruptly, by our mandate
compel its approval. To institute the proposed inquiry would be a direct attack
upon the independence of the legislature, and a usurpation of power subversive
of the constitution." Wright v. Defrees, 8 Ind. 302, per Gookins, J. " We are
not at liberty to inquire into the,,motives of the legislature. We can only examine into its power under the constitution." Per Clw.se, Ch. J., in Ex park
McCardle, 7 Wal. 514. And see McCulloch v. State, 11 Ind. 431.
1 Attorney-General v. Brown, 1 Wis. 522; Wright v. Defrees, 8 Ind. 302.
1 Strong v. Daniel, 5 Ind. 848; Astrom "· Hammond, 3 McLean, 107 ;
Meagher v. Storey Co. 5 Nev. 244. But one acting as an officer under an uDconstitutionallaw was held in Commonwealth v. McCombs, 56 Penn. St. 436, to
be an officer de facto. This could hardly be so, however, if the law creating
the office was unconstitutional. There can be no officer de facto when there is
DO office. See Carleton v. People, 10 Mich. 250.
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THE SEVERAL canons or MUNICIPAL covsnnmsnr.

IN the examination of American constitutional law, we shall

not fail to notice the care taken and the means adopted to bring

the agencies by which power is to be exercised as near as possible

* C H A PTE R

to the subjects upon which the power is to operate.

In contradistinction to those governments where power is con-

[*189]

VIII.

centrated in one man, or one or more bodies of men, whose

supervision and active control extend to all the objects of gov-

THE SEVERAL GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT.

ernment within the territorial limits of the State, the American

system is one of complete decentralization, the primary and vital

idea of which is, that local affairs shall be managed by local

authorities, and general affairs only by the central authority. It

was under the control of this idea that a national constitution

was formed, under which the States, while yielding to the national

government complete and exclusive jurisdiction over external

affairs, conferred upon it such powers only, in regard to matters

of internal regulation, as seemed to be essential to national union,

strength, and harmony, and without which the purpose in organ-

izing the national authority might have been defeated. It is

this, also, that impcls the several States, as if by common arrange-
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ment, to subdivide their territory into counties, towns, road and

school districts, and to confer upon each the powers of local legisla-

tion, and also to incorporate cities, boroughs, and villages where-

ever a dense population renders different rules important from

those which are needful for the rural districts.

The system is one which almost seems a part of the very nature

of the race to which we belong. A similar subdivision of the

realm for the purposes of municipal government has existed in

England from the earliest ages ;1 and in America, the ﬁrst set-

tlers, as if instinctively, adopted it in their frame of govern-

‘ C1-abbe‘s History of English Law, c. 2; 1 Bl. Com. 114; Hallam’s Middle

Ages, c. 8, pt. 1; 2 Kent, 278; Vaughan‘s Revolutions in English History, b. 2,

c. 8.
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IN the ex~mination of American constitutional law, we shall
not fail to notice the care taken and the means adopted to bring
the agencies by which power is to be exercised as near as possible
to the subjects upon which the power is to operate.
In contradistinction to those governments where power is concentr·ated in one man, or one or more bodies of men, whose
supervision and active control extend to all the objects of government within the territorial limits of the State, the American
system is one of complete decentralization, the primary and vital
idea of which is, that local affairs shall be managed by local
authorities, and general affairs only by the central authority. It
was under the control of this idea that a national constitution
was formed, under which the States, while yielding to the national
government complete and exclusive jurisdiction over external
affairs, conferred upon it such powers only, in regard to matters
of internal regulation, as seemed to be essential to national union,
strength, and harmony, and without which the purpose in organizing the national authority might have been defeated. It is
this, also, that impels the several States, as if by common arrangement, to subdivide their territory into counties, towns, road and
school districts, and to confer upon each the powers of local legislation, and also to incorporate cities, boroughs, and villages whereever a dense population renders different rules important from
those which are needful for the rural districts.
The system is one which almost seems a part of the very nature
of the race to which we belong. A similar subdivision of the
realm for the purposes of municipal government has existed in
England from the earliest ages ; 1 and in America, the first set.
tiers, as if instinctively, adopted it in their frame of govern1 Crabbe'~ History of English Law, c. 2; 1 Bl. Com. 114; Hallam's Middle
Ages, c. 8, pt. 1; 2 Kent, 278; Vaughan's Revolutions in English History, b. 2,
c. 8.
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found advocates. In most of the colonies the central

power created and provided for the organization of the towns ; 1 in

one at least the towns preceded and created the central authority ;2

but in all, the ﬁnal result was substantially the same, that towns,

villages, boroughs, cities, and counties exercised the powers of

local government, and the Colony or State the powers of a more

general nature.“

The several State constitutions have been framed with this

system in view, and the delegations of power which they make,

and the express and implied restraints which they impose there-

upon, can only be correctly understood and construed by keeping

' For an interesting history of the legislation in Connecticut on this subject,

see Webster v. llarwinton, 32 Conn. 131. In New Hampshire, see Bow v.

Allenstown, 34- N. H. 351. The learned note to Commonwealth v. Roxbury, 9

Gray, 503, will give similar information concerning the organization and authority

of towns in the Massachusetts provinces. Mr. Elliott well says: “ The prime

strength of New England and of the whole republic was and is in the municipal

ment, and *no other has ever supplanted it, or even [*190]
found advocates. In most of the colonies the central
power created and provided for the organization of the towns ; 1 in
one at least the towns preceded and created the central authority ; 2
but in all, the final result was substantially the same, that towns,
villages, boroughs, cities, and counties exercised the powers of
local government, and the Colony or State the powers of a more
general nature. 3
The several State constitutions have heeu framed with this
system in view, and the delegations of power which they make,
and the express and implied restraints which they impose thereupon, can only he correctly understood and construed by keeping

governments and in the homes." And he-adds, that among the earliest things

decided in Massachusetts was, “ that trivial things should be ended in towns."

(1635.) Elliott’s New England, Vol. I. p. 182.

' Rhode Island; see Arnold’s History, c. 7.
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1' “ The townships,” says De Tocqueville, “ are only subordinate to the State

in those interests which I shall term social, as they are common to all of the

citizens. They are independent in all that concerns themselves, and among the

inhabitants of New England, I believe that not a man is to be found who would

acknowledge that the State has any right to interfere in their local interests. The

towns of New England buy and sell, prosecute or are indicted; augment or

diminish their rates, without the slightest opposition on the part of the adminis-

trative anthority of the State. They are bound, however, to comply with the

demands of the community. If a State is in need of money, a town can neither

give nor withhold the supplies. If a State projects a road, the township cannot

refuse to let it cross its territory; if a police regulation is made by the State it

must be enforced by the town. An uniform system of instruction is organized

all over the country, and every town is bound to establish the schools which the

law ordains. . . . Strict as this obligation is, the government of the State im-

poses it in principle only, and in its performance the township assumes all its

independent rights. Thus taxes are voted by the State, but they are assessed

and collected by the township; the existence of a school is obligatory, but the

township builds, pays, and superintends it. In France, the State collector re-

ceives the local imposts; in America, the town collector receives the taxes of the

State. Thus the French government lends its agents to the commune; in Amer-

ica, the township is the agent of the government. The fact alone shows the

extent of the differences which exist between the two nations.” Democracy in

America, c. 5.
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1 For an interesting history of the legislation in Connecticut on this subject,
see Webster v. Harwinton, 82 Conn. 181. In New Hampshire, see Bow "·
Allenstown, 34 N. H. 351. The learned note to Commonwealth v. Roxbury, 9
Gray, 508, will gh·e similar information concerning the organization ami authority
of towns in the Mas:<achusetts provinces. Mr. Elliott well says : " The prime
strength of New England and of the whole rPpublic was and is in the municipal
governments and in the homes." And he •adds, that among the earliest things
decided in Ma~<sachusetts was, "that trivial things should be ended in towns."
(1635.) Elliott's New England, Vol. I. p. 182.
' Rhode Island; see Arnold's History, c. 7.
~ "The townships," says De Tocqueville, "are only subordinate to the State
in those interests which I shall term social, as they are common to all of the
citizens. They are independent in all that concerns themselvPs, and among the
inhabitants of New England, I believe that not a man is to be found who would
acknowledge that the State has any right to interfere in their local interests. The
towns of New Englaud buy and sell, prosecute or are indicted; augment or
diminish their rates, without the slightest opposition on the part of the administrative authority of the State. They are bound, however, to comply with the
demands of the community. If a State is in need of money, a town can neither
give nor withhold the supplies. If a State projects a road, the township cannot
refuse to let it cro~s its territory ; if a police regulation is made by the State it
must be enforced by the town. An uniform system of instruction is organized
all over the country, and every town is bound to establish the schools which the
law ordains. . . . Strict as this obligation is, the government of the State imposes it in principle only, and in its performance the tQwnship assumes all ita
independent rights. Thus taxes are voted by the State, but they are assessed
and collected by the township; the t>xistence of a school is obligatory, but the
township builds, pay!l, and superintends it. In France, the State collector receives the local imposts; in America, the town collector receives the taxes of the
State. Thus the French government lends its agents to the commune; in America, the township is the agent of the government. The fact alone shows the
extent of the differences which exist between the two nations." Democracy in
America, c. 5.
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in view its present existence and anticipated continuance. There

(CR. VIII.

are few of the general rules of constitutional law that are

not more or less affected by the fact that the powers of govern-

ment are not concentrated in any one body of men, but are

carefully distributed, with a view to being easily, cheaply,

[* 191] and **intelligently exercised, and as far as possible by

the persons more immediately interested.

We have already seen that the legislature cannot delegate its

power to make laws; but fundamental as this maxim is, it is so

qualiﬁed by the customs of our race, and by other maxims which

regard local government, that the right of the legislature, in the

entire absence of authorization or prohibition, to create towns and

other inferior municipal organizations, and to confer upon them

the powers of local government, and especially of local taxation

and police regulation usual with such corporations, would always

pass unchallenged. The legislature in these cases is not regarded

as delegating its authority, because the regulation of such local

affairs as are commonly left to, local boards and officers is not un-

derstood to properly belong to the State ; and when it interferes,

as sometimes it must, to restrain and control the local action,

there must be reasons of State policy or dangers of local abuse

to warrant the interposition}
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The people of the municipalities, however, do not deﬁne for

themselves their own rights, privileges, and powers, nor is there

any common law which draws any deﬁnite line of distinction be-

‘ “ It seems to be generally conceded that powers of local legislation may be

granted to cities, towns, and other municipal corporations. And it would require

strong reasons to satisfy us that it could have been the design of the framers of

our constitution to take from the legislature a power which has been exercised in

Europe by governments of all classes from the earliest history, and the exercise

of which has probably done more to promote civilization than all other causes

combined; which has been constantly exercised in every part of our country

from its earliest settlement, and which has raised up among us many of our most

valuable institutions.” State v. Noyes, 10 Fost. 292, per Bell, J . See also

Tanner v. Trustees of Albion, 5 Hill, 121 ; Dalby v. Wolf, 14 Iowa. 228; State

v. Simonds, 3 Mo. 414; McKee v. McKee, 8 B. Monr. 433; Smith v. Levinus,

in view its present existence and anticipated continuance. There
are few of the general rules of constitutional law that are
not more or less affected by the fact that the powers of government are not concentrated in any one body of men, but are
carefully distributed, with a view to being easily, cheaply,
[*191] and *intelligently exercised, and as far as possible by
the persons more immediately interested.
We have already seen that the ,legislature cannot delegate its
power to make laws ; but fundamental as this maxim is, it is so
qualified by the customs of our race, and by other maxims which
regard local government, that the right of the legislature, in the
entire absence of authorization or prohibition, to create towns and
other inferior municipal organizations, and to confer upon them
the powers of local government, and especially of local ta~ation
and police regulation usual with such corporations, would always
pass unchallenged. The legislature in these cases is not regarded
as delegating its authority, because the regulation of such local
affairs as are commonly left to. local boards and officers is not understood to properly belong to the State ; and when it interferes,
as sometimes it must, to restrain and control the local action,
there must be reasons of State policy or dangers of local abuse
to warrant the interposition.1
The people of the municipalities, however, do not define for
themselves their own rights, privileges, and powers, nor is there
any common law which draws any definite line of distinction be-

8 N. Y. 472; People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 532; Burgess v. Pue, 2 Gill, 11; New

Orleans v. Turpin, 13 La. An. 56; Gilkeson v. The Frederick Justices, 13 Grat.

577; Mayor, &c., of New York v. Ryan, 2 E. D. Smith, 368; St. Louis v.

Russell, 9 Mo. 503; Bliss v. Kraus, 16 Ohio, N. s. 55; Trigally 0. Memphis,

6 Cold. 382; Durach‘s Appeal, 63 Penn. St. 491 ; State v. \Vilcox, 45 Mo. 458;

Jones v. Richmond, 18 Grat. 517; State v. Neill, 24 Wis. 149.
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1 " It seems to be generally conceded that power~ of local legislation may be
granted to cities, towns, and other municipal corporations. And it would require
strong reasons to satisfy us that it could have been the design of the framers of
our constitution to take from the legislature a power which has been exercised in
Europe by governments of all classes from the earliest history, and the exercise
of which has probably done more to promote civilization than all other causea
combined; which has been constantly exercised in every part of our country
from its earliest settlement, and which has raised up among us many of our most
valuable institutions." State v. Noyes, 10 Fost. 292, per Bell, J. See also
Tanner v. Trustees of Albion, 5 Hill, 121 ; Dalby v. Wolf, 14 Iowa, 228; St.ate
"· Simonds, 3 Mo. 414; McKee v. McKee, 8 B. Monr. 433; Smith v. Levinus,
8 N.Y. 472; People v. Draper, 15 N.Y ..')32; Burgess v. Pue, 2 Gill, 11; New
Orleans v. Turpin, 13 La. An. 66 ; Gilkeson v. The Frederick .Justices, 13 Grat.
577; Mayor, &c., of New York v. Ryan, 2 E. D. Smith, 368; St. Louis "·
Russell, 9 Mo. 503; Bliss v. Kraus, 16 Ohio, N. s. 55; Trigally v. Memphis,
6 Cold. 382; Durach's Appeal, 63 P~nn. St. 491; State v. Wilcox, 45 Mo. 458;
Jones v. Richmond, 18 Grat. 517; State v. Neill, 24 Wis. 149.
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tween the powers which may be exercised by the State and those

which must be left to the local governments} The municipalities

must look to the State for such charters of government .as the

legislature shall see ﬁt to provide; and they cannot prescribe for

themselves the details, though they have a right to expect that

those charters will be granted with a recognition of the

general ‘principles with which we are familiar. The ["‘192]

charter, or the general law under which they exercise

their powers, is their constitution, in which they must show

authority for the acts they assume to perform. They have no

inherent jurisdiction to make laws or adopt regulations of gov-

ernment; they are governments of enumerated powers, acting

by a delegated authority; so that while the State legislature

may exercise such powers of government coming within a proper

designation of legislative power as are not expressly or im-

pliedly prohibited, the local authorities can exercise those only

which are expressly or impliedly conferred, and subject to such

regulations or restrictions as are annexed to the grant?

The creation of municipal corporations, and the conferring

upon them of certain powers and subjecting them to correspond-

ing duties, does not deprive the legislature of the State of that
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complete control over their citizens which was before possessed.

It still has authority to amend their charters, enlarge or diminish

their powers, extend or limit their boundaries, consolidate two or

more into one, overrule their action whenever it is deemed unwise,

impolitic, or unjust, and even abolish them altogether in the legis-

lative discretion.“ The rights and franchises of such a corpora-

‘ As to the common law affecting these corporate existences, and the effect

of usage, see 2 Kent, 278, 279. ~

’ Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass. 272; VVillard v. Killingworth, 8 Conn. 254;

Abendroth v. Greenwich, 29 Conn. 363; Baldwin v. North Branford, 32 Conn.

47; \Vebster v. Harwinton, ib. 131; Douglass v. Placerville, 18 Cal. 643; Lack-

land v. Northern Missouri Railroad Co. 31 Mo. 180; Mays v. Cincinnati, 1 Ohio,

N. s. 268; Frost v. Belmont, 6 Allen, 152. '

3 St. Louis v. Allen, 13 Mo. 400; Coles 0. Madison Co., Breese, 115; Rich-

land County v. Lawrence County, 12 Ill. 1; Trustees of Schools v. Tstman, 13

Ill. 27 ; Robertson v. Rockford, 21 Ill. 1 ; People v. Power, 25 Ill. 187; St. Louis

0. Russell, 9 Mo. 503; State v. Cowan, 29 Mo. 330; McKim v. Odorn, 3 Bland,

tween the powers which may be exercised by the State and those
which must be left to the local governments. 1 The municipalities
must look to the State for such charters of government .as the
legislature shall see fit to provide ; and they cannot prescribe for
themselves the details, though they have a right to expect that
those charters will be granted with a recognition of the
general • principles with which we are familiar. The [*192]
charter, or the general law under which they exercise
their powers, is their constitution, in which they must show
authority for the acts they assume to perform. They have no
inherent jurisdiction to make laws or adopt regulations of government ; they are governments of enumerated powers, acting
by a delegated authority ; so that while the State legislature
may exercise suc~1 powers of government coming within a proper
designation of legislative power as are not expressly or impliedly prohibited; the local authorities can exercise those only
which are expressly or impliedly conferred, and subject to such
regulations or restrictions as are annexed to the grant.2
The creation of municipal corporations, and the conferring
upon them of certain powers and subjecting them to corresponding duties, does not deprive the legislature of the State of that
complete control over their citizens which was before possessed.
It still has authority to amend their charters, enlarge or diminish
their powers, extend or limit their boundaries, consolidate two or
more into one, overrule their action whenever it is deemed unwise,
impolitic, or unjust, and even abolish them altogether in the legislative discretion.s The rights and franchises of such a corpora-

407; Granby -v. Thurston, 23 Conn. 416; Harrison Justices v. Holland, 3 Grat.

247; Brighton 1:. Wilkinson, 2 Allen, 27; Sloan v. State, 8 Blackf. 361; Mills

1:. Williams, 11 Ired. 558; Langworthy v. Dubuque, 16 Iowa, 271; Weeks v.
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1 As to the common law affecting these corporate existences, and the effect
of usage, sec 2 Kent, 278, 279.
1 Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass. 272; Willard t'. Killingworth, 8 Conn. 254;
Abendroth v. Greenwich, 29 Conn. 363; Baldwin 11. North Branford, 32 Conn.
47; Webster t'. Harwinton, ib. 131; Douglass v. Placerville, 18 Cal. 643; Lackland 11. Northern Missouri Railroad Co. 31 Mo. 180; Mays 11. Cincinnati, 1 Ohio,
N. s. 268; Frost v. llelmont, 6 Allen, 152. ·
3 St. Louis 11. Allen, 13 Mo. 400; Coles 11. Madison Co., Breese, 115; Richland County 11. Lawrence County, 12 TIL 1; Trustees of Schools 11. Tatman, 13
Ill. '27; Robertson v. Rockford, 21 Ill. 1; People"· Power, 25lll. 187; St. Louis
11. Russell, 9 Mo. 503; State 11. Cowan, 29 Mo. 330; McKim 11. Odorn, 3 Bland,
407; Granby v. Thurst.on, 23 Conn, 416; Harrison Justices t'. Holland, 3 Grat.
247; Brighton 11. Wilkinson, 2 Allen, 27 ; Sloan v. State, 8 Blackf. 361 ; Mills
11. Williams, 11 Ired. 558; Langworthy 11. Dubuque, 16 Iowa, 271; Weeks t'.
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[* 193] can never *hecome such vested rights as against the

_ State that they cannot be taken away; nor does the char-

tion, being granted for the purposes of the government,

ter constitute a contract in the sense of the constitutional provision

which prohibits the obligation of contracts being violated} Re-

straints on the legislative power of control must be found in the

constitution of the State, or they must rest alone in the legislative

discretion? If the legislative action in these cases operates inju-

Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 242; State v. Branin, 3 Zab. 484; Patterson v. Society, &c.,

4 Zab. 385; Atchison v. Bartholow. 4 Kansas, 124; City of St. Louis v. Caffe-

rata, 24 Mo. 9-L; People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 532; Aspinwall v. Commissioners,

&c., 22 How. 364. The legislature may in its discretion recall to itself and exer-

cise so much of such powers as it has conferred upon municipal corporations as

[* 193] can never • become such vested rights as against the
State that they cannot be taken away ; nor does the charter constitute a contract in the sense of the constitutional provision
which prohibits the obligation of contracts being violated.1 Restraints on the legislative power of control must be found in the
constitution of the State, or they must rest alone in the legislative
discretion.2 If the legislative action in these cases operates inju-

is not secured to them by the constitution. People v. Pinkney, 32 N. Y. 377.

The creditors of a county cannot prevent the legislature reducing its limits, not-

withstanding their security may be diminished thereby. \Vade v. Richmond, 18

Grat. 583. This power is not defeated or alfected by the circumstance that the

municipal corporation was by its charter made the trustee of a charity; and in

such case, if the corporation is abolished, the Court of Chancery may be em-

powered and directed by the repealing act to appoint a new trustee to take charge

of the property and execute the trust. Montpelier v. East Montpelier, 29 Vt.

12. And see Harrison v. Bridgeton, 16 Mass. 16; Montpelier Academy v.
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George, 14 La. An. 406; Reynolds v. Baldwin, 1 La. An. 162;. Police Jury v.

Shreveport, 5 La. An. 665. But neither the identity of a corporation, nor its

right to take property by devise, is destroyed by a change in its name, or en-

largement of its area, or an increase in the number of its corporators. Girard

v. Philadelphia, 7 Wal. 1. Changing a borough into a city does not of itself

abolish or aﬁ'ect the existing borough ordinances. Trustees of Erie Academy v.

City of Erie, 31 Penn. St. 515. Nor will it affect the indebtedness of the cor-

poration, which will continue to be its indebtedness under its new organization.

Olney v. Harvey, 50 Ill. 453.

‘ This principle was recognized by the several judges in Dartmouth College

v. Woodward, 4Wheat. 518. And see People v. Morris, 13 Vl'en‘d. 331: St.

Louis v. Russell, 9 Mo. 507 ; Montpelier v. East Montpelier, 29 Vt. 12 ; Trustees

of Schools v. Tatman, 13 Ill. 30; Brighton v. Wilkinson, 2 Allen, 27; Reynolds

v. Baldwin, 1 La. An. 162; Police Jury v. Shreveport, 5 La. An. 665; Mt. Car-

mel v. Wabash County, 50 lll. 69.

" “ Where a corporation is the mere creature of legislative will, established

for the general good, and endowed by the State alone, the legislature may, at

pleasure, modify the law by which it was created. For in that case there would

be but one party alfected, —-the government itself, —and therefore not a con-

tract within the meaning of the constitution. The trustees of such a corporation

would be the mere mandatories of the State, having no personal interest involved,

and could not complain of any law that might abridge or destroy their agency."

Montpelier Academy v. George, 1-L La. An. 406. In Trustees of Schools v.
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Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 242; State v. Branin, 3 Zab. 484; Patterson v. Society, &c.,
4 Zab. 385; Atchison v. Bartholow, 4 Kansas, 124; City of St. Louis v. Cafferata, 24 Mo. 94; People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 532; Aspinwall"· Commissioners,
&c., 22 How. 364. The legislature may in its discretion recall to itself and exercise so much of such powers as it has conferred upon municipal corporations as
is not secured to them by the constitution. People v. Pinkney, 32 N.Y. 377.
The creditors of a county cannot prevent the legislature reducing its limits, notwithstanding their security may be diminished thereby. Wade "· Richmond, 18
Grat. 583. This power is not defeated or affected by the circumstance that the
municipal corporation was by its charter made the trustee of a charity; and in
such case, if the corporation is abolished, the Court of Chancery may be empowered and directed by the repealing act to appoint a new trustee to take charge
of the property and execute the trust. Montpelier v. East Montpelier, 29 Vt.
12. And see Harrison v. Bridgeton, 16 Mass. 16; Montpelier Academy v.
George, 14 La. An. 406; Reynolds v. Baldwin, 1 La. An. 162 ;' Police Jury v.
Shreveport, 5 La. An. 665. But neither the identity of a corporation, nor its
right to take property by devise, is destroyed by a change in its name, or enlargement of its area, or an increase in the number of its corporators. Girard
v. Philadelphia, 7 W al. 1. Changing a. borough into a. city does not of itself
abolish or affect the existing borough ordinances. Trustees of Erie A('ademy 11.
City of Erie, 31 Penn. St. 515. Nor will it. affect the indebtedness of the corporation, which will continue to be its indebtedness under its new organization.
Olney v. Harvey, 50 Ill. 453.
1 This principle was recognized by the several judges in Dartmouth College
v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518. And see People v. Morris, 1:3 Wend. 331: St.
Louis v. Russell, 9 Mo. 507; Montpelier v. East Montpelier, 29 Vt. 12; Trustees
of Schools v. Tatman, 13 Ill. 30; Brighton t•. Wilkinson, 2 Allen, 27; Reynolds
v. Baldwin, 1 La. An. 162; Police Jury"· Shreveport, 5 La. An. 6ti5; 1\lt. Carmel v. Wabash County, 50 lll. 69.
1 ''·where a corporation is the mere creature of legislative will. established
for the general good, and endowed by the State alone, the legislature may, at
pleasure, modify the law by which it was created. For in that Pase there would
be but one party affected, -the government itself, -and therefore not a contract within the meaning of the constitution. The trustees of such a corporation
would be the mere mandatories of the State, having no personal interest involved,
and could not complain of any law that might abridge or destroy their agency."
Montpelier Academy v. George, 14 La. An. 406. In Trustees of Schools v.
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riously to individuals, the remedy is not with the courts. They
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have no power to interfere, and the people must be looked to, to

right through the ballot-box all these wrongs.‘ This is the general

rule; and the exceptions to it are not numerous, and will be indi-

cated hereafter.

Tatman, 13 Ill. 30, the court say: “ Public corporations are but parts of the

machinery employed in carrying on the affairs of the State; and they are subject

to be changed, modiﬁed, or destroyed, as the exigencies of the public may

demand. The State may exercise a general superintendence and control over

riously to individuals, the remedy is not with the courts. They
have no power to interfere, and the people must be looked to, to
right through the ballot-box all these wrongs. 1 This is the general
rule ; and the exceptions to it are not numerous, and will be indicated hereafter.

them and their rights and effects, so that their property is not diverted from the

uses and objects for which it was given or purchased.” It is a lawful exercise

of legislative authority upon the divisibn of counties, towns, &c., to confer a

part of the corporate property of the old corporation upon the new, and to

direct the old body to pay it over to the new. Harrison v. Bridgeton, 16 Mass.

16; Bristol v. New Chester, 3 N. H. 524; Milwaukee Town 0. Milwaukee City,

12 Wis. 93; Marshall Co. Court v. Calloway Co. Court, 3 Bush, 93. But it

seems that this apportionment of property can only be made at the time of the

division. Windham v. Portland, 4 Mass. 390; Hampshire v. Franklin, 16 Mass.

76. See Richland v. Lawrence, 12 Ill. S; Bowdoinham v. Richmond, 6 Greenl.

112. In the latter case, it was held that the apportionment of debts between

an old town and one created from it was in the nature of a contract; and it was

not in the power of the legislature afterwards to release the new township from
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payment of its share as thus determined. But the case of Layton v. New Orleans,

12 La. An. 515, is contra. See also Borough of Dunmore’s Appeal, 52 Penn. St.

374, which in principle seems to accord with the Louisiana case. In Burns v.

Clarion County, 62 Penn. St. 422, it was held the legislature had the power

to open a settlement made by county creditors with the county treasurer, and to

compel them to settle with him on principles of equity. See further Cambridge

v. Lexington, 17 Pick. 222; Attorney-General v. Cambridge, 16 Gray, 247.

‘ “The correction of these abuses is as readily attained at the ballot-box

as it would be by subjecting it to judicial revision. A citizen or a number of

citizens may be subtracted from a county free from debt, having no taxation for

county purposes, and added td an adjacent one, whose debts are heavy, and

whose taxing powers are exercised to the utmost extent allowed by law, and this,

too, without consulting their wishes. It is done every day. Perhaps a majority

of the people thus annexed to an adjacent or thrown into a new county by the

division of an old one may have petitioned the legislature for this change; but

this is no relief to the outvoted minority, or the individual who deems himself

oppressed and vexed by the change. Must we, then, to prevent such occasional

hardships, deny the power entirely?

“ It must be home in mind that these corporations, whether established over

cities, counties, or townships (where such incorporated subdivisions exist), are

never intrusted and can never be intrusted with any legislative power inconsist-

ent or conﬂicting with the general laws of the land, or derogatory to those rights

either of person or property which the constitution and the general laws guarantee.

They are strictly subordinate to the general laws, and merely created to carry
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Tatman, 13 Ill. 30, the court say: " Public corporations are but parts of the
machinery employed in carrying on the affairs of the State ; and they are subject
to be changeu, modified, or destroyed, as the exigen-:!ies of the public may
demand. The State may exercise a general superintendence and control over
them and their rights and effects, so that tileir property is not diverted from the
uses and objects for which it was given or purchased." It is a lawful exercise
of legislative authority upon the division of counties, towns, &c., to confer a
part of the corporate property of the old corporation upon the new, and to
direct the old body to pay it over to the new. Harrison 11. Bridgeton, 16 Mass.
16; Bristol v. New Chester, 3 N.H. 624; Milwaukee Town 11. Milwaukee City,
12 Wis. 93; Marshall Co. Court v. Calloway Co. Court, 3 Bush, 93. But it
seems that this apportionment of property can only be made at the time of the
division. Windham 11. Portland, 4 Mass . 390; Hampshire v. Franklin, 16 Mass.
76. See Richland 11. Lawrence, 12 Ill. 8; Bowdoinhat~ "· Richmond, 6 Greenl.
112. In the latter case, it was held that the apportionment of debts between
an old town and one created from it was in the nature of a contract; and it was
not in the pO\ver of the legislature afterwards to release the new township from
payment of its share as thus determined. But the case of Layton 11. New Orleans,
12 La. An. !)1!), is c()'ll(ra. See also Borough of Dunmore's Appeal, 62 Penn. St.
374, which in principle seems to accord with the Louisiana case. In Bums "·
Clarion County, 62 Penn. St. 422, it was held the legislature had the power
to open a settlement made by county creditors with the county treasurer, and to
compel them to settle with him on principles of equity. See further Cambridge
"·Lexington, 17 Pick. 222; Attorney-General v. Cambridge, 16 Gray, 247.
1 "The correction of these abuses is as readily attained at the ballot-box
as it would be by subjecting it to judicial revision. A citizen or a number of
citizens may be subtracted from a county free from debt, having no taxation for
county purposes, and added to an adjacent one, whose debts are heavy, and
whose taxing powers are exercised to the utmost extent allowed by law, and this,
too, without consulting their wishes. It is done every day. Perhaps a majority
of the people thus annexed to an adjacent or thrown into a new county by the
division of an old one may have petitioned the legislature for this change; but
this is no relief to the outvoted minority, or the individual who deems himself
oppressed and vexed by the change. Must we, then, to prevent such occasional
hardships, deny the power entirely?
"It must be borne in mind that these corporations, whether established over
cities, rounties, or townships (where such incorporated subdivisions exist), are
never intrusted and can never be intrusted with any legislative power inconsistent or conflicting with the general laws of the land, or derogatory to those rights
either of person or property which the constitution and the general laws guarantee.
They are st.rictly subordinate to the general laws, and merely created to carry
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The powers of these corporations are either express or implied.

The former are those which the legislative act under which they

exist confers in express terms; the latter are such as are neces-

sary in order to carry into effect those expressly granted, and

• Powers of Public Corporations.

[*194]

which must, therefore, be presumed to have been within the in-

tention of the legislative grant} Certain powers are also inci-

dental to corporations, and will be possessed unless expressly or

by implication prohibited. Of these an English writer has said:

“A municipal corporation has at common law few powers beyond

those of electing, governing, and removing its members, and reg-

ulating its franchises and property. The power of its governing

officers can only extend to the administration of the by-laws and

other ordinances by which the body is regulated.”2 But without

being expressly empowered so to do, they may sue and be sued;

may have a common seal; may purchase and hold lands

[* 195] and other "‘ property for corporate purposes, and convey the

same; may make by-laws whenever necessary to accom-

plish the design of the incorporation, and enforce the same by

penalties; and may enter into contracts to effectuate the corporate

purposes? Except as to these incidental powers, and which need

not be, though they usually are, mentioned in the charter, the
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charter_ itself, or the general law under which they exist, is the

measure of the authority to be exercised.

And the general disposition of the courts in this country has

been to conﬁne municipalities within the limits that a strict con-

out the purposes of those laws with more certainty and eﬂiciency. They may

be and sometimes are intrusted with powers which properly appertain to private

corporations, and in such matters their power as mere municipal corporations

ceases.” City of St. Louis v. Allen, 13 Mo. 414. '

' 2 Kent, 278, note; Halstead v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 3 N. Y. 433;

Hodges v. Buffalo, 2 Denio, 112; New London v. Brainerd, 22 Conn. 552; State

v. Ferguson, 33 N. II. 424; McMillan v. Lee County, 3 Iowa, 311; La Fayette

v. Cox, 5 Ind. 38; Clark v. Des Moines, 19 Iowa, 212; State v. Morristown,

33 N. J. 63; Beaty v. Knowler, 4 Pet. 162; Mills v. Gleason, 11 \Vis. 470. In

this last case, it was held that these corporations had implied power to borrow

money for corporate purposes. And see also Ketcham v. Buffalo, 14 N. Y. 356.

' Willcock on Municipal Corporations, tit. 769.

' Angell and Ames on Corp. §§ 111, 239; 2 Kyd on Corp. 102; State v.

Ferguson, 33 N. H. 430.

The powers of these corporations are either express or implied.
The former are those which the legislative act under which they
exist confers in express terms ; the latter are such as are necessary in order to carry into effect those expressly granted, and
which must, therefore, be presumed to have been within the intention of the legislative grant.l Certain powers are also incidental to corporations, and will be possessed unless expressly or
by implication prohibited. Of these an English writer has said:
"A municipal corporation has at common law few powers beyond
those of electing, governing, and removing its members, and regulating its franchises and property. The power of its governing
officers can only extend to the administration of the by-laws and
other ordinances by which the body is regulated." 2 But without
being expressly empowered so to do, they may sue and be sued ;
may have a common seal ; may purchase and hold lands
[• 195] and other • property for corporate purposes, and convey the
same; may make by-laws whenever necessary to accomplish the design of the incorporation, and enforce the same by
penalties; and may enter into contracts to effectuate the corporate
purposes. 3 Except aR to these incidental powers, and which need
not be, though they usually are, mentioned in the charter, the
charter itself, or the general law under which they exist, is the
measure of the authority to be exercised.
And the general disposition of the courts in this country has
been to confine municipalities within the limits that a strict con-
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out the purposes of those laws with more certainty and efficiency. They may
be and sometimes are intrusted with powers which properly appertain to private
corporations, and in such matters their power as mere municipal corporationa
ceases." City of St. Louis v. Allen, 13 Mo. 414.
'
1 2 Kent, 278, note; Halstead v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 3 N.Y. 433;
Hodges v. Buffalo, 2 Denio,112; New London v. Brainerd, 22 Conn. 552; State
v. Ferguson, 33 N.H. 424; McMillan v. Lee County, 3 Iowa, 311; La Fayette
v. Cox, 5 Ind. 38; Clark v. Des :Moines, 19 Iowa, 212; State v. Morristown,
33 N.J. 63; Beaty v. Knowler, 4 Pet. 162; Mills v. Gleason, 11 Wis. 470. In
this last case, it was held that these corporations had impiied power to borrow
money for corporate purposes. And see also Ketcham v. Buffalo, 14 N.Y. 356.
1 Willcock on Municipal Corporations, tit. 769.
1 Angell and Ames on Corp. §§ 111, 239; 2 Kyd on Corp. 102; State 11.
Ferguson, 33 N.H. 430.
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struction of the grants of powers in their charters will assign to
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them; thus applying substantially the same rule that is applied

to charters of private incorporation.1

* It must follow that, if in any case a party assumes to [* 196]

deal with a corporation on the supposition that it possesses

powers which it does not, or to contract in any other manner than

is permitted by the charter, he will not be allowed, notwithstand-

ing he may have complied with the undertaking on his part, to

maintain a suit against the corporation based upon its unauthorized

action. Even where a party is induced to enter upon work for a

' Under a city charter which authorized the common council to appoint asses-

sors for the purpose of awarding damages to those through whose property a

street might be opened, and to assess such damages on the property beneﬁted,

it was decided that the council were not empowered to levy a tax to pay for the

other expenses of opening the street. Reed v. Toledo, 18 Ohio, 161. So a

power to enact by-laws and ordinances to abate and remove nuisances will not

struction of the grants of powers in their charters will assign to
them; thus applying substantially the same rule that is appli~d
to charters of private incorporation. 1
*It must follow that, if in any case a party assumes to [* 196]
deal with a corporation on the supposition that it possesses
powers which it does not, or to contract in any other manner than
is permitted by the charter, he will not be allowed, notwithstanding he may have complied with the :undflrtakiug on his part, to
maintain a snit again~:~t the corporation based upon its unauthorized
action. Even where a party is induced to enter upon work for a

authorize the passing of an ordinance to prevent nuisances, or to impose penalties

for the creation thereof. Rochester v. Collins, 12 Barb. 559. A power to impose

penalties for obstructions to streets would not authorize the like penalties for

encroacluncnls upon streets, where, under the general laws of the State, the

oﬂ'ences are recognized as different and distinct. Grand Rapids v. Hughes, 15

Mich. 5-L. Authority to levy a tax on real and personal estate would not warrant
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an income tax, especially when such a tax is unusual in the State. Mayor of

Savannah v. Hartridge, 8 Geo. 23. It will appear, therefore, that powers near

akin to those expressly conferred are not, for that reason, to be taken by impli-

cation. And see Commonwealth v. Erie and N. E. Railroad Co. 27 Penn. St.

339. This rule has often been applied where authority has been asserted on

behalf of a municipal corporation to loan its credit to corporations formed to

construct works of internal improvement. See La Fayette v. Cox, 5 Ind. 38.

A power to pass ordinances to prohibit the sale or giving away of intoxicating

liquors in certain special cases is an implied exclusion of the power to prohibit

the sale or giving away in other cases. State v. Ferguson, 33 N. H. 424. 1n

Dunham v. Rochester, 5 Cow. 465, it is said: “For all the purposes of juris-

diction corporations are like the inferior courts, and must show the power given

them in every case. If this be wanting, their proceedings must be holden void

whenever they come in question, even collaterally; for they are not judicial and

subject to direct review on certiorari. 2 Kyd on Corp. 10-1-107.” See also

Milhau v. Sharp, 17 Barb. 435, 28 Barb. 228, and 27 N. Y. 611; Douglass v.

Placerville, 18 Cal. 643; Mount Pleasant v. Breeze, 11 Iowa, 399; Hooper v.

Emery, 14 Me. 375; Mayor, &c., of Macon v. Macon and Western R.R. Co.

7 Geo. 224; Hopple v. Brown, 13 Ohio, N. s. 311; Lackland v. Northern Mis-

souri Railroad Co. 31 Mo. 180; Smith v. Morse, 2 Cal. 52-L; Bennett o. Borough

of Birmingham, 31 Penn. St. 15; Tucker v. Virginia City, 4 Nev. 20; Leaven-

worth v. Norton, 1 Kansas, 432; Kyle o. Malin, 8 Ind. 34; Johnson v. Philadel-

phia, 60 Penn. St. 451.
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1 Under a city charter which authorized the common council to appoint asdessors for the purpose of awarding damages to those through whoso property a
street might be opened, and to assess such damages on the property benefited,
it was decided that the council were not empowered to levy a tax to pay for the
other expenses of opening the street. Reed v. Toledo, 18 Ohio, 161. So a
power to enact by-laws and ordinances to abate and remove nuisances will not
authorize the passing of an ordinance to prevtmt nuisances, or to impose penalties
for the creation thereof. Rochester v. Collins, 12 Barb. 059. A power to impose
penalties for obstructions to streets would not authorize the like penalties for
mcroachmC'IIis upon streets, where, under the geDeral laws of the State, the
offences are recognized as different and distinct. Grand Rapids v. Hughes, 15
l\lich. 54. Authority to levy a tax on real and personal estate would not warrant
an income tax, especially when such a tax is unusual in the State. Mayor of
Savannah v. Hartridge, 8 Geo. 23. It will appear, therefore, that powers near
akin to those expressly conferred are not, for that reason, to be taken by implication. And see Commonwealth v. Erie and N. E. Uailroad Co. 27 Penn. St.
339. This rule has often been applied where authority has been asserted on
behalf of a municipal corporation to loan its credit to corporations formed to
construct works of internal improvement. See La Fayette v. Cox, 5 Ind. 38.
A power to pass ordinances to prohibit the sale or giving away of intoxicating
liquors in certain special cases is an implied exclusion of the power to prohibit
the sale or giving away in oth.!r cases. State v. Ferguson, 33 N.H. 4:24. In
Donham t'. Rochester, 5 Cow. 465, it is said: "For all the purposes of jurisdiction corporations are like the inferior courts, and must show the power given
them in every case. If this be wanting, their proceedings must be holden void
whenever they come in question, even collaterally; for they are not judicial and
subject to direct review on ctrtiorari. 2 Kyd on Corp. 1Q.l-107 ." See also
Milhau v. Sharp, 17 Barb. 435, 28 Barb. 228, and 27 N.Y. 611; Douglass t'.
Placerville, 18 Cal. 643; Mount Pleasant v. Breeze, 11 Iowa, 399; Hooper v.
Emery, 14 Me. 375; Mayor, &c., of Macon "· Macon and Western R. H. Co.
7 Geo. 224; Hopple v. Brown, 13 Ohio, N. s. 311; Lack land v. Northern Missouri Railroad Co. 31 Mo. 180; Smith v. Morse, 2 Cal. 524; Bennett v. Borough
of Birmingham, 31 Penn. St. 15; Tucker v. Virginia City, 4 Nev. i!O; Leavenworth"· :Norton, 1 Kansas, 432; Kyle v. Malin, 8 Ind. 34; Johnson"· Philadelphia, 60 Penn. St. 451.
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regard to the existence of facts on which by law the power of the

corporation to enter upon the work depends, these false representa-

tions cannot have the eﬂ"ect to give a power which in the particular

case was wanting, or to validate a contract otherwise void, and

therefore can afford no ground of action against the corporation ;

but every party contracting with it must take notice of any want

of authority which the public records would show} This is the

' The common council of \Villiamsburg had power to open, regulate, grade,

and pave streets, but only upon petition signed by one third of the persons own-

ing lands within the assessment limits. A party entered into a contract with the

corporation for improving a street upon the false representations of the council

that such a petition had been presented. Held, that the provision of the law

corporation by the false representations of corporate officers, in
regard to the existence of facts on which by law the power of the
corporation to enter upon the work depends, these false representations cannot have the effect to give a power which in the particular
case was wanting, or to validate a contract otherwise void, and
therefore can afford no ground of action against the corporation ;
but every party contracting with it must take notice of any want
of authority which the public records would show. 1 This is the

being public, and all the proceedings leading to a determination by the council

to make a particular improvement being matters of record, all persons were

chargeable with notice of the law and such proceedings; and that, notwithstand-

ing the false representations, no action would lie against the city for work done

under the contract. Swift v. Williamsburg, 24 Barb. 427. “ If the plaintiﬂ‘ can

recover on the state of facts he has stated in his complaint, the restrictions and

limitations which the legislature sought to impose upon the powers of the com-

mon council will go for nothing. And yet, these provisions are matters of

substance, and were designed to be of some service to the constituents of the
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common council. They were intended to protect the owners of lands and the

tax-payers of the city, as well against the frauds and impositions of the con-

tractors who might be employed to make local improvements, as against the

illegal acts of the common council themselves in employing the contractors.

But if the plaintiff can recover in this action, of what value or effect are all these

safeguards? If the common council desire to make a local improvement, which

the persons to be beneﬁted thereby, and to be assessed therefor, are unwilling

to have made, the consent of the owners may be wholly dispensed with, accord-

ing to the plaintiﬂ"s theory. The common council have only to represent that

the proper petition has been presented and the proper proceedings have been

taken, to warrant the improvement. They then enter into the contract. The

improvement is made. Those other safeguards for an assessment of the ex-

penses and for reviewing the proceedings may or may not be taken. But when

the work is completed and is to be paid for, it is found that the common council

have no authority to lay any assessment or collect a dollar from the property

beneﬁted by the improvement. The contractor then brings his action, and

recovers from the city the damages he has sustained by the failure of the city to

pay him the contract price. The ground of his action is the falsity of the repre-

sentations made to him. But the truth or falsity of such representations might

have been ascertained by the party with the use of the most ordinary care and

diligence. The existence of the proper petition, and the taking of the necessary

initiatory steps to warrant the improvement, were doubtless referred to and

recited in the contract made with the plaintiff. And he thus became again directly
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1 The co~mon council of Williamsburg had power to open, regulate, grade,
and pave streets, but only upon petition signed by one third of the persons owning lands within the assessment limits. A party entered into a contract with the
corporation for improving a street upon the false representations of the council
that such a petition had been presented. Held, that the provision of the law
being public, and all the proceedings leading to a determination by the council
to make a particular improvement being matters of record, all persons were
chargeable with notice of the law and such proceedings; and that, notwithstanding the false representations, no action would lie against the city for work done
under the contract. Swift v. Williamsburg, 24 Barb. 427. "If the plaintiff can
recover on the state of facts he has stated in his complaint, the restrictions and
limitations which the legislature sought to impose upon the powers of the common council will go for nothing. And yet, these provisions are matters of
substance, and were designed to be of some service to the constituents of the
common council. They were intended to protect the owners of lands and the
tax-payers of the city, as well against the frauds and impositions of the contractors who might be employed to make local improvements, as against the
illegal act.'! of the common council themselves in employing the contractors.
But if the plaintiff can recover in this action, of what value or effect are all these
safeguards? If the common council desire to make a local improvement, which
the persons to be benefited thereby, and to be assessed therefor, are unwilling
to have made, the consent of the owners may be wholly dispensed with, according to the plaintiff's theory. The common council have only to represent that
the proper petition has been presented and the proper proceedings have been
taken, to warrant the improvement. They then enter into the contract. The
improvement is made. Those other safeguards for an assessment of the expenses and for reviewing the proceedings may or may not be taken. But when
the work is completed and is to be paid for, it is found that the common council
have no authority to lay any assessment or collect a dollar from the property
benefited by the improvement. The contractor then brings his action, and
recovers from the city the damages he has sustained by the failure of the city to
pay him the contract price. The ground of his action is the falsity of the representations made to him. But the truth or falsity of such representations might
have been ascertained by the party with the use of the most. ordinary care and
diligence. The existence of the proper petition, and the taking of the necessary
initiatory steps to warrant the improvement, were doubtless referred to and
recited in the contract made with the plaintiff. And he thus became again directly
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general rule, and the cases of unauthorized action which may bind
the corporation are exceptional, and will be referred to further on .
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The origin of many of the corporate privileges asserted and

enjoyed in England is veiled in obscurity, and it is more than

•

probable that in some instances they had no better foundation

• Corporations by Preseription and Implication. [*197]

than an uninterrupted user for a considerable period. In other cases

the regal or baronial grant became lost in the lapse of time, and

the evidence that it had ever existed might rest exclusively upon

reputation, or upon the inference to be drawn from the exercise of

corporate functions. In all these cases it seems to be the law that

the corporate existence may be maintained on the ground of

prescriptvbn; that is to say, the exercise of corporate rights for a

time whereof the memory of man runncth not to the contrary, is

suﬂicient evidence that such rights were once granted by com-

petent authority, and are therefore now exercised by right and not

by usurpation} And this presumption concludes the crown, not-

chargeable with notice of the contents of all these papers. It is obvious that the

restrictions and limitations imposed by the law cannot be thus evaded. The

consent of the parties interested in such improvements cannot be dispensed with;

the responsibility, which the conditions precedent created by the statute impose,
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cannot be thrown off in this manner. For the effect of doing so is to shift en-

tirely the burden of making these local improvements, to relieve those on whom

the law sought to impose the expense, and to throw it on others who are not lia-

ble either in law or morals.”

So where the charter of Detroit provided that no public work should be con-

tracted for or commenced until an assessment had been levied to defray the

expense, and that no such work should be paid or contracted to he paid for,

except out of the proceeds of the tax thus levied, it was held, that the city cor-

poration had no power to make itself responsible for the price of any public

work, and that such work could only be paid for by funds actually in the hands

of the city treasurer, provided for the speciﬁc purpose. Goodrich v. Detroit, 12

Mich. 279.

Parties dealing with the agents or ofﬁcers of municipal corporations must, at

their own peril, take notice of the limits of the powers both of the municipal

corporation, and of those assuming to act on its behalf. State v. Kirkley, 29

Md. 85; Gould v. Sterling, 23 N. Y. 464; Clark v. Des Moines, 19 Iowa, 209;

Veeder v. Lima, 19 Wis. 280.

' Introduction to Willeock on Municipal Corporations; The King v. Mayor,

&c., of Stratford upon Avon, 14 East, 360; Robie v. Sedgwick, 35 Barb. 326.

See Londonderry v. Andover, 28 Vt. 416.

[201]

•

The origin of many of the corporate privileges asserted and
enjoyed in England is veiled in obscurity, and it is more than
probable that in some instances they had no better foundation
than an uninterrupted user for a considerable period. In other cases
the regal or baronial grant became lost in the lapse of time, and
the evidence that it had ever existed might rest exclusively upon
reputntion, or upon the inference to be drawn from the exercise of
corporate functions. In all these cases it seems to be the law that
the corporate existence may be maintained on the ground of
prescription; that is to say, the exercise of corporate rights for a
time whereof the memory of man runneth not to the contrary, is
sufficient evidence that such rights were once granted by competent authority, and are therefore now exercised by right and not
by usurpation. 1 And this presumption concludes the crown, notchargeable with notice of the contents of all these papers. It is obvious that the
restrictions and limitations imposed by the law cannot be thus evaded. The
consent of the parties interested in such improvements cannot be dispensed with;
the respontiibility, which the conditions precedent created by the statute impose,
cannot be thrown off in this manner. }'or the effe~t of doing so is to shift entirely the· burden of making these local improvements, to relieve those on whom
the law sought to impose the expense, and to throw it on otbt•rs who are not liable either in law or morals."
So whe1·c the charter of Detroit provided that no public work should be contracted for or commenced until an assessment had been levied to defray the
expense, and that no such work should be paid or contracted to be paid for,
except out of the proceeds of the tax thus levied, it was held, that the city corporation had no powe1· to make itself responsible for the price of any public
wor~, and that such work could only be paid for by funds actually in the hands
of the city treasurer, provided for the specific purpose. Goodrich v. Detroit, 12
Mich. 279.
Parties dealing with the agents or officers of municipal corporations must, at
their own peril, take notice of the limits of the powers both of the municipal
corporation, and of those assuming to act on its behalf. State v. Kirkley, 29
Md. 85; Gould v. Sterling, 23 N.Y. 464; Clark v. Des Moines, 19 Iowa, 209;
Veeder v. Lima, 19 Wis. 280.
1 Introduction to Willcock on Municipal Corporations; The King v. Mayor,
&c., of Stratford upon A von, 14 East, 360; Robie v. Sedgwick, 35 Barb. 326.
See Londonderry v. Andover, 28 Vt. 416.
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withstanding the maxim that the crown shall lose no rights by

(CH. VIII.

lapse of time. If the right asserted is one of which a grant might

be predicated, a jury is bound to presume a grant from that

prescription} In this particular the claim to a corporate franchise

stands on the same ground as any claim of private right which

requires a grant for its support, and is to be sustained under

the same circumstances of continuous assertion and enjoyment?

And even the grant of a charter by the crown will not preclude

the claim to corporate rights by prescription; for a new charter

does not extinguish old privileges.“

A corporation may also be established upon presumptive evidence

that a charter has been granted within the time of memory. Such

evidence is addressed to a jury, and though not conclusive upon

them, yet if it reasonably satisﬁes their minds, it will justify them

in a verdict ﬁnding the corporate existence. “There is a great

diﬁerence,” says Lord Zllansﬁeld, “between length of time which

operates as a bar to a claim, and that which is only used by way of

evidence. A jury is concluded by length of time which operates

as a bar; as where the statute of limitations is pleaded to a debt;

though the jury is satisﬁed that the debt is still due and unpaid, it

is still a bar. So in the case of presumption. If it be time out of

mind, a jury is bound to preclude the right from that prescription,
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if there could be a legal commencement of the right. But any

written evidence showing that there was a time when the prescrip-

tion did not exist, is an answer to a claim founded on presc.ription.

But length of time used merely by way of evidence may be left to

the consideration of the jury, to be credited or not, and to draw

their inference one way or the other according to circumstances.” 4

The same ruling has been had in several cases in the courts of this

country, where corporate powers had been exercised, but no charter

could be produced. In one of these cases common reputation that

a charter had once existed was allowed to be given to the jury ;.the

court remarking upon the notorious fact that two great ﬁres in the

' Mayor of Hull v. Horner, Cowp. 108, per Lord Maruﬁeld.

' 2 Kent, 277; Angell and Ames on Corp. § 70; 1 Kyd on Corp. 14.

‘ Hadduck‘s Case, T. Raym. 439; The King 1:. Mayor, &c., of Stratford upon

Avon, 14 East, 360; Bow v. Allenstown, 34 N. H. 366. See Jameson v. People,

16 Ill. 259.

‘ Mayor of Hull 1:. Homer, Cowp. 108, 109; citing, among other cases, Bedle

v. Beard, 12 Co. 5. _
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withstanding the maxim that the crown shall lose no rights by
lapse of time. If the right asserted is one of which a grant might
be predicated, a jury is bound to presume a grant from that
prescription. 1 In this particular the claim to a corporate franchise •
stands on the same ground as any claim of private right which
requires a grant for its support, and is to be sustained under
the same circumstances of continuous assertion and enjoyment.2
And even the grant of a charter by the crown will not preclude
the claim to corporate rights by prescription ; for a new charter
does not extinguish old privileges.3
A corporation may also be established upon presumptive evidence
that a charter has been granted within the time of memory. Such
evidence is addressed to a jury, and though not conclusive upon
them, yet if it reasonably satisfies their minds, it will justify them
in a verdict finding the corporate existence. " There is a great
difference," says Lord Mansfield, " between length of time which
operates as a bar to a claim, and that which is only used by way of
evidence. A jury is concluded by length of time which operates
as a bar; as where the statute of limitations is pleaded to a debt;
though the jury is satisfied that the debt is still due and unpaid, it
is still a bar. So in the case or presumption. If it be time out of
mind, a jury is bound to preclude the right from that prescription,
if there could be a legal commencement of the right. But any
written evidence showini that there was a time when the prescription did not exist, is au answer to a claim founded on prescription. ·
But length of time used merely by way of evidence may be left to
tl1e consideration of the jury, to be credited or not, and to draw
their inference one way or t~e other according to circumstances." 4.
The same ruling bas been had in several cases in the courts of this
countt·y, where corporate powers had been exercised, but no charter
could be produced. In one of these cases common reputation that
a charter had once existed was allowed to be given to the jury; .the
court remarking upon the notorious fact that two great fires in the
Mayor of Hull v. Homer, Cowp. 108, per Lord Mansfield.
2 Kent, 277 ; Angell and Ames on Corp. § 70; 1 Kyd on Corp. 14.
a Hadduck's Ca~e. T. Raym. 439; The King v. Mayor, &c., of Stratford upon
Avon, 14 East, 360; Bow v. Allenstown, 34 N.H. 366. See Jameson v. People,
16 Ill. 2h9.
• Mayor of Hull v. Homer, Cowp. 108, 109; citing, among other cases, Bedle
"· Beard, 12 Co. 5.
1

1
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In other cases there was evidence of various acts which could only

lawfully and properly be done by a corporation, covering a period of

thirty, forty, or ﬁfty years, and done with the knowledge of the

State and without question.” The inference of corporate powers,

however, is not one of law; butis to be drawn as a fact by the jury. 3

Wherever a corporation is found to exist by prescription, the

same rule as to construction of powers, we apprehend,

would apply as in other cases. *The presumption as to [*‘ 198]

the powers granted would be limited by the proof of the

usage, and nothing could be taken by intendment which the usage

did not warrant.

Corporations are also said sometimes to exist by implication.,

When that power in the State which can create corporations, grants

to individuals such property, rights, or franchises, or imposes upon

them such burdens, as can only be properly held, enjoyed, con-

tinued, or borne, according to the terms of the grant, by a corporate

entity, the intention to create such corporate entity is to be

presumed, and corporate capacity is held to be conferred so far as

is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the grant or burden. On

this subject it will be suﬁieient for our purpose to refer, to author-

ities named in the note. 4 In these cases the rule of strict
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construction of corporate powers applies with unusual force.

- Municipal By-Laws.

The power of municipal corporations to make by-laws is limited

in various ways.

' Dillingham v. Snow, 5 Mass. 552. And see Bow v. Allenstown, 34 N. H.

351.

' Stockbridge v. West Stockbridge, 12 Mass. 400; New Boston v. Dunbarton,

13 N. H. 409, and 15 N. H. 201; Bow v. Allenstown, 34 N. H. 351; Trott v.

Warren, 2 F airf. 227.

' New Boston v. Dunbarlon, 15 N. H. 201 ; Bow u. Allenstown, 34 N. H. 851 ;

Mayor of Hull v. Homer, 14 East, 102.

‘ Dyer, 400, cited by Lord Kenyon, in Russell v. Men of Devon, 2 T. R. 672,

capital of the colony had destroyed many of the public rccords.l
In other cases there was evidence of various acts which could only
lawfully and properly be done by a corporation, covering a period of
thirty, forty, or fifty years, and done with the knowledge of the
State and without question.2 The inference of corporate powers,
however, is not one of law; but is to be drawn as a fact by the jury. s
Wherever a corporation is found to exist by presm·iption, the
same rule as to construction of powers, we apprehend,
would apply as in other cases. *The presumption as to [* 198]
the powers granted would be limited by the proof of the
usage, and nothing could be taken by intendment which the usage
did not warrant.
Corporations are also said sometimes to exist by implication ..
When that power in the State which can create corporations, grants
to individuals such property, rights, or franchises, or imposes upon
them such burdens, as can only be properly held, enjoyed, continued, or bonte, according to the terms of the grant, by a corporate
entity, the intention to create such corporate entity is to be
presumed, and corporate capacity is held to he conferred so far as
is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the grant or burden. On
this subject it will be sufficient for our purpose to refer to authorities named in the note. 4 In these cases the rule of strict
construction of corporate powers applies with unusual force.

and in 2 Kent, 276; Viner’s Abr. tit. “ Corporation ”; Conservators of River Tone

Municipal By-Lawr.

v. Ash, 10 B. & C. 349; "Same case, ib. 383, citing case of Sutton Hospital, 10

Co. 28; per Kent, Chancellor, in Denton v. Jackson, 2 Johns. Ch. 325; Coburn

0. Ellenwood, 4 N. H. 101; Atkinson v. Bemis, 11 N. H. 46; North Hempstead

v. Hempstead, 2 Wend. 109; Thomas v. Dakin, 22 Wend. 9; per Shaw, Ch. J .,

in Stebbins v. Jennings, 10 Pick. 188.

The power of municipal corporations to make by-laws is limited
in various ways.
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1

Dillingham v. Snow, 5 1\fass. 552.

And see Bow v. Allensto,m, 3! N.H.

351.
1 Stockbri1lge v. West Stockbridge, 12 Mass. 400; New Boston v. Dunbarton,
13 N.H. 409, and 15 N. H. 201; Bow v. Allenstown, 34 N.H. 351; Trott v.
Warren, 2 Fairf. 227.
3 New Boston 11. Dunbarton, 15 N.H. 201; Bow"· Allen11town, 3! N.H. 351;
Mayor of Hull v. Horner, 14 East, 102.
4 Dyer, 400, cited by Lortl Kenyon, in Russell v. Men of Devon, 2 T. R. 6i2,
antl in 2 Kent, 276; Viner's Abr. tit." Corporation"; Conservat{)rs of River Tone
11. Ash, 10 B. & C. 349; 'Same case, ib. 383, citing case of Sutton Hospital, 10
Co. 28; per Kent, Chancellor, in Denton"· Jackson, 2 Johns. Ch. 325; Coburn
11. Ellenwood, 4 N. 11. 101; Atkinson v. Bemis, 11 N. H. 46; North Hempstead
11. Hempstead, 2 Wend. 109; Thomas "· Dakin, 22 Wend. 9; per Shaw, Cb. J.,
in Stebbins 11. Jennings, 10 Pick. 188.
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1. It is controlled by the Constitution of the United States and
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of the State. The restrictions imposed by those instruments, and

which directly limit the legislative power of the State, rest equally

upon all the instruments of government created by the State. If a

State cannot pass an ea: postfacto law, or law impairing the obliga-

tion of contracts, neither can any agency do so which acts under the

State with delegated authority.‘ By-laws, therefore, which in their

operation would be ea; post facto, or violate contracts, are not

within the power of municipal corporations; and whatever the

people by the State constitution have forbidden the State govern-

ment from doing, it cannot do indirectly through the local govern-

ments.

2. Municipal by-laws must also be in harmony with the general

laws of the State, and with the provisions of the municipal charter.

Whenever they come in conﬂict with either, the by-law must give

way.” The charter, however, may expressly or by necessary im-

plication exclude the general laws of the State on any particular

subject, and allow the corporation to pass local laws at discretion,

which may differ from the rule in force elsewhere.“ But in these

cases the control of the State is not excluded if the legislature

afterward see ﬁt to exercise it; nor will conferring a power

[* 199] upon a * corporation to pass by-laws and impose penalties
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. upon any speciﬁed subject necessarily supersede the State

' Angeli and Ames on Corporations, § 332; Stuyvesant v. Mayor, &., of New

York, 7 Cow. 588; Brooklyn Central Railroad Co. u. Brooklyn City Railroad

Co. 32 Barb. 358; Illinois Conference Female College v. Cooper, 25 Ill. 148.

The last was a case where a by-law of an educational corporation was held void,

as violating the obligation of a contract previously entered into by the corpora-

tion in a certiﬁcate of scholarship which it had issued. See also Davenport, &c.,

Co. v. Davenport, 13 Iowa, 229; Saving Society v. Philadelphia, 31 Penn. St.

175; Haywood v. Savannah, 12 Geo. 404.

' Wood v. Brooklyn, 14 Barb. 428; Mayor, &c., of New York v. Nichols, 4

Hill, 209; Petersburg v. Metzker, 21 lll. 205; Southport v. Ogden, 23 Conn.

1. It is controlled by the Constitution of the United States and
of the State. The restrictions imposed by those instruments, and
which directly limit the legislative power of the State, rest equally
upon all the instruments of government created by the State. If a
State cannot pass an ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, neither can any agency do so which acts under the
State with delegated authority. 1 By-laws, therefore, which in their
operation would be ex post facto, or violate contracts, are not
within the power of municipal corporations ; and whatever the
people by the State constitution have forbidden the State government from doing, it cannot do indirectly through the local governments.
2. :Municipal by-laws must also be in harmony with the general
laws of the State, and with the provisions of the municipal charter.
Whenever they come in conflict with either, the by-law must give
way. 2 The charter, however, may expressly or by necessary implication exclude the general laws of the State on any particular
subject, and allow the corporation to pass local laws at discretion,
which may differ from the rule in force clsewhere.3 .But in these
cases the control of the State is not excluded if the legislature
afterward see fit to exercise it; nor will conferring a power
[* 199] upon a *corporation to pass by-laws and impose penalties
upon any specified subject necessarily supersede the S~ate

128; Carr v. St. Louis, 9 Mo. 191; Commonwealth v. Erie and Northeast Rail-

road Co. 27 Penn. St. 339; Burlington o. Kellar, 18 Iowa, 59; Conwell v. O’Brien,

11 Ind. 419. See Baldwin v. Green, 10 1\Io.410; Cowen v. \Vest Troy, 43

Barb. 48; State v. Georgia. Medical Society, 38 Geo. 629; Pestcrﬁeld v. Vickers,

3 Cold. 205. '

' State v. Clarke, 1 Dutch. 54. Peculiar and exceptional regulations may

even be made applicable to particular portions of a city only, and yet not be

invalid. Goddard, Petitioner, 16 Pick. 504; Commonwealth v. Patch, 97 Mass.

222, per Hoar, J . ; St. Louis v. W'eber, 44 Mo. 547.
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1 Angell and Ames on Corporations, § 332; Stuyyesant v.l\layor, &., of New
York, 7 Cow. 588; Brooklyn Central Rllilroad Co. "· Brooklyn City Railroad
Co. l\2 Barb. 358; Illinois Conference Female College v. Cooper, 25 Ill. 148.
The last was a case where a by-law of an educational corporation was held void,
as violating the obligation of a contract previously entered into by the corporation in a certificate of scholarship which it had issued. See also Davenport, &c.,
Co. v. Davenport, 13 Iowa, 229; Saving Society v. Philadelphia, 31 Penn. St.
175; Haywood v. Sannnab, 12 Geo. 40!.
1 Wood v. Brooklyn, 14 Barb. 428; Mayor, &c., of New York v. Nil·hols, 4
Hill, 209; Petersburg "· Metzker, 21 Ill. 205; Southport v. Ogden, 23 Conn.
128; Carr v. St. Louis, 9 1\lo. 191; Commonwealth v. Eric and Northeast Railroad Co. 27 Penn. St. 339; Burlington v. Kellar, 18 Iowa, 59; Conwell v. O'Brien,
11 Ind. 419. See Baldwin v. Green, 10 Mo. 410; Cowen v. \Vest Troy, 43
Barb. 48; State v. Georgia Medical Society, 38 Geo. 629; Pcstcrfield v. Vickers,
3 Cold. 205.
·
3 State v. Clarke, 1 Dutch. 54.
Peculiar and exceptional regulations may
even be made applicable to particular portions of a city only, and yet not be
invalid. Goddard, Petitioner, 16 Pick. 504; Commonwealth v. Patch, 97 l\Iass.
222, per Hoar, J.; St. Louis v. 'Veber, 44 Mo. 547.
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both stand together if not inconsistent.‘ Indeed, the same act

may constitute an offence both against the State and the municipal

corporation, and both may punish it without violation of any

constitutional principle?

1 City of St. Louis v. Bentz, 11 Mo. 61; City of St. Louis v. Caﬁcrata, 24

Mo. 97; Rogers v. Jones, 1 Wend. 261; Levy v. State, 6 Ind. 281 ; Mayor, &c.,

of Mobile v. Allaire, 14 Ala. 400.

' Such is the clear weight of authority, though the decisions are not uniform.

law on the same subject, but the State law and the by-law may
both stand together if not inconsistent. 1 Indeed, the same act
may constitute an offence both against the State and the municipal
corporation, and both may punish it without violation of any
constitutional principle.2

In Rogers v. Jones, 1 Wend. 261, it is said: " But it is said that the by-law of a

town or corporation is void, if the legislature have regulated the subject by law.

If the legislature have passed a law regulating as to certain things in a city, I

apprehend the corporation are not thereby restricted from making further regu-

lations. Cases of this kind have occurred and never been questioned on that

ground; it is only to notice a case or two out of many. The legislature have

imposed a penalty of one dollar for servile labor on Sunday; the corporation of

New York have passed a by-law imposing the penalty of ﬁve dollars for the same

offence. As to storing gunpowder in New York, the legislature and corporation

have each imposed the same penalty. Suits to recover the penalty have been

sustained under the corporation law. It is believed that the ground has never

been taken that there was a conﬂict with the State law. One of these cases is

reported in 12 Johns. 122. The question was open for discussion, but not noticed.”
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In Mayor, &c., of Mobile v. Allaire, 14 Ala. 400, the validity of a municipal by-

law imposing a ﬁne of ﬁfty dollars, for an assault and battery committed within

the city, was brought in question. Collier, Ch. J ., says, p. 403: “ The object of

the power conferred by the charter, and the purpose of the ordinance itself, was,

not to punish for an offence against the criminal justice of the country, but to

provide a mere police regulation, for the enforcement of good order and quiet

within the limits of the corporation. So far as an offence has been committed

against the public peace and morals, the corporate authorities have no power to

inﬂict punishment, and we are not informed that they have attempted to arrogate

it. It is altogether immaterial whether the State tribunal has interfered and

exercised its powers in bringing the defendant before it to answer for the assault

and battery; for whether he has there been punished or acquitted is alike unim-

portant. The offence against the corporation and the State we have seen are

distinguishable and wholly disconnected, and the prosecution at the suit of each

proceeds upon a different hypothesis; the one contemplates the observance of the

peace and good order of the city; the other has a more enlarged object in view,

the maintenance of the peace and dignity of the State.” See also Mayor, &c.,

of Mobile v. Rouse, 8 Ala. 515; Intendant, &c., of Greensboro v. Mullins, 13 Ala

341 ; Mayor, &c., of New York v. Hyatt, 3 E. D. Smith, 156; People v. Stevens,

13 Wend. 341; Blatchley v. Moser, 15 VVend. 215; Levy v. State, 6 Ind. 281;

Ambrose v. State, ib. 351 ; Lawrenceburg v. Wuest, 16 Ind. 387; Amboy v.

Sleeper, 31 Ill. 499; St. Louis 0. Bentz, 11 Mo. 61; St. Louis v. Cafferata, 24

Mo. 94. On the other hand, it was held in State v. Cowan, 29 Mo. 330, that

where a municipal corporation was authorized to take cognizance of and punish
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1 City of St. Louis"· Bentz, 11 Mo. 61; City of St. Louis "· Cafferata, 24
Mo. 97; Rogers o. Jones, 1 Wend. 261; Levy 11. State, 6 Ind. 281; Mayor, &c.,
of Mobile o. Allaire, 14 Ala. 400.
1 Such is the clear weight of authority, though the deci~ions arc not uniform.
In Rogers 11. Jones, 1 Wend. 261, it is said: "But it is said that the by-law of a
town or corporation is void, if the legislature have regulated the subject by law.
If the legislature have passed a law regulating as to certain things in a city, I
apprehend the corporation are not thereby restricted from making further regulations. Cases of this kind have occurred and ne,·er been questioned on that
ground; it is only to notice a case or two out of many. The legislature have
imposed a penalty of one dollar for servile labor on Sunday ; the corporation of
New York have passed a by-law imposing the penalty of five dollars for the same
offence. As to storing gunpowder in New York, the legislature and corporation
have each imposed the same penalty. Suits to recover the penalty have been
sustained under the corporation law. It is believed that the ground has never
been taken that there was a conflict with the State law. One of these cases is
reported in 12 Johns. 122. The question was open for discussion, but not noticed."
ln Mayor, &c., of Mobile"· Allaire, 14 Ala. 400, the validity of a municipal bylaw imposing a fine of fifty dollars, for an assault and battery committed within
the city, was brought in question. Collier, Ch. J., says, p. 403: "The object of
the power conferred by the charter, and the purpose of the ordinance itself, was,
not to punish for an offence against the criminal justice of the country, but to
provide a mere police regulation, for the enforcement of good order and quiet
within the limits of the corporation. So far as an offence has been committed
against the public peace and morals, the corporate authorities have no power to
inflict punishment, and we are not informed that they have attempted to arrogate
it. It is altogether immaterial whether the State tribunal has interfered and
exercised its powers in bringing the defendant before it to answer for the assault
and battery; for whether he has there been punished or acquitted is alike unim·
portant. The offence against the corporation and the State we have scl'n are
distinguishable and wholly diseonnected, and the prosecution at the suit of each
pi'O(.-eeds upon a different hypothesis ; the one contemplates the observance of the
peace and good order of the city; the otht>r has a more enlarged object in view,
the maintenance of the peace and dignity of the State." See also Mayor, &c.,
of Mobile "· Rouse, 8 Ala. 515; Intendant, &c., of Greensboro"· Mullins, 13 Ala
341; :Mayor, &c., of New York 11. Hyatt, 3 E. D. Smith, 156; People 11. Steven~o,
18 Wend. 841 ; Blatchley "· Moser, 16 Wend. 215; Levy 11. State, 6 Ind. 281;
Ambrose "· State, ib. 351; Lawrenceburg "· Wuest, 16 Ind. 387; Amboy "·
Sleeper, 81 Ill. 499; St. Louis "· Bentz, 11 Mo. 61 ; St. Louis "· Cafferata, 24
Mo. 94. On the other hand, it was held in State "· Cowan, 29 Mo. 330, that
where a municipal corporation was authorized to take cognizance of and punish
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[* 200] * 3. Municipal by-laws must also be reasonable. When-
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ever they appear not to be so, the court must, as a matter

of law, declare them void} To render them reasonable, they

an act as an offence against its ordinances which was also an offence against the

general laws of the State. and this power was exercised and the party punished,

he could not afterwards be proceeded against under the State law. “ The con-

[* 200]

• 8. Municipal by-laws must also be reasonable. Whenever they appear not to be so, the court must, as a matter
of law, declare them void. 1 To render them reasonable, they

stitution,” say the court, " forbids that a person shall be twice punished for the

same offence. To hold that a. party can be prosecuted for an act under the State

laws, after he has been punished for the same act by the municipal corporation

within whose limits the act was done, would be to overthrow the power of the

General Assembly to create corporations to aid in the management of the aﬁhirs

of the State. For a power in the State to punish, after a punishment had been

inﬂicted by the corporate authorities, could only ﬁnd a support in the assumption

that all the proceedings on the part of the corporation were null and void. The

circumstance that the municipal authorities have not exclusive jurisdiction over

the acts which constitute offences within their limits does not affect the question.

It is enough that their jurisdiction is not excluded. If it exists,—although it

may be concurrent, —- if it is exercised, it is valid and binding so long as it is a

constitutional principle that no man may be punished twice for the same olfcnce."

This case seems to stand alone, though the case of Slaughter v. People, cited

below, goes still further. Those which hold that the party may be punished under

both the State and the municipal law are within the principle of Fox v. State, 5
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How. 410; Moore v. People, 14 How. 13. In Jefferson City v. Courtmire, 9 Mo.

692, it was held that authority to a municipal corporation to “ regulate the police

ofthe city,” gave it no power to pass an ordinance for the punishment of indict-

able oﬁences. And in Slaughter v. People, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 334, it was held

not competent to punish, under city by-laws, an indictable oﬂence.

VVherc an act is expressly or by implication permitted by the State law, it can-

not be forbidden by the corporation. Thus, the statutes of New York established

certain regulations for the putting up and marking of pressed hay, and provided

that such hay might be sold without deduction for tare, and by the weight as

marked, or any other standard weight that should be agreed upon. It was held

that the city of New York had no power to prohibit under a penalty the sale of

such hay without inspection; this being obviously inconsistent with the statute

which gave a right to scll it‘ its regulations were complied with. Mayor, &c., of

New York v. Nichols, 4 Hill, 209. '

‘ 2 Kyd on Corporations, 107; Davies v. Morgan, 1 Cromp. & J . 587; Cham-

berlain of London v. Compton, 7 D. & R. 597; Clark v. Le Cren, 9 B. & C. 52;

Gosling v. Veley, 12 Q. B. 347 ; Dunham v. Rochester, 5 Cow. 462; Mayor, &c.,

of Memphis v. Winﬁeld, 8 Humph. 707; Hayden v. Noyes, 5 Conn. 391; Ea:

parte Burnett, 30 Ala. 461; Craig v. Burnett, 32 Ala. 728; Austin v. Murray, 16

Pick. 121; Godard, Petitioner, ib. 504; Commonwealth v. \Vorcester, 3 Pick.

462; Commonwealth v. Gas Co. 12 Penn. St. 318; State 0. Jersey City, 5 Dutch.

170; Gallatin v. Bradford, 1 Bibb, 209; Carew v. Western Union Telegraph Co.

15 Mich. 525; St. Louis 1:. \Veber, 44 Mo. 550. But where the question of the

reasonableness of a by-law depends upon evidence, and it relates to a subject

within the jurisdiction of the corporation, the court will presume it to be reason-
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an net as an offence against its ordinances which was also an offence against the
general laws of the State. and this power was exercised and the party punished,
he could uot afterwards be proceeded against under the State law. "The constitution," say the court, " forbids that a person shall be twice punished for the
same offence. To hold that a party can be prosecuted for an act under the State
laws, after he has been punished for the same act by the municipal corporation
within whose limits the act was done, would be to overthrow the power of the
General Assembly to create corporations to aid in the management of the affairs
of the State. For a power in the State to punish, after a punishment had been
inflicted by the corporate authorities, could only find a support in the assumption
that all the proceedings on the part of the corporation were null and void. The
circumstance that the municipal authorities have not exclu!!ive jurisdiction o\"er
the acts which constitute offences within their limits does not affect the question.
It is enough that their jurisdiction is not exrluded. If it exists,- although it
may be concurrent,- if it is exercised, it is valid and binding so long as it is a
constitutional principle that no man may be punished twice for the same offence."
This ca~e seems to stand alone, though the case of Slaughter t'. People, cited
below, goes still further. Those which hold that the party may be punished under
both the State and the municipal law are within the principle of }'ox 1:'. State, 5
How. 410; Moore"· People, 14 How. 18. In Jefferson City v. Courtmire, 91\lo.
692, it was held that authority to a municipal rorporation to "regulate the police
of the city," gave it no power to pass an ordinance for the punisl1ment of indictable offences. And in Slaughter ,, People, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 334, it was held
not competent to puni~h, under city lly-laws, an indictable o1lence.
Where an act is expressly or by implication permitted by the State law, it cannot be forbidden by the corporation. Thus, the statutes of New York established
certain regulations for the putting up and marking of pressed hay, and provided
that such hay might be sold without deduction for tare, and by the weight as
marked, or any other standard weight that should be agreed upon. It was ht·ld
that the city of New York had no power to prohibit under a penalty the sale of
such hay without inspection; this being obviously inconsistent with the statute
which gave a right to sell if its regulations were complied with. Mayor, &c., of
New York"· Nichols, 4 Hill, 209.
1 2 Kyd on Corporations, 107; Davies v. Morgan, 1 Cromp. & J. 587; Chamberlain of London 1:'. Compton, 7 D. & R. 597; Clark v. Le Cren, 9 B. & C. 5:l;
Gosling"· Veley, 12 Q. B. 847; Dunham"· Rochester, 5 Cow. 462; Mayor, &l'.,
of Memphis v. Winfield, 8 Humph. 707; Hayden v. Noyes, 6 Conn. 391; Ez
parte Burnett, SO Ala. 461; Craig 1:'. Burnett, 82 Ala. 728; Austin ".1\Iurray, 16
Pick. 121; Godard, Petitioner, ib. 504; Commonwealth 1:'. Worcester, 8 Pick.
462; Commonwealth v. Gas Co. 12 Penn. St. 318; State"· Jersey City, 5 Dut<:h.
170; Gallatin 1:'. Bradford, 1 Bibb, 209; Carew v. Western Union Telegraph Co.
15 Mich. 525; St. Louis v. Weber, 44 Mo. 550. But where the question of the
reasonableness of a by-law depends upon evidence, and it relates to a snbjt'ct
wit.hin t.he jurisdiction of the corporation, the court will presume it to be reason-
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should tend in some degree to the accomplishment of the
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objects for which the corporation* was created and its [* 201]

powers conferred. A by-law, that persons chosen annu-

ally as stewards of the Society of Scriveners should furnish a

dinner on election day to the freeinen of the soc'iety,—the free-

men not being the electors nor required to attend, and the office

of steward being for no other purpose but that of giving the

dinner,—was held not connected with the business of the cor-

poration, and not tending to promote its objects, and therefore

unreasonable and void.1 And where a statute permitted a mu-

nicipal corporation to license the sale of intoxicating drinks and

to charge a license fee therefor, a by-law requiring the payment

of a license fee of one thousand dollars was held void as not

advancing the purpose of the law, but as being in its nature

prohibitory.” And if a corporation has power to prohibit the

carrying on of dangerous occupations within its limits, a by-law

which should permit one person to carry on such an occupation

and prohibit another, who had an equal right, from pursuing the

same business; or which should allow the business to be carried

on in existing buildings, but prohibit the erection of others for it,

would be unreasonable.” And a right to license an employment

does not imply a right to charge a license fee therefor with a view
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to revenue, unless such seems to be the manifest purpose of the

power; but the authority of the corporation will be limited to

such a charge for the license as will cover the necessary expenses of

issuing it, and the additional labor of officers and other expenses

thereby imposed. Alicense is issued under the police power;

but the exactiou of a license fee with a view to revenue would be

an exercise of the power of taxation ; and the charter must plainly

show an intent to confer that power, or the municipal corporation

cannot assume it.‘

able until the contrary is shown. Commonwealth v. Patch, 97 Mass. 221. And

see St. Louis v. Weber, 44 Mo. 547.

‘ Society of Scriveners v. Brooking, 3 Q. B. 95.

’ Ea: parts Burnett, 30 Ala. 461; Craig v. Burnett, 32 Ala. 728.

i‘ Mayor, &c., of Hudson v. Thorno, 7 Paige, 261. A power to prevent and

regulate the carrying on of manufactures dangerous in causing or promoting ﬁres

does not authorize an ordinance prohibiting the erection of wooden buildings

within the city, or to limit the size of buildings which individuals shall be per-

mitted to erect on their own premises. Ibid.

‘ State v. Roberts. 11 Gill & J . 506; Mays v. Cincinnati, 1 Ohio, N. s. 268;
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should tend in some degree to the accomplishment of the
objects for which the corporation • was created and its [* 201]
powers conferred. A by-law, that persons chosen annually as stewards of the Society of Scriveners should furnish a
dinner on election day to the freemen of the society,- the freemen not being the electors nor required to attend, and the office
of steward being for no other purpose but that of giving the
dinner,- was held not connected with the business of the corporation, and not tending to promote its objects, and therefore
unreasonable and void. 1 And where a statute permitted a municipal corporation to license the sale of intoxicating drinks and
to charge a license fee therefor, a by-law requiring the payment
of a license fee of one thousand dollars was held void as not
advancing the purpose of the law, but as being in its nature
prohibitory.2 And if a corporation has power to prohibit the
carrying on of dangerous occupations within its limits, a by-law
which should permit one person to carry on such an occupation
and prohibit another, who had an equal right, from pursuing tho
same business ; or which should allow the business to be carried
on in existing buildings, but prohibit the erection of others for it,
would be unreasonable.8 And a right to license an employment
does not imply a right to charge a license feo therefor with a view
to revenue, unless such seems to be the manifest purpose of the
power ; but the auth_ority of the corporation will be limited to
such a charge for the license as will cover tho necessary expenses of
issuing it, and the additional labor of officers and other expenses
thereby imposed. A license is issued under the police power ;
but the exaction of a license fee with a view to revenue would be
an exercise of the power of taxation ; and the charter must plainly
show an intent to confer that power, or the municipal corporation
cannot assume it. 4
able until the contrary is Hhown. Commonwealth v. Patch, 97 Mass. 221. And
see St. Louis v. Weber, 44 1\lo. 5-17.
1 Society of Scriveners v. Brooking, 3 Q. B. 9ll.
' Ex parte Burnett, 30 Ala. 461; Craig v. Burnett, 32 Ala. 728.
3 Mayor, &c., of Hudson v. Thorne, 7 Paige, 261.
A power to prevent and
rt>gulate the carrying on of manufactures Jangerous in causing or promoting fires
does not authorize an ordinance prohibiting the erection of wooden buildings
within the city, or to limit the size of buildings which individuals shall be permitted to erect on their own premise11. Ibid.
4 State v. Roberts. 11 Gill & J. 506; Mays v. Cincinnati, 1 Ohio, N. s. 268;
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[* 202] A by-law to be reasonable should be certain. If it aﬂixes
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a penalty for its violation, it would seem that such penalty

should be a ﬁxed and certain sum, and not left to the discretion

of the oﬂicer or court which is to impose it on conviction ; though

a by-law imposing a penalty not exceeding a certain sum has been

held not to be void for uncertainty}

So a by-law to be reasonable should be in harmony with the

general principles of the common law. If it is in general re-

straint of trade,—like the by-law that no person shall exercise

the art of painter in the city of London, not being free of the

company of pa.inters,—it will be void on this ground.“ So it

has been held that a by-law of a bank, that all payments made

or received by the bank must be examined at the time, and

mistakes corrected before the dealer leaves, was unreasonable and

invalid, and that a recovery might be had against the bank for

an over-payment discovered afterwards, notwithstanding the by-

law.“ So a by-law of a town, which, under pretence of regulating

Cincinnati v. Bryson, 15 Ohio, 625; Freeholders v. Barber, 2 Halst. 64; Kip v.

Paterson, 2 Dutch. 298; Bennett v. Borough of Birmingham, 31 Penn. St. 15;

Commonwealth u. Stodder, 2 Cush. 562; Chilvers v. People, 11 Mich. 43; Mayor,

&c., of Mobile v. Yuille, 3 Ala. 144; Johnson v. Philadelphia, 60 Penn. St. 451.

Nevertheless, the courts will not inquire very closely into the expense of a license
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with a view to adjudge it a tax, where it does not appear to be unreasonable in

amount in view of its purpose as a regulation. Ash v. People, 11 Mich. 347;

Johnson v. Philadelphia, 60 Penn. St. 451. And in some cases it has been held

that license fees might be imposed under the police power with a view to operate

[* 202] A by-law to

~e

reasonable should be certain. If it affixes
a penalty for its violation, it would seem that such penalty
should be a fixed and certain sum, and not left to the discretion
of the officer or court which is to impose it on conviction; though
a by-law imposing a penalty not exceeding a certain sum bas been
held not to be void for uncertainty.1
So a by-law to be reasonable should be in harmony with the
general principles of the common law. It' it is in general restraint of trade,-like the by-law that no person shall exercise
the art of painter in the city of London, not being free of the
company of painters,- it will be void on this ground.2 So it
has been held that a by-law of a bank, that all payments made
or received by the bank must be examined at the time, and
mistakes corrected before the dealer leaves, was unreasonable and
invalid, and that a recovery might be had against the bank for
an over-payment discovered afterwards, notwithstanding the bylaw.8 So a by-law of a town, which, under pretence of regulating

as a restriction upon the business or thing licensed. Carter v. Dow, 16 Wis. 299;

Tenney v. Lenz, ib. 567. But in such cases, where the right to impose such

license fees can be fairly deduced from the charter, it would perhaps be safer and

less liable to lead to confusion and diﬁiculty to refer the corporate authority to

the taxing power, rather than exclusively to the power of regulation. See Dun-

ham v. Trustees of Rochester, 5 Cow. 462, upon the extent of the police power.

Fees which are imposed under the inspection laws of the State are akin to license

fees, and if exacted not for revenue, but to meet the expenses of regulation, are

to be referred to the police power. Cincinnati Gas Light Co. 0. State, 18 Ohio,

N. s. 243.

‘ Mayor, &c., of Huntsville v. Phelps, 27 Ala. 55, overruling Mayor, &c., of

Mobile v. Yuille, 3 Ala. 144. And see Piper v. Chappell, 14 M. & W. 624.

_’ Clark v. Le Cren, 9 B. & C. 52; Chamberlain of London v. Compton, 7 D.

& R. 597. But a by-law is not void, as in restraint of trade, which requires

loaves of bread baked for sale to be of speciﬁed weight and properly stamped,

or which requires bakers to be licensed. Mayor, &c., of Mobile v. Yuille, 3

Ala. 137.

' Mechanics and Farmers Bank v. Smith, 19 Johns. 115; Gallatin v. Brad-
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Cincinnati v. Bryson, 15 Ohio, 625; Freeholders v. Barber, 2 Haist. 64; Kip v.
Paterson, 2 Dutch. 298; Bennett v. Borough of Birmingham, 31 Peun. St. 15;
Commonwealth v. Stodder, 2 Cush. 562; Chilvers "· People, 11 Mich. 43; Mayor,
&c., of Mobile v. Yuille, 3 Ala. 144; Johnson v. Philadelphia, 60 Penn. St. 451.
Nevertheless, the courts will not inquire very closely into the expense of a license
with a view to adjudge it a tax, where it does not appear to be unreasonable in
amount in view of its purpose as a regulation. Ash v. People, 11 Mich. 3-!7;
Johnson v. Philadelphia, 60 Penn. St. 451. And in some cases it has been held
that license fees might be imposed under the police power with a view to operate
as a restriction upon the business or thing licensed. Carter v. Dow, 16 Wis. 299;
Tenney v. Lenz, ib. 567. But in such cases, where the right to impose such
license fees can be fairly deduced from the charter, it would perhaps be safer and
less liable to lead to confusion and difficulty to refer the corporate authority to
the taxing power, rather than exclusively to the power of regulation. See Dunham v. Trustees of Rochester, 5 Cow. 462, upon the extent of the police power.
Fees which are imposed undtlr the inspection laws of the State are akin to license
fees, and if exacted not for revenue, but to meet the expenses of regulation, are
to be referred to the police power. Cincinnati Gas Light Co. v. State, 18 Ohio,
N. 8. 243.
1 Mayor, &c., of Huntsville v. Phelps, 27 Ala. 55, overruling Mayor, &c., of
Mobile v. Yuille, 3 Ala. 144. And see Piper v. Chappell, 14M. & W. 624.
1 Clark"· Le Cren, 9 B. & C. 52; Chamberlain of London v. Compton, 7 D.
&.R. 597. But a by-law is not ' 'oid, as in restraint of trade, which requires
loaves of bread baked for sale to be of specified weight and properly stamped,
or which requires bakers to be licensed. Mayor, &c., of Mobile v. Yuille, 3
Ala. 137.
a Mechanics and Farmers Bank v. Smith, 19 Johns. 115; Gallatin v. Brad-
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the ﬁshery of clams and oysters within its limits, prohibits all
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persons except the inhabitants of the town from taking shell-ﬁsh in

a navigable river, is void as in contravention of common

right.‘ ‘And for like reasons a by-law is void which [* 203]

abridges the rights and privileges conferred by the general

laws of the State, unless express authority therefor can be pointed

out in the corporate charter.” And if it assumes to be a police

regulation, but deprives a party of the use of his property without

regard to the public good, under the pretence of the preservation

of health, when it is manifest that such is not the object and

purpose of the regulation, it will be set aside as ~a clear and

direct infringement of the right of property without any com-

pensating advantages.“

ford, 1 Bibb, 209. Although these are cases of private corporations, they are

cited here because the rules governing the authority to make by-laws are the

same with both classes of corporations.

' Hayden v. Noyes, 5 Conn. 891. As it had been previously held that every

person has a common-law right to ﬁsh in a navigable river or arm of the sea,

until by some legal mode of appropriation this common right was extinguished,

—Peck v. Lockwood, 5 Day, 22, —the by-law in effect deprived every citizen,

the fishery of clams and oysters within its limits, prohibits all
persons except the inhabitants of the town from taking shell-fish in
a navigable river, is void as in contravention of common
right. 1 *And for like reasons a by-law is void which [* 203]
abridges the rights and privileges conferred by the general
laws of the State, unless express authority therefor can be pointed
out in the corporate charter.2 And if it assumes to be a police
regulation, but deprives a party of the use of his property without
regard to the public good, under the pretence of the preservation
of health, wheu it is manifest that such is not the object and
purpose of the regulation, it will be set aside as -a clear and
direct infringement of the right of property without any compensating advantnges.s

except residents of the township, of rights which were vested, so far as from the

nature of the case a right could be vested. That a right to regulate does not
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include a right to prohibit, see also Ex parte Burnett, 30 Ala. 461; Austin v.

Murray, 16 Pick. 121. And see Milhau v. Sharp, 17 Barb. 435, 28 Barb. 228,

and 27 N. Y. 611.

’ Dunham v. Trustees of Rochester, 5 Cow. 462; Mayor, &c., of New York

v. Nichols, 4 Hill, 209.

‘ By a by-law of the town of Charlestown all persons were prohibited, with-

out license from the selectmen, from burying any dead body brought into town

on any part of their own premises or elsewhere within the town. By the

court, Wilde, J .: “ A by-law to be valid must be reasonable; it must be leyi,

jidei, ralioni consona. Now if this regulation or prohibition had been limited

to the populous part of the town, and were made in good faith for the purpose of

preserving the health of the inhabitants, which may be in some degree exposed

to danger by the allowance of interments in the midst of a dense population, it

would have been a very reasonable regulation. But it cannot be pretended that

this by-law was made for the preservation of the health of the inhabitants. Its

restraints extend many miles into the country, to the utmost limits of the town.

Now such an unnecessary restraint upon the right of interring the dead we think

essentially unreasonable. If Charlestown may lawfully make such a by-law as

this, all the towns adjoining Boston may impose similar restraints, and conse-

quently all those who die in Boston must of necessity be interred within the

precincts of the city. That this would be prejudicial to the health of the inhab-

itants, especially in the hot seasons of the year, and when epidemic diseases

[215]

ford, 1 Bibb, 200. Although these are cases of private corporations, they are
cited here because the rules governing the authority to make by-laws are the
same with both classes of corporations.
1 Hsyden "· Noyes, 5 Conn. S!H.
As it had been previously held that every
person has a common-law right to fish in a navigable rh·er or arm of the sea,
until by some legal mode of appropriatioft this common right was extinguished,
-Peck "· Lockwood, 6 Day, 22,- thll by-law in effect deprived every citizen,
except residents of the township, of .rigl1ts which were vested, so far as from the
nature of the case a right could be vested. That a right to reg11late does not
include a right to prohibit, see also Ex parte Burnett, 30 Ala. 461; Austin "·
Murray, 16 Pick. 121. And see :Milhau v. Sharp, 17 Barb. 435, 28 Barb. 228,
and 27 N.Y. 611.
1 Dunham v. Trustees of Rochester, 5 Cow. 462; M:ayor, &c., of New York
"· Nichols, 4 Hill, 209.
~ By a by-law of the town of Charlestown all persons were prohibited, without lieense from the selectmen, from burying any dead body brought into town
on any part of their own premises or elsewhere within the town. By the
court, Wilde, J.: "A by-law to be valid must be reasonable; it must be legi,
fidei, rationi t'onsona. Now if this regulation or prohibition had been limited
to the populous part of the town, and were made in good faith for the purpose of
preserving the health of the inhabitants, which may be in some degree exposed
to danger by the allowance of interments in the midst of a dense population, it
would have been a very reasonable regulation. But it cannot be pretended that
this by-law was made for the preservation of the health of the inhabitants. Its
restraints extend many miles into the country, to the utmost limits of the town.
Now such an unnecessary restraint upon the right of interring the dead we think
essentially unreasonable. If Charlestown may lawfully make such a by-law as
this, all the towns adjoining Boston may impose similar restraints, and consequently all those who die in ll~ston must of necessity be interred within the
precincts of the city. That this would be prejudicial to the health of the inhabitants, especially in the hot seasons of the year, aud when epidemic diseases
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[* 204] ‘Delegation of Municipal Powers.
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Another and very important limitation which rests upon muni-

cipal powers is, that they shall be executed by the municipality

prevail, seems to be a well-established opinion. Interments, therefore, in cities

and large populous towns, ought to be disconntenanced, and no obstacles should

• Delegfltion of Municipal Power1.

[•204]

be permitted to the establishment of cemeteries at suitable places in the vicinity.

The by-law in question is therefore an unreasonable restraint upon many of the

citizens of Boston, who are desirous of burying their dead without the city, and

for that reason void. And this by-law would seem to be void for another reason.

Another and very important limitation which rests upon municipal powers is, that they shall be executed by the municipality

A by-law for the total restraint of one‘s right is void; as if a man be barred of

the use of his land. Com. Dig. By-Law, c. 4. The land where the bodies

were interred was the land of the Catholic Bishop of Boston, purchased by him

in 1830, and then consecrated as a Catholic burying-ground, and has ever since

been used as such, for the interment of Catholics dying in Charlestown and

Boston. It is true the by-law does not operate to the total restraint or depriva-

tion of the bishop’s right, but it is a total restraint of the right of the burying

the dead in Boston, for which a part‘of the burying-ground was appropriated.

The illegality of the by-law is the same, whether it may deprive one of the use

of a part or the whole of his property; no one can be so deprived, unless the

public good requires it. And the law will not allow the right of private property

to be invaded under the guise of a police regulation for the preservation of

health, when it is manifest that such is not the object and purpose of the regula-
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tion. Now we think this is manifest from the case stated in regard to the by-law

in question. It is a clear and direct infringement of the right of property,

without any compensating advantages, and not a police regulation made in good

faith for the preservation of health. It interdicts, or in its operation necessarily

intercepts, the sacred use to which the Catholic burying-ground was appropriated

and consecrated, according to the forms of the Catholic religion; and such an

interference, we are constrained to say, is wholly unauthorized and most unreason-

able.” Austin v. Murray, 16 Pick. 125. So in VVreford v. People, 14 Mich. 41,

the common council of Detroit, under a power granted by statute to compel the

owners and occupants of slaughter-houses to cleanse and abate them whenever

necessary for the health of the inhabitants, assumed to pass an ordinance alto-

gether prohibiting the slaughtering of animals within certain limits in the city;

and it was held void. See further, State v. Jersey City, 5 Dutch. 170. Upon

the whole subject of municipal by-laws, see Angcll and Ames on Corp. c. 10;

Grant on Corp. 76 at seq. See also Redﬁcld on Railways (lid ed.), Vol. I. p. 88.

The subject of the reasonableness of by-laws was considered at some length

in People v. Medical Society of Erie, 24 Barb. 570, and Same v. Same, 32 N. Y.

187. In the ﬁrst case, it was held that a regulation subjecting a member of the

County Medical Society to expulsion, for charging less than the established fees,

was unreasonable and void. In the second, it was decided that where a party

had the prescribed qualiﬁcations for admission to the society, he could not be

refused admission, on the ground of his having previous to that time failed to
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prevail, seems to be a well-established opinion. Interments, therefore, in cities
and large populous towns, ought to be di~cotmtenanced, and no obstacles should
be permitted to the establishment of cemeteries at suitable places in the vicinity.
The by-law in question is therefore an unreasonable restraint upon many of the
citizens of Boston, who are desirous of burying their dead without the city, a~d ·
for that rea~on void. And this by-law would seem to be void for another reason.
A by-law for the total restraint of one's right is void; 811 if a man be barred of
the use of his land. Com. Dig. By-Law, c. 4. The land where the bodies
Wl're interred was tho land of the Catholic Bishop of Boston, purchased by him
in 1830, and then consecrated as a Catholic burying-ground, and has ever since
bet-n used as such, for the interment of Catholics dying in Charlestown and
Boston. It is true the by-law does not operate to the total re~traint or deprivation of the bishop's right, but it is a total restraint of the right of the burying
the dead in Boston, for which a part.of the burying-ground was appropriated.
The illegality of the by-law is the same, whether it may deprive one of the nse
of a part or the whole of his property; no one can be so deprived, unless the
public good requires it. And the law will not allow the right of private property
to be invaded under the guise of a police regulation for the preservation of
health, when it is manifest that such is not the object and purpose of the regulation. Now we think this is manifest from the case stated in regard to the by-law
in question. It is a clear and direct infringement of the right of property,
without any compensating advantages, ami not a police regulation made in good
faith for the preservation of health. It interdicts, or in its operation necessarily
inh'rcepts, the sacred use to which the Catholic burying-ground was appropriated
and consecrated, according to the forms of the Catholic religion ; and such an
interference, we are constrained to say, is wholly unauthorized and most unreasonable." Austin"· Murray, 16 Pick. 125. So in '\Vreford "·People, 141\Iich. 41,
the common coundl of Detroit, under a power granted by statute to compel the
owners arid occupants of slaughter-houses to cleanse and abate them whenever
necessary for the health of the inhabitants, assumed to pass an ordinance altogether prohibiting the slaughtering of animals within certain limits in the city ;
and it was held void. See further, State "· Jersey City, 5 Dutch. 170. Upon
the whole subject of municipal by-laws, see Angdl and Ames on Corp. c. 10;
Grant on Corp. 76 et seq. See also Redfidd on Railways (3d ed.), Vol. I. p. 88.
The subject of the reasonableness of by-laws was considered at some length
in People ".Medical Societyof Erie, 24 Barb. 570, and Same"· Same, 32N. Y.
187. In the first case, it was held that a regulation subjecting a member of the
County Medical Society to expulsion, for charging less than the established fees,
was unreasonable and void. In the second, it was decided that where a party
had the prescribed qualifications for admission to the society, he could not be
refused admist~ion, on the ground of his having previous to that time failed to
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itself, or by such agencies or otﬁcers as the statute has pointed
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out. So far as its functions are legislative, they rest in the dis-

cretion and judgment of the municipal body iutrusted with them,

and that body cannot refer the exercise of the power to the dis-

cretion and judgment of its subordinates or of any other author-

ity. So strictly is this rule applied, that when a city charter

authorized the common council of the city to make by-laws and

ordinances ordering and directing any of the streets to be pitched,

levelled, paved, ﬂagged, &c., or for the altering or repair-

ing the * same, “ within such time and in such manner as [* 205]

they may prescribe under the superintendence and direction

of the city superintendent,” and the common council passed an

ordinance directing a certain street to be pitched, levelled, and

ﬂagged, “in such manner as the city superintendent, under the

direction of the committee on roads of the common council, shall

direct and require,” the ordinance was held void, because it left

to the city superintendent and the committee of the common

council the decision which, under the law, must be made by the

council itself. The trust was an important and delicate one, as

the expenses of the improvement were, by the statute, to be paid

by the owners of the property in front of which it was made. It

was in effect a power of taxation, which is the exercise of sover-
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eign authority; and nothing short of the most positive and explicit

language could justify the court in holding that the legislature

intended to confer such a power on a city oﬂicer or committee.

The statute in question not only contained no such language,

but, on the contrary, clearly expressed the intention of conﬁding

the exercise of this power to the common council, the members

of which were elected by and responsible to those whose property

they were thus allowed to tax.‘

This restriction, it will be perceived, is the same which rests

upon the legislative power of the State, and it springs from the

observe the code of medical ethics prescribed by the society for its members.

Municipal by-laws may impose penalties on parties guilty of a violation thereof,

but they cannot impose forfeiture of property or rights, without express legis-

lative authority. State v. Ferguson, 33 N. H. 430; Phillips v. Allen, 41 Penn.

St. 481. See also Kirk 1:. Nowell, 1 T. R. 124; Hart v. Albany, 9 Wend.

688.

' Thompson v. Schermerhorn, 6 N. Y. 92. See also Smith v. Morse, 2 Cal.

524; Oakland v. Carpenticr, 13 Cal. 540; 1Vhyte v. Nashville, 2 Swan, 364;

East St. Louis v. Wehrung, '50 Ill. 28.
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itself, or by such agencies or officers as the statuto has pointed
out. So far as its functions are legislative, they rest in the discretion and judgment of the municipal body intrusted with them,
and that body cannot refer the exercise of the power to the discretion and judgment of its subordinates or of any other authority. So strictly is this rule applied, that when a city charter
authorized the common council of the city to make hy-laws and
ordinances ordering and directing any of the streets to be pitched,
levelled, paved, flagged, &c., or for the altering o1· repairing the *same," within such time and in such manner as [* 205]
they may prescribe under the superintendence and direction
of the city superintendent," and the common council passed an
ordinance directing a certain street to be pitched, levelled, and
flagged, " in such manner as the city superintendent, under the
direction of the committee on roads of the common council, shall
dit·ect and require," the ordinance was held void, because it left
to the city supel'intendent and the committee of the common
council the decision which, under the law, must be made by the
council itself. The trust was an important and delicate one, as
the expenses of tho improvement were, by the statute, to be paid
by the owners of the property in front of which it was made. It
was in effect a power of taxation, which is the exercise of sovereign authority ; and nothing short of the most positive and explicit
language could justify the court in holding that the legislature
intended to confer such a power on a city officer or committee.
The statute in question not only contained no such language,
but, on the contrary, clearly expressed the intention of confiding
the exercise of this power to the common council, the members
of which were elected by and responsible to those whose property
they were thus allowed to tax. 1
This restriction, it will be perceived, is the same which rests
upon the legislative power of the State, and it springs from the
observe the code of medical ethics prescribed by the society for its members.
Municipal by-laws may impose penalties on parties guilty of a \·iolation thereof,
but they cannot impose forfeiture of property or rights, without express legislative authority. State"· :Ferguson, 33 N.H. 430; Phillips v. Allen, 41 P~nn.
St. 481. See also Kirk.,, Nowell, 1 T. R. 124; Hart 11. Albany, 9 Wend.
~.
1 Thompson v. Schermerhorn, 6 N.Y. 92.
See also Smith 11. Morse, 2 Cal.
624 i Oakland "· Carpentier, 13 Cal. MO i 'Whyte 11. Ntl.Shvillc, 2 Swan, 364 i
East St. Louis 11. W ehrung, bO Ill. 28.
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same reasons. The people in the one case in creating the legis-
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[CH. VIII•

lative department, and the legislature in the other in conferring

the corporate powers, have selected the depository of the power

which they have designed should be exercised, and in conﬁding it

to such depository have impliedly prohibited its being exercised

by any other agency. A trust created for any public purpose

cannot be assignable at the will of the trustee.‘

[* 206] * Equally incumbent upon the State legislature and these

municipal bodies is the restriction that they shall adopt no

irrepealable legislation. No legislative body can so part with its

powers by any proceeding as not to be able to continue the

exercise of them. It can and should exercise them again and

again, as often as the public interests require.” Such a body has

no power, even by contract, to control and embarrass its legislative

powers and duties. On this ground it has been held, that a grant

of land by a municipal corporation, for the purposes of a cemetery,

' The charter of Washington gave the corporation authority “to authorize

the drawing of lotteries, for effecting any important improvement in the city,

which the ordinary funds or revenue thereof will not accomplish; provided that

the amount raised in each year shall not exceed ten thousand dollars. And

provided also that the object for which the money is intended to be raised shall

be ﬁrst submitted to the President of the United States, and shall be approved
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by him.” Per Marshall, Ch. J ., speaking of this authority: “ There is great

weight in the argument that it is a trust, and an important trust, conﬁded to

same reasons. The people in the one case in creating the legislative department, and the legislature in the other in conferring
the corporate powers, have selected the depository of the power
which they have designed should be exercised, and in confiding it
to such depository have impliedly prohibited its being exercised
by any other agency. A trust created for any public purpose
cannot be assignable at the will of the trustee.1
[• 206] • Equally incumbent upon the State legislature and these
municipal bodies is the restriction that they shall adopt no
irrepealable legislation. No legislative body can so part with its
powers by any proceeding as not to be able to continue the
exercise of them. It can and should exercise them again and
again, as often as the public interests require. 2 Such a body has
no power, even by contract, to control and embarrass its legislative
powers and duties. On this ground it has been held, that a grant
of land by a municipal corporation, for the purposes of a cemetery,

the corporation itself, for the purpose of elfecting important improvements in the

city, and ought, therefore, to be executed under the immediate authority and

inspection of the corporation. It is reasonable to suppose that Congress, when

granting a power to authorize gaming, would feel some solicitude respecting the

fairness with which the_ power should be used, and would take as many precau-

tions against its abuse as was compatible with its beneﬁcial exercise. Accordingly,

we ﬁnd a limitation upon the amount to be raised, and on the object. for which

the lottery may be authorized. It is to be for any important improvement in the

city, which the ordinary funds or revenue thereof will not accomplish; and it is

subjected to the judgment of the President of the United States. The power

thus cautiously granted is deposited with the corporation itself, without an _indi-

cation that it is assignable. It is to be exercised like other corporate powers,

by the agents of the corporation under its control. While it remains where

Congress has placed it, the character of the corporation affords some security

against its ahuse,—-some security that no other mischief will result from it

than is inseparable from the thing itself. But if the management, control, and

responsibility may be transferred to any adventurer who will purchase, all the

security for fairness which is furnished by character and responsibility is lost.”

Clark v. Washington, 12 Wheat. 54.

’ East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Co. 10 How. 535.

[218]

1 The charter of W ashingt{)n gave the corporation authority " to authorize
the dt·awing of lotteries, for effecting any important improvement in the city,
whid1 the ordinary funds or revenue thereof will not accomplish; provided that
the amount raised in each year shall not exceed ten thousand dollars. And
provided also that the object for which the money is intended to be raised shall
be first submitted to the President of the United States, and shall be approved
by him." Per Marshall, Ch. J., speaking of this authority: "There is great
weight in the argument that it is a trust, and an important trust, confided to
the corporation itself, for the purpose of cff~Jcting important improvements in the
city, and ought, therefore, to be executed under the immediate authority and
inspection of the corporation. It is reasonable to suppose that Congress, when
granting a power to authorize gaming, would feel some solicitude respecting the
fairness with which the. power should be •Jsed, and would take as many precautions against its abuse as was compatible with its beneficial exerl'ise. Accordingly,
we find a limitation upon the amount to be raised, and on the object. for which
the lott~Jry may be authorized. It is .to be for any important improvement in the
city, which the ordinary funds or revenue thereof will not accomplish; and it is
subjected to the judgment of the President of the United States. The power
thus cautiously granted is deposited with the corporation itself, without an .indication that it is assignable. It is to be exercised like other corporate powers,
by the agents of the corporation under its control. While it remains where
Congress has placed it, the character of the corporation affords some security
against its abuse, -some security that no other mischief will result from it
than is inseparable from the thing itself. But if the management, control, and
responsibility may be transferred to any adventurer who will purchase, all the
security for fairness which is furnished by character and responsibility is lost."
Clark v. Washington, 12 Wheat. M.
1 East Hartford tl. Hartford Bridge Co. 10 How. 535.
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with acovenant for quiet enjoyment by the grantee, could not
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preclude the corporation, in the exercise of its police powers,

from prohibiting any further use of the land for cemetery purposes,

when the advance of population threatened to make such use a

public nuisance} So when “ a lot is granted as a place of deposit

for gunpowder, or other purpose innocent in itself at the time ;

it is devoted to that purpose till, in the progress of population, it

becomes dangerous to the property, the safety, or the lives of

hundreds ; it cannot be that the mere form of the grant, because

the parties choose to make it particular instead of general and

absolute, should prevent the use to which it is limited being

regarded and treated as a nuisance, when it becomes so in fact.

In this way the legislative powers essential to the comfort and

preservation of populous communities might be frittered

away into ‘perfect insigniﬁcance. To allow rights thus [‘* 207]

to be parcelled out and secured beyond control would ﬁx

a principle by which our cities and villages might be broken up.

Nuisances might and undoubtedly would be multiplied to an

intolerable extent.” 2

And on the same ground it is held,that a municipal corporation,

having power to establish, make, grade, and improve streets,

does not, by once establishing the grade, preclude itself from

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:20 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105011581
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

changing it as the public needs or interest may seem to require,

notwithstanding the incidental injury which must result to those

individuals who have erected buildings with reference to the

ﬁrst grade.“ S0 a corporation having power under the charter to

establish and regulate streets cannot under this authority, without

explicit legislative consent, permit individuals to lay down a

' Brick Presbyterian Church v. City of New York, 5 Cow. 540; New York

v. Second Avenue R. R. Co. 32 N. Y. 261.

' Coats v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 7 Cow. 605. See also Davis v. Mayor,

&c., of New York, 14 N. Y. 506; Attorney-General v. Mayor, &c., of New

York, 3 Ducr, 119; State v. Graves, 19 Md. 51; Gozzle v. Georgetown, 6

Wheat. 597.

' Callender v. Marsh, 1 Pick. 417; O’Connor v. Pittsburg, 18 Penn. St. 187;

Smith v. Washington, 20 How. 135; Skinner v. Hartford Bridge Co. 29 Conn.

528; Graves v. Otis, 2 Hill, 466; La Fayette v. Bush, 19 Ind. 326; Creal v.

Keokuk, 4Green (Iowa), 47;_Roberts v. Chicago, 26 Ill. 249. And see post,

ch. 15. A city is not liable for consequential injuries in the repair of streets or

the construction of drains, sewers, &c., where no negligence is chargeable. Vin-

ccnncs v. Richards, 23 Ind. 881; Alexander v. Milwaukee, 16 Wis. 247.

with a covenant for quiet enjoyment by the grantee, could not
preclude the corporation, in the exercise of its police powers,
from prohibiting any further use of the land for cemetery purposes,
when the advance of population threatened to make such use a
public nuisance. 1 So when " a lot is granted as a place of deposit
for gunpowder, or other purpose innocent in itself at the time ;
it is devoted to that purpose till, in the progress of populntion, it
becomes dangerous to the property, the safety, or the lives of
hundreds ; it cannot be that the mere form of the grant, because
the parties choose to make it particular instead of general and
absolute, should prevent the use to which it is limited being
regarded and treated as a nuisance, when it becomes so in fact.
In this way the legislati¥e powers essential to the comfort and
preservation of populous communities might be frittered
away into • perfect insignificance. To allow rights thus [* 207]
to be parcelled out and secured beyond control would fix
a principle by which our cities and villages might be broken up.
Nuisances might and undoubtedly would be multiplied to an
intolerable extent." 2
And on the same ground it is held, that a municipal corporation,
having power to establish, make, grade, and improve streets,
does not, by once establishing the grade, preclude itself from
changing it as the public needs or interest may seem to require,
notwithstanding the incidental injury which must result to those
individuals who have erected buildings with reference to the
first grade.8 So a corporation having power under the charter to
establish and regulate streets cannot under this authority, without
explicit legislative consent, permit individuals to lay down a
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Brick Presbyterian Church 11. City of New Yflrk, 5 Cow. 540; New York
Second Avenue R. R. Co. 32 N.Y. 261.
1 Coat.s 11. Mayor, &c., ofNcw York, 7 Cow. 605.
See also Davis 11. Mayor,
&c., of New York, 14 N.Y. 506; Attorney-General 11. Mayor, &c., of New
York, 3 Ducr, 119; State 11. Graves, 19 Md. 51 ; Gozzle 11. Georgetown, 6
Wheat. 597.
' Callender 11. Marsh, 1 Pick. 417; O'Connor 11. Pittsburg, 18 Penn. St. 187;
Smith "· Washington, 20 How. 135; Skinner v. Hartford Bridge Co. 29 Conn.
523; Graves o. Otis, 2 Hill, 466; La Fayette v. Bush, 19 Ind. 326; Creal v.
Keokuk, 4: Green (Iowa), 47; _Roberts 11. Chicago, 26 Ill. 249. And see po8t,
ch. 15. A city is not liable for consequential injuries in the repair of streets or
the construction of drains, sewers, &c., where no negligence is chargeable. Vincennes 11. Richards, 23 Ind. 381; Alexander v. Milwaukee, 16 Wis. 247.
1

11.
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railway in one of its streets, and confer privileges exclusive in
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their character and designed to be perpetual in duration. In

a case where this was attempted, it has been said by the court :

“ The corporation has the exclusive right to control and regulate

the use of the streets of the city. In this respect, it is endowed

with legislative sovereignty. The exercise of that sovereignty

has no limit, so long as it is within the objects and trusts for

which the power is conferred. An ordinance regulating a street

is a legislative act, entirely beyond the control of the judicial

power of the State. But the resolution in question is not such

an act. Though it relates to a street, and very materially affects

the mode in which that street is to be used, yet in its essential

features it is a contract. Privileges exclusive in their nature

and designed to be perpetual in their duration are conferred.

Instead of regulating the use of the street, the use itself to the

extent speciﬁed in the resolution is granted to the associates.

For what has been deemed an adequate consideration, the corpo-

ration has assumed to surrender a portion of their municipal

authority, and has in legal effect agreed with the defendants that,

so far as they may have occasion to use the street for the purpose

of constructing and operating their railroad, the right to

[’* 208] regulate *and control the use of that street shall not be
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exercised. . . . It cannot be that powers vested in the

corporation as an important public trust can thus be frittered

away, or parcelled out to individuals or joint-stock associations,

and secured to them beyond control.” 1

So it has been held, that the city of Philadelphia exercised a

portion of the public right of eminent domain in respect to the

streets within its limits, subject only to the higher control of the

State and the use of the people; and therefore a written license

granted by the city, though upon a valuable consideration, author-

‘ Milhau v. Sharp, 17 Barb. 435; Same case, 28 Barb. 228, and 27 N. Y. 611.

See also Davis v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 14 N. Y. 506 ; State v. Mayor, &c.,

3 Duer, 119; State v. Graves, 19 Md. 351. The consent of the legislature in

any such case would relieve it of all diﬂiculty, except so far as questions might

arise concerning the right of individuals to compensation, as to which see post,

ch. 15. In the case of Milhau v. Sharp, above cited, it was also held that, under

authority “ from time to time to regulate the rates of fare to be charged for the

carriage of persons,” the corporation could not pass a resolution that, in respect

to the carriages employed on a street-railway therein authorized to be constructed,

that power should never be exercised.

- [220]

railway in one of its streets, and confer privileges exclusive in
their character and designed to be perpetual in duration. In
a case where this was attempted, it has been said by the court :
"The corporation has the exclusive right to control and regulate
the use of the streets of the city. In this respect, it is endowed
with legislative sovereignty. The exercise of that sovereignty
has no limit, so long as it is within the objects and trusts for
which the power is conferred. An ordinance regulating a street
is a legislative act, entirely beyond the control of the judicial
power of tho State. But the resolution in question is not such
an act. Though it relates to a street, and very materially affects
the mode in which that street is to be used, yet in its essential
features it is a contract. Privileges exclusive in their uature
and designed to be perpetual in their duration are conferred.
Instead of regulating the use of the street, the use itself to the
extent specified in the resolution is granted to the associates.
For what has been deemed an adequate consideration, the corporation has assumed to surrender a portion of their municipal
authority, and has in legal effect agreed with the defendants that,
so far as they may have occasion to use the street for the purpose
of constructing and operating their railroad, the right to
[* 208] regulate • and control the use of that street shall not be
exercised ...• It cannot be that powers vested in the
corporation as an important public trust can thus be frittered
away, or parcelled out to individuals or joint-stock associations,
and secured to them beyond control." 1
So it has been held, that the city of Philadelphia exercised a
portion of the public right of eminent domain in respect to the
streets within its limits, su~ect only to the higher control of the
State and the use of the people; and therefore a written license
granted by the city, though upon a valuable consideration, author1 Milhau v. Sharp, 17 Barb. 435; Same case, 28 Barb. 228, and 27 N. Y. 611.
Sec also Davis v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 14 N.Y. 506; State tl. Mayor, &c.,
3 Duer, 119; State v. Graves, 19 Md. 851. The consent of the legislature in
any such case would relieve it of all difficulty, except so far as questions might
arise concerning the right of individuals to comp,msation, as to which see post,
ch. 15. In the case of Milhau v. Sharp, above cited, it was also held thllt, under
authority " from time to time to regulate the rates of fare to be charged for the
carriage of persons," the corporation could not pass a resolution that, in respect
to the carriages employed on a street-railway therein authorized to be constructed,
that power should never be exercised.
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izing the holder to connect his property with the city railway by a
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turnout and track, was not such a contract as would prevent the

city from abandoning or removing the railway wherever, in

the opinion of the city authorities, such action would tend to

the beneﬁt of its police}

Thus hedged in by the limitations which control the legislative

power of the State, these corporations are also entitled to the same

protection which surrounds the exercise of State legislative power.

One of these is that no right of action shall arise in favor of an

individual for incidental injury suﬁ"ered by him in consequence of

their adopting or failing to adopt legislative action? Another is

that the same presumption that they have proceeded upon suﬁicient

information and with correct motives shall support their legislative

action which supports the statutes of the State, and precludes

judicial inquiry on these points.3 These rules, however,

must be conﬁned to those cases where the corporation * is [*“ 209]

exercising a discretionary power, and where the reasons

which are to determine whether it shall act or not, and if it does,

what the action shall be, are addressed to the municipal body

exclusively. _

Among the implied powers of such an organization appears to be

the power to defend and indemnify its oﬂicers where they have
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incurred liability in the bonaﬁrle discharge of their duty. It has

been held that, where irregularities occurred in the assessment of

taxes, in consequence of which the-tax was void, and the assessors

refunded to the persons taxed the moneys which had been collected

and paid into the town, county, and State treasuries, the town had

authority to vote to raise a sum of money to refund to the assessors

what had been so paid by them, and that such vote was a legal

promise to pay, on which the assessors might maintain action

against the town. “The general purpose of this vote was just

and wise. The inhabitants, ﬁnding that three of their townsmen

' Bryson 1:. Philadelphia, 47 Penn. St. 329.

‘ RadcliiI'e’s Ex‘rs v. Mayor, &c., of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 195; Duke v. Mayor,

&c., of Rome, 20 Geo. 655; Larkin v. Saginaw County, 11 Mich. 88; St. Louis

v. Gurno, 12 Mo. 414; Griﬂin v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 9 N. Y. 456; Ben-

nett v. New Orleans, 14 La. An. 120; W'eightman v. \Vashington, 1 Black, 39;

Westem College v. Cleveland, 12 Ohio, N. s. 375; Barton 0. Syracuse, 37 Barb.

292; Commissioners v. Duckett, 20 Md. 468.

' Milhau v. Sharp, 15 Barb. 193; New York and Harlmm Railroad Co. v.

Mayor, &c., of New York, 1 Hilton, 562.
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izing the holder to connect his property with the city railway by a
turnout and track, was not such a contract as would prevent the
city from abandoning or removing the railway wherever, in
the opinion of the city authorities, such action would tend to
the benefit of its police. 1
Thus hedged in by the limitations which control the legislative
power of the State, these corporations are also entitled to the same
protection which Aurrounds the exercise of State legislative power.
One of these is that no right of action shall arise in favor of an
indiYidual for incidental injury suffered by hini in consequence of
their adopting or failing to adopt legislative action.2 Another is
that the same presumption that they have proceeded upon sufficient
information and with correct motives shall support their legislative
action which supports the statutes of the State, and precludes
judicial inquiry on these points.3 These rules, however,
must be confined to those cases where the corporation • is [* 209]
exercising a discretionary power, and where the reasons
which are to determine whether it shall act or not, and if it does,
what the action shall be, are addressed to the municipal body
exclusively.
Among the implied powers of such au organization appears to be
the powe1· to defend and indemnify its officers where they have
incurred liability in the bona fide discharge of their duty. It has
been held that, where irregularities occurred in the assessment of
taxes, in consequence of which the· tax was void, and the assessors
refunded to the persons taxed the moneys which had been collected
and paid into the town, county, and State treasuries, the town had
autholity to vote to raise a sum of money to refund to the assessors
what had been so paid by them, and that such Yote was a legal
promise to pay, on which the assessors might maintain action
against the town. " The general purpose of this vote was just
and wise. The inhabitants, finding that three of their townsmen
Bryson v. Philadelphia, 47 Penn. St. 329.
Radcliffe's Ex'rs "·Mayor, &c., of Brooklyn, 4 N.Y. 195; Duke"· Mayor,
&c., of Rome, 20 Geo. 605; Larkin"· Saginaw County, 11 Mich. 88; St. Louis
!'. Gurno, 12 Mo. 414; Griffin v.l\Iayor, &c., of New York, 9 N.Y. 456; Ben·
nett 11. New Orleans, 14 La. An. 120; Weightman v. Washington, 1 Bla(•k, ::19;
'Vestern College"· Cleveland, 12 Ohio, N. s. 375; Barton"· Syracuse, 37llarb.
2!.12; Commissioners v. Duckett, 20 1\fd. 468.
~ ~Iilhau "· Sharp, 15 Barb. 193; New York and Harlrem Railroad Co. "·
1\layor, &c., of New York, 1 Hilton, 562.
1

1
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who had been elected by themselves to an oﬁice, which they could

[CH. VIII.

not, without incurring a penalty, refuse to accept, had innocently

and inadvertently committed an error which in strictness of law

annulled their proceedings, and exposed them to a loss perhaps to

the whole extent of their property, if all the inhabitants individu-

ally should avail themselves of their strict legal rights, —ﬁnding

also that the treasury of the town had been supplied by the very

money which these unfortunate individuals were obliged to refund

from their own estates, and that, so far as the town tax went, the

very persons who had rigorously exacted it from the assessors, or

who were about to do it, had themselves shared in due proportion

the beneﬁts and use of the money which had been paid into the

treasury, in the shape of schools, highways, and various other

objects which the necessities of a municipal institution call for,-

concluded to re-assess the tax, and to provide for its assessment in

a manner which would have produced perfect justice to every

individual of the corporation, and would have protected the

assessors from the effects of their inadvertence in the_ assessment

which was found to be invalid. The inhabitants of the town had a

perfect right to make this re-assessment, if they had a right to raise

the money originally. The necessary supplies to the treasury of a

town cannot be intercepted, because of an inequality in the mode
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of apportioning the sum upon the individuals. Debts must be

incurred, duties must be performed, by every town;

[* 210] "‘ the safety of each individual depends upon the execution

of the corporate duties and trusts. There is and must be

an inherent power in every town to bring the money necessary for

the purposes of its creation into the treasury; and if its course is

obstructed by the ignorance or mistakes of its agents, they may

proceed to enforce the end and object by correcting the means; and

whether this be done by resorting to their original power of voting

to raise money a second time for the same purposes, or by direct-

ing to re-assess the sum before raised by vote, is immaterial;

perhaps the latter mode is best, at least it is equally good.” 1

It has also been held competent for a town to appropriate money

to indemnify the school committee for expenses incurred in defend-

ing an action for an alleged libel contained in a report made by

them in good faith, and in which action judgment had been

' Per Parker, Ch. J ., in Nelson v. Milford, 7 Pick. 23.
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who had been elected by themselves to an office, which they could
not, without incurring a penalty, refuse to accept, had innocently
and inadvertently committed an error which in strictness of law
annulled their proceediugs, and exposed them to a loss perhaps to
the whole extent of their property, if all the inhabitants indi,·idually should avail themselves of their strict legal rights,- finding
also that the treasury of the town had been supplied by the very
money which these unfortunate individuals were obliged to refund
from their own estates, and that, so far as the town tax went, the
very persons who had rigorously exacted it from the assessors, or
who were about to do it, had themselves shared in due proportion
the benefits and use of the money which had been paid into the
treasury, in the shape of schools, highways, and various other
objects which the necessities of a municipal institution call for,concluded to re-assess the tax, and to provide for its assessment in
a manner which would have produced perfect justice to every
individual of the corporation, and would have protected tbe
assessors from the effects of their inadvertence in the. assessment
which was found to be invalid. The inhabitants of the town had a
perfect right to make this re·asscssment, if they had a right to raise
the money origiually. The necessary supplies to the treasury of a
town cannot be intercepted, because of an inequality in the mode
of apportioning the sum upon the individuals. Debts must be
iucurred, duties must be performed, by every town;
[• 210] • the safety of each individual depends upon the execution
of the corporate duties and trusts. There is and must be
an inherent power in every town to bring the money necessary for
the purposes of its creation into the treasury ; and if its course is
obstructed by the ignorance or mistakes of its agents, they may
proceed to enforce the end and object by correcting the means ; and
whether this be done by resorting to their original power of voting
to raise money a second time for the same purposes, or by directing to re-assess the sum before raised by vote, is immaterial;
perhaps the latter mode is best, at least it is equally good." 1
It has also been held competent for a town to appropriate money
to indemnify the school committee for expenses incurred in defending an action for an alleged libel contained in a report made by
them in good faith, and in which action judgment had been
1

Per Parlur, Ch. J., in NelBon v. Milford, 7 Pick. 23.
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rendered in their favor} And although it should appear that the
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officer had exceeded his legal right and authority, yet if he has

acted in good faith in an attempt to perform duty, the town has

the right to adopt his act and to bind itself to indemnify

him.” * And perhaps the legislature may even have power [* 211]

to compel the town, in such a ease, to reimburse its

ofﬁcers the expenses incurred by them in the honest but mistaken

discharge of what they believed to be their duty, notwithstanding

the town, by vote, has refused to do so.3

Construction of lllunicipal Powers.

The powers conferred upon municipalities must be construed

with reference to the object of their creation, namely, as agencies

1 Fuller v. Inhabitants of Groton, 11 Gray, 340. See also Hadsell v. Inhabi-

tants of Hancock, 3 Gray, 526.

rendered in their favor. 1 And although it should appear that the
officer had exceeded his legal right and authority, yet if he has
acted in good faith in an attempt to perform duty, the town has
the right to adopt his act and to bind itself to indemnify
him.2 • And perhaps the legislature may even have power [* 211]
to compel the town, in such a case, to reimburse its
officers the expenses incurred by them in the honest but mistaken
discharge of what they believed to be their duty, notwithstanding
the town, by vote, has refused to do so.3

' A surveyor of highways cut a drain for the purpose of raising a legal ques-

tion as to the bounds of the highway, and the town appointed a committee to

defend an action brought against the surveyor therefor, and voted to defray the

Construction of lJ.funicipal Powers.

expenses incurred by the committee. By the court: “ It is the duty of a town

to repair all highways within its bounds, at the expense of the inhabitants, so that

the same may be safe and convenient for travellers; and we think it has the

The powers conferred upon municipalities must be construed
with reference to the object of their creation, namely, as agencies

power, as incident to this duty, to indemnify the surveyor or other agent against

any charge or liability he may incur in the bona ﬁde discharge of this duty,
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although it may turn out on investigation that he mistook his legal rights and

authority. The act by which the surveyor incurred a liability was the digging a

ditch, as a drain for the security of the highway; and if it was done for the pur-

pose of raising a legal question as to the bounds of the highway, as the defend-

ants offered to prove at the trial, the town had, nevertheless, a right to adopt

the act, for they were interested in the subject, being bound to keep the highway

in repair. They had, therefore, a right to determine whether they would dt-fend

the surveyor or not; and having determined the question, and appointed the

plaintiffs a committee to carry on the defence, they cannot now be allowed to

deny their liability, after the committee have paid the charges incurred under

the authority of the town. The town had a right to act on the subject-matter

which was within their jurisdiction; and their votes are binding and create a

legal obligation, although they were under no previous obligation to indemnify

the surveyor. That towns have an authority to defend and indemnify their

agents who may incur a liability by an inadvertent error, or in the performance

of their duties imposed on them by law, is fully maintained by the case of Nelson

v. Milford, 7 Pick. 18.” Bancroft v. Lynnﬁeld, 18 Pick. 568.

° Guilford v. Supervisors of Chenango, 13 N. Y. 143. But where oflicers

make themselves liable to penalties for refusal to perform duty, the corporation

has no authority to indemnify them. Halstead v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 3

N. Y. 430; Merrill v. Plainﬁeld, 45 N. H. 126. See Frost v. Belmont, 6 Allen,

152.

[ 22a ]

1 Fuller v. Inhabitants of Groton, 11 Gray, 840.
See also Hadsell v. Inhabitants of Hancock, 8 Gray, 526.
1 A surveyor of highways cut a drain for the purpose of raising a legal question as to the bounds of the highway, and the town appointed a committee to
defend an action brought against the surveyor therefor, and voted to defray the
expenses incurred by the committee. By the court: "It is the duty of a town
to repair all highways within its bounds, at the expense of the inhabitants, so that
the same may be safe and convenient for travellers; and we think i' has the
power, as incident to this duty, to indemnify the surveyor or other agent against
any charge or liability he may incur in the bona .fide discharge of this duty,
although it may turn out on investigation that he mistook his legal rights and
authority. The act by \vhich the surveyor incurred a liability was the digging a
ditch, as a drain for the security of the highway ; and if it 'vas done for the purpose of raising a legal question as to the bounds of the highway, as the defendants offered to prove at the trial, the town bad, nevertheless, a right to adopt
the act, for they were interested in the subject, being bound to keep the highway
in repair. They had, therefore, a right to determine whether they would d1.f,·nd
the surveyor or not; and having determined the question, and appointed the
plaintiff!! a commit~e to ('arTY on the defence, they cannot now be allowed to
deny their liability, after the committee ba,·e paid the charges in('urred under
the authority of the town. The town had a right to act on the subject-matter
which was within tht•ir jurisdiction ; and their votes are binding and create a
legal obligation, although they were under no previous obligation to indemnify
the surveyor. That towns have an authority to defend and indemnify their
agents who may incur a. liability by an inadvertent error, or in the perfonnunce
of their duties imposed on them by law, is fully maintained by the case of Nelson
"· Milford, 7 Pick. 18." Bancroft v. Lynnfield, 18 Pick. 568.
3 Guilford v. Supervi11ors of Chenango, 18 N.Y. 143.
But where officers
make themselves liable to penalties for refusal to perform duty, the corporation
has no authority to indemnify them. Halstead v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 3
N.Y. 480; Merrill v. Plainfield, 45 N.H. 126. See Frost v. Belmont, 6 Allen,
152.
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of the State in local government} The State can create them for

no other purpose, and it can confer powers of government to no

other end, without at once coming in conﬂict with the constitution-

al maxim, that legislative power cannot be delegated, or with other

maxims designed to conﬁne all the agencies of government to the

exercise of their proper functions. And wherever the municipality

shall attempt to exercise powers not within the proper province of

local self-government, whether the right to do so be claimed under

express legislative grant, or by implication from the charter, the

act must be considered as altogether ultra wires.

A reference to a few of the adjudged cases will perhaps best

illustrate this principle. The common council of the city of

Buﬁ"alo undertook to provide an entertainment and ball for its

citizens and certain expected guests on the 4th of July, and for

that purpose entered into contract with a. hotel keeper to provide

the entertainment at his house, at the expense of the city. The

entertainment was furnished and in part paid for, and suit was

brought to recover the balance due. The city had authority, under

its charter, to raise and expend moneys for various speciﬁed pur-

' A somewhat peculiar question was involved in the case of Jones u. Rich-

mond, 18 Grat. 517. In anticipation of the evacuation of the city of Richmond

by the Confederate authorities, and under the apprehension that scenes of disorder
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might follow, which would be aggravated by the opportunity to obtain intoxicating

liquors, the common council ordered the seizure and destruction of all such liquors

within the city, and pledged the faith of the city to the payment of the value.

The Court of Appeals of Virginia afterwards decided that the city might be held

liable on the pledge in an action of assumpsit. Rives, J ., says: “ By its char-

ter the council is specially empowered to ‘ pass all by-laws, rules, and regula-

of the State in local government.! The State can create them for
no other purpose, and it can confer powers of government to no
other end, without at once coming in conflict with the constitutional maxim, that Iegislath·e power cannot be delegated, or with other
maxims designed to confine all the agencies of government to the
exercise of their proper functions. And wherever the municipality
shall attempt to exercise powers not within the proper province of
local self-government, whether the right to do so be claimed u~1dcr
express legislative grant, or by implication from the charter, the
act must be considered as altogether ultra vires.
A reference to a few of the adjudged cases will perhaps best
illustrate this principle. The common council of the city of
Buffalo undertook to provide an entertainment and ball for its
citizens and certain expected guests on the 4th of July, and for
that purpose entered into contract with a hotel keeper to provide
the entertainment at his house, at the expense of the city. The
entertainment was furnished and in part paid for, and suit was
brought to recover the balance due. The city had authority, under
its charter, to raise and expend moneys for various specified pur-

tions which they shall deem necessary for the peace, comfort, convenience, good

order, good morals, health, or safety of said city, or of the people or property

therein.’ It is hard to conceive of larger terms for the grant of sovereign leg-

islative powers to the speciﬁed end than those thus employed in the charter; and

they must be taken by necessary and unavoidable intcndment to comprise the

powers of eminent domain within these limits of prescribed jurisdiction. There

were two modes open to the council: ﬁrst, to direct the destruction of these

stores, leaving the question of the city’s liability therefor to be afterwards liti-

gated and determined; or, secondly, assuming their liability, to contract for the

values destroyed under their orders. Had they pursued the ﬁrst mode, the corpo-

ration would have been liable in an action of trespass for the damages ; but they

thought proper to adopt the latter mode, make it a matter of contract, and ap-

proach their citizens, not as trespassers, but with the amicable prolfer of a formal

receipt and the plighted faith of the city for the payment. In this they seem to

me to be well justiﬁed."

—~7
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1 A 110mewhat peculiar question was involved in the case of Jones "· Richmond, 18 Grat. 517. In antidpation of t.he eval'uation of the city of Richmond
by the Confederate aut horitics, and under the apprehension that scenes of disorder
might follow, which would be a~gravated by the opportunity to obtain intoxicating
liquors, the common counl'il ordered the seizure and destruction of all such liquors
within the city, and plerlged the faith of the city to the payment of the value.
The Court of Appeals of Virginia afterwards decided that the city might be held
liable on the pledge in an action of assumpsit. Rives, J ., says : " By its charter the council is specially empowered to • pass all by-laws, rules, and regulations which they shall deem necessary for the peace, comfort, convenience, good
order, good morals, health, or safety of said city, or of the people or property
therl'in.' It is hard to conceive of larger terms for the grant of sovereign leg-.
islative powertc to the specified end than those thus employed in the charter; and
they must be taklon by necessary and unavoidable intendment to comprise the
powers of eminent domain within these limits of prescribed jurisdiction. There
were two modes open to the coun<;il: first, to direct the destruction of these
stores, leaving the question of the city's liability therefor to be afterwards litigated and determined; or, secondly, assuming their liability, to contract for the
values destroyed under their orders. Had they pursued the first mode, the corporation would have been liahle in an action of tre~pass for the damages ; but they
thought proper to adopt the latter mode, make it a matter of contract, and approach their citizens, not as trespassers, but with the amicable pl'offer of a formal
receipt and the plighted faith of the cit.y for the payment. In this they seem to
me to be well justified."

[
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poses, and also “ to defray the contingent and other expenses of the
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city.” But providing an entertainment for its citizens is no

part of municipal self-government, and it has never been

considered, ‘where the common law has prevailed, that [* 212]

the power to do so pertained to the government in any of

its departments. The contract was therefore held void,‘ as not

within the province of the city government.‘

The supervisors of the city of New York refused to perform a

duty imposed upon them by law, and were prosecuted severally

for the penalty which the law imposed for such refusal, and judg-

ment recovered. The board of supervisors then assumed, on

behalf of the city and county, the payment of these judginents,

together with the costs of defending the suits, and caused drafts

to be drawn upon the treasurer of the city for these amounts.

It was held, that these drafts upon the public treasury to indem-

nify oﬁicers for disregard of duty were altogether unwarranted

and void, and that it made no diﬂerenee tliattlie oﬂicers had

acted conscientiously in refusing to perform their duty, and in

the honest belief that the law imposing the duty was unconstitu-

tional. The city had no interest in the suits against the super-

visors, and appropriating the public funds to satisfy the judgments

and costs was not within either the express or implied powers
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conferred upon the board.” It was in fact appropriating the pub-

‘ Hodges v. Butfalo, 2 Dcnio, 110. See also the case of New London v.

Brainard, 22 Conn. 552, which follows and approves this case. The cases dill} r

in this only, that in the ﬁrst suit was brought to enforce the illegal contra 1,

while in the second the city was enjoined from paying over moneys which it had

appropriated for the purposes of the celebration. The cases of Tush v. Atlains,

10 Cush. 252, and Hood v. Lynn, 1 Allen, 103, are to the same effect. A tout!

cannot lawfully be assessed to pay a reward offered by a vote of the town for the

apprehension and conviction of a person supposed to have committed murder

therein. Gale v. South Berwick, 51 Me. 174. Nor under its general authoiity

to raise money for " necessary town charges,” is a town authorized to raise and

expend moneys to send lobbyists to the legislature. Frankfort v. \Vinterport,

poses, and also "to defray the contingent and other expenses of the
city." But providing an entertainment for its citizens is uo
part of municipal self-government, and it has never been
considered, • where the common law 'has prevailed, that [* 212]
the power to do so pertained to the government in any of
its departments. 'l'he contract was therefore held void, as 11ot
within the province of the city governmeut. 1
The supervisors of the city of New York refused to perform a
duty imposed upon them by law, and were prosecuted severally
for the penalty which the law imposed for such refusal, and judgment recovered. The board of supervisors then assumed, on
behalf of the city and county, the payment of these judgmcut:;,
together with the costs of defending the suits, and caused rlrafts
to be drawn upon the treasurer of the city for these amouut:;.
It was held, that these drafts upon the public trensury to iudemnify officers for disregard of duty were altogether un warrau ted
and void, and that it made no difference that .the officers had
acted conscientiously in refusing to perform their duty, and in
the honest belief that the law imposing the duty was Ullcoustitntional. The city had no interest in the suits against the supervisors, and appropriating the public funds to satisfy the judgmeuts
and costs was not within either the express or implied powers
conferred upon the board.2 It was in fact appropriating the pub-

54 Me. 250. \Vhere a municipal corporation enters into a contract ultra vires,

no implied contract arises to compensate the contractor for anything he may have

done under it, notwithstanding the corporation may have reaped a beneﬁt there-

from. McSpcdon v. New York, 7 Bosw. 601; Zottman v. San F rancisco, 20

Cal. 96.

’ Halstead v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 3 N. Y. 430. See a similar case in

People 0. Lawrence, 6 Hill, 244. See also Carroll v. St. Louis, 12 Mo. 444;

Vincent v. Nantucket, 12 Cush. 103; Parsons v. Goshen, 11 Pick. 396.

\
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1 Hodges v. Buffalo, 2 Denio, 110.
See also the case of New London u.
Brainard, ~2 Conn. 552, which follows and approves this case. The cases c.JiiJ", r
in this only, that in the first suit was brought to enfon·e the illegal c.·outra ·t,
while in the second the city was enjoined from paying over moneys wh:cb it hl\<l
appropriated for the purposes of the celebration. Tbc casc.•s of Tub tl. Adam.•,
10 Cush. 252, and Hood tl. Lynn, 1 Allen, 103, are to the same effcet. A t"'" n
cannot lawfully be asst.-ssed to pay a reward offered by a vote of the town for the
apprehension and convit1ion of a person supposed to have committed murdl·r
therein. Gale v. South Berwick, .511\Ie. 174. Nor under its general autho,ity
to raise money. for •· ne,.essary town charges," is a town authorized to raise aud
expend moneys to send lobbyists to the legislature. Frankfort tl. \Vinterport,
M Me. 250. \Vhere a municipal corporation enters into a contract ultra vbu,
no implied contract arises to compensate the contrac.~tor for any thing he may have
done under it, notwithstanding the corporation may have reaped a benefit therefrom. 1\lcSp<!don tl. New York, 7 Bosw. 601; Zottman v. San Francbco, 20
Cal. 96.
• Halstead v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 3 N. Y. 430. See a similar case in
People c. Lawrence, 6 Hill, 244. See also Carroll tl. St. Louis, 1~ Mo. 444;
Vincent v. Nantucket, 12 Cush. 103; Parsons v. Goshen, 11 Pick. 3!.16.

to
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lie money for private purposes, and a tax levied therefor must
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consequently be invalid, on general principles controlling the right

of taxation, which will be considered in another place. In a recent

case in Iowa it is said: “No instance occurs to us in which it

would be competent for [a municipal cogporation] to loan its

credit or make its accommodation paper for the beneﬁt of citizens

to enable them to execute private enterprises” ;1 and where it

' cannot loan its credit to private undertakings, it is equally

[* 213] without * power to appropriate the moneys in its treasury,

or by the conduct of its oﬂicers to subject itself to implied

obligations? g

The powers conferred upon the municipal governments must

also be construed as conﬁned in their exercise to the territorial

limits embraced within the municipality; and the fact that these

powers are conferred in general terms will not warrant their exer-

cise except within those limits. A general power “to purchase,

hold, and convey estate, real and personal, for the public use ” of

the corporation, will not authorize a purchase outside the corpo-

rate limits for that purpose? Without some special provision they

cannot, as of course, possess any control or rights over lands lying

outside ;‘ and the taxes they levy of their own authority, and the

moneys they expend, must be for local purposes only.“
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' Clark v. Des Moines, 19 Iowa, 224.

' “ In determining whether the subject-matter is within the legitimate authority

of the town, one of the tests is to ascertain whether the expenses were incurred

in relation to a subject specially placed by law in other hands. . . . It is a

decisive tcst against the validity of all grants of money by towns for objects

liable to that objection, but it does not settle questions arising upon expenditures

for objects not specially provided for. In such cases the question will still recur,

whether the expenditure was within the jurisdiction of the town. It may be

safely assumed that, if the subject of the expenditure be in furtherance of some

duty enjoined by statute, or in exoneration of the citizens of the town from a

lie money for private purposes, and a tax le¥ied therefor must
consequently be invalid, on general principles controlling the right
of taxation, which will be considered in another place. In a recent
case in Iowa it is said: "No instance occurs to us in which it
would be competent for [a municipal CQ1;Jloration] to loan its
credit or make its accommodation paper for the benefit of citizens
to enable them to execute private enterprises" ; 1 and where it
· cannot loan its credit to private undertakings, it is equally
(* 213] without • power to appropriate the moneys in its treasury,
or by the conduct of its officers to subject itself to implied
obligations.2 ·
The powers cpnferred upon the municipal governments must
also be construed as confined in their exercise to the territorial
limits embraced within the municipality ; and the fact that these
powers are conferred in general terms will not warrant their exercise except within those limits. A general power " to purchase,
hold, and convey estate, real and personal, for the public use" of
the corporation, will not authorize a purchase outside the corporate limits for that purpose.8 Without some special provision they
cannot, as of course, possess any control or rights over lands lying
outside;~ and the taxes they levy of their own authority, and the
moneys they expend, must be for local purposes only.6

liability to a common burden, a contract made in reference to it will be valid and

binding upon the town.” Allen v. Taunton, 19 Pick. 487. See Tucker v. Vir-

ginia City, 4 Nev. 20.

' Riley v. Rochester, 9 N. Y. 64. .

‘ Per Kem, Chancellor, Denton v. Jackson, 2 Johns. Ch. 336. And see Bul-

lock v. Curry, 2 Met. 171; \Veaver v. Cherry, 8 Ohio, N. s. 564; North

Hempstead v. Hempstead, llopk. 294; Concord v. Boscawen, 17 N. H. 465.

‘ In Parsons v. Goshen, 11 Pick. 396, the action of a town appropriating

money in aid of the construction of a county road, was held void and no protec-

tion to the oﬁiccrs who had expended it, See also Concord v. Boscawcn, 17

N. H. 465.

i ~~ _
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Clark v. Des Moines, 19 Iowa, 224.
"In determining whl•ther the subject-matter is within the legitimate authority
of the town, one of the tests is to ascertain whether the expenses were incurred
in relation to a subject specially placed by law in other hands. • . . It is a
decisive test against the validity of all grants of money by towns for objects
liable to that objection, but it does not settle questions arising upon expenditures
for objects not specially provided for. In such cases the question will still recur,
whether the expenditure was within the jurisdietion of the town. It may be
safely assumed that, if the 11ubject of the expenditure be in furtherance of some
duty enjoined by statute, or in exoneration of the citizens of thl' tOl\'n from a
liability to a common burden, a contract made in reference to it will be valid and
binding upon the town." Allen v. Taunton, 19 Pick. 487. See Tucker "·Virginia City, 4 Nev. 20.
1 Riley v. Rochester, 9 N.Y. 64.
~ Per Kent, Chancellor, Denton"· Jac:kson, 2 Johns. Ch. 336. And see Bullock"· Curry, 2 Met. (Ky.) 171; Wea,·er v. Cherry, 8 Ohio, N. s. M4; North
Hempstead"· Hempstead, Ilopk. 294; Concord v. Boscawen, 17 N.H. 465.
• In Parsons v. Goshen, 11 Pick. 396, the action of a town appropriating
money in aid of the construction of a county road, was held void and no protection to the officers who had expended it, See also Concord v. Boscawen, 17
N . H. 465.
1

1
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may authorize the corporation to extend its action to objects out-

side the city limits, and to engage in entepprises of a public

nature which may beneﬁt the citizens of the municipality in

common with the people of the State at large, and also in some

special and peculiar manner, but which nevertheless are not under

the control of the corporation, and are so far aside from the ordi-

nary purposes of local governments that assistance by the munici-

pality in such enterprises would not be warranted under any

general grant of power for'municipal government. For a. few years

past the sessions of the legislative bodies of the several

States have been proliﬁc in a * species of legislation which [* 214]

has ﬂooded the country with municipal securities issued

in aid of works of public improvement, to be owned, controlled,

and operated by private parties, or by corporations created for the

purpose ; the works themselves being designed for the convenience

of the people of the State at large, but being nevertheless supposed

to be specially beneﬁcial to certain localities because running near

or through them, and therefore justifying, it is supposed, the impo-

sition of a special burden by taxation upon such localities to aid in

their construction} We have elsewhere” collected the cases in

which it has been held that the legislature may constitutionally
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authorize cities, townships, and counties to subscribe to the stock

of railroad companies, or to loan their credit to these enterprises,

and to tax their citizens to pay these subscriptions, or the bonds or

other securities issued, where a peculiar beneﬁt to the municipality

was anticipated from the improvement. The rulings in these cases,

if sound, must rest upon the same right which allows such muni-

cipalities to impose burdens upon their citizens to construct local

streets or roads, and they can only be defended on the ground that

“ the object to be accomplished is so obviously connected with the

[municipality] and its interests as to conduee obviously and in a

special manner to their prosperity and advancement.“ But there

are authorities which deny their soundness.

1 In Merrick v. Inhabitants of Amherst, 12 Allen, 500, it was held competent

for the legislature to authorize a town to raise money by taxation for a State

agricultural college, to be located therein. The case, however, we think, stands

on different reasons from those where aid has been voted by municipalities to

public improvements.

' Ante, p. 119.

’ Talbot v. Dent, 9 B. Monr. 526. See Hasbrouck v. Milwaukee, 13 Wis.

[ 227 ]

But it is another question how far the legislature of the State
may authorize the corporation to extend its action to objects outside the city limits, and to engage in ente~rises of a public
nature which may benefit the citizens of the municipality in
common with the people of the State at large, and also in some
special and peculiar manner, but which nevertheless are not under
the control of the corporation, and are so far aside from the ordi..
nary purposes of local w>vcmments that assistance by the municipality in such enterprises would not be warranted under any
general grant of power for'muuicipal government. For a few years
past the sessions of the legislative bodies of the several
States have been prolific in a *species of legislation which [* 214]
has flooded the country with municipal securities issued
in aid of works of public improvement, to be owned, controlled,
and operated by private parties, or by corporations created for the
purpose; the works themselves being designed for the convenience
of the people of the State at large, but being nevertheless supposed
to be specially beneficial to certain localities because running near
or through them, and therefore justifying, it is supposed, the imposition of a special burden by taxation upon such localities to aid in
their construction) We have elsewhere 2 collected the cases in
which it has been held that the legislature may constitutionally
authorize cities, townships, and counties to subscribe to tho stock
of railroad companies, or to loan their credit to these enterprises,
and to tax their citizens to pay these subscriptions, or the bonds or
other securities issued, where a peculiar benefit to the municipality
was anticipated from the improvement. The rulings in these cases,
if sound, must rest upon the same right which allows such municipalities to impose burdens upon their citizens to construct local
streets or roads, and they can only be defended on the ground that
" the object to be accomplished is so obviously connected with the
[municipality] and its interests as to conduce obviously and in a
special manner to their prosperity and advancement." 8 But there
are authorities which deo.Y their soundness.
1 In Merrick "· Inhabitants of Amherst, 12 Allen, 500, it was held competent
for the legislature to authorize a town to raise money by taxation for a State
agricultural college, to be located therein. The case, however, we think, stands
on different reasons from those where aid has been voted by municipalities to
public improvements.
1 Ante, p. 119.
1 Talbot "· Dent, 9 B. Monr. 526.
See Hasbrouck t~. Milwaukee, 13 Wis.
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[* 215] ‘Assuming that any such subscriptions or securities

[cH. vm.

may be authorized, the ﬁrst requisite to their validity

would seem, then, to be a special legislative authority to make or

issue them; an authority which does not reside in the general

words in which the powers of local self-government are usually

conferred} and one also which must be carefully followed by the

municipality in all essential particulars, or the subscription or

44. “I confess it appears to me, notwithstanding the weight of authority on

this head, that a delegation of the power to municipal corporations to tax their

citizens for works of such a large and general utility as railroads cannot be fairly

called a taxation for local purposes, nor justiﬁed on that ground. The road may

beneﬁt the locality, but it is not easy to see how it can properly be called a local

object.” Sedgwick on Statutory and Const. Law, 464. See also Cass v. Dillon,

2 Ohio, N. s. 624, per Thurman, J.; dissenting opinion of Ranney, J., in same

case; Griﬂith v. Commissioners of Crawford County, 20 Ohio, 609, per Spauld-

ing, J . And see the following cases in Iowa, where it has been held incompetent

under the constitution of that State to confer any such power upon the munici-

pality: Stokes 0. Scott County, 10 Iowa, 166 ; State v. Wapello County, 13 lows,

388; Myers 1:. Johnson County, 14 Iowa, 47; Smith v. Henry County, 15 Iowa,

385; Ten Eyck v. Mayor, &c., of Keokuk, ib. 486; Clark v. Des Moines, 19

Iowa, 212; McClure v. Owen, 26 Iowa, 243, and the more recent case of Han-

sen v. Vernon, 27 Iowa, in which an elaborate and able opinion was delivered by

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:20 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105011581
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

Ch. J . Dillon. See also Whiting v. Sheboygan R. R. C0. in the Supreme Court

of Wisconsin, 9 Am. Law Register, N. s. 156; People v. Township Board of

Salem in Supreme Court of Michigan, 20 Mich. and 9 Am. Law Register, N. s.

487, and notes thereto by Judges Dillon and Redﬁeld ; and Garrard County

Court v. Kentucky River Navigation Co., recently decided by the Court of

Appeals of Kentucky. The case of the People v., Township Board of Salem

denies that the incidental beneﬁts which the municipality expects or receives from

the construction of a railroad in the hands of a private corporation, can consti-

tute a ground for taxation any more than can similar beneﬁts in the case of the

establishment of a manufactory, a store, or any other private enterprise. This

case has elicited a good deal of criticism, both commendatory and the contrary;

the ablest of the latter class which has fallen under our observation being that

contained in the American Law Review for October, 1870.

‘ Bullock 0. Curry, 2 Met. (Ky.) 171. A general power to borrow money

or incur indebtedness to aid in the construction of “ any road or bridge ” must be

understood to have reference only to the roads or bridges within the municipality.

Stokes v. Scott County, 10 Iowa, 173; State v. WVapello County, 13 Iowa, 388;

La Fayette 0. Cox, 5 Ind. 38. There are decisions in the Supreme Court of

the United States which appear to be to the contrary. The city charter of Mus-

catine conferred in detail the usual powers, and then authorized the city “ to

borrow money for any object in its discretion,” after a vote of the city in favor

of the loan. In Meyer v. Muscatine, 1 \Val. 384, the court seem to have con-

strued this clause as authorizing a loan for any object whatever ; whereas we think

such phrases are understood usually to be conﬁned in their scope to the speciﬁc
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[* 215]

• Assuming that any such subscriptions or securities
may be authorized, the first requisite to their validity
would seem, then, to be a special legislative authority to make or
issue them ; an authority which does not reside in the general
words in which the powers of local self-government are usually
conferred,1 and one also which must be carefully followed by the
municipality in all essential particulars, or the subscription or
44. " I confess it appears to me, notwithstanding the weight of authority on
this head, that a delegation of the power to municipal corporations to tax their
citizens for works of such a large and general utility as railroads cannot be fairly
called a taxation for local purposes, nor justified on that ground. The road may
benefit the locality, but it is not easy to see bow it can properly be called a local
object." Sedgwick on Statutory and Const. Law, 464. See also Cass v. Dillon,
2 Ohio, N. s. 624, per Thurman, J.; dissenting opinion of Ranney, J., in same
case; Griffith 11. Commissioners of Crawford County, 20 Ohio, 609, per Spaulding, J. And see the follo"'ing cases in Iowa, where it h&l! been held incompt>tent
under the constitution of that State to confer any such power upon the municipality: Stokes 11. Scott County, 10 Iowa, 166; State v. Wapello County, 13 Iowa,
888; :Myers v. Johnson County, 14 Iowa, 47; Smith"· Henry County, 15 Iowa,
385; Ten Eyck "· Mayor, &c., of Keokuk, ib. 486; Clark 11. Des Moines, 19
Iowa, 212; McClure"· Owen, 26 Iowa, 243, and the more recent case of H<insen v. Vernon, 27 Iowa, in which an elaborate and able opinion was delivered by
Ch. J. Dillon. See also Whiting 11. Sheboygan R. R. Co. in the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin, 9 Am. Law Register, N. s. 156; People tt. Township Board of
Salem in Supreme Court of Michigan, 20 Mich. and 9 Am. Law Register, N. s.
487, and notes thereto by Judges Dillon and Redfield; and Garrard County
Court tt. Kentucky River Navigation Co., recently decided by the Court of
Appeals of Kentucky. The case of the People v .. Township Board of Salem
denies that the incidental benefits which the municipality expects or receives from
the construction of a railroad in the hands of a private corporation, can constitute a ground for taxation any more than can similar benefits in the case of the
establishment of a manufactory, a store, or any other private enterprise. This
case has elicited a good deal of criticism, both commendatory and the contrary ;
the ablest of the latter class which has fallen under our observation being that
contained in the American Law Review for October, 1870.
1 Bullock v. Curry, 2 Met. (Ky.) 171.
A general power to borrow money
or incur indebtedness to aid in the construction of "any road or bridge" must be
understood to have reference only to the roads or bridges within the municipality.
Stokes 11. Scott County, 10 Iowa, 173; State v. Wapello County, 13 Iowa, 388;
La Fayette v. Cox, 5 Ind. 38. There are decisions in the Supreme Court of
the United States which appear to be to the contrary. The city charter of Muscatine conferred in detail the usual powers, and then authorized the city " to
borrow money for any object in its discretion,, after a vote of the city in favor
of the loan. In Meyer v. Muscatine, 1 W al. 384, the court seem to have construed this clause as authorizing a loan for any object whater:er; wherelUI we think
auch phrases are understood usually to be confined in their scope to the specific
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going to the essentials of the power, would not prevent parties who

had acted in reliance upon the securities enforcing them, yet as

the doings of these corporations are matters of public record, and

they have no general power to issue negotiable securities, any one

who becomes holder of such securities, even though they be negoti-

able in form, will take them with constructive notice of any want

of power in the corporation to issue them, and cannot enforce them

when their issue was unanthorized.1

objects before enumerated; or at least to those embraced within the ordinary

functions of municipal governments. This case was followed in Rogers v. Bur-

lington, B Wal. 654, four justices dissenting. A municipal corporation having

power to borrow money, it is held, may make its obligations payable wherever it

shall agree. Meyer v. Muscatine, 1 W’:-11. 384. There are cases, however,

which hold that such obligations can only be made payable at the corporation

security will be void. And while mere irregularities of action, not
going to the essentials of the power, would not prevent parties who
had acted in reliance upon the securities enforcing them, yet as
the doings of these corporations are matters of public record, and
they have no general power to issue negotiable securities, any one
who becomes holder of such securities, even though they be negotiable in form, will take them with constructive notice of any want
of power in the corporation to issue them, and cannot enforce them
when their issue was unauthorized.1

treasury, unless there is express legislative authority to make them payable else-

where. People v. Tazewell County, 22 Ill. 147; Pekin v. Reynolds, 31 Ill. 529.

Such corporations cannot give their obligations all the qualities of negotiable

paper, without express legislative permission. Dively v. Cedar Falls, 21 Iowa,

565.

' There is considerable confusion in the cases on this subject. If the corpo-

ration has no authority to issue negotiable paper, or if the oﬂicers who assume
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to do so have no power under the charter for that purpose, there can be no doubt

that the defence of want of power may be made by the corporation in any suit

brought on the securities. Smith v. Cheshire, 13 Gray, 318; Gould v. Sterling,

23 N. Y. 458; Andover v. Grafton, 7 N. H. 298; Clark v. Des Moines, 19 Iowa,

209. And in any case, if the holder has received the securities with notice of

any valid defence, he takes them subject thereto. But where the corporation has

power to issue negotiable paper in some cases, and its ofﬁcers have assumed to

do so in cases not within the charter, whether a bonajide holder would be charge-

able with notice of the want of authority in the particular case, or, on the other

hand, would be entitled to rely on the securities themselves as sufficient evidence

that they were properly issued when nothing appeared on their face to apprise

him of the contrary, is a question still open to some dispute.

In Stoney v. American Life Insurance C0. 11 Paige, 685, it was held that s.

negotiable security of a corporation which upon its face appears to have been

duly issued by such corporation, and in conformity with the provisions of its

charter, is valid in the hands of a bona ﬁde holder thereof without notice,

although such security was in fact issued for a purpose and at a place not author-

ized by the charter of the company, and in violation of the laws of the State

where it was actually issued. In Gelpecke v. Dubuque, 1 Wal. 203, the law is

stated as follows: “ Where a corporation has power, under any circumstances,

to issue negotiable securities, the bona ﬁde holder has a right to presume they

were issued under the circumstances which give the requisite authority, and

they are no more liable to be impeached for any inﬁrmity in the hands of such
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objects before enumerated; or at least to those embraced within the ordinary
functions of municipal governments. This case was followed in Rogers v. Burlington, S W al. 654, four justices dissenting. A municipal corporation having
power to boJ:I'(lw money, it is held, may make its obligations payable wherever it
shall agree. :Meyer 11. Muscatine, 1 '\Val. 384. There are cases, however,
which hold that such obligations can only be made payable at the corporation
treasury, unless there is express legislative authority to make them payable elsewhere. People 11. Tazewell County, 22 Ill. 147; Pekin 11. Reynolds, 81 Ill. 529.
Such corporations cannot give their obligations all the qualities of negotiable
paper, without express legislative permi11sion. Dively 11. Cedar Falls, 21 Iowa,
566.
1 There is considerable confusion in the cases on this subject.
If the corporation has no authority to issue negotiable paper, or if the officers who assume
to do so have no power under the charter for that purpose, there (:an be no doubt
that the defence of want of power may be made by the corporation in any suit
brought on the securities. Smith v. Cheshire, 18 Gray, 818; Gould v. Sterling,
23 N. Y. 458; Andover o. Grafton, 7 N. H. 298; Clark v. Des :Moines, 19 Iowa,
209. And in any case, if the holder has received the securities with notice of
any valid defence, he takes them subject thereto. But where the corporation has
power to issue negotiable paper in some cases, and its officers have assumed to
do so in cases not within the charter, whether a bonafide holder would be chargeable with notice of the want of authority in the particular case, or, on the other
hand, would be entitled to rely on the securities themselves as sufficient evidence
that they were properly issued when nothing appeared on their face to appri1e
him of the contrary, is a question still open to some dispute.
In Stoney v. American Life Insurance Co. 11 Paige, 635, it was held that a
negotiable security of a corporation which upon its face appears to have been
duly issued by such corporation, and in conformity with the provisions of itl
charter, is valid in the hands of a bona fi<k holder thereof without notice,
although such security was in fact issued for a purpose and at a place not authorized by the charter of the company, and in violation of the laws of the State
where it was actually issued. In Gelpecke v. Dubuque, 1 'Val. 203, the law is
stated as follows: " Where a corporation has power, under any circumstances,
to issue negotiable securities, the bona fide holder has a right to presume they
were issued under the circumstances which give the requisite authority, and
Uley are no more liable to be impeached for any infirmity in the hands of suclt
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[* 216] *" In some of the cases involving the validity of the subscrip-
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tions made or bonds issued by municipal corporations in

holder than any other commercial paper." See also Commissioners of Knox

Co. v. Aspinwall, 21 How. 539; Russell v. Jeifersonville, 24 How. 287; Thorn

0. Commissioners of Miami Co. 2 Black, 722; De Voss v. Richmond, 18 Grat.

[• 216] • In some of the cases involving the validity of the subscriptions made or bonds issued by municipal corporations in

338. In Farmers and Mechanics Bank v. The Butchers and Drovers Bank,

1.6 N. Y. 125, it is said: “A citizen who deals directly with a corporation, or

who takes its negotiable paper, is presumed to know the extent of its corporate

powers. But when the paper is, upon its face, in all respects such as the cor-

poratien has authority to issue, and its only defect consists in some extrinsic

fact, — such as the purpose or object for which it was issued, —to hold that the

person taking the paper must inquire as to such extraneous fact, of the existence

of which he is in no way apprised, would obviously conﬂict with the whole policy

of the law in regard to negotiable paper.” In Madison and Indianapolis Rail-

road Co. 2:. The Norwich Savings Society, 24 Ind. 461, this doctrine is approved,

and a distinction made, in the earlier case of Smead v. Indianapolis, &c., Rail-

road Co. 11 Ind. 104, between paper executed ultra vires and that executed

within the power of the corporation, but, by an abuse of the power in that

particular instance, was repudiated. In Halstead v. Mayor, &c., of New York,

5 Barb. 218, action was brought upon warrants drawn by the corporation of

New York upon its treasurer, not in the course of its proper and legitimate busi-

ness. It was held that the corporation under its charter had no general power to
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issue negotiable paper, though not being prohibited by law it might do so for

any debt contracted in the course of its proper legitimate business. VVe quote

from the opinion of Edwards, J . : “ It was contended on the argument, that the

rule of the law merchant which protects the bona jide holder of negotiable paper,

without notice, was of universal application; and that, if the defendants had a

right to issue negotiable paper, it must ea: necessitate be subject to the same rules

as the negotiable paper of an individual. This view seems plausible, but will it

bear the test of examination? In the ﬁrst place, the defendants have no general

power, either express or implied, to issue negotiable paper. They have only a

special or conditional implied power for that purpose; that it is necessary as

a condition precedent to the validity of such paper that the debt which forms

the consideration should be contracted in the proper legitimate business of the

defendant. The act under which they were incorporated is declared to be a

public act. Every person who takes their negotiable paper is bound to know

the extent of their powers, and is presumed to receive it with a full knowledge

that they have only a limited and conditional power to issue it. He is thus put

on his inquiry, and takes it at his peril. The circumstances under which a bona

ﬁde holder, without notice, receives the negotiable paper of a natural person, or

of a corporation having the general express power to issue negotiable paper,

are very dilferent. In both those instances, the power to issue such paper is

general and unconditional; and hence the rules which have been established by

commercial policy, for the purpose of giving currency to mercantile paper, are

applicable. It results from the views which have been expressed, that the drafts

in question, not having been issued by the defendants in their proper and legiti-

_~
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holder than any other commercial paper." See also Commissioners of Knox
Co. v. Aspinwall, 21 How. 589; Russell o. Jeffersonville, 24 How. 287; Thorn
"· Commissioners of Miami Co. 2 Black, 722; De Voss "· Richmond, 18 Grat.
888. In Farmers and Mechanics Bank "· The Butchers and Drovers Bank,
l6 N.Y. 125, it is said: "A citizen who deals directly with a. corporation, or
who takes its negotiable paper, is presumed to know the extent of its corporate
powers. But when the paper is, upon its face, in all respects such as the corporatien has authority to issue, and its only defect consists in some extrinsic
fact, - such as the purpose or object for which it was issued, -to hold that the
person taking the paper must inquire as to such extl'aneous fact, of the existence
of which he is in no way apprised, would obviously conflict with the whole policy
of the law in regard to negotiable paper." In Madison and Indianapolis Railroad Co. v. The Norwich Savings Society, 24 Ind. 461, this doctrine is approved,
and a distinction made, in the earlier case of Smead v. Indianapolis, &c., Railroad Co. 11 Ind. 104, between paper executed ultra vires and that executed
within the power of the corporation, but, by an abuse of the power in that
particular instance, was repudiated. In Halstead v. Mayor, &c., of New York,
li Barb. 218, action was brought upon warrants draw1l by the corporation of
New York upon its treasurer, not in the course of its proper and legitimate business. It was held that the corporation under its charter had no general power to
issue negotiable paper, though not being prohibited by law it might do so for
any debt contracted in the course of its proper legitimate business. We quote
from the opinion of Edwards, J.: "It was contended on the argument, that the
rule of the law merchant which protects the bona fide holder of negotiable paper,
without notice, was of universal application; and that, if the defendants had a
right to issue negotiable paper, it must ex necessitate be subject to the same rules
as the negotiable paper of an individual. This view seems plausible, but will it
bear the test of examination? In the first place, the defendants have no general
power, either express or implied, to issue negotiable paper. They have only a
Bpe('ial or conditional implied power for that purpose ; that it is necessary as
a condition precedent to the validity of such paper that the debt which fonns
the consideration should be contracted in the proper legitimate business of the
defendant. The act under which they were incorporated is declared to be a
public act. Every person who takes their negotiable paper is bound to know
the extent of their powers, and is presumed to receive it with a full knowledge
that they have only a limited and conditional power to issue it. He is thus put
on his inquiry, and takes it at his peril. The circumstances under which a bona
fide bolder, without notice, receives the negotiable paper of a natural person, or
of a QOrporation having the general express power to issue negotiable paper,
are very different. In both those instances, the power to issue such paper is
general and unconditional; and hence the rules which have been established by
commercial policy, for the purpose of giving currency to mercantile paper, are
applicable. It results from the views which have been expressed, that the drafts
in question, not having been issued by the defendants in their proper and legiti-
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aid of internal ‘improvements, there has been occasion [*“217]
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to consider clauses in the State constitutions designed

mate business, are void in the bands of the plaintiff, although received by him

without actual notice of their consideration." This decision was aﬁirmed in 3

N. Y. 430. In Gould v. Town <1‘ Stirling, 23 N. Y. 464, it was held that where

aid of internal • improvements, there has been occasion [•217]
to consider clauses in the State constitutions designed

a town had issued negotiable bonds, which could only be issued when the written

assent of two-thirds of the resident persons taxed in the town had been obtained

and ﬁled in the county clerk‘s oﬁice, the bonds issued without such assent were

invalid, and that the purchaser of them could not rely upon the recital in the

bonds that such assent had been obtained, but must ascertain for himself at his

peril. Say the court: “ One who takes a negotiable promissory note or bill of

exchange, purporting to be made by an agent, is bound to inquire as to the power

of the agent. \Vhcre the agent is appointed and- the power conferred, but the

right to exercise the power has been made to depend upon the existence of facts

of which the agent may be supposed to be in an especial manner cognizant, the

bona ﬁde holdcr is protected; because he is presumed to have taken the paper

upon the faith of the representation as to those facts. The mere fact of executing

the note or bill amounts in itself, in such a case, to a representation by the agent

to every person who may take the paper that the requisite facts exist. But the

holder has no such protection in regard to the existence of the power itself. In

that respect the subsequent bona jide holder is in no better situation than the

payee, except in so far as the latter would appear of necessity to have had

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:20 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105011581
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

cognizance of facts which the other cannot [must P] be presumed to have known."

And the case is distinguished from that of the Farmers and Mechanics Bank v.

Butchers and Drovers Bank, 16 N. Y. 125, where the extrinsic fact affecting the

authority related to the state of accounts between the bank and one of its cus-

tomers, which could only be known to the teller and other oﬂicers of the bank.

See also Brady v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 2 Bosw. 173; Hopple v. Brown

Township, 13 Ohio, N. s. 311; Vecder v. Lima, 19 \Vis. 280. The subject is

reviewed in Clark v. City of Des Moines, 19 Iowa, 209. The action was brought

upon city warrants, negotiable in form, and of which the plaintiﬂ‘ claimed to be

bonaﬁdc assignee, without notice of any defects. The city offered to show that

the warrants were issued without any authority from the city council, and without

any vote of the council authorizing the same. It was held that the evidence

should have been admitted, and that it would constitute a complete defence. See

further, Head v. Providence, &c., Co. 2 Cranch, 169; Royal British Bank v.

Turquand, 6 El. & Bl. 327; Knox County v. Aspinwall, 21 How. 644; Bissell

v. Jeffersonville, 24 How. 287; Sanborn v. Deertield, 2 N. H.254; Alleghany

City v. l\IcClurkan, 14 Penn. St. 83; Morris Canal and Banking Co. v. Fisher,

1 Stock. 667; Clapp v. Cedar Co. 5 Iowa, 15; Commissioners, &c. v. Cox,

6 Ind. 403; Madison and Indianapolis R. R. Co. v. Norwalk Savings Society, 24

Ind. 457; Bird v. Daggett, 97 Mass. 494. It is of course impossible to recon-

cile these authorities; but the doctrine in the case of Gould v. Town of Stirling

appears to us to be sound, and that, wherever a want of power exists, a purchaser

of the securities is chargeable with notice of it, if the defect is disclosed by

the corporate records, or, as in that case, by other records where the power is
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mate business, are void in the hands of the platntiff, although received by him
without actual notice of their consideration." Thi~ decision was affirmed in 3
N. Y. 430. In Gould 11. Town~ Stirling, 23 N.Y. 464, it was held that where
a towh had issued negotiable bonds, whieh could only be issued when the written
assent of two-thirds of the resitlent persons tA~d in the town had been obtained
and filed in the county clerk's office, the bonds issued without such assent were
invalid, and that the purchaser of them could not rely upon the recital in the
bonds that such assent had been obtained, but must ascertain for himself at hi~
peril. Say the court: " Ope who takes a negotiable promissory note or bill of
exchange, purporting to be made by an agent, is bound to inquire as to the power
of the agent. Where the agant is appointed and the power conferred, but the
right to exercise the power has been made to depend upon the existence of facts
of whil·h the agent may be supposed to be in an especial manner cognizant, the
bona fide holder is protected ; because he is presumed to have taken the paper
upon the faith of the representation as to those facts. The mere fact of executing
the note or bill amounts in itself, in such a case, to a representation by the agent
to every person who may take the paper that the requisite facts exi~t. But the
holder has no such protection in regard to the existen('e of the power itself. In
that respect the subsequent bona fide holder is in no better situation than tho
payee, except in so far as the latter would appear of necessity to have had
cognizance of facts which the otlwr eannot [must?] be presumed to have known."
And the case is distinguished from that or the Farmers and Mechanics Bank v.
Butchers and Drovers Bank, 16 N.Y. 125, where'the extrinsic fact affecting the
authority related to the state of account:! between the bank and one of its customers, which could only be known to the teller ami other officers of the bank.
See al:;o Brady 11. Mayor, &c., of New York, 2 Bosw. 173; Hopple v. Brown
Township, 13 Ohio, N . s. 311; Veeder 11. Lima, 19 Wis. 280. The subject is
reviewed in Clark v. City of Des :Moines, 19 Iowa, 209. The action was brought
upon city wal!l'ants, negoliable in form, and of whieh the plaintiff claimetl to be
bonafide assignee, without notice of any dt:fccts. The city offered to show that
the warrants were issued without any authority from the city council, and without
any vote of the council authorizing the same. It was held that the evidence
should have been admitted, an<l th!lt it would constitute a complete defence. See
further, Head v. Providence, &c., Co. 2 Cranch, 169; Royal British Bank v.
Turquand, 6 El. & Bl. 327 ; Knox County "· Aspinwall, 21 How. 544; Bissell
.,. Jeffersonville, 24 How. 287; Sanborn v. Deerfield, 2 N. H. 254; Alleghany
City"· McClurkan, U Penn. St. 83; i\lorris Canal and Banking Co. "· Fisher,
1 Stock. 667; Clapp v. Cedar Co. 5 [owa, 15; Commissioners, &c. v. Cox,
6 Ind. 403; Madison and Indianapolis R. R. Co. v. Norwalk Savings Society, 24
Ind. 45i; Bird c. Daggett, 97 )lass. 494. It is of course impossible to reconcile these authorities; but the doctrine in the case of Gould "· Town of Stirling
appears to us to be sound, and that, wherever a want of power exists, a purchaser
of the securities is chargeable with notice of it, if the defect is disclosed by
the corporate records, or, as in that case, by other records where the power is
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[* 218] to limit the power of the ‘legislature to incur indebtedness

on behalf of the State, and which clauses, it has been

urged, were equally imperative in restraining indebtedness on

behalf of the several political divisions of the State. The Constitu-

tion of Kentucky prohibited any act of the legislature authorizing

any debt to be contracted on behalf of the Commonwealth, except

for certain speciﬁed purposes, unless provision should be made in

such act for an animal tax sulﬁcient to pay such debt within thirty

years; and the act was not to have effect unless approved by the

people. It was contended that this provision was not to apply to

the Commonwealth as a. mere ideal abstraction, unconnected with

her citizens and her soil, but to the Commonwealth as composed of

her people, and their territorial organizations of towns, cities, and

counties, which make up the State, and that it embraced in prin-

ciple every legislative act which authorized a debt to be contracted

by any of the local organizations of which the Commonwealth was

composed. The courts of that State held otherwise. “ The clause

in question,” they say, “applies in terms to a debt contracted

on behalf of the Commonwealth as a distinct corporate body;

and the distinction between a debt on behalf of the Commonwealth,

and a debt or debts on behalf of one county, or of any number of

counties, is too broad and palpable to admit of the sup-
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[‘* 219] position that the latter class of * debts was intended to be

embraced by terms speciﬁcally designating the former

only.”1 The same view has been taken by the courts of Iowa,

Wisconsin, and Illinois of the provisions in the constitutions of

those States restricting the power of the legislature to contract

debts on behalf of the State in aid of internal improvements;*

required to be shown. That the powers of the agents of municipal corporations

are matters of record, and the corporation not liable for an unauthorized act, see

further, Baltimore v. Eschbach, 18 Md. 276; Johnson v. Common Council, 16

Ind. 227. Those who deal with a corporation must take notice of the restrictions

in its charter, or in the general law, and see to it that the contracts on which

they rely are entered into in the manner the law authorizes. Brady v. Mayor,

&c., of New York, 2 Bosw. 173; same case, 20 N. Y. 312; Swift v. \Villiams-

burg, 2-1 Barb. 427; Marsh v. Supervisors of Fulton Co., recently decided by

the Supreme Court of United States. If they are not, no subsequent ratiﬁcation

by the corporation can make them valid. Leavenworth v. Rankin, 2 Kansas,

357.

' Slack v. Railroad Co. 13 B. Monr. 16.

' Dubuque County v. Railroad Co. 4 Greene (Iowa), 1; Clapp v. Cedar

County, 5 Iowa, 15; Clark v. Janesville, 10 \Vis. 136; Bushnell 1:. Beloit, ib.

:~W
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[ • 218] to limit the power of the •legislature to incur indebtedness
on behalf of the State, and which clauses, it has been
urged, were equally imperative in restraining indebtedness on
behalf of the several political divisions of the State. The Constitution of Kentucky prohibited any act of the legislature authorizing
nuy debt to be contracted on behalf of the Commonwealth, except
fc>r certain specified put·poses, unless provision should be made in
such act for an annual tax sufficient to pay such debt within thirty
years ; and the act was not to have effect unless approved by the
people. It was contended that this provision was not to apply to
the Commonwealth as a mere ideal abstraction, unconnected with
her citizens and her soil, but to the Commonwealth as composed of
her people, and their territorial organizations of towns, cities, and
counties, which make up the State, and that it embraced in principle every legislatiYe act which authorized a debt to be contracted
by any of the local organizations of which the Commonwealth was
composed. The courts of that State held otherwise. " The clause
in question," they say, "applies in terms to a debt contracted
on behalf of the Commonwealth as a distinct corporate body;
and the distinction between a debt on behalf of the Commonwealth,
and a debt or debts on behalf of one county, or of any number of
counties, is too broad and palpable to admit of the sup[• 219] position that the latter class of • debts was intended to bo
embraced by terms specifically designating the former
only." 1 The same view has beeu taken by the courts of Iowa,
Wisconsin, and Illinois of the provisions in the constitutions of
those States restricting the power of the legislature to contract
debts on behalf of the State in aid of internal improvements; 2
required to be shown. That the powers of the agents of municipal corporations
are matters of'record, and the corporation not liable for an unauthorized act, see
fi1rtlwr, Baltimore t~. Eschbach, 18 Md. 276; Johnson "· Common Council, 16
lml. 227. Those who deal with a corporation must take notice of the restrictions
in it~ eharter, or in the general law, and see to it that the contracts on which
they rely are entered into in the manner the law authorizes. Brady 11. Mayor,
&c., of New York, 2 Bosw. 173; same case, 20 N. Y. 312; Swift 11. Williams·
hurg, 2-1 Barb. 427; Marsh 11. Supervisors of Fulton Co., recently decided by
the Supreme Court of United States. If they are not, no subsequent ratification
by the corporation can make them valid. Leavenworth 11. Rankin, 2 KAD!as,
857.
1 Sla~k 11. Railroad Co. 13 B. Monr. 16.
1 Dubu'1ue County "· Railroad Co. 4 Greene (Iowa), 1; Cla.pp "· Cedar
Couuty, 5 Iowa, 15; Clark v. Janesville, 10 Wis. 136; Bushnell "· Beloit, ib.
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but the decisions of the ﬁrst-named State have since been
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doubted.‘

Another class of legislation has recently demanded the attention

of the courts, which has not been less troublesome, from the new,

varied, and peculiar questions involved, than that in relation to

municipal subscriptions in aid of internal improvements. As the

power to declare war and to conduct warlike operations rests in the

national government, and that government is vested with unlimited

control of all the resources of the country for those purposes, the

duty of national defence, and, consequently, to defend all the

citizens aswell as all the property of all the municipal organiza-

tions in the several States, rests upon the national authorities.

This much is conceded, though in a qualiﬁed degree, also, and

subordinate to the national government, a like duty rests doubtless

upon the State governments, which may employ the means and

services of their citizens for the purpose. But it is no part of the

duty of a township, city, or county, as such, to raise men or money

for warlike operations, nor have they any authority, without ex-

press legislative sanction, to impose upon their people any burden

by way of taxation for any such purpose.“ Nevertheless, when a

195; Prettyman v. Supervisors, 19 Ill. 406; Robertson v. Rockford, 21 Ill. 451;

Johnson v. Stark County, 24 Ill. 75; Perkins v. Lewis, ib. 208; Butler v. Dun-
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ham, 27 Ill. 474.

‘ State v. Wapello County, 13 Iowa, 388. And see People v. Supervisor, &c.

16 Mich. 254. The history of these constitutional provisions would doubtless

throw light upon their proper construction. Where a constitutional provision is

adopted forbidding the State to cngge in internal improvements, and the history

of the times shows that it was adopted by way of establishing as a rule of State

policy the principle that such improvements should be left to he constructed,

but the decisions of the first--named State have since been
doubted. 1
Another class of legislation has recently demanded the attention
of the courts, which has not been less troublesome, from the new,
Yaried, and peculiar questions involved, than that in relation to
municipal subscriptions in aid of internal improvements. As the
power to declare war and to conduct warlike operations rests in the
national government, and that government is vested with unlimited
control of all the resources of the country for those purposes, the
duty of national defence, and, consequently, to defend all the
citizens as well as all the property of all the municipal organizations in the several States, rests upon the national authorities.
This much is conceded, though in a qualified degree, also, and
subordinate to the national government, a like duty rests doubtless
upon the Rtate governments, which may employ the means and
services of their citizens for the purpose. But it is no part of the
duty of a township, city, or county, as such, to raise men or mouey
for warlike operations, nor have they any authority, without express legislative sanction, to impose upon their people any burden
by way of taxation for any such purpose.2 Nevertheless, when a

controlled, and managed by private enterprise, and not by the public authorities,

it is ditlicult to perceive on what ground it can be held that though the State,

in its sovereign capacity, may not burden its citizens with the cost of these works,

every inferior subdivision, deriving from the State its whole authority, may

nevertheless be allowed to do so. We cannot construe a constitution with the

same strictness as a criminal statute, and hold nothing to be within its meaning

which is not exactly included in its words; such an instrument establishes gen-

eral principles in comprehensive terms, and should be construed with liberality

to etfectuate the intent of the people wherever that intent is suﬂiciently ap-

parent.

’ Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass. 272; Gove v. Epping, 41 N. H.545; Crowell

v. Hopkinton, 45 N. H. 9; Baldwin v. North Branford, 32 Conn. 47 ; Vi/ebster v.

Harwinton, ib. 131. See also Claﬂin v. Hopkinton, 4 Gray, 502; Cover v. Bay-
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195; Prettyman t~. Supervisors, 19 lll. 406; Robertson v. Rockford, 21 III. 451;
Johnson "· Stark County, 2! Ill. 75; Perkins t~. Lewis, ib. 208; Butler v. Dunham, 27 Ill. 474.
1 State t~. Wapello County, 13 Iowa, 388.
And see People v. Sup<>rvi~or, &c.
16 Mich. 254. The hiBtory of these constitutional provisions would doubtless
throw light upon their proper construction. Where a constitutional provision is
adopted forbidding the State to engage in internal improvements, and the history
of the times shows that it was adopted by way of establishing as a rule of State
policy the principle that such improvements should be lel't to be constructed,
controlled, and managed by private enterprise, and not by the public authorities,
it is difficult to perceive on what ground it can be held that though the State,
in its sovereign capacity, may not burden its citizens with the cost of these works,
every inferior subdivision, deriving from the State its whole authority, may
nevertheless be allowed to do so. We cannot construe a constitution with the
same strictness as a criminal statute, and hold nothing to bo within its meaning
which is not exactly included in its words; such an instrument establishes general principles in comprehensive tenns, and should be construed with liberality
to effoctuate the intent of the people wherever that intent is sufficiently apparent.
1 Stetson"· Kempton, 18 Mass. 272; Gove "·Epping, 41 N.H. 545; Crowell
"·Hopkinton, 45 N.H. 9; Baldwin"· North Branford, 82 Conn. 47; Webster v.
Harwinton, ib. 131. See also Claflin t~. Hopkinton, 4 Gray, 502; Cover t~. Bay-
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war arises which taxes all the energies of the nation, which makes
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it necessary to put into the ﬁeld a large proportion of all the able-

bodied men of the country, and which renders imperative a resort

to all available means for ﬁlling the ranks of the army, recruiting

the navy, and replenishing the national treasury, the ques-

[* 220] tion ‘becomes a momentous one, whether the local organ-

izations— those which are managed most immediately by

the people themselves— may not be made important auxiliaries to

the national and State governments in accomplishing the great

object in which all alike are interested so vitally ; and if so, whether

there is any constitutional principle which would be violated by

making use of these organizations in a case where failure on the

part of the central authority would precipitate general dismay and

ruin. Indeed, as the general government, with a view to con-

venience, economy, and promptness of action, will be very likely to

adopt, for any purposes of conscription, the existing municipal

divisions of the States, and its demand for men to recruit its armies

will assume a form seeming to impose on the people whose muni-

cipal organization embraces the territory covered by the demand,

the duty of meeting it, the question we have stated may appear to

be one rather of form than of substance, inasmuch as it would be

diﬁicult to assign reasons why a duty resting upon the citizens of a
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municipality may not be considered as resting upon the corporation

itself of which they are the constituents, and if so, why it may not

be assumed by the municipality itself, and then be discharged in

like manner as any other municipal burden, if the legislature shall

grant permission for that purpose. _

One diﬂiculty that suggests itself in adopting any such doctrine

is, that, by the existing law of the land, able-bodied men between

certain specified ages are alone liable to be summoned to the per-

formance of military duty; and if the obligation is assumed by the

municipal organizations of the State, and discharged by the pay-

ment of money or the procurement of substitutes, the taxation

required for this purpose can be claimed, with some show of reason,

to be taxation of the whole community for the particular beneﬁt of

that class upon whom by the statutes the obligation rests. When

the public funds are used for the purpose, it will be insisted that

they are appropriated to discharge the liabilities of private individ-

town, 12 Minn. 124; Fiske v. Hazzard, 7 R. I. 438; Alley v. Edgecomb, 53 Me.

446.
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war arises which taxes all the energies of the nation, which makes
it necessary to put into the field a large proportion of all the ablebodied men of the country, and which renders imperative a resort
to all available means for filling the ranks of the army, recruiting
the navy, and replenishing the national treasury,.. the ques[* 220] tion • becomes a momentous one, whether the local organizations- those which are ma.naged most immediately by
the people themselves- may not be made important auxiliaries to
the national and State governments in accomplishing the great
object in which all alike are interested so vitally ; and if so, whether
there is any constitutional principle which would be violated by
making use of these organizations in a case where failure on the
part of the central authority would precipitate general dismay and
ruin. Indeed, as the general government, with a view to convenience, economy, and promptness of action, will be very likely to
adopt, for any purposes of conscription, the existing municipal
divisions of the States, and its demand for men to recruit its armies
will assume a fot·m seeming to impose on the people whose municipal organization embrace~ the territory covered by the demand,
the duty of meeting it, the question we have stated may appear to
be one rather of form than of substance, inasmuch as it would be
difficult to assign reasons why a duty resting upon the citizens of a
municipality may not be considered as resting upon the corporation
itself of which they are the constituents, and if so, why it may not
be assumed by tho municipality itself, and then be discharged in
like manner as any other municipal burden, if the legislature shall
grant permission for that purpose.
One difficulty that suggests itself in adopting any such doctrine
is, that, by the existing law of the land, able-bodied men between
certain specified ages are alone liable to be summoned to the performance of military duty; and if the obligation is assumed by the
municipal organizations of the State, and discharged by the payment of money or the procurement of substitutes, the taxation
required for this purpose can be claimed, with some show of reason,
to be taxation of the whole community for the particular benefit of
that class upon whom by the statutes the obligation rests. When
the public funds are used for the purpose, it will be insisted that
they are appropriated to discharge the liabilities of private individtown, 12 Minn. 12!; Fiske v. Hazzard, 7 R.I. 438; Alley o. Edgecomb, 53 :Me.
446.

[ 234]

cal vm.] was eaanas on MUNICIPAL eovarmmanr. "' 220

uals. Those who are already past the legal age of service, anid

en: vm.]

THE GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT.

• 220

who have stood their chance of being called into the ﬁeld, or per-

haps have actually rendered the required service, will be able to

urge with considerable force that the State can no longer honorably

and justly require them to contribute to the public defence, but

ought to insist that those within the legal ages should perform their

legal duty; and if any upon whom that duty rests shall actually

have enrolled themselves in the army witha view to discharge it,

such persons may claim, with even greater reason, that

every consideration of ‘ equality and justice demands that [* 221]

th‘e property they leave behind them shall not be taxed to

relieve others from a duty equally imperative.

Whatever may be the abstract reasoning on this subject, there

can be no question, in the light of the judicial decisions which have

been made, that the people of any municipal corporation or polit-

ical division of a State have such a general interest in relieving that

portion of their fellow-citizens who are liable to the performance of

military duty, as will support taxation or render valid indebtedness

contracted for the purpose of supplying their places, or of ﬁlling

any call of the national authorities for men,_with volunteers who

shall be willing to enter the ranks for such pecuniary inducements

as may be offered them. The duty of national defence it is held
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rests upon every person under the protection of the government

who is able to contribute to it, and not solely upon those who are

within the legal ages. The statute which has prescribed those

ages has for its basis the presumption that those between the limits

ﬁxed are best able to discharge the burden of military service to

the public beneﬁt, and others are not absolved from being sum-

moued to the duty, if at any time the public exigency should seem

to demand it. Exemption from military duty is a privilege rather

than a right, and, like other statutory privileges, may be recalled at

any time when reasons of public policy or necessity seem to demand

the recall.‘ Moreover, there is no valid reason, in the nature of

things, why those who are incapable of performing military service,

by reason of age, physical inﬁrmity, or other cause, should not

contribute, in proportion to their ability, to the public defence by

such means as are within their power; and it may well happen

that taxation, for the purpose of recruiting the armies of the nation,

‘ See post, p. 883.
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uals. Thos~ who are already past the leg~l age of serYiGo,
who have stood their chance of being cal'i~d into tho field, or perhaps have actually rendered the requiaed service, will be able to
urge with considerable force that tho State can no longer honorably
and justly require them to contribute to the public defence, but
ought to insist that those within the legal ages should perform their
legal duty; and if any upon whom that duty rests shall actually
have enrolled themselves in the army with a view to discharge it,
such persons may claim, with even greater reason, that
every consideration of • equality and justice demands that [• 221]
tlie property they leave behind them shall not be taxed to
relieve others from a duty equally imperative.
'Vhatever may be the abstract reasoning on this subject, there
can be no question, in the light of the judicial decisions which have
been made, that the people of any municipal corporation or political division of a State have such a general interest in relieving that
portion of their fellow-citizens who are liable to the performauce of
military duty, as will support taxation or render valid indebtedness
contracted for the purpose of supplying their places, or of filling
any call of the national authorities for men,. with volunteers who
shall be willing to enter the ranks for such pecuniary inducements
as may be offered them. The duty of national defence it is held
rests upon every person under the protection of the government
who is able to contribute to it, and not solely upon those who are
within the legal ages. The statute which has prescribed those
ages has for its basis the presumption that those between the limits
fixed are best able to discharge the burden of military service to
the public benefit, and others are not absolved from being summoned to the duty, if at any time the public exigency should seem
to demand it. Exemption from military duty is a privilege rather
than a right, and, like other statutory privileges, may be recalled at.
any time when reasons of public policy or necessity seem to demand
the recall. 1 Moreover, there is no Yalid reason, in the nature of
things, why those who are incapable of performing military service,
by reason of age, physical infirmity, or other cause, should not
contribute, in proportion to their ability, to the public defence by
such means as are within their power; and it may well happen
that taxation, for the purpose of recruiting the armies of the nation,
1

Sec polt, p. 383.
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will distribute the burden more equally and justly among all the

citizens than any other mode which could be devised. Whether it

will be just and proper to allow it in any instance must rest with

the legislature to determine; but it is unquestionably competent,

with legislative permission, for towns, cities, and counties to raise

money by loans or by taxation to pay bounty moneys to those who

shall volunteer to ﬁll any call made upon such towns, cities, or

counties to supply men for the national armies.‘

‘ “ The power to create a public debt, and liquidate it by taxation, is too clear

for dispute. The question is therefore narrowed to a single point: Is the purpose

in this instance a public one? Does it concern the common welfare and interest

of the municipality? Let us see. Civil war was raging, and Congress provided

in the second section of the act of 2-Lth February, 1864, that the quota of the

will distribute the burden more equally and justly among all the
citizens than any other mode which could be devised. Whether it
will bejust and proper to allow it in any instance must rest with
the legislature to determine ; but it is unquestionably competent,
with legislative permission, for towns, cities, and counties to raise
money by loans or by taxation to pay bounty moneys to those who
shall volunteer to fill any call made upon such towns, cities, or
counties to supply men for the national armies. 1

troops of each ward of s city, town, township, precinct, &c., should be as nearly

as possible in proportion to the number of men resident therein liable to render

military service. Section three provided that all volunteers who may enlist after

a drafl shall be ordered shall be deducted from the number ordered to be drafted

in such ward, town, &c. ' Volunteers are therefore by law to be accepted in re-

lief of the municipality from a compulsory service to be determined by lot or

ehance. Does the relief involve the public welfare or interest? The answer

rises spontaneously in the breast of every one in the community liable to the mili-

tary burden. It is given, not by the voice of him alone who owes the service,
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but swells into a chorus from his whole family, relatives, and friends. Military

service is the highest duty and burden the citizen is called to obey or to bear. It

involves life, limb, and health, and is therefore a greater ' burden ’ than the tax-

ation of property. The loss or the injury is not conﬁned to the individual him-

self, but extends to all the relations he sustains. It embraces those bound to him

in the ties of consanguinity, friendship, and interest; to the community which

must furnish support to his family, if he cannot, and which loses in him a member

whose labor, industry, a_nd property contribute to its wealth and its resources;

who assists to bear its burdens, and whose knowledge, skill, and public spirit con-

tribute to the general good. Clearly the loss of that part of the population upon

whom the greatest number depend, and who contribute most to the public wel-

fare, by their industry, skill, and property, and good conduct, is a common loss,

and therefore a. general injury. These are alike subject to the draft. The blind

and relentless lot respects no age, condition, or rank in life. It is therefore

clearly the interest of the community that those should serve who are willing,

whose loss will sever the fewest ties, and produce the least injury.

“ The bounty is not a private transaction in which the individual alone is ben-

eﬁted. It beneﬁts the public by inducing and enabling those to go who feel they

can best be spared. It is not voluntary in those who pay it. The community is

subject to the draft, and it is paid to relieve it from a burden of war. It is not

amcre gift orreward, but a consideration for services. It is therefore not a

conﬁscation of one man‘s property for another’s use, but it is a contribution from

the public treasury for a general good. In short, it is simply taxation to relieve

— ~ --—~-
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"The power to create a public debt, and liquidate it by taxation, is too clear
for dispute. The question is therefore narrowed to a single point: Is the purpose
in this instance a public one? Does it concern the common welfare and interest
of the municipality? Let us see. Civil war was raging, and Congress provided
in the second section of the act of 2-lth February, 1864, that the quota of the
troops of each ward of a city, town, township, precinct, &c., should be as nearly
as possible in proportion to the number of men resident therein liable to render
military service. Section three provided that all volunteers who may enlist after
a draft shall be ordered shall be deducted from the number ordered to be drafted
in such ward, town, &c. Volunteers are therefore by law to be accepted in relief of the municipality from a compulsory service to be determined by lot or
chance. Does the relief involve the public welfare or interest? The answer
rises spontaneously in the breast of every one in the community liable to the military burden. It is given, not by the voi~e of him alone who owes the service,
but swells into a chorus from his whole family, relatives, and friends. Military
service is the highest duty and burden the citizen is called to obey or to bear. It
involves life, limb, and health, and is therefore a greater • burden' than the taxation ofproperty. The loss or the injury is not confined to the individual himself, but extends to all the relations he sustains. It embraces those bound to him
in the ties of consanguinity, friend8hip, and interest; to the community which
must furnish support to his family, if he cannot, and which loses in him a member
whose labor, indu~try, and property contribute to its wealth and its resources;
who assists to bear its burdens, and whose knowledge, skill, and public spirit contribute to the general good. Clearly the loss of that part of the population upon
whom the greatest number depend, and who contribute most to the public welfare, hy their industry, t~kill, and property, and good conduct, is a common loss,
and therefore a general injury. These are alike subject to the draft. The blind
and relentless lot respects no age, condition, or rank in life. It is therefore
clearly the interest of the community that those should serve who are willing,
whose loss will sever the fewest ties, and produce the leaet injury.
"The bounty is not a private transaction in which the individual alone is benefited. It benefits the public by inducing and enabling those to go who feel they
can best be spared. It is not voluntary in those who pay it. The community is
subject to the draft, and it is paid to relieve it from a burden of war. It is not
a mere gift or. reward, but a consideration for services. It is therefore not a
confiscation of one man's property for another's use, but it is a contribution from
the public treasury for a general good. In short, it is simply taxation to relieve
1
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draft is not, however, the sole consideration which will sup-

port taxation by the municipal corporations of the State to raise

money for the purpose of paying bounties to soldiers. Gratitude

to those who have entered the military service, whether as

volunteers or drafted men, or as substitutes for others who

were drafted or were ‘liable to be, is a consideration [* 223]

which the State may well recognize, and it may compensate

the service either by the payment of bounty moneys directly to such

persons or by provision for the support of those dependent upon

them while they shall be absent from their homes. Whether we

regard such persons as public benefactors, who, having taken upon

themselves the most severe and dangerous duty a citizen is ever

called upon to perform, have thereby entitled themselves to public

reward as an incentive to ﬁdelity and courage, or as persons who,

having engaged in the public service for a compensation inadequate

to the toil, privation, and danger incurred, are deserving of the

bounty as a further recognition on the part of the community of

the worth of their services, there seems in either case to be no

suﬁicieut reason to question the right of the legislature to authorize

the municipal divisions of the State to raise moneys in any of the

usual modes, for the purpose of paying bounties to them or
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their families inrecognition of such services.‘ ‘ And if a [* 22-1]

the municipality from the stern demands of war, and avert a public injury in the

loss of those who contribute most to the public welfare.” Speer v. School Di-

rectors of Blairsville, 50 Penn. St. 159. See also Waldo v. Portland, 33 Conn.

363; Bartholomew v. Harwinton, ib. 408; Fowler v. Danvers, 8 Allen, 80;

Lowell v. Oliver, ib. ‘247; W'ashington County v. Berwick, 56 Penn. St. 466;

Trustees of Cass v. Dillon, 16 Ohio, N. s. 38. Also Opinions of Justices, 52 Me.

695, in which the view is expressed that towns cannot, under the power to raise

money for “ necessary town charges," raise and pay commutation moneys to re-

lieve persons drafted into the military service of the United States.

' The act under which the Pennsylvania case, cited in the preceding note, was

decided, authorized the borough to contract a debt for the payment of three

hundred dollars to each non-commissioned oﬁicer and private who might there-

after volunteer and enter the service of the United States, and be credited upon

the quota of the borough under an impending dralt. The whole purpose, there-

fore, was to relieve the community from the threatened conscription. But in the

case of Brodhead v. Milwaukee, 19 Wis. 652, it was held constitutional, not only

to provide for the future by such municipal taxation, but also to raise moneys to

pay bounties to volunteers previously enlisted, as well as to those who should

thereafter procure substitutes for themselves, and have them credited on the

municipal quota. Chief Justice Dixon, in delivering the opinion of the court,
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• Relief of the community from an impending or possible [* 222]
draft is not, however, the sole consideration which will support taxation by the municipal corporations of the State to raise
money for the purpose of paying bounties to soldiers. Gratitude
to those who have entered the military service, whether as
volunteers or drafted men, or as substitutes for others who
were drafted or were *liable to be, is a consideration (* 223]
which the State may well recognize, and it may compensate
the service either by the payment of bounty moneys directly to such
persons or by provision for the support of those dependent upon
them while they shall be absent from their homes. Whether we
regard such persons as public benefactors, who, having taken upon
themselres the most severe and dangerous duty a citizen is ever
called upon to perform, have thereby entitled themselves to public
reward as an incentive to fidelity and courage, or as persons who,
having engaged in the public service for a compensation inadequate
to the toil, privation, and danger incurred, are deserving of the
bounty as a further recognition on the part of the community of
the worth of their services, there seems in either case to be no
sufficient reason to question the right of the legislature to authorize
the municipal divisions of the State to raise moneys in any of the
usual modes, for the purpose of paying bounties to them or
their families in recognition of such serviccs. 1 • And if a (* 224]
the municipality from the b"tern demands of war, and an~rt a public injury in the
loss of those who contribute most to the public welfare." Speer v. School Directors of Blairsville, 50 Penn. St. 159. Sec also Waldo t'. Portland, 8:3 Conn.
563; Bartholomew "· Harwinton, ib. 408; Fowler "· Danvers, 8 Allen, 80;
Lowell "· Oliver, ib. 247; 'Vashington County v. Berwick, 56 Penn. St. 466 ;
Trustees ofCass v. Dillon, 16 Ohio, N. s. 88. Also Opinions of Justices, 52 Me.
695, in which the view is expressed that towns cannot, under the power to raise
money for " necessary town eharges," raise aml pay commutation moneys to relieve persons drafted into the military service of the United States.
1 The act under which the Pennsylvania case, cited in the prereding note, was
decided, authorized the borough to contract a debt for the payment of three
hundred dollars to each non-commissioned officer and private who might thereafter volunteer and enter the senice of the United States, and be credited upon
the quota of the borough under an impending draft. The whole pu'1>ose, therefore, was to relieve the community from the threatened conscription. But in the
case of Brodhead v. 1\lilwaukec, 19 Wi11. 652, it was held constitutional, not only
to provide for the future by such municipal taxation, but also to raise moneys to
pay bounties to volunteers previously enlisted, as well as to those who should
thereafter procure substitutes for themselves, and have them credited on the
munieipal quota. Chief Justice Dixo11, in delivering the opinion of the court,
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municipal corporation shall have voted moneys for such pur-
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pose without legislative authority, it is competent for the

municipal corporatiDn shall have voted moneys for such purpose without legislative authority, it is competent for the

says: “ I think the consideration of gratitude alone to the soldier for his services,

be he volunteer, substitute, or drafted man, will sustain a tax for bounty money

to be paid to him or his family. Certainly no stronger consideration of gratitude

can possibly exist than that which arises from the hardships, privations, and dan-

gers which attend the citizen in the military service of his country; and all na-

tions have ever so regarded it. \Vho will say that the legislature may not, in

consideration of such services, either directly or indirectly, or through the agency

of the municipality or district to which he is credited, give to the soldier or his

family a suitable bounty after his enlistment, or even after his term of service has

expired? I certainly cannot. It is a matter which intimately concerns the pub-

lic welfare; and that nation will live longest in fact, as well as in history, and be

most prosperous, whose people are most sure and prompt in the reasonable and

proper acknowledgment of such obligations.

“ But the act provides for paying the same bounties ‘ to persons who shall pro-

cure substitutes for themselves before being drafted, and have them credited to

such town, city, or village upon its quota,’ under the then pending call of the

President, or any call which should thereafter be made; and it is said that

clearly no debt of gratitude is due to such persons. To my mind it is not quite

so clear. Suppose that during the late rebellion citizens enough in the loyal

States, liable to military service, had furnished substitutes so as promptly to have
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answered the calls of the President, and kept the armies of the Union replenished

with new soldiers, and so as to have avoided the evils and expenses of the drafts;

is it clear that all the communities thus relieved would have been under no obli-

gation of gratitude to such citizens? Suppose still further, that, under the system

of apportionment adopted by Congress, a. sufﬁcient number of such citizens had

been found in any town, city, or election precinct to have ﬁlled its quota by sub-

stitutes; would there have been no cause for thankfulness on the part of the

inhabitants of such town, city, or precinct for their having done so? I must con-

fess that I think there would. War, though often unavoidable, is always a most

deplorable public misfortune; and among its calamities, not the least, I may say

the greatest, is the forcible separation of husbands, fathers, sons, and brothers

from their homes, kindred, and friends, to be made bloody sacriﬁces on the ﬁeld

of battle, or to die of loathsome diseases contracted in camps or upon campaigns;

and those who avert the evils of such forcible separation, I care not from what

motive of private or individual interest, so that the duty of furnishing men for the

army is performed, cannot but be regarded as in some sense public benefactors.

“ But it is not for those who have furnished substitutes in the past that the act

provides bonntics, but for those who shall do so under a pending call before being

drafted, and have them credited to the town, city, or village, so as to avoid or help

to avoid an approaching/ draft. In such case the power to tax may not rest upon

the ground of gratitude. It can be sustained upon consideration of the beneﬁt

accruing to the town, city, or village from the credit, which is direct and palpa-

ble. The procuring of substitutes was lawful and proper in itself. The act of

Congress authorizes it, and the credit to the town, city, or village. Substitutes

must be persons not liable to the draft, so as not to affect the interests of those
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says : " I think the consideration of gratitude alone to the soldier for his services,
be he volunteer, substitute, or drafted man, will sustain a tax for bounty money
to be paid to him or his family. Certainly no stronger consideration of gratitude
can possibly exist than that which arises from the hardships, privations, and dangers which attend the citizen in the military service of his country ; and all nations have ever so regarded it. Who will say that the legislature may not, in
consideration of such services, either directly 9r indirectly, or through the agenC'y
of the municipality or district to whi~:h he is credited, give to the soldier or his
family a suitable bounty after his enlistment, or even after his term of service has
expired? I certainly cannot. It is a matter which intimately concerns the public welfare ; and that nation will lwe longest in fact, as well as in history, and be
most prosperous, whose people are most sure and prompt in the reasonable and
proper acknowledgment of such obligations.
" But the act provides for paying the same bounties ' to persons who shall procure substitutes for themselves before being drafted, and have them credited to
such town, city, or village upon its quota,' under the then pending call of the
President, or any call which should thereafter be made ; aud it is said that
clearly no debt of gratitude is due to such persons. To my mind it is not quite
so clear. Suppose that during the late rebellion citizens enough in the loyal
States, liable to military service, had furnished substitutes so as promptly to have
answered the calls of the President, and kept the armies of the Union replenished
with new soldiers, and so as to have avoided the evils and expenses of the drafts;
is it clear that all the communities thus relieved would have been under no obligation of gratitude to such citizens? Suppose still further, that, under the system
of apportionment adopted by Congress, a sufficient number of sueh citizens had
been found in any town, city, or election precinct to have filled its quot:L by substitutes; would there have been no cause for thankfulness on th~ part of the
inhabitants of such to1m, city, or precinct for their having done so? I must confess that I think there would. War, though often unavoidable, is always a most
deplorable public misfortune; and among its calamities, not the lfl!Uit, I may say
tbt) greatest, is the forcible separation of husbands, Jilthcrs, sons, and brothers
from their homes, kindred, and friends, to be m1de bloody sacrifices on the fi~ld
of battle, or to die of loathsome disl'ases contracted in camps or upon campaigns ;
and those who avert the evils of such forcible sep:u-ll.tion, I care not from whst
motive of private or individual interest, so that the duty of furnishing men for the
army is performed, cannot but be regarded as in some sense public benefactors.
"But it is not for those who have furnished sub~titutes in the past that the act
provides bounties, but for those who shall do so und~r a pending call before being
drafted, and have them credited to the town, city, or village, so as to avoid or help
to avoid an approaching,draft. In such case the power to tax may not rest upon
the ground of gratitude. It can be sustained upon consideration of the benefit
accruing to the town, cily, or village from the credit, which ia direct and palpable. The procuring of substitutes was lawful and proper in itself. The act of
Congress authorizes it, and the credit to the town, city, or ,·illage. Substitutes
must be persons not liable to the draft, so as not to affect the interesta of those
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*legislature afterwards to legalize their action if it shull [* 225]
so ch.oose.1

who were, otherwise than by directly relieving them from the burden of it. The

provision for substitutes was a necessity. Other obligations exist as strong, some-

times almost stronger, than that of carrying arms in the public defence ; and they

could not be ignored. Some were ,so situated that personal service seemed im-

possible. Others might not go without greater loss to the community at home

than gain to the public at large. The procuring of substitutes was therefore not

only proper, but in many cases commendable. Persons procuring them per-

formed their whole duty under the law. They furnished soldiers for the ﬁeld,

and relieved the communities in which they resided, the same as if they bad them-

selves enlisted. So far as the public interest is concerned in being relieved from

the draft, I can see no distinction between paying bounties to them and to those

who volunteer. Both contribute precisely in the same degree to such relief. The

error of counsel, I think, consists in looking exclusively to the motives of private

advantage by which the persons were governed. That such motives existed, and

were most frequently the predominant cause of their procuring substitutes, will

not be denied. But there is no public good without at the same time some pri-

vate gain; and in the language of Chief Justice Black, it is enough that we can

see any possible public interest in the act, or public beneﬁt to be derived from it.

All beyond that is a question of expediency for the legislature, not of law, much
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less of constitutional law to be determined by the courts.”

‘ The town of Woodbury, being subject to a call for thirty-two men for ser-

vice in the national army, passed a resolution appropriating six thousand four

hundred dollars from the treasury of the township for the purpose of procuring

substitutes to fill such call. There was no legislation at the time which would

warrant this resolution, but a special statute was afterwards passed authorizing

the town to conﬁrm this action, which it did by vote of a legal meeting called

for the purpose. Bill being ﬁled to restrain action under these votes, it was

alleged that they were illegal, unjust to the tax-payers, unconstitutional, and dis-

loyal to the govemment of the United States; that they were intended to defeat

the proper effect of the law of the United Slates and the call of the President;

and that the town thereby unlawfully undertook to transfer the individual liability

of each person drafted by the United States to widows, orphans, and non-mili-

tary subjects, as well as to those liable in their own persons to do military duty

on behalf of the United States. The court state the question involved in the

case to be this : “ “'hether it is competent for the State legislature to give gra-

tuities to such of its citizens as are called, under the allegiance they owe to the

national government, and independent of the allegiance they owe to the State

government, by distinctive and independent national enactments, to render to

that national government distinct and independent military service, and tax the

citizens generally therefor. For if they have the power to do it, they may im-

pose the duty or confer the power of doing it upon the towns.” And after saying

that the State constitutions do not, in express terms, confer any such power, nor

expressly forbid it, and that the question therefore is, whether it is within the

grant of legislative power, they proceed to show that the special statute was not
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who were, otherwise than by din·ctly relieving them from the burdeu of it. The
provision for substitutes was a necessity. Other obligations exist as strong, sometimes almost stronger, than that of carrying arms in the public defence; and they
could not be ignored. Some were ,so situated that personal service seemed impossible. Others might not go without greater loss to the community at home
than gain to the- public at large. The procuring of substitutes was therefore not
only proper, but in many cases commendable. Persons procuring them perfanned their whole duty under the law. They furnished soldiers for the field,
and relieved the communities in which they resided, the same as if they bad themselves enlisted. So far ns the public interest is concerned in 'being relie\·ed from
the draft, I can see no distinction between paying bounties to them and to thoge
who volunteer. Both contribute precisely in the same degree to such relief. The
error of counsel, I think, consists in looking exclusively to the motives of private
advantage by which the persons were governed. That such moth·es existed, and
were most frequently the predominant cause of their procuring substitutes, will
not be denied. But tbere is no public good without at the same time sonre private gain ; and in the language of Chief Justice Black, it is enough that we can
see any possible public interest in the act, or public benefit to be <.lt•rived from it.
All beyond that is a question of expediency for the legislature, not of law, much
less of constitutional law to be determined by the courts."
1 The town of Woodbury, being subject to a call for thirty-two men for service in the national army, passed a resolution appropriating six thousand four
hundred dollars from the treasury of the township for tbe purpose of procuring
substitutes to fill such call. There was no legislation at the time which would
warrant this resolution, but a special statute was aftenvards passed authorizing
the town to confirm this action, which it did by vote of a lt'gal meeting called
for the purpose. Bill being filed to restrain action under these votes, it was
alleged that they were illegal, unjust to the tax-payers, unconstitutional, and disloyal to the government of tbe United States; that they were intended to deft·at
the proper effect of the law of the United States and the call of the President;
and that the town thereby unlawfully undertook to vansfer the individual liability
of each person drafted by the United States to widows, orphans, and non-military subject!, as well as to those liable in their own persons to do military duty
on behalf of the United States. The court state the question involved in the
case to be this: " Whether it is competent for the State legislature to give gratuities to such of its citizens as are called, under the allegiance they owe to the
national government, and independt.'nt of the allegiance they owe to the State
gm·ernment, by distinctive and independent national enactments, to render to
that national government distinct and independent military service, and tax the
citizens generally therefor. For if they have the power to do it, they may impose the duty or ron fer the power of doing it upon the towns." And after saying
that the State constitutions do not, in express terms, confer any such power, nor
expressly forbid it, and that the question therefore is, whether it is within the
grant of legislath·e power, they proceed to show that the special statute was not
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assume that, if the purpose is one for which the State

such an infringement of natural justice as would warrant the court in holding it

inoperative, as in excess of legislative authority, for several reasons.

“ In the ﬁrst place, if it be conceded that it is not competent for the legisla-

tive power to make a gift of the common property, or of a sum of money to be

raised by taxation, where no possible public beneﬁt, direct or indirect, can be

derived therefrom, such exercise of the legislative power must be of an extraor-

dinary character to justify the interference of the judiciary. And this is not that

case.

“ Second. If there be the least possibility that making the gift will be pro-

motive in any degree of the public welfare, it becomes a question of policy, and

not of natural justice; and the determination of the legislature is conclusive.

And such is this case. Such gifts to unfortunate classes of society, as the indi-

gent blind, the deaf and dumb, or insane, or grants to particular colleges or

schools, or grants of pensions, swords, or other mementoes for past services,

involving the general good indirectly and in slight degree, are frequently made

and nevi 1' questioned.

" Third. The government of the United States was constituted by the people

of the State, although acting in concert with the people of other States, and the

general good of the people of this State is involved in the maintenance of that

general government. In many conceivable ways the action of the town of \"Vood-
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bury might not only mitigate the burdens imposed upon a class, but render the

service of that class more efﬁcient to the general government, and therefore it

must be presumed that the legislature found that the public good was in fact

thereby promoted.

“And fourth, it is obviously possible, and therefore to be intended, that the

General Assembly found a clear equity to justify their action.

,“ Every citizen i bound to take up arms when necessary in defence of his

government; not as a matter of strict law, but as an incident of citizenship; and

the selection of a. class only of a certain age, of whom that service is to be im-

mcdiatt-ly demanded in a particular case, although wise, is arbitrary, not based

on any peculiar or special obligation resting upon the class, or on their liability

alone to render the service, or to render it with less pecuniary or social sacriﬁce,

but on the wants of the government, and the supposed ﬁtness of the class to

subserve the purposes of the government with more eﬂioiency than others. But

if all owe the service, and it is for the common good, and there is the usual pro-

vision that it may be rendered by substitute or commutation, it is not easy to see

why men above forty-ﬁve years of age, if able-bodied, may not be called upon

as well as those of less age. If not as able to endure the hardships of the ﬁeld,

they may answer equally well for garrison duty, or as details, and presumptively

they are better able to procure substitutes, or commute, for they have more gen-

erally accumulated property or received it by inheritance. Indeed, if substitu-

tion and commutation are made elements of the conscription, —and they were of

the law in question, -— the ability to procure a substitute or commute may well

be an element without regard to age, and therefore when all above a certain age

are exempt, they are favored; and it is clearly equitable and just that they equal-

_ §__ - ~ 1 —' ~——
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• The cases to which we have referred in the notes
assume that, if the purpose is one for which the State

such an infringement of natural justice as would warrant the court in holding it
inoperative, as in excess of legislative authority, for several reasons.
" In the first place, if it be conceded that it is not competent for the legislative power to make a gift of the common property, or of a sum of money to be
raised by taxation, where no possible public benefit, direct or indire<.-t, can be
derived therefrom, such exercise of the fegislative power must be of an extraordinary character to justify the interference of the judiciary. And this is not that
case.
" Second. If there be the least possibility that making the gift will be promoti\·e in any degree of the public welfare, it becomes a question of policy, and
not of natural justice ; and the determination of the legislature is conclusive.
And such is this case. Such gif'UI to unfortunate classes of society, as the indigent blind, the deaf and dumb, or insane, or grants to particular colleges or
schools, or grants of pensions, swords, or other mementoes for past services,
involving the general good indirectly and in slight degree, are frequently made
and nev1 r questioned.
"Third. The government of the United States was constituted by the people
of the ~tate, although acting in concert with the people of other States, and the
genet·al good of the people of this State is involved in the maintenance of tllat
general government. In many conceivable ways the action of the town of Woodbury might not only mitigate the burdens imposed upon a class, but render the
service of that class more dlicient to the general government, and therefore it
must be presumed that the legislature found that the public good was in fact
thert•by promoted.
'• And fourth, it is obviously possible, and th~refore to be intended, that the
General Assembly found a clear equity to justify their action.
" Every citizen is bound to take up arms when nee.essary in defence of his •
governm~ut; not as a matter of :;trict law, but as an incidtmt of citizenship; and
the ~eleetion of a dass only of a certain age, of whom that service is to be immNliatdy demanded in a particular ease, although wise, is arbitrary, not based
on any peculiar or special obligation resting upon the class, or on their liability
alun~ to render the service, or to render it with less pecuniary or social sacrifice,
but on the wants of the government, and the supposed fitness of the class to
snbservll the purposes of the government with more efficiency than othera. But
if all owe the service, and it is for the common good, and there is the usual provi~ion that it may be rendered by substitute or commutation, it is not easy to see
why men above forty-five years of age, if able-bodied, may not be called upon
as well as those of less age. If not as able to endure the hardships of the field,
they may answer equally Willi for garrison duty, or as details, and presumptively
they are better able to procure substitutes, or commute, for they have more generally act·umulated property or received it by inheritance. Indeed, if sub!ltitution and commutation are made element& of the con~cription, -and they were of
the law in question, -the ability to procure a substitute or eommute may well
be an elt·ment without regard to age, and therefore when all above a certain age
are exempt, they are favored; and it ill d~a.rly equitable and just that they equal-
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would also have power to apportion and impose the duty, or confer

the power of assuming it upon the towns and other municipal or

political divisions. And the rule laid down is one which opens a

broad ﬁeld to legislative discretion, allowing as it does the

raising and "‘ appropriation of moneys, whenever, in the [* 227]

somewhat extravagant words of one of the cases, there is

“the least possibility that it will be promotive in any degree of the

public welfare.” 1 The same rule, substantially, has been recognized

by the Court of Appeals of New York. “ The legislature is not

conﬁned in its appropriation of the public moneys, or of the sums

to be raised by taxation in favor of individuals, to cases in which a

legal demand exists against the State. It can thus recognize

claims founded in equity and justice in the largest sense of these

terms, or in gratitude or charity. Independently of express con-

stitutional restrictions, it can make appropriations of money when-

ever the public well-being requires or will be promoted by it, and

it is the judge of what is for the public good. It can, moreover,

under the power to levy taxes, apportion the public burdens among

ize the burden by bounties to those who are draﬁed and serve. or by making

provision for the support of their families. On this obvious equity rests the

general law making provision for the families of all drafted men and their sub-
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stitutes.” '

The court were therefore of opinion that it was competent for the General

Assembly to pass votes in reference to all the drafted men of the State like those

which this town had passed, and that it was equally competent for them to dele-

gate that power to the towns, and of course to authorize the towns to ratify votes

of that character which they had before adopted. Booth v. Town of \Voodbury,

32 Conn. 118. See, to the same elfect, Bartholomew v. Harwinton, 33 Conn. 408;

might properly levy a tax upon its citizens at large, the legislature
would also have power to apportion and impose the duty, or confer
the power of assuming it upon the towns and other municipal or
political divisions. And the rule laid down is one which opens a
broad field to legislative discretion, allowing as it does the
raising and •appropriation of moneys, whenever, in the [* 227]
somewhat extravagant words of one of the cases, there is
"the least possibility that it will be promotive in any degree of the
public welfare." 1 The same rule, substantially, has been recognized
by the Court of Appeals of New York. "The legislature is not
confined in its appropriation of the public moneys, or of the sums
to be raised by taxation in favor of individuals, to cases in which a
legal demand exists against the State. It can thus recognize
claims founded in equity and justice in the largest sense of these
terms, or in gratitude or charity. Independently of express constitutional restrictions, it can make appropriations of money whenever the public well-being requires or will be promoted by it, and
it is the judge of what is for the public good. It can, moreo,·er,
under the power to levy taxes, apportion the public burdens among

Crowell v. Hopkinton, 45 N. H. 9; Shackford v. Newington, 46 N. H. 415;

Lowell v. Oliver, 8 Allen, 247 ; Ahl v. Gleim, 52 Penn. St. 432; “’eister v. Hade,

ib. 474; Cotfman v. Keightley, 24 Ind. 509; Board of Commissioners v. Brearss,

25 Ind. 110; Connor v. Fulsom, 13 Minn. 219; State v. Demorest, 32 N. J. 528;

Taylor v. Thompson, 42 Ill. 9. In State v. Jackson, 33 N. J . 450, a statute

authorizing a town to raise money by tax to relieve its inhabitants from the bur-

den of a draft under a law of Congress, was held void as tending to dc-feat the

purpose of such law. The decision was made by a bare majority of a bench of

eleven judges.

' Booth 0. Woodbury, 32 Conn. 128, per Butler, J. “To make a tax law

unconstitutional on this ground, it must be apparent at ﬁrst blush that the com-

munity taxed can have no possible interest in the purpose to which their money

is to be applied.” Sharpless v. Mayor, &c. 21 Penn. St. 174, following Cheaney

v. Hooser, 9 B. Monr. 345.
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ize the burden by bounties to those who are drafted and serve. or by making
provision for the support of their families. On this obvious equity rests the
general law making provision for the families of all drafted men and their substitutes."
The court were therefore of opinion that it was competent for the General
Assembly to pass votes in reference to all the drafted men of the State like those
which this town had passed, and that it was equally competent for them to delegate that power to the towns, and of course to authorize the towns to ratify votes
of that character which they had before adopted. Booth"· Town ofWoodbury,
3~ Conn. 118. Sec, to the same effect, Bartholomew "· Harwinton, 33 Conn. 408;
Crowell v. Hopkinton, 4b N.H. 9; Shack:ford v. Newington, 46 N. H. 415;
Lowell v. Oliver, 8 Allen, 247; Ahl "·Gleim, 52 Penn. St. 482; Weister v. Hade,
ib. 4H; Coffman v. Keightley, 24 Ind. 509; Board of Commissioners v. Brearss,
2.') Ind. 110; Connor tJ. Fulsom, 13 Minn. 219 ; State "· Demorest, 32 N. J . .'J28;
Taylor "· Thompson, 42 lll. 9. In State v. Jackson, 33 N. J. 450, a statute
authorizing a town to raise money by tax to relieve its inhabitants from the burden of a draft under a Jaw of Congress, was held void as tending to dt:fcat the
purpose of such law. The decision was made by a bare majority of a bench of
eleven judges.
1 Booth"· Woodbury, 32 Conn. 128, per Butler, J.
''To make a tax law
uncomtitutional on this ground, it must be apparent at first blush that the community taxed can have no possible interest in the purpose to which their money
is to be applied." Sharpless"· Mayor, &c. 21 Penn. St. 174, following Cheaney
"· Hooser, 9 B. Monr. 345.
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all the tax-paying citizens of the State, or among those of a partic-

(CH. VIII.

ular section or political division.” 1 And where citizens have vol-

untarily advanced moneys for the purpose of paying bounties to

recruits who ﬁll the quota of a municipal corporation, on an under-

standing, based upon informal corporate action, that the moneys

should be refunded when a law should be passed permitting it, a

subsequent act of the legislature authorizing taxation for this pur-

pose is valid? i

However broad are the terms employed in describing the legis-

lative power over taxation in these eases, it is believed that no one

of them has gone so far as to sanction taxation or the appropri-

ation of the public revenue in order to refund to individuals

moneys which they may have paid to relieve themselves from an

impending draft, or may have voluntarily contributed to any public

purposes, from motives purely personal to themselves, without

any reason to rely upon the credit of the State, or of any munici-

pal corporation, for reimbursement, and where the circumstances

are not such as fairly to challenge the public gratitude. Taxation

in such a ease, where no obligation, honorary or otherwise, rests

upon the public, would be nothing else than a naked ease of appro-

priating the property of the tax-payer for private purposes, and

that without reference to anticipated public beneﬁts.“
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' Guilford v. Supervisors of Chenango, 13 N. Y. 149.

' Weister v. Hadc, 52 Penn. St. 474. And see People v. Sullivan, 43 Ill.

413; Johnson v. Campbell, 49 Ill. 316.

3 Tyson v. School Directors, &c. 51 Penn. St. 9. A meeting of persons liable

to draft under the law of the United States was called, and an association formed,

called the Halifax Bounty Association, which levied an assessment of thirty dol-

lars on each person liable to military duty in the township, and solicited contri-

butions from others. Afterwards, an act was passed by the legislature, with a

preamble reciting that certain citizens of Halifax township, associated as the

Halifax Bounty Association, for freeing the said township from the late drafts,

all the tax-paying citizens of the State, or among those of a particular section or political division." 1 And where citizens have voluntarily advanced moneys for the purpose of paying bounties to
recruits who fill the quota of a municipal corporation, on an understanding, based upon informal corporate action, that the moneys
should be refunded when a law should be passed permitting it, a
subsequent act of the legislature authorizing taxation for this purpose is valid.2
However broad are the terms employed in describing the legislative power over taxation in these cases, it is believed that no one
'of them has gone so far as to sanction taxation or the appropriation of the public revenue in order to refund to individuals
moneys which they may have paid to relieve themselves from an
impending draft, or may have voluntarily contributed to any public
purposes, from motives purely personal to themselves, without
any reason to rely upon the credit of the State, or of any municipal corporation, for reimbursement, and where the circumstances
are not such as fairly to challenge the public gratitude. Taxation
in such a case, where no obligation, honorary or otherwise, rests
upon the public, would be nothing else than a naked case of appropriating the property of the tax-payer for private purposes, and
that without reference to anticipated public benefits.3

advanced moneys, which were expended in paying bounties to volunteers to ﬁll

the quota of the township. The act then authorized and required the school

directors to borrow such sums of money as would fully reimburse the said Hali-

fax Bounty Association for moneys advanced to free said township from the

draft, and then further authorized the school directors to levy and collect a tax

to repay the sums borrowed. The court say: “ \Ve are bound to regard the

statute as an authority to reimburse what was intended by the Association as

advances made to the township with the intent or understanding to be reimbursed

or returned to those contributing. This was the light in which the learned judge

below regarded the terms used; and unless this appears in support of the present

levy by the school directors, they are acting without authority. But the learned

i_ - _._‘.— - -Q
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Guilford v. Supervisors of Chenango, 18 N.Y. 149.
W cister v. Hade, f>2 Penn. St. 474. And see People "· Sullivan, 43 Ill.
418; Johnson o. Campbell, 49 Ill. 316.
3 Tyson v. School Directors, &c. 51 Penn. St. 9. A meeting of persons liable
to draft under the law of the United States was called, and an association formed,
called the Halifax Bounty Association, which levied an assessment of thirty dol~
lars on each person liable to military duty in the township, and solicited contributions from others. Afterwards, an act was passed by the legislature, with a
preantble reciting that certain citizens of Halifax township, as~~t>ciated as the
Halifax Bounty A~sociation, for freeing the said township from the late drafts,
advanced moneys, which were expended in paying bounties to ..-olnnteers to fill
the quota of the township. The aet then authorized and required the school
directors to borrow such sums of money as would fully reimburse the said Halifax Bounty Association for moneys advanced to free said township from the
draft, and then further authorized the school directors to levy and rollt-ct a ta.'t
to repay the sums borrowed. The court say: " We are bound to regard the
statute as an authority to reimburse what was intended by the Association as
advances made to the township with the intent or understanding to be reimbursed
or returned to those contributing. This was the light in which the learned judge
below regarded the tenus used; and unless this appears in support of the present
levy by the school directors, they are acting without authority. But the learned
1

1
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But it has been held by the Supreme Court of Massa- [* 228]

chusetts that towns might be authorized by the legislature

to raise moneys by taxation for the purpose of refunding sums

contributed by individuals to a common fund, in order to ﬁll the

quota of such towns under a call of the President, notwithstand-

ing such moneys might have been contributed without promise or

expectation of reimbursement. The court were of opinion

that such contributions * might well be considered as ad- [* 229]

vancements to a public purpose, and, being such, the leg-

islature might well recognize the obligation and provide for its

discharge.‘ -

judge, if I properly comprehend his meaning, did not give suﬂicient importance

to these terms, and hence, I apprehend, he fell into error. He does not seem to

have considered it essential whether the Association paid its money voluntarily

in aid of its own members, or expressly to aid the township in saving its people

from a draft, with the understanding that it was advanced in the character of a

• But it has been held by the Supreme Court of Massa- [* 228]
chusetts that towns might be authorized by the legislature
to raise moneys by taxation for the purpose of refunding sums
contributed by individuals to a common fund, in order to fill the
quota of such towns under a call of the President, notwithstanding such moneys might have been contributed without promise or
expectation of reimbursement. The court wet•e of opinion
that such contributions • might well be considered as ad- [* 229]
vancements to a public purpose, and, being such, the leghdature might well recognize the obligation and provide for its
discharge.!

loan if the legislature chose to direct its repayment, and the school directors

chose to act on the authority conferred. This we cannot agree to. Such an

enactment would not be legislation at all. It would be in the‘nature of judicial

action, it is true; but wanting the justice of notice to the parties to be affected

_by the hearing, trial, and all that gives sanction and force to regular judicial
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proceedings, it would much more resemble an imperial rescript than constitutional

legislation: ﬁrst, in declaring an obligation where none was created or previously

existed; and next, in decreeing payment by directing the money or property of

the people to be sequestered to make the payment. The legislature can exercise

no such despotic functions; and as it is not apparent in the act that they attempted

to do so, we are not to presume that they did. They evidently intended the

advancements to be reimbursed to be only such as were made on the faith that

they were to be returned.” See also Crowell v. Hopkinton, 45 N. H. 9; Miller

v. Grandy, 13 Mich. 540; Peasc v. Chicago, 21 Ill. 508; Ferguson v. Landraw,

5 Bush, 230; Esty v. Westminster, 97 Mass. 324; Cole v. Bedford, ib. 326;

Usher v. Colehester, 33 Conn. 567. In Freeland v. Hastings, 10 Allen, 570, it

was held that.the legislature could not empower towns to raise money by tax-

ation for the purpose of refunding what had been paid by individuals for substi-

tutes in military service. In Cass v. Dillon, 16 Ohio, N. s. 38, it was held that

taxes to refund bounties previously and voluntarily paid might be authorized.

See also State v. Harris, 17 Ohio, N. S. 608.

' Freeland v. Hastings, 10 Allen, 585. The court, after considering the gen-

eral ubject of the power to authorize the towns to raise money by tax for the

payment of bounties to volunteers, proceed to say: “ It would seem to follow

as a necessary consequence, that not only was the payment of bounties by the

Commonwealth, and by cities and towns, for the purpose of procuring volunteers,

a proper and legitimate object of expenditure of public money, raised or to be

raised by taxation, but also that money contributed voluntarily by individuals to

raise a fund for the same purpose may well have been considered by the legis-
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judge, if I properly comprehend his meaning, did not give sufficient importanoo
to these terms, and hence, I apprehend, he fell into error. He does not seem to
have considered it essential whether the Association paid its money voluntarily
in aid of its own members, or expressly to aid the township in s~ving its people
from a draf\, with the understanding that it was advanced in the character of a
loan if the legislature chose to direct its repayment, and the Rchool directors
chose to act on the authority conferred. This we cannot agree to. Such an
enactment would not be legislation at all. It would be in the'nature of judicial
action, it is true; but wanting the justice of notice to the parties to be affected
by the hearing, trial, and all that gives sanction and force to regular judicial
proceedings, it would much more resemble an imperial rescript than constitutional
legislation: first, in declaring an obligation where none was created or previously
existed; and next, in decreeing payment by directing the money or property of
the people to be sequestered to make the payment. The legislature can exercise
no such despotic functions ; and as it is not apparent in the act that they attempted
to do so, we are not to presume that they did. They evidently intende1l the
adDance1M71ls to be reimbursed to be only such as were made on the faith that
they were to be returned." See also Crowell v. Hopkinton, 45 N.H. 9; l\liller
.v. Grandy, 13 Mich. 540; Pease v. Chicago, 21 Til. 508; Ferguson v. Lamlraw,
5 Bush, 230; Llty v. Westminster, 97 Mass. 324; Cole v. Bedford, ib. 326;
Usher v. Colchester, 33 Conn. 567. In Freeland v. Hastings, 10 Allen, 5i0, it
was held that~he legislature could not empower towns to raise money by taxation for the ('Urpose of refunding what had been paid by individuals for substitutes in military service. In Cass v. Dillon, 16 Ohio, N. s. 38, it was held that.
taxes to refund bounties previously and voluntarily paid might be authorized.
See also State v. Harris, 17 Ohio, N. s. 608.
1 Freeland"· Hastings, 10 Allen, 585.
The court, after considering the general subject of the power to authorize the towns to raise money by tax fo1· the
payment of bounties to volunteers, proceed to say : •• It would seem to follow
u a necessary consequence, that not only was the payment of bounties by the
Commonwealth, and by cities and towns, for the purpose of procuring volunteers,
a proper and legitimate object of expenditure of public money, raised or to be
raised by taxation, but also that money contributed voluntarily by individuals to
rai.ee a fund for the same purpose may well have been considered by the legis-
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a municipal corporation, to compel its citizens to assume

lature as an advancement of money for a public object. When in the summer

of 1864 it became necessary to furnish a large additional number of soldiers to

the army of the United States by ﬁlling the quotas allotted to the several cities

[• 230]

• Whether the legislature has power, against the will of
a municipal corporation, to compel its citizens to assume

and towns, a public exigency had arisen for which no adequate provision had

been made by the legislature. The alternative was presented to the people of

the Commonwealth of procuring volunteers to enlist by the payment of bounties,

or of submitting to the evils and hardships attendant upon an attempt to recruit

the army by a draft. In most if not all of the cities and towns, it was deemed

to be wise and expedient, and most for the interest of the inhabitants, to em-

brace the former branch of this alternative; and accordingly, as no authority

was then vested in towns or cities to raise money by taxation or otherwise for

the payment of bounties, resort was had to the method of procuring voluntary

contributions to raise a fund in each town for such purpose. But these contribu-

tions, though voluntarily made, and without any legal claim on the town or city

for reimbursement, or any expectation of legislative sanction, were nevertheless

given in aid of the performance of a public duty, which devolved on the city or

town, and for which it would have been competent for the legislature, in anticipa-

tion of the exigency, to authorize money to be raised, by taxation or otherwise,

on the credit of a town or city. In this view the question as to the validity of

the statute resolves itself into this: whether it was competent for the legislature
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to authorize towns and cities to repay to individuals money which, in the opinion_

of the legislature, they had advanced in a pressing public exigency to enable a

town or city to discharge a duty which was legally devolved upon it, and which

it could-not have performed without such adventitious aid. Upon the best con-

sideration which we have been able to give the subject, we can see no legal or

constitutional objection to the action of the legislature. \Ve are not called upon

to determine the wisdom or expediency of the act. Confining ourselves to the

question whether the legislature have transcended their authority in passing it,

we are of opinion that no private right is invaded, and no constitutional barrier

overstepped, in giving authority to cities and towns to raise money by taxation

to reimburse individuals for contributions made in aid of an object of a public or

municipal nature; or, in other words, that as it is competent for the legislature

to authorize the imposition of taxes to raise money to be expended for a public

purpose, so it is competent for them to sanction an expenditure already made

for a like object, and to give authority for its repayment by means of‘ taxation.

If these views are correct, then it follows that the statute under consideration is

not obnoxious to the objections to its validity urged by the petitioners. It cannot

in any just sense he said that the legislature authorized an assessment, by means

of which money could be capriciously taken from one individual or class and

given to another, or that it sanctioned the appropriation of public money to

the payment of claims which had no just or equitable existence. The clear and

decisive answer to all such objections is, that the money which the statute author-

ized towns to repay by means of taxation was raised and contributed for a

public object. This seems to us not only to constitute a test by which the validity

of the statute is proved, but also a safe limit by which the power of the legislature

1 W ___;_7 _ - — ‘ _ <-
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lature as an advancement of money for a public object. When in the summer
of 1864 it became necessary to furnish a large additional number of soldiers to
the army of tho United States by filling the quotas allotted to the several cities
and towns, a public exigency had arisen for which no adequate provision had
been made by the legislature. The alternative was presented to the people of
the Commonwealth of procuring volunteers to enlist by the payment. of bounties,
or of submitting to the evils and hardships attendant upon an attempt to recruit
the army by a draft. In most if not all of the cities and towns, it was deemed
to be wise and expedient, and most for the interest of the inhabitants, to embrace the former branch of this alternative; and accordingly, as no authority
was then vested in towns or cities to raise money by taxation or otherwi11e for
the payment of bounties, resort was had to the method of procuring voluntary
contributions to raise a fund in each town for such purpose. But these contributions, though voluntarily made, and without any legal claim on the town or city
for reimbursement, or any expectation of legiblative sanction, were nevertheless
given in aid of the performance of a public duty, which devolved on the city or
town, and for which it would have been competent for the legislature, in anticipation of the exigency, to authorize money to be raised, by taxation or otherwise,
on the credit of a town or city. In this view the qu~stion as to the validity of
the statute resolves itself into this: whether it was competent for the legislature
to authorize towns and cities to repay to individuals money which, in the opinion.
of the legislature, they had advanced in a pressing public exigency to enable a
town or city to discharge a duty which was legally devolved upon it, and which
it could not have performed without such a1hentitious aid. Upon the best consideration which we have been able to give the subject, we can see no legal or
constitutional objection to the action of the legislature. ·we arc not called upon
to determine the wisdom or expediency of the act. Confining ourselves to the
question whether the legislature have transcended their authority in passing it,
we are of opinion that no private right is invaded, and no constitutional barrier
overstepped, in giving authority to cities and towns to raise money by taxation
to reimburse individuals for contributions made in aid of an object of a public or
municipal nature; or, in other words, that as it is competent for the legislature
to authorize the imposition of taxes to raise money to be expended for a public
purpose, so it is competent for them to sanction an expenditure already made
for a like object, and to give authority for its repayment by means of taxation.
If these views are correct, then it follows that the statute under consideration is
not obnoxious to the objections to its validity urged by the petitioners. It cannot
in any just sense he said that the legislature authorized an assessment, by means
of which money could be capriciously taken from one individual or class and
given to another, or that it sanctioned the appropriation of public money to
the payment of claims which had no just or equitable existence. The clear and
decisive answer to all such objections is, that the money which the statute authorized towns to repay by means of taxation was raised and contributed for a
public object. This 11eems to us not only to constitute a test by which the validity
of the statute is proved, but also a safe limit by which the power of the legislature
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an obligation, and to discharge it by taxation, where the obligation

CH. VIII.]

THE GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT.

is one which it would not fall within the ordinary functions of mu-

nicipal government to enter into, is a question which, if it is to be

decided by authority, is not entirely free from diﬁieulty. There

are cases which deny to the legislature the possession of any such

power; and which claim for the municipal organizations the same

exemption from compulsory burdens, outside the circle of their

ordinary legal duties, that protects the individual citizen. And

even where a moral obligation may fairly be said to rest uponthe

municipality, it is denied, in some eases, that the legislature can

convert it into a legal demand, and enforce its payment, though

it is conceded that the State may authorize the citizens of the

municipality to assume the burden and discharge it if they choose

to do so.‘

to authorize taxation for repayments or reimbursements of money advanced

without legislative sanction may be restrained." This case should be compared

and contrasted with that of Tyson v. School Directors, 51 Penn. St. 9, given

fully in a preceding note.

‘ In Hasbrouck v. Milwaukee, 13 VVis. 37, it appeared that the city of Mil-

waukee had been authorized to issue bonds to an amount not exceeding ﬁfty

thousand dollars, to raise money to expend in the construction of a harbor in

an obligation, and to discharge it by taxation, where the obligation
is one which it would not fall within the ordinary functions of municipal government to enter into, is a question which, if it is to be
decided by authority, is not entirely free from difficulty. There
are cases which deny to the legislature the possession of any such
power; and which claim for the municipal organizations the same
exemption from compulsory burdens, outside the circle of their
ordinary legal duties, that protects the individual citizen. And
even where a moral obligation may fairly be said to rest upon the
municipality, it is deuied, in some cases, that the legislature can
convert it into a legal demand, and enforce its payment, though
it is conceded that the State may authorize the citizens of the
municipality to assume the burden and discharge it if they choose
to do so.1

that city. The city authorities entered into a contract for that purpose, at a
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cost largely exceeding the limit thus ﬁxed. Subsequent acts of the legislature

extended the authority to issue bonds to such an amount as should be necessary

to complete the harbor. Whether these ‘acts had the effect to render valid the

contract before entered into by the city was made a question in the court. It

did not appear that the city petitioned for such subsequent acts, or had in any

way expressed its assent to them. “ Under these circumstances,” say the court,

“the question is, Can the legislature, by recognizing the existence of a pre-

viously void contract, and authorizing its discharge by the city, or in any other

way, coerce the city against its will into a performance of it; or does the law

require the assent of the city as well as of the legislature, in order to make the

obligation binding and cfﬁcacious?

“I must say that, in my opinion, the latter act, as well as the former, is

necessary for that purpose, and that without it the obligation cannot be enforced.

A contract void for want of capacity in one or both of the contracting parties to

enter into it is as no contract; it is as if no attempt at an agreement had ever

been made. And to admit that the legislature, of its own choice, and against the

wishes of either or both of the contracting parties, can give it life and vigor, is

to admit that it is within the scope of legislative authority to divest settled rights

of property, and to take the property of one individual or corporation and

transfer it to another. It is certainly unnecessary at this day to enter into an

argument, or to cite authorities, to show that under a constitutional government

like ours the legislature has no such power.
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to authorize taxation for repayments or reimbursements of money advanced
without legislative sanction may be restrained." This case should be compared
and contrasted with that of Tyson tl. School Directors, 51 Penn. St. 9, given
fully in a preL-eding uote.
1 Iu Hasbrouck o. Milwaukee, 13 Wis. 37, it appeared that the city of 1\lilwaukee had been authorized to issue bonds to an amount not exceeding fifty
thousand dollars, to raise money to expend in the construction of a harbor in
that city. The city authorities entered into a contract for that purpose, at a
cost largely exceeding the limit thus fixed. Subsequent acts of the legislature
extended the authority to issue bonds to such an amount as should be neeessary
to complete the harbor. Whether these •acts had the effect to render valid the
contract before entered into by the city was made a question in the court. It
did not appear that the city petitioned for such subsequent acts, or had in any
way expressed its assent to them. " Undcr these eircumstances," say the court,
" the question is, Can the legislature, by recognizing the existence of a previously ,·oiu contract, and authorizing its discharge by the city, or in any other
way, coerce the city against its will into a performance of it; or dotJs the law
require the assent of the city as well as of the ltJgislature, in order to make the
obligation binding and efficacious ?
"I must say that, in my opinion, the latter act, as well as the fonner, is
necessary for that purpose, and that without it the obligation cannot be enforced.
A contract void for want of capacity in one or both of the contracting parties to
enter into it is as no contract ; it is as if no attempt at an agreement had ever
been made. And to admit that the legislature, of its own choice, and against the
wishes of either or both of the contracting parties, can give it life and vigor, is
to adlllit that it is within the scopt! of legislative authority to divest settled righta
of property, and to take the property of one indh·idual or corporation and
transfer it to another. It is certainly unnecessary at this day to enter into an
argument. or to cite authorities, to show that under a constitutional government
like ours the legislature has no such pow~r.
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[*‘ 231] * There are other cases, however, which appear to go to

• 231

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

[cH. vm .

the extent of holding that municipal corporations and

organizations are so completely under the legislative control, that,

whatever the legislature may permit them to do, with a view to the

general beneﬁt, it may compel them to do, whether their citizens

are willing or not. If, for instance, the legislature may constitu-

tionally authorize a town or city to take stock in a railroad enter-

prise, for the convenience and beneﬁt of its citizens, and on the

supposition that the work, though not local in its character, will

be productive of local beneﬁts, it may also compel such action by

the town or city, or oblige it to refund moneys which individuals

may have advanced for the purpose. And where a State or county

building is to be erected, the eﬂ'ect of which may be locally bene-

ﬁcial, the legislature, on the principle of equalizing, as far as

practicable, the beneﬁts and the burdens, may oblige the town

where it is to be built to contribute to that object such sum as it

shall deem just, over and above the ratable proportion as assessed

upon the State or county at large}

ts

It is undoubtedly true that, in cases like the present, where there is a strong

moral, but no legal obligation to pay, courts have often seized, and may again

seize upon very slight circumstances of assent in order to give effect to the con-
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tract. And in this case, if it appeared that the city did by some authorized

action procure the passage of the act, or had subsequently acquiesced in it by

ratifying the contract, there would be little diﬂiculty in the way of holding it

bound by its terms. In such cases it is the contemporaneous or subsequent

assent of the parties to be bound, coupled with the power or ability on their

[* 231]

• There are other cases, however, which appear to go to
the extent of holding that municipal corporations and
organizations are so completely under the legislative control, that,
whatever the legislature may permit them to do, with a view to the
general benefit, it may compel them to do, whether their citizens
are willing or not. If, for instance, the legislature may constitutionally authorize a town or city to take stock in a railroad enterprise, for the convenience and benefit of its citizens, and on the
suppositio'n that the work, though not local in its character, will
be productive of local benefits, it may also compel such action by
the town or city, or oblige it to refund moneys which individuals
may have advanced for the pul\l)Ose. .And where a State or county
building is to be erected, the effect of which may be locally beneficial, the legislature, on the principle of equalizing, as far as
practicable, the benefits and the burdens, may oblige the town
where it is to be built to contribute to that object such sum as it
shall deem just, over and above the ratable proportion as assessed
upon the State or county at large.I

part to give such assent, which makes the contract obligatory. But the giving

of such assent is a matter which depends upon their own free will. It is a volun-

tary act which they may do or not as they see ﬁt, and in case they think proper

to withhold it, the legislature has no power to compel it.” See also Hampshire

v. Franklin, 16 Mass. 83. for somewhat similar views.

' Kirby 1:. Shaw, 19 Penn. St. 258. In this case, by an act of April 3, 1848,

the commissioners of Bradford county were to add ﬁve hundred dollars annually,

until 1857, to the usual county rates and levies of the borough of Towanda in

said county, for the purpose of defraying the expenses of erecting the court-

house and jail, then in process of erection in that borough. The act was held

constitutional, on the principle of assessment of beneﬁts. In Thomas v. Leland,

24 \Vcnd. 67, it appeared that certain citizens of Utica had given their bond to

the people of the State of New York, conditioned for the payment into the canal

fund of the sum of thirty-eight thousand six hundred and fifteen dollars, the

estimated difference between the cost of connecting the Chenango Canal with

the Erie at Utica, instead of at Whitesborough, as the canal commissioners had

contemplated; and it was held within the constitutional powers of the legislature

-__-~,

[ 246 ]

" It is undoubtedly true that, in ca.ses like the present, where there is a strong
moral, but no lt'gal obligation to pay, courts have often seized, and may again
aeize upon very slight circumstances of a.ssent in order to give effect to the contract. And in this case, if it appeared that the city did by some authorized
action procure the pa.ssage of the act, or had subsequently acquiesced in it by
ratifying the contract, there would be· little difficulty in the way of holding it
bound by its terms. In such ca.ses it is the contemporaneous or subsequent
a~sent of the parties to be bound, coupled with the power or ability on their
part to give such a.ssent, which makes the contract obligatory. But the giving .
of such a.s~ent is a matter which depends upon their own free will. It is a voluntary act which they may do or not as they see fit, and in case they think proper
to withhohl it, the legi~lature ba.s no power to compel it." See also Hampshire
v. Franklin, 16 Ma.ss. 88. for somewhat similar views.
1 Kirby "· Shaw, 19 Penn. St. 2.'>8.
In this case, by an act of April 3, 1848,
the commissioners of Brad~ord county were to add five hundred dollars annually,
until 1857, to the usual county rates and levies of the borough of Towanda in
said county, for the purpose of defraying the expenses of erecting the courthouse and jail, then in process of erection in that borough. The ·act was held
constitutional, on the principle of a.ssessment of benefits. In Thoma.s 11. Leland,
24 Wend. 67, it appeared that certain citizens of Utica had given their bond to
the people of the State of New York, conditioned for the payment into the can&l
fund of the sum of thirty-eight thousand six hundred and fifteen dollars, the
estimated difftJrence between the cost of connecting the Chenango Canal with
the Erie at Utica, instead of at Whitesborough, as the canal commissioners had
contemplated ; and it was held within the constitutional powers of the legisla.ture
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‘ If these cases, which are referred to in the note, are [* 232]

CH. VIII.]

THE GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT.

• 232

sound, the limitations which rest upon the power of the

to require this sum to be assessed upon the taxable property of the city of Utica,

• If these cases, which are referred to in the note, are [* 232]

supposed to be beneﬁted by the canal connection. The court treat the case as

“ the ordinary one of local taxation to make or improve a public highway. If

sound, the limitations which rest upon the power of the

such an act,” says Gowen, J ., “ be otherwise constitutional, we do not see how

the circumstance that a bond had been before given securing the same money

can detract from its validity. Should an individual volunteer to secure a sum of

money in itself properly leviable by way of tax on a town or county, there would

be nothing in the nature of such an arrangement which would preclude the legis-

lature from resorting, by way of tax, to those who are primarily and more justly

liable. Even should he pay the money, what is there in the constitution to pre-

clude his being reimbursed by a tax?" The same general views have been

acted upon in other cases, which assert the complete power of the legislature over

the subject of taxation, and that it must determine what sums shall be raised,

either in the State at large, or in any particular portion of the State, and also to

what objects the sums so raised shall be applied. See particularly Guilford 0.

Supervisors of Chenango, 18 Barb. 615; same case, 13 ‘N. Y. 143; People v.

Mitchell, 45 Barb. 208; same case, 35 N. Y. 551 ; People 0. Power, 25 Ill. 187;

People v. Mayor, &c., of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419; Slack v. Maysville and Lexing-

ton Railroad Co. 13 B. Monr. 26; Cheaney v. Hooser, 9 B. Monr. 330; Cypress

Pond Draining Co. v. Hooper, 2 Met. (Ky.) 353. See also Borough of Dunmore’s
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Appeal, 52 Penn. St. 374. In that case it appeared that a township which was

considerably indebted, had had four boroughs carved out of it. Afterwards an

act was passed by which the Court of Common Pleas was directed to appoint

three commissioners, for the purpose of ascertaining the indebtedness of the

township, and what amount, if any, was due and owing from the boroughs, and

make an equitable adjustment thereof between them all, and allowing no appeal

by the boroughs from their decision. It was held that the act was valid. Per

Woodworih, Ch. J .: “This legislation is unprecedented, and perhaps severe;

but it denies trial by jury only to municipal corporations, who, being creatures

of the legislative power, are subject to the legislative will in a manner and to an

extent to which citizens are not. The constitutional guaranties of the citizen

were respected in giving him a right of appeal ; the municipal corporations, having

no such guaranties, the right of appeal was not given to them. The theory of

the act was therefore unexceptionable, and we have no reason to doubt that its

operation in the peculiar circumstances of the case will be beneﬁcent and just.”

See also People v. Alameda, 26 Cal. 641; Burns v. Clarion County, 62 Penn.

St. 423. Similar views were expressed by the Supreme Court of Louisiana in

Layton v. New Orleans, 12 La. An. 515. In consolidating three distinct muni-

cipalities into one, the statute had provided that the territory which had been

embraced in each should pay the pre-existing debts. Afterwards a statute was

passed that no tax should be levied, “except the same be equal and uniform

within the entire limits of the city.” This was held to be constitutional. By the

court: “ As respects municipal corporations, it has always been, held that the law

of the State creating them, and conferring upon their oﬂieers a part of the

sovereign authority as mandatarics of the government, is not a contract, and

_ [247]

t<> require this sum to be assessed upon the taxable property of the city of Utica,
supposed to be benefited by the canal connection. The court treat the case as
"the ordinary one of local taxation to make or improve a public highway. H
such an act," says Cotcen, J., "be otherwise constitutional, we do not see how
the circumstance that a bond had been before given securing the same money
can detract from its validity. Should an individual volunteer to secure a sum of
money in itself properly leviable by way of tax on a town or county, there would
be nothing in the nature of such an arrangement which would preclude the legislature from resorting, by way of tax, to those who are primarily and more justly
liable. Even should he pay the money, what is there in the constitution to preclude his being reimbursed by a tax?" The same general views have been
acted upon in other cases, which assert the complete power of the legi~lature over
the subject of taxation, and that it must dctennine what sums shall be raised,
either in the State at large, or in any particular portion of the State, and also to
what objects the sums so raised shall be applied. Sec particularly Guilford"·
Supervisors of Chenango, 18 Barb. 615; same case, 13 ·N. Y. 143; People"·
Mitchell, 45 Barb. 208; ~arne case, 35 N. Y. 551; People o. Power, 25 Ill. 187;
People 11. Mayor, &c., of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419; Slack o. Maysville and Lexington Railroad Co. 13 B. Monr. 26; Cheaney"· Hooser, 9 B. Monr. 330; Cypress
Pond Draining Co."· Hooper, 2 Met. (Ky.) 353. See also Borough of Dunmore's
Appeal, 52 Penn. St. 874. In that case it appeared that a township which was
considerably indebted, had had four boroughs carved out of it. Afterwards an
act was passed by which the Court of Common Pleas was directed to appoint
three commissioners, for the purpose of ascertaining the indebtedness of the
township, and what amount, if any, was due and owing from the boroughs, and
make an equitable adjustment thereof between them all, and allowing no appeal
by the boroughs from their decision. It was held that the act was valid. Per
Woodworth, Ch. J. : " This legislation is unprecedented, and perhaps severe ;
but it denies trial by jury only to municipal corporations, who, being creatures
of the legislative power, are subject to the legislative will in a manner and to an
extent to which citizens are not. The constitutional guaranties of the citizen
were respected in giving him a right of appeal ; the municipal corporations, having
no such guaranties, the right of appeal was not given to them. The theory of
the act was therefore unexceptionable, and we have no reason to doubt that its
operation in the peculiar circumstances of the case will be beneficent and just."
See also People .,, Alameda, 26 Cal. 641; Burns .,, Clarion County, 62 Pellll.
St. 423. Similar views were expressed by the Supreme Court of Louisiana in
Layton"· New Orleans, 12 La. An. 515. In consolidating three distinct municipalities into one, the statute had provided that the territory which had been
embraced in each should pay the pre-existing debts. Afterwards a statute wsa
passed that no tax should be levied, " except the same be ef!ual and unifonn
within the entire limits of the city." This was held to be constitutional. By the
court: " As respects municipal corporations, it has always been. held that the law
of the State creating them, and conferring upon their officers a part of the
w ..·ereign authority as mandataries of the government, is not a contra<:t, and
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[*‘ 233] legislature to compel * municipal corporations to assume

• 232

CONSTITUTIONAL LIHITATIONS.

[cu. vm .

and discharge obligations, can only be such as spring from

the general principles governing taxation, namely, that the demand

or purpose for which the tax is leviedshall be such as to constitute

a proper charge or burden upon the State or portion of the State

taxed to pay or to accomplish it. But upon this question the legis-

lature is vested with discretionary and compulsory power, and its

decisions are not subject to review in the courts. They must be

ﬁnal, unless in clear cases, where, there being no ground to adjudge

the purpose to be a proper one for taxation, the legislature may be

held to have proceeded unwarrantably. And perhaps there is still

a further limitation, that if the claim is unadjusted and in dispute,

the legislature have no authority to adjudicate upon it, but must

leave the exercise of the judicial function to the ordinary tri-

bunals.1

as a consequence that the legislature may modify such acts of incorporation at

its pleasure. If it has the power to create, modify, or abolish, it has the powerto

provide in what manner the taxes shall be levied for their support, and how their

debts shall be paid upon their dissolution. This is a discretion vested in the legis-

lature (with whom is vested the power of judging of the necesity of taxation),

and nothing prevents it from changing its policy if it shall deem the necessities

of the public so require. The courts can only interfere when.it has overstepped

[• 233] legislature to compel • municipal corporations to assume
and discharge obligations, can only be such as spring from
the general principles governing taxation, namely, that the demand
or purpose for which the tax is levied_ shall be such as to constitute
a proper charge or burden upon the State or portion of the State
taxed to pay or to accomplish it. But upon this question the legislature is vested with discretionary and compulsory power, and its
decisions are not subject to review in the courts. They must be
final, unless in clear cases, where, there being no ground to adjudge
the purpose to be a proper one for taxation, the legislature may be
held to have proceeded unwarrantably. And perhaps there is still
a further limitation, that if the claim is unadjusted and in dispute,
the legislature have no authority to adjudicate upon it, but must
leave the exe1·cise of the judicial function to the ordinary tribunals.1
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the limits prescribed by the Constitution.” The Pennsylvania and Louisiana

cases above quoted are directly opposed to the case of Hampshire v. Franklin,

16 Mass. 83, cited in the preceding note. _

‘ The courts of New York have perhaps gone further than any others in

holding that the legislature has complete control over the subject of municipal

taxation. Nevertheless it was held, in People v. Hawes, 37 Barb. 440, that the

legislature had no right to direct a municipal corporation to satisfy a claim made

against it for damages for breach of contract, out of the funds or property of such

corporation. In citing the cases of Guilford v. Supervisors of Chenango, 13

N. Y. 143, and People v. Supervisors of New York, 11 Abb. 114, a distinction is

drawn by which the cases are supposed to be reconciled with the one then under

decision. “ Those cases and many others,” say the court, p. 455, “ related, not

to the right or power of the legislature to compel an individual or corporation to

pay a debt or claim, but to the power of the legislature to raise money by tax,

and apply such money, when so raised, to the payment thereof. \Ve could not,

under the decisions of the courts on this point, made in these and other cases,

now hold that the legislature had not authority to impose a tax to pay any claim,

or to pay it out of the State treasury; and for this purpose to impose a tax upon

the property of the State, or upon any portion of the State. This was fully set-

tled in People v. Mayor, &c., of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419 ; but neither that ease nor

the casein 13 N. Y. 143, in any manner gave a warrant for the opinion, that the

legislature had a right to direct a municipal corporation to pay a claim for dain-

i _ _~
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as a consequence that the legislature may modify such acts of incorporation at
its pleasure. If it has the power to create, modifY, or abolish, it has the power to
provide in what manner the ~es shall be levied for their support, and how their
debts shall be paid upon their dissolution. This is a discretion vested in the legislature (with whom is vested the power of judging of the necessity of taxation),
and nothing prevents it from changing its policy if it shall deem the necessities
of the public so require. The courts can only interfere when,it has overstepped
the limits prescribed by the Constitution." The Pennsylvania and Louisiana
cases above quoted are directly opposed to the case of Hampshire v. Franklin,
16 Mass. 83, cited in the preceding note.
1 The courts of New York have perhaps gone further than any others in
holding that the legislature has complete control over the subject of municipal
taxation. Nevertheless it was held, in People v. Hawes, 37 Barb. 440, that the
legislature had no right to direct a municipal corporation to satisfy a claim made
against it for damages for breach of contract, out of the funds or property of such
corporation. In. citing the cases of Guilford v. Supervisors of Chenango, 13
N.Y. 148, and People o. Supervisors of New York, 11 Abb. 114, a distinction is
drawn by which the cases are supposed to be reconciled with the one then under
decision. "Those cases and many others,,, say the court, p. 455, "related, not
to the right or power of the legislature to compel an individual or corporation to
pay a debt or·claim, but to the. power of the legislature to raise money by tax,
and apply such money, when so raised, to the payment thereof. 'Ve could not,
under the decisions of the courts on this point, made in these and other cases,
now hold that the legislature had not authority to impose a tax to pay any claim,
or to pay it out of the State treasury ; and for this purpose to impose a tax upon
the property of the State, or upon any portion of the State. This was fully settled in People v. Mayor, &c., of Brooklyn, 4 N.Y. 419; but neither that case nor
the case in 13 N. Y. 143, in any manner gave a warrant for the opinion, that the
legislature had a right to direct a municipal corporation to pay a claim for dam-
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bounty moneys by taxation, to be paid to persons in the

military service, we think stand by themselves and are supported

on diﬁerent principles from any which can fairly be summoned to

the aid of some of the other cases which we have cited. The

burden of the public defence unquestionably rests upon the whole

community; and the legislature may properly provide for

its apportionment and * discharge in such manner as its [* 235]

wisdom may prescribe. But those cases which hold it

competent for the legislature to give its consent to a municipal cor-

poration engaging in works of public improvement outside its ter-

ritorial limits, and becoming a stockholder in a private corporation,

have certainly, as we think, gone to the very limits of constitutional

ages for breach of a contract, out of the funds or property of the corporation,

without a submission of such claim to a judicial tribunal.” If by this is meant

that the legislature has power to compel a corporation to tax its citizens for the

payment of a demand, but has not the authority to make it a charge against the

corporation in any other mode, the distinction seems to be one of form rather

than of substance. It is no protection to the rights or property of a municipal

corporation to hold that the legislature cannot determine upon a claim against

• Those cases which hold that the State may raise [* 234]
bounty moneys by taxation, to be paid to persons in the
military servicei, we think stand by themselves and are supported
on different principles from any which can fairly be summoned to
the aid of some of the other cases which we have cited. The
burden of the public defence unquestionably rests upon the whole
community ; and the legislature may properly provide for
its apportionment and • discharge in such manner as its [* 235]
wisdom may prescribe. But those cases which hold it
competent for the legislature to give its consent to a municipal corporation engaging in works of public improvement outside its territorial limits, and becoming a stockholder in a private corporation,
have certainly, as we think, gone to the very limits of constitutional

it, if at the same time the corporation may be compelled by statute to assume and

discharge the obligation through the levy of a tax for its satisfaction. But if it is
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only meant to declare that the legislature cannot adjudicate upon disputed claims,

there can be no good reason to ﬁnd fault with the decision. It is one thing to

determine that the nature of a claim is such as to make it proper to satisfy it by

taxation, and another to adjudge how much is justly due upon it. The one is the

exercise of legislative power, the other of judicial. See Sanbom v. Rice, 9 Minn.

273; Commonwealth v. Pittsburgh, 34 Penn. St. 496. But the power to decide

upon the breach of a contract by a corporation, and the extent of the damages

which have resulted, is less objectionable and less likely to lead to oppression,

than the power to impose through taxation a claim upon a corporation which it

never was concerned in creating, against which it protests, and which is uncon-

nected with the ordinary functions and purposes of municipal government; as

was the case in Thomas v. Leland, 24 Wcnd. 67. In Borough of Dun1nore’s Ap-

peal, 52 Penn. St. 374, a decision was made which seems to conﬂict with that in

People v. Hawes, supra; and with the subsequent case of Baldwin v. Mayor, &c.,

of New York, 42 Barb. 549. The Pennsylvania court decided that the constitu-

tional guaranty of the right to jury trial had no application to municipal corpora-

tions, and a commission might be created by the legislature to adjust the demands

between them. See also Layton v. New Orleans, 12 La. An. 515. In People 0.

Power, 25 Ill. 187, it was held competent for the legislature to apportion the

taxes collected in a county between a city therein and the remainder of the

county, and that the county revenues “ must necessarily be within the control of

the legislature for political purposes."

0
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ages for breach of a contract, out of the funds or property of the corporation,
without a submission of such claim to a judicial tribunal." If by this is meant
that the legislature has power to compel a corporation to tax its citizens for the
payment of a demand, but has not the authority to make it a charge against the
corporation in any other mode, the distinction seems to be one of form rather
than of substance. It is no protection to the rights or property of a municipal
corporation to hold that the legislature cannot determine upon a claim against
it, if at the same time the corporation may be compelled by statute to assume and
discharge the obligation through the levy of a tax for its satisfaction. But if it is
only meant to declare that the legislature cannot adjudicate upon disputed claims,
there can be no good reason to find fault with the decision. It is one thing to
determine that the nature of a claim is such as to make it proper to satisfy it by
ta.xation, and another to adjudge how much is justly due upon it. The one is the
exercise of legislative power, the other of judicial. See Sanborn v. Rice, 9 Minn.
2'13; Commonwealth v. Pittsburgh, 34 Penn. St. 496. But the power to decide
upon the breach of a contract by a corporation, and the extent of the damages
which have resulted, is less objectionable and less likely to lead to oppression,
than the power to impose through taxation a claim upon a corporation which it
never was concerned in creating, against which it protests, and which is unconnected with the ordinary functions and purposes of municipal government; as
was the case in Thomas t'. Leland, 24 Wend. 67. In Borough of Dunmore's Appeal, 52 Penn. St. 374, a decision was made which seems to conflict with that in
People v. Hawes, aupra; and with the subsequent case of Baldwin v. Mayor, &c.,
of New York, 42 Barb. 549. The Pennsylvania court decided that the constitutional guaranty_ of the right to jury trial had no application to municipal corporations, and a commission might be created by the legislature to adjust the demands
between them. See also Layton v. New Orleans, 12 La. An. 515. In People v.
Power, 25 Ill. 187, it was held competent for the legislature to apportion the
taxes collected in a county between a city therein and the remainder of the
county, and that the county revenues "must necessarily be within the control of
the legislature for political purposes."
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power in this direction ;1 and to hold that the legislature may go

[ca. vm.

even further, and, under its power to control the taxation of the

political divisions and organizations of the State, may compel them,

against the will of their citizens, to raise money for such purposes,

and invest their funds in these exterior undertakings, seems to us

to be introducing new principles into our system of local self-gov-

ernment, and to be sanctioning a centralization of power not within

the contemplation of the makers of the American constitutions.

We think where any such forced taxation is resisted by the munic-

ipal organization, it will be very diﬁicult to defend it as a proper

exercise of legislative authority in a government where power is

distributed on the principles which prevail here.

Legislative Control of Corporate Property.

The legislative power of the State controls and disposes of the

property of the State. How far it can also control and dis-

pose of the property of those agencies of government which it

has created and endowed with corporate powers is a question

which happily there has been very little occasion to discuss in the

power in this direction ; 1 and to hold that the legislature may go
even further, and, under its power to control the taxation of the
political divisions and organizations of the State, may compel them,
against the will of their citizens, to raise money for such purposes,
and invest their funds in these exterior undertakings, seems to us
to be introducing new principles into our system of local self-government, and to be sanctioning a centralization of power not within
the contemplation of the makers of the American constitutions.
We think where any such forced taxation is resisted by the municipal organization, it will be very difficult to defend it as a proper
exercise of legislative authority in a government where power is
distributed on the principles which prevail here.

courts. Being a mere agency of government, it is evident that

the munieipalitycannot itself have that complete and absolute

control and power of disposition of its property which is possessed

by individuals over their own. For it can hold and own property

Legislative Control of Corporate Property.
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only for corporate purposes, and these purposes are liable at any

time to be so modiﬁed by legislation as to render the property

no longer available. Moreover, the chartered rights may be

altogether taken away; and in that case the legislature has

deprived the corporation of its property by depriving it of cor-

porate capacity to hold it. And in many ways, while the

corporation holds and enjoys property, the legislature must pos-

sess power to interfere with its control at least incidentally ; for

the mere fact that the corporation possesses property cannot

deprive the State of its complete authority to mould and change

‘ When the ﬁrst edition of this work was published, there were reasons which

precluded a more deﬁnite expression of opinion on the part of the author than is

here made. Since then he has had occasion to unite in a decision upon the point

in question. See reference to the case -—People v. Township Board of Salem—

in note to p. 214.

é _ _ _ 4|-
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The legislative power of the State controls and disposes of the
property of the State. How far it can also control and dispose of the property of those agencies of government which it
l1as created and endowed with corporate powers is a question
which happily there has been very little occasion to discuss in the
courts. Being a mere agency of government, it is evident that
the municipality· cannot itself have that complete and absolute
control and power of disposition of its property which is possessed
by individuals over their own. For it can hold and own property
only for corporate purposes, and these purposes are liable at any
time to be so modified by legislation as to render the property
no longer available. Moreover, the chartered rights may be
altogether taken away ; and in that case the legislature has
deprived the corporation of its property by depriving it of corporate capacity to hold it. .And in many ways, while the
corporation holds and enjoys property, the legislature must possess power to interfere with its control at least incidentally ; for
the mere fact that the corporation possesses property cannot
deprive the State of its complete authority to mould and change
1 When the first edition of this work was published, there were reasons which
precluded a more definite expression of opinion on the part of the author than is
here made. Since then he has had occasion to unite in a decision upon the point
in question. See reference to the case- People v. Township Board of Salemin note top. 214.

[ 250]

cu. vm.] rm: enamzs or MUNICIPAL eovnnumanr. ' * 236

"the corporate organization, and enlarge or diminish its [* 236]

CH. VIII.]

THE GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT.

• 236

powers, which it possessed before. But whether the State

can directly intervene and take away the corporate property, or

convert it to other uses than those for which it was procured, or

whether, on repealing a charter of incorporation, it can take to

itself the corporate property, and dispose of it at its discretion,

are different questions from any raised by the indirect and inciden-

tal interference referred to.

In the leading case, in which it was decided by the Supreme

Court of the United States that a private charter of incorporation,

granted by a State, was a contract between the State and the

corporators, not subject to modiﬁcation or repeal, except in pur-

suance of a right expressly reserved, but that the charter of a

municipal corporation was not such a contract, it was at the same

time declared, as the opinion of the judges, that the legislature

could not deprive such municipal corporations of their vested

rights in property. “ It may be admitted,” says one of the judges,

“that corporations for mere public government, such as towns,

cities, and counties, may in many respects be subject to legislative

control. But it will hardly be contended, that even in respect to

such corporations, the legislative power is so transcendent that it

may, at its will, take away the private property of the corporation,
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or change the uses of its private funds acquired under the public

faith. Can the legislature conﬁscate to its own use the private

funds which a municipal corporation holds under its charter,

without any default or consent of the corporators? If a mu-

nicipal corporation be capable of holding devises and legacies

to charitable uses, as many municipal corporations are, does the

legislature, under our forms of limited government, possess the

authority to seize upon those funds and appropriate them to other

uses, at its own arbitrary pleasure, against the will of the donors

and donees? From the very nature of our government, the

public faith is pledged the other way, and that pledge constitutes

a valid compact; and that compact is subject only to judicial

inquiry, construction, and abrogation.”1 “The government has

no power to revoke a grant, even of its own funds, when given to

a private person or corporation for special uses. It cannot recall

its own endowments, granted to any hospital or college, or

1 Story, J ., in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 694, 695.
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• the corporate organization, and enlarge or diminish its [* 236]
powers, which it possessed before. But whether tho State
can directly intervene and take away the corporate property, or
couvert it to other uses than those for which it was procured, or
whether, on repealing a charter of incorporation, it can take to
itself the corporate property, and dispose of it at its discretion,
are different questions from any raised by tho indirect and incidental interference referred to.
In the leading case, in which it was decided by the Supreme
Court of the United States that a private charter of incorporation,
granted by a State, was a contract between the State and the
corporators, not subject to modification or repeal, except in pursuance of a right expressly reserved, but that the charter of a ·
municipal corporation was not such a contract, it was at the same
time declared, as the opinion of the judges, that the legislature
could not deprive such municipal corporations of their vested
rights in property. "It may be admitted," says one of the judges,
" that corporations for mere public government, such as towns,
cities, and counties, may in many respects bo subject to legislative
control. But it will hardly be contended, that even in respect to
such corporations, the legislative power is so transcendent that it
may, at its will, take away the private property of the corporation,
or change the uses of its private funds acquired under the public
faith. Can the legislature confiscate to its own use the private
funds which a municipal corporation holds under its charter,
without any default or consent of the corporators ? If a municipal corporation be capable of holding devises and legacies
to charitable uses, as many municipal corporations are, does the
legislature, under our forms of limited government, possess the
authority to seize upon those funds and appropriate them to other
uses, at its own arbitrary pleasure, against the will of the donors
and donees ? From the very nature of our government, the
public faith is pledged the other way, and that pledge constitutes
a valid compact ; and that compact is subject only to judicial
inquit·y, construction, and abrogation." 1 "The government has
no power to revoke a grant, even of its own funds, when given to
a private person or corporation for special uses. It cannot ,recall
its own endowments, granted to any hospital or college, or
J

Story, J., in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 694, 695.
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authority remaining to the government is judicial, to as-

certain the validity of the grant, to enforce its proper uses, to sup-

press frauds, and, if the uses are charitable, to secure their

regular administration through the means of equitable tribunals,

in cases where there would otherwise be a failure of justice.” 1

“In respect to public corporations,” says another judge,

“ which exist only for public purposes, such as towns, cities, &c.,

the legislature may, under proper limitations, change, modify,

enlarge, or restrain them, securing, however, the property for the

use of those for whom and at whose expense it was purchased.” 2

These views had been acted upon by the same court in preceding

eases?’ They draw a distinction between the political rights and

privileges conferred on corporations, and which are not vested

rights in any sense implying constitutional permanency, and

such rights in property as the corporation acquires, and which

are protected by the same reasons which shield similar rights

in individuals.‘

When the municipal divisions of the territory of the State are

changed in their boundaries, two or more consolidated in one, or

one subdivided, it is conceded that the legislature possesses the

power to make such disposition of the corporate property as nat-
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ural equity would require in view of the altered condition of

things. The fact that a portion of the citizens, before entitled to

‘ Story, J ., in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 \Vheat. 698.

' lVaslu'nglon, J., Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 \Vheat. 663.

’ Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 43; Town of Pawlet v. Clark, ib. 292. See

also State v. Haben, 22 Wis. 660, in which it was held that moneys raised by a

city for the erection ofa school building could not constitutionally be devotedby

the legislature to the construction of a State Normal school building even at the

same place.

‘ “ It is an unsound and even absurd proposition that political power conferred

by the legislature can become a vested right, as a_r/ainst the government, in any

individual or body of men. It is repugnant to the genius of our institutions,

and the spirit and meaning of the Constitution; for by that fundamental law, all

[• 237] city or town, for the use of such corporations. • The only
authority remaining to the government is judicial, to ascertain the validity of the grant, to enforce its proper uses, to suppress frauds, and, if the uses are charitable, to secure their
regular administration through the means of equitable tribunals,
in cases where there would otherwise be a failure of justice." 1
" In respect to public corporations," says another judge,
'' which exist only for public purposes, such as towns, cities, &c.,
the legislature may, under proper limitations, change, modify,
enlarge, or restrain them, securing, however, the property for the
use of those for whom and at whose expense it was purchased." 2
These views had been acted upon by the same court in preceding
cases.3 They draw a distinction between the political rights and
privileges conferred on corporations, and which are not vested
rights in any sense implying constitutional permanency, and
such rights in property as the corporation acquires, and which
are protected by the same reasons which shield similar rights
in individuals.4
When the municipal divisions of the territory of the State are
changed in their boundaries, two or more consolidated in one, or
one subdivided, it is conceded that the legislature possesses the
power to make such disposition of the corporate property as natural equity would require in view of the altered condition of
things. The fact that a portion of the citizens, before entitled to

political rights not there deﬁned and taken out of the exercise of legislative dis-

cretion were intended to be leﬂ: subject to its regulation. If corporations can set

up a vested right as against the government to the exercise of this species of

power, because it has been conferred upon them by the bounty of the legislature,

so may any and every ofiicer under the government do the same.” Nelson, J ., in

People v. Morris, 13 Wend. 331. And see Bristol v. New Chester, 3 N. H. 532;

Benson v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 10 Barb. 244.
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Story, J., in Dartmouth Co1lt>ge "·Woodward, 4 Wheat. 698.
Wasltington, J., Dartmouth College o. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 663.
1 Terrett o. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 43; Town of Pawlet "· Clark, ib. 292.
See
also State "· Haben, 22 Wis. 660, in which it was held that moneys raised by a
city for the erection of a school building could not constitutionally be devoted by
the legislature to the construction of a State Normal school building even at the
same place.
' " It is an unsound and even absurd proposition that political power conferred
by the legislature can become a vested right, as against the govemment, in any
individual or body of men. It is repugnant to the genius of our institutions,
and the spirit and meaning of the Constitution; for by that fundamental IMv, all
political rights not there defined and taken out of the exercise of legislative discretion were intended to be left subject to its regulation. If corporations can set
up a vested right as against the government to the exercis"' of this species of
power, because it has been conferred upon them by the bounty of the legislatu•-e,
so may any and every officer under the government do the same." Nelso,, J., in
People"· Morris, 13 Wend. 331. And see Bristol o. New Chester, 3 N.H. 532;
Benson "· Mayor, &c., of New York, 10 Barb. 244.
1

1
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purposes, will now be deprived of that beneﬁt, cannot affect the
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validity of the legislative act, which is supposed in some other

way to compensate them for the incidental loss.‘ And

in many *other cases the legislature exercises a similar [" 238]

power of control in respect to the corporate property,

and may direct its partition and appropriation, in order to ac-

commodate most justly and effectually in view of new circum-

stances the purposes for which it was acquired.

The rule upon the subject we take to be this : when corporate

powers are conferred, there is an implied compact between the

State and the corporators that the property which they are

given the capacity to acquire for corporate purposes under their

charter shall not be taken from them and appropriated to

other uses? If the State grants property to the corporation,

the grant is an executed contract, which cannot be revoked.

The rights acquired,‘ either by such grants or by any other

legitimate mode in which such a corporation can acquire prop-

erty, are vested rights, and cannot be taken away. Neverthe-

less if the corporate powers should be repealed, the corporate

ownership would necessarily cease, and even when not repealed,

a modiﬁcation of those powers, or a change in corporate bounds,
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might seriously aﬁcct, if not altogether divest, the rights of

individual corporators, so far as they can be said to have any

rights in public property. And in other ways, incidentally as

well as by direct intervention, the State may exercise authority

and control over the disposition and use of corporate property,

according to the legislative view of what is proper for the pub-

lic interest and just to the corporators, subject only—as we

think-to this restriction, that the purpose for which the prop-

erty was originally acquired should be kept in view, so far as

the circumstances will admit, in any appropriation that may be

made of it.3

' Bristol v. New Chester, 3 N. H. 583. And see ante, 232-234, notes.

’ If land is dedicated as a public square, and accepted as such, a law devoting

it to other uses is void, because violating the obligation of contracts. \Varren

v. Lyons City, 22 Iowa, 351. As there was no attempt in that case to appro-

priate the laud to such other uses under the right of eminent domain, the ques-

tion of the power to do so was not considered.

3 “ That the State may make a contract with, or a grant to, a public municipal

corporation, which it could not subsequently impair or resume, is not denied; but

[253]

the benefits springing from the use of specific property for public
purposes, will now be depl"ived of that benefit, cannot affect the
validity of the legislatiYe act, which is supposed in some other
way to compensate them for the incidental loss.l And
in many *other cases the legislature exercises a similar [• 238]
power of control in respect to the corporate property,
and may direct its partition and appropriation, in order to accommodate most justly and effectually in view of new circumstances the purposes for which it was acquired.
The rule upon the subject we take to be this : when corpomte
powers are conferred, there is an implied compact between the
State and the corporators that the property which they are
given the capacity to acquire for corporate purposes under their
charter shall not be taken from them and appropriated to
other uses.2 If the State grants property to the corporation,
the grant is an executed contrad, which cannot be revoked.
The rights acquired; either by such grants or by any other
legitimate mode in which such a corporation can acquire property, are vested rights, and cannot be taken away. Nevertheless if the corporate powers should be repealed, the corporate
ownership would necessarily cease, and even when not repealed,
a modification of those powers, or a change in corporate bounds,
might seriously affect, if not altogether divest, the rights of
individual corporators, so far as they can be said to have any
rights in public property. And in other ways, incidentally as
well as by direct intervention, the State may exercise authority
and control over the disposition and use of corporate property,
according to the legislath·e view of what is proper for the public interest and just to the corporators, subject only- ns we
think- to this restriction, that the purpose fo1· which the property waa originally acquired should be kept in view, so far as
the circumstances will admit, in any appt·opriation that may be
made of it.a
1 Bristol v. New Chester, 3 N. H. 533.
Anll see ante, 232-234, notes.
' If land is dedicated as a public square, and accepted as such, a law devoting
it to other uses is void, because violating the obligation of contracts. Warren
v. Lyons City, 22 Iowa, 351. As there was no attempt in that case to appropriate the land to such other uses under the right of eminent domain, the question of the powrr to do so was not considered.
3 "That the State may make a contract with, or a grant to, a public municipal
corporation, which it could not subsequently impair or resume, is not denied; but
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rate powers arc abolished than it is in other eases; and

whatever might be the nature of the public property which the cor-

poration had acquired, and whatever the purpose of the acquisition,

the legislature, when by taking away the corporate authority it

became vested with the control of the property, would be under

obligation to dispose of it in such manner as to give the original

corporators the beneﬁt thereof, by putting it to the use designed, if

still practicable, or to some kindred or equally beneﬁcial use having

reference to the altered condition of things. The obligation is one

which, from the very nature of the case, must rest for its enforce-

mentin great-measure upon the legislative good faith and sense of

in such a case the corporation is to be regarded as a private company. A grant

may be made to a public corporation for purposes of private advantage; and

although the public may also derive a common beneﬁt therefrom, yet the corpora-

tion stands on the same footing, as respects such grant, as would any body of per-

sons upon whomlike privileges were conferred. Public or municipal corporations,

however, which exist only for public purposes, and possess no powers except such

[• 239]

• This restriction is not the less applicable where corporate powers are abolished than it is in other cases; and
whatever might be the nature of the public property which the corporation had acquired, and whatever the purpose of the acquisition,
the legislature, when by taking away the corporate authority it
became vested with the control of the property, would be under
obligation to dispose of it in such manner as to give the original
corporators the benefit thereof, by putting it to the use designed, if
still practicable, or to some kindred or equally beneficial use having
reference to the altered condition of things. The obligation is one
which, from the very nature of the case, must rest for its enforcement ·in great· measure upon the legislative good faith and sense of

as are bestowed upon them for public political purposes, are subject at all times to

the control of the legislature, which may alter, modify, or abolish them at pleas-

ure." Trumbull, J ., in Richland County u. Lawrence County, 12 Ill. 8. “ Pub-

lic corporations are but parts of the machinery employed in carrying on the
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affairs of the State; and they are subject to be changed, modiﬁed, or destroyed,

as the exigencies of the public may demand. The State may exercise a general

superintendence and control over them and their rights and effects, so that their

property is not diverted from the uses and objects for which it was given or pur-

chased.” Trustees of Schools v. Tatman, 13 Ill. 30, per Treat, Ch. J . And see

Harrison v. Bridgeton, 16 Mass. 16 ; Montpelier v. East Montpelier, 27 Vt. 704;

Same v. Same, 29 Vt. 19 ; Benson v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 10 Barb. 223. See

also City ofLouisville v. University, 15 B. Monr. 642. In State v. St. Louis County

Court, 34 Mo. 572, the following remarks are made by the court, in considering

the cause shown by the county in answer to an application to compel it to meet

a requisition for the police board of St. Louis: “ As to the second cause shown

in the return, it is understood to mean, not that there is in fact no money in the

treasury to pay this requisition, but that as a matter of law all the money which

is in the treasury was collected for speciﬁc purposes from which it cannot be

diverted. The speciﬁc purposes for which the money was collected were those

heretofore directed by the legislature; and this act, being a later expression of the

will of the legislature, controls the subject, and so far as it conﬂicts with previous

acts, rcpeals them. The county is not a private corporation, but an agency of

the State government; and though as apublic corporation it holds property, such

holding is subject to a large extent to the will of the legislature. Wliilst the

legislature cannot take away from a county its property, it has full power to

direct the mode in which the property shall be used for the beneﬁt of the

county."

ji___~ x
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in such a case the corporation is to be regarded as a private company. A grant
may be made to a public corporation for purposes of private advantage; and
although the public may also derive a common benefit therefrom, yet the corporation stands on the same footing, as respects such grant, as would any body of persons upon whom like privileges were conferred. Public or municipal corporations,
however, which exist only for public purposes, and possess no powers except such
as are bestowed upon them for public political purposes, are subject at all times to
the control of the legislature, which may alter, modify, or abolish them at pltl&Sure.'' Trumbull, J., in Richland County t'. Lawrence County, 12 Ill. 8. "Public corporations are but parts of the machinery employed in carrying on the
affairs of the State; and they are subject to be changed, modified, or destroyed,
as the exigencies of the public may demand. The State may exercise a general
superintendence and control over them and their rights and effects, so that their
property is not diverted from the uses and objects for which it was given or purchased." Trustees of Schools"· Tatman, 13 Til. 30, per Treat, Cb. J. And see
Harrison"· Bridgeton, 16 Mass. 16; Montpelier"· East Montpelier, 27 Vt. 70-1;
Same v. Same, 29 Vt. 19; Benson v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 10 Barb. 223. See
also City of Louisville"· University, 15 B. Monr. 6!2. In State 11. St. Louis County
Court, S-11\:lo. 572, the following remarks are made by the court, in considering
the cause shown by the county in answer to an application to compel it to meet
a requisition for the police board of St. Louis : " As to the second cause shown
in the return, it is understood to mean, not that there is in fact no money in the
treasury to pay this requisition, but that as a matter of law all the money which
is in the treasury was collected for specific purposes from which it cannot be
diverted. The specific purposes for which the money was collected wt>re those
heretofore directed by the legislature ; and this act, being a later expression of the
will of the legislature, controls the subject, and so far as it conflicts with previous
acts, repeals them. The county is not a private corporation, but an agency of
the State government; and though as a public corporation it holds property, such
holding is subject to a large extent to the will of the legislature. Whilst the
legislature cannot take away from a county its property, it has full power to
direct the mode in which the property shall be used for the benefit of the
county."

[ 254]
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justice ; and it could only be in those cases where there had been a
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clear disregard of the rights of the original corporators, in the use

attempted to be made of the property, that relief could be had

through judicial action.

No such restriction, however, can rest upon the legislature in

regard to the rights and privileges which the State grants to mu-

nicipal corporations in the nature of franchises, and which are

granted only as aids or conveniences to the municipality in effect-

ing the purposes of its incorporation. These, like the corporate

powers, must be understood to be granted during pleasure.‘

"‘ Towns and Counties. [* 240]

Thus far we have been considering general rules, applicable

to all classes of municipal organizations possessed of corporate

powers, and by which these powers may be measured, or the

duties which they impose deﬁned. In regard to some of these

organizations, however, there are other and peculiar rules which

justice ; and it could only be in those cases where there had been a
clear disregard of the rights of the original corporators, in the use
attempted to be made of the property, that relief could be had
through judicial action.
No such restriction, however, can rest upon the legislature in
regard to the rights and privileges which the State grants to municipal corporations in the nature of franchises, and which are
granted only as aids or conveniences to the municipality in effecting the purposes of its incorporation. These, like the corporate
powers, must be understood to be granted during pleasure. 1

require separat0 mention. Some of them are so feebly endowed

with corporate life, and so much hampered, controlled, and directed

• Towns and Counties.

in the exercise of the functions which are conferred upon them,

[• 240]

that they are sometimes spoken of as nondescript in character, and

as occupying a position somewhere between that of a corporation

and a mere voluntary association of citizens. Counties, townships,
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school districts, and road districts do not usually possess corporate

powers under special charters; but they exist under general laws

of the State, which apportion the territory of the State into

‘ East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Co. 10 How. 535. On this subject, see

c. 9, post. The case of Trustees of Aberdeen Academy v. Mayor, &c., of Aber-

deen, 13 S. & M. 645, appears to be contra. By the charter of the town of

Aberdeen in 1837, the legislature granted to it the sole power to grant licenses

to sell vinous and spirituous liquors within the corporate limits thereof, and to

appropriate the money arising therefrom to city purposes. In 1848 an act was

passed giving these moneys to the Aberdeen Female Academy. The act was

held void, on the ground that the original grant was of a franchise which consti-

tuted property, and it could not be transferred to another, though it might be

repealed. The case cites Bailey v. Mayor, &c. 3 Hill, 541, and St. Louis v. Rus-

sell, 9 Mo. 507, which seem to have little relevancy. Also, 4 \Vheat. 663, 698,

699; and 2 Kent, 305, note, for the general rule protecting municipal corpora-

tions in their vested rights to property. The case of Benson v. Mayor, &c., of

New York, IO Barb. 228, also holds the grant of a ferry franchise to a municipal

Thus far we have been considering general ~ules, applicable
to all classes of municipal organizations possessed of corporate
powers, and by which these powers may be measured, or the
duties which they impose defined. In regard to some of these
organizations, however, there are other and peculiar rules which
require separatt9 mention. Some of thep1 are so feebly endowed
with corporate life, and so much hampered, controlled, and directed
in the exercise of the functions which are conferred upon them,
that they are sometimes spoken of as nondescript in character, and
as occupying a position somewhere between that of a corporation
and a mere voluntary association of citizens. Counties, townships,
school districts, and road districts do not usually possess corporate
powers under special charters; but they exist under general laws
of the State, which apportion the territory of the State into

corporation to be irrevocable.

[ 255]

East Hartford "· Hartford Bridge Co. 10 How. 535. On this subject, see
e. 9, post. The case of Trustees of Aberdeen Academy v. Mayor, &c., of Aberdeen, 13 S. & M. 645, appears to be contra. By the charter of the town of
Aberdeen in 1837, the legislature granted to it the sole power to grant licenses
to sell vinous and spirituous liquors within the corporate limits thereof, and to
appropriate the money arising therefrom to city purposes. In 1848 an act was
passed giving these moneys to the Aberdeen Female Academy. The act was
held void, on the ground that the original grant was of a franchise which constituted property, and it could not be transferred to another, though it might be
repealed. The case cites Bailey t~. Mayor, &c. 3 Hill, 541, and St. Louis l'· Russell, 9 Mo. 507, which seem to have little relevancy. Al11o, 4 'Vheat. 663, 698,
699 ; and 2 Kent, 305, note, for the general rule protecting municipal corporations in their vested rights to property. The case of Benson o. Mayor, &c., of
New York, 10 Barb. 228, also holds the grant of a ferry franchise to a municipal
corporation to be irrevocable.
1
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political divisions for convenience of government, and require of
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the people residing within those divisions the performance of cer-

tain public duties as a part of the machinery of the State; and, in

order that they may be able to perform these duties, vest them with

certain corporate powers. Whether they shall assume those duties

or exercise those powers, the people of the political divisions are

not allowed the privilege of choice; the legislature assumes this

division of the State to be essential in republican government, and

the duties are imposed as a part of the proper and necessary burden

which the citizens must bear in maintaining and perpetuating

constitutional liberty. Their functions, therefore, are wholly of a

public nature, and there is no room to imply any contract between

them and the State, in their organization as corporate bodies, ex-

cept that which springs from the ordinary rules of good faith, and

which requires that the property they shall acquire by local taxation

or otherwise, for the purposes of their organization, shall

[* 241] not be seized by the State, and appropriated " in other

ways. They are, therefore, sometimes called quasi corpo-

rations} to distinguish them from the corporatﬂms in general,

which possess more completely the functions of an artiﬁcial entity.

Chief Justice Parke-r, of Massachusetts, in speaking of school

districts, has said: “ That they are not bodies politic and corporate,
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with the general powers of corporations, must be admitted; and

the reasoning advanced to show their defect of power is conclusive.

The same may be said of towns and other municipal societies;

which, although recognized by various statutes, and by immemo-

rial usage, as persons or aggregate corporations, with precise duties

which may be enforced, and privileges which may be maintained

by suits at law, yet are deﬁcient in many ofthe powers incident to

the general character of corporations. They may be considered,

under our institutions, as quasi corporations, with limited powers,

co-extensive with the duties imposed upon them by statute or usage,

but restrained from the general use of authority which belongs to

these metaphysical persons by the common law. The same may

be said of all the numerous corporations which have been from time

to time created by various acts of the legislature; all of them en-

‘ Riddle v. Proprietors, &c. 7 Mass. 186, 187; School District v. Wood, 13

Mass. 192; Adams v. Wiscasset Bank, 1 Greenl. 361; Dcnton v. Jackson, 2

Johns. Ch. 325; Beardsley v. Smith, 16 Conn. 367; Eastman v. Meredith, 36

N. H. 296; Hopple v. Brown, 13 Ohio, N. s. 311.

L. T j~ _ * *7 _ i
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politico.l divisions for convenience of government, and require of
the people residing within those divisions the performance of certain public duties as a part of the machinery of the State; and, in
order that they may be able to perform these duties, vest them with
certain corporate powers. Whether they shall assume those duties
or exercise those powers, the people of the political divisions are
not allowed the privilege of choice ; the legislature assumes this
division of the State to be essential in republican government, and
the duties are imposed as a part of the proper and necessary burden
which the citizens must bear in maintaining and perpetuating
constitutional liberty. Their fw1ctions, therefore, are wholly of a
public nature, and there is no room to imply any contract between
them and the State, in their organization as corporate bodies, except that which springs from the ordinary rules of good faith, and
which re.quires that the property they shall acquire by local taxation
or otherwise, for the purposes of their organization~ shall
[* 241] not be seized by the State, and appropriated • in other
ways. They are, therefore, sometimes called quasi corporations,1 to distinguish J;hem from the corporatfbns in general,
which possess more completely the functions of an artificial entity.
Chief Justice Parker, of Massachusetts, in speaking of school
districts, has said : " That they are not bodies politic and corporate,
with the general powers of corporations, must be admitted ; aud
the reasoning advanced to show their defect of power is conclusive.
The same may be said of towns and other municipal societies ;
which, although recognized by various statutes, and by immemorial usage, as persons or aggregate corporations, with precise duties
which may be enforced, and privileges which may be maintained
by suits at law, yet are deficient in many ofthe powers incident to
the general character of corporations. They may be considered,
under our institutions, as quasi corporations, with limited powers,
co-extensive with the duties imposed upon them by statute or usage,
but restrained from the general use of authority which belongs to
these metaphysical persons by the common law. The same may
be said of all the numerous corporations which have been from time
to time created by various acts of the legislature ; all of them enRiddle"· Proprietors, &c. 7 :Mass. 186, 187; School District"· Wood, 13
Mass. 192; Adams v. Wiscasset Bank, 1 Greenl. 861; Denton "· Jackson, 2
Johns. Cb. 825; Beardsley v. Smith, 16 Conn. 867; Eastman v. Meredith, 86
N.H. 296; Hopple v. Brown, 13 Ohio, N. s. 811.
1
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joying the power which is expressly bestowed upon them, and
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perhaps, in all instances where the act is silent, possessing, by

necessary implication, the authority which is requisite to execute

the purposes of their creation.” “ It will not do to apply the strict

principles of law respecting corporations in all cases to these

aggregate bodies which are created by statute in this Common-

wealth. By the several statutes which have been passed respecting

school districts, it is manifest that the legislature has supposed

that a division of towns, for the purpose ofmaintaining schools, will

promote the important object of general education; and this valua-

ble object of legislative care seems to require, in construing their

acts, that a liberal view should be had to the end to be effected. ” ‘

Following out this view, the courts of the New England States have

held, that when judgments are recovered against towns, parishes,

and school districts, any of the property of private owners

within ‘the municipal division is liable to be taken for ["2/12]

their discharge. The reasons for this doctrine, and the

custom upon which it is founded, are thus stated by the Supreme

Court of Connecticut: -—-

“ We know that the relation in which the members of munic-

ipal corporations in this State have been supposed to stand, in

respect to the corporation itself, as well as to its creditors, has
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elsewhere been considered in some respects peculiar. We have

treated them, for some purposes, as parties to corporate proceed-

ings, and their individuality has not been considered as merged in

their corporate connection. Though corporators, they have been

holden to be parties to suits by or against the corporation, and

individually liable for its debts. Heretofore this has not been

doubted as to the inhabitants of towns, locatdd ecclesiastical

societies, and school districts.

“ From a recurrence to a history of the law on this subject, we

are persuaded that the principle and usage here recognized and

followed, in regard to the liability of the inhabitants of towns and

communities, were very early adopted by our ancestors. And

whether they were considered as a part of the common law of

England, or originated here, as necessary to our state of society,

it is not very material to inquire. We think, however, that the

principle is not of domestic origin, but to some extent was

operative and applied in the mother country, especially in cases

‘ School District v. Wood, 18 Mass. 192.

11 [ 257 ]

joying the power which is expressly bestowed upon them, and
perhaps, in all instances where the act is silent, possessing, by
necessary implication, the authority which is requisite to execute
the purposes of their creation." " It will not do to apply the strict
principles of law respecting corporations in all cases to these
aggregate bodies which are created by statute in this Commonwealth. By the several statutes which have been passed respecting
school districts, it is manifest that the legislature has supposed
that a division of towns, for the purpose of maintaining schools, will
promote the important object of general education; and this valuable object of legislative care seems to require, in construing their
acts, that a liberal view should be had to the end to be effected. " 1
Following out this view, the courts of the New England States have
held, that when judgments are recovered against towns, parishes,
and school districts, any of the property of private owners
within • the municipal division is liable to be taken for [• 242]
their discharge. The reasons for this doctrine, and the
custom upon which it is founded, are thus stated by the Supreme
Court of Connecticut:"We know that the relation in which the members of municipal corporations in this State have been supposed to stand, in
respect to the corporation itself, as well as to its creditors, has
elsewhere been considered in some respects peculiar. We have
treated them, for some purposes, as parties to corporate proceedings, and their individuality has not been cousidered as merged in
their corporate connection. Though corporators, they have been
holden to ba parties to suits by or against the corpot·ation, and
individually liable for its debts. Heretofore this has not been
doubted as to the inhabitants of towns, located ecclesiastical
societies, and school districts.
"From a recurrence to a history of the law on this subject, we
are pet·suaded that the principle and usage here recognized and
followed, in regard to the liability of the inhahitauts of towns and
communities, were very early adopted by our ancestors. And
whether they were considered as a part of the common law of
England, or originated here, aa necessary to our state of society,
it is not very material to inquire. We think, however, that the
principle is not of domestic origin, but to some extent was
operative and applied in the mother conn try, especially in cases
1

School District o. Wood, 18 Mass. 192.
17
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where a statute ﬁxed a liability upon a municipality which had

no corporate funds. The same reason and necessity for the appli-

cation of such a principle and practice existed in both countries.

Such corporations are of a public and political character; they

exercise a portion of the governing power of the State. Statutes

impose upon them important public duties. In the performance

of these, they must contract debts and liabilities, which can only

be discharged by a resort to individuals, either by taxation or

execution. Taxation, in most cases, can only be the result of the

voluntary action of the corporation, dependent upon the con-

tingent will of the majority of the corporators, and upon their

tardy and uncertain action. It affords no security to creditors,

because they have no power over it. Such reasons as these prob-

ably operated with our ancestors in adopting the more elﬁcient

and certain remedy by execution, which has been resorted to in

the present case, and which they had seen to some extent in oper-

ation in the country whose laws were their inheritance.

[* 243] *“ The plaintiff would apply to these municipal or

quasi corporations the close principles applicable to private

corporations. But inasmuch as they are not, strictly speaking,

corporations, but only municipal bodies, without pecuniary funds,

it will not do to apply to them literally, and in all cases, the law of
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corporations]

“ The individual liability of the members of quasi corporations,

though not expressly adjudged, was very distinctly recognized in

the case of Russell v. The Men of Devon.” It was alluded to as a

known principle in the case of the Attorney-General v. The City of

Exeter,3 applicable as well to cities as to hundreds and parishes.

That the rated inhabitants of an English parish are considered as

the real parties to suits against the parish is now supposed to be

well settled; and so it was decided in the case of The King v. The

Inhabitants of Woburn,4 and The King v. The Inhabitants of Hard-

wickﬁ And in support of this principle, reference was made to

the form of the proceedings; as that they are entitled ‘ against the

inhabitants,’ &c.

“ In the State of Massachusetts, from whose early institutions

we have borrowed many valuable specimens, the individual re-

‘ School District v. VVood, 13 Mass. 192. 2 2 Term Rep. 660.

‘ 2 Russ. 45. ‘ 10 East, 395. ° 11 East, 577.

L~_——k
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where a statute fixed a liability upon a municipality which had
no corporate funds. The same reason and necessity for the application of such a principle and practice existed in both countries.
Such corporations are of a public and political character; they
exercise a portion of the governing power of the State. Statutes
impose upon them important public duties. In the performance
of these, they must contract debts and liabilities, which can only
be discharged by a resort to individuals, either by taxation or
execution. Taxation, in most cases, can only be the result of the
voluntary action of the corporation, dependent upon the contingent will of the majority of the corporators, and upon their
tardy and uncertain action. It affords no security to creditors,
because they have no power over it. Such reasons as these probably operated with our ancestors in adopting the more efficient
and certain remedy by execution, which has been resorted to in
the present case, and which they had seen to some extent in operation in the country whose laws were their inheritance.
[• 243]
•" The plaintiff would apply to these municipal or
quasi corporations the close principles applicable to private
corporations. But inasmuch as they are not, strictly speaking,
corporations, but only municipal bodies, without pecuniary funds,
it will not do to apply to them literally, and in all cases, the law of
corporations.1
"The individual liability of the members of quasi corporations,
though not expressly adjudged, was very distinctly recognized in
the case of Russell v. The Men of Devon.2 It was alluded to as a
known principle in the case of the Attorney-General v. The City of
Exeter,3 applicable as well to cities as to hundreds and parishes.
That the rated inhabitants of an English parish are considered as
the real parties to suits against the parish is now supposed to be
well settled ; and so it was decided in the case of The King v. The
Inhabitants of Woburn,4 and The King v. The Inhabitants of Hardwick.6 And in support of this principle, reference was made to
the form of the proceedings ; as that they are entitled ' against the
inhabitants,' &c.
" In the State of M!J.ssachusetts, from whose early institutions
we have borrowed many ~aluable specimens, the individual re1
1

School District t~. Wood, 13 Mass. 192.
2 Russ. 45.
• 10 East, 895.

[ 258]

2 Term Rep. 660.
• 11 East, 677.

1
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been established. Distinguished counsel in the case of the Mer-

chants Bank v. Cook} referring to municipal bodies, say: ‘ For a

century past the practical construction of the bar has been that, in

an action by or against a corporation, a member of the corpo-

ration is a party in the suit.’ In several other cases in that State

the same principle is repeated. In the case of Riddle v. The Pro-

prietors of the Locks and Canals on Merrimack River} Parsons,

Ch. J ., in an allusion to this private responsibility of corporators,

remarks: ‘And the sound reason is, that having no corporate

fund, and no legal means of obtaining one, each corporator is

liable to satisfy any judgment obtained against the corporation.’

So in Brewer v. Inhabitants of New Gloucester,“ the court say:

‘As the law provides that, when judgment is recovered against the

inhabitants of a town, execution may be levied upon the property

of any inhabitant, each inhabitant must be considered as a party.’

In the case before referred to of the Merchants Bank v.

Cook, * Parker, Oh. J ., expresses the opinion of the court [* 244]

upon this point thus: ‘Towns, parishes, precincts, &c.,

are but a collection of individuals, with certain corporate powers

for political and civil purposes, without any corporate fund, from

which a judgment can be satisﬁed; but each member of the com-
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munity is liable, in his person and estate, to the execution which

may issue against the body; each individual, therefore, may be

well thought to be a party to a. suit brought against them by their

collective name. 1n regard to banks, turnpikes, and other corpo-

rations, the case is different.’ The counsel ‘concerned in the case

of Mower v. Leicester,* without contradiction, speak of this prac-

tice of subjecting individuals as one of daily occurrence. The law

on this subject was very much considered in the case of Chase v.

The Merrimack Bank,5 and was applied a.ud enforced against the

members of a territorial parish. ‘ The question is,’ say the court,

‘ whether, on an execution against a town or parish, the body or

estate of any inhabitant may be lawfully taken to satisfy it. This

question seems to have been settled in the afﬁrmative by a series

of decisions, and ought no longer to be considered as an open

question.’ The State of Maine, when separated from Massachu-

setts, retained most of its laws and usages, as they had been

‘ 4 Pick. 40:3. ’ 7 Mass. 187. 3 14 Mass. 216.

‘ 9 Mass. 247. ‘ 19 Pick. 564.
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sponsibility of the inhabitants of towns for town debts has long
been establilihed. Distinguished counsel in the case of the Merchants Bank v. Cook,1 referring to municipal bodies, say: 'For a
century past the practical construction of the bar has been that, in
an action by or against a corporation, a member of the corporation is a party in the suit.' In several other cases in that State
the same principle is repeated. In the case of Riddle v. The Proprietors of the Locks and Canals on Merrimack River,2 Parsons,
Ch. J., in an allusion to this private responsibility of corporators,
remarks: ' And the sound reason is, that having no corporate
fund, and no legal means of obtaining one, each corporator is
liable to satisfy any judgment obtained against the corporation.'
So in Brewer v. Inhabitants of New Gloucester,8 the court say:
'As the law provides that, when judgment is recovered against the
inhabitants of a town, execution may be levied upon the property
of any inhabitant, each inhabitant must be considered as a party.'
In the case before referred to of the Merchants Bank v.
Cook, *Parker, Ch. J., expresses the opinion of the court [* 244]
upon this point thus: 'Towns, parishes, precincts, &c.,
are but a collection of individuals, with certain corporate powers
for political and civil purposes, without any corporate fund, from
which a judgment can be satisfied; but each member of the community is liable, in his person and estate, to the execution which
may issue against the body; each individual, therefore, may be
well thought to be a party to a suit brought against them by their
collective name. In regard to banks, turnpikes, and other corporations, the case is different.' The counsel 'concerned in the case
of :Mower v. Leicester,4 without contradiction, speak of this practice of subjecting individuals as one of daily occurrence. The law
on this subject was very much considered in the case of Chase v.
The Merrimack Bank,6 and was applied and enforced against the
members of a territorial parish. ' The question is,' say the court,
'whether, on an execution against a town or parish, the body or
estate of any inhabitant may be lawfully taken to satisfy it. This
question seems to have been settled in the affirmative by a series
of decisions, and ought no longer to be considered as an open
question.' The State of Maine, when separated from :Massachusetts, retained most of its laws and usages, as they had been
1
4

4 Pick. 40:).
9 1\lass. 247.

1
&

7 1\Iass. 187.
19 Pick. 564.

3

14 .Mass. 216.
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recognized in the parent State; and, among others, the one in

•

question. In Adams v. Wiscasset Bank,‘ Mellen, Ch. J ., says:

‘ It is well known that all judgments against quasi corporations

may be satisﬁed out of the property of any individual inhabitant.’

“The courts of this State, from a time beyond the memory of

any living lawyer, have sanctioned and carried out this usage, as

one of common-law obligation; and it has been applied, not to

towns only, but also, by legal analogy, to territorial ecclesiastical

societies and school districts. The forms of our process against

these communities have always corresponded with this view of the

law. The writs have issued against the inhabitants of towns,

societies, and districts as parties. As early in the history of our

jurisprudence as 1805, a statute was enacted authorizing com-

munities, such as towns, societies, &c., to prosecute and defend

suits, and for this purpose to appear, either by themselves, agents,

or attorneys. If the inhabitants were not then considered as

parties individually, and liable to the consequences of judgments

against such communities as parties, there would have

[* 245] been a glaring * impropriety in permitting them to appear

and defend by themselves; but if parties, such a right was

necessary and indispensable. Of course this privilege has been

and may be exercised.”
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“Our statute providing for the collection of taxes enacts that

the treasurer of the State shall direct his warrant to the col-

lectors of the State tax in the several towns. If neither this

nor the further proceedings against the collectors and the select-

men authorized by the statute shall enforce the collection of

the tax, the law directs that then the treasurer shall issue his

execution against the inhabitants of such town. Such an exe-

cution may be levied upon the estate of the inhabitants ; and this

provision of the law was not considered as introducing a new

principle, or enforcing a novel remedy, but as being only in

conformity with the well-known usage in other cases. The levy

of an execution under this statute produced the case of Beers

2:. Botsfordﬁ There the execution, which had been issued

against the town of Newtown by the treasurer of the State, had

been levied upon the property of the plaintiﬁ, an inhabitant of

that town, and he had thus been compelled to pay the balance

‘ 1 Grcenl. 361. ' 1 Swift"s System, 227. ' 3 Day, 159.
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recognized in the parent State ; and, among others, the one in
question. In Adams v. Wiscasset Bank,1 Mellen, Ch. J., says:
'It is well known that all judgments against quasi corporations
may be satisfied out of the property of any individual inhabitant.'
"The courts of this State, from a time beyond the memory of
any living lawyer, have sanctioned and carried out this usage, as
one of common-law obligation ; and it has been applied, not to
towns only, but also, by legal analogy, to territorial ecclesiastical
societies and school districts. The forms of our process against
these communities have always corresponded with this view of the
law. The writs have issued against the inhabitants of towns,
societies, and districts as parties. As early in the history of our
jurisprudence as 1805, a statute was enacted authorizing communities, such as towns, societies, &c., to prosecute and defend
suits, and for this purpose to appear, either by themselves, agents,
or attorneys. If the inhabitants were not tlum considered as
parties individually, and liable to the consequences of judgments
against such communities as parties, there would have
[• 245] been a glaring • impropriety in permitting them to appear
and defend by themselves; but if parties, such a right was
necessary and indispensable. Of course this privilege has been
and may be exercised.~
" Our statute providing for the collection of taxes enacts that
the treasurer of the State shall direct his warrant to the collectors of the State tax in the several towns. If neither this
nor the further proceedings against the collectors and the selectmen authorized by the statute shall enforce the collection of
the tax, the law i:lirects that then the treasurer shall issue his
execution against the inhabitants of such town. Such an execution may be levied upon the estate of the inhabitants ; and this
provision of the law was not considered as introducing a new
principle, or enforcing a novel remedy, but as being only in
conformity with the well-known usage in other cases. The levy
of an execution under this statute produced the case of Beers
v. Botsford.a There the execution, which had been issued
against the town of Newtown by the treasurer of the State, hnd
been levied upon the property of the plaintiff, an inhabitant of
that town, and he had thus been compelled to pay the balance
1

1 Grcenl. 361.
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1

1 Swifi's System, 227.

1

3 Day, 159.
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of a State tax due from the town. He sued the town of New-

town for the recovery of the money so paid by him. The most

distinguished professional gentlemen in the State were engaged

as counsel in that case; and it did not occur, either to them

or to the court, that the plaintiff ’s property had been taken

without right: on the contrary, the case proceeded throughout

on the conceded principle of our common law, that the levy

was properly made upon the estate of the plaintiﬂ‘. And with-

out this the plaintiff could not have recovered ot' the town, but

must have resorted to his action against the oﬁicer for his ille-

gal and void levy. In Fuller v. Hampton} Peters, J., remarked

that, if costs are recovered against a town, the writ of- execu-

tion to collect them must have been issued against the property

of the inhabitants of the town ; and this is the invariable prac-

tice. The case of Atwater v. Woodbridge? also grew out of this

ancient usage. The ecclesiastical society of Bethany had been

taxed by the town of Woodbridge for its moneys at interest,

and the warrant for the collection of the tax had been levied

upon the property of the plaintiff, and the tax had thus been col-

lected of him, who was an inhabitant of the located society

of Bethany. Brainerd,J., who drew up the ‘opinion of [" 246]
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the court, referring to this proceeding, said: ‘This prac-

tice, with regard to towns, has prevailed in New England, so

far as I have been able to investigate the subject, from an early

period,-—from its ﬁrst settlement,—a practice brought by our

forefathers from England, which had there obtained in corpo-

rations similar to the towns incorporated in New England.’

It will here be seen that the principle is considered as applica-

ble to territorial societies as to towns, because the object to be

obtained ‘was the same in both,—‘that the town or society

should be brought to a. sense of duty, and make provision for

payment and indemnity’; a very good reason, and very appli-

cable to the ease we are considering.

“The law on this subject was more distinctly brought out

and considered by this court in the late case of McCloud v.

Selby,3 in which this well-known practice, as it had been ap-

plied to towns and ecclesiastical societies, was extended and

sanctioned as to school districts; ‘else it would be breaking in

upon the analogies of the law.’ ‘They are communities for

‘ 5 Conn. 417. ' 6 Conn. 223. ‘ 10 Conn. 390-395.
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of a State tax due from the town. He sued the town of Newtown for the recovery of the money so paid by him. The most
distinguished professional gentlemen in the State were engaged
as counsel in that case; and it did not occur, either to them
or to tho court, that the plaintiff's property had been taken
without rig-ht: on the contrary, the case proceeded throughout
on the conceded principle of our common law, that the Levy
was properly made upon the estate of tho plaintiff. And without this the plaintiff could not have recovered of the town, but
must have resor~ed to his action against the officer for his illegal and void levy. In Fuller v. Hampton,1 Peters, J., remarked
that, if costs are recovered against a town, the writ of- execution to collect them must have been issued against the property
of the inhabitants of the town ; and this is tho invariable practice. The case of Atwater v. Woodbridge 2 also grew out of this
ancient usage. The ecclesiastical society of Bethany had been
taxed by the town of Woodbridge for its moneys at interest,
and the warrant for the collection of the tax had been levied
upon the property of the plaintiff, and the tax had thus been collected of him, who was an it\habitant of the located society
of Bethany. Brainerd, J., who drew up the • opinion of [* 246]
the court, referring to this p1·oceeding, said : ' This practice, with regard to towns, has prevailed in New England, so
far as I have been able to investigate the subject, from an early
period,- from its first settlement,- a practice brought by our
forefathers from England, which had there obtained in corporations similar to the towns incorporated in New England.'
It will here be seen that the principle is considered as applicable to territorial societies as to towns, because the object to be
obtained 'was the same in both,- • that the town or society
should be brought to a sense of duty, and make provision for
payment and indemnity' ; a very good reason, and very applicable to the case we are considering.
"The faw on this subject was more distinctly brought out
and considered by this court in the late case of McCloud v.
Sel hy ,a in which this well-known practice, as it had been applied to towns a·nd ecclesiastical societies, was extended and
sanctioned as to school districts ; ' else it would be breaking in
upon the analogies of the law.' 'They are communities for
1

5 Conn. 417.

1

6 Conn. 223.

~

10 Conn. 390--395.
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no doubt can remain, since the decision of this case, but that

different purposes, but essentially of the same character.' And
no doubt can remain, since the decision of this case, but that
the real principle, in all of the cases on this subject, has been,
and is, that the inhabitants of quasi corporations are parties
individually, as well as in their corporate capacities, to all the
actions in which the corporation is a party. And to the same
effect is the language of the elementary writers." 1
So far as this rule rests upon the reason that these organizations have no common fund, and that no other mode exists
by which demands against them can be enforced, it cannot
be considered applicable in those States where express provision
is made by law for compulsory taxation to satisfy any judgment
recovered against the corporate body,- the duty of levying the
tax being imposed upon some officer, who may be compelled by
mandamus to perform it. Nor has any usage, so far as we are
aware, grown up in any of the newer States, like that
[* 247] which had so early an origin in New England. *More
just, convenient, and inexpensive modes of enforcing
such demands have been established by statute, and the rules
concerning them are conformed more closely to those which are
established for other corporations.
On the other hand, it is settled that these corporations are not
liable to a private action, at the suit of a party injured by a neglect
of its officers to perform a corporate duty, unless such action is
given by statute. This doctrine has been frequently applied where
suits have been brought against towns, or the highway officers
of towns, to recover for damages sustained in consequence of
defects in the public ways. The common law gives no such
action, and it is therefore not sustainable at all, unless given
by statute. A distinction is made between those corporations
which are created as exceptions, and receive special grants of
power for the peculiar convenience and benefit of the corporators, on the one hand, and the incorporated inhabitants of a
district, who are by statute invested with particular powers, without

the real principle, in all of the cases on this subject, has been,

and is, that the inhabitants of quasi corporations are parties

individually, as well as in their corporate capacities, to all the

actions in which the corporation is a party. And to the same

eﬁ'ect is the language of the elementary writers/’1

So far as this rule rests upon the reason that these organiza-

tions have no common fund, and that no other mode exists

by which demands against them can be enforced, it cannot

be considered applicable in those States where express provision

is made by law for compulsory taxation to satisfy any judgment

recovered against the corporate body,—-the duty of levying the

tax being imposed upon some oﬁicer, who may be compelled by

mandamus to perform it. Nor has any usage, so far as we are

aware, grown up in any of the newer States, like that

[* 247] which had so early an origin in New England. * More

just, convenient, and inexpensive modes of enforcing

such demands have been established by statute, and the rules

concerning them are conformed more closely to those which are

established for other corporations.

On the other hand, it is settled that these corporations are not
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liable to a private action, at the suit of a party injured by a neglect

of its officers to perform a corporate duty, unless such action is

given by statute. This doctrine has been frequently applied where

suits have been brought against towns, or the highway officers

of towns, to recover for damages sustained in consequence of

defects in the public ways. The common law gives no such

action, and it is therefore not sustainable at all, unless given

by statute. A distinction is made between those corporations

which are created as exceptions, and receive special grants of

power for the peculiar convenience and beneﬁt of the corpo-

rators, on the one hand, and the incorporated inhabitants of a.

district, who are by statute invested with particular powers, without

‘ Beardsley v. Smith, 16 Conn. 375, citing 2 Kent, 221; Angeli and Ames on

Corp. 374; 1 Swift’s Dig. 72, 794; 5 Dane’s Abr. 158. It was held constitu-

tional in this case to extend the same principle to incorporated cities; and an act

of the legislature permitting the enforcement of city debts in the same mode was

sustained. For u. more recent case in Massachusetts than these cited, sec Gaskill

v. Dudley, 6 Met. 551.

it ~
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'

1 Beardsley v. Smith, 16 Conn. 375, citing 2 Kent, 221; Angell and Ames on
Corp. 874; 1 Swift's Dig. 72, 794; 5 Dane's Ahr. 158. It was held constitutional in this case to extend the same principle to incorporated cities; and an act
of the legislature permitting the enforcement of city debts in the same mode was
sustained. For a more recent case in Massachusetts than these cited, see Gaskill
tJ. Dudley, 6 :Met. 551.
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pose corporate duties, and compel their performance, under

penalties; but the corporators, who are made such whether

they will or no, cannot be considered in the light of persons

who have voluntarily, and for a consideration, assumed obli-

gations, so as to owe a duty to every person interested in the

performance.1

The reason which exempts these public bodies from liability

to private actions, based upon neglect to perform public obli-

gations, does not apply to villages, boroughs, and cities,

which accept special ‘charters from the State. The [*248]

grant of the corporate franchise, in these cases, is usually

made only at the request of the citizens to be incorporated, and

it is justly assumed that it confers what to them is a valuable

privilege. This privilege is a consideration for the duties which

the charter imposes. Larger powers of self -government are given

than are conﬁded to towns or counties; larger privileges in the

acquisition and control of corporate property; and special authority

is conferred to make use of the public highways for the special and

peculiar convenience of the citizens of the municipality in various

modes not permissible elsewhere. The grant by the State to the

municipality of a portion of its sovereign powers, and their accept-
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ance for these beneﬁcial purposes, is regarded as raising an implied

promise, on the part of the corporation, to perform the corporate

duties ; and this implied contract, made with the sovereign power,

‘ Mower v. Leicester, 9 Mass. 250; Bartlett v. Crozier, 17 Johns. 439; Far-

num v. Concord, 2 N. H. 392; Adams v. VViscasset Bank, 1 Green]. 361 ;

Baxter v. \Vinooski Turnpike, 22 Vt. 123; Chidsey v. Canton, 17 Conn. 475;

Commissioners of Highways v. Martin, 4 Mich. 557; Morey v. Newfane, 8 Barb.

645; Lorillard v. Monroe, 11 N. Y. 392; Galen v. Clyde and Rose Plank Road

Co. 27 Barb. 543; Reardon v. St. Louis, 36 Mo. 555; Sherburne v. Yuba Co.

21 Cal. 113; State v. County of Hudson, 1 Vroom, 137. These cases follow the

leading English case of Russell 1:. Men of Devon, 2 T. R. 667. In the very care-

fully considered case of Eastman v. Meredith, 36 N. H. 284, it was decided, on

the principle above stated, that if a building erected by a town for a town-house is

so imperfectly constructed that the ﬂooring gives way at the annual town-meeting,

and an inhabitant and legal voter, in attendance on the meeting, receives thereby

their consent, on the other. In the latter case, the State may impose corporate duties, and compel their performance, under
penalties ; but the corporators, who are made such whether
they will or no, cannot be considered in the light of persons
who have voluntarily, and for a consideration, assumed obligations, so as to owe a duty to every person interested in the
performance. I
The reason which exempts these public bodies from liability
to private actions, based upon neglect to perform public obligations, does not apply to villages, boroughs, and cities,
which accept special • charters from the State. The [• 248]
grant of the corporate franchise, in these cases, is usually
made only at the request of the citizens to be incorporated, and
it is justly assumed that it confers what to them is a valuable
privilege. This privilege is a consideration for the duties which
the charter imposes. Larger powers of self-government are given
than are confided to towns or counties; larger privileges in the
acquisition and control of corporate property; and special authority
is conferred to make use of the public highways for the special and
peculiar convenience of the citizens of the municipality in various
modes not permissible elsewhere. The grant by the State to the
municipality of a portion of its sovereign powers, and their acceptance for these beneficial purposes, is regarded as raising an implied
promise, on the part of the corporation, to perform the corporate
duties; and this implied contract, made with the sovereign power,

a bodily injury, he cannot maintain an action against the town to recover

damages for this injury. The case is carefully distinguished from those where

corporations have been held liable for the negligent use of their own property

by means of which others are injured. The familiar maxim that one shall so use

his own as not to injure that which belongs to another is of general application.
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1 Mower 11. Leicester, 9 Mass. 250; Bartlett 11. Crozier, 17 Johr.s. 489; Farnum 11. Concord, 2 N. H. 392; Adams v. Wiscasset Bank, 1 Green!. 36 L ;
Baxter 11. ·winooski Turnpike, 22 Vt. 123; Chidsey v. Canton, 17 Conn. 475;
Commissioners of Highways"· Martin, 4 Mich. 567; Morey v. Newfane, 8 Barb.
645; Lorillard v. Monroe, 11 N. Y. 392; Galen v. Clyde and Rose Plank Road
Co. 27 Barb. 543; Reardon v. St. Louis, 36 Mo. 555; Sherburne v. Yuba Co.
21 Cal. 113; State"· County of Hudson, 1 Vroom, 137. These cases follow the
leading English case of Russell"· Men of Devon, 2 T. R. 667. In the very carefully considered case of Eastman 11. Meredith, 36 N. H. 284, it was dedded, on
the principle above stated, that if a building erected by a town for a town-house is
110 irnperfel'tly constructed that the flooring gives way at the annual town-meeting,
and an inhabitant and legal voter, in attendance on the meeting, receives thereby
a bodily injury, he cannot maintain an action against the town to recover
damages for this injury. The case is carefully distinguished from those where
corporations have been held liable for the negligent use of their own property
by means of which others are injured. The familiar maxim that one shall so use
his own as not to injure that which belongs t.o another is of general application.
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enures to the beneﬁt of every individual interested in its perform-

[cH. vm .

ance} In this respect these corporations are looked upon as occu-

pying the same position as private corporations, which, having

accepted a valuable franchise, on condition of the performance of

certain public duties, are held to contract by the acceptance for

the performance of these duties. In the case of public corpo-

rations, however, the liability is contingent on the law affording

the means of performing the duty, which, in some cases, by

reason of restrictions upon the power of taxation, they might not

possess. But assuming the corporation to be clothed with suffi-

cient power by the charter to that end, the liability of a city or

' Selden, J., in Weet v. Brockport, 16 N. Y. 161, note. See also Mayor of

Lyme v. Turner, Cowp. 86; Henleyv. Lyme Regis, 5 Bing. 91; Same case in

error, 3 B. & Adol. 77, and 1 Bing. N. C.- 222; Mayor, &c., of New York v.

Furzc, 3 Hill, 612; Rochester VVhite Lead Co. v. Rochester. 3 N. Y. 464; Hut-

son v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 9 N. Y. 163; Conrad v. Ithaca, 16 N. Y. 158;

Mills v. Brooklyn, 32 N. Y. 439; Barton v. Syracuse, 36 N. Y. 54; Lee v. Sandy

enures to the benefit of every individual interested in its performance.1 In this respect these corporations are looked upon as occupying the same position as private corporations, which, having
accepted a valuable franchise, on condition of the performance of
certain public duties, are held to contract by the acceptance for
the performance of these duties. In the case of public corporations, however, the liability is contingent on the law affording
the means of performing the duty, which, in some cases, by
reason of restrictions upon the power of taxation, they might not
possess. But assuming the corporation to be clothed with sufficient power by the charter to that end, the liability of a city or

Hill, 40 N. Y. 442; Clark v. Washington, 12 Wheat. 40; Riddle 0. Proprietors

of Locks, &c., 7 Mass. 183; Bigelow-v. Inhabitants of Randolph, 14 Gray, 541;

Mears v. Commissioners of Wilmington, 9 Ired. 73; Browning v. Springﬁeld,

17 lll. 143; Pittsburg v. Grier, 22 Penn. St. 54; Jones v. New Haven, 34 Conn.

1; Stackhouse v. Lafayette, 26 Ind. 17; Brinkmeyer v. Evansville, 29 Ind. 187;
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Sawyer v. Corse, 17 Grat. 241; Richmond v. Long, ib. 375; Blake v. St.

Louis, 40 Mo. 569; Scott v. Mayor, &c., of Manchester; 37 Eng. L. & Eq. 495;

Smoot v. ¥Vetumpka, 24 Ala. 112; Detroit v. Corey, 9 Mich. 165; Rusch v.

Davenport, 6 Iowa, 443; Commissioners v. Duckett, 20 Md. 468; Weightman

v. Washington, 1 Black, 41; Chicago v. Robbins, 2 Black, 418; Nebraska v.

Campbell, ib. 590. In the recent case of Detroit v. Blackeby, 20 Mich., this

whole subject is considered at length ; and the court (one judge dissenting) deny

the soundness of the principle stated in the text. and hold that‘ municipal corpo-

rations existing under special charters are not liable to individuals for injuries

caused by neglect to perform corporate duties, unless expressly made so by

statute. In Murtangh v. St. Louis, 44 Mo. 480, Currier, J., says: “ The

general result of the adjudications seems to be this: \Vhen the oﬂicer or servant

of a municipal corporation is in the exercise of a power conferred upon the

corporation for its private beneﬁt, and injury ensues from the negligence or

rnisfcasance of such officer or servant, the corporation is liable, as in the case of

private corporations or parties; but when the acts or omissions complained of

were done or omitted in the exercise of a. corporate franchise conferred upon the

corporation for the public good, and not for the private corporate advantage,

then the corporation is not liable for the consequences of such acts or omissions.“

Citing Bailey_v. New York, 3 Hill, 531; Martin v. Brooklyn, 1 Hill, 550;

Richmond e. Long’s Adm’r, 17 Grat. 375; Sherburne u. Yuba Co. 21 Cal. 113;

Dargan v. Mobile, 31 Ala. 469 ; Stewart v. New Orleans, 9 La. Au. 461 ; P1-other

v. Lexington, 13 B. Monr. 559.
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Selden, J., in Weet v. Brockport, 16 N.Y. 161, note. See also Mayor of
Lyme v. Tumer, Cowp. 86 ; Henley v. Lyme Regis, f> Bing. 91 ; Same case in
error, 3 B. & Adoi. 77, and 1 Bing. N. C, 222; Mayor, &c., of New York v.
Furze, 3 Hill, G12; Rochester White Lead Co. v. Rochester, 3 N. Y. 464; Hutson v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 9 N.Y. 163; Conrad v. Ithaca, 16 N.Y. 158;
:Mills v. Brooklyn, 32 N. Y. 489 ; Barton v. Syracuse, 36 N. Y. M; Lee v. Sandy
Bill, 40 N.Y. 442; Clark v. Washington, 12 Wheat. 40; Riddle v. Proprietors
of Locks, &c., 7 Mass. 183; Bigelow v. Inhabitants of Randolph, 14 Gray, 5-11;
Mears v. Commissioners of Wilmington, 9 Ired. 78; Browning v. Springfield,
17lll. 143; Pittsburg v. Grier, 22 Penn. St. 54; Jones v. New Haven, 34 Conn.
1; Stackhouse "· Lafayette, 26 Ind. 17; Brinkmeyer v. Evansville, 29 Ind. 187;
Sawyer v. Corse, 17 Grat. 241; Richmond v. Long, ib. 375; Blake v. St.
Louis, 40 Mo. 569; Scott v. Mayor, &c., of Manchester; 87 Eng. L. & Eq. 495;
Smoot v. Wetumpka, 24 Ala. 112; Detroit v. Corey, 9 Mich. 165; Ru~ch v.
Davenport, 6 Iowa, 443; Commissionl!rs v. Duckett, 20 Md. 468; Weightman
v. Washington, 1 Black, 41; Chicago v. Robbins, 2 Black, 418; Nt!braska t!.
Campbell, ib. 590. In the recent case of Detroit v. Blackeby, 20 1\licb., this
wl10le subject is considered at length ; and the court (one judge dissenting) deny
the soundness of the principle stated in the text, anrl hold that· municipal corporations existing under special charters are not liable to individuals for injuries
caused by neglect to perform corporate duties, unless expressly made so by
statute. In Murtaugh v. St. Louis, 44 Mo. 480, Currier, J., says: "The
general result of the adjudications seems to be this: When the officer or ser,•ant
of a municipal corporation is in the exercise of a power conferred upon tbe
corporation for its private benefit, and injury ensues from the negligence or
misfeasance of such officer or servant, the corporation is liable, as in the case or
pr:vate corporations or parties; but when the acts or omissions complained of
were done or omitted in the exercise of a corporate franchise conferred upon the
corporation for the public good, and not for the private corporate advantage,
then the corporation is not liable for the consequences of such acts or omissions."
Citing Bailey v. New York, 3 Hill, 531; Martin v. Brooklyn, 1 Hill, 550;
Ri.:hmond v. Long's Adm'r, 17 Grat. 37[); Sherburne v. Yuba Co. 21 Cal. 113;
Dargan v. Mobile, 31 Ala. 469; Stewart v. New Orleans, 9 La. An. 461; Prother
v. Lexington, 13 B. Monr. 559.
1
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village, vested with control of its streets, for any neglect to keep
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them in repair, or for any improper construction, has been

determined in many cases.‘ And a similar liability would exist

in other cases where the same reasons would be applicable.

' But if the ground of the action is the omission by the [‘ 249]

corporation to repair a. defect, it would seem that notice

of the defect should be brought home to the corporation, or to

oﬁicers charged with some duty-respecting the streets, or that facts

should appear sufficient to show that, by proper vigilance, it must

have been known.”

In regard to all those powers which are conferred upon the

corporation, not for the beneﬁt of the general public, but of the

c0rporators,- as to construct works to supply a city with water, or

gas-works, or sewers, and the like,—— the corporation is held to a

still more strict liability, and is made to respond in damages to the

parties injured by the negligent manner in which the work is

constructed, or guarded, even though, under its charter, the agents

for the construction are not chosen or controlled by the corpora-

tion, and even where the work is required by law, be let to the

lowest responsible bidder.

In Bailey v. Mayor, &c., of New York,3 an action was brought

' VVeet v. Brockport, 16 N. Y. 161, note; Hickok v. Plattsburg, ib. 158;
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Morey v. Newfane, 8 Barb. 645; Browning v. Springﬁeld, 17 Ill. 143; Hyatt v.

Rondout, 44 Barb. 385; Lloyd v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 5 N. Y. 369;

Rust-h v. Davenport, 6 Iowa, 443. The cases of Weet v. Broekport, and Hickok

v. Plattsburg, were criticised by Mr. Justice Marvin, in the case of Peck v.

Batavia, 82 Barb. 634, where, as well as in Cole v. Medina, 27 Barb. 218, he

held that a village merely authorized to make and repair sidewalks, but not in

terms absolutely and imperatively required to do so, had a discretion conferred

upon it in respect to such walks, and_ was not responsible for a refusal to enact

ordinances or by-laws in relation thereto; nor, if it enacted such ordinances or

village, vested with control of its streets, for any neglect to keep
them in repair, or for any improper construction, has been
determined iu many cases.1 And a similar liability would exist
in other cases where the same reasons would be applicable.
• But if the ground of the action is the omission by the [• 249]
corporation to repair a defect, it would seem that notice
of the defect should be brought home to the corporation, or to
officers charged with some duty· respecting the streets, or that facts
should appear sufficient to show that, by proper vigilance, it must
have been known.2
In regard to all those powers which are conferred upon the
corporation, not for the benefit of the general public, Lut of the
corporators,- as to construct works to supply a city with water, or
gas-works, or sewers, and the like,- the corporation is held to a
still more strict liability, and is made to respond in damages to the
parties injured by the negligent manner in which the work is
constructed, or guat·ded, even though, under its charter, the agents
for the construction are not chosen or controlled by the corporation, and even where the work is required by law, be le_t to the
lowest responsible bidder.
In Bailey v. Mayor, &c., of New York,8 an action was brought

by-laws, was it liable for damages arising from a neglect to enforce them. The

doctrine that a power thus conferred is discretionary does not seem consistent

with the ruling in some of the other cases cited, and is criticised in Hyatt v.

Rondout, 44 Barb.$92. Calling public meetings for political or philanthropic

purposes is no part of the business of a municipal corporation, and it is not liable

to one who, in lawfully passing by where the meeting is held, is injured by the

discharge of a cannon ﬁred by persons concerned in the meeting. Boyland v.

Mayor, &c., of New York, 1 Sandf. 27.

’ Hart v. Brooklyn, 36 Barb. 226; Dewey 1'. City of Detroit, 1.5 Mich. 309;

Garrison v. New York, 5 Bosw. 497; McGinity v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 5

Duer, 674.

' 3 Hill, 531 ; 2 Denio, 433.
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1 Weet v. Brockport, 16 N.Y. 161, note; Hickok v. Plattsburg, ib. 158;
:Morey t'. Newfane, 8 Barb. 645; Browning v. Springfield, 17 Ill. 143; Hyatt v.
Rondout, 44 Barb. 385; Lloyd v. Mayor, &c., of Ne'v York, 5 N. Y. 369;
Ru:wh v. Davenport, 6 Iowa, 4-13. The <'ases of Weet "· Bro\:kport, and Hickok
"· Plattsburg, were criticbed by Mr. Justice Marvin, in the case of Peck v.
Batavia, 32 Barb. 634, where, as well as in Cole v. Medina, 27 Barb. 218, he
held that a village merely authorized to make and repair sidewalks, but not in
terms absolutely and imperatively required to t.lo so, had a discretion conferred
upon it in respect to such walks, and. was not responsible for a refusal to enact
ordiuances or by-laws in relation thereto; nor, if it enacted such ordinances or
by-laws, wa:~ it liable for damages ari~ing from a neglect to enforce them. The
doctrine that a power tim:. \:Onferred is discretionary does not seem consistent
with the ruling in some of the other cases citt>d, and is critil'iscd in Hyatt !1.
Rondout, 44 Barb. ~92. Calling public meetings for political or philanthropic
purposes is no part of the business of a municipal corporation, and it is not liable
to one who, in lawfully passing by where the meeting is held, is injured by the
di11cbarge of a cannon fired by persons concerned in the rueeting. Boyland v.
Mayor, &c., of New York, 1 San1lf. 27.
1 Hart v. Brooklyn, 86 Barb. 226; Dewey v. City of Detroit, 15 Mich. 309 ;
Garrison !1. :New York, 5 Bosw. 497; McGinity !1. :Mayor, &c., of New York, 5
Doer, 674.
3 3 Hill, 531; 2 Denio, 433.

[ 265]

•

* 249 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [cn. vm.

against the city by one who had been injured in his property by the

• 249

CONSTITUTIONAL LIIIIITATIONS.

[CH. VIII.

careless construction of the Croton dam for the purpose of supply-

ing the city with water. The work was constructed under the

control of water commissioners, in whose appointment the city had

no voice; and upon this ground, among others, and also on the

ground that the city oﬁicers were acting in a public capacity, and,

like other public agents, not responsible for the misconduct

[' 250] of ‘those necessarily appointed by them, it was insisted

the city could not be held liable. Nelson, Ch. J ., examin-

ing the position that, “ admitting the water commissioners to be

the appointed agents of the defendants, still the latter are not

liable, inasmuch as they were acting solely for the State in

prosecuting the work in question, and therefore are not responsible

for the conduct of those necessarily employed by them for that

purpose,” says : “ We admit, if the defendants are to be regarded as

occupying this relation, and are not chargeable with any want of

diligence in the selection of agents, the conclusion contended for

would seem to follow. They would then be entitled to all the im-

munities of public oﬁicers charged with a duty which, from its

nature, could not be executed, without availing themselves of the

services of others ; and the doctrine of respondeat mzperior docs not

apply to such cases. If a public oﬁicer authorize the doing of an
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act not within the scope of his authority, or if he be guilty of

negligence in the discharge of duties to be performed by himself,

he will be held responsible; but not for the misconduct or

malfeasance of such persons as he is obliged to employ. But this

view cannot be maintained on the facts before us. The powers

conferred by the several acts of the legislature, authorizing the

execution of this great work, are not, strictly and legally speaking,

conferred for the beneﬁt of the public; the grant is a special,

private franchise, made as well for the private emolument and ad-

vantage of the city as for public good. The State, in its sovereign

character, has no interest in it. It owns no part of,the work. The

whole investment, under the law, and the revenue and proﬁts to be

derived therefrom, are a part of the private property of the city, as

much so as the lands and houses belonging to it situate within its

corporate limits.

“ The argument of the defendants’ counsel confounds the powers

in question with those belonging to the defendants in their

character as a municipal or public body,—such as are granted ex-
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against the city by one who had been injured in his property by the
careless construction of the Croton dam for the purpose of supplying the city with water. The work was constructed under the
control of water commissioners, in whose appointment the city had
no voice ; and upon this ground, RlllOilg others, and also on the
ground that the city officers were acting in a public capacity, and,
like other public agents, not responsible for the misconduct
[• 250] of • those necessarily appointed by them, it was insisted
the city could not be held liable. Nelson, Ch. J., examining the position that," admitting the water commissioners to be
the appointed agents of the defendants, still the latter are not
liable, inasmuch as they were acting solely for the State in
prosecuting the work in question, and therefore are not responsible
for the conduct of those necessarily employed by them for that
purpose," says: " We admit, if the defendants are to be regarded as
occupying this relation, and are not chargeable with any want of
diligence in the selection of agents, the conclusion contended for
would seem to follow. They would then be entitled to all the immunities of public officers charged with a duty which, from its
nature, could not be executed, without availing themselves of the
services of others ; and the doctrine of respondeat superior docs not
apply to such cases. If a public officer authorize the doing of an
act not within the scope of his authority, Ol' if he be guilty of
negligence in the discharge of duties to be performed by himself,
he will be held responsible ; but not for the misconduct or
malfeasance of such persons as he is obliged to employ. But this
view cannot be maintained on the facts before us. The powers
conferred by the several acts of the legislature, authorizing the
execution of this great work, are not, strictly and legally speaking,
conferred for the benefit of the public; the grant is a special,
private franchise, made as well fol' the private emolument and advantage of the city as for public good. The State, in its sovereign
character, has no interest in it. It owns no pal't of.the work. The
whole investment, under the law, and the revenue and profits to be
derived therefrom, are a part of the private property of the city, as.
much so as the lands and houses belonging to it situate within its
corporate limits.
"The argument of the defendants' counsel confounds the powers
in question with those belonging to the defendants in their
character as a municipal or public body,-such as are granted ex[ 266]
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where the corporations have, if I may so speak, no private estate or

interest in the grant.

“As the powers in question have been conferred upon one of

these public corporations, thus blending, in a measure, those con-

ferred for private advantage and emolument with those already

possessed for public purposes, there is some difficulty, I

‘ admit, in separating them in the mind, and properly dis- [* 251]

tinguishing the one class from the other, so as to distribute

the responsibility attaching to the exercise of each.

“ But the distinction is quite clear and well settled, and the pro-

cess of separation practicable. To this end, regard should be had,

not so much to the nature and character of the various powers con-

ferred, as to the object and purpose of the legislature in conferring

them. If granted for public purposes exclusively, they belong

to the corporate body in its public, political, or municipal character.

But if the grant was for purposes of private advantage and emolu-

ment, though the public may derive a common beneﬁt therefrom, the

corporation quo ad hoc is to be regarded as a private company. It

stands on the same footing as would any individual or body of

persons upon whom the like special franchises had been con-

ferred.1
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“ Suppose the legislature, instead of the franchise in question,

had conferred upon the defendants banking powers, or a charter

for a railroad leading into the city, in the usual manner in which

such powers are conferred upon private companies, could it be

doubted that they would hold them in the same character, and be

subject to the same duties and liabilities? It cannot be doubtedbut

they would. These powers, in the eye of the law, would be entire-

ly distinct and separate from those appertaining to the defendants

as a municipal body. So far as related to the charter thus con-

ferred, they would be regarded as a private company, and be

subject to the responsibilities attaching to that class of institutions.

The distinction is well stated by the Master of the Rolls, in

Moodalay v. East India Co.,3 in answer to an objection made by

' Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 668, 672; Phillips v. Bury, 1

Ld. Raym. 8; 2 T. R. 352, s. c.; Allen v. McKeen, 1 Sumn.'297; People v.

Morris, 13 Wend. 331-,-338; 2 Kent's Com. 275 (4th ed.); United States Bank

0. Planters Bank, 9 Wheat. 907; Clark v. Corp. of Washington, 12 ib. 40;

Moodalay v. East India Co. 1 Brown’s Ch. R. 469.

’ 1 Brown‘s Ch. R. 469.
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elusively for public purposes to counties, cities, towns, and villages,
where the corporations have, if I may so speak, no private estate or
interest in the grant.
".As the powers in question have been conferred upon one of
these public corporations, thus blending, in a measure, those conferred for private advantage and emolument with those already
possessed for public purposes, there is some difficulty, I
• admit, in separating them in the mind, and properly dis- [* 251]
tinguishing the one class from the other, so as to distribute
the responsibility attaching to the exercise of each.
"But the distinction is quite clear and well settled, and the process of separation practicable. To this end, regard should be had,
not so much to the nature and character of the various powers conferred, as to the object and purpose of the legislature in conferring
them. If granted for public purposes exclusively, they belong
to the corporate body in its public, political, or municipal character.
But if the grant was for purposes of private advantage and emolument, though the public may derive a common benefit therefrom, the
corporation quo ad hoc is to be regarded as a private company. It
stauds on the same footing as would any individual or body of
persons upon whom the like special franchises had been conferred.1
"Suppose the legislature, instead of the franchise in question,
had conferred upon the defendants banking powers, or a charter
for a railroad leading into the city, in the usual manner in which
such powers are conferred upon private companies, could it be
doubted that they would hold them in the same character, and be
subject to the same duties and liabilities? It cannot be doubted but
they would. These powers, in the eye of the law, would be entirely distinct and separate from those appertaining to the defendants
as a municipal body. So far as related to the charter thus conferred, they would be regarded as a private company, and be
subject to the responsibilities attaching to that class of institutions.
The distinction i8 well stated by the Master of the Rolls, in
Moodalny v. East India Co.,3 iu answer to an objection ma~e by
1 Dartmoulh College "· Woodward, 4 Wheat. 668, 672;
Phillips v. Bury, 1
Ld. Raym. 8; 2 T. R. 352, s. c.; Allen v. McKeen, 1 Sumn.' 297; People v.
Morris, 13 Wend. 331:-338; 2 Kent's Com. 2i5 (4th ed.); United States Bank
v. Planters Bank, 9 Wheat. 907; Clark v. Corp. of Washington, 12 ib. 40;
1\loodalay v. East India Co. 1 Brown's Ch. R . 469.
• 1 Brown's Ch. R. 469.
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counsel. There the plaintiff had taken a lease from the company,

(CH. VIII.

granting him permission to supply the inhabitants of Madras with

tobacco for ten years. Before the expiration of that period, the com-

pany dispossessed him, and granted the privilege to another. The

» plaintiff, preparatory to bringing an action against the com-

["* 252] pany, ﬁled a bill of discovery. One of the objections * taken

by the defendant was, that the removal of the plaintiff

was incident to their character as a sovereign power, the

exercise of which could not be questioned in a bill or suit at law.

The Master of the Rolls admitted that no suit would lie against a

sovereign power for any thing done in that capacity ; but he denied

that the defendants came within the rule. ‘ They have rights,’ he

observed, ‘ as a sovereign power; they have also duties as individ-

uals; if they enter into bonds in India, the sums secured may be

recovered here. So in this case, as a private company, they have

entered into a. private contract, to which they must be liable.’ It is

upon the like distinction that municipal corporations, in their

private character as owners and occupiers of lands and houses, are

regarded in the same light as individual owners and occupiers, and

dealt with accordingly. As such, they are bound to repair bridges,

highways, and churches; are liable to poor-rates ; and, in a

word, to the discharge of any other duty or obligation to which an
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individual owner would be subject.” 1

In Stoors v. City of Utica,2 it was held that a city, owing to the

public the duty of keeping its streets in a safe condition for travel,

was liable to persons receiving injury from the neglect to keep

proper lights and guards at night around an excavation which

had been made for the construction of a sewer, notwithstanding it

' 2 Inst. 703; Thursﬁeld v. Jones, Sir T. Jones, 187_; Rex v. Gardner, Cowp.

79; Mayor of Lyme v. Turner, ib. 87; Henley v. Mayor of Lyme, 5 Bing. 91;

1 Bing. N. C. 222, s. C. in House of Lords. See also Lloyd v. Mayor, &c., of

New York, 5 N. Y. 369; Commissioners v. Duckett, 20 Md. 468. “ The cor-

poration of the city of New York possesses two kinds of powers, —one govern-

mental and public, and, to the extent they are held and exercised, is clothed with

sovereignty; the other private, and, to the extent they are held and exercised,

is a legal individual. The former are given and used for public purposes, the

latter for private purposes. While in the exercise of the former, the corporation

is a municipal government, and while in the exercise of the latter is a corporate,

legal individual.” lbid. per Foot, J. See upon this point also, Western Fund

Savings Society v. Philadelphia, 31 Penn. St. 175; Louisville v. Commonwealth,

counsel. There the plaintiff had taken a lease from the company,
granting him permission to supply the inhabitants of Madras with
tobacco for ten years. Bcfot·e the expiration of that period, the company dispossessed him, and granted tho privilege to another. The
plaintiff, preparatory to bringing an action against the com[• 252] pany, filed a bill of discovery. One of the objections • taken
by the defendant was, that the removal of the plaintiff
was incident to their character as a sovereign power, the
exm·cise of which could not be questioned in a bill or suit at law.
The Master of the Rolls admitted that no suit would lie against a
sovereign power for any thing done in that capacity ; but he denied
that the defendants came within the rule. 'They have rights,' he
observed, 'as a sovereign power; they have also duties as individuals; if they enter into bonds in India, the sums secured may be
recovered here. So in this case, as a private company, they have
entered into a private contt·act, to which they must be lia~le.' It is
upon the like distinction that municipal corporations, in their
private character as owners and occupiers of lands and houses, are
regarded in the same light as individual owners and occupiers, and
dealt with accordingly. As such, they are bound to repair bridges,
highways, and churches; are liable to poor-rates; and, in a
word, to the discharge of any other duty or obligation to which au
individual ownet· would be subject." 1
In Stoors v. City of Utica,2 it was held that a city, owing to the
pub.lic the duty of keeping its streets in a safe condition for travel,
was liahlo to persons receiving injury from the neglect to keep
proper lights and guards at night around an excavation which
had been made for the construction of a sewer, notwithstanding it

1 Duvall, 295.

* 17 N. Y. IOL
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1 2 Inst. 703; Thursficld v. Jones, Sir T . Jones, 187.; Rex 11. Gardner, Cowp.
79; Mayor of Lyme v. Turner, ib. 87; Henley "· Mayor of Lyme, 5 Bing. 91;
1 Bing. N.C. 222, s. c. in House of Lords. See also Lloyd"· Mayor, &c;, of
New York, 5 N. Y. 369; Commissioners "· Duckett, 20 Mc.l. 468. " The corporation of the city of New Y01·k posse.;ses two kind~ of power~, -one governmental and public, and, to the extent they are held and exercised, is clothed with
sovereignty; the other private, and, to the extent they are helc.l and exercised,
is a le~al individual. The former are given and u~ed for public purposes, the
latter for private purposes. While in the exercise of the forme•·, the corporation
is a municipal government, and while in the exerdse of the latter i~ a corporate,
legal individual" Ibid. per Foot, J. See upon this point also, Western Fund
Savings Society"· Philadelphia, 31 Penn. St. 175; Louisville v. Commonwealth,
1 Duvall, 295.
I 17 N.Y. lOl.
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had contracted for all proper precautions with the persons execut-
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ing the work. And in the City of Detroit v. Coreyl the corpo-

ration was held liable in a similar case, notwithstanding the work

was required by the charter to be let to the lowest bidder. Ellen-

ning, J ., in speaking to the point whether the contractors were to

be considered as the agents of the city, so that the maxim respow

deat superior should apply, says: “It is to be observed _

that the * power under which they acted, and which made [" 253]

that lawful which would otherwise have been unlawful,

was not a power given to the city for governmental purposes, or a

public municipal duty imposed on the city, as to keep its streets

in repair, or the like, but a special legislative grant to the city for

private purposes. The sewers of the city, like its works for sup-

plying the city with water, are the private property of the city;

they belong to the city. The corporation and its corporators, the

citizens, are alone interested in them; the outside public or people

of the State at large have no interest in them, as they have in the

streets of the city, which are public highways.

“The donee of such a power, whether the donee be an indi-

vidual or a corporation, takes it with the understanding—for such

are the requirements of the law in the execution of the power-—

that it shall" be so executed as not unnecessarily to interfere with
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the rights of the public, and that all necdful and proper measures

will be taken, in the execution of it, to guard against accidents to

persons lawfully using the highway at the time. He is individ-

ually bound for the performance of these obligations; he cannot

accept the power divested of them, or rid himself of their perform-

ance by executing them through a third person as his agent.

He may stipulate with the contractor for their performance, as

was done by the city in the present case, but he cannot thereby

relieve himself of- his personal liability, or compel an injured

party to look to his agent, instead of himself, for damages.”

And in answer to the objection that the contract was let to the

lowest bidder, as the law required, it is shown that the provision

of lawito that cﬁ'ect was introduced for the beneﬁt of the city, to

protect it against frauds, and that it should not, therefore, relieve

it from any liability.’ .

‘ 9 Mich. 165.

’ See also Rochester VVhite Lead Co. v. City of Rochester, 3 N. Y. 463;

Grant v. City of Brooklyn, 41 Barb. 381; City of Buﬁiilo v. Holloway, l4 Barb.
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had contracted for all proper precautions with the persons executing the work. And in the City of Detroit v. Corey 1 the corpo·
ration was held liable in a similar case, notwithstanding the work
was required by the charter to be let to the lowest bidder. Mannz:ng, J., in speaking to the point whether the contractors were to
be considered as the agents of the city, so that the maxim respondeat sHperior should apply, says : " It is to be observed •
that the • power under which they acted, and which made [• 253]
that lawful which would otherwise have been unlawful,
was not a power given. to the city for governmental purposes, or a
public municipal duty imposed on the city, as to keep its streets
in repair, or the like, but a special legislative grant to the city for
private purposes. The sewers of the city, like its works for su~
plying the city with water, are the private property of the city;
they belong to the city. The corporation and its corporators, the
citizens, are alone interested in them; the outside public or people
of the State at large have no interest in them, as they have in the
streets of the city, which arc public highways.
"The donee of such a power, whether the donee be an individual or a corporation, takes it with the understanding- for such
arc the rcqniremen ts of the law in the execution of the powerthat it shall be so executed as not unnecessarily to interfere with
the rights of the public, and that all needful and proper measures
will be taken, in the execution of it, to guard against accidents to
persons lawfully usiug the highw&y at the time. He is individually bound for the performance of these obligations; he canuot
accept the power divested of them, or rid himself of their performance by executing them through a third person as his agent.
He may stipulate with the contractor for their perfot·mance, as
was done by the city in the present case, but he cannot thereby
relieve himself of his personal liability, or compel an injured
pa1·ty to look to his agent, instead of himself, for damages."
Aud in answer to the objection that the con tract was let to the
lowest bidder, as the law required, it is shown that the provision
of law· to that effect was introduced for the benefit of the city, to
protect it against frauds, and that it should not, therefore, relieve
it from auy liauility .2
9 1\Iich. 165.
s See also Ro(·hester White Lead Co. t' . City of Rochester, 3 N.Y. 463;
Grant"· City of Brooklyn, 41 Barb. 381; City of Buffalo"· Holloway, 14llarb.
1
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[* 254] '* We have not deemed it important, in considering the

subject embraced within this chapter, to discuss the vari-

ous questions which might be suggested in regard to the val-

idity of the proceedings by which it is assumed in any case that a

municipal corporation has become constituted. These questions

are generally questions between the corporators and the State,

with which private individuals are regarded as having no concern.

In proceedings where the question whether a corporation exists or

not arises collaterally, the courts will not permit its corporate

character to be questioned, if it appear to be acting under color of

law, and recognized by the State as such. Such a question should

be raised by the State itself, by qua wa-rranto or other direct pro-

ceeding.‘ And the rule, we apprehend, would be no different, if

the constitution itself prescribed the manner of incorporation.

Even in such a case, proof that the corporation was acting as

such, under legislative action, would be sufficient evidence of

right, except as against the State; and private parties could not

enter upon any question of regularity. And the State itself may

101, and 7 N.Y. 493; Lloyd v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 5 N. Y. 369; Del-

monico v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 1 Sandf. 222; Barton v. Syracuse, 37

Barb. 292. For further illustration of the rules of liability to which municipal

corporations are subject for the negligent discharge of corporate duties, or the
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improper construction of corporate works, see \Vallace v. Muscatine, 4 Greene

(Iowa), 373; Creal v. Keokuk, ib. 47; Cotes v. Davenport, 9Iowa, 227; hiayor

v. Sheffield, 4 Wal. 189; Child v. Boston, 4 Allen, 41; Walcott v. Swzunpscott,

1 Allen, 101 ; Buttrick v. Lowell, ib. 172; Munn 0. Pittsburgh, 40 Penn. St. 364;

[• 254]

• We have not deemed it important, in considering the
subject embraced within this chapter, to discuss the various questions which might be suggested in regard to the validity of the proceedings by which it is assumed in any case that a
municipal corporation has become constituted. These questions
are generally questions between the corporators and the State,
with which private individuals are regarded as having no concern.
In proc~edings where the question whether a corporation exists or
not arises collaterally, the courts will not permit its corporate
character to be questioned, if it appear to be acting under color of
law, and recognized by the State as such. Such a question should
be raised by the State itself, by quo warranto or other direct proceeding.I And the rule, we apprehend, would be no different, if
the constitution itself prescribed the manner of incorporation.
Even in such a case, proof that the corporation was acting as
such, under legislative action, would be sufficient eyidence of
right, except as against the State ; and private parties cottld not
enter upon any question of regularity. And the State itself may

Pekin v. Newell, 26 Ill. 320; Weightman v. Washington, 1 Black, 39; Kiwa-

naugh 1:. Brooklyn, 38 Barb. 232; Wenrlell v. Troy, 39 Barb. 3'29; Mills v.

Brooklyn, ~32 N.Y. 489; Stein v. Burden, 24 Ala. 130; City of Providence v.

Clapp, 17 How. 161; Champaign v. Patterson, 50 Ill. 62; Ross v. Madison,

1 Ind. 281 ; Mayor, &c., of New York v. Bailey, 2 Denio, 433; Rochester ‘Vhite

Lead Co. v. Rochester, 3 N. Y. 463; Wheeler v. City of Worcester, 10 Allen,

591; Burnham v. Boston, ib. 290; Boom v. City of Utica, 2 Barb. 104; Martin

v. Mayor, &c., of Brooklyn, 1 Hill, 545; Howell v. Buﬁhlo, 15 N. Y. 512;

Lacour v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 3 Duer, 406; Pittsburgh v. Grier, 22 Penn.

St. 54; Erie City v. Schwingle, ib. 384. A municipal corporation is not liable

for neglect to devise and construct a proper system of drainage. Carr 12. North-

ern Liberties, 35 Penn. St. 324.

‘ State v. Carr, 5 N. H. 367; President, &c., of Mendota v. Thompson, 20

Ill. 200; Hamilton v. President, &c., of Carthage, 24 Ill. 22. These were

prosecutions by municipal corporations for recovery of penalties imposed by

by-laws, and where the plea of nul tiel corporation was interposed and over-

ruled. See also Kayser '0. Bremen, 16 Mo. 88; Kettering v. Jacksonville, 50

Ill. 39.

— ._ M A __-a
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101, and 7 N.Y. 493; Lloyd v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 5 N.Y. 869; Delmonico v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 1 Sandf. 222; Barton 11. Syracuse, 87
Barb. 292. For further illustration of the rules of liability to which municipal
corporations are subject for the negligent discharge of corporate duties, or the
improper construction of corporate works, see \Vallace v. Muscatine, 4 Greene
(Iowa), 373; Creal v. Keokuk, ib. 47; Cotes v. DavenporL, 9 Iowa, 227; Mayor
v. Sheffield, 4 Wal. 189; Child v. Boston, 4 Allen, 41; Walcott v. Swampscott,
1 Allen, 101; Buttrick v. Lowell, ib. 172; Munn v. Pittsburgh, 40 Penn. St. 864;
Pekin v. Newell, 26 Ill. 820; Weightman v. Washington, 1 Black, 39; Kavanaugh v. Brooklyn, 88 Barb. 232; Wendell v. Troy, 89 Barb. 329; Mills "·
Brooklyn,-32 N.Y. 489; Stein v. Burden, 24: Ala. 180; City of Providence v.
Clapp, 17 How. 161; Champaign v. Patterson, 50 Ill. 62; Ross v. :Madison,
1 Ind. 281; l\layor, &c., of New York v. Bailey, 2 Denio, 433; Rochester White
Lead Co. v. Rochester, 3 N.Y. 468; Wheeler "· City of Worcester, 10 Allen,
591; Burnham v. Boston, ib. 290; Boom v. City of Utica, 2 Barb. 104; Martin
t~. Mayor, &c., of Brooklyn, 1 Hill, 541>; Howell v. Buffalo, 15 N.Y. 512;
Lacour"· Mayor, &c., of New York, 8 Duer, 406; Pittsburgh v. Grier, 22 Penn.
St. 54; Erie City v. Schwingle, ib. 384. A municipal corporation is not liable
for neglect to devise and construct a proper system of drainage. Carr ?J. Northern Liberties, 35 Penn. St. 324.
1 State v. Carr, 5 N.H. 867; President, &c., of Mendota v. Thompson, 20
Til. 200; Hamilton v. President, &c., of Carthage, 24 Til. 22. These were
prosecutions by municipal corporations for recovery of penalties imposed by
by-laws, and where the plea of nul tiel corporation was interposed and overruled. See also Kayser v. Bremen, 16 Mo. 88; Kettering v. Jacksonville, 50
Til. 39.

[ 270]

en. v1n.] run ensues or MUNICIPAL eovsamusnr. ' 254

justly be precluded, on the principle of estoppel, from raising such

CH. VIII.]

THE GRADES OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT.

an objection, where there has been long acquiescence and recog-

nition.1

‘ In People v. Maynard, 15 Mich. 470, where the invalidity of an act organ-

izing a county, passed several years before, was suggested on constitutional

grounds, Campbell, J ., says: “ If this question had been raised immediately, we

justly be precluded, on the principle of estoppel, from raising such
an objection, where there has been long acquiescence and recognition.1

are not prepared to say that it would have been altogether free from difliculty.

But inasmuch as the arrangement there indicated had been acted upon for ten

years before the recent legislation, and had been recognized as valid by all

parties interested, it cannot now be disturbed. Even in private associations the

acts of parties interested may often estop them from relying on legal objec-

tions, which might have availed them if not waived. But in public affairs, where

the people have organized themselves under color of law into the ordinary

municipal bodies, and have gone on year after year raising taxes, making im-

provements, and exercising their usual franchises, their rights are properly

regarded as depending quit-e as much on the acquiescence as_on the regularity

of their origin, and no ea: post facto inquiry can be permitted to undo their

corporate existence. Whatever may be the rights of individuals before such

general acquiescence, the corporate standing of the community can no longer be

open to question. See Rumsey 1:. People, 19 N. Y. 41; and Lanning v. Car-

penter, 20 N. Y. 474, where the effect of the invalidity of an original county

organization is very well considered in its public and private bearings. There
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have been direct legislative recognitions of the new division on several occasions.

The exercise of jurisdiction being notorious and open in all such cases, the

State as well as county and town taxes being all levied under it, there is no

principle which could justify any court, at this late day, in going back to inquire

into the regularity of the law of 1857.”

[211]

0

1 In People v. 1\faynard, 15 1\lich. 470, where the invalidity of an act organizing a county, passed several years before, was suggested on constitutional
grounds, Campbell, J., says: "If this question had been raised immediately, we
are not prepared to say that it would have been altogether free from difficulty.
But ina~much as the arrangement there indicated had been acted upon for ten
years before the recent legislation, and had been recognized as valid by all
parties interested, it cannot now be disturbed. Even in private associations the
acts of parties interested may often estop them from relying on legal objections, which might have availed them if not waived. But in public affairs, where
the people have organized themselves under color of law into the ordinary
municipal bodies, and have gone on year after year raising taxes, making improvements, and exercising their usual franchises, their rights are properly
regarded as depending quite as much on the acquiescence as. on the regularity
of their origin, and no ex post facto inquiry can be permitted to undo their
corporate existence. Whatever may be the rights of individuals before such
general acquiescence, the corporate standing of the community can no longer be
open to question. See Rumsey t'. People, 19 N.Y. 41; and Lanning v. Carpenter, 20 N.Y. 474, where the effect of ~he invalidity of an original county
organization is very well considered in its public and private bearings. There
have been direct legislative recognitions of the new division on several occasions.
The exercise of jurisdiction being notorious and open in all such cases, the
State as well as county and town taxes being all levied under it, there is no
principle which could justify any court, at this late day, in going back to inquire
into the regularity of the law of 1857."
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[’*255] "‘CHAPTER IX.

[ca.

IX.

PROTECTION TO PERSON AND PROPERTY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF

THE UNITED STATES.

As the government of the United States was one of enumerated

powers, it was not deemed important by the framers of its Consti-

tution that a bill of rights should be incorporated among its pro-

visions. If, among the powers conferred, there was none which

would authorize or empower the government to deprive the citizen

•CHAPTER IX.

[• 255]

of any of those fundamental rights which it is the object and the

duty of the government to protect and defend, and to insure

PROTECTION TO PERSON AND PROPERTY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF
which is the sole purpose of bills of rights, it was thought to be at

THE UNITED STATES •

least unimportant to insert negative clauses in that instrument,

inhibiting the government from assuming any such powers, since

the mere failure to confer them would leave all such powers

beyond the sphere of its constitutional authority. And, as Mr.

Hamilton argued, it might seem even dangerous to do so. “ For

why declare that things shall not be done which there is no power

to do? Why, for instance, should it be said that the liberty of

the press shall not be restrained, when no power is given by

which restrictions may be imposed? I will not contend that

such a provision would confer a regulating power; but it is evi-

dent that it would furnish, to men disposed to usurp, a plausible
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pretence for claiming that power. They might urge, with a.

semblance of reason, that the Constitution ought not to be charged

with the absurdity of providing against the abuse of an authority

which was not given, and that the provision against restraining

the liberty of the press atforded a clear implication that a right to

prescribe proper regulations concerning it was intended to he

vested in the national government. This may serve as a speci-

men of the numerous handles which would be given to the doctrine

of constructive powers, by the indulgence of an injudicious zeal

for bills of rights.” 1

It was also thought that bills of rights, however important

‘ Federalist, No. 84.
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.A.s the government of the United States was one of enumerated
powers, it was not deemed important by the ft·amers of its Constitution that a bill of rights should be incorporated among its proVIsions. If, among the powers conferred, there was uoue which
would authorize or empower the government to deprive the citizen
of any of those fundamental rights which it is the object and the
duty of the government to protect and defend, and to insure
which is the sole purpose of bills of right~ it was thought to be at
least m~importan t to insert negative clauses in that instrument,
inhibiting the government from assuming any such powers, since
the mere failure to confer them would leave all such powers
beyond the sphere of its constitutional authority. And, as Mr.
Hamilton argued, it might seem even dangerous to do so. "For
why declare that things shall not be done which there is no powet·
to do ? Why, for instance, should it be said that the liberty of
tho press shall not be restrained, when no power is given by
which restrictions may be imposed? I will not· contend that
such a provision would confer a regulating power; but it is evident that it would furnish, to men disposed to usurp, a plausible
pretence for claiming that power. They might urge, with a
semblance of reason, that the Coustitution ought not to be charged
with the absurdity of providing against the abuse of an authority
which was not given, aud that the provision a~uinst res~raiuing
the liberty of the press afforded a clear implicaLion that a right to
prescribe propet· regulations concerning it was intended to be
vested in the national government. This may serve as a specimen of the numerous handles which _would be given to the doctrine
of constructive powers, by the indulgence of an injudicious zeal
fot· bills of rights." 1
It was also thought that bills of rights, however important
1
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Federalist, No. 84.
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"under a monarchical government, were of no mo- [’* 257]
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ment in a constitution of government framed by the

people for themselves, and under which public affairs were to be

managed by means of agencies selected by the popular choice, and

subject to frequent change by popular action. “ It has been

several times truly remarked, that bills of rights are, in their

origin, stipulations between kings and their subjects, abridg-

ments of prerogative in favor of privilege, reservations of rights

not surrendered to the prince. Such was Magna Charta, obtained

by the barons, sword in hand, from King John. Such were the

subsequent conﬁrmations of that charter by succeeding princes.

Such was the Petition of Right, assented to by Charles the First,

in the beginning of his reign. Such also was the Declaration of

Right presented by the Lords and Commons to the Prince of Or-

ange in 1688, and afterwards thrown into the form of an act of

Parliament, called the Bill of Rights. ’It is evident, therefore,

that, according to their primitive signiﬁcation, they have no appli-

cation to constitutions professedly founded upon the power of the

people, and executed by their immediate representatives and ser-

vants. Here, in strictness, the people surrender nothing; and, as

they retain every thing, they have no need of particular reservations.

‘ WE, was PEOPLE or THE UNITED Sums, to secure the blessings
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of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish

this Constitution for the United States of America.’ This is a

better recognition of popular rights than volumes of those aphor-

isms which make the principal ﬁgure in several of our State bills

of rights, and which would sound much better in a treatise of

ethics than in a constitution of government.”1

Reasoning like this was specious, but it was not satisfactory to

many of the leading statesmen of that day, who believed that “ the

purposes of society do not require a surrender of all our rights

to our ordinary governors; that there are certain portions of right

not necessary to enable them to carry on an effective government,

and which experience has nevertheless proved they will be con-

stantly encroaching on, if submitted to them; that there are also

certain fences which experience has proved peculiarly eﬁicacious

against wrong, and rarely obstructive of right, which yet the

governing powers have ever shown a disposition to weaken and

‘ Federalist, No. 84, by Hamilton.
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• under a monarchical government, were of no mo- [• 257]
ment in a constitution of government framed by the
people for themselves, and under which public aff.1.irs were to be
managed by means of agencies selected by the popular choice, and
subject to frequent change by popular nction. "It has hceu
several times truly remarked, that bills of rights are, in their
origin, stipulations between kings and their subjects, abridgments of prerogative in favor of privilege, reservations of rights
not surrendered to the priace. Such was Magna Charta, obtained
by the barons, sword in hand, from King John. Such were the
subsequent confirmations of that charter by succeeding princes.
Such was the Petition of Right, assented to by Charles the First,
in the beginning of his reign. Such also was the Declaration of
Right presented by the Lords and Commons to the Prince of Orange in 1688, and afterwards thrown into the form of an act of
Parliament, called the Bill of Rights. It is evident, therefore,
that, according to their primitive signification, they have no application to constitutions professedly founded upon the power of the
people, and executed by their immediate representatives and servants. Here, in strictness, the people surrender nothing; and, as
they retain every thing, they have no need of particular reset·vations.
'WE, THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES, to secure the blessings
of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish
this Constitution for the United States of America.' This is a
better recognition of popular rights than volumes of those aphorisms which make the principal figure in several of our State bills
of rights, and which would sound much better in a treatise of
ethics than in a constitution of government." 1
Reasoning like this was specious, but it was not satisfactory to
many of the leading statesmen of that day, who believed that" the
purposes of society do not require a surrender of all our rights
to our ordinary governors; that there are certain portions of right
not necessary to enable them to carry on an effective government,
and which experience has nevertheless proved they will be constantly encroaching on, if submitted to them; that there are also
certain fences which experience has proved peculiarly efficacious
against wrong, and rarely obstructive of right, which yet the
governing powers have ever shown a disposition to weaken and
1

Federalist, No. 84, by Hamilton.
18
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remove.”1 And these governing powers will be no less

[CB. IX.

[* 258] disposed *" to be aggressive when chosen by majorities than

when selected by the accident of birth, or at the will of

privileged classes. Indeed if, during the long struggle for consti-

tutional liberty in England, covering the whole of the seventeenth

century, importance was justly attached to a distinct declaration

and enumeration of individual rights on the part of the govern-

ment, when it was still in the power of the governing authorities

to infringe upon or to abrogate them at any time, and when, conse-

quently, the deelaration could possess only a moral force, a similar

declaration would appear to be of even more value in the Consti-

tution of the United States, where it would constitute authoritative

law, and be subject to no modiﬁcation or repeal, except by the

people themselves whose rights it was designed to protect, and in

the manner by the Constitution provided?

‘ Jefferson’s “forks, Yo]. III. 201.

’ Mr. Jeﬂerson sums up the objections to a bill of rights in the Constitution

of the United States, and answers them as follows: “ 1. That the rights in

question are reserved by the manner in which the Federal powers are granted.

Answer: A constitutive act may certainly be so formed as to necd no declara-

tion of rights. The act itself has the force of a declaration, as far as it goes;

and if it goes to all material points, nothing more is wanting. In the draft of a
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constitution which I had once a thought of proposing in Virginia, and printed

remove." 1 And these governing powers will be no less
[* 258] disposed • to be aggressive when chosen by majorities than
when selected by the accident of birth, or at the will of
privileged classes. Indeed if, during the long struggle for constitutional liberty in England, covering the whole of the seventeenth
century, importance was justly attached to a distinct declaration
and enumeration of individual rights on the part of the government, when it was still in the power of the governing authorities
to infringe upon or to abrogate them at any time, and when, consequently, the declaration could possess only a moral force, o. similar
declaration would appear to be of even more value in the Constitution of the United States, where it would constitute authoritative
.law, and be subject to no modification or repeal, except by tbe
people themselves whose rights it was designed to protect, and m
the manner by the Constitution provided.2

afterwards, I endeavored to reach all the great objects ‘of public liberty, and did

not mean to add a declaration of rights. Probably the object was imperfectly

executed; but the deﬁciencies would have been supplied by others in the course

of discussion. But in a constitutive act which leaves some precious articles

unnoticed, and raises implications against others, a declaration of rights becomes

necessary by way of supplement. This is the case of our new Federal Consti-

tution. This instrument forms us into one State. as to certain objects, and gives

us a legislative and executive body for those objects. It should therefore guard us

against their abuses of power, within the ﬁeld submitted to them. 2. A positive

declaration of some essential rights could not he obtained in~the requisite latitude.

Answer: Half a loaf is better than no bread. If we cannot secure all our rights,

let us secure what we can. 3. The limited powers of the Federal government,

and jealousy of the subordinate governments, afford a security, \vhich exists in

no other instance. Answer: The ﬁrst member of this seems resolvable into the

ﬁrst objection before stated. The jealousy of the subordinate governments is a

precious reliance. But observe that those governments are only agents. They

must have principles furnished them whereon to found their opposition. The

declaration of rights will be the text whereby they will try all the acts of the

Federal government. In this view it is necessary to the Federal government

also; as by the same text they may try the opposition of the subordinate govern-

ments. 4. Experience proves the ineﬁicacy of a bill of rights. True. But

[274]

1 Jefferson's Works, v;ol. III. 201.
' Mr. Jefferson sums up the objections to a bill of rights in the Constitution
of the United States, and answers them as follows: " 1. That the rights in
' question are reserved by the manner in which the Federal powers are granted.
Answer : A constitutive act may certainly be so formed as to need no declaration of rights. The act itself has the force of a declaration, as far as it goes ;
and if it goes to all material points, nothing more is wanting. In the draft of a
constitution which I had once a thought of proposing in Virginia, and printed
afterwards, I endeavored to rear~h all the great objects ·of public liberty; and did
not mean to add a declaration of rights. Probably the object was imperfectly
executed ; but the deficiencies would have been supplied by others in the course
of discussion. But in a constitutive act which leaves some precious articles
unnoticed, and raises implications against others, a declaration of rights becomes
necessary by way of supplement. This is the case of our new Federal Constitution. This instrument forms us into one State, as to certain objects, and givl's
us a legislative and executive body for those objects. It should therefore guard us
against their abuses of power, within the field submitted to them. 2. A positi,·e
declaration of some essential rights could not be obtainetl in the requisite latitude.
Answer: Half a loaf is better than no bread. If we cannot secure all our rights,
let us secure what we can. 3. The limited powers of the Federal goyernment,
and jealousy of the subordinate governments, afford a security, which exists in
no other instance. Answer: The first member of this seems resolvable into the
first objection before stated. The jealousy of the subordinate governments is a
precious reliance. But obscl"\'e that those governments are only agents. They
must have principles furnished them whereon to found their opposition. The
declaration of rights will be the text whereby they will try all the acts of the
Federal government. In this view it is necessary to the Federal government
also ; as by the same text they may try the opposition of the subordinate go,·ernments. 4. Experience proves the inefficacy of a bill of rights. 'rrue. But
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ground of a decided, earnest, and formidable opposition to

the conﬁrmation of the national Constitution by the people; and its

adoption was only secured in some of the leading States in con-

nection with the recommendation of amendments which should

cover the ground}

The clauses inserted in the original instrument, for the protect-ion

of person and property, had reference mainly to the action of the

State governments, and were made limitations upon their power.

The exceptions embraced a few cases only, in respect to which

the experience of both English and American history had forcibly

demonstrated the tendency of power to abuse, not when wielded by

a prince only, but also when administered by the agencies of the

people themselves.

Bills of attainder were prohibited to be passed, either by the

Congress? or by the legislatures of the several States.” Attainder,

in a strict sense, means an extinction of civil and political rights

and capacities; and at the common law it followed, as of course,

on conviction and sentence to death for treason; and, in greater or

less degree, on conviction and sentence for the different classes of

felony. i

A bill of attainder was a legislative conviction for alleged crime,
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with judgment of death. Such convictions have not been un-

though it is not absolutely eflicacious, under all circumstances, it is of great

potency always, and rarely incflicacious. A brace the more will often kecp up

the building which would have fallen with that brace the less. There is a re-

markable dilference between the characters of the inconveniences which attend a

declaration of rights, and those which attend the want of it. The inconveniences

of the declaration arc, that it may cramp government in its useful exertions. But

the evil of this is short-lived, moderate, and reparable. The inconveniences of the

want of a declaration are permanent, atllietive, and irreparable. They are in con-

stant progrcssion from bad to worse. The executive, in our governments, is not

the sole, it is scarcely the principal, object of my jealousy. The tyranny of the

legislatures is the most formidable dread at present, and will be for many years.

• The want of a bill of rights was, therefore, made the [• 259]
ground of a decided, earnest, and formidable opposition to
tho confirmation of tho national Com'ltitution by the people; and its
adoption was only secured in some of the leading States in connection with the recommendation of amendments which should
cover the ground.l
The clauses inserted in the original instrument, for the protection
of person and property, had reference mainly to the action of the
State governments, and were made limitations upon their power.
The exceptions embraced a few cases only, in respect to which
the experience of both English and American history had forcibly
demonstrated the tendency of power to abuse, not when wielded by
a prince only, but also when administered by the agencies of th~
people themselves.
Bills of attainder were prohibited to bo passed, either by the
Congress 2 or by the legislatures of the several States. 3 Attainder,
in a strict sense, means an extinction of civil and political rights
aud capacities; and at the common law it followed, as of course,
on corlviction and sentence to death for treason ; and, in greater or
less degree, on conviction and sentence for the different classes of
felony.
·
A bill of attainder was a legislative conviction for alleged crime,
with judgment of ~eath. Such convictions have not been un-

That of the executive will come in its turn; but it will be at a remote period."

Letter to Madison, March 15, 1789, 3 Jelferson’s \Vorks, p. 4. See also same

volume, pp. 13 and 101; Vol. II. pp. 329, 358.

‘ For the various recommendations by Massachusetts, South Carolina, New

Hampshire, Virginia, New York, North Carolina, and Rhode Island, see 1Elliott's

Debates, 322-334.

' Constitution ‘of United States, art. 1, § 9.

" Constitution of United States, art. 1, § 10. .
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though it is not absolutely efficacious, under all circumstances, it is of great
potency always, ami rarely incflit·acious. A brace the more will often ke('P up
the building which would have fallen with that brace the less. There is a remarkal,Je dilference between the charaeters of the inconveniences which attend a
dec·hration of rights, aud those which attend the want of it. The inconveniences
of the det·laration are, that it may cramp goTernment in its useful exertions. But
the evil of this is short-lived, moderate. and reparable. The inconvenienees of the
want of a declaration are permanent, afflictive, and irreparable. They are in constant progrt•Nsion from bad to wol'lle. The executive, in our governmentll, is not
the sole, it is scarcely the principal, ohject of my jealousy. The tyranny of the
le;.:islatures is the most formidable dread at present, and will be for many years.
That of the executive will come in its turn; but it will be at a remote period."
Letter to Madison, March 15, li89, 3 Jefferson's Works, p. 4. See al~o same
Yolum•~, pp. 13 and 101; Vol. II. pp. ::129, 358.
' For the various recommendations by Massachusetts, South Carolina, New
Hampshire, Virginia, New York, North Carolina, and Rhode Island, see 1 Elliott's
Debates, S:l:?-33-l.
1 Con~titution of United States, art. 1, § 9.
3 Constitution of United States, art. 1, § 10.
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common under other governments, and the power to pass these bills

(CH. IX.

has been exercised by the Parliament of England at some periods

in its history, under the most oppressive and unjustiﬁable

[* 260] * circumstances, greatly aggravated by an arbitrary course

of procedure, which had few of the incidents of a judicial

investigation into alleged crime. Of late years in England no one

had attempted to defend it as a legitimate exercise of power; and

if it would be unjustiﬁable anywhere, there were many reasons why

it would be specially obnoxious under a free government, and why

consequently its prohibition, under the existing circumstances of

our country, would be a matter of more than ordinary importance.

Every one must concede that a legislative body, from its numbers

and organization, and from the very intimate dependence of its

members upon the people, which renders them liable to be pecu-

liarly susceptible to popular clamor, is not properly constituted to

try with coolness, caution, and impartiality a criminal charge, es-

pecially in those cases in which the popular feeling is strongly

excited; the very class of cases most likely to be prosecuted by this

mode. And although it would be conceded that, if such bills were

allowable, they should properly be presented only for offences

against the general laws of the land, and be proceeded with on

the same full opportunity for investigation and defence which is
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aﬁorded in the courts of the common law, yet it was remembered

that in practice they were often resorted to because an obnoxious

person was not subject to punishment under the general law,1 or

because, in proceeding against him by this mode, some rule of the

common law requiring a particular species or degree of evidence

might be evaded, and a conviction secured on proofs that a jury

would not be suffered to accept as overcoming the legal presump-

‘ Cases of this description were most numerous during the reign of Henry VIlI.,

and among the victims was Cromwell, who is said to have ﬁrst advised that mon-

arch to resort to this objectionable proceeding. Even the dead were attainted,

as in the case of Richard IIL, and later, ol' the heroes of the Commonwealth.

The most atrocious instance in history, however, only relieved by its weakness

and futility, was the great act of attainder passed in 1688 by the Parliament

of James 1I., assembled in Dublin, by which between two and three thousand

persons were attainted, their property conﬁscated, and themselves sentenced to

death if they failed to appear at a time named. And, to render the whole pro-

ceeding as horrible in barbarity as possible, the list of the proscribed was care-

fully kept secret until after the time ﬁxed for their appearance! Macaulayis

History of England, c. 12.
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common under other governments, and the power to pass these bills
has been exercised by the Parliament of England at some periods
in its history, under the most oppressive and unjustifiable
[* 260] *circumstances, greatly aggravated by an arbitrary course
of procedure, which had few of the incidents of a judicial
investigation into alleged crime. Of late years in England no one
bad attempted to defend it as a legitimate exercise of power ; and
if it would be unjustifiable anywhere, there were many reasons why
it would be specially obnoxious under a free government, and why
consequently its prohibition, under the existing circumstances of
our country, would be a matter of more than ordinary importance.
Every one must concede that a legislative body, from its numbers
and organization, and from the very intimate dependence of its
members upon the people, which renders them liable to be peculiarly susceptible to popular clamor, is not properly constituted to
try with coolness, caution, and impartiality a criminal charge, especially in those cases in which the popular feeling is strongly
excited; the very class of cases most likely to be prosecuted by this
mode. And although it would be conceded that, if such bills were
allowable, they should properly be presented only for offences
against the general laws of the land, and be proceeded with on
the same full opportunity for investigation and defence which is
afforded in the courts of the common law, yet it was remembered
that in practice they were often resorted to because an obnoxious
person was not subject to punishment under the general law,1 or
because, in proceeding against him by this mode, some rule of the
common law requiring a particular species or degree of evidence
might be evaded, and a conviction secured on proofs that a jury
would not be suffered to accept as overcoming the legal presump1 Cases of this description were most numerous during the reign of Henry VIII.,
and among the vidims was Cromwell, who is said to have first advised that monarch to resort to this objectionable proceeding. Even the dead were attainted,
as in the case of Richard III., and later, of the heroes of tbe Commonwealth.
The most atrocious instance in history, however, only relieved by its weakness
and futility, was tbe great act of attainder passed in 1688 by the Parliament
of James II., assembled in Dublin, by which between two and three thousand
persons were attainted, their property confiscated, and themselves sentenced to
death if they failed to appear at a time named. And, to render the whole proceeding as horrible in barbarity as possible, the list of the proscribed waa carefully kept secret until after the time fixed for their appearance! Macaulay'•
History of England, c. 12.
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tion of innocence. Whether the accused should necessarily be served
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with process; what degree or species of evidence should be

required; whether the rules of law should be *’followed, [* 261]

either in determining what constituted a crime, or in

dealing with the accused after conviction,—were all questions

which would necessarily address themselves to the legislative dis-

cretion and sense of justice ; and the very qualities which are

essential in a tiourt to protect individuals on trial before them

against popular clamor, or the hate of those _in power, were pre-

cisely those which were likely to prove weak or wanting in the

legislative body at such a time.1 And what could be more

obnoxious in a free government than the exercise of such a power

by a popular body, controlled by a mere majority, fresh from the

contests of exciting elections, and quite too apt, under the most

favorable circumstances, to suspect the motives of their adversaries,

and to resort to measures of doubtful propriety to secure party

ends ?

Legislative punishments of this severe character, however, were

not the only ones known to parliamentary history; but there were

ot-hers of a milder form, which were only less obnoxious in that the

consequences were less terrible. Those legislative convictions

which imposed punishments less than that of death were called hills
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of pains and penalties, as distinguished from bills of attainder; but

the constitutional provisions we have referred to were undoubtedly

aimed at any and every species of legislative punishment for

criminal or supposed criminal offences; and the term “ bill of

attainder ” is used in a. generic sense, which would include bills of

pains and penalties also.”

1 This was equally true, whether the attainder was at the command of the

king, as in the case of Cardinal Pole’s mother, or at the instigation of the popu-

lace, as in the case of Wentwortb, Earl of Stratford. The last inllic'tion of capi-

tal punishment in England, under a bill of attainder, was upon Sir John Fenwick,

in the reign of William and Mary. It is worthy of note that in the preceding

reign Sir John had been prominent in the attaindcr of the unhappy Monmouth.

Macaulny’s History of England, c. 5.

’ Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Crunch, 138; Story on Constitution, § 1344; Cummings

v. Missouri, 4 \Val. 277; Ea: parte Garland, ib. 333; Drehmnn v. Stitle, 8 Wal.

601. “I think it will be found that the following comprise those essential

elements of bills of attainder, in addition to those I have already mentioned

[which were that they declared certain persons attainted and their blood cor-

rupted, so that it had lost all heritable property], which distinguish them from

other legislation, and which made them so obnoxious to the statesmen who organ-
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tion of innocence. Whether the accused should necessarily be served
with process ; what degree or species of evidence should be
required; whether the rules of law should be *followed,[* 261]
either in determining what constituted a crime, or in
dealing with the accused after conviction,- were all questions
which would necessarily address themselves to the legislative discretion and sense of justice ; and the very qualities which are
essential in a court to protect individuals on trial before them
against popular clamor, or the hate of those in power, were precisely those which were likely to prove weak or wanting in the
legislative body at such a time. 1 And what could be more
obnoxious in a free government than the exercise of such a power
by a popular body, controlled by a mere majority, fresh from the
contests of exciting elections, and quite too apt, under the most
favorable circumstances, to suspect the motives of their adversaries,
and to resort to measures of doubtful propriety to secure party
ends?
Legisl~tive punishments of this severe character, however, were
not the only ones known to parliamentary history ; but there were
others of a milder form, which were only less obnoxious in that the
consequences were less terrible. Those legislative convictions
which imposed punishments less than that of death were called hills
of pains and penalties, as distinguished from bills of attainder; but
the constitutional provisions we have referred to were undoubtedly
aimed at any and every species of legislative punishment for
criminal or supposed criminal offences; and the term "bill of
attainder" is used in a generic sense, which would include bills of
pains and penalties also. 2
1 This was equally true, whether the attainder was at the command of the
king, as in the case of Cardinal Pole's mother, or at the instigation of the populace, as in the l'ase of \Vent worth, Earl of Strafford. The last infliction of capital punishment in England, under a bill of attainder, was upon Sir John Fenwick,
in the reign of William and l\Iary. It is worthy of note that in the preceding
reign Sir John had been prominent in the attainder of the unhappy l\Ionmouth.
Macaulay's History of Englanrl, c. 5.
1 Fleteher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 188; Story on Constitution, § 1844; Cummings
"· Missouri, 4 W al. 277 ; Ex J>al'te Garland, ib. 833; Drehmnn "· Stilte, 8 W al.
601. "I think it will be found that the following comprise those essential
elements of bill~ of attainder, in addition to those I have already mentioned
[which were that they declared certain persons attainted and their blood corrupted, so that it had lost all heritable property], which distinguish them fl·om
other legislation, and which made them so obnoxious to the statesmen who organ-
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[* 262] * The thoughtful reader will not fail to discover, in the
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acts of the American States during the Revolutionary

period, sullicient reason for this constitutional provision, even if

the still more mouitory history of the English attaindcrs had not

been so freshly remembered. Some of these acts provided for the

forfeiture of the estates, within the Commonwealth, of those British

subjects who had withdrawn from the jurisdiction because not

satisﬁed that grievances existed suﬁ‘iciently scrio'us to justify the

last resort of an oppressed people, or because of other reasons not

satisfactory to the existing authorities; and the only investigation

provided for was an inquiry into the desertion. Others mentioned

particular persons by name, adjudged them guilty of adhering to

the enemies of the State, and proceeded to inﬂict punishment upon

them, so far as the presence of property within the Commonwealth

would enable the government to do so.1 These were the resorts

of a time of extreme peril; and if possible to justify them in a

period of revolution, when every thing was staked on success, and

when the public safety would not permit too much weight to

scruples concerning the private rights of those who were not aiding

the popular cause, the power to repeat such acts under any possible

circumstances in which the country could be placed again was felt

to be too dangerous to be left in the legislative hands. So far as
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proceedings had been completed under those acts, before the treaty

of 1783, by the actual transfer of property, they remained valid and

elfectual afterwards ; but so far as they were then incomplete, they

were put an end to by that treaty?

ized our government: 1. They were convictions and sentences pronounced by

the legislative department of the government, instead of the judicial. 2. The

sentence pronounced and the punishment inﬂicted were determined by no pre-

vious law or ﬁxed rule. 3. The investigation into the guilt of the accused, if any

such were niade, was not necessarily or generally conducted in his presence or

that of his counsel, and no recognized rule of evidence governed the inquiry."

Per llliller, J ., in Ex parte Garland, 4 \Val. 388.

‘ See Belknap’s History of New Hampshire, c. 26; 2 Ramsay‘s History of

South Carolina, 351 ; 8 Rhode Island Colonial Records, 609; 2 Arno1d‘s History

of llhode Island, 360, 449; Thompson v. Carr, 5 N. H. 510; Sleght v. Kane, 2

Johns. Cas. 236. On the general subject of bills of attaindcr, one would do well

[* 262]

• The thoughtful reader will not fail to discover, in the
acts of the American States during the Revolutionary
period, sufficient reason for this constitutional provision, even if
the still more monitory history of the English attainders had uot
been so freshly remembered. Some of these acts provided for the
forfeiture of the estates, within the Commonwealth, of those British
subjects who had withdrawn from the jurisdiction · because not
satisfied that grievances existed sufficiently serio·us to justify the
last resort of an oppressed people, or because of other reasons not
satisfactory to tl1e existing authorities; and the only investigation
provided for was an inquiry into the desertion. Others mentioned
particular persons by name, adjudged them guilty of adhering to
the enemies of the State, and proceeded to inflict punishment upon
them, so far as the presence of property within the Commonwealth
would enable the government to do so.1 These were the resorts
of a time of extreme peril ; and if possible to justify them in a
period of revolution, when every thing was staked on success, and
when the public safety would not permit too much weight to
scruples concerning the private rights of those who were not aiding
the popular cause, the power to repeat such acts under any possible
circumstances in whick the country could be placed again was felt
to be too dangerous to be left in the legislative hands. So far as
proceedings had been completed under those acts, before the treaty
of 1783, by the actual transfer of property, they remained valid and
effectual afterwards ; but so far as they were then incomplete, they
were put an end to by that treaty.2

to consult, in addition to the cases in 4 Wallace, those of Blair v. Ridgclcy, 41

Mo. 63, (where it was very elaborately examined by able counsel); State 0.

Staten, 6 Cold. 248; Randolph u. Good, 3 W. Va. 551; Er parte Law, decided

by Mr. Justice Erskine, in the United States District Court of Georgia, May

term, 1866. ' Jackson v. Munson, 3 Caines, 137.

;i—_—_”_D‘*
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izcd our government : 1. They were convictions and sentences pronounced by
the legislative department of the government, instead of the judicial. 2. The
sentence pronounced and the punishment inflicted were determined by no previous law or fixt•d rule. 3. The investigation into the guilt of the accused, if any
such wtre n:iade, was not necessarily or generally conducted in his presence or
that of his counsel, and no recognized rule of evidence governed the inquiry."
Per ltfiller, J., inEz parte Garland, 4 Wal. 388.
1 See Belknap's History of New Hampshire, c. 26; 2 Ramsay's History of
South Carolina, 851 ; 8 Rhode Island Colonial Records, 609; 2 Arnold's History
of Rhode Island, 860, 449; Thompson "· Carr, 5 N. H. 510; Sleght v. Kane, 2
Johns. Cas. 236. On the general subject of bills of attainder, one would do well
to con5ult, in addition to the cases in 4 Wallace, those of Blair "· Hidgcley, 41
Mo. 63, (where it was very elaborately examined by able counsel); State "·
Staten, 6 Cold. 248; Randolph v. Good, 8 W.Va. 5lH; Bz parte I..aw, decided
by Mr. Justice Erskine, in the United States District Court of Georgia, May
1 Jackson"· Munson, 8 Caines, 137.
tenn, 1866.
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' The conviction of the propriety of this constitutional provision
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has been so universal, that it has never been questioned, either in

legislative bodies or elsewhere. Nevertheless, cases have recently

arisen, growing out of the attempt to break up and destroy the

government of the United States, in which the Supreme

Court of * the United States has adjudged certain action of [" 263]

Congress void as in violation of this provision} The action

referred to was designed to exclude from practice in the United

' On the 2d of July, 186:2, Congress, by “ an act to prescribe an oath of

oﬂice, and for other purposes,” enacted that “ hereafter every person elected or

appointed to any oﬁice of honor or proﬁt under the government of the United

States, either in the civil, military, or naval departments of the public service,

excepting the President of the United States, shall, before entering upon the du-

· The conviction of the propriety of this constitutional provision
bas been so universal, that it has never been questioned, either in
legislative bodies or elsewhere. Nevertheless, cases have recently
arisen, growing out of the attempt to break up and destroy the
government of the United States, in which the Supreme
Court of • the United States has adjudged certain action of[* 263]
Congress void as in violation of this provision.1 The action
referred to was designed to exclude from practice in the United

ties of such oﬂice, take and subscribe the following oath or aﬁirmation: I, A B,

do solemnly swear or aﬁirm that I have never voluntarily borne arms against the

United States since I have been a citizen thereof; that I have voluntarily given

no aid, countenance, counsel, or encouragement to persons engaged in armed hos-

tility thereto; that I have neither sought nor accepted, nor attempted to exercise,

the functions of any ofiice whatever, under any authority or pretended authority

in hostility to the United States; that I have not yielded a voluntary support to

any pretended government, authority, power, or constitution within the United

States, hostile or inimical thereto. And I do further swear or aﬂirm that, to the
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best of my knowledge and ability, I will support and defend the Constitution of

the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true

faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any

mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully dis-

charge the duties of the oﬁice on which I am about to enter, so help me God.”

On the 2-lth of January, 1865, Congress passed a supplementary act as follows:

“ No person after the date of this act shall be admitted to the bar of the Supreme

Court of the United States, or at any time after the 4th of March next shall

be admitted to the bar of any Circuit or District Court of the United States, or

of the Court of Claims, as an attorney or counsellor of such court, ‘or shall be

allowed to appear and to be heard in any such court, by virtue of any previous

admission, or any special power of attorney, unless he shall have ﬁrst taken and

subscribed the oath ” aforesaid. False swearing, under each of the acts, was made

perjury. See 12 Statutes at Large, 502; 13 ib. 424. In Ex parte Garland, 4

\‘Val. 333, a majority of the court held the second of these acts void, as partaking

of the nature of a bill of pains and penalties, and also as being an ea: postfacto

law. The act was looked upon as inﬂicting a punishment for past conduct; the

exaction of the oath being the mode provided for ascertaining the parties upon

whom the act was intended to operate. See Drehman v. Stiﬁe, 8 Wal. 597.

The conclusion declared by the Supreme Court of the United States in Ex parts

Garland had been .previously reached by Mr. Justice Trigg, of the United States

Circuit Court, in Matter of Baxter; by Mr. Justice Bus-teed, of the District

Court of Alabama, in Matter of Shorter el al.; and by Mr. Justice Erskine, of

the District Court of Georgia, in Ex parts Law. [ 279 ]

1 On the 2d of July, 1862, Congress, by "an act to prescribe an oath of
office, and for other purposes," enacted that "hereafter every person elected or
appointed to any office of honor or pro6t under the government of the United
States, either in the civil, military, or nanl departments of the public service,
excepting the President of the United States, shall, before entering upon the duties of such office, take and subscribe the following oath or affirmation; I, A B,
do solemnly swear or affirm that I have never voluntarily borne arms against the
United States since I have been a citizen thereof; that I have voluntarily given
no aid, countenance, counsel, or encouragement to persons engaged in armt>d hostility thereto ; that I have neither sought nor accepted, nor attempted to exercise,
the functions of any office whatever, under any authority or pt·etended authority
in hostility to the United States; that I have not yielded a voluntary support to
any pretended government, authority, power, or constitution within the United
States, hostile or inimical thereto. And I do further swear or affirm that, to the
best of my knowledge and ability, I will support and defend the Con~titution of
the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true
faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any
mental reservation or purpose of evasion ; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, so help me God."
On the 24th of January, 1865, Congress passed a supplementary act as follows:
.. No person after the date of this act shall be admitted to the bar of the Supreme
Court of the United States, or at any time after the 4th of March next shall
be admitted to the bar of any Circuit or District Court of the United States, or
of the Court of Claims, as an attorney or counsellor of such court, ·or shall be
allowed to appear and to be heard in any such court, by virtue of any previous
admission, or any special p9wer of attorney, unless be shall have first taken and
subscribed the oath "aforesaid. False swearing, under each of the acts, was made
perjury. See 12 Statutes at Large, 502; 13 ib. 42!. In Ex parte Garland, 4
'Val. 333, a majority of the court held the second of thesa acts void, as partaking
of the nature of a bill of pains and penalties, and also as being an ex post facto
law. The act was looked upon as inflicting a punishment for past conduct; the
exaction of the oath being the mode provided for ascertaining the parties upon
whom the act was intended to operate. See Drehman v. Stifle, 8 Wal. 597.
The conclusion declared by the Supreme Court of the United States in Ex parte
Garland had bcen.previously reached by Mr. Justice Trigg, of the United States
Circuit Court, in Matter of Buter; by Mr. Justice Busteed, of the District
Court of Alabama, in 1\Iatter of Shorter et al.; and by 1\Ir. Justice Erski.ne, of
the District Court of Georgia, in E~ parte Law.
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States courts all persons who had taken up arms against the gov-

[co.

IX.

ernment during the recent rebellion, or who had voluntarily given

aid and encouragement to its enemies; and the mode adopted

to effect the exclusion was to require of all persons, before they

should be admitted to the bar or allowed to practise, an oath

negativing any such disloyal action. This decision has not been

universally accepted as sound; and the Supreme Courts of West

Virginia and of the District of Columbia have since refused to

follow it, insisting that permission to practise in the courts is

[‘ 26-1] not a right, but a privilege, and that the withholding * it for

any reason of State policy or personal unﬁtness could not

be regarded as the inﬂiction of criminal punishment.‘

The Supreme Court of the United States have also, upon the

same reasoning, held a clause in the Constitution of Missouri,

which, among other things, excluded all priests and clergymen

from practising or teaching unless they should ﬁrst take a similar

oath of loyalty, to be void, overruling in so'doing a decision of the

Supreme Court of that State.“

The same provisions of the national Constitution which we have

cited3 also forbid the passage either by the States or by Congress of

any ex postfacto law.

At an early day it was settled by authoritative decision, in oppo-
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sition to what might seem the more natural and obvious meaning

of the term ex post facto, that in their scope and purpose these

' See the cases of E2: parte Magruder, American Law Register, Vol. VI. N. s.

p. 292; and Ex parte Hunter, ib. 410, 2 W. Va. 122. Sec also Cohen v. Wright,

22 Cal. 293; Ea: partc Yale, 24 Cal. 241. ’

' Cummings 1:. Missouri, 4 Wal. 277. See also the case of State v. Adams,

44 Mo. 570, in which it was held that a legislative act declaring that the board

of curators of St. Charles College had forfeited their ofiice, was of the nature

of a bill of attainder and void. The Missouri oath of loyalty was a very strin-

gent one, and applied to electors, State, county, city, and town officers, otlicers

in any corporation, public or private, professors and teachers in educational insti-

tutions, attorneys and counsellors, bishops, priests, deacons, ministers, elders,

or other clergymen of any denomination. The Supreme Court of Missouri had

States courts all persons who had taken up arms against the government during the recent rebellion, or who had voluntarily given
aid and encouragement to its enemies; and the mode adopted
to effect the exclusion was to require of all persons, before they
should be admitted to the bar or allowed to practise, an oath
negatiYing any such disloyal action. This decision has not been
universally accepted as sonnd ; and the Supreme Courts of West
Virginia and of the District of Columbia have since refused to
follow it, insisting that permission to practise in the courts is
[• 264] not a right, but a privilege, and that the withholding • it for
any reason of State policy or personal unfitness could not
be regarded as the infliction of criminal punishment.I
The Supreme Court of the United States have also, upon the
same- reasoni1~g, held a clause in the Constitution of Missouri,
which, among other things, excluded all priests and clergymen
from practising or teaching unless they should first take a similar
oath of loyalty, to be void, overruling in so·doing a decision of the
Supreme Court of that State.2
The same provisions of the national Constitution which we have
cited 8 also forbid the passage either by the States or by Congress of
any ex postfacto law.
At an early day it was settled by authoritative decision, in opposition to what might seem the more natural and obvious meaning
of the term ex poBt facto, that in their scope and purpose these

held this provision valid in the following cases: State v. Garesche, 36 Mo. 256.

case of an attorney; State v. Cummings, 36 Mo. 263, case ofa minister, reversed

as above stated; State v. Bernoudy, 36 Mo. ‘279, case of the recorder of St.

Louis; State 1.1. McAdoo, 36 Mo. 4.32, where it is held that a certiﬁcate of elec-

tion issued to one who failed to take the oath as required by the constitution

was void.

“ Constitution of United States, art. 1, §§ 9 and 10.

[ 280 ]

1

_i. __ _ __ -—_-1

1 See the cases of Ex parte Magruder, American Law Register, Vol. VI. N. s.
p. 292; and Ex parte Hunter, ib. 410,2 W.Va. 122. See also Cohen"· Wright,
22 Cal. 293; Ex parte Yale, 24 Cal. 241.
1 Cummings t'. :Missouri, 4 Wal. 277.
See also the case of State "·Adams,
44 Mo. 1>70, in which it was held that a legislative act declaring that the board
of curators of St. Charles College bad forfeited their office, was of the nature
of a bill of attainder and void. The Missouri oath of loyalty was a very stringent one, and applied to electors, State, county, city, and town officers, officers
in any corporation, public or private, professors and teachers in educational institutions, attorneys and counsellors, bishops, priests, deacons, ministers, elders,
or other clergymen of any denomination. The Supreme Court of Missouri bad
held this provision valid in the following cases: State "· Garesche, 36 1\lo. 256.
case of an attorney; State v. Cummings, 36 Mo. 263, case of a minister, reversed
as above stated; State v. Bcrnoudy, 36 :Mo. 279, case of the recorder of St.
Louis ; State v. McAdoo, 86 Mo. 4fi2, where it is held that a certificate of election issued to one who failed to take the oath as required by the constitution
wu void.
a Constitution of United States, art. 1, §§ 9 and 10.
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provisions were conﬁned to laws respecting criminal punishments,
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and had no relation whatever to retrospective legislation of any

other description. And it has, therefore, been repeatedly held,

that retrospective laws, when not of a criminal nature, do not

come in conﬂict with the national Constitution, unless obnoxious

to its provisions on other grounds than their retrospective char-

acter.

“The prohibition in the letter,” says Chase, J., in the leading

case,‘ “is not to pass any law concerning or after the fact; but

the plain and obvious meaning and intention of the prohibition is

this: that the legislatures of the several States shall not pass laws

after a fact done by a subject or citizen, which shall have relation

to such fact, and punish him for having done it. The pro-

hibition, ‘considered in this light, is an additional bulwark [* 265]

in favor of the personal security of the subject, to protect

his person from punishment by legislative acts having a retro-

spective operation. I do not think it was inserted to secure the

citizen in his private rights of either property or contracts. The

prohibitions not to make any thing but gold and silver coin a

tender in payment of debts, and 11ot to pass any law impairing

the obligation of contracts, were inserted to secure private rights;

but the restriction not to pass any ex post facto law was to
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secure the person of the subject from injury or punishment, in

consequence of such law. If the prohibition against making ex

postfacto laws was intended to secure personal rights from being

affected or injured by such law, and the prohibition is suffi-

cientlylextcnsive for that object, the other restraints I have enu-

merated were unnecessary, and therefore improper, for both of

them are retrospective.

“I will state what laws I consider ex post facto laws, within

the words and the intent of the prohibition. 1st. Every law that

makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which

was innocent when done, criminal, and punishes such action.

2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than

it was when committed. 3d. Every law that changes the punish-

mcut, and inﬂicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to

the crime when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal

rules of evidence, and receives less or different testimony than

‘ Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 390.
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provisions were confined to laws respecting cl"iminal punishments,
and had no relation whatever to retrospective legislation of any
other description. And it has, therefore, been repeatedly held,
that retrospective laws, when not of a criminal nature, do not
come in conflict with the national Constitution, unless obnoxious
to its provisions on other grounds than their retrospective character.
"The prohibition in the letter," says (Jlw,se, J., in the leading
case,1 "is not to pass any law concerning or after the fact; but
the plain and obvious meaning and intention of the prohibition is
this: that the legislatures of the several States shall not pass laws
after a fact done by a subject or citizen, which shall have relation
to such fact, and punish him for having done it. The prohibition, *considered in this light, is an additional bulwark [* 265)
in favor of the personal security of the subject, to protect
his person ft·om punishment by legislative acts having a retrospective operation. I do not think it was inserted to secure the
citizen in his private rights of either property or contracts. The
prohibitions not to make any thing but gold and silver coin a
tender in payment of debts, and not to pass any law impairing
tho obligation of contracts, were inserted to secure private rights;
but the restriction not to pass any ex post facto law was to
secure the person of the subject from injury or punishment, in
consequence of such law. If the prohibition against making ex
post facto laws was intended to secure personal rights from being
affected or injured by such Ia w, and the prohibition is sufficiently 'extensive for that object, the other restraints I have enumerated were unnecessary, and therefore improper, for both of
them are retrospective.
" I will state what laws I consider ex post facto laws, within
the words and the intent of the prohibition. 1st. Every law that
makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which
was innocent when done, criminal, and punishes such action.
2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than
it was when committed. 3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to
the crime when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal
rules of evidence, and receives less or different testimony than
1

Calder v. Bull, S Dull. 390.
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the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in

• 265

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

(CH. IX.

order to convict the oﬁender. All these and similar laws are

manifestly unjust and oppressive. In my opinion, the true dis-

tinction is between er post facto laws and retrospective laws.

Every ea: post facto law must necessarily be retrospective, but

every retrospective law is not an e.v post facto law; the former

only are prohibited. Every law that takes away or impairs rights

vested, agreeably to existing laws, is retrospective and is generally

unjust, and may he oppressive; and there is a good general rule,

that a law should have no retrospect; but there are cases in

which laws may justly, and for the beneﬁt of the community, and

also of individuals, relate to a time antecedent to their commence-

ment; as statutes of oblivion or of pardon. They are certainly

retrospective, and literally both concerning and after the facts

committed. But I do not consider any law er post facto, within

the prohibition, that molliﬁes the rigor of the criminal

[* 266] law; but * only those that create or aggravate the crime,

pr increase the punishment, or change the rules of evi-

dence for the purpose of conviction. Every law that is to have an

operation before the making thereof, as to commence at an antece-

dent time, or to save time from the statute of limitations, or to

excuse acts which were unlawful, and before committed, and the
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like, is retrospective. But such acts may be proper and necessary,

as the case may be. There is a. great and apparent difference

between making an unlawful act lawful, and the making an inno-

cent act criminal, and punishing it as a crime. The expressions

ex postfacto are technical; they had been in use long before the

Revolution, and had acquired an appropriate meaning, by legis-

lators, lawyers, and authors.” 1

Assuming this construction of the constitutional provision to be

correct,-— and it has been accepted and followed as correct by the

courts ever since,——it would seem that little need be said relative

‘ See also Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat.

266; Satterlee v. Mathewson, 2 Pet. 380; Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet. 110;

Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 421; Carpenter v. Pennsyl-

vania, 17 How. 463; Cummings v. Missouri, 4 \Val. 277; Ex parte Garland,

ib. 333; Bangher v. Nelson, 9 Gill, 299; \Voart v. Winnick, 3 N. H. 475;

Locke v. Dane, 9 Mass. 363; Dash v. Van Kleek, 7 Johns. 497; Evans v. Mont-

gomery, 4 \V. & S. 218:, Tucker v. Harris, 13 Geo. 1; Perry’s Case, 3 Grat.

632; Municipality No. 1 v. \Vheeler, 10 La. An. 745; New Orleans v. Poulz,

14 La. An. 853.
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the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in
order to convict the offender. All these and similar laws are
manifestly unjust and oppressive. In my opinion, the true distinction is between ex post facto laws and retrospective laws.
Every ex post facto law must necessarily be retrospective, but
' law ; the former
every retrospective law is not an ex post facto
only are prohibited. Every law that takes away or impairs rights
vested, agreeably to existing laws, is retrospective and is generally
unjust, and may be oppressive ; and there is a good general rule,
that a law should have no retrospect; but there are cases in
which laws may justly, and for the benefit of the community, and
also of individuals, relate to a time antecedent to their commencement; as statutes of oblivion or of pardon. They are certainly
retrospective, and literally both concerning and after the facts
committed. But I do not consider any law ex post facto, within
the prohibition, that mollifies the rigor of the criminal
[* 266] law ; but • only those that create or aggravate the crime,
pr increase the punishment, or change the rules of C\-idence for the purpose of conviction. Every law that is to have an
operation before the making thereof, as to commence at an antecedent time, or to save time from the statute of limitations, or to
excuse acts which were unlawful, and before committed, and the
like, is retrospective. But such acts may be proper and necessary,
as the case may be. There is a great and apparent difference
between making an unlawful act lawful, and the making an innocent act criminal, and punishing it as a crime. The expressions
ex post facto are technical ; they had been in use long before the
Revolution, and had acquired an appropriate meaning, by legislators, lawyers, and authors." 1
Assuming this construction of the constitutional provision to be
correct,- and it has been accepted and followed as correct by the
court~ ever since, -it would seem that little need be said relative
1 Sec also Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87 ; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat.
266; Satterlee v. Mathewson, 2 Pet. 380; Watson 11. Mercer, 8 Pet. 110;
Charles River Bridge o. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 421; Carpenter 11. Pennsylvania, 17 How. 468; Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wal. 217; E~ parte Garland,
ib. 333; Baugher"· Nelson, 9 Gill, 299; Woart "·Winnick, 3 N.H. 475;
Locke v. Dane, 9 Mass. 863; Dash o. Van Kleek, 7 Johns. 497; Evans v. Montgomery, 4 W. & S. 218; Tucker 11. Harris, 18 Geo. 1; Perry's Case, 3 Grat.
632; Municipality No. 1 v. Wheeler, 10 La. An. 745; New Orleans "· P~utz,
14 La. An. 853.
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to the ﬁrst, second, and fourth classes of ea: post facto laws, as
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enumerated in the opinion quoted. It is not essential, however, in

order to render a law invalid on these grounds, that it should

expressly assume the action to which it relates to be criminal, or

provide for its punishment on that ground. If it shall subject an

individual to a pecuniary penalty for an act which, when done,

involved no responsibility,‘ or if it deprives a party of any valuable

right—like the right to follow a lawful calling—for acts which

were innocent, or at least not punishable by law when committed,”

the law will be e1: post faclo in the constitutional sense, notwith-

standing it does not in terms declare the acts to which the penalty

is attached criminal.“ But how far a law may change the punishment

for a criminal offence, and make the change applicable to

past offences, is certainly a question of great *‘diﬁ’iculty, [* 267]

which has been increased by the decisions made concerning

it. As the constitutional provision is enacted for the protection

and security of accused parties against arbitrary and oppressive

legislative action, it is evident that any change in the law which

goes in mitigation of the punishment is not liable to this objection.‘

But what does go in mitigation of the punishment? If the law

makes a ﬁne less in amount, or imprisonment shorter in point of

duration, or relieves it from some oppressive incident, or if it
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dispenses with some severablc portion of the legal penalty, no

embarrassment would be experienced in reaching a conclusion that

the law was favorable to the accused, and therefore not ea: postfacto.

But who shall say, when the nature of the punishment is altogether

changed, and a ﬁne is substituted for the pillory, or imprisonment

for whipping, or imprisonment at hard labor for life for the death

penalty, that the punishment is diminished, or at least not increased

by the change made? What test of severity does the law or reason

' Falconer v. Campbell, 2 McLean, 212.

' Cummings v. Missouri, 4\Val. 277; Ea: parte Garland. ib. 333. But a

divorce is not a punishment, and it may therefore be authorized for causes hap-

pening previous to the passage of the divorce act. Carson v. Carson, 40 Miss.

3-19.

’ The repeal of an amnesty law by a Constitutional Convention was held to

be at post _/‘acto as to the cases covered by the law in State v. Keith, 63 N. C.

140.

‘_ Strong v. State, 1 Blackf. 193; Keen v. State, 3 Chand. 109; Boston v.

Cunimins, 16 Geo. 102; Woart v. Winnick, 3 N. H. 473; State v. Arlin, 39

N. H. 180; Clarke v. State, 23 Miss. 261; Maul v. State, 25 Texas, 166.
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to the first, second, and fourth classes of ex post facto laws, as
enumerated in the opinion quoted. It is not essential, however, in
order to render a law invalid on these grounds, that it should
expressly assume the action to which it relates to be criminal, or
provide for its punishment on that ground. If it shall subject an
individual to a pecuniary penalty for an act which, when done,
inYolved no responsibility,1 or if it deprives a party of any valuable
right -like the right to follow a lawful calling- for acts which
were innocent, or at least not punishable by law when committed,2
the law will be ex post facto in the coJl.Stitutioual sense, notwithstanding it does not in terms declare the acts to which the penalty
is attached criminal. a But how far a law may change the punishment
for a criminal offence, and make the change applicable to
past offences, is certainly a question of great • difficulty, [• 267]
which has been increased by the decisions made concerning
it. As the constitutional provision is enacted for the protection
and security of accused parties against arbitrary and oppressive
legislative action, it is evident that any change in the law which
goes in mitigation of the punishment is not liable to this objection.!
But what does go in mitigation of the punishment? If the law
makes a fine less in amount, or imprisonment shorter in point or'
duration, or relieves it from some oppressive incident, or if it
dispenses with some seYerablo portion of the legal penalty, no
embarrassment would be experienced in reaching a conclusion that
the law was favorable to the accused, and therefore not ex post facto.
But who shall say, when the nature of the punishment is altogether
changed, and a fine is substituted for the pillory, or imprisonment
for whipping, or imprisonment at hard labor for life for the death
penalty, that the punishment is diminished, or at least not increased
by the change made? What test of severity does the law or ;fea&on
Falconer v. Campbell, 2 McLean, 212.
Cummings "· Missouri, 4 Wal 2i7; Ex parte Garland, ib. 333. But a
divorce is not a punishment, and it may therefore 'be authorized for causes hap•
peuing previous to the passage of the divoree act. Carson "· Carson, 40 Miss.
1

1

349.
a The repeal of an amnesty law by a Constitutional Convention was held to
be a post facto as to the cases covered by the law in State"· Keith, 63 N. C.
140.
4 Strong v. State, 1 Blackf. 193; Keen "· State, 3 Chand. 109; Boston "·
C~mius, 16 Geo. 102; Woart "· Winnick, 3 N. H. 478; State "· Arlin, 89
N. H. 180; Clarke "· State, 23 Miss. 261 ; Maul "· State, 25 Texas, 166.
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furnish in these cases? and must the judge decide upon his own

(CH. IX.

view of the pain, loss, ignominy, and collateral consequences usually

attending the punishment? or may he take into view the peculiar

condition of the accused, and upon that determine whether, in his

particular case, the punishment prescribed by the new law is

more severe than that under the old or not?

In State v. Arlin,1 the respondent was charged with a robbery,

which, under the law as it existed at the time it was committed, was

subject to be punished by solitary imprisonment not exceeding six

months, and conﬁnement for life at hard labor in the State prison.

As incident to this severe punishment, he was entitled by the same

law to have counsel assigned him by the government, to process to

compel the attendance of witnesses, to a copy of his indictment, a

list of the jurors who were to try him, &c. Before he was brought

to trial, the punishment for the offence was reduced to solitary im-

prisonment not exceeding six months, and conﬁnement at hard

labor in the State prison for not less than seven nor more than thirty

years. By the new act, the court, zf they thought proper,

[* 268] were to assign the respondent counsel, and " furnish him

with process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his

behalf; and, acting under this discretion, the court assigned the

respondent counsel, but declined to do more; while the respondent
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insisted that he was entitled to all the privileges to which he would

have been entitled had the law remained unchanged. The court

held this claim to be unfounded in the law. “ It is contended,”

they say, “that, notwithstanding the severity of the respondent's

punishment was mitigated by the alteration of the statute, he is

entitled to the privileges demanded, as incidents to the offence with

which he is charged, at the date of its commission; in other words,

it seems to be claimed, that, by committing the alleged offence, the

respondent acquired a vested right to have counsel assigned him,

to be furnished with process to procure the attendance of witnesses,

and to enjoy all the other privileges to which he would have been

entitled if tried under laws subjecting him to imprisonment for life

upon conviction. This position appears to us wholly untenable.

We have no doubt the privileges the respondent claims were

designed and created solely as incidents of the severe punishment

to which his offence formerly subjected him, and not as incidents

of the offence. When the punishment was abolished, its incidents

‘ 39 N. H. 179.

\
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furnish in these cases ? and must the judge decide upon his own
view of the pain, loss, ignominy, and collateral consequences usually
attending the punishment? or may he take into view the peculiar
condition of the accused, and upon that determine whether, in his
particular case, the punishment prescribed by the new law is
more severe than that under the old or not?
In State v. Arlin,1 the respondent was charged with a robbery,
which, under the law as it existed at the time it was committed, was
subject to be punished by solitary imprisonment not exceeding six
months, and confinement for life at hard labor in the State prison.
As incident to this severe punishment, he was entitled by the same
law to have counsel assigned him by the government, to process to
compel the attendance of witnesses, to a copy of his indictment, a
list of the jurors who were to try him, &c. Before he wa.s brought
to trial, the punishment for the offence was reduced to solitary imprisonment not exceeding six months, and confinement at ha1·d
labor in the State prison for not less than seven nor more than thirty
years. By the new act, the court, if tltcy thougltt proper,
[* 268] were to assign the respondent counsel, and • furnish him
with process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his
behalf; and, acting under this discretion, the court assigned the
respondent counsel, but declined to do more; while the respondent
insisted that he was entitled to all the privileges to which he would
have been entitled had the law remained unchanged. The court
held this claim to be unfounded in the luw. "It ift contended,"
they say, "that, notwithstanding the severity of the respondent's
punishment was mitigated by the alteration of the statute, he is
entitled to the privileges demanded, as incidents to the offence with
which he is charged, at the date of its commission; in other words,
it seen)S to be claimed, that, by committing the alleged offence, the
respondent acquired a vested right to ha,Te counsel assigned him,
to be furnished with process to procure the attendance of witnesses,
and to enjoy all the other privileges to which he would have ueeu
entitled if tried under laws subjecting him to imprisonment for life
upon conviction. This position appears to us wholly untenable.
We have no doubt the privileges the respondent claims were
designed and created solely as incidents of the severe punishment
to which his offence formerly subjected him, and not as incidents
of the offence. When the punishment was abolished, its incidellts
1
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fell with it; and he might as well claim the right to be punished

CH. IX.]
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under the former law as to be entitled to the privileges connected

with a trial under it.”1

In Strong v. State,” the plaintiﬂ" in error was indicted

and convicted * of perjury, which, under the law as it ["‘ 269]

existed at the time it was committed, was punishable by

not exceeding one hundred stripes. Before the trial, this punish-

ment was changed to imprisonment in the penitentiary not exceed-

ing sevcn years. The court held this amendatory law not to be ea:

post ﬁzcto, as applied to the case. “ The words ex postfacto have a

deﬁnite, technical signiﬁcation. The plain and obvious meaning of

this prohibition is, that the legislature shall not pass any law, after

a fact done by any citizen, which shall have relation to that fact, so

as to punish that which was innocent when done, or to add to the

punishment of that which was criminal, or to increase the malig-

nity of a crime, or to retrench the rules of evidence so as to make

conviction more easy.” “ Apply this deﬁnition to the act under

consideration. Does this statute make a new offence? It does not.

Does it increase the malignity of that which was an offence before?

It does not. Does it so change the rules of evidence as to make

conviction more easy ? This cannot be alleged. Does it then

increase the punishment of that which was criminal before its
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enactment? We think not.”3

' \Vith great deference it may be suggested whether this case does not over-

look the important circumstance, that the new law, by taking from the accused

that absolute right to defence by counsel, and to the other privileges by which

the old law surrounded the trial,-—all of which were designed as securities

against unjust convictions, —was directly calculated to increase the party’s peril,

and was in consequence brought within the reason of the rule which holds a law

ea: post fut-to which changes the rules of evidence after the fact, so as to make a

less amount or degree sufﬁcient. Could a. law be void as ea: post fuclo which

made a party liable to conviction for perjury in a previous oath on the t».-stimeny

of a. single witness, and another law unobjectionable on this score which deprived

a party, when put on trial for a previous act, of all the usual opportunities of

exhibiting the facts and establishing his innocence? Undoubtedly, if the party

accused was always guilty, and certain to be comicted, the new law must be

regarded as mitigating the offence; but, assuming every man to be innocent until

he is proved to be guilty, could such a law be looked upon as “ mollifying the

rigor ” of the prior law, or as favorable to the accused, when its mollifying cir-

cumstance is more than counterbalanced by others of a. contrary character?

' 1 Blackf. 193.

' Mr. Bishop says of this decision: “ But certainly the court went far in this

case.” 1 Bishop, Crim. Law, § 219 (108).
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fell with it; aud he might as well claim th~ right to be punished
under the former law as to be entitled to the privileges connected
with a trial under it." 1
In Strong v. Sta.te,2 the plaintiff in error was indicted
and convicted • of perjury, which, under the law as it [• 269]
existed at the time it was committed, was punishable by
not exceeding one hundred stripes. Before the trial, this puuishrueut was changed to imprisonment in the penitentiary not exceeding seven years. The court held this ameudatory law not to be ex
post facto, as applied to the case. "The words ex postfacto have a
definite, technical signification. The plain and obvious meaniug of
this prohibition is, that the legislature shall not pass any law, after
a fact done by any citizen, which shall have relation to that fact, so
as to punish that which was innocent when done, or to add to the
punishment of that which was criminal, or to iucrease the malignity of a crime, or to retrench the rules of evideuce so as to make
conviction more easy." " Apply this definition to the act under
consideration. Does this statuto make a new offence? It does not.
Does it increase the malignity of that which was an offence before?
It does not. Does it so change the rul'Cs of evidence as to make
conviction more easy'! This cannot be alleged. Does it then
increase the punishment of that which was criminal before its
enactment? We think not." 3
1 With great deference it may be suggested whether this case docs not overlook the important circumstance, that the new law, by taking from the accused
that absolute right to defence by counsel, and to the other privileges by which
tht: old law surrounded the trial, -all of which were designed as fecurities
against unjust convictions,- was directly calculnted to increl18e the party's peril,
and was in consequence brought within the reason of the rule which holds a law
ex post facto which changes the rules of evidence after the fact, so ll8 to make a
less amount or degree sufficient. Could & law be void as ex post faclo which
made a party liable to com·iction for perjury in a previous oath on the testinwny
of a ~ingle witness, and another law unol.jectionable on th1s score which deprived
a party, when put on trial for a previous act, of all the usual opportunities of
exhibiting the facts and establishing his innoct!nce? Undoubtedly, if the party
accused was always guilty, and certAin to be comicted, the new law must be
reg&rded as mitigating the offence ; but, assuming every man to be innocent until
he is proved to be guilty, could such a law be looked upon as "mollifying the
rigor" of the prior law, or as favorable to the accused, when its mollifying circumstance is more than counterbalanced by others of a contrary character?
1 1 Blackf. 193.
1 .Mr. Bisho' says of this decision: "But certainly the court went far in this
case." 1 Bishop, Crim. Law,§ 219 (108).

[ 285]

* 269 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [cn. IX.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

So in Texas it has been held that the inﬂiction of stripes, from

[CH. IX.

the peculiarly degrading character of the punishment, was worse

than the death penalty. “Among all nations of civilized man,

from the earliest ages, the inﬂiction of stripes has been considered

more degrading than death itself.” 1 While, on the other hand, in

South Carolina, where, at the time of the commission of a forgery,

the punishment was death, but it was changed before ﬁnal

judgment to ﬁne, whipping, and imprisonment, the new law was

applied to the case in passing the sentence? These cases

[* 270] illustrate ‘the diﬂiculty of laying down any rule which

will be readily and universally accepted as to what is a

mitigation of punishment, where its character is changed, and

when from the very nature of the case there can be no common

standard, by which all minds, however educated, can measure the

relative severity and ignominy.

In Hartung v. People,3 the law providing for the inﬂiction of

capital punishment had been so changed as'to require the party

liable to this penalty to be sentenced to conﬁnement at hard labor

in the‘State prison until the punishment of death should be in-

ﬂicted ; and it further provided that such punishment should not

be inﬂicted under one year, nor until the governor should issue

his warrant for the purpose. The act was evidently designed for
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the beneﬁt of parties convicted, and, among other things, to enable

advantage to be taken, for their beneﬁt, of any circumstances sub-

‘ Herber v. State, 7 Texas, 69.

’ State v. Williams, 2 Rich. 418. In Clark v. State, 23 Miss. 261, defendant

was convicted of a mayhem. Between the commission of the act and his convic-

tion, a statute had been passed. changing the punishment for this offence from

the pillory and a ﬁne to imprisonment in the penitentiary, but providing further,

that “ no offence committed, and no penalty and forfeiture incurred previous to

the time when this act shall take effect shall be affected by this act, except that

when any punishment, forfeiture, or penalty should have been mitigated by it,

its provisions should be applied to the judgment to be pronounced for offences

committed before its adoption.” In regard to this statute the court say: “ We

think that in every case of olfence committed before the adoption of the peni-

So in Texas it has been held that the infliction of stripes, from
the peculiarly degrading character of the punishment, was worse
than the death penalty. "Among all nations of civilized man,
fro~ the earliest ages, the infliction of stripes has been considered
more degrading than death itself." 1 While, on the other hand, in
South Carolina, where, at the time of the commission of a forgery,
the punishment was death, but it was changed before final
judgment to fine, whipping, and imprisonment, the new law was
applied to the case in passing the sentence.2 These cases
[• 270] illustrate • the difficulty of laying down any rule which
will oo readily and universally accepted as to what is a
mitigation of punishment, where its character is changed, and
when from the very nature of the case there can be no common
standard, by which all minds, however educated, can measure the
relative severity and ignominy.
In Hartung v. People,a the law providing for the infliction of
capital punishment had been so changed as' to require the party
liable to this penalty to be sentenced to confinement at hard labor
in the· State prison until the punishment of death should be inflicted ; and it further provided that such punishment should not
be inflicted under one year, nor until the governor should issue
his warrant for the purpose. The act was evidently designed for
the benefit of parties convicted, and, among other things, to enable
advantage to be taken, for their benefit, of any circumstances snb-

tentiary code, the prisoner has the option of selecting the punishment prescribed

in that code in lieu of that to which he was liable before its enactment." But

inasmuch as the record did not show that the defendant claimed a commutation

of his punishment, the court conﬁrmed a sentence imposed according to the terms

of the old law. On this subject, see further the cases of Holt v. State, 2 Texas,

363; Dawson v. State, 6 Texas, 347.

‘ 22 N. Y. 105.

*-<--i
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Herber 'C: State, 7 Texas, 69.
State v. Williams, 2 Rich. 418. In Clark v. State, 28 Miss. 261, defendant
was convicted of a mayhem. Between the commission of the act and his conviction, a statute had been passed. changing the punishment for this offence from
the pillory and a fine to imprisonment in the penit!!ntiary, but providing further,
that " no offence committ!!d, and no penalty and forfeiture .incurred preYious to
the time when this act shall take effect shall be affected by this act, except that
when any punishment, forfeiture, or penalty should have been mitigated by it,
its provisions should be applied to the judgment to be pronouncl'(] for offenees
committed before its adoption." In regard to this statute the court say: "We
think that in every case of offence committed before the adoption of the penitentiary code, the prisoner has the option of selecting the punishment pre~eribed
in that code in lieu of that to which he was liable before its enaetment." But
inasmuch as the record did not show that the defendant claimed a commutation
of his punishment, the court confirmed a sentence imposed according to the terms
of the old law. On this subject, see further the cases of Holt v. State, 2 Texas.
863; Dawson"· State, 6 Texas, 347.
1 22 N.Y. 105.
1

1
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scquently coming to light which might show the injustice of the
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judgment, or throw any more favorable light on the action of the

accused. Nevertheless, the court held the act inoperative as to

offences before committed. “ In my opinion,” says Denio, J ., “it

would be perfectly competent for the legislature, by a general law,

to remit any separable portion of the prescribed punishment. For

instance, if the punishment were ﬁne and imprisonment, a law

which should dispense with either the ﬁne or the imprisonment

might, I think, be lawfully applied to existing oﬁences; and so, in

my opinion, the term of imprisonment might be reduced, or the

number of stripes diminished, in cases punishable in that manner.

Any thing which, if applied to an individual sentence, would fairly

fall within the idea of a remission of a. part of the sentence, would

not be liable to objection. And any change which should be refer-

able to prison discipline or penal administration as its primary ob-

ject might also be made to take effect upon past as. well as future

offences; as changes in the manner or kind of employment of con-

victs sentenced to hard labor, the system of supervision,

the means of restraint, or the like. Changes of this " sort ["‘ 271]

might operate to increase or mitigate the severity of the

punishment of the convict, but would not raise any question under

the constitutional provision we are considering. The change
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wrought by the act of 1860, in the punishment of existing offences

of murder, does not fall within either of these exceptions. If

it is to be construed to vest in the governor a discretion to deter-

mine whether the convict should be executed or remain a perpetual

prisoner at hard labor, this would only be equivalent to what he

might do under the authority to commute a sentence. But he can,

under the Constitution, only do this once for all. If he refuses

the pardon, the convict is executed according to sentence. If he

grants it, his jurisdiction of the case ends. The act in question

places the convict at the mercy of the governor in oﬁice at the

expiration of one year from the time of the conviction, and of all

of his successors during the lifetime of the convict. He may be

ordered to execution at any time, upon any notice, or without

notice. Under one of the repealed sections of the Revised Stat-

utes, it was required that a period should intervene between the

sentence and execution of not less than four, nor more than eight

weeks. If we stop here, the change effected by the statute is be-

tween an execution within a limited time, to be prescribed by the

[ 287 ]

scqucntly coming to light which might show the injustice of the
judgment, or throw any more favorable light on the action of the
accused. Nevertheless, tho court held the act inoperative as to
offences before committed. "In my opinion," says Denio, J., "it
would be perfectly competent for the legislature, by a general law,
to remit any separable portion of the prescribed punishment. For
instance, if the punishment were fine and imprisonment, a law
which should dispense with either the fine or the imprisonment
might, I think, be lawfully applied to existing offences; and so, in
my opinion, the term of imprisonment might be reduced, or the
number of stripes diminished, in cases punishable in that manner.
Any thing which, if applied to an individual sentence, would fairly
fall within the idea of a remission of a part of the sentence, would
not be liable to objection. And any change which should be referable to prison discipline or penal administration as its primary object might also be made to take effect upon past as. well as future
offences; as changes in the manner or kind of employment of convicts sentenced to hard labor, the system of supervision,
the means of restraint, or the like. Changes of this • sort [• 271]
might operate to increase or mitigate the severity of the
punishment of the convict, but would not raise any question under
the constitutional provision we are considering. The change
wrought by the act of 1~60, in the punishment of existing offences
of murder, does not fall within either of these exceptions. If
it is to be construed to vest in the governor a discretion to determine whether the convict should be executed or remain a perpetual
prisoner at hard labor, this would only be equivalent to what he
might do under the authority to commute a sentence. But he can,
under the Constitution, only do this once for all. If he refuses
the pardon, the convict is executed according to sentence. If he
grants it, his jurisdiction of the case ends. The act in question
places the convict at the mercy of the governor in office at the
expiration of one year from the time of the conviction, and of all
of his successors during the lifetime of the convict. He may be
ordered to execution at any time, upon any notice, or without
notice. Under one of the repealed sections of the Revised Statutes, it woas required that a period should intervene between the
sentence and execution of not less than four, nor more than eight
weeks. If we stop here, the change effected by the statute is between an execution within a limited time, to be prescribed by the
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period, on the one hand, and the placing the convict at the mercy

of the executive magistrate for the time, and his successors, to be

executed at his pleasure at any time after one year, on the other.

The sword is indeﬁnitely suspended over his head, ready to fall at

any time. It is not enough to say, if even that can be said, that

most persons would probably prefer such a fate to the former cap-

ital sentence. It is enough to bring the law within the condem-

nation of the Constitution, that it changes the punishment after

the commission of the offence, by substituting for the prescribed

penalty a different one. We have no means of saying whether

one or the other would be the most severe in a given case. That

would depend upon the disposition and temperament of the con-

vict. The legislature cannot thus experiment upon the criminal

law. The law, moreover, prescribes one year’s imprisonment, at

hard labor in the State prison, in addition to the punishment Qf

death. In every case of the execution of a capital sentence. it

must be preceded by the year’s imprisonment at hard labor.

True, the concluding part of the punishment cannot be

[* 272] executed *unless the governor concurs by ordering the

execution. But as both parts may, in any given case,

be inﬂicted, and as the convict is conseq_uently, under this law,
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exposed to the double inﬂiction, it is, within both the deﬁnitions

which have been mentioned, an ex postfacto law. It changes the

punishment, and inﬂicts a greater punishment than that which

the law annexed to the crime when committed. It is enough, in

my opinion, that it changes it in any manner except by dispensing

with divisible portions of it; but upon the other deﬁnition an-

nounced by Judge Chase, where it is implied that the change must

be from a less to a greater punishment, this act cannot be sus-

tained.” This decision has since been several times followed in

the State of New York,‘ and it must now be regarded as the

settled law of that State, that “ a law changing the punishment for

offences committed before its passage is ea: post facto and void,

under the Constitution, unless the change consists in the remission

of some separable part of the punishment before prescribed, or is

referable to prison discipline or penal administration as its primary

' Shepherd v. People, 25 N. Y. 406; Ratzky v. People, 29 N. Y. 124; Kuck-

ler v. People, 5 Park Cr. Rep. 212.
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court, or a pardon or commutation of the sentence during that
period, on the one hand, and the placing the convict at the mercy
of the executive magistrate for the time, and his successors, to be
executed at his pleasure at any time after one year, on the other.
The sword is indefinitely suspended over his head, ready to fall at
any time. It is not enough to say, if even that can be said,. that
most persons would probably prefer such a fate to the former capital sentence. It is enough to bring the law within the condemnation of the Constitution, that it changes the punishment after
the commission of the offence, by substituting for the prescribed
penalty a different one. We have no means of saying whether
one or the other would be the most severe in a given case. That
would depend upon the disposition and temperament of the convic~. The legislature cannot thus experiment upon the criminal
law. Tlte law, moreover, prescribes one year's imprisonment, at
ltard labor in the State prison, in addition to the punishment of
deatlt. In every case of the execution of a capital sentence, it
must be preceded by the year's imprisonment at hard labor.
True, the concluding part of the punishment cannot be
[* 272] executed • unless the governor concurs by ordering the
execution. But as both parts may, in any given case,
be inflicted, and as the convict is conseq,uently, under this law,
exposed to the double infliction, it is, within both the definitions
which have been mentioned, an ex post facto law. It changes the
punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment than that which
the law annexed to the crime when committed. It is enough, in
my opinion, that it changes it in any manner except by dispensing
with divisible portions of it; but upon the other definition announced by Judge 0/wse, where it is implied that the change must
be from a less to a greater punishment, this act cannot be sustained." This decision has since been several times followed in
the State of New York, 1 and it must now be regarded as the
settled law of that State, that" a law changing the punishment for
offences committed before its passage is ex post facto and void,
under the Constitution, unless the change consists in the remission
of some separable part of the punishment before prescribed, or is
referable to prison discipline or penal administration as its primary
1 Shepherd v. People, 25 N.Y. 406; Ratzky 1:1. People, 29 N.Y. 124; Kuckler tl. People, 5 Park Cr. Rep. 212.
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with perhaps this single qualiﬁcation,—that the substitution of

any other punishment for that of death must be regarded as a

mitigation of the penalty.”

But so far as mere modes of procedure are concerned, a party

has _no more right, in a criminal than in a civil action, to insist

that his case shall be disposed of under the law in force when the

act to be investigated is charged to have taken place. Remedies

must always be under the control of the legislature, and it would

create endless confusion in legal proceedings if every case was to

be conducted only in accordance with the rules of practice, and

heard only by the courts, in existence when its facts arose. The

legislature may abolish courts and create new ones, and it may

prescribe altogether different modes of procedure in its discretion,

though it cannot lawfully, we think, in so doing, dispense with

any of those substantial protections with which the existing law

surrounds the person accused of crime. A law giving the gov-

ernment additional challenges,3 and another which author-

ized ‘the amendment of indictments,‘ have both been [“' 273]

sustained as applicable to past transactions, as any similar

law, tending only to improve the remedy, but working no injustice

to the defendant, and depriving him of no substantial right, doubt-
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less would be.

And a law is not objectionable as ex post facto which, in pro-

viding for the punishment of future offences, authorizes the offend-

er’s conduct in the past to be taken into the account, and the

punishment to be graduated accordingly. Heavier penalties are

often provided by law for a second or any subsequent oﬂ'ence than

for the ﬁrst; and it has not been deemed objectionable that, in pro-

viding for such heavier penalties, the prior conviction authorized

_.

Per Davies, J., in Ratzky v. People, 29 N. Y. 124. _

See 1 Bishop, Crim. Law, § 219 (108).

\Valston v. Commonwealth, 16 B. Monr. 15; State v. Ryan, 13 Minn. 370.

‘ State v. Manning, 14 Texas, 402. The defendant in any case must be pro-

ceeded against and punished under the law in force when the proceeding is had.

State v. Williams, 2 Rich. 418; Keene v. State, 2 Chand. 109 ; People v. Phelps,

5 VVend. 9; Rand v. Commonwealth, 9 Grat. 738. A law is not unconstitutional

which precludes a defendant in a criminal case from taking advantage of vari-

ances which do not prejudice him. Commonwealth v. Hall, 97 Mass. 570. Nor

one which, though passed alter the commission of the oﬂ'ence, authorizes a change

of venue to another county of the judicial district. Gut v. State, 9 W'al. 35.
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object." 1 And this rule seems to us a sound and sensible one,
with perhaps this single qualification,- that the substitution of
any other punishment for that of death must be regarded as a
mitigation of the penalty.2
But so far as mere modes of procedure are concerned, a party
has !!O more right, in a criminal than in a civil action, to insist
that his case shall be disposed of under the law in force when the
act to be investigated is charged to have taken place. Remedies
must always be under the control of the legislature, and it would
create endless confusion in legal proceedings if every case was to
be conducted only in accordance with the rules of practice, and
heard only by the courts, in existence when its facts arose. The
legislature may aboli8h courts and create new ones, and it may
prescribe altogether different modes of procedure in its discretion,
though it cannot lawfully, we think, in so doing, dispense with
any of those substantial protections with which the existing law
surrounds the person accused of crime. A law giving the government additional challenges,3 and another which authorized • the amendment of indictments,~ have both been (* 273]
sustained as applicable to past transactions, as any similar
law, tending only to improve the remedy, but working no injustice
to the defendant, and depriving him of no substantial right, doubt,.
less would be.
And a law is not objectionable as ex po.st facto which, in providing for the punishment of future offences, authorizes the offender's conduct in the past to be taken into the account, and the
punishment to be graduated accordingly. Heavier penalties are
often provided by law for a second or any subsequent offence than
for the first ; and it has not been deemed objectionable that, in providing for such heavier penalties, the prior conviction authorized
Per Davies, J., in Ratzky "·People, 29 N.Y. 124.
See 1 Bishop, Crim. Law, § 219 (108).
1 Walston v. Commonwealth, 16 B. Monr. 15; State"· Ryan, 13 Minn. 370.
4 State"· Manning, 14: Texas, 402.
The defendant in any case must be proceeded against and punished under the law in force when the proceeding is had.
State D. Williams, 2 Rich. 418; Keene"· State, 2 Chand. 109; People"· Phelps,
5 Wend. 9; Rand "· Commonwealth, 9 Grat. 738. A law is not unconstitutional
which precludes a defendant in a criminal case from taking advantage of variances which do not prejudice him. Commonwealth "· Hall, 97 Mass. 570. Nor
one which, though passed after the commission of the offenc(', authorizes a change
of venue to another county of the judicial district. Gut c. State, 9 Wal. 35.
19
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to be taken into the account may have taken place before the law

was passed} In such case, it is the second or subsequent offence

that is punished, not the ﬁrst;3 and the act would be void if the

offence to be actually punished had been committed before it had

taken effect, even though it was after its passage?

Laws impairing the Obligation of Contracts.

The Constitution of the United States also forbids the States

passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts} It is

to be taken into the account may have taken place before the law
was passed.l In such case, it is the second or subsequent offence
that is punished, not the first ; 2 and the act would be Yoid if the
offence to be actually punished had been committed before it had
taken effect, even though i.t was after its passage.8

remarkable that this very important clause was passed over

almost without comment during the discussions preceding the

adoption of that instrument, though since its adoption no clause

which the Constitution contains has been more proliﬁc of liti-

Laws impairing tile Obligation of Contracts.

gation, or given rise to more animated and at times angry contro-

versy. It is but twice alluded to in the papers of the Federalist ;5

and though its great importance is assumed, it is evident that the

writer had no conception of the prominence it was afterwards to

hold in constitutional discussions, or of the-very numerous cases

to which it was to be applied in practice.

C The ﬁrst question that arises under this provision is,

[** 274] What is a *contract in the sense in which the word is

here employed? In the leading case upon this subject,

it appeared that the legislature of Georgia had made a. grant of
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land, but afterwards, on an allegation that the grant had been

obtained by fraud, a subsequent legislature had passed another

act annulling and rescinding the ﬁrst conveyance, and asserting

the right of the State to the land it covered. “ A contract,” says

Ch. J . Marshall, “is a compact between two or more parties,

and is either executory or executed. An executory contract

is one in which a party binds himself to do or not to do a

particular thing. Such was the law under which the conveyance

was made by the governor. A contract executed is one in

which the object of the contract is performed; and this, says

Blackstone, differs in nothing from a grant. The contract between

Georgia and the purchasers was executed by the grant. A

' Rand v. Commonwealth, 9 Grat. 738; Ross’s Case, 2 Pick. 165; People v.

Butler, 3 Cow. 347.

’ Rand v. Commonwealth, 9 Grat. 738. 3 Riley’s Case, 2 Pick. 172.

‘ Const. art. 1, § 10. ° Federalist, Nos. 7 and 44.

<-
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The Constitution of the U uited States also forbids the States
passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts.4 It is
remarkable that this very important clause was passed over
almost without comment during the discussions preceding the
adoption of that instrument, though since its adoption no clause
which the Constitution contains has been more prolific of litigation, or given rise to more animated and at times angry controversy. It is but twice alluded to in the papers of the Federalist ; 6
and though its great importance is assumed, it is evident that the
writer had no conception of the prominence it was afterwards to
hold in constitutional discussions, or of the ·very numerous cases
to which it was to be applied in practice.
·
The first question that arises under this provision is,
[* 27 4J What is a • contract in the sense in which the word is
here employed? In the leading case upon this subject,
it appeared that the legislature of Georgia had made a grant of
land, but afterwards, on an allegation that the grant had been
obtained by fraud, a subsequent legislature had passed anoth~r
act annulling and rescinding the first conveyance, and asserting
the right of the State to the land it covered. " A contract," says
Ch. J. Marshall, " is a compact between two or more parties,
and is either executory or executed. An executory contract
is one in which a party binds himself to do or not to do a
particular thing. Such was the law under which the conveyance
was made by the governor. A contract executed is one in
which the object of the contract is performed ; and this, says
Blackstone, differs in nothing from a grant. The contract between
Georgia and the purchasers was executed by the grant. A
a Rand v. Commonwealth, 9 Grat. 788; Ross's Case, 2 Pick. 165; Peoplc v.
Butler, 3 Cow. 347.
3 Riley's Case, 2 Pick. 172.
• Rand v. Coinmonwealth, 9 Grat. 738.
• Federalist, Nos. 7 and 44.
' Const. art. 1, § 10.
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obligations binding on the parties. A grant, in its own nature,

amounts to an extinguishment of the right of the grantor, and

implies a contract not to reassert that right. Aparty is, therefore,

always estopped by his own grant. Since then, in fact, a grant

is a contract executed, the obligation of which still continues,

and since the Constitution uses the general term ‘contract,’ with-

out distinguishing between those which are executory and those

which are executed, it must be construed to comprehend the

latter as well as the former. A law annulling conveyances

between individuals, and declaring that the grantors should

stand seized of their former estates, notwithstanding those grants,

would be as repugnant to the Constitution as a law discharging

the vendors of property from the obligation of executing their

contracts by conveyances. _ It would be strange if a contract to

convey was secured by the Constitution, while an absolute convey-

ance remained unprotected. If, under a fair construction of the

Constitution, grants are comprehended under the term ‘ contracts,’

is a grant from the State excluded from the operation of the

provision? Is the clause to be considered as inhibiting the State

from impairing the obligation of contracts between two individuals,

but as excluding from that inhibition contracts made with itself ?
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The words themselves contain no such distinction. They are

general, and are applicable to contracts of every description. If

contracts made with the State are to be exempted from their oper-

ations, the exception must arise from the character of

‘the contracting party, not from the words which are ["‘27-5]

employed.” And the court proceed to give reasons for

their decision, that violence should not “ be done to the natural

meaning of words, for the purpose of leaving to the legislature

the power of seizing, for public use, the estate of an individual,

in the form'of a law annulling the title by which he holds that

estate.”1 »

It will be seen that this leading decision settles two important

points: first, that an executed contract is within the provision,

and second, that it protects from violation the contracts of States

equally with those entered into between private individuals?

' Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 133.

' This decision has been repeatedly followed. In the founding of the Colony

of Virginia, the religious establishment of England was adopted, and before the

- [291]

contract ex-ecuted, as well as one which is executory, contains
obligations binding on the parties. A grant, in its own nature,
amounts to an extinguishment of the right of the grantor, and
implies a contract not to reassert that right. A party is, therefore,
always estopped by his own grant. Since then, in fact, a grant
is a contract executed, the obligation of which still continues,
and since the Constitution uses the general term 'contract,' without distinguishing between those which are executory and those
which are executed, it must be construed to comprehend the
latter as well as the former. A law annulling conveyances
between individuals, and declaring that the grantors should
stand seized of their former estates, notwithstanding those grants,
would be as repugnant to the Constitution as a law discharging
the vendors of property from the obligation of executing their
contracts by conveyances. _ It would be strange if a contract to
convey was secured by the Constitution, while an absolute conveyance remained unprotected. If, under a fair construction of the
Constitution, grants are comprehended under the term 'contracts,'
is a grant from the State excluded from the operation of the
provision ? Is the clause to be considered as inhibiting the State
from impairing the obligation of contracts between two individuals,
but as excluding from that inhibition contracts made with itself?
The words themselves contain no such distinction. They are
general, and are applicable to contracts of every description. If
contracts made with the State are to be exempted from their operations, the exception must arise from the character of
• the contracting party, not from the words which are [*275]
employed." And the court proceed to give reasons for
their decision, that violence should not " be done to the natural
meaning of words, for the purpose of leaving to the legislature
the power of seizing, for public use, the estate of an individual,
in the form·of a law annulling the title by which he holds that
estate." 1
It will be seen that this leading decision settles two important
points : first, that an executed contract is within the provision,
and second, that it protects from violation the contracts of States
equally with those entered into between private individuals.2
Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 133.
Thi~ decision has been repeatedly followed. In the founding of the Colony
of Virginia, the religious establishment of England was adopted, anti before the
1

1
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in like manner protected} These decisions, however, do

["‘ 276] not fully * determine what under all circumstances is to

be regarded as a contract. A grant of land by a State is

a contract, because in making it the State deals with the purchaser

precisely as any other vendor might; and if its mode of convey-

ance is any different, it is only because, by virtue of its sover-

eignty, it has power to convey by other modes than those which

Revolution the churches of that denomination had become vested, by grants of

the crown or Colony, with large properties, which continued in their possession

after the constitution of the State had forbidden the creation or continuance of

any religious establishment, possessed of exclusive rights or privileges, or the

compelling the citizens to worship under a stipulated form or discipline, or to pay

And it has since been held that compacts between two States are
in like manner protected.! These decisions, however, do
[• 276] not fully • determine what under all circumstances is to
be regarded as a contract. A grant of land by a State is
a contract, because in making it the State deals with the purchaser
precisely as any other vendor might; and if its mode of conveyance is any different, it is only because, by virtue of its sovereignty, it has power to convey by other modes than those which

taxes to those whose creed they could not conscientiously believe. By statute in

1801, the legislature asserted their right to all the property of the Episcopal

churches in the respective parishes of the State; and, among other things, di-

rected and authorized the overseers of the poor and their successors in each

parish, wherein any glebe land was vacant or should become so, to sell the same

and appropriate the proceeds to the use of the poor of the parish. By this act,

it will be seen, the State sought in effect to resume grants made by the sover-

eignty, —a practice which had been common enough in English history, and of

which precedents were not wanting in the history of the American Colonies.
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The Supreme Court of the United States held the grant not revocable, and that

the legislative act was therefore unconstitutional and void. Terrett v. Taylor, 9

Cranch, 43. See also Town of Pawlet v. Clark, 9 Cranch, 335; People v. Platt,

17 Johns. 195; Montgomery v. Kasson, 16 Cal. 189; Grogan v. San Francisco,

18 Cal. 590; Rehoboth v. Hunt, 1 Pick. 224; Lowry v. Francis, 2 Yerg. 534;

University of North Carolina v. Foy, '2 Hayw. 310; State v. Barker, 4 Kansas,

879 and 435. The lien of a bondholder, who has loaned money to the State on

a pledge of property by legislative act, cannot be divested or postponed by a.

subsequent legislative act. Wabash, &c., Co. v. Beers, 2 Black, 448.

' On the separation of Kentucky from Virginia a compact was entered into

between the proposed new and the old State, by which it was agreed “ that all

private grants and interests of lands, within the said district, derived from the

laws of Virginia, shall remain valid and sechre under the laws of the proposed

State, and shall be determined by the laws now existing in this State.” After

the admission of the new State to the Union, “ occupying claimant” laws were

passed by its legislature, such as were not in existence in Virginia, and by the

force of which, under certain circumstances, the owner might be deprived of his

title to land, unless he would pay the value of lasting improvements made upon

it by an adverse claimant. These acts were also held void; the compact was

held inviolable under the Constitution, and it was deemed no objection to its

binding character, that its eﬂect was to restrict, in some directions, the legislative

power of the State entering into it. Green v. Biddle, 8 \Vheat. 1. See also

Hawkins v. Barney’s Lessee, 5 Pet. 457.

[292]

Revolution the churches of that denomination had become vested, by grants of
the crown or Colony, with large properties, which continued in their possession
after the constitution of the State had forbidden the creation or continuance of
any religious establishment, possessed of exclusive rights or privileges, or the
compelling the citizens to worship under a stipulated form or discipline, or to pay
taxes to those whose creed they could not conscientiously believe. By statute in
1801, the legislature asserted their right to all the property of the Episcopal
churches in the respective parishes of the State; and, among other things, directed and authorized the overseers of the poor and their successors in each
parish, wherein any glebe land was vacant or should become so, to sell the same
and appropriate the proceeds to the use of the poor of the parish. By this act,
it will be seen, the State sought in effect to resume grants made by the sovereignty, - a practice which had been common enough in English history, and of
which precedents were not wanting in the history of the American Colonies.
The Supreme Court of the United States held the want not revocable, and that
the legislative act was therefore unconstitutional and voitl. Terrett v. Taylor, 9
Cranch, 48. See also Town of Pawlet v. Clark, 9 Crancb, 835 ; People v. Platt,
17 Johns. 195; Montgomery v. Kasson, 16 Cal. 189; Grogan v. San Francisco,
18 Cal. 590; Rehoboth v. Hunt, 1 Pick. 224; Lowry v. Francis, 2 Yerg. 534;
University of North Carolina v. Foy, ·2 Hayw. 810; State v. Barker, 4 Kansas,
879 and 435. The lien of a bondholder, who has loaned money to the State on
a pledge of property by legislative act, cannot be divested or postponed by a
subsequent legislative act. Wab1111h, &c., Co. v. Beers, 2 Black, 448.
1 On the separation of Kentucky from Virginia a compact was entered into
between the proposed new and the old State, by which it was agreed "that all
private grants and interests of lands, within the said district, derived from the
laws of Virginia, shall remain valid and secure under the laws of the proposed
State, and shall be determined by the laws now existing in this State." After
the admission of the new State to the Union, ''occupying claimant" laws were
passed by its legislature, such as were not in E'xistence in Virginia, and by the
force of which, under certain circumstances, the owner might be deprived of his
title to land, unless he would pay the value of lasting improvements made upon
it by an adverse claimant. These acts were also held void; the compact was
held inviolable under the Constitution, and it was deemed no objection to its
binding character, that its effect was to restrict, in some directions, the legislative
power of the State entering into it. Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1. See also
Hawkins v. Barney's Lessee, 6 Pet. 457.
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the general law opens to private individuals. But many things

done by the State may seem to hold out promises to individuals,
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which after all cannot be treated as contracts without hampering

the legislative power of the State in a manner that would soon

leave it without the means of performing its essential functions.

The State creates offices, and appoints persons to ﬁll them;

it establishes municipal corporations, with large and valuable privi-

leges for its citizens ; by its general laws it holds out inducements

to immigration; it passes exemption laws, and laws for the

encouragement of trade and agriculture ; and under all these laws

a greater or less number of citizens expect to derive proﬁt and

emolument. But can these laws be regarded as contracts be-

tween the State and the oﬂicers and corporations who are, or

the citizens of the State who expect to be, beneﬁted by their pas-

sage, so as to preclude their being repealed?

On these points it would seem that there could be no difficulty.

When the State employs officers or creates municipal corporations

as the mere agencies of government, it must have the power

to discontinue the agency whenever it comes to be regarded as

no longer important. “ The framers of the Constitution did not

intend to restrain the States in the regulation of their civil

institutions, adopted for internal government.”1 They may,
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therefore, discontinue oﬂices and abolish or change the organi-

zation of municipal corporations at any time, according to the

existing legislative view of state policy, unless forbidden

by their own constitutions from doing so? And *al- [“‘ 277]

1 Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 629, per Marshall, Ch. J .

' Butler v. Pennsylvania, 10 How. 402; VVarner v. People, 2 Denio, 272;

Commonwealth v. Bacon, 6 S. & R. 322; Commonwealth v. Mann, 5 \V. & S.

418; Conner v. New York, 2 Sandf. 355, and 5 N. Y. 285. “ Where an oﬁice

is created by statute, it is wholly within the control of the legislature. The term,

the mode of appointment, and the compensation may be altered at pleasure, and

the latter may be even taken away without abolishing the oﬂice. Such extreme

legislation is not to be deemed probable in any case. ' But we are now discussing

the legislative power, not its expediency or propriety. Having the power, the

legislature will exercise it for the public good, and it is the sole judge of the ex-

igcncy which demands its interference.” Per Sandford, J ., 2 Sandf. 369. “ The

selection of officers who are nothing more than public agents for the elfectuating

the general law opens to private individuals. But many things
done by the State may seem to hold out promises to individuals,
which after all cannot be treated as contracts without hampering
the legislative power of the State in a manner that would soon
leave it without the means of performing its essential functions.
The State creates offices, and appoints persons to fill them ;
it establishes municipal corporations, with large and valuable privileges for its citizens ; by its general laws it holds out inducements
to immigration; it passes exemption laws, and laws for the
encouragement of trade and agriculture ; and under all these laws
a greater or less number of citizens expect to derive profit and
emolument. But can these laws be regarded as contracts be·
tween the State and the officers and corporations who are, or
the citizens of the State who expect to be, benefited by their passage, so as to preclude their being repealed ?
On these points it would seem that there could be no difficulty.
When the State employs officers or creates municipal corporations
as the mere agencies of government, it must have the power
to discontinue the agency whenever it comes to be regarded as
no longer important. " The framers of the Constitution did not
intend to restrain the States in the regulation of their civil
institutions, adopted for internal government." 1 They may,
therefore, discontinue offices and abolish or change the organization of municipal corporations at any time, according to the
existing legislative view of state policy, unless forbidden
by their owu constitutions from doing so.2 And • al- [• 277]

of public purposes is matter of public convenience or necessity, and so, too, are

the periods for the appointment of such agents, but neither the one nor the other

of these arrangements can constitute any obligation to continue such agents, or

to reappoint them, after the measures which brought them into being shall have
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Dartmouth College"· Woodward, 4 Wheat. 629, per Marshall, Ch. J.
Butler "· Pennsylvania, 10 How. 402; Warner "· People, 2 Denio, 272;
Commonwealth "·Bacon, 6 S. & R . 322; Commonwealth "· Mann, 5 W. & S.
418 ; Conner"· New York, 2 Sandf. 35.5, and 5 N.Y. 285. "Where an office
is created by statute, it is wholly within the control of the legislature. The term,
the mode of appointment, and the compensation may be altered at pleasure, and
the latter may be even taken away without abolishing the office. Such extreme
legislation is not to be deemed probable in any case. · But we are now discussing
the legisl&tive power, not its expediency or propriety. Having the power, the
legislature will exetcise it for the public good, and it is the sole judge of the exigency which demands its interference." Per Sandford, J., 2 Sandf. 369. "The
selection of officers who are nothing more than public agents for the effectuating
of public purposes is matter of public convenience or necessity, and so, too, are
the periods for the appointment of such agents, but neither the one nor the other
of these arrangements can constitute any obligation to continue such agents, or
to reappoint them, after the measures which brought them into being shall have
1

1
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though municipal corporations, as respects the property which
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they hold, control, and manage for the beneﬁt of their citizens,

[CH. IX.

are governed by the same rules and subject to the same lia-

bilities as individuals, yet this property, so far as it has been

derived from the State, or obtained by the exercise of the

ordinary powers of government, must be held subject to control

by the State, but under the restriction only, that it is not to

be appropriated to uses foreign to those for which it has been

acquired. And the franchises conferred upon such a corporation,

for the beneﬁt of its citizens, must be liable to be resumed at

any time by that authority which may mould the corporate

powers at its will, or even revoke them altogether. The

greater power will comprehend the less.‘ If, however, a

been found useless, shall have been fulﬁlled, or shall have been abrogated as even

detrimental to the well-being of the public. The promised compensation for

services actually performed and accepted, during the continuance of the particu-

lar agency, may undoubtedly be claimed, both upon principlesof compact and of

equity; but to insist beyond this upon the perpetuation of a public policy either

useless or detrimental, and upon a reward for acts neither desired nor performed,

would appear to be reconcilable with neither common justice nor common sense.”

Daniel, J., in 10 How. 416. See also Barker v. Pittsburgh, 4 Penn. St. 49;

though municipal corporations, as respects the property which
they hold, control, and manage for the benefit of their citizens,
are governed by the same rules and subject to the same liabilities as individuals, yet this property, so far as it has been
derived from the State, or obtained by the exercise of the
ordinary powers of government, must be held subject to control
by the State, but under the restriction only, that it is not to
be appropriated to uses foreign to those for which it has been
acquired. And the franchises conferred upon such a corporation,
for the benefit of its citizens, must be liable to be resumed at
any time by that authority which may mould the corporate
powers at its will, or even revoke them altogether. The
greater power will comprehend the less.1 If, however, a

Territory v. Pyle, 1 Oregon, 149; Bryan v. Cattell, 15 Iowa, 538. But if the
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term of an otlice is ﬁxed by the Constitution, the legislature cannot remove the

oiﬁcer—except as that instrument may allow—either directly, or indirectly by

abolishing the ofiice. People v. Dubois, 23 lll. 547; State v. Messmore, 14 Wis.

163; Commonwealth v. Gamble, 62 Penn. St. 343. As to control of municipal

corporations, see further, Marietta v. Fearing, 4 Ohio, 427; Bradford v. Cary, 5

Greenl. 339; Bush v. Shipman, 4 Scam. 186; Trustees, &c. v. Tatman, 13 Ill.

27; People v. Morris, 13 Wcnd. 325; Mills 1:. Williams, 11 Ircd. 558; People

v. Banvard, 27 Cal. 470.

‘ In East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Co. 10 How. 533, Mr. Justice Wood-

bury, in speaking of the grant of a ferry franchise to a municipal corporation,

says: “Our opinion is . . . that the parties to this grant did not by their

charter stand in the attitude towards each other of making a contract by it, such

as is contemplated by the Constitution, and as could not be modiﬁed by subse-

quent legislation. The legislature was acting here on the one part, and public

municipal and political corporations on the other. They were acting, too, in

relation to a public object, being virtually a highway across the river, over

another highway up and down the river. From this standing and relation of

these parties, and from the subject-matter of their action, we think that the

doings of the legislature as to this ferry must be considered rather as public laws

than as contracts. They related to public interests. They changed as those

interests demanded. The grantees, likewise, the towns, being more organizations

for public purposes, were liable _to have their public powers, rights, and duties
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been found usele11s, shall have been fulfilled, or shall have been abrogated as even
detrimental to the well-being of the public. The promised compensation for
services actually performed and accepted, during the continuance of the particular agency, may undoubtedly be claimed, both upon principles of compact and of
equity; but to insist. beyond this upon the perpetuation of a public policy either
useless or detrimental, and upon a reward for acts neither desil·ed nor performed,
would appear to be reconcilable with neither common justice nor common sense."
Daniel, J., in 10 How. 416. See also Barker "· Pittsburgh, 4 Penn. St. 49;
Territory v. Pyle, 1 Oregon, 149; Bryan "· Cattell, 15 Iowa, 538. But if the
term of an office is fixed by the Constitution, the legislature cannot remove the
officer- except as that instrument may allow - either directly, or indirectly by
abolishing the office. People"· Dubois, 23 Ill. 547; State"· Messmore, 14 Wis.
163; Commonwealth"· Gamble, 62 Penn. St. 343. As to control of municipal
corporations, see further, Marietta v. Fearing, 4 Ohio, 427; Bradford v. Cary, 5
Greenl. 339; Bush "· Shipman, 4 Scam. 186; Trustees, &c. "·Tatman, IS Ill.
27; People"· Morris, 13 Wend. 325; Mills"· Williams, 11 Ired. 558; People
"· Banvard, 27 Cal. 470.
1 In East Hartford "· Hartford Bridge Co. 10 How. 533, Mr. Justice Woodbury, in speaking of the grant of a ferry franchise to a municipal corporation,
says: "Our opinion is . . • that the parties to this grant did not by their
charter stand in the attitude towards each other of making a contract by it, such
as is contemplated by the Constitution, and as could not be modified by subsequent legislation. The legislature was acting here on the one part, l}nd public
municipal and political corporations on the other. They were aGting, too, in
relation to a public object, being Tirtually a highway across the river, over
another highway up and down the river. From this standing and relation of
these parties, and from the subject-matter of their action, we think that the
· doings of the legislature as to this ferry must be considered rather as public laws
than as contracts. They related to public interests. They changed as those
interests demanded. The grantees, likewise, the towns, being mere organizations
for public purposes, were liable .to have their public powers, rights, and duties
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grant is made to a municipal corporation ‘charged [*278]
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with a trust in favor of an individual, private corpora-

modiﬁed or abolished at any moment by the legislature. They are incorporated

for public, and not private objects. They are allowed to hold privileges or prop-

erty only for public purposes. The members are not shareholders nor joint part-

grant is made to a municipal corporation • charged [* 2i8]
with a trust in favor of an individual, private corpora-

ners in any corporate estate, which they can sell or devise to others, or which

can be attached and levied on for their debts. Hence, generally, the doings

between them and the legislature are in the nature of legislation rather than com-

pact. and subject to all the legislative conditions just named, and therefore to be

considered not violated by subsequent legislative changes. It is hardly possible

to conceive the grounds on which a dilferent result could be vindicated, without

destroying all legislative sovereignty, and checking most legislative improvements,

as well as supervision over its subordinate public bodies.” A different doctrine

was advanced by Mr. Justice Barculo, in Benson v. Mayor, &c., of New York,

10 Barb. 234, who cites in support of his opinion, that ferry grants to the city of

New Ybrk could not be taken away by the legislature, what is said by Chancellor

Kent (2 Kent’s Com. 275), that “public corporations . . . may be empowered

to take and hold private property for municipal uses; and such property is

invested with the security of other private rights. So corporate franchises,

attached to public corporations, are legal estates, coupled with an interest, and

are protected as private property.” This is true in a general sense, and it is also

true that, in respect to such property ‘and franchises, the same rules of responsi-
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bility are to be applied as in the case of individuals. Bailey v. Mayor, &c., of

New York, 3 Hill, 531. But it does not follow that the legislature, under its

power to administer the government, of which these agencies are a part, and for

the purposes of which the grant has been made, may not at any time modify the

municipal powers and privileges, by transferring the grant to some other agency,

or revoking it when it seems to have become unimportant. In People v. Power,

25 Ill. 190, Breese, J ., in speaking of a law which provided that three-fourths of

the taxes collected in the county of Sangamon, with certain deductions, should

be paid over to the city of Springﬁeld, which is situated therein, says: " While

private corporations are regarded as contracts, which the legislature cannot con-

stitutionally impair, as the trustee of the public interests it has the exclusive and

unrestrained control over public corporations; and as it may create, so it may

modify or destroy, as public exigency requires or the public interests demand.

Coles v. Madison County, Breese, 115. Their whole capacities, powers, and

duties are derived from the legislature, and subordinate to that power. If, then,

the legislature can destroy a county, they can destroy any of its parts, and take

from it any one of its powers. The revenues of a county are not the property

of the county, in the sense in which revenue of a private person or corporation

is regarded. The whole State has an interest in the revenue of a county, and

for the public good the legislature must have the power to direct its application.

The power conferred upon a county to raise a revenue by taxation is a political

power, and its application when collected must necessarily be within the control

of the legislature for political purposes. The act of the legislature nowhere pro-

poses to take from the county of Sangamon, and give to the city of Springﬁeld,
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modified or abolished at any moment by the legislature. They are incorporated
for public, and not private objects. They are allowed to hold privilPges or property only for public purposes. The members are not shareholders nor joint partners in any corporate estate, which they can sell or devise to otht-rs, or which
can he attached and levied on for their debts. Hence, gem• rally, the doings
bet'Ween them and the legislature are in the nature of legislation rather than compact, and subject to all the legislative conditions just named, and therefore to be
considt>red not viol'll.tt"d by subsequent legislative changes. It is hardly possible
to conceive the grounds on which a different result could be vindieated, without
destroying all legislative sovereignty, and checking most legislativt• improvements,
as well as supervision over its subordinate public bodies." A different doctrine
was advanced by Mr. Justice Barettlo, in Benson v. :Mayor, &c., of New York,
10 Barb. 234, who cites in support of his opinion, that ferry grants to the city of
New Yt>rk could not be taken away by the legislature, what is said by Chancellor
Kent (2 Kent's Com. 275), that "public eorporations . . . may be empowered
to take and hold private property for municipal uses ; and such property is
invested with the security of other private rights. So corporate franchises,
attached to public corporations, are legal estates, coupled with an interest, and
are protected as private property." This is true in a general sense, and it is also
true that, in respect to such property 'and franchises, the same rules of responsibility are to be applied as in the case of individuals. Bailey v. Mayor, &c., of
New York, 3 Hill, 531. But it does not follow that the legislature, under its
power to administer the government, of which these agencies are a part, and for
the purposes of which the grant has been made, may not at any time modify the
municipal powers and privileges, by transferring the grant to some other agency,
or revoking it when it seems to have become unimportant. In l'eople v. Power,
25 Til. 190, Breese, J., in speaking of a law which provided that three-fourths of
the taxes collected in the county of Sangamon, with certain deduetions, should
be paid over to the city of Springfield, which is situated therein, says : " While
private corporations are regarded as contracts, which the legislature cannot conlltitutionally impair, as the trustee of the public interests it has the exelusive and
unrestrained control over public corporations; and as it may create, so it may
modify or destroy, as public exigency requires or the public interests demand.
Coles "· Madison County, Breese, 115. Their whole capal'ities, powers, and
duties are derivt•d from the legislature, and subordinate to that power. If, then,
the legislature can destroy a county, they can destroy any of its parts, and take
from it any one of its powers. The revenues of a county are not the. property
of the county, in the sense in which revenue of a private person or co•·poration
is regarded. The whole State has an interest in the revenue of a county, and
for the public good the legislature must have the power to direct its application.
The power conferred upon a county to raise a revenue by taxation is a political
power, and its application when collected must necessarily be within the control
of the legislature for political purposes. The act of the legislature nowhere proposes to take from the county of Sangamon, and give to the city of Springfield,
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[* 279] tion, ’* or charity, the interest which the cestui que
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trust has under the grant may sustain it against legis-

lative revocation, a vested equitable interest being property in

the same sense and entitled to the same protection as a legal}

Those charters of incorporation, however, which are granted, not

as a part of the machinery of the government, but for the private

beneﬁt or purposes of the corporators, stand upon a different foot-

ing, and are held to be contracts between the legislature and the

corporators, having for their consideration the liabilities and duties

which the corporators assume by accepting them; and the grant of the

franchise can no more be resumed by the legislature, or its beneﬁts

diminished or impaired without the consent of the grantees, than

any other grant of property or valuable thing, unless the right to

do so is reserved in the charter itself.”

any property belonging to the county, or revenues collected for the use of the

county. But if it did, it would not be objectionable. But, on ‘the contrary, it

proposes alone to appropriate the revenue which may be collected by the county,

by taxes levied on property both in the city and county, in certain proportions

ratably to the city and county.” And see Bush v. Shipman, 4 Scam. 190; Rich-

land County v. Lawrence County, 12 Ill. 1; Borough of Dunmore‘s Appeal, 52

Penn. St. 37-L; Guilford v. Supervisors of Chenango, 18 Barb. 615, and 13

[* 279] tion, • or charity, the interest which the cestui que
trust has under the grant may sustain it against legislative revocation, a vested equitable interest being property in
the same sense and entitled to the same protection as a legal.l
Those charters of incorporation, however, which aro granted, not
as a part of the machinery of the government, but for the private
benefit or purposes of the corporators, stand upon a different footing, and are held to be contracts between the legislature and the
corporators, having for their consideration the liabilities and duties
which the corporators assume by accepting them; and the grant of the
franchise can no more be resumed by the legislature, or its benefits
diminished or impaired without the consent of the grantees, than
any other grant of property or valuable thing, unless the right to
do so is reserved in the charter itself. 2

N. Y. 143; ante, 235-239, and cases cited. _
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' See Town of Pawlet v. Clark, 9 Cranch, 292, and Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch,

43. The municipal corporation holding property or rights in trust might even

be abolished without affecting the grant ; but the Court of Chancery might be

empowered to appoint a new trustee to take charge of the property, and to

execute the trust. Montpelier v. East Montpelier, 29 Vt. 12.

" Dartmouth College 13. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 519; Trustees of Vincennes

University v. Indiana, 14 How. 208; Planters Bank v. Sharp, 6 How. 301; Piqua

Bank v. Knoop, 16 How. 369; Binghampton Bridge Case, 3 ‘Val. 51; Norris v.

Trustees of Abingdon Academy, 7 G. & J . 7; Grammar School v. Burt, 11 Vt.

632; Brown v. Hummel, 6 Penn. St. 86; State v. Heyward, 3 Rich. 389; People

v. Manhattan Co. 9Wend. 851; Commonwealth v. Cullen, 13 Penn. St. 133;

Commercial Bank of Natchez v. State, 14 Miss. 599; Backus v. Lebanon, 11

N. H. 19; Michigan State Bank v. Hastings, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 225; Bridge Co.

0. Hoboken Co. 2 Beas. 81; Miners Bank v. United States, 1 Greene (Iowa),

553; Edwards v. Jagers, 19 Ind. 407; State v. Noyes, 47 Me. 189; Bruifett 0.

G. IV. R. R. Co. 25 Ill. 353; People v. Jackson and Michigan Plank Road Co.

9 Mich. 285; Bank of the State v. Bank of Cape Fear, 13 Ired. 75; Mills v.

Williams, 11 Ired. 558; Hawthorne v. Calef, 2\Vs.l. 10; Wales v. Stetson,

2 Mass. 146; Nichols v. Bertram, 3 Pick. 342; King v. Dedham Bank, 15 Mass.

447; State v. Tombeckbee Bank, 2 Stew. 30; Central Bridge v. Lowell, 15 Gray,

106. It is under the protection of the decision in the Dartmouth College Case

that the most enormous and threatening powers in our country have been created;
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any property belonging to the county, or revenues collected for the use of the
county. But if it did, it would not be objectionable. ~ut, on ,the contrary, it
proposes alone to appropriate the revenue which may be collected by the county,
by taxes levied on property both in the city and county, in certain proporti7>ns
ratably to the city and county." And see Bush v. Shipman, 4 Scam. 190; Richland County v. Lawrence County, 12 Ill. 1; Borough of Dunmore's Appeal, 52
Peun. St. 374; Guilford v. Superviaors of Chenango, 18 Barb. 615, and 13
N. Y. 143; ante, 235-239, and cases cited.
1 ~ee Town of Pawlet v. Clark, 9 Crancl1, 292, and Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Crancb,
43. The municipal corporation holding property or rights in trust might even
be abolished without affecting the grant ; but the Court of Chancery might be
empowered to appoint a new trustee to take charge of the property, aud to
execute the trust. Montpelier v. East Montpelier, 29 Vt. 12.
1 Dartmouth CollE.'ge v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 519; Trustees of Vincennes
University v. Indiana, 14 How. 268; Planters Bank v. Sharp, 6 How. 301; Piqua
Bank v. Knoop, 16 How. 369 ; Binghampton Bridge Case, 3 W al. lH ; Norris v.
Trustees of Abingdon Academy, 7 G. & J. 7; Grammar School v. Burt, 11 Vt.
632; Brown v. Hummel, 6 Penn. St. 86; State v. Heyward, 3 Rich. 889; People
v. Manhattan Co. 9 Wend. 351; Commonwealth v. Cullen, 13 Penn. St. 133;
Commercial Bank of Natchez v. State, 14 Miss. 599; Backus v. Lebanon, 11
N.H. 19; Michigan State Bank v. Hastings, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 225; Bridge Co.
v. Hoboken Co. 2 Beas. 81; .Miners Bank v. United States, 1 Greene (Iowa),
553; Edwards v. Jagers, 19 Ind. 407; State v. Noyes, 47 Me. 189; Bruffett "·
G. W. R. R. Co. 25 Ill. 353; People v. Jackson and Michigan Plank Road Co.
9 Mich. 285; Bank of the State v. Bank of Cape Fear, 13 Ired. 75; Mills v.
Williams, 11 Ired. 558; Hawthorne v. Calef, 2 Wal. 10; Wales v. Stetson,
2 Mass. 146 ; Nichols v. Bertram, 3 Pick. 342; King v. Dedham Bank, 15 Mass.
447; State v. Tombeckbee Bank, 2 Stew. 30; Central Bridge v. Lowell, 15 Gray,
106. It is under the protection of the decision in the Dartmouth College Case
that the most enormous and threatening powers in our country have been created;
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' Perhaps the most interesting question which arises in [* 280]
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this discussion is, whether it is competent for the legislature

to so bind up its own hands by a grant as to preclude it from

exercising for the future any of the essential attributes of sovereignty

in regard to any of the subjects within its jurisdiction ; whether, for

instance, it can agree that it will not exercise the power of taxation,

or the police power of the State, or the right of eminent domain, as

to certain speciﬁed property or persons; and whether, if it shall

undertake to do so, the agreement is not void on the general

principle that the legislature cannot diminish the power of its

successors by irrepealable legislation, and that any other rule

might cripple and eventually destroy the government itself. If the

legislature has power to do this, it is certainly a very dangerous

power, exceedingly liable to abuse, and may possibly come in time

some of the great and wealthy corporations actually having greater inﬂuence in

the country at large and upon the legislation of the country than the States to which

they owe their corporate existence. Every privilege granted or right conferred

— no matter by what means or on what pretence —being made inviolable by the

Constitution, the government is frequently found stripped of its authority in

very important particulars, by unwise, careless, or corrupt legislation; and a

clause of the Federal Constitution, whose purpose was to preclude the repudia-

• Perhaps the most interesting question which arises in [• 280]
this discussion is, whether it is competent for the legislature
to so bind up its own hands by a grant as to preclude it from
exercising for the future any of the essential attributes of sovereignty
in regard to any of the subjects within its jurisdiction ; whether, for
instance, it can agree that it will not exercise the power of taxation,
or the police power of the State, or the right of eminent domain, as
to certain specified property or persons; and whether, if it shall
undertake to do so, the agreement is not void on the general
principle that the legislature cannot diminish the power of its
successors by irrepealable legislation, and that any other rule
might cripple and eventually destroy the government itself. If the
legislature has power to do this, it is certainly a very dangerous
power, exceedingly liable to abuse, and may possibly come in time

tion of debts and just contracts, protects and perpetuates the evil. To guard
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against such calamities in the future, it is customary now for the people in

framing their constitutions to forbid the granting of corporate powers except

subject to amendment and repeal; but the improvident grants of an early day

are beyond their reach.

In Mills v. Williams, 11 Ired. 561, Pearson, J ., states the difference between

the acts of incorporation of public and private corporations as follows: “The

substantial distinction is this. Some corporations are created by the mere will

of the legislature, there being no other party interested or concerned. To this

party a portion of the power of the legislature is delegated, to be exercised for

the general good, and subject at all times to be modiﬁed, changed, or annulled.

Other corporations are the result of contract. The legislature is not the only

party interested; for, although it has a public purpose to be accomplished, it

chooses to do it by the instrumentality of a second party. These two parties

make a contract. The legislature, for and in consideration of certain labor and

outlay of money, confers upon the party of the second part the privilege of being

a corporation, with certain power and capacities. The expectation of beneﬁt to

the public is the moving consideration on one side, that of expected remuneration

for the outlay is the consideration on the other. It is a contract, and therefore

cannot be modiﬁed, changed, or annulled, without the consent of both parties."

An incorporated academy, whose endowment comes exclusively from the public,

is a public corporation. Dart v. Houston, 22 Geo. 506.
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some of the great and wealthy corporations actually having greater influence in
the country at large and upon the legislation of the country than the States to which
they owe their corporate existence. Every privilege granted or right conferred
-no matter by what means or on what pretence- being made inviolable by the
Constitution, the government is frequently found stripped of its authority in
very important particulars, by unwise, careless, or corrupt legislation ; and a
dause of the Federal Constitution, whose purpose wu to preclude the repudiation of debts and just contracts, protects and perpetuates the evil. To guard
against such calamities in the future, it is customary now for the people in
framing their constitutions to forbid the granting of corporate powers except
subject to amendment and repeal; but the improvident grants of an early day
are beyond their reach.
In Mills v. Williams, 11 Ired. 561, Pearson, J., states the difference between
the acts of incorporation of public and private corporations as follows : " The
substantial distinction is this. Some corporations are created by the mere will
of the legislature, there being no other party interested or concerned. To this
party a portion of the power of the legislature is delegated, to be exercised for
tue general good, and subject at all times to be modified, changed, or annulled.
Other corporations are the result of contract. The legislature is not the only
party interested ; for, 11lthough it has a public purpose to be accomplished, it
chooses to do it by the instrumentality of a second party. These two parties
make a contract. The legislature, for and in cotu~ideration of certain labor and
outlay of money, confers upon the party of the 11econd part the privilege of being
a corporation, with certain power and capacities. The expectation of benefit to
tbe public is thtl moving consideration on one side, that of expected remuneration
for the outlay is the consideration on the other. It is a c~mtract, and therefore
cannot be modified, changed, or annulled, without the consent of both parties."
An incorporated academy, whose endowment comes exclusively from the public,
is a public corporation. Dart 11. Houston, 22 Gi!o. 506.
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to make the constitutional provision in question as proliﬁc of evil

(CH. IX.

as it ever has been, or is likely to be, of good.

So far as the power of taxation is concerned, it has been so often

decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, though not

without remonstrance on the part of State courts,1 that an agree-

ment by a State, for a consideration received or supposed to be

received, that certain property, rights, or franchises shall

[* 281] be exempt from taxation,or be taxed only at acertaiu * agreed

rate, is a contract protected by the Constitution, that the

question can no longer be considered an open one.” In any case,

however, there must be a consideration, so that the State can be

supposed to have received a beneficial equivalent; for it is con-

ceded on all sides that if the exemption is made as a privilege

only, it may be revoked at any time.“

The power of the legislature to preclude itself in any case from

exercising the power of eminent domain is not so plainly decided.

‘ Mechanics and Traders Bank v. Debolt, 10hio, N. s. 591 ; Toledo Bank v.

Bond, ib. 622; Knoop v. Piqua Bank, -ib. 603; Milan and R. Plank Road Co. v.

Husted, 3 Ohio, N. s. 578; Piscataqna Bridge 0. N. H. Bridge, 7 N. H. 69;

Brewster v. Hough, 10 N. H. 143; Backus v. Lebanon, 11 N. H. 24; Thorpe

v. R. & B. R.R. Co. 27 Vt. 140; Brainard v. Colchester, 31 Conn. 410; Mott v.

Pennsylvania R.R. Co. 30 Penn. St. 9; East Saginaw Salt Manuf. Co. v. East
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Saginaw, 19 Mich. 259. See also the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Miller

in Washington University v. Rouse, 8 Wal. 441, in which the Chief Justice and

to make the constitutional provision in question as prolific of evil

as it ever has been, or is likely to be, of good.
So far as the power of taxation is concerned, it has been so often
decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, though not
without remonstrance on the part of State conrts,1 that an agreement by a State, for a consideration received or supposed to be
received, that certain property, rights, or franchises shall
[* 281] be exempt from taxation, or be taxed only at a certain • agreed
rate, is a contract protected by the Constitution, that the
question can no longer be considered an open one.2 In any case,
however, there must be a consideration, so that the State can be
supposed to have received a beneficial equivalent; for it is conceded on all sides that if the exemption is made as a privilege
only, it may be revoked at any time.8
The power of the legislature to preclude itself in any case from
exercising the power of eminent domain is not so plainly decided.

Justice Field concurred. Also Raleigh, &c , R.R. Co. v. Reid, 64 N. C. 155.

' New Jersey 0. Wilson, 7 Cranch, 164; Gordon v. Appeal Tax Court, 3 How.

133; Piqua Bank v. Knoop, 16 How. 369; Ohio Life and Trust Co. v. Debolt,

ib. 416 ; Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331 ; Mechanics and Traders Bank v. Debolt,

18 How. 380; Mechanics and Traders Bank v. Thomas, ib. 384; McGee 0.

Mathis, 4 Wal. 143; Home of the Friendless v. Rouse, 8 Wal. 430; \Vashington

University v. Rouse, ib. 431. See also Atwater v. Woodbridge, 6 Conn. 223;

Osborne v. Humphrey, 7 Conn. 335; Parker v. Redﬁeld, 10 Conn. 495; Landon

v. Litchiield, 11 Conn. 251; Herrick v. Randolph, 13 Vt. 525; Armington v.

Barnet, 15 Vt. 751; O’Donnell v. Bailey, 24 Miss. 386; St. Paul, &c., R.R. Co.

v. Parcher, 14 Min. 297.

' Christ's Church v. Philadelphia, 24 How. 300; Brainard v. Colchester, 31

Conn. 410. See also Commonwealth v. Bird, 12 Mass. 442; Dole v. The Gov-

ernor, 3 Stew. 387. If an exemption from taxation exists in any case, it must

be ‘the result of a deliberate intention to relinquish this prerogative of sover-

eignty, distinctly manifested. Easton Bank v. Commonwealth. 10 Penn. St.

450; Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 561; Christ Church v. Philadelphia,

24 How. 302; Gilman v. Sheboygan. 2 Black, 513; Herrick 1:. Randolph, 13Vt.

531; East Saginaw Salt Manuf. Co. v. East Saginaw, 19 Mich. 259; People 0.

Roper, 25 N. Y. 629.
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1 Mechanics and Traders Bank 11. Debolt, 1 Ohio, N. 8. 591 ; Toledo Bank 11.
Bond, ib. 6i:2: Knoop v. Piqua Bank, ib. 603 ; Milan and R. Plank Road Co. "·
Husted, 8 Ohio, N. 8. 578; Piscataqua. Bridge "· N.H. Bridge, 7 N.H. 69;
Brewster "· Hough, 10 N.H. 143; Backus "·Lebanon, 11 N.H. 24; Thorpe
v. R. & B. R.R. Co. 27 Vt. 140; Brainard v. Colchester, 31 Conn. 410; Mott".
Pennsylvania R.R. Co. 80 :Penn. St. 9; East Saginaw Salt Manuf. Co. v. East
Saginaw, 19 Mich. 259. See also the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Miller
in Washington University v. Rouse, 8 Wal. 441, in whieh the Chief Justk·e and
Justice Field concurred. Also Raleigh, &c, R.R. Co."· Rrill, 64 N.C. 155.
1 New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch, 164; Gordon v. Appeal Tax Court, 8 How.
133; Piqua Bank v. Knoop, 16 How. 369; Ohio Life and Trust Co. v. Debolt,
ib. 416; Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 831; Mechanics and Traders Bank v. Debolt,
18 How. 380; Mechanics and Traders Bank v. Thomas, ib. 884; McGi!e "·
Mathis, 4 Wal. 148; Home of the Friendlt>ss "· Rouse, 8 W al. 430; 'Va~hington
University"· Rouse, ib. 481. See also Atwater "· Woodbridge, 6 Conn. 228;
Osborne v. Humphrey, 7 Conn. 385; Parker"· Redfield, 10 Conn. 495; Landon
v. Litchfield, 11 Conn. 261 ; Herrick v. Rllndolph, 13 Vt. 525; Armington "·
Barnet, 15 Vt. 751; O'Donnell v. Bailey, 24 Miss. 886; St. Paul, &c., R.R. Co.
"· Parcher, 14 Min. 297.
1 Christ's Church "· Philadelphia, 24 How. 300; Brainard "· Colchester, 31
Conn. 410. See also Commonwealth "· Bird, 12 Mass. 442; Dole v. The Governor, 3 Stew. 387. If a.n exemption from taxation exists in any case, it must
be 'the result of a deliberat-e intentio!J. to relinquish this prerogative of sovereignty, distinctly manifested. Easton Bank "· Commonwealth. 10 Pt>nn. St.
450; Providence Bank "· Billings, 4 Pet. 561 ; Christ Church v. Phlladelphia,
24 How. 302; Oilman"· Sheboygan, 2 Black, 513; Herrick v. Randolph, liS Vt.
531; East Saginaw Salt Manuf. Co. v. East Saginaw, 19 Mich. 259; People "·
Roper, 25 N.Y. 629.
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It must be conceded, under the authorities, that the State may
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grant exclusive franchises,—like the right to construct the only

* 281

railroad which shall be built between certain termini ; or the only

bridge which shall be permitted over a river between speciﬁed

limits; or to own the only ferry which shall be allowed at a certain

point,‘—but the grant of an exclusive privilege will not prevent

the legislature from exercising the power of eminent domain in

respect thereto. Franchises, like every other thing of value, and

in the nature of property, within the State, are subject to this

power, and any of their incidents may be taken away, or themselves

altogether annihilated by means of its exercise.” And it is believed

that an express agreement in the charter, that the power of

eminent domain should not be so exercised as to impair or affect

the franchise granted, if not void as an agreement beyond the

power of the legislature to make, must be considered as only a

valuable portion of the privilege secured by the grant, and as such

liable to be appropriated under the power of eminent

domain. The exclusiveness " of the grant, and the agree- [* 282]

ment against interference with it, if valid, constitute

elements in its value to be taken into account in assessing com-

pensation ; but appropriating the franchise in such a case no more

violates the obligation of the contract than does the appropriation
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of land which the State has granted under an express or implied

agreement for quiet enjoyment by the grantee, but which never-

theless may be taken when the public need requires. , All grants

are subject to this implied condition; and it may well be worthy of

inquiry, whether the agreement that a franchise granted shall not

afterwards be appropriated can have any other or greater force

than words which would make it an exclusive franchise, but

which, notwithstanding, would not preclude a subsequent grant

on making compensation.” The words of the grant are as much

1 ‘Vest River Bridge C0. v. Dix, 16 Vt. 446, and 6 How. 507; Binghampton

Bridge Case, 3 VVal. 51; Shorter v. Smith, 9 Geo. 529; Piscataqua Bridge v.

N. H. Bridge, 7 N. H. 35; Boston Water Power Co. v. Boston and \V0rcester

R.R. C0. 23 Pick. 360; Boston and Lowell R.R. v. Salem and L0well_R.R.

2 Gray, 9; Cost-ar v. Brush, 25 \Vend. 628; California Telegraph Co. v. Alta

Telegraph C0. '22 Cal. 398.

’ Matter of Kerr, 42 Barb. 119; Endﬁeld Toll Bridge Co. v. Hartford and

N. H. R.R. Co. 17 Conn. 40, 454; \Vest River Bridge C0. v. Dix, 16 Vt. 446,

and G How. 507.

‘ Mr. Greenleaf, in a note to his edition of Cruise on Real Property, Vol. H.
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It must be conceded, under the authorities, that the State may
grant exclusive franchises,- like the right to construct the only
railroad which shall be built between certain termini ; or the only
bridge which shall be permitted over a river between specified
limits ; or to own the only ferry which shall be allowed at a certain
point,1 - but the grant of an exclusive privilege will not prevent
the legislature from exercising the power of eminent domain in
respect thereto. Franchises, like every other thing of value, and
in the nature of property, within the State, are subject to this
power, and any of their incidents may be taken away, or themselves
altogether annihilated by means of its exercise.2 And it is believed
that an express agreement in the charter, that the power of
eminent domain should not be so exercised as to impair or affect
the franchise granted, if not void as an agreement beyond the
power of the legislature to make, must be considered as only a
valuable portion of the privilege secured by the grant, and as such
liable to be appropriated under the power of eminent
domain. The exclusiveness • of the grant, and the agree- [* 282]
ment against interference with it, if valid, constitute
elements in its value to be taken into account in assessing compensation ; but appropriating the franchise in such a case no more
violates the obligation of the contract than does the appropriatio11
of land which the State has granted under an express or implied
agreement for quiet enjoyment by the grantee, but which uevertheless may be taken when the public need requires . . All grants
are subject to this implied condition ; and it may well be worthy of
inquiry, whether the agreement that a franchise granted shall not
afterwards be appropriated can have any other or greater force
than words which would make it an exclusive franchise, but
which, notwithstanding, would not preclude a subsequent grant
on making compensation.8 The words of the grant are as much
1 West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 16 Vt. 446, and 6 How. 507; Binghampton
Bridge Case, 3 Wal. 51; Shorter v. Smith, 9 Geo. 529; Piscataqua Bridge v.
N.H. Bridge, 7 N.H. 35; Boston ·water Power Co. v. Boston and Worcester
R.R. Co. 23 Pick. 360; Boston and Lowell R.R. v. Salem and Lowell R.R.
2 Gray, 9 ; Costar "· Brush, 25 Wend. 628; California Telegraph Co.
Alta
Telegraph Co. 22 Cal. 398.
1 :Matter of Kerr, 42 Barb. 119; Endfield Toll Bridge Co. l). Hartford and
N.H. R.R. Co. 17 Conn. 40, 454; West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 16 Vt. 446,
and 6 How. 507.
3 Mr. Greenleaf, in a note to his edition of Cruise on Real Property, Vol. II.

v:
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in the way of the grant of a conﬂicting franchise in the one case

as in the other.

It has also been intimated in a very able opinion that the

[* 283] *‘ police power of the State could not be alienated even by

express grant} And this opinion is supported by those

p. 67, says upon this subject: “ In regard to the position that the grant of the

franchise of a ferry, bridge, turnpike, or railroad, is in its nature exclusive, so

that the State cannot interfere with it by the creation of another similar franchise,

in the way of the grant of a conflicting franchise in the one case
as in the other.
It has also been intimated in a very able opinion that the
[* 283] *police power of the State could not be alienated even by
express grant.1 And this opinion is supported by those

tending materially to impair its value, it is with great deference submitted that

an important distinction should be observed between those powers of government

which are essential attributes of sovereignty, indispensable to be always pre-

served in full vigor, such as the power to create revenues for the public purposes,

to provide for the common defence, to provide safe and convenient ways for the

public necessity and convenience, and to take private property for public uses,

and the like, and those powers which are not thus essential, such as the power to

alienate the lands and other property of the State, and to make contracts of

service, and of purchase and sale, or the like. Powers of the former class are

essential to the constitution of society, as without them no political community

can well exist; and necessity requires that they should continue unimpaired.

They are intrusted to the legislature to be exercised, not to be battered away;

and it is indispensable that each legislature should assemble with the same
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measure of sovereign power which was held by its predecessors. Any act of the

legislature disabling itself from the future exercise of powers intrusted to it for

the public good must be void, being in effect a. covenant to desert its paramount

duty to the whole people. It is therefore deemed not competent for a legislature

to covenant that it will not, under any circumstances, open another avenue for

the public travel within certain limits, or in a certain term of time; such cov-

enant being an alienation of sovereign powers, and a \n'olation of public duty.”

See also Redﬁeld on Railways (3d ed.), Vol. I. p. 258. That the intention to

relinquish the right of eminent domain is not to be presumed in any legislative

grant, see People v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 32 Barb. 113; Illinois and

Michigan Canal v. Chicago and Rock Island Railroad Co. 14 Ill. 321.

‘ “ We think the power of the legislature to control existing railways in this

respect may be found in the general control over the police of the country, which

resides in the law-making power in all free States, and which is, by the ﬁfth arti-

cle of the Bill of Rights in this State, expressly declared to reside perpetually

and inalienably in the legislature, which is, perhaps, no more than the enuncia-

tion of a general principle applicable to all free states, and which cannot there-

fore be violated so as to deprive the legislature of the power, even by express

grant, to any mere public or private corporation. And when the regulation of

the police of a city or town, by general ordinances, is given to such cities or

towns, and the regulation of their own internal police is given to railroads, to be

carried into effect by their by-laws and other regulations, it is, of course, always,

in all such cases, subject to the superior control of the legislature. ‘ That is a

responsibility which legislatures cannot divest themselves of, if they would."

Thorpe v. R. & B. R.R. C0. 27 Vt. 149, per Redﬁeld, Ch. J. See also Indian-
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p. 67, says upon this :~ubject: "In regard to the position that the grant of the
franchise of a ferry, bridge, turnpike, or railroad, is in its nature exclusive, so
that the State cannot interfere with it by the creation of another similar franchise,
tending materially to impair its value, it is with great deference submitted that
an important distinction should be observed between those powers of government
which are essential attributes of sovereignty, indispensable to be always preserved in full vigor, such as the power to create revenues for the public purposes,
to provide for the common defence, to provide safe and convenient ways for the
public necessity and convenience, and to take private property for public uses,
and the like, and those powers which are not thus essential, such as the power to
alienate the lands and other property of the State, and to make contracts of
service, and of purchase and sale, or the like. Powers of the former class are
essential to the constitution of society, as without them no political community
can well exist; and necessity requires that they should continue unimpaired.
They are intrusted to the legislature to be exercised, not to be bartered away;
and it is indispensable that each legislature should assemble with the same
measure of sovereign power which was held by its predecessors. Any act of the
legislature disabling itself from the future exercise of powers intrusted to it for
the public good must be void, being in effect a covenant to desert its paramount
duty to th~ whole people. It is therefore deemed not competent for a legislature
to covenant that it will not, under any circumstances, open another avenue for
the public travel within certain limit11, or in a certain term of time; such covenant being an alienation of sovereign powers, and a violation of public duty."
See also Redfiflld on Railways (3d ed.), Vol. I. p. 258. That the intention to
relinquish the right of eminent domain is not to be presumed in any legislative
grant, see People v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 32 Barb. 113 i lllinois and
Michigan Canal v. Chicago and Rock Island Railroad Co. 14 Ill. 321.
1 "We think the power of the legislature to control existing railways in this
respect may be found in the general control over the police of the country, which
resides in the law-making power in all free States, and which is, by the fifi.h article of the Bill of Rights in this State, expressly declared to reside perpetually
and inalienably in the legislature, which is, perhaps, no more than the enunciation of a general principle applicable to all free states, and which cannot therefore be violated so as to deprive the legislature of the power, even by express
grant, to any were public or private corporation. And when the regulation of
the police of a city or town, by general ordinances, is given to such cities or
towns, and the regulation of their own internal police is given to railroads, to be
carried into effect by their by-laws and other regulations, it is, of course, always,
in all such cases, subject to the superior control of the legislature. That is a
responsibility which legislatures cannot divest themselves of, if they would."
Thorpe v. R. & B. R.R. Co. 27 Vt. 149, per Redfield, Ch. J. See also Indian-
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cases where it has been held that licenses to make use of property
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in certain modes may be revoked by the State, notwithstanding they

may be connected with grants and based upon a consideration}

But this subject we shall recur to hereafter.

It would seem, therefore, to be the prevailing opinion, and one

based upon sound reason, that the State could not barter away,

or in any manner abridge or weaken, any of those essential powers

which are inherent in all governments, and the existence of which

in full vigor is important to the well-being of organized society;

and that any contracts to that end, being without authority, cannot

be enforced under the provision of the national Constitution now

under consideration. If the tax cases are to be regarded as an

exception to this statement, the exception is perhaps to be consid-

ered a nominal rather than a real one, since taxation is for the

purpose of providing the State a revenue, and the State laws

which have been enforced as contracts in these cases have

been supposed to be based upon consideration, " by which ['* 284]

the State receives the beneﬁt which would have accrued

from an exercise of the relinquished power in the ordinary mode.

We have said in another place that citizens have no vested right

in the existing general laws of the State which can preclude their

amendment or repeal, and that there is no implied promise on
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the part of the State to protect its citizens against incidental

injury occasioned by changes in the law. Nevertheless there may

be laws which amount to propositions on the part of the State,

which, if accepted by individuals, will become binding contracts.

Of this class are perhaps to be considered bounty laws, by which

the State promises the payment of a gratuity to any one who will

do any particular act supposed to be for the State interest. Un-

apolis, &c., R.R. Co. v. Kercheval, 16 Ind. 84; Ohio, &c., R.R. Co. v. M‘Clel-

land, 25 Ill. 140. See State v. Noyes, 47 Me. 189, on the same subject.

‘ See, upon this subject, Brick Presbyterian Church v. Mayor, &c., of New

York, 5 Cow. 538; Vanderbilt v. Adams, 7 Cow. 349; Him v. State, 1 Ohio,

s. 15; Calder v. Kurby, 5 Gray, 597. Whether a State, after granting licenses

to sell liquors for which a fee is received, can revoke them by a general law for-

bidding sales, is in dispute upon the authorities. See Freleigh v. State, 8 Mo.

606; State v. Sterling, ib. 697; State v. Hawthom, 9 Mo. 389; State v. Phalen,

3 Hart. 441; Calder v. Kurby, 5 Gray, 597; Adams v. Hackct, 7 Post. 294;

Metropolitan Board of Excise v. Barrie, 34 N. Y. 657. If it has the power, it

would seem an act of bad faith to exercise it, without refunding the money

received for the license. Hirn v. State, 1 Ohio, N. s. 21.
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cases where it has been held that licenses to make use of property
in certain modes may be revoked by the State, notwithstanding they
may be connected with grants and based upon a consideration.l
But this subject we shall recur to hereafter.
It would seem, therefore, to be the prevailing opinion, and one
based upon sound reason, that the State could not barter away,
or in any manner abridge or weaken, any of those essential powers
which are inherent in all governments, and the existence of which
in full vigor is important to the well-being of organized society ;
and that any contracts to that end, being without authority, cannot
be enforced under the provision of the national Constitution now
under consideration. If the tax cases are to be regarded as an
exception to this statement, the exception is perhaps to be considered a nominal rather than a real one, since taxation is for the
purpose of providing the State a revenue, and the State laws
which have been enforced as contracts in these cases have
been supposed to be based npon consideration, • by which [• 284]
the State receives the benefit which would have accrued
from an exercise of the relinquished power in the ordinary mode.
We have said in another place that citizens have no vested right
in the existing general laws of the State which can preclude their
amendment or repeal, and that there is no implied promise on
the part of the State to protect its citizens against incidental
injury occasiopcd by changes in the law. Nevertheless there may
be laws which amount to propositions on the part of the State,
which, if accepted by individuals, will become binding contracts.
Of this class are perhaps to be considered bounty laws, by which
the State promises the payment of a gratuity to any one who will
do any particular act supposed to be for the State interest. Unapolis, &c., R.R. Co. "· Kercheval, 16 Ind. 84; Ohio, &c., R.R. Co. v. M'Cielland, 25 TIL 140. See State v. Noyes, 47 Me. 189, on the same subject.
1 See, upon this subject, Brick Presbyterian Church v. Mayor, &c., of New
York, 5 Cow. 538; Vanderbilt tt. Adams, 7 Cow. 849; Him "· State, 1 Ohio,.
N. s. 15; Calder v. Kurby, 5 Gray, 597. Whether a State, after granting licenses
to sell liquors for which a fee is received, can revoke them by a general law forbidding sales, i11 in dispute upon the authorities. See Freleigh "· State, 8 Mo.
606 ; State v. Sterling, ib. 697 ; State v. Hawthorn, 9 Mo. 889; State v. Phalen,
3 Harr. 441; Calder v. Kurby, 6 Gray, 597; Adams v. Hackct, 7 Fost. 294;
:Metropolitan Board of Excise "· Barrie, 3-! N.Y. 657. If it has the power, it
would seem an act of bad faith to exercise it, without refunding the money
received for the license. Hirn v. State, 1 Ohio, N. s. 21.
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when the proposition has been accepted by tl1e performance of the

act before the law is repealed, the contract would seem to be com-

plete, and the promised gratuity becomes a legal debt? And

where a State was owner of the stock of a bank, and by the law its

bills and notes were to be received in payment of all debts due to

the State, it was properly held that this law constituted a contract

with those who should receive the bills before its repeal, and that

a repeal of the law could not deprive these holders of the right

which it assured. Such a law, with the acceptance of the bills

under it, “comes within the deﬁnition of a contract. It is a con-

tract founded upon a good and valuable consideration,—— a consid-

eration beneﬁcial to the State, as its proﬁts are increased by

sustaining the credit, and consequently extending the circulation

of the paper of the bank.”3

That laws permitting the dissolution of the contract of marriage

are not within the intention of the clause of the Constitution under

discussion seems to be the prevailing Opllll0l1.4 It has been inti-

mated, however, that, so far as property rights are concerned, the

contract must stand on the same footing as any other, and that a

law passed after the marriage, vesting the property in the wife for
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her sole use, would be void, as impairing the obligation of

[* 285] contracts.5 * But certainly there is no such contract em-

braced in the marriage as would prevent the legislature

changing the law, and vesting in the wife solely all property

which she should acquire thereafter; and if the property had

already become vested in the husband, it would be protected in

him, against legislative transfer to the wife, on other grounds than

the one here indicated.

“ The obligation of a contract,” it is said, “ consists in its bind-

‘ Christ Church v. Philadelphia, 24 How. 300; East Saginaw Salt Manuf. Co.

v. East Saginaw, 19 Mich. 259.

' People v. Auditor-General, 9 Mich. 327. See Montgomery v. Kasson, 16

Cal. 189; Adams Q. Palmer, 51 Me. 480.

‘ \VoodrulI' v. Trapnall, 10 How. 190. See Winter v. Jones, 10 Geo. 190.;

Furman v. Nichol, 8 \Val. 44.

‘ Per Marshall, Ch. J ., Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 \Vheat. 629;

Maguire v. Maguire, 7 Dana, 183; Clark v. Clark, 10 N. H. 385; Cronise v.

Cronise, 54 Penn. St. 255; Carson v. Carson, 40 Miss._ 349; Adams v. Palmer,

51 Me. 480.

° Holmes v. Holmes, 4 Barb. 295.
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questionably the State may repeal such an act at any time ;1 but

questionably the State may repeal such an act at any time; 1 but
when the proposition has been accepted by the performance of the
act before the law is repealed, the contract would seem to be complete, and the promised gratuity becomes a legal debt.2 And
where a State was owner of the stock of a bank, and by the law its
bills and notes were to be received in payment of all debts due to
the State, it was properly held that this law constituted a contract
with those who should receive the bills before its repeal, and that
a repeal of the law could not deprive these holders of the right
which it assured. Such a law, with the acceptance of the bills
under it, "comes within the definition of a contract. It is a contract founded upon a good and vahtable consideration,- a consideration beneficial to the State, as its profits are increased by
sustaining ihe credit, and consequently extending the circulation
of the paper of the bank."8
That laws permitting the dissolution of the contract of marriage
are not within the intention of the clause of the Constitution under
discussion seems to be the prevailing opinion.4 It has been intimated, however, that, so far as property rights are concerned, the
contract must stand on the same footing as any other, and that a
law passed after the marriage, vesting the property in the wife for
her sole use, would be void, as impairing the obligation of
[• 285] coutracts.5 • But certainly there is no such contract em·
braced in the marriage as would prevent the legislature
changing the law, and vesting in the wife solely all property
which she should acquire thereafter; and if the property had
already become ves~d in the husband, it would be protected in
him, against legislative transfer to the wife, on other grounds than
the one here indicated.
" Tlte obligation of a contract," it is said, "consists in its bind1 Christ Church v. Philadelphia, 24 How. 800 ; East Saginaw Salt Manu f. Co.
v. East Saginaw, 19 Mich. 259.
1 People v. Auditor-General, 9 Mich. 327.
See Montgomery v. Kasson, 16
Cal. 189; Adams ~- Palmer, 511\Ie. 480.
1 Woodruff v. Trapnall, 10 How. 190.
See Winter "· Jones, 10 Geo. 190;
Furman v. Nichol, 8 'Val. 44.
• P er · Mm·shall, Ch. J ., Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 629;
Maguire v. Maguire, 7 Dana, 183; Clark v. Clark, 10 N.H. 385; Cronise v.
Cronise, 54 Penn. St. 255; C!lrson "· Carson, 40 1\Iiss .. 349 ; Adams v. Palmer,
51 Me. 480.
6 Holmes v. Holmes, 4 Barb. 295.
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ing force on the party who makes it. This depends upon the laws
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in existence when it is made; these are necessarily referred to

in all contracts, and forming a part of them as the measure of the

obligation to perform them by the one party, and the right

acquired by the other. There can be no other standard by which

to ascertain the extent of either, than that which the terms of the

contract indicate, according to their settled legal meaning; when

it becomes consummated, the law deﬁnes the duty and the right,

compels one party to perform the thing contracted for, and gives

the other a right to enforce the performance by the remedies then

in force. If any subsequent law affect to diminish the duty, or to

impair the right, it necessarilyibears on the obligation of the con-

tract, in favor of one party, to the injury of the other; hence any

law which, in its operations, amounts to a denial_or obstruction of

the rights accruing by a contract, though professing to act only on

the remedy, is directly obnoxious to the prohibition of the Consti-

tution.” 1 “ It is the civil obligation of contracts which [the Con-

stitution] is designed to reach; that is, the obligation

which is recognized "‘ by, and results from, the law of the [* 286]

State in which it is made. If, therefore, a contract when

made is by the law of the place declared to be illegal, or deemed

to be a nullity, or a nude pact, it has no civil obligation, because
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the law, in such cases, forbids its having any binding eﬁicacy or

force. It confers no legal right on the one party and no corre-

spondent legal duty on the other. There is no means allowed or

recognized to enforce it; for the maxim is ex nudo pat-to non oritur

' McCra(-ken v. Hayward, 2 How. 612. “ The obligation of a contract . . .

is the law which binds the parties to perform their agreement. The law, then,

which has this binding obligation, must govern and control the contract, in every

shape in which it is intended to bear upon it, whether it affects its validity, con-

struction, or discharge. It is, then, the municipal law of the State, whether that

be written or unwritten, which is emphatically the law of the contract made

within the State, and must govern it throughout, whenever its perfonnance is

sought to be enforced.” Washington, J., in Ogden v. Saunders, 1'2 Wheat. 259.

“ As I understand it, the law of the contract forms its obligation." Thompson,

J., ib. 302. “ The obligation of the contract consists in the power and efiicacy

of the law which applies to, and enforces performance of, the contract, or the

ing force on the party who makes it. This depends upon the laws
in existence when it is made; these are necessarily referred to
in all contracts, and forming a part of them as the measure of the
obligation to perform them by the one party, and the right
acquired by the other. There can be no other standard by which
to ascertain the extent of either, than that which the terms of the
contract indicate, according to their settled legal meaning; when
it becomes consummated, the law defines the duty and the right,
compels one party to perform the thii1g contracted for, and gives
the other a right to enforce the performance by the remedies then
in force. If any subsequent law affect to diminish the duty, or to
impair the right, it necessarily 'bears on the obligation of the contract, in favor of one party, to the injury of the other; hence any
law which, in its operations, amounts to a denial. or obstruction of
the rights accruing by a contract, though professing to act ouly on
the remedy, is directly obnoxious to the prohibition of the Constitution." 1 "It is the civil obligation of contracts which [the Constitution] is designed to reach; that is, the obligation
which is recognized • by, and results from, the law of the [* 286]
State in which it is made. If, therefore, a contract when
made is by the law of the place declared to be illegal, or deemed
to be a nullity, or a nude pact, it has no civil obligation, because
the law, in such cases, forbids its hb.ving any bindi.ng efficacy or
force. It confers no legal right on the one party and uo con·espondcnt legal duty on the other. There is no means allowed or
recognized to enforce it; for the maxim is ex nudo pacto non oritur

payment of an equivalent for non-performance. The obligation does not lIlllt'l‘G

and subsist in the contract itself, proprio viyore, but in the law applicable to the

contract. This is the sense, I think, in which the Constitution uses the term

‘ obligation)” Trimble, J., ib. 318. And see Van Baumbach v. Bade, 9 \Vis.

577; Johnson v. Higgins, 3 Met. (Ky.) 566.

[303]

1 l\IcCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 612.
"The obligation of a contract . • .
is the law which binds the parties to perform their agreement. The law, then,
which has thi~ binding obligation, must govern and control the contract, in e\·ery
shape in which it is intended to bear upon it, 'vhethcr it affects ib validity, construction, or discharge. It is, then, the municipal law of the State, whether that
be written or unwritten, which is emphatically the law of the contract made
within the State, and must govern it throughout, whenever its performance is
sought to be enforced." Waah1:ngton, J., in Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 259.
"As I understand it, the law of the contract forms its obligation." Thompson,
J., ib. 30:!. "The obligation of the contrad consists in the power and effieacy
of the law which applic~ to, and enforces performance of, the contract, or the
payment of an equivalent for non-perforn1ance. The obligation does not inh\·re
and subsist in the contract itself, proprio vigore, but in the law applicable to the
contract. This is the sense, I think, in which the Con~titution uses the term
'obligation.'" Trimble, J., ib. 318. And see Van Baumbach "· Bade, 9 'Vis.
577; Johnson"· Higgins, 3 Met. (Ky.) 566.
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actio. But when it does not fall within the predicament of being

[CH. IX.

either illegal or void, its obligatory force is coextensive with its

stipulations.” 1

Such being the obligation of a contract, it is obvious that the

rights of the parties in respect to it are liable to be affected in

many ways by changes in the laws, which it could not have been

the intention of the constitutional provision to preclude. “ There

are few laws which concern the general police of a State, or the

government of its citizens, in their intercourse with each other or

with strangers, which may not in some way or other affect the

contracts which they have entered into or may thereafter form.

For what are laws of evidence, or which concern remedies, frauds,

and perjuries, laws of registration, and those which aifect land-

lord and tenant, sales at auction, acts of limitation, and those

which limit the fees of professional men, and the charges of tav-

ern-keepers, and a multitude of others which crowd the codes of

every State, but laws which affect the validity, construction, or

duration, or discharge of contracts.”” But the changes in these

laws are not regarded as necessarily affecting the obligation of

contracts. Whatever belongs merely to the remedy may be

altered according to the will of the State, provided the alteration

does not impair the obligation of the contract;3 and it does not
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impair it, provided it leaves the parties a substantial remedy,

according to the course of justice as it existed at the time the con-

tract was made.‘

[“‘287] ’*It has accordingly been held that laws changing

' Story on Const. § 1380.

’ Washington, J ., in Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 259.

3 Bronson 0. Kinzie, 1 How. 316, per Taney, Ch. J.

‘ Stocking v. Hunt, 3 Denio, 274; Van Baumbach v. Bade, 9 \Vis. 578;

Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 316; McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 608; Butler v.

Palmer, 1 Hill, 324; Van Renselaer v. Snyder, 9 Barb. 302, and'13 N. Y. 299;

Conkey v. Hart, 14 N. Y. 22; Guild v. Rogers, B Barb. 502; Story v. Furman,

25 N. Y. 214; Coriell v. Ham. 4 Greene (Iowa), 455; Heyward v. Judd, 4

Minn. 483; Swift v. Fletcher, 6 Minn. 550; Maynes v. Moor, 16 Ind. 116; Smith

v. Packard, 12 ‘Vie. 371; Grosvenor v. Chesley, 48 Me. 369; Van Renselaer v.

Ball, 19 N. Y. 100; Van Renselaer v. Hays, ib. 68; Litchﬁeld v. McComber,

actio. But when it does not fall within the predicament of being
either illegal or void, its obligatory force is coextensive with its
stipulations." I
Such being the obligation of a contract, it is obvious that the
rights of the parties in respect to it are liable to be affected in
many ways by changes in the laws, which it could not have been
the intention of the constitutional provision to preclude. " There
are few laws which concern the general police of a State, or the
government of its citizens, in their intercourse with each other or
with strangers, which may not in some way or other affect the
contracts which they have entered into or may thereafter form.
For what are laws of evidence, or which concern remedies, frauds,
and perjuries, laws of registration, and those which affect landlord and tenantJ sales at auction, acts of limitation, and those
which limit the fees of professional men, and the charges of tavern-keepers, and a multitude of others which crowd the codes of
every State, but laws which affect the validity, construction, or
duration, or discharge of contracts." 2 But the changes in these
laws are not regarded as necessarily affecting the obligation of
contracts. Whatever belongs merely to the remedy may be
altered according to the will of the State, provided the alteration
does not impair the obligation of the contract ; 3 and it does not
impair it, provided it leaves the parties a substantial remedy,
according to the course of justice as it existed at the time the contract was made.4
[• 287]
• It has accordingly been held that laws changing

42 Barb. 288; Paschal v. Perez, 7 Texas, 365; Auld v. Butcher, 2 Kansas, 155;

Kenyon v. Stewart, 44 Penn. St. 179; Clark v. Martin, 49 Penn. St. 299; Rison

v. Farr, 24 Ark. 161; Sanders v. Hillsborough Insurance Co. 44 N. H. 238;

Huntzinger v. Brock, 3 Grant’s Cases, 243; Mechanics, &c., Bank Appeal, 31

Conn. 63.

w M???‘ l’ ‘“ ' Li’ * _
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Story on Const. § 1380.
Wa8hington, J., in Ogden "· Saunder11, 12 Wheat. 259.
3 Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 316, per Taney, Ch. J.
• Stocking "· Hunt, 3 Denio, 274; Van Baumbarh "· Bade, 9 Wis. 578;
Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 316; McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 608; Butler v.
Palmer, 1 Hill, 324; Van Renselaer v. Snyder, 9 Barb. 302, and'13 N.Y. 299;
Conkey"· Hart, 14 N.Y. 22; Guild 11. Rogers, 8 Barb. 502; Story v. Furman,
25 N.Y. 214; Coriell"· Ham, 4 Greene (Iowa), 455; Heyward 11. Judrl, 4
Minn. 483; Swift o. Fletcher, 6 Minn. 550; Maynes v. Moor, 16 Ind. 116; Smith
"·Packard, 12 Wi~. 3il; Grosvenor v. Chesley, 48 l\le. 369; Van Rcnselaer o.
Ball, 19 N. Y. 100; Van Renselaer v. Hays, ib. 68; Litchfield "· McComber,
42 Barb. 288; Paschal"· Per€'z, 7 Texas, 365; Auld v. Butcher, 2 Kansas, 155;
Kenyon"· Stewart, 44 Penn. St. 179; Clark"· Martin, 49 Penn. St. 299; Rison
"· Farr, 24 Ark. 161; Sanders v. Hillsborough Insurance Co. 44 N. H. 288;
Huntzinger v. Brock, 3 Grant's Cases, 243; Mechanics, &c., Bank Appeal, 31
Conn. 63.
1

1
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remedies for the enforcement of legal contracts will be valid,
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even though the new remedy be less convenient than the old,

or less prompt and speedy}

“ Without impairing the obligation of the contract, the remedy

may certainly be modiﬁed" as the wisdom of the nation shall

direct.“ To take a strong instance; although the law at the

time the contract is made permits the creditor to take the body of

his debtor in execution, there can be no doubt of the right

to abolish all laws for this purpose, leaving the creditor to his

remedy against property alone. “ Conﬁnement of the debtor may

be a punishment for not performing his contract, or may be

allowed as a means of inducing him to perform it. But the State

may refuse to inﬂict this punishment, or may withhold this means,

and leave the contract in full force. Imprisonment is no part of

the contract, and simply to release the prisoner does not impair

the obligation.” Nor is there any constitutional objection to

such a modiﬁcation of those laws which exempt certain portions

of a debtor’s property from execution as shall increase the

exemptions, nor to the modiﬁcations being made applicable to

contracts previously entered into. The State “may, if it thinks

proper, direct that the necessary implements of agriculture, or the
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tools of the mechanic, or articles of necessity in household

furniture, shall, like wearing apparel, not be liable to execution

on judgments. Regulations of this description have always been

considered, in every civilized community, as properly belonging to

the remedy, to be exercised or not, by every sovereignty,

according to its own views of policy and humanity.

It ‘must reside in every State to enable it to secure its [*"288]

‘ Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 270; Beers v. Haughton, 9 Pet. 859; Bum-

gardner v. Circuit Court, 4 Mo. 50; Tarpley v. Hamer, 17 Miss. 310; Quack-

enbush v. Danks, 1 Denio, 128, 3 Denio, 594, and 1 N. Y. 129; Bronson v.

Newberry, 2 Doug. Mich. 38; Rockwell 0. Hubbell‘s Adm’rs, ib. 197; Evans v.

Montgomery, 4 W. & S. 218; Holloway 0. Sherman, 12 Iowa, 282; Sprecker

v. Wakeley, 11 Wis. 432; Smith v. Packard, 12 Wis. 371; Morse o. Goold, 11

N. Y. 281; Penrose v. Erie Canal Co. 56 Penn. St. 46.

' Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, per Marshall, Ch. J . A statute

allowing the defence of want of consideration in a sealed instrument previously

given does not violate the obligation of contracts. Williams v. Haines, 27 Iowa,

251.

‘ Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, per Marshall, Ch. J.; Mason v.

remedies for the enforcement of legal contracts will be valid,
even though the new remedy be less convenient than the old,
or less prompt and speedy.I
" Without impairing the obligation of the contract, the remedy
may certainly be modified as the wisdom of the nation shall
direct." 2 To take a strong instance; although the law at the
time the contract is made permits the creditor to take the body of
his debtor in execution, there can be no doubt of the right
to abolish all laws for this purpose, leaving the creditor to his
:remedy against property alone. " Confinement of the debtor may
be a punishment for not performing his contract, or may be
allowed as a means of inducing him to perform it. But the State
may refuse to inflict this punishment, or may withhold this means,
and leave the contract in full force. Imprisonment is no part of
the contract, and simply to release the prisoner does not impair
the obligation." 8 Nor is there any constitutional objection to
such a modification of those laws which exempt certain portions
of a debtor's property from execution as shall increase the
exemptions, nor to the modifications being made applicable to
contracts previously entered into. The State "may, if it thinks
proper, direct that the necessary implements of agriculture, or the
tools of the mechanic, or articles of necessity in household
furniture, shall, like wearing apparel, not be liable to execution
on judgments. Regulations of this description have always been
considered, in every civilized community, as properly belonging to
the remedy, to be exercised or not, by every sovereignty,
according to its own views of policy and humanity.
It • must reside in every State to ena.bl~ it to secure its [• 288]

Haile, 12 Wheat. 370; Bronson v. Newberry, 2 Doug. (Mieh.) 38; Maxey v.

Loyal, 38 Geo. 540.

20 [ 305 ]

1 Ogden "· Saunders, 12 Wheat. 270; Beers "· Haughton, 9 Pet. 859; Bumgardner "· Circuit Court, 4 .Mo. 50; Ta.rpley "· Hamer, 17 Miss. 810; Quackenbush c. Danks, 1 Denio, 128, 8 Denio, 594, and 1 N. Y. 129; Bronson v.
Newberry, 2 Doug. .Mich. 38; Rockwell"· Hubbell's Adm'rs, ib. 197; Evans c.
Montgomery, 4 W. & S. 218; Holloway "· Sherman, 12 Iowa, 282; Sprecker
c. Wakeley, 11 Wis. 4S2; Smith v. Packard, 12 Wis. 371; .Morse c. Goold, 11
N.Y. 281; Penrose c. Erie Canal Co. 56 Penn. St. 46.
t Sturges "· Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, per Marshall, Cb. J.
A sta.tute
allowing the defence of want of consideration in a sealed instrument previously
given does not violate the obligation of contracts. Williams "· Haines, 27 Iowa,

251.

.

, Sturges "· Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, per Marshall, Ch. J. ; Mason c.
Haile, 12 Wheat. 370; Bronson "· Newberry, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 38; Maxey c.
Loyal, 38 Geo. 540.
20
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them in those pursuits which are necessary to the existence and

well-being of every eommunity.”1

And laws which change the rules of evidence relate tolthe

remedy only ; and while, as we have elsewhere shown, such laws

may, on general principles, be applied to existing causes of action,

so, too, it is plain that they are not precluded from such application

by the constitutional clause we are considering.” And it has

been held that the legislature may even take away a common-

law remedy altogether, without substituting any in its place,

if another and eﬂicient remedy remains. Thus, a law abolishing

distress for rent has been sustained as applicable to leases in force

at its passage ;3 and it was also held that an express stipulation

in the lease, that the lessor should have this remedy, would not

prevent the legislature from abolishing it, because this was a

subject concerning which it was not competent for the parties to

contract in such manner as to bind the hands of the State. In

the language of the court: “ If this is a subject on which parties

can contract, and if their contracts when made become by virtue

of the Constitution of the United States superior to the power of

the legislature, then it follows that whatever at any time exists as

part of the machinery for the administration of justice may be
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perpetuated, if parties choose so to agree. That this can scarcely

have been within the contemplation of the makers of the Consti-

' Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311, per Taney, Ch. J .; Rockwell v. Hubbell‘s

Adm’rs, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 197; Quackenbush v. Danks, 1 Denio, 128, 3 Denio,

594, and 1 N. Y. 129; Morse v. Goold, 11 N. Y. 281; Sprecker v. \Vakelcy, 11

VVis. 432; Cusic v. Douglas, 3 Kansas, 123; Maxey v. Loyal, 38 Geo. 531;

Hardiman v. Downer, 39 Geo. 425. The increase in exemptions, however, must

not go to the extent to render the remedy nugatory or impracticable. Stephen-

son v. Osborne, 41 Miss. 119. It has been decided that a homestead exemption

may be made applicable to previously existing contracts. Hill v. Kessler, 63

N. C. 437 ; Hardiman v. Downer, 39 Geo. 425. “ Statutes pertaining to the rem-

edy are merely such as relate to the course and form of proceedings, but do not

affect the substance of a judgment when pronounced.” Per Merrick, Ch. J ., in

citizens from unjust and harassing litigation, and to protect
them in those pursuits which are necessary to the existence and
well-being of every community." 1
And laws which change the rules of evidence relate to the
remedy only ; and while, as we have elsewhere shown, such laws
may, on general principles, be applied to existing causes of action,
so, too, it is plain that they are not precluded from such application
by the constitutional clause we are considering.2 And it has
been held that the legislature may even take away a commonlaw remedy altogether, without substituting any in its place,
if another and efficient remedy remains. Thus, a law abolishing
distress for rent has been sustained as applicable to leases in force
at its passage ; 8 and it was also held that an express stipulation
in the lease, that the lessor should have this remedy, would not
prevent the legislature from abolishing it, because this was a
subject concerning which it was not competent for the parties to
contract in such manner as to bind the hands of the State. In
the language of the court : " If this is a subject on which parties
can contract, and if their contracts when made become by virtue
of the Constitution of the United States superior to the power of
the legislature, then it follows that whatever at any time exists as
part of the machinery for the administration of justice may be
perpetuated, if parties choose so to agree. That this can scarcely
have been within the contemplation of the makers of the Consti-

Morton v. Valentine, 15 La. An. 153.

' Neass v. Mercer, 15 Barb. 318. On this subject see the discussions in the

Federal courts; Sturges 0. Crowninshield, 4 \Vheat. 122; Ogden v. Saunders,

12 Wheat. 213; Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311; McCracken v. Hayward, 2

How. 608.

’ Van Renselaer v. Snyder, 9 Barb. 302, and 13 N. Y. 299; Guild v. Rogers,

8 Barb. 502; Conkey v. Hart, 14 N. Y. 22.

l
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Bronson"· Kinzie, 1 How. 311, per Taney, Ch. J.; Rockwell v. Hubbell's
Adm'rs, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 197; Quackenbush "· Danks, 1 Denio, 128, 3 Denio,
594, and 1 N.Y. 129; Morse v. Goold, 11 N.Y. 281; Sprecker v. Wakeley, 11
Wis. 432; Cusic t1. Douglas, 3 Kansas, 123; Maxey v. Loyal, 38 Gco. 531 ;
Hardiman v. Downer, 39 Geo. 425. The increase in exemptions, however, must
not go to the t!Xtent to render the remedy nugatory or impracticable. Stephenson v. Osbornl:', 41 Miss. 119. It bas been decided that a homestead exemption
may be made applicable to previou11ly existing contracts. Hill t1. Kessler, 63
N.C. 437 ; Hardiman "· Downer, 39 Geo. 425. " Statutes pertaining to the remedy are merely such as relate to the course and form of proceedings, but do not
affect the substance of a judgment when pronounced." Per Men·ick, Ch. J., in
Morton v. V alcntine, 15 La. An. 153.
1 Neass v. Mercer, 15 Barb. 318.
On this subject see the discussions in the
Federal courta i Sturt;es "· Crowninsbield, 4 'Vheat. 122 ; Ogden v. Saunders,
12 Wheat. 213; Bronson t1. Kinzie, 1 How. 311; McCracken v. Hayward, ~
How. 608.
, Van Renselaer "·Snyder, 9 Barb. 302, and 13 N.Y. 299 i Guild v. Rogers,
8 Barb. 502; Conkey v. Hart, 14 N. Y. 22.
1
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tution, and that if it prevail as law it will give rise to grave

inconveniences, is quite obvious. Every such stipulation is in its

CH. IX.]
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own nature conditional upon the lawful continuance of the

process. The State is no party to "‘ their contract. It is [* 289]

bound to afford adequate process for the enforcement of

rights; but it has not tied its own hands as to the modes by

which it will administer justice. Those from necessity belong to

the supreme power to prescribe ; and their continuance is not the

subject of -contract between private parties. In truth, it isnot at

all probable that the parties made their agreement with reference

to the possible abolition of distress for rent. The ﬁrst clause of

this special provision is, that the lessor may distrain, sue, re-enter,

or resort to any other legal remedy, and the second is, that in

cases of distress the lessee waives the exemption of certain

property from the process, which by law was exempted. This

waiver of exemption was undoubtedly the substantial thing which

the parties had in view ; but yet perhaps their language cannot be

conﬁned to this object, and it may therefore be proper to consider

the contract as if it had been their clear purpose to preserve their

legal remedy, even if the legislature should think ﬁt to abolish it.

In that aspect of it the contract was a subject over which they had

no control.” 1
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But a law which deprives a party of all legal remedy must

necessarily be void. “ If the legislature of the State were to

undertake to make alaw preventing the legal remedy upon a

contract lawfully made, and binding on the party to it, there is no

question that such legislature would, by such act, exceed its legiti-

mate powers. Such an act must necessarily impair the obligation

of the contract within the meaning of the Constitution.” This

has been held in regard to those cases in which it was sought to de-

prive certain classes of persons of the right to maintain suits, because

of their having participated in rebellion against the government.”

' Conkey v. Hart, 14 N. Y. 30; citing Handy v. Chatﬁeld, 23 \Vend. 35;

Mason o. Haile, 12 \Vheat. 370; Stocking v. Hunt, 3 Denio, 274; and Van Ren-

selaer v. Snyder, 13 N. Y. 299.

’ Call v. Hagger, 8 Mass. 430. See Griﬂin v. Wilcox, 21 Ind. 370; Penrose

v. Erie Canal Co. 56 Penn. St. 46. In Jackoway v. Denton, 25 Ark. 641, a

clause in the Constitution of Arkansas declaring all contracts for the sale or

purchase of slaves void was held invalid.

' Bison v. Farr, 24 Ark. 161; McFarland v. Butler, 8 Minn. 116; Jackson

\
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tution, and that if it prevail as law it will give rise to grave
inconveniences, is quite obvious. Every such stipulation is in its
own nature conditional upon the lawful continuance of the
process. The State is no party to • their contract. It is [* 289]
bound to afford adequate process for the enforcement of
rights ; but it has not tied its own hands as to the modes by
which it will administer justice. Those from necessity belong to
the supreme power to prescribe ; and their continuance is not the
subject of ·contract between private parties. In truth, it is "not at
all probable that the parties made their agreement with remrence
to the possible abolition of distress for rent. The first clause of
this special provision is, that the lessor may distrain, sue, re-enter,
or resort to any other legal remedy, and the second is, that in
cases of distress the lessee waives ~he exemption of certain
property from the process, which by law was exempted. This
waiver of exemption was undoubtedly the substantial thing which
the parties had in view; but yet perhaps their language cannot be
confined to this object, and it may therefore be proper to consider
the contract as if it had been their clear purpose to preserve their
legal remedy, even if the legislature should think fit to abolish it.
lu !hat aspect of it the contract was a subject over which they had
no control." 1
But a law which deprives a party of all legal remedy must
necessarily be void. " If the legislature of the State were to
undertake to make a law preventing the legal remedy upon a
contract lawfully made, and binding on the party to it, there is no
question that such legislature would, by such act, exceed its leiitimate powers. Such an act must necessarily impair the obligation
of the contl'act within the meaning of the Constitution." 2 This
has been held in regard to those cases in which it was sought to deprive certain classes of persons of the right to maintain suits, because
of their having participated in rebellion against the government.3
1 Conkey v. Hart, 14 N. Y. 30; citing Handy v. Chatfield, 23 Wend. 35;
Mason"· Haile, 12 Wheat. 370; Stocking v. Hunt, 3 Denio, 274; and Van Renselaer v. Snyder, 13 N . Y. 299.
' Call v. Bagger, 8 l\Iass. 430. See Griffin v. Wilcox, 21 Ind. 370; Penrose
v. Erie Canal Co. 66 Penn. St. 46. In Jackoway "· Denton, 25 Ark. 641, a
clause in the Constitution of Arkansas declaring all contracts for the sale or
purchase of slaves void was held invalid.
a Rison v. Farr, 24 Ark. 161 ; McFarland v. Butler, 8 Minn. 116; Jackson

[ 307]

" 28.9 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [cn. IX.

And where a statute does not leave a party a substantial remedy

according to the course of justice as it existed at the time the

• 28.9

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

(CH. IX •

contract was made, but shows upon its face an intention to clog,

hamper, or embarrass the proceedings to enforce the remedy, so as

to destroy it entirely, and thus impair the contract so far

[* 290] as it is in the ‘power of the legislature to do it, such

statute cannot be regarded as a mere regulation of the

remedy, and is void.1

And where a statute dividing a town and incorporating a new

one enacted that the new town should pay its proportion towards

the support of paupers then constituting a charge against the old

town, it was held that a subsequent statute exonerating the new

town from this liability was void as impairing the contract created

by the ﬁrst-mentioned statute.” And in any case the lawful repeal

of a statute cannot constitutionally be made to destroy contracts

which have been entered into under it, but being legal when made,

they remain valid notwithstanding the repeal.“ i

So where, by its terms, a contract provides for the payment of

money by one party to another, and, by the law then in force,

property would be liable to be seized, and sold on execution to the

highest bidder, to satisfy any judgment recovered on such contract,

a subsequent law, forbidding property from being sold on execution
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for less than two-thirds the valuation made by appraisers, pursuant

to the directions contained in the law, though professing to act

only on the remedy, amounts to a denial or obstruction of the

rights accruing by the contract, and is directly obnoxious to the

prohibition of the Constitution.‘ So a law which takes away from

mortgagees the right to possession under their mortgages until

after foreclosure is void, because depriving them of the right to the

v. Same, ib. 117. The case of Drehman v. Stitie, 8 Wal. 599, should be consid-

ered in connection with these.

‘ Oatman v. Bond, 15 Wis. 28.

' Bowdoinham v. Richmond, 6 Green]. 12.

' Tuolumne Redemption Co. v. Sedgwick, 15 Cal. 515; McCauley v. Brooks,

16 Cal. 11; Commonwealth v. New Bedford Bridge, 2 Gray, 339; State v.

Phalen, 3 Harr. 441 ; State v. Hawthorn, 9 Mo. 389.

‘ McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 608; Willard v. Longstreet, 2 Doug. (Mich.)

172; Rawley v. Hooker, 21 Ind. 144. So a law which, as to existing mortgages

foreclosable by sale, prohibits the sale for less than half the appraised value of

the land, is void for the same reason. Gantley‘s Lessee v. Ewing, 3 How. 707;

Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311.

[aos]

And where a statute does not leave a party a substantial remedy
according to the course of justice as it existed at the time the
contract was made, but shows upon its face an intention to clog,
hamper, or embarrass the proceedings to enforce the remedy, so as
to destroy it entirely, and thus impair the contract so far
[* 290] as it is in the • power of the legislature to do it, such
statute cannot· be regarded as a mere regulation of the
remedy, and is void.1
And where a statute dividing a town and incorporating a new
one enacted that the new town should pay its proportion towards
the support of paupers then constituting a charge against the old
town, it was held that a subsequent statute exonerating the new
town from this liability was void as impairing the contract created
by the first-mentioned statute.2 And in any case the lawful repeal
of a statute cannot constitutionally be made to destroy contracts
which have been entered into under it, but being legal when made,
they remain valid notwithstanding the repeal.3
·
So where, by its terms, a contract provides for the payment of
money by one party to another, and, by the law then in force,
property would be liable to be seized, and sold on execution to the
highest bidder, to satisfy any judgment recovered on such contract,
a subsequent law, forbidding property from being sold on execution
for less than two-thirds the valuation made by appraisers, pursuant
to the directions contained in tl1e law, though professing to act
only on the remedy, amounts to a denial or obstruction of the
rights accruing by the contract, and is directly obnoxious to the
prohibition of the Constitution.• So a law which takes away from
mortgagees the right to possession under their mortgages until
after foreclosure is void, because depriving them of the right to the
"· Same, ib. 117. The cue of Drehman "·Stifle, 8 Wal. b99, should be considered in conne~:tion with these.
1 Oatman "· Bond, 15 Wis. 28.
1 Bowdoinham v. Richmond, 6 Greenl. 12.
1 Tuolumne Redemption Co. v. Sedgwick, 15 Cal. 515; McCauley 11. Brooks,
16 Cal. 11; Commonwealth "· New Bedford Bridge, 2 Gray, 339; State "·
Phalen, 8 Harr. 441; State v. Hawthorn, 9 Mo. 889.
' McCracken"· Hayward, 2 How. 608; Willard 11. Longstreet, 2 Doug. (Mich.)
172; Rawley v. Hooker, 21 Ind. 144. So a law which, as to existing mortgages
foreclosable by sale, prohibits the sale for less than half the appraised value of
the land, is void for the same reason. GanUey's Lessee v. Ewing, 3 How. 707;
Bronson 11. Kinzie, 1 How. 811.
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rents and proﬁts, which was avaluable portion of the right secured
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by the contract. “ By this act the mortgagee is required to incur

the additional expense of foreclosure, before obtaining possession,

and is deprived of the right to add to his security, by the percep-

tion of the rents and proﬁts of the premises, during the time

required to accomplish this and the time of redemption, and during

that time the rents and proﬁts are given to another, who may or

may not appropriate them to the payment of the debt, as he

chooses, and the mortgagee in the * mean time is subjected [* 291]

to the risk, often considerable, of the depreciation in the

value of the security.” 1 So a law is void which extends the time for

the redemption of lands sold on execution, or for delinquent taxes,

after the sales have been made ; for in such a case the contract with

the purchaser, and for which he has paid his money, is, that he

shall have title at the time then provided by the law; and to

extend the time for redemption is to alter the substance of the

contract, as much as would be the extension of the time for pay-

ment of a promissory note." So a law which shortens the time for

redemption from a mortgage, after a foreclosure sale has taken

place, is void; the rights of the party being ﬁxed by the foreclosure

and the law then in force, and the mortgagor being entitled, under

the law, to possession of the laud until the time of redemption
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expires.“ And where by statute a purchaser of lands from the

‘ Mimdy v. Monroe, 1 Mich. 76; Blackwood v. Vanvleet, 11 Mich. 252. Com-

pare Dikeman v. Dikemau, 11 Paige, 484, and James v. Stull, 9 Barb. 482. In the

last case it was held that a statute shortening the notice to be given on foreclosure

of a mortgage under the power of sale, from twenty-four to twelve weeks, was

valid as atfecting the remedy only; and that a stipulation in a mortgage that on

default being made in payment the mortgagee might sell “ according to law,”

meant according to the law as it should be when sale was made. See also

Bathold v. Fox, 13 Minn. 501, in which it was decided that in the case of a mort-

gage given while the law allowed the mortgagee possession during the period

allowed for redemption after foreclosure, such law might be so changed as to take

rents and profits, which was a valuable portion of the right secured
by the contract. "By this act the mortgagee is required to incur
the additional expense of foreclosure, before obtaining possession,
and is deprived of the right to add to his security, by the perception of the rents and profits of the premises, during the time
required to accomplish this and the time of redemption, and during
that time the rents and profits are given to another, who may or
may not appropriate them to the payment of the debt, as he
chooses, and the mortgagee in the • mean time is subjected [• 291]
to the risk, often considerable, of the depreciation in the
value of the security." 1 So a law is void which extends the time for
the redemption of lands sold on execution, or for delinquent taxes,
after the sales have been made ; for in such a case the contract with
the purchaser, and for which he has paid his money, is, that he
shall have title at the time then provided by the law; and to
extend the time for redemption is to alter the substance of the
contract, as much as would be the extension of the time for payment of a promissory note. 2 So a law which shortens the time for
redemption from a mortgage, after a foreclosure sale has taken
place, is void ; the rights of the party being fixed by the foreclosure
and the law then in force, and the mortgagor being entitled, under
the law, to possession of the land until the time of redemption
expires.8 And where by statute a purchaser of lands from the

away this right.

' Robinson v. Howe, 13 Wis. 341; Dikeman v. Dikeman, 11 Paige, 484; Goe-

nen v. Schroeder, 8 Minn. 387. But see Stone v. Basset, 4 Minn. 298; Heyward

v. Judd, jb. 483; F reeborn v. Pettibone, 5 Minn. 277.

' Cargill v. Power, 1 Mich. 369. The contrary ruling was made in Butler v.

Palmer, 1 Hill, 324, by analogy to the statute of limitations. The statute, it was

said, was no more in effect than saying: “ Unless you redeem within the shorter

time prescribed, you shall have no action for a recovery of the land, nor shall

your defence against an action be allowed, provided you get possession." And

in Robinson 0. Howe, 13 Wis. 346, the court, speaking of a similar right in a

[309]

Mundy u. Monroe, 1 Mich. 76; Blackwood"· Vanvleet, 11 Mich. 252. Compare Dikeman v. Dikeman, 11 Paige, 484, and James"· Stull, 9 Barb. 482. In the
lut case it was held that a statute shortening the notice to be given on foreclosure
of a mortgage under the power of sale, from twenty-four to twelve weeks, was
valid as affecting the remedy only; and that a stipulation in a mortgage that on
default being made in payment the mortgagee might sell '' according to law,"
meant according to the law as it should be when sale was made. See also
Bathold "· Fox, 13 Minn. 501, in which it was decided that in the case of a mortgage given while the law allowed the mortgagee possession during the period
allowed for redemption after foreclosure, such law might be so changed as to take
away this right.
1 Robinson v. Howe, 13 Wis. 341 ; Dikeman "· Dikeman, 11 Paige, 484; Goenen v. Schroeder, 8 Minn. 387. But see Stone "· Basset, 4 Minn. 298; Heyward
"· Judd, ,ib. 483; Freeborn"· Pettibone, 5 Minn. 277.
1 Cargill v. Power, 1 Mich. 369.
The contrary ruling was made in Butler v.
Palmer, 1 Hill, 324, by analogy to the statute of limitations. The statute, it was
said, was no more in effect than saying: "Unless you redeem within the shorter
time prescribed, you shall have no action for a recovery of the land, nor shall
your defence against an action be allowed, provided you get possession." And
in Robinson "· Howe, 13 Wis. 346, the court, speaking of a similar right in a
1

[ 309]

"* 291 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [om Ix.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

State had the right, upon the forfeiture of his contract of purchase

(CH. IX.

for the non-payment of the sum due upon it, to revive it at any time

before a public sale of the lands, by the payment of all sums due upon

the contract, with a penalty of ﬁve per cent, it was held that this

right could not be taken away by a subsequent change i11 the law

which subjected the forfeited lands to private entry and

["‘ 292] sale.1 And a statute which * authorizes stay of execution,

for an unreasonable or indeﬁnite period, on judgments

rendered on pre-existing contracts, is void, as postponing payment,

and taking away all remedy during the continuance of the stay.”

And a law is void on this ground which declares aforfeiture of the

charter of a corporation for acts or omissions which constituted no

cause of forfeiture at the time they occurred? And it has been

party, say : “ So far as his right of redemption was concerned, it was not derived

from any contract, but was given by the law only; and the time within which he

might exercise it might be shortened by the legislature, provided a reasonable

time was left in which to exercise it, without impairing the obligation of any con-

tract.” And see Smith v. Packard, 12 \Vis. 371, to the same effect.

1 State v. Commissioners of School and University lands, 4 VVis. 414.

’ Chadwick v. Moore, 8 \V. & S. 49; Bunn v. Gorgas, 4l Penn. St. 441;

State had the right, upon the forfeiture of his contract of purchase
for the non-payment of the sum due upon it, to revive it at any time
before a public sale of the lands, by the payment of all snms due upon
the contract, with a penalty of five per cent, it was held ihat tl1is
right could not be taken away by a subsequent change in the law
which subjected the forfeited lands to private entry and
[• 292] sale.1 And a statute which • authorizes stay of execution,
for an unreasonable or indefinite period, on judgments
reudered on pre-existing contracts, is void, as postponing payment,
and taking away all remedy during the continuance of the stay/a
And a law is void on this ground which declares a forfeiture of the
charter of a corporation for acts or omissions which constituted no
cause of forfeiture at the ~ime they occurred.8 And it bas been

Stevens v. Andrews, 31 Mo. 205; Hasbrouck v. Shipman, 16 Wis. 296. In Brei-

tenbach v. Bush, 44 Penn. St. 313, and Coxe v. Martin, ib. 322, it was held that
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an act staying all civil process against volunteers who had enlisted in the national

service for three years or during the war was valid, —— “ during the war ” being

construed to mean unless the war should sooner terminate. See also State v.

Carew, 13 Rich. 498. A general law that all suits pending should be continued

until peace between the Confederate States and the United States, was held void

in Burt v. \Villiams, 24 Ark. 94. See also Taylor v. Stearns, 18 Grat. 244;

Hudspeth v. Davis, 41 Ala. 389; Aycock v. Martin, 37 Geo. 124; Cotfman v.

Bank of Kentucky, 40 Miss. 29; Jacobs v. Sinallwood, 63 N. C. 112; Cutts v.

Hardee, 38 Geo. 350; Sequestration Cases, 30 Texas, 688. A law permitting a

yenr’s stay upon judgments where security is given, is valid. Farnsworth v.

Vance, 2 Cold. 108. But a statute was held void which stayed all proceedings

against volunteers who had enlisted “ during the war," this period being indeﬁnite.

Clark v. Martin, 3 Grant's Cas. 393. In Johnson 0. Higgins, 3 Met. (Ky.) 566,

it was held that the act of the Kentucky legislature of May 24, 1861, which for-

bade the rendition, in all the courts of the State, of any judgment from date till

January 1st, 1862, was valid. It related, it was said, not to the remedy for

enforcing a contract, but to the courts which administer the remedy; and those

courts, in a legal sense, constitute no part of the remedy. A law exempting

soldiers from civil process until thirty days after their discharge from military

service was held valid as to all contracts subsequently entered into, in Bruns v.

Crawford, 34 Mo. 330. And see McCormick 0. Rusch, 15 Iowa, 127.

3 People v. Jackson and Michigan Plank Road Co. 9 Mich. 285, per Chrzlrtiancy,

J.; State v. Tombeckbee Bank, 2 Stew. 30.

I

i
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party, say : .. So far as his right of redemption was concerned, it was not derived
from any contract, but was given by the law only; and the time within which he
might exercise it might be shortened by the legislature, provided a reasonable
time was left in which to exercise it, without impairing the obligation of any contract." And see Smith"· Packard, 12 Wis. 871, to the same effect..
1 State"· Commissioners of School and University lands, 4 Wis. 414.
' Chadwick "·Moore, 8 W. & S. 49; Bunn v. Gorgas, 41 Penn. St. 441;
Stevens"· Andrews, 81 Mo. 205; Hasbrouck v. Shipman, 16 Wis. 296. In Breitenbach"· Bush, 44 Penn. St. 318, and Coxe v. Martin, ib. 822; it was held that
an act staying all civil process against volunteers who had enlisted in the national
service for three years or during the war was valid, - " during the war " being
construed to mean unless the war should sooner terminate. See al11o State v.
Carew, 13 Rich. 498. A general law that all suits pending should be continued
until peace between the Confederate States and the United States, was held void
in Burt v. Williams, 24 Ark. 94. See also Taylor "· Stearns, 18 Grat. 244;
Hudspeth v. Davis, 41 Ala. 889; Aycock v. Martin, 87 Geo. 124; Coffman v.
Bank of Kentucky, 40 Miss. 29; Jacobs v. Smallwood, 63 N. C. 112; Cutts v.
Hardee, 38 Geo. 850; Sequestration Case~. 30 Texas, 688. A law permitting a
year's stay upon judgments where security is given, is valid. Farnsworth v.
Vance, 2 Cold. 108. But a statute was held void which stayed all proceedings
against volunteers who had enlisted" during the war," this period being indefinite.
Clark 11. Martin, 3 Grant's Cas. 398. In Johnson v. Higgins, 8 Met. (Ky.) o66,
it was held that the act of the Kentucky legislature of May 24, 1861, which forbade the rendition, in all the courts of the State, of any judgment from date till
January 1st, 1862, was valid. It related, it was said, not to the remedy for
enforcing a contract, but to the courts which administer the remedy; and those
courts, in a legal sense, constitute no part of the remedy. A law exempting
11oldiers from civil process until thirty day• after their discharge from military
service was held valid as to all contracts subsequently entered into, in Bruns "·
Crawford, 34 Mo. 330. And see McCormick"· Rusch, 15 Iowa, 127.
3 People v. Jackson and Michigan Plank Road Co. 9 :Mich. 285, per Christiancy,
J.; State v. Tombeckbee Bank, 2 Stew. SO.
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held that where a statute authorized a municipal corporation to
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issue bonds, and to exercise the power of local taxation in order

to pay them, and persons bought and paid value for bonds issued

accordingly, this power of taxation is part of the contract, and

cannot be withdrawn until the bonds are satisﬁed; that an attempt

to repeal or restrict it by statute is void; and that unless the

corporation imposes and collects the tax in all respects as if the

subsequent statute had not been passed, it will be compelled to do

so by mandamus} And it has also been held that a statute

repealing a former statute, which made the stock of stockholders in

a corporation liable for its debts, was, in respect to creditors exist-

ing at the time of the repeal, a law impairing the obligation

of contracts.” In each of these cases it is evident that

substantial rights ‘were affected; and where the laws ["‘ 293]

which were held void operated upon the remedy, they

either had an effect equivalent to importing some new stipulation

into the contract, or they failed to leave the party a substantial

remedy such as was assured to him by the law in force when the

contract was made. In Pennsylvania it has been held that a

statute authorizing a stay of execution on contracts in which the

debtor had waived the right was unconstitutional ;3 but it seems to

ns that an agreement to waive a legal privilege which the law gives
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as a matter of State policy cannot be binding upon a party, unless

the law itself provides for the waiver.‘

Where, however, by the operation of existing laws, a contract

cannot be enforced without some new action of a party to ﬁx his

liability, it is as competent to prescribe by statute the requisites to

the legal validity of such alt as it would be in any case to prescribe

the legal requisites of a contract to be thereafter made. Thus,

though a verbal promise is sufficient to revive a debt barred by

the statute of limitations or by bankruptcy, yet this rule may be

changed by a statute making all such future promises void unless

in writing.“ It is also equally true that where a legal impediment

exists to the enforcement of a contract which parties have entered

‘ Van Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wal. 535. See also Soutter v. Madison, 15 Wis.

30; Smith v. Appleton, 19 Wis. 468.

* Hawthorne v. Calef, 2 Wal. 10.

' Billmeyer v. Evans, 40 Penn. St. .324; Lewis v. Lewis, 44 Penn. St. 127.

‘ See Conkey v. Hart, 14 N. Y. 30; Handy v. Chatﬁeld, 23 \Vend. 35. '

‘ Joy v. Thompson, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 373; Kingsley v. Cousins, 47 Me. 91.
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held that where a statute authorized a municipal corporation to
issue bonds, and to exercise the power of local taxation in order
to pay them, and persons bought and paid value for bonds issued
accordingly, this power of taxation is part of the contract, and
cannot be withdrawn until the bonds are satisfied ; that an attempt
to repeal or restrict it by statute is void; and that unless the
corporation· imposes and collects the tax in al~ respects as if the
subsequent statute had not been passed, it will be compelled to do
so by mandamus.1 And it has also been held that a statute
repealing a former statute, which made the stock of stockholders in
a corporation liable for its debts, was, in respect to creditors existing at the time of the repeal, a law impairing the obligation
of contracts.2 In each of these cases it is evident that
substantial rights • were affected; · and where the laws [* 293]
which were held void operated upon the remedy, they
either had an effect equivalent to importing some new stipulation
into the contract, or they failed to leave the party a substantial
remedy such as was assured to him by the law in force when the
contract was made. In Pennsylvania it has been held that a
statute authorizing a stay of execution on contracts in which the
debtor had waived the right was unconstitutional; 8 but it seems to
us that an agreement to waive a legal privilege which the law gives
as a matter of State policy cannot be binding upon a party, unless
the law itself provides for the waiver.4
Where, however, by the operation of existing laws, a contract
cannot be enforced without some new action of a party to fix his
liability, it is as competent to prescribe by statute the requisites to
the legal validity of such att as it would be in any case to prescribe
the legal requisites of a contract to be thereafter made. Thus,
though a verbal promise is sufficient to revive a debt barred by
the statute of limitations or by bankruptcy, yet this rule may be
changed by a statute making all such future promises void unless
in writing.6 It is altJO equally true that where a legal impediment
exists to the enforcement of a contract which parties have entered
Van Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wal.6M. See also Soutter v. Madison, 15 Wis.
SO; Smith v. Appleton, 19 Wis. 468.
1 Hawthorn.e "· Calef, 2 Wal. 10.
• Billmeyer v. Evans, 40 Penn. St..324; Lewis v. Lewi11, 44 Penn. St. 127.
4 See Conkey v. Hart, 14 N.Y. 30; Handy v. Chatfield, 23 Wend. 35.
• Joy"· Thompson, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 378; Kingsley v. Cousins, 47 Me. 91.
1
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into, the constitutional provision in question will not preclude

the legislature from removing such impediment and validating

the contract. A statute of that description would not impair the

obligation of contracts, but would perfect and enforce it.1 And

for similar reasons the obligation of contracts is not impaired by

continuing the charter of a corporation for a certain period, in

order to the proper closing its business.“

One other topic remains to be mentioned in this connection,

and that is, as to the power of the States to pass insolvent laws,

and the classes of contracts to which they may be made to apply.

As this whole subject has been gone over very often and very

fully by the Supreme Court of the United States, and the important

questions seem at last to be ﬁnally set at rest, and as the whole

subject is now rendered comparatively unimportant by the

[* 294] existence of a federal bankrupt law, we shall ‘content

ourselves with giving what we understand to be the con-

clusions of the court.

1. The several States have power to legislate on the subject of

bankrupt and insolvent laws, subject, however, to the authority

conferred upon Congress by the Constitution to adopt a uniform

system of bankruptcy, which authority, when exercised, is para-

mount, and State enactments in conﬂict with those of Congress
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upon the subject must give way.“

2. Such State laws, however, discharging the person or the

property of the debtor, and thereby terminating the legal obliga-

tion of the debts, cannot constitutionally be made to apply to

contracts entered into before they were passed, but they may be

made applicable to such future contracts as can be considered as

having been made in reference to them}

3. Contracts made within a State where an insolvent law exists,

between citizens of that State, are to be considered as made in

reference to the law, and are subject to its provisions. But the

law cannot ‘apply to a contract made in one State between a

‘ As where the defence of usury to a contract is taken away by statute. Welcli

v. Wadsworth, 30 Conn. 149; Curtis v. Leavitt, 15 N. Y. 9. And see Wood v.

Kennedy, 19 Ind. 68, and the cases cited, post, pp. 375, 376.

’ Foster v. Essex Bank, 16 Mass. 245.

' Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122; Farmers and Mechanics Bank v.

Smith, 6 Wheat. 131; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213; Baldwin v. Hale,

1 Wal. 229.

‘ Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213.

_j _
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into, the constitutional provision in question will not preclude
the legislature from removing such impediment and validating
the contract. A statute of that description would not impair the
o~ligation of contracts, but would perfect and enforce it.1 And
for similar reasons the obligation of contracts is not impaired by
continuing the charter of a corporation for a certain period, in
order to the proper closing its business.2
One other topic remains to be mentioned in this connection,
and that is, as to the power of the States to pass insolvent laws,
and the classes of contracts to which they may be made to apply.
As this whole subject has been gone over very often and very
fully by the Supreme Court of the United States, and the important
questions seem at last to be finally set at rest, and as the whole
subject is now rendered comparatively unimportant by the
[* 294] existence of a federal bankrupt law, we shall • content
ourselves with giving what we understand to be the conclusions of the court.
1. The several States have power to legislate on the subject of
bankrupt and insolvent laws, subject, however, to the authority
conferred upon Congress by the Constitution to adopt a uniform
system of bankruptcy, which authority, when exercised, is paramount, and State enactments in conflict with those of Congress
upon the subject must give way.s
2. Such State laws, however, discharging the person or the
property of the debtor, and thereby terminating the legal obligation of the debts, cannot constitutionally be made to apply to
contracts entered into before they were passed, but they may be
made applicable to such future contraciB as can be considered as
having been made in reference to them.4
3. Contracts made within a State where an insolvent law exists,
between citizens of that State, are to be considered as made in
reference to the law, and are subject to its provisions. But the
law cannot ,apply to a contract made in one State between a
1 As where the defence of usury to a contract is taken away by statute. Welch
.,, Wadsworth, 30 Conn. 149; Curtis t1. Leavitt, 15 N.Y. 9. And see Wood v.
Kennedy, 19 Ind. 68, and the cases cited, post, pp. 3i5, 376.
' Foster v. Essex Bank, 16 Mass. 245.
3 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122 ; Farmers and Mechanics Bank v.
Smith, 6 Whe&t. 131; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213; Baldwin "· Hale,
1 Wal. 229.
' Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213.
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citizen thereof and a citizen of another State,1 nor to contracts
not made within the State, even though made between citizens of
the same State,2 ~ef't, --perhaps~ where they are citizens of- the
State -pai&ing-the-la.w)~- And where the contract is made between
a citizen of one State and a citizen of another, the circumstance
that the contract is made payable in the State where the insolvent
law exists will not render such contract subject to be discharged
under the law.• If, however, the creditor in any of these cases
makes himself a party to proceedings under the insolvent law, he
will be bound thereby like any other party to judicial proceedings,
and is not to be heard afterwards to object that his debt was
excluded by the· Constitution from being affected by the law.5
New provisions for personal liberty, and for the protection of the
right to life, liberty, and property, are made by the thirteenth and
fourteenth amendments to the Constitution of the United States;
and these will be referred to in the two succeeding chapters. 8
The most important clause in the fourteenth amendment is that
part oT section 1 which declares that all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,
are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside.7 This provision very properly puts an end to any question
of the title of the freedmen and others of their race to the rights
of citizenship; but it may be doubtful whether the further provisions of the same section surro~nd the citizen with any protections
additional to those before possessed under the State constitutions;

In

citizen thereof and a citizen of another State} nor to contracts

not made within the State, even though made between citizens of

the same State,’ ~, where they are citizens of the

State passingtlae la.w.~"~ And where the contract is made between

a citizen of one State and a citizen of another, the circumstance

that the contract is made payable in the State where the insolvent

law exists will not render such contract subject to be discharged

under the law.4 If, however, the creditor in any of these cases

makes himself a. party to proceedings under the insolvent law, he

will be bound thereby like any other party to judicial proceedings,

and is not to be heard afterwards to object that his debt was

excluded by the Constitution from being affected by the law.5

New provisions for personal liberty, and for the protection of the

right to life, liberty, and property, are made by the thirteenth and

fourteenth amendments to the Constitution of the United States;

and these will be referred to in the two succeeding chapters.“

The most important clause in the fourteenth amendment is that

part of section 1 which declares that all persons born or natural-

ized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,
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are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they

reside? This provision very properly puts an end to any question

of the title of the freedmen and others of their race to the rights

of citizenship; but it may be doubtful whether the further provis-

ions of the same section surround the citizen with any protections

additional to those before possessed under the State constitutions;

‘ Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213; Springer 0. Foster, 2 Story, 387; Boyle

v. Zacharie, 6 Pet. 348; Woodhull v. Wagner, Baldw. 300; Suydam v. Broadnax,

14 Pet. 75; Cook 12. Motfat, 5 How. 310; Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wal. 231.

' McMillan v. McNeil], 4 Wheat. 209.

‘Marsh v. Putnam, 3 G-ray, 551. '

‘.Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wal. 223; Baldwin v. Bank of Newberry, ib. 234; Gil-

man v. Lockwood, 4 \Val. 409.

" Clay v. Smith, 3'Pet. 411; Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wal. 223; Gilman u. Lock-

wood, 4 Wal. 409.

' See ante, p. 11; post, pp. 299, 397.

or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are

citizens of the United States, and of the State wherein they reside. No State

shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities

of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within

its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
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Ogdeu ~. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213; Springer"· Foster, 2 Story, 387; Boyle
"· Zacharie, 6 Pet. 348; Woodhull~. Wagner, Baldw. 300; Suydam"· Broadnax,
14 Pet. 75; Cook "· :Moffat, 5 How. 310; Baldwin "· Hale, 1 W al. 281.
1 :McMillan~. McNeill, 4: Wheat. 209.
~T&h "·.Putnam, 8 Gray, 551.
4 .Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wal. 223; Baldwin"· Bank of Newberry, ib. 234; Gilman"· Lockwood, 4 Wal. 409.
• Clay"· Smith, 3 ·Pet. 411; Baldwin "· Hale, 1 Wal. 223; Gilman"· Lockwood, 4 Wal. 409.
• See ante, p. 11 ; post, pp. 299, 397.
' The complete text of this section is as follows : " Section 1. All persons born
or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States, and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
1

" The complete text of this section is as follows: “ Section 1. All persons born

---.......
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but as a principle of State constitutional law has now been made a

[em.

IX.

part of the Constitution of the United States, the effect will be

tomake the Supreme Court of the United States the ﬁnal arbiter

of cases in which a violation of this principle by State laws is com-

plained of, inasmuch as the decisions of the State courts upon laws

which are supposed to violate it will be subject to review in that

court on appeal.1

‘ See ante, pp. 12-14. Notwithstanding this section, the protection of all

citizens in their privileges and immunities, and in their right to an impartial

administration of the laws, is just as much the business of the individual States

as it was before. This amendment of the Constitution does not concentrate power

but as a principle of State constitutional law has now been made a
part of the Constitution of the United States, the effect will bE)
to make the Supreme Court of the United States the final arbiter
of cases in which a violation of this principle by State laws is com·
plained of, inasmuch as the decisions of the State courts upon laws
which are supposed to violate it wilt be subject to review in that
court on appeal. 1

in the general government for any purpose of police government within the

States; its object is to preclude legislation by any State which shall “abridge

See ante, pp. 12-14. Notwithstanding this section, the protection of all
citizens in their privileges and immunities, and in their right to an impartial
administration of the laws, is just as much the business of the individual States
as it was before. This amendment of the Constitution does not concentrate power
in the general government for any purpose of police government within the
States; its object is to preclude legislation by any State which shall " abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States," or "deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law," or "deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws"; and Congress is
empowered to pass all laws necessary to render such unconstitutional State legislation ineffectual.
'
1

the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States," or “ deprive any

person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,” or “ deny to any

person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws ”; and Congress is

empowered to pass all laws necessary to render such unconstitutional State legis-

lation ineffectual. '

[314]
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY.

OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY.

ALTHOUGH the people from whom we derive our laws now possess

a larger share of civil and political liberty than any other in Europe,

there was a period in their history when a considerable proportion

were in a condition of servitude. Of the servile classes one portion

were villeins regardant, or serfs attached to the soil, and transfer-

*CHAPTER X.

able with it, but not otherwise} while the other portion were vil-

[*295]

leins in gross, whose condition resembled that of the slaves known

to modern law in America.” How these people became reduced to

OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY.

this unhappy condition, it,may not be possible to determine at

this distance of time with entire accuracy; but in regard to the

ﬁrst class, we may suppose that when a conqueror seized the terri-

tory upon which he found them living, he seized also the people as

a part of the lawful prize of war, granting them life on condition

of their cultivating the soil for his use ; and that the second were

often persons whose lives had been spared on the ﬁeld of battle,

and whose ownership, in accordance with the custom of barbar-

ous times, would pcrtain to the persons of their captors. Many

other causes also contributed to reduce persons to this condition.”

At the beginning of the reign of John it has been estimated that

' Litt. § 181; 2 Bl. Com. 92. “They originally held lands of their lords
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on condition of agricultural service, which in a certain sense was servile, but in

reality was not so, as the actual work was done by the theows, or slaves. . . .

They did not pay rent, and were not removable at pleasure; they went with the

land and rendered services, uncertain in their nature, and therefore opposed to

rent. They were the originals of copyholders.” Note to Reeves, History of

English Law, Pt. I. c. 1.

' Litt. § 181; 2 Bl. Com. 92. “ These are the persons who are described

by Sir \Villiam Temple as ‘ a sort of people who were in a condition of down-

right servitude, used and employed in the most servile works; and belonging,

they and their children and eﬂ'ects, to the lord of the soil, like the rest of the

stock or cattle upon it.’ ” Reeves, History of English Law, Pt. I. c. 1.

’ For a view of the condition of the servile classes, see Wright, Domestic

Manners and Sentiments, 101, 102; Crabbe, History of English Law (ed. of

1829), pp. 8, 78, 365; Hallam, Middle Ages, Pt. II. c. 2; Vaughan, Revolu-

tions in English History, Book 2, c. 8; Broom, Const. Law, 74 at seq.
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the people from whom we derive our laws now possess
a larger share of civil and political liberty than any other in Europe,
there was a period in their history when a considerable proportion
were in a condition of servitude. Of the servile classes one portion
were villeins regardant, or serfs attached to the soil, and transferable with it, but not otherwise,1 while the other portion were villeins in gross, whose condition resembled that of the slaves known
to modern law in .America.2 How these people became reduced to
this unhappy condition, it . may not be possible to determine at
this distance of time with entire accuracy; but in regard to the
first class, we may suppose that when a conqueror seized the territory upon which he found them living, he seized also the people as
a part of the lawful prize of war, granting them life on condition
of their cultivating the soil for his use; and that the second were
often persons whose lives had been spared on the field of battle,
and whose ownership, in accordance with the custom of barbarous times, would pertain to the persons of their captors. Many
other causes also contributed to reduce persons to this condition.3
.At the beginning of the reign of John it has been estimated that
ALTHOUGH

1 Litt. § 181; 2 Bl. Com. 92.
"They originally held lands of their lords
on condition of agricultural service, which in a certain sense was servile, but in
reality was n,ot so, as the actual work was done by the theows, or slaves. • • .
They did not pay rent, and were not removable at pleasure ; they went with the
land and rendered services, uncertain in their nature, and therefore opposed to
rent. They were the originals of copyholders." Note to Reeves, History of
English Law, Pt. I. c. 1.
1 Litt. § 181; 2 Bl. Com. 92.
"These are the persons who are described
by Sir William Temple as ' a sort of people who were in a condition of downright servitude, used and employed in the most servile works ; and belonging,
they and their children and effects, to the lord of the soil, like the rest of the
stock or cattle upon it.'" Reeves, History of English Law, Pt. I. c. 1.
3 For a view of the condition of the servile classes, see Wright, Domestic
:Manners and Sentiments, 101, 102; Crabbe, History of English Law (ed. of
1829), pp. 8, 78, 865; Hallam, :Middle Ages, Pt. II. c. 2; Vaughan, Revolutions in English History, Book 2, c. 8; Broom, Const. Law, 74 et seq.
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one half of the Anglo-Saxons were in a condition of servitude, and

• 295

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

[cH. x.

if we go back to the time of the Conquest, we ﬁnd a still larger pro-

portion of the people held as the property of their lords, and inca-

pable of acquiring and holding any property as their own.1 Their

treatment was such as might have been expected from masters

trained to war and violence, accustomed to think lightly of human

life and human suffering, and who knew little of and cared less for

any doctrine of human rights which embraced within its scope

others besides the governing classes.

It would be idle to attempt to follow the imperceptible

[*“ 296] steps by * which involuntary servitude at length came to

an end in England.‘ It was never abolished by statute,“

and the time when slavery ceased altogether cannot be accurately

determined.” The causes were at work silently for centuries; the

historian did not at the time note them; the statesman did not

observe them; they were not the subject of agitation or contro-

versy; but the time arrived when the philanthropist could examine

the laws and institutions of his country, and declare that slavery

had ceased to be recognized, though at what precise point in legal

history the condition became unlawful he might‘ not be able to

determine. Among the causes of its abrogation he might be able

‘ Hume, History of England, Vol. I. App. 1.

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:20 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105011581
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

" Barrington on the Statutes (3d ed.), 272.

3 Mr. Hargrave says, at the commencement of the seventeenth century. 20

State Trials, 40; May, Const. Hist. c. 11. And Mr. Barrington (On Stat.

3d ed. p. 278) cites from Rymer a commission from Queen Elizabeth in the

year 1574, directed to Lord Burghley and Sir Walter Mildmay, for inquiring

into the lands, tenements, and other goods of all her bondmen and bondwomen

in the counties of Cornwall, Devonshire, Somerset, and Gloucester, such as

were by blood in a slavish condition, by being born in any of her manors, and

to compound with any or all of such bondmen or bondwomen for their manu-

one half of the Anglo-Saxons were in a condition of servitude, and
if we go back to the time of the Conquest, we find a still larger proportion of the people held as the property of their lords, and incapable of acquiring and holding any property as their own.1 Their
treatment was such as might have been expected from masters
trained to war and violence, accustomed to think lightly of human
life and human suffering, and who knew little of and cared less for
any doctrine of human rights which embraced within its scope
others besides the governing classes.
It would be idle to attempt to follow the imperceptible
[• 296] steps by • which involuntary servitude at length came to
an end in England. · It was never abolished by statute,2
and the time when slavery ceased altogether cannot be accurately
determined.3 The causes were at work silently for centuries ; the
historian did not at the time note them ; the statesman did not
observe them; they were not the subject of agitation or controversy ; but the time arrived when the philanthropist could examino
the laws and institutions of his country, and declare that slavery
had ceased to be recognized, though at what precise point in legal
history the condition became unlawful he mighf not be able to
determine. Among the causes of its abrogation he might be able

mission and freedom. And this commission, he says, in connection with other

circumstances, explains why we hear no more of this kind of servitude. And

see Crabbe, History of English Law (ed. of 1829), 574. This author says that

villeinage had disappeared by the time of Charles II. Hurd says in 1661. Law

of Freedom and Bondage, Vol. I. p. 136. And see 2 Bl. Com. 96. Macaulay

says there were traces of slavery under the Stuarts. History of England, c. 1.

Hume (History of England, c. 23) thinks there was no law recognizing it after

the time of Henry VII., and that it had ceased before the death of Elizabeth.

Froude (History of England, c. 1) says in the reign of Henry VIII. it had

practically ceased. Mr. Christian says the last claim of villeinage which we

ﬁnd recorded in our courts was in 15th James I. Noy, 27 ; 11 State Trials, 342.

Note to Blackstone, Book 2, p. 96.

l T _- ? _.
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Hume, History of England, Vol. I. App. 1.
Barrington on the Statutes (3d ed.), 272.
3 Mr. Hargrave says, at the commencement of the seventeenth century.
20
State Trials, 40; May, Const. Hist. c. 11. And :Mr. Barrington (On Stat.
Sd ed. p. 278) cites from Rymer a commission from Queen Elizabeth in the
year 1574, directed to Lord Burghley and Sir Walter :Mildmay, for inquiring
into the lands, tenements, and other goods of all her bondmen and bondwomen
in the counties of Cornwall, Devonshire, Somen~et, and Gloucester, such as
were by blood in a slavish condition, by being born in any of her manors, and
to compound with any or all of such bondmen or bondwomen for their manu,. mission and freedom. And this commission, he says, in connection with other
circumstances, explains why we hear no more of this kind of servitude. And
see Crabbe, History of English Law (ed. of 1829), 574. This author says that
villeinage had disappeared by the time of Charles II. Hurd says in 1661. Law
of Freedom and Bondage, Vol. I. p. 136. And see 2 Bl. Com. 96. Macaulay
says there were traces of slavery under the Stuarts. History of England, c. 1.
Hume (History of England, c. 23) thinks there was no law recognizing it after
the time of Henry VII., and that it had ceased before the death -of Elizabeth.
Froudc (History of England, c. 1) says in the reign of Henry VIII. it had
practically ceased. Mr. Christian eaye the last claim of villeinage which we
find recorded in our courts wae in 15th James I. Noy, 27; 11 State Trials, 342.
Note to Blackstone, Book 2, p. 96.
1

1
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to enumerate : 1. That the slaves were of the same race with their

masters. There was therefore not only an absence of that antip-

athy which is often found existing when the ruling and the ruled

are of different races, and especially of different color, but instead

thereof an active sympathy might often be supposed to exist, which

would lead to frequent emancipations. 2. The common law pre-

sumed every man to be free until proved to be otherwise ; and this

presumption, when the slave was of the same race as his master,

and had no natural badge of servitude, must often have rendered it

extremely difﬁcult to recover the fugitive who denied his thraldom.

3. A residence for a year and a day in a corporate town rendered

the villein legally free ;1 so that to him the towns consti-

tuted cities of * refuge. 4. The lord treating him as a [* 297]

freeman—as by receiving homage from him as tenant, or

entering into a contract with him under seal -- thereby emancipated

him, by recognizing in him a capacity to perform those acts which

only a freeman could perform. 5. Even the lax morals of the times

were favorable to liberty, since the condition of the child followed

that of the father;2 and in law the illegitimate child was nulliua

ﬁlius,— had no father. And 6. The inﬂuence of the priesthood

was generally against slavery, and must often have shielded the
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fugitive and inﬂuenced emancipations by appeals to the con-

science, especially when the master was near the close of life, and

the conscience naturally most sensitive.“ And with all these inﬂu-

' Crabbe, History of English Law (ed. of 1829), p. 79. But this was only

as to third persons. The claim of the lord might be made within three years.

lbid. And ‘see Mackintosh, History of England, c. 4.

' Barrington on Statutes (3d ed.), 276, note; 2 Bl. Com. 93. But in the

very quaint account of “ Villeinage and Nieﬁzy,” in Mirror of Justices, § 28, it

is said, among other things, that “ those are villeins who are begotten of a free-

man and a nief, and born out of matrimony." The ancient rule appears to have

been that the condition of the child followed that of the mother; but this was

changed in the time of Henry I. Crabbe, History of English Law (ed. of 1829),

p. 78; Hallam, Middle Ages, Pt. II. c. 2.

to enumerate: 1. That the slaves were of the same race with their
masters. There was therefore not only an absence of that antipathy which is often found existing when the ruling and the ruled
are of different races, and especially of different color, bnt instead
thereof an active sympathy might often· be supposed to exist, which
would lead to frequent emancipations. 2. The common law presumed every man to be free until proved to be otherwise; and this
presumption, when the slave was of the same race as his master,
and had no natural badge of servitude, must often have rendered it
extremely difficult to recover the fugitive who denied his thraldom.
3. A residence for a year and a day in a corporate town rendered
the villein legally free; 1 so that to him the towns constituted cities of • refuge. 4. The lord treating him as a [* 297]
freeman- as by receivinp; homage from him as tenant, or
entering into a contract with him under seal- thereby emancipated
him, by recognizing in him a capacity to perform those acts which
only a freeman could perform. 5. Even the lax morals of the times
were favorable to liberty, since the condition of the child followed
that of the father; 2 and in law the illegitimate child was nullius
filius,- had no father. And 6. The influence of the priesthood
was generally against slavery, and must often have shielded the
fugitive and influenced emancipations by appeals to the conscience, especially when the master was near the close of life, and
the conscience naturally most sensitive.8 And with all these influ-

i‘ In 1514, Henry VIII. manumitted two of his villeins in the following words:

“Whereas God created all men free, but afterwards the laws and customs of

nations subjected some under the yoke of servitude, we think it pious and

meritorious with God to manumit Henry Knight, a tailor, and John Herle, a

hushandman, our natives, as being born within the manor of Stoke Clymercys-

land, in our county of Cornwall, together with all their issue born or to be

born, and all their goods, lauds, and chattels acquired, so as the said persons

and their issue shall from henceforth by us be free and of free condition.” Bar-

rington on Statutes (3d ed.), 275. See Mackintosh, History of England, c. 4.
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1 Crabbe, History of English Law (ed. 9f 1829), p. 79.
But this was only
as to third persons. The claim of the lord might be made within three years.
Ibid. And see Mackintosh, History of England, c. 4.
1 Barrington on Statutes (3d ed. ), 276, note; 2 Bl. Com. 93.
But in the
very quaint account of" Villeinage and Niefty," in Mirror of Justices,§ 28, it
is said, among other things, that " those are villeins who are begotten of a freeman and a nief, and born out of matrimony." The ancient rule appears to have
been that the condition of the child followed that of the mother; but this was
changed in the time of Henry I. Crabbe, History of English Law ( ed. of 1829),
p. 78; Hallam, Middle Ages, Pt. II. c. 2.
~ In 1514, Henry VITI. manumitted two of his villeins in the following words:
•• Whereas God created all men free, but afterwards the laws and customs of
nations subjected some under the yoke of servitude, we think it pious and
meritorioua with God to manumit Henry Knight, a tailor, and John Herle, a
husbandman, our natives, as being born within the manor of Stoke Clymercysland, in our county of Cornwall, together with all their issue born or to be
born, and all their goods, lands, and chattels acquired, ao as the said persons
and their issue shall from henceforth by us be free and of free condition." Barrington on Statutes (3d ed.), 2i6. See Mackintosh, History of England, c. 4.
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ences there should be noted the further circumstance, that a class

(eH. X.

of freemen was always near to the slaves in condition and sulfering,

with whom they were in association, and between whom and them-

selves there were frequent intermarriages,1 and that from these to

the highest order in the State there were successive grades; the

children of the highest gradually ﬁnding their way into those below

them, and ways being open by which the children of the lowest

might advance themselves, by intelligence, energy, or thrift, through

the successive grades above them, until the descendants of dukes

and earls were found cultivating the soil, and the man of obscure

descent winning a place among the aristocracy of the realm,

through his successful exertions at the bar, or his services to the

State. Inevitably these inﬂuences must at length over-

[* 298] throw the "‘ slavery of white men which existed in England}

and no other ever became established within the realm.

Slavery was permitted, and indeed fostered, in the colonies; in part

because a proﬁt was made of the trade, and in part also because it

was supposed that the peculiar products of some of them could not

be proﬁtably cultivated with free labor;3 and at times masters

brought their slaves with them to England and removed them

again without question, until in Sommersett’s Case, in 1771, it was

ruled by Lord Mansﬁeld that slavery was repugnant to the common
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law, and to bring a slave into England was to emaucipate him.‘

‘ Wright, Domestic Manners and Sentiments, p. 112.

’ Macaulay (History of England, c. 1) says the chief instrument of emanci-

pation was the Christian religion. Mackintosh (History of England, c. 4) also

attributes to the priesthood great inﬂuence in this reform, not only by their

direct appeals to the conscience, but by the judges, who were ecclesiastics,

multiplying presumptions and rules of evidence consonant to the equal and

humane spirit which breathes throughout the morality of the Gospel. Hume

(History of England, c. 23) seems to think emancipation was brought about by

selﬁsh considerations on the part of the barons, and from aconviction that the

returns from their lands would be increased by changing villeinage into socage

tenures.

ences there should be noted the further circumstance, that a class
of freemen was always near to the slaves in condition and suffering,
with whom they were in association, and between whom and themselves there were frequent intermarriages,1 and that from these to
the highest order in the State there were successive grades ; the
children of the highest gradually finding their way into those below
them, and ways being open by which the children of the lowest
might advance. themselves, by intelligence, energy, or thrift, through
the successive grades above them, until the descendants of dukes
and earls were found cultivating the soil, and the man of obscure
descent winning a place among the aristocracy of the realm,
through his successful exertions at the bar, or his services to the
State. Inevitably these influences must at length over[• 298] throw the • slavery of white men which existed in England,2
and no other ever became established within the realm.
Slavery was permitted, and indeed fostered, in the colonies ; in part
because a profit was made of the trade, and in part also because it
was supposed that the peculiar products of some of them could not
be profitably cultivated with free labor ; 8 and at times masters
brought their slaves with them to England and removed them
again without question, until in Sommersett's Case, in 1771, it was
·ruled by Lord Mansfield that slavery was repugnant to the common
law, and to bring a slave into England was to emancipate him.•

’ Robertson, America, Book 9; Bancroft, United States, Vol. I. c. 5.

‘ Lolft, 18; 20 Howell, State Trials, 1; Life of Granville Sharp, by Hoare,

c. 4; Hurd, Law of Freedom and Bondage, Vol. I. p. 189. The judgment of

Lord Mansﬁeld is said to have been delivered with evident reluctance. 20 State

Trials, 79; per Lord Stou-ell, 2 Hagg. Adm. 105, 110; Broom, Const. Law.

105. Of the practice prior to the decision Lord Stowell said: “The personal

traffic in slaves resident in England had been as public and as authorized in

London as in any of our West India islands. They were sold on the Exchange,

and other places of public resort, by parties themselves resident in London,
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Wright., Domestic Manners and Sentiments, p. 112.
Macaulay (History of England. c. 1) says the chief instrument of emancipation was the Christian religion. Mackintosh (History of England, c. 4) also
attributes to the priesthood great influence in this reform, not only by their
direct appeals to the conscience, but by the judges, who were ecclesiastics,
multiplying presumptions and rules of evidence consonant to the equal and
humane spirit which breathes throughout the morality of the Gospel. Hume
(History of England, c. 28) seems to think emancipation was brought about by
selfish considerations on the part of the barons, and from a conviction that the
returns from their lands would be increased by changing villeinage into socage_
tenures.
1 Robertson, America, Book 9; Bancroft, United States, Vol. I. c. 5.
4 Lofft, 18; 20 Howell, State Trials, 1 ; Life of Granville Sharp, by Hoare,
c. 4:; Hurd, Law of Freedom and Bondage, Vol. I. p. 189. T~e judgment of
Lord Mansfield is said to have been delivered with evident reluctanl'e. 20 State
Trials, 79; per Lord Stowell, 2 Hagg. Adm. 105, 110; Broom, Const. Law.
105. Of the practice prior to the decision Lord Stozcell said: "The personal
traffic in slaves resident in England had been as public and as authorized in
London as in any of our West India islands. They were sold on the Exchange,
and other places of public resort, by parties themselves resident in London,
1

1
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without authoritative decision.‘

In Scotland a condition of servitude continued to a later period.

The holding of negroe's in slavery was indeed held to be

illegal ‘soon after the Sommersett Case; but the salters [’* 299]

and colliers did not acquire their freedom until 1799, nor

without an act of Parliament? A previous statute for their enfran-

chisement through judicial proceedings had proved ineffectual.“

The history of slavery in this country pertains rather to general

history than to a. work upon State constitutional law. Through-

out the land involuntary servitude is abolished by constitutional

amendment, except as it may be imposed in the punishment of

crime.‘ Nor do we suppose the exception will permit the convict to

be subjected to other servitude than such as is under the control

and direction of, the public authorities, in the manner heretofore

customary. The laws of the several States allow the letting of the

services of the convicts, either singly or in numbers, to contractors

who are to employ them in mechanical trades in or near the prison,

and under the surveillance of its ofﬁcers; but it might well be

doubted if a regulation which should suffer the convict to be placed

upon the auction block and sold to the highest bidder, either for

life or for a term of years, would be in harmony with the constitu-
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tional prohibition. It is certain that it would be open to very grave

abuses, and it is so inconsistent with the general sentiment in

countries where slavery does not exist, that it may well be believed

and with as little reserve as they would have been in any of our “Test India

possessions. Such a state of things continued without impeachment from a

very early period up to nearly the end of the last century.” The Slave Grace,

2 Hagg. Adm. 105. In this case it was decided that if a slave, carried by his

master into a free country, voluntarily returned with him to a country where

slavery was allowed by the local law, the status of slave would still attach to

him, and the master’s right to his service be resumed. Mr. Broom collects the

authorities on this subject in general, in the notes to Sommersett’s Case, Const.

Law, 105.

' “As soon as a slave comes into England, he becomes free; one may be a

villein in England, but not a slave.” Holt, Ch. J ., in Smith v. Brown, 2 Salk.

The same opinion had been previously expressed by Lord Holt, but
without authoritative decision. 1
In Scotland a condition of servitude continued to a later period.
The holding of negro~ in slavery was indeed held to be
illegal • soon after the Sommersett Case ; but the salters [* 299]
and colliers did not acquire their freedom until 1799, nor
without an act of Parliament.2 A previous statute for their enfranchisement through judicial proceedings had proved ineffectual.3
The history of slavery in this country pertains rather to general
history than to a work upon State constitutional law. Throughout the land involuntary servitude is abolished by constitutional
amendment, except as it may be imposed in the punishment of
crime.4 Nor do we suppose the exception will permit the convict to
be subjected to other servitude than such as is under the control
and direction of. the public authorities, in the manner heretofore
customary. The laws of the s~veral States allow the letting of the
services of the convicts, either singly or in numbers, to contractors
who are to employ them in mechanical trades in or near the prison,
and under the surveillance of its officers; but it might well be
doubted if a regulation which should suffer the convict to be placed
upon the auction block and sold to the highest bidder, either for
life or for a term of years, would be in harmony with the constitutional prohibition. It is certain that it would be open to very grave
abuses, and it is so inconsistent with the general sentiment in
countries where slavery does not exist, that it may well be believed

666._ See also Smith v. Gould, Ld. Raym. 1274; s. 0. Salk. 666. There is a

learned note in Q,uincy’s Rep. p. 94, collecting the English authorities on the

subject of Slavery.

' 39 Geo. III. c. 56.

' May’s Const. Hist. c. 11.

‘ Amendments to Const. of U. S. art. 13.
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and with as little reserve as they would have been in any of our 'Vest India
possessions. Such a state of things continued without impeachment from a
very early period up to nearly the end of the last century." The Slave Grace,
2 Hagg. Adm. 105. In this case it was decided that if a slave, carried by his
master into a free country, voluntarily returned with him to a country where
slavery was allowed by the local !aw, the status of slave would still attach to
him, and the master's right to his service be resumed. Mr. Broom collects the
authorities on this subject in general, in the notes to Sommersett's Case, Const.
Law, 105.
1 " As soon as a slave comes into England, he becomes free ; one may be a
villein in England, but not a slave." Holt, Ch. J., in Smith 11. Brown, 2 Salk.
666.. See also Smith 11. Gould, Ld. Raym. 1274; s. c. Salk. 666. There is a
learned note in Quincy's Rep. p. 94, collecting the English authorities on the
subject of Slavery.
I 39 Geo. m. c. 56.
' 1\fay's Const. Hist. e. 11.
• Amendments to Canst. of U.S. art. 13.
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not to have been within the understanding of the people in

[CH. X.

incorporating the exception with the prohibitory amendment.

The common law of England permits the impressment of sea-

faring men to man the royal navy ; 1 but this species of servitude

was never recognized in the law of America. The citizen may

doubtless be compelled to serve his country in her wars; but the

common law as adopted by us has never allowed arbitrary

discriminations for this purpose between persons of diﬁerent

avocations.

Unreasonable Searches and Seizures.

Near in importance to exemption from any arbitrary control of

the person is that maxim of the common law which secures to the

citizen immunity in his home against the prying eyes of the govern-

ment, and protection in person, property, and papers, against even

not to have been within the understanding of the people in
incorporating the exception with the prohibitory amendment.
The common law of England permits the impressment of seafaring men to man the royal navy ; 1 but this species of Rervitude
was never recognized in the law of America. The citizen may
doubtless be compelled to serve his country in her wars; but the
common law as adopted by us has never allowed arbitrary
discriminations for this purpose between persons of different
avocations.

the process of the law, except in a few speciﬁed cases. The

maxim that “ every man’s house is his castle,”” is made

Unreasonable Searches and Seizures.

[*‘ 300] a * part of our constitutional law in the clauses prohibit-

ing unreasonable searches and seizures, and has always

been looked upon as of high value to the citizen.

If in English history we inquire into the original occasion for

these constitutional provisions, we shall probably ﬁnd it in the

abuse of executive authority, and in the unwarrantable intrusion
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of executive agents into the houses and among the private papers

of individuals, in order to obtain evidence of political offences

either committed or designed. The ﬁnal overthrow of this practice

is so clearly and succinctly stated in a recent work on the constitu-

tional history of England that we cannot refrain from copying the

account in the note below.” p

‘ Broadfoot’s Case, 18 State Trials, 1323; Fost. Cr. Law, 178; Rex v.Tubbs,

Cowp. 512; Exparte Fox, 5 State Trials, 276; 1 Bl. Com. 419; Broom, Const.

Law, 116.

’ Broom, Maxims, 321. The eloquent passage in Chatham’s speech on Gen-

eral Warrants is familiar: “ The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid deﬁance to

all the forces of the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may

blow through it; the storm may enter; the rain may enter; but the king of

England may not enter; all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined

tenement." And see Lieber on Civil Liberty and Self Government, c. 6.

3 “ Among the remnants of a jurisprudence which had favored prerogative at

the expense of liberty was that of the arrest of persons under general warrants,

without previous evidence of their guilt or identiﬁcation of their persons. This

I
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Near in importance to exemption from any arbitrary control of
the person is that maxim of the common law which secures to the
citizen immunity in his home against the prying eyes of the government, and protection in person, property, and papers, against even
the process of the law, except in a few specified cases. The
maxim that " every man's house is his castle," 2 is made
[* 300] a • part of our constitutional law in the clauses prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, and has always
been looked upon as of high value to the citizen.
If in English history we inquire into the original occasion for
these constitutional provisions, we shall probably find it in the
abuse of executive authority, and in the unwarrantable intrusion
of executive agents into the houses and among the private papers
of individuals, in order to obtain evidence of political offences
either committed or designed. The final overthrow of this practice
is so clearly and succinctly stated in a recent work on the constitutional history of England that we cannot refrain from copying the
account in the note below.8
1 Broadfoot's Case, 18 State Trials, 1828; Fost. Cr. Law, 178; Rex !'.Tubbs,
Cowp. 512; Ex parte Fox, 5 State Trials, 276; 1 Bl. Com. 419; Broom, Const.
Law, 116.
• Broom, Maxims, 321. The eloquent passage in Chatham's speech on Gen·
eral Warrants is familiar : " The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to
all the forces of the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may
blow through it; the storm may enter ; the rain may enter ; but the ki~ of
England may not enter ; all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined
tenement." And see Lieber on Civil Liberty and Self Government, c. 6.
3 "Among the remnants of a jurisprudence w~ich bad favored prerogative at
the expense of liberty was that of the arrest of persons under general warrants,
without previous evidence of their guilt or identification of their persons. This
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connection with that in America immediately previous to

practice survived the revolution, and was continued without question, on the

ground of usage, until the reign of George IIl., when it received its death-blow

from the boldness of Wilkes and the wisdom of Lord Camden. This question

• The history of this controversy should be read in [• 301]
connection with that in America. immediately previous to

was brought to an issue by N 0. 45 of the ‘ North Briton,’ already so often men-

tioned. There was the libel, but who was the libeller? Ministers knew not, nor

waited to inquire, after the accustomed forms of law; but forthwith Lord Hali-

fax, one of the secretaries of state, issued a warrant, directing four messengers,

taking with them a, constable, to search for the authors, printers, and publishers;

and to apprehend and seize them, together with their papers, and bring them in

safe custody before him. No one having been charged or even suspected, —no

evidence of crime having been offered, —no one was named in this dread instru-

ment. The offence only was pointed at, not the offender. The magistrate who

should have sought proofs of crime deputed this olﬁce to his messengers. Armed

with their roving commission, they set forth in quest of unknown offenders; and,

unable to take evidence, listened to rufnors, idle tales, and curious guesses.

They held in their hands the liberty of every man whom they were pleased to

suspect. Nor were they triﬁers in their work. In three days they arrested no

less than forty-nine persons on suspicion,—many as innocent as Lord Halifax

himself. Among the number was Dryden Leach, a printer, whom they took from

his bed at night. They seized his papers, and even apprehended his journeymen
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and servants. He had printed one number of the ‘ North Briton,’ and was then

reprinting some other numbers; but as he happened not to have printed N 0. 45,

he was released without being brought before Lord Halifax. They succeeded,

however, in arresting Kearsley the publisher," and Balfe the printer, of the ob-

noxious number, with all their workmen. From them it was discovered that

Wilkes was the culprit of whom they were in search; but the evidence was, not

on oath; and the messengers received verbal directions to apprehend Wilkes

under the general warrant. W'ilkes, far keener than the crown lawyers, not see-

ing his own name there, declared it ‘a ridiculous warrant against the whole

English nation,’ and. refused to obey it. But after being in custody of the

messengers for some hours, in his own house, he was taken away in a chair, to

appear before the secretaries of state. No sooner had he been removed than

the messengers, returning to his house, proceeded to ransmck his drawers; and

carried off all his private papers, including even his will and his pocket-book.

When brought into the presence of Lord Halifax and Lord Egremont, questions

were put to Wilkes which he refused to answer: whereupon he was committed

close prisoner to the Tower, denied the use of pen and paper, and interdicted

from receiving the visits of his friends or even of his professional advisers.

From this imprisonment, however, he was shortly released on a writ of habeas

corpus, by reason of his privilege as a member of the House of Commons.

“ Wilkes and the printers, supported by Lord Temple’s liberality, soon ques-

tioned the legality of the general warrant. First, several journeyman printers

brought action against the messengers. On the ﬁrst trial, Lord Chief Justice

Pratt—n0t allowing bad precedents to set aside the sound principles of English

21 [ 321 ]

practice survived the revolution, and was continued without question, on the
ground of usage, until the reign of George III., when it received its death-blow
from the boldness of Wilkes and the wisdom of Lord Camden. This question
was brought to an issue by No. 45 of the 'North Briton,' already so often mentioned. There was the libel, but who was the libeller P Ministers knew not, nor
. waited to inquire, after the accustomed forms of law; but forthwith Lord Halifax, one of the secretaries of state, issued a warrant, directing four messengers,
taking with them a, constable, to search for the authors, printers, and publishers ;
and to apprehend and seize them, together with their papers, and bring tht>m in
safe custody before him. No one having been charged or even suspected,- no
evidence of crime having been offered, -no one was named in this dread instrument. The offence only was pointed at, not the offender. The magistrate who
should have sought proofs of crime deputed this office to his meaengers. Armed
with their roving commission, they set forth in quest of unknown offenders; and,
unable to take evidence, listened to rumors, idle tales, and curious guesses.
They held in their hands the liberty of e,·ery man whom they were pleased to
suspect. Nor were they triflers in their work. In three days they arrested no
less than forty-nine persons on suspicion,- many as innocent as Lord Halifax
himself. Among the number was Dryden Leach, a printer, whom they took from
his bed at night. They seized his papers, and even apprehended his journeymen
and servants. He had printed one number of the • North Briton,' and was then
reprinting some other numbers; but as he happened not to have printed No. 45,
be was released without being brought before Lord Halifax. They succeeded,
however, in arresting Kearsley the publisher, and Balfe the printer, of the obnoxious number, with all t.heir workmen. From them it was discovered that
Wilkt!s was the culprit of whom they were in search; but the evidence was. not
on oath; and the messengers receiveu verbal directions to apprehend Wilkes
under the general warrant. Wilkell, fllr keener than the crown lawyers, not seeing his own name there, declared it ' a ridiculous warrant against the whole
English nation,' and. refused to obey it. But after being in custody of the
messengers for some hours, in his own house, he was taken away in a chair, to
appear before thtJ secretaries of state. No sooner bad he been removed than
the messengers, returning to his bouse, proceeded to ransack his drawers; and
carried off all biB private papers, including even his will and his pocket-book.
When brought into the presence of Lord Halifax and Lord Egremont, questions
were put to Wilkes which he refused to answer: whereupon he was committed
close prisoner to tho Tower, denied the use of pen and paper, and interdicted
from receiving the visits of his friends or even of his professional advisers.
From this imprisonment, however, be was shortly released on a writ of habeas
corpus, by reason of his privilege as a member of the House of Commons.
"Wilkes and the printers, supported by Lord Temple's liberality, soon questioned the legality of the general warrant. First, several journeymen printers
brought action against the messengers. On the first trial, Lord Chief Justice
Pratt- not allowing bad preredents to set aside the sound principles of English
21
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issued by the courts to the revenue oﬂicers, empowering

law—held that the general warrant was illegal; that it was illegally executed;

and that the messengers were not indemniﬁed by statute. The journeymen re-

covered three hundred pounds damages; and the other plaintiffs also obtained

[• 302] the American Revolution, • in regard to writs of assistance
issued by the courts to the revenue officers, empowering

verdicts. In all these cases, however, bills of exceptions were tendered and

allowed. Mr. Wilkes himself brought an action against Mr. Wood, under-secre-

tary of state, who had personally superintended the execution of the warrant.

At this trial it was proved that Mr. Wood and the messengers, after lVilkes’s

removal in custody, had taken entire possession of his house, refusing admission

to his friends; had sent for a blacksmith, who opened the drawers of his bureau;

and having taken out the papers, had carried them away in a sack, without taking

any list or inventory. All his private manuscripts were seized, and his pocket-

book ﬁlled up the mouth of the sack. Lord Halifax was examined, and admitted

that the warrant had been made out three days before he had received evidence

that lVilkes was the author of the ‘North Briton.‘ Lord Chief Justice Pratt

thus spoke of the warrant: ‘The defendant claimed a right, under precedents,

to force persons’ houses, break open escritoires, and seize their papers upon a

general warrant, where no inventory is made of the things thus taken away, and

where no offenders’ names are speciﬁed in the warrant, and therefore a discre-

tionary power given to messengers to search wherever their suspicions may

chance -to fall. If such a power is truly invested in a secretary of state, and he
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can delegate this power, it certainly may affect the person and property of every

man in this kingdom, and is totally subversive of the liberty of the subject.’

The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff with one thousand pounds damages.

‘f Four days after Wilkes had obtained his verdict against Mr. Wood, Dryden

Leach, the printer, gained another verdict, with four hundred pounds damages

against the messengers. A bill of exceptions, however, was tendered and re-

ceived in this as in other cases, and came on for hearing before the Court of

King‘s Bench in 1765. After much argument, and the citing of precedents show-

ing the practice of the secretary of state‘s office ever since the revolution, Lord

Mansﬁeld pronounced the warrant illegal, saying: ‘ It is not ﬁt that the judging

of the information should be left to the discretion of the ofﬁcer. The magistrate

should judge, and give certain directions to the oﬂicer.’ The other three judges

agreed that the warrant was illegal and bad, ‘ believing that no degree of an-

tiquity can give sanction to an usage bad in itself.’ The judgment was therefore

aﬂirmed. '

“ Wilkes had also brought actions for false imprisonment against both the

secretaries of state. Lord Egremont’s death put an end to the action against

him; and Lord Halifax, by pleading privilege, and interposing other delays

unworthy of his position and character, contrived to put off his appearance until

after lvilkes had been outlawed, when he appeared and pleaded the outlawry.

But at length, in 1769, no further postponement could be contrived; the action

was tried, and Wilkes obtained no less than four thousand pounds damages.

Not only in this action, but throughout the proceedings, in which persons ag-

grieved by the general warrant had sought redress; the government oﬂ'ered an
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Ia w- held that the general warrant was illegal ; that it was illegally executed;
and that the messengers were not indemnified by statute. The journeymen recovered three hundred pounds damages ; and the other plaintiffs also obtained
verdicts. In all these cases, however, bills of exceptions were tendered and
allowed. Mr. Wilkes himself brought an action against l\lr. Wood, undeNecretary of state, who had personally superintended the execution of the warrant.
At this trial it was proved that Mr. Wood and the messengers, after Wilkes's
removal in custody, had takeD entire possession of his house, refusing admission
to his friends ; had sent for a blacksmith, who opened the drawers of his bureau ;
and having taken out the papers, bad earried them away in a sack, without taking
list or inventory. All his private manuscripts were seized; and his pocketbook filled up the mouth of the sack. Lord Halifax was examined, and admitted
that the warrant had been made out three days before he had received evidence
that Wilkes was the author of the 'North Briton.' Lord Chief Justice Pratt
thus spoke of the warrant: ' The defendant claimed a right, under precedents,
to force persons' houses, break open escritoires, and seize their papers upon a
general warrant, where no inventory is made of the things thus taken away, and
\vhere no offenders' names are specified in the warrant, and therefore a discretionary power given to messengers to search wherever their suspicions may
ch~nce to fall. If su~·h a power is truly invested in a secretary of state, and he
can delegate this power, it certainly may affect the person and property of every
man in this kingdom, and is totally subversive of the liberty of the subject.'
The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff with one thousand pounds damages.
"Four days after Wilkes had obtained his verdict against Mr. Wood, Dryden
Leach, the printer, gained another verdict, with four hundred pounds damages
against the messengers. A bill of exceptions, however, was tendered and received in this as in other cases, and came on for hearing before the Court of
King's Bench in 1765. After much argument, and the citing of precedents showing the practice of the secretary of state's office ever since the revolution, Lord
Mansfield pronounced the warrant illegal, saying: 'It is not fit that the judging
of the information should be left to the discretion of the officer. The magistrate
should judge, and give certain directions to the officer.' The other three judges
agreed that the warrant was illegal and bad, • belie,·ing that no degree of antiquity can give sanction to an usage bad in itself.' The judgment was therefore
affirmed.
" Wilkes had also brought actions for false imprisonment against both the
secretarie~ of state. Lord Egremont's death put an end to the action against
him ; and Lord Halifax, by pleading privilege, and interposing other delays
unworthy of his position and character, contrived to put off his appearance until
after Wilkes had been outlawed, when he appeared and pleaded the outlawry.
But at length, in 1769, no further postponement could be contrived; the action
was tried, and Wilkes obtained no less than four thousand pounds llamages.
Not only in this action, but throughout the proceedings, in which persons aggrieved by the general warrant had sought redress; the government offered an
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them, in their discretion, to search ‘ suspected places for [* 303]

smuggled goods, and which Otis pronounced “the worst

obstinate and vexatious resistance. The defendants were harassed by every

obstacle which the law permitted, and subjected to ruinous costs. The expenses

them, in their discretion, to search • suspected places for [• 303]
smuggled goods, and which Otis pronounced " the worst

which government itself incurred in these various actions were said to have

amounted to one hundred thousand pounds.

“The liberty of the subject was further assured at this period by another

remarkable judgment of Lord Camden. In November, 1762, the Earl of Hali-

fax, as secretary of state,' had issued a warrant directing certain messengers,

taking a constable to their assistance, to search for John Entinck, clerk, the

author or one concerned in the writing of several’ numbers of the ‘Monitor, or

British F reeholdcr,’ and to seize him, together with his books and papers, and

bring him in safe custody before the secretary of state. In execution of -this

warrant, the messengers“ apprehended Mr. Entinck in his house, and seized the

books and papers in his bureau, writing-desk, and drawers. This case differed

from that of Wilkes, as the warrant speciﬁed the name of the person against

whom it was directed. In respect of the person, it was not a general warrant;

but as regards the papers, it was a general search-warrant, -- not specifying any

particular papers to be-seized, but giving authority to the messengers to take all

his books and papers according to their discretion. '

“ Mr. Entinck" brought an action of trespass against the messengers for the
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seizure of his papers, upon which a jury found a special verdict, with three hun-

dred pounds damages. This special verdict was twice learnedly argued before

the Court of Common Pleas, where, at length, in 1765, Lord Camden pronounced

an elaborate judgment. He even doubted the right of the secretary of state to

commit persons at all, except for high treason; but in deference to prior deci-

sions, the court felt bound to acknowledge the right. The main question, how-

ever, was the legality of a search-warrant for papers. ‘ If this point should be

determined in favor of the jurisdiction,’ said Lord Camden, ‘ the secret cabinets

and bureaus of every subject in this kingdom will be thrown open to the search

and inspection of a messenger, whenever the secretary of state shall see ﬁt to

charge, or even to suspect, a person to be the author, printer, or publisher of a

seditious libel.’ ‘ This power, so assumed by the secretary of state, is an execu-

tion upon all the party’s papers in the ﬁrst instance. His house is riﬂed; his most

valuable papers are taken out of his possession, before the paper, for which he is

charged, is found to be criminal by any competent jurisdiction, and before he

is convicted either of writing, publishing, or being concerned in the paper.‘ It

had been found by the special verdict that many such warrants had been issued

since the revolution; but he wholly denied their legality. He referred the origin

of the practice to the Star Chamber, which in pursuit of libels had given search-

warrants to their messenger of the press; a practice which, after the abolition

of the Star Chamber, had been revived and authorized by the licensing act of

Charles II., in the person of the secretary of state. And he conjectured that

this practice had been continued after the expiration of that act, —a conjecture

shared by Lord Mansﬁeld and the Court of King's Bench. With the unanimous

concurrence of the other judges of his court, this eminent magistrate now ﬁnally

condemned this dangerous and unconstitutional practice.” May’s Constitutional

[ 323 ]

obstinate and vexatious resistance. The defendants were harassed by every
obstacle which the law permitted, and subjected to ruinoua costs. The expensea
which government itself incurred in these various actions were said to have
amounted to one hundred thousand pounds.
"The liberty of the suhjed was further assured at this period by another
remarkable judgment of Lord (':Lmden. In November, 1762, the Earl of Halifax, as secretary of state; hac.l is~ued a warrant directing certain messengers,
taking a constable to their assistnnce, to search for John Entinck, clerk, the
author or one concerned in the writing of several· numbers of the 'Monitor, or
British Freeholder,' and to seize him, together with his books and papers, and
bring him in sa_fe custody before the secretary of state. In execution of-this
warrant, the messengers apprehended Mr. Entinck in his bouse, and seized the
books and papers in his bureau, writing-desk, and drawers. This case differed
from that of Wilkes, as the warrant specified the name of the person against
whom it was directed. In respect of the person, it was not a general warrant;
but as regards the papers, it was a general search-warrant, -not specifying any
particular papers to be· seized, but giving authority to the messenger!! to take all
his books and papers according to thf'ir discretion.
"Mr. Entinck brought an action of trespass against the messengers for the
seizure of his papers, upon whil·h a jury found a special verdict, with three hundred pounds damages. This special verdict was twice learnedly argueJ. before
the Court of Common Pleas, where, at length, in 1765, Lord Camden pronounced
an elaborate judgment. He even doubted the right of the secretary of state to
commit persons at all, except for high treason ; but in deference to prior decisions, the court felt ·bound to acknowledge the right. The main question, bowever, was the legality of a search-warrant for papers. ' If this point should be
determined in favor of the jurisdiction.' said Lord Camden, 'the secret cabineta
and bureaus of every subject in this kingdom will be thrown open to the search
and inspection of a messenger, whenever the secretary of state shall see fit to
charge, or even to suspect, a person to be the author, printer, or publisher of a
seditions libel.' 'This power, so assumed by thu secretary of state, is an execution upon all the party'11 papers in the first instance. His house is rifled; his most
valuable papers arc taken out of his posses11ion, before the paper, for whi<."h he is
charged, is found to be criminal by any competent jurisdiction, and before he
is convicted either of writing, publishing, or being concerned in the paper.' It
bad been found by the special verdict that many such warrants had been issued
since the revolution ; but he wholly denied their legality. He referred the origin
of the practice to the Star Chamber, which in pursuit of libels bad given searchwarrants to their messenger of the press ; a practice which, after the abolition
of the Star Chamber, bad been revived and authorized by the licensing act of
Charles II., in the person of the secretary of state. And he conjectured that
this practice bad been continued after the expiration of that act, - a conjecture
shared by Lord Mansfield and the Court of King's Bench. With the unanimous
concurrence of the other judges of his court, this eminent magistrate now finally
condemned this dangerous arid unconstitutional practice." May's Constitutional
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instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English

liberty and the fundamental principles of law, that ever was found

in an English law book ; ” since they placed “ the liberty of every

man in the hands of every petty officer.” 1 All these matters are

now a long way in the past; but it has not been deemed unwise to

repeat in the State constitutions, as well as in the Constitution of

the United States,“ the principles already settled in the common

law upon this vital point in civil liberty. .

For the service of criminal process the houses of private par-

ties are subject to be broken and entered under circumstances

which are fully explained in the works on criminal law, and need

not be enumerated here. And there are also cases where search-

warrants are allowed to be issued, under which an ofﬁcer may be

protected in the like action. But as search-warrants are a species

of process exceedingly arbitrary in character, and which ought not

to be resorted to except for very urgent and satisfactory reasons,

the rules of law which pertain to them are of more than ordinary

strictness; and if the party acting under them expects legal pro-

tection, it is essential that these rules be carefully observed.

[* 304] ‘In the ﬁrst place they are only to be granted in the

cases expressly authorized by law; and not generally in
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such cases until after a showing made before a judicial officer,

under oath, that a crime has been committed, and that the party

complaining has reasonable cause to suspect that the oﬂender, or

the property which was the subject or the instrument of the crime,

is concealed in some speciﬁed house or place.“ And the law, in

requiring a showing of reasonable cause for suspicion, intends that

evidence shall be given of such facts as shall satisfy the magistrate

History of England, c. 11. See also Semayne‘s Case, 5 Coke, 91; 1 Smith’s

Lead. Cas. 183; Entinck v. Carrington, 2 Wils. 275, and 19 State Trials, 1030;

Note to same case in Broom, Const. Law, 613; Money v. Leach, Burr. 1742;

Wilkes’s Case, 2 Wils. 151, and 19 State Trials, 1405. For debates in Parlia-

ment on the same subject, see Hansard’s Debates, Vol. XV. p. 1393 to 1418,

Vol. XVI. pp. 6 and 209. In further illustration of the same subject, see

De Lolme on the English Constitution, c. 18; Story on Const. §§ 1901, 1902;

Bell v. Clapp, 10 Johns. 263; Sailly v. Smith, 11 Johns. 500.

‘ Works of John Adams, Vol. II. pp. 523, 524; 2 Hildreth’s U. S. 499; 4

Bancroﬁfs U. S. 414; Quincy, Mass. Reports, 51. See also the appendix to

these reports, p. 395, for a history of writs of assistance.

instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English
liberty and the fundamental principles of law, that ever was found
in an English law book;" since they placed "the liberty of every
man in the hands of every petty officer." 1 All these matters are
now a long way in the past; but it has not been deemed unwise to
repeat in the State constitutions, as well as in the Constitution of
the United States,2 the principles already settled in the common
law upon this vital point in civil liberty.
For the service of criminal process the houses of private parties nre subject to be broken and entered under circumstances
which are fully explained in the works on criminal law, and need
not be enumerated here. And there are also cases where searchwarrants are allowed to be issued, under which an officer may be
protected in the like action. But as search-warrants are a species
of process exceedingly arbitrary in character, and which ought not
to be resorted to except for very urgent aud satisfactory reasons,
the rules of law which pertain to them are of more than ordinary
strictness ; and if the party acting under them expects legal protection, it is essential that these rules be carefully observed.
[• 304]
• In the first place they are only to be granted in the
cases expressly authorized by law; and not generally in
such cases until aftet: a showing made before a judicial officer,
under oath, that a crime has been committed, and that the party
complaining has reasonable cause to suspect that the offender, or
the property which was the subject or the instrument of the crime,
is concealed in some specified house or place.8 And the law, in
requiring a showing of reasonable cause for suspicion, intends that
evidence shall be given of such facts as shall satisfy the magistrate

' U. S. Const. 4th Amendment.

’ 2 Hale, P. C. 142; Bishop, Cr. Pro. §§ 716—719; Archbold, Cr. Law, 147.

— __ _.L__J
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History of England, c. 11. See also Semayne's Case, 6 Coke, 91; 1 Smith's
Lead. Cas. 183; Entinck !'.Carrington, 2 Wils. 275, and 19 State Trials, 1030;
Note to same case in Broom, Const. Law, 613; Money v. Leach, Burr. l742;
Wilkes's Case, 2 Wils. 151, and 19 State Trials, 1405. For debates in Parliament on the same subject, see Hansard's Debates, Vol. XV. p. 1393 to 1418,
Vol. XVI. pp. 6 and 209. In further illustration of the same subject, see
De Lolme on the English Colllltitution, c. 18; Story on Const. §§ 1901, 1902;
Bell v. Clapp, 10 Johns. 263; Sailly v. Smith, 11 Johns. 500.
1 Works of John Adams, Vol. II. pp. 523, 524; 2 Hildreth's U. S. 499; 4
Bancroft's U. S. 414; Quincy, Mass. Reports, 61. See also the appendix to
these reports, p. 39b, for a history of writs of assistance.
• U.S. Const. 4th Amendment.
1 2 Hale, P. C. 142; Bishop, Cr. Pro. §§ 716-719; Archbold, Cr. Law, 147.
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ground for the warrant exceptas the facts justify it.1 _

In the next place, the warrant which the magistrate issues must

particularly specify the place to be searched, and the object for

which the search is to be made. If a building is to be searched,

the name of the owner or occupant should be given;” or, if not

occupied, it should be particularly described, so that the oﬂicer will

be left to no discretion in respect to the place; and a misdescrip-

tion in regard to the ownership,” or a description so general that it

applies equally well to several buildings or places, would render

the warrant void in law.‘ Search-warrants are always obnoxious

to very serious objections; and very great particularity is justly

required in these cases, before the privacy of a man’s premises is

allowed to be invaded by the minister of the law.“ And therefore

a designation of goods to be searched for as “ goods, wares, and

merchandises,” without more particular description, has been

regarded as insufﬁcient, even ih the case of goods supposed to be

smuggled,“ where there is usually greater difficulty in giving

description, and where consequently more latitude should be

permitted than in the case of property stolen.

* Lord Hale says, “ It is ﬁt that such warrants to search [* 305]

do express that search be made in the day-time ; and though
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I do not say they are unlawful without such restriction, yet they

are very inconvenient without it; for many times, under pretence

of searches made in the night, robberies and burglaries have been

committed, and at best it creates great disturbance”? And the

statutes upon this subject will generally be found to provide for

“searches in the day-time only, except in very special cases.

‘ Commonwealth v. Lottery Tickets. 5 Cush. 369; Else v. Smith, 1 D. &

R 97.

' Stone u. Dana, 5 Met. 98.

’ Sandford v. Nichols, 13 Mass. 286; Allen v. Staples, 6 Gray, 491.

‘ Thus, a warrant to search the “houses and buildings of Hiram Ide and

Henry Ide,” is too general. Humes v. Tabor, 1 R. I. 464. See McGlinchy v.

Barrows, 41 Me. 74. So a warrant for the arrest of an unknown person under

the designation of John Doe, without further description, is void. Common-

wealth v. Crotty, 10 Allen, 403.

° A warrant for searching a dwelling-house will not justify a forcible entry

into a barn adjoining the dwelling-house. Jones v. Fletcher, 41 Me. 254;

Downing v. Porter, 8 Gray, 539; Bishop, Cr. Pro. §§ 716-719.

‘ Sandford v. Nichols, 13 Mass. 286; Archbold, Cr. Law, 143.

that the suspicion is well founded ; for the suspicion itself is no
ground for the warrant except .a.s the facts justify it.I
In the next place, the warrant which the magistrate issues must
particularly specify the place to be searched, and the object for
which the search is to be made. If a building is to be searched,
the name of the owner or occupant should be given; 2 or, if not
occupied, it should be particularly described, so that the officer will
be left to no discretion in respect to the place ; and a misdescription in regard to the ownership,8 or a description so general that it
applies equally well to several buildings or places, would render
the warrant void in law.' Search-warrants are always obnoxious
to very serious objections ; and very great particularity is justly
required in these cases, before the privacy of a man's premises is
allowed to be invaded by the minister of the law.6 And therefore
a designation of goods to be searched for as " goods, wares, and
merchandises," without more particular description, has been
regarded as insufficient, even in the case of goOds supposed to be
smuggled,6 where there is usually greater difficulty in g1vtng
description, and where consequently more latitude should be
permitted than in the case of property stolen.
• Lord Hale says," It is fit that such warrants to search [• 305]
do express that search be made in the day-time ; and though
I do not say they are unlawful without such restriction, yet they
are very inconvenient without it; for many times, under pretence
of searches made in the night, robberies and burglaries have been
committed, and at best it creates great disturbance." 7 And the
statutes upon this subject will generally be found to provide for
searches in the day-time only, except in very special cases.

" 2 Hale, P. C. 150. See Archbold, Cr. Law (7th ed.), 145.

[ 325 ]

1 Commonwealth "· Lottery Tickets, 5 Cush. 369 i Else o. Smith, 1 D. &
R 97.
1 Stone "· Dana, 5 Met. 98.
' Sandford v. Nichols, 13 Mass. 286; Allen"· Staples, 6 Gray, 491.
4 Thus, a warrant to search the " houses and buildings of Hiram Ide and
Henry Ide," is too general. Humes"· Tabor, 1 R. I. 464. See McGlinchy "·
Barrows, 41 Me. 74. So a warrant for the arrest of an unknown person under
the designation of John Doe, without further description, is void. Commonwealth"· Crotty, 10 Allen, 408.
· 1 A warrant for searching a dwelling-house will not justify a forcible entry
into a barn adjoining the dwelling-bouse. Jones v. Fletcher, 41 Me. 254;
Downing v. Porter, 8 Gray, 539; Bishop, Cr. Pro. §§ 716-719.
• Sandford"· Nichols, 13 Mass. 286; ;\rchbold, Cr. Law, 143.
' 2 Hale, P. C. 150. See Archbold, Cr. Law (7th ed.), 145.
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The warrant should also be directed to the sheriff or other

[cH. x.

proper oﬂicer, and not to private persons; though the party

complainant may be present for the purposes of identiﬁcation}

and other assistance can lawfully be called in by the oﬂicer if

necessary.

The warrant must also command that the goods or other

articles to be searched for, if found, together with the party in

whose custody they are found, be brought before the magistrate,

to the end that, upon further examination into the facts, the goods,

and the party in whose custody they were, may be disposed of

according to law? And it is a fatal objection to such a warrant,

that it leaves the disposition of the goods searched for to the

ministerial oﬂicer, instead of requiring them to be brought be-

fore the magistrate, that he may pass his judgment upon the

truth of the complaint made; and it would also be a fatal ob-

jection to a statute authorizing such a warrant, if it permitted

a condemnation or other ﬁnal disposition of the goods, without

notice to the claimant, and without an opportunity for a hear-

ing being aﬂ'0rded him.“

The warrant is not allowed for the purpose of obtaining evi-

dence of an intended crime; but only after lawful evidence of

an offence actually committed! Nor even then is it allowable
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to invade one’s privacy for the sole purpose of obtaining

[' 306] evidence against him,5 ‘except in a few special cases

where that which is the subject of the crime is supposed

to be concealed, and the public or the complainant has an interest

' Hale, P. C. 150; Archbold, Cr. Law (7th ed.), 145.

' 2 Hale, P. C. 150; Bell v. Clapp, 10 Johns. 263; Hibbard v. People,

4 Mich. 126; Fisher v. McGirr, 1 Gray, 1.

3 The “Search and Seizure" clause in some of the prohibitory liquor laws

was held void on this ground. Fisher v. McGirr, 1 Gray, 1; Greene v. Briggs,

1 Curtis, 311; Hibbard v. People, 4 Mich. 126. See also Matter of Morton,

10 Mich. 208, for a somewhat similar principle.

‘ VVe do not say that it would be incompetent to authorize, by statute, the

issue of search-warrants for the prevention of offences in some cases; but it is

diﬂicult to state any case in which it might be proper, except in such cases of

attempts, or of preparations to commit crime, as are in themselves criminal.

‘ The fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, found also

The warrant should also be directed to the sheriff or other
proper officer, and not to private persons; though the party
complainant may be present for the purposes of identification,1
and other assistance can lawfully be called in by the officer if
necessary.
The warrant must also command that the goods or other
articles to be searched for, if found, together with the party in
whose custody they are found, be brought before the magistrate,
to the end that, upon further examination into the facts, the goods,
and the party in whose custody they were, may be disposed of
according to law.2 And it is a fatal objection to such a warrant,
that it leaves the disposition of the goods searched for to the
ministerial officer, instead of requiring them to be brought before the magistrate, that he may pass his judgment upon the
truth of the complaint made ; and it would also be a fatal objection to a statute authorizing such a warrant, if it permitted
a condemnation or other final disposition of the goods, without
notice to the claimant, and without an opportunity for a hearing being afforded him.s
The warrant is not allowed for the purpose of obtaining evidence of an intended crime ; but only after lawful evidence of
an offence actually committed.4 Nor even then is it allowable
to invade one's privacy for the sole purpose of obtaining
(* 306) evidence against him,6 • except in a few special cases
where that which is the subject of the crime is supposed
to be concealed, and the public or the complainant has an interest

in many State constitutions, would clearly preclude the seizure of one’s papers

in order to obtain evidence against him; and the spirit of the ﬁfth amendment-—

that no person shall be compelled in a criminal case to give evidence against

himself —would also forbid such seizure.
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Hale, P. C. 150; Archbold, Cr. Law (7th ed.), 145.
2 Hale, P. C. 150; Bell v. Clapp, 10 Johns. 263; Hibbard v. People,
4 1.lich. 126; Fisher v. McGirr, 1 Gray, 1.
3 The " Search and Seizure" clause in some of the prohibitory liquor laws
was held void on this ground. Fisher v. McGirr, 1 Gray, 1; Greene v. Br:ggs,
1 Curtis, 811; Hibbard v. People, 4 Mich. 126. See also Matter of Morton,
10 Mich. 208, for a somewhat similar principle.
• \Ve do not say that it would be incompetent to authorize, by statute, the
issue of search-warrants for the prevention of offences in some cases; but it is
difficult to state any case in which it might be proper, except in such cases of
attempts, or of preparations to commit erime, as are in themselves criminal.
• The fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, found also
in many State constitutions, would clearly preclude the seizure of one's papers
in order to obtain evidence against him; and the spirit of the fifth amendmentthat no person shall be compelled in a criminal case to give evidence against
himself- would also forbid such seizure.
1

1

~
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in it or in its destruction. Those special cases are familiar and
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well understood in the law. Search-warrants have heretofore

been allowed to search for stolen goods, for goods supposed to

have been smuggled into the country in violation of the revenue

laws, for implements of gaming or counterfeiting, for lottery-

tickets or prohibited liquors kept for sale contrary to law, for

obscene books and papers kept for sale or circulation, and for

powder or other dangerous or explosive material so kept as to

endanger the public safety} A statute which should permit the

breaking and entering a man’s house, and the examination of

books and papers with a view to discover the evidence of crime,

might possibly not be void on constitutional grounds in some

other cases; but the power of the legislature to authorize a re-

sort to this process is one which can properly be exercised only

in extreme cases, and it is better oftentimes that crime should

go unpunished than that the citizen should be liable to have

his premises invaded, his desks broken open, his private books,

letters, and papers exposed to prying curiosity, and to the

misconstructions of ignorant and suspicious persons ; and all this

under the direction of a mere ministerial oﬁicer, who brings

with him such assistants as he pleases, and who will select them

more often with reference to physical strength and courage than
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to their sensitive regard to the rights and feelings of others.

To incline against the enactment of such laws, is to

incline to the side of safety.“ In principle they are * ob- [" 307]

jectionable ; in the mode of execution they are necessarily

odious; and they tend to invite abuse and to cover the com-

‘ These are the most common cases, but in the following search-warrants are

also sometimes provided for by statute: books and papers of a public character,

retained from their proper custody; females supposed to be concealed in houses

of ill-fame; children enticed or kept away from parents or guardians; concealed

weapons ; counterfeit money, and forged bills or papers. See cases under English

statutes speciﬁed in 4 Broom and Hadley’s Commentaries, 332.

' Instances sometimes occur in which ministerial officers take such liberties,

in endeavoring to detect and punish offenders, as are even more criminal than

the offences they seek to punish. The employment of spies and decoys to lead

men on to the commission of crime, on the pretence of bringing criminals to

justice, cannot be too often or too ‘strongly condemned; and that prying into

private correspondence by oﬁicers,~which has sometimes been permitted by

in it or in its destruction. Those special cases are familiar and
well understood in the law. Search·warrants have heretofore
been allowed to search for stolen goods, for goods supposed to
have been smuggled into the country in violation of the revenue
laws, for implements of gaming or counterfeiting, for lottery·
tickets or prohibited liquors kept for sale contrary to law, for
obscene books and papers kept for sale or circulation, and for
powder or other dangerous or explosive material so kept as to
endanger the public safety.1 A statute which should permit the
breaking and entering a man's house, and the examination of
books and papers with a view to discover the evidence of crime,
might possibly not be void on constitutional grounds in some
other cases ; but the power of the legislature to authorize a re·
sort to this process is one which can properly be exercised only
in extreme cases, and it is better oftentimes that crime should
go unpunished than that the citizen should be liable to have
his premises invaded, his desks broken open, his private books,
letters, and papers exposed to prying curiosity, and to the
misconstructions of ignorant and suspicious persons; and all this
under the direction of a mere ministerial officer, who brings
with him such assistants as he pleases, and who will select them
more often with reference to physical strength and courage than
to their sensitive regard to the rights and feelings of others.
To incline against the enactment of such laws, is to
incline to the side of safety.2 In principle they are • ob. [• 307]
jectionable ; in the mode of execution they are necessarily
odious ; and they tend to invite abuse and to cover the com·

postmasters, is directly in the face of the law, and cannot be excused. The

importance of public conﬁdence in the inviolability of correspondence through
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1 These are the most common cases, but in the following search-warrants are
also sometimes provided for by statute: books and papers of a public character,
retained from their proper custody; females supposed to be concealed in houses
of ill-fame; children enticed or kept away from parents or guardians; concealed
weapons; counterfeit money, and forged bills or papers. See cases under English
statutes specified in 4 Broom and Hadley's Commentaries, 882.
1 Instances sometimes occur in which ministerial officers take such liberties,
in endeavoring to detect and punish offenders, as are even more criminal than
the offences they seek to punish. The employment of spies and decoys to lead
men on to the commfssion of crime, on the pretence of bringing criminals to
justice, cannot be too often or too ·strongly condemned; and that prying into
private correspondence by officers, - which has sometimes been permitted by
postmasters, is directly in the face of the law, and cannot be excused. The
importance of public confidence in the inviolability of correspondence through
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mission of crime. We think it would generally be safe for the

[cH. X.

legislature to regard all those searches and seizures “unreason-

able” which have hitherto been unknown to the law, and on

that account to abstain from authorizing them; leaving parties

and the public to the accustomed remedies}

We have said that if the oﬂicer follows the command of his

warrant he is protected; and this is so even when the com-

plaint proves to have been unfounded? But if he exceed

[*‘ 308] the command by *searchingin places not described therein,

or by seizing persons or articles not commanded, he is not

the post-oﬁice cannot well be overrated; and the proposition to permit letters

to be opened, at the discretion of s. ministerial oﬁicer, would excite general

indignation. The same may be said of private correspondence by telegraph;

the public are not entitled to it for any purpose; and a man’s servants might

with the same propriety be subpaenaed to bring into court his private letters

and journals, as a telegraph operator to bring in the private correspondence

mission of crime. We think it would generally be safe for the
legislature to regard all those searches and seizttres " unreasonable" which have hitherto been unknown to the law, and on
that account to abstain from authorizing them; leaving parties
and the public to the accustomed remedies.1
We have said that if the officer follows the command of his
warrant he is protected; and this is so even when the complaint proves to have been unfounded.2 But if he exceed
[* 308] the command by *searching in places not described therein,
or by seizing persons or articles not commanded, he is not

which passes through his hands. In either case it would be equivalent to an

unlawful and unjustifiable seizure of private papers; such an “unreasonable

seizure” as is directly condemned by the Constitution. In England, the secre-

tary of state sometimes issues his warrant for opening a particular letter, where

he is possessed of such facts as he is satisﬁed would justify him with the public;

but no American oﬂicer or body possesses such authority, and its usurpation
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should not be tolerated. For an account of the former and present English

practice on this subject, see May, Constitutional History, c. 11; Todd, Parlia-

mentary Government, Vol. I. p. 272; Broom, Const. Law, 615.

' A search-warrant for libels and other papers of a suspected party was illegal

at the common law. See 11Stste Trials, 313, 321; Archbold, Cr. Law (7th ed.),

141; Wilkes v. Wood, 19 State Trials, 1153. “ Search-warrants were never

recognized by the common law as processes which might be availed of by

individuals in the course of civil proceedings, or for the maintenance of any mere

private right; but their use was conﬁned to the case of public prosecutions

instituted and pursued for the suppression of crime, and the detection and

punishment of criminals. Even in those cases, if we may rely on the authority

of Lord Coke, their legality was formerly doubted; and Lord Camden said that

they crept into the law by imperceptible practice. But their legality has long

been considered to be established, on the ground of public necessity; because

without them felons and other mslefactors would escape detection.” Merrick, J .,

in Robinson v. Richardson, 13 Gray, 456. “To enter a man‘s house," said

Lord Camden, “ by virtue of a nameless warrant, in order to procure evidence,

is worse than the Spanish Inquisition ; a law under which no Englishman would

wish to live an hour.” See his opinion in Entick v. Carrington, 19 State Trials,

1029; s.c. 2 Wils. 275; and Broom, Const. Law, 558; Huckle v. Money, 2

Wils. 205; Leach v. Money, 19 Stats Trials, 1001; s. 0.8 Burr. 1692; and

1 W. Bl. 555; Note to Entick v. Carrington, Broom, Const. Law, 613.

‘ Barnard v. Bartlett, 10 Cush. 501.
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the post-office cannot well be overrated ; and the proposition to permit letters
to be opened, at the discretion of a ministerial officer, would excite general
indignation. The same may be said of printe correspondence by telegraph;
the public are not entitled to it for any purpose; and a man's servants might
with the same propriety be subprenaed to bring into court his private letters
and journals, as a telegraph operator to bring in the private correspondence
which passes through his hands. In either case it would be equivalent to an
unlawful and unjustifiable seizure of private papers ; such an " unreasonable
seizure" as is directly condemned by the Constitution. In England, the secretary of state sometimes issues his warrant for opening a particular letter, where
he is possessed of such facts as he is satisfied would justify him with the public ;
but ~o American officer or body possesses such authority, and its usurpation
should not be tolerated. For an account of the former and present English
practice on this subject, see May, Constitutional History, c. 11; Todd, Parliamentary Government, Vol. I. p. 272; Broom, Const. Law, 615.
1 A search-warrant for libels and other papers of a suspected party was illegal
at the common law. See llStateTrials, 313, 321; Archbold, Cr. Law (7th ed.),
141; Wilkes !l.' Wood, 19 State Trials, 1153. "Search-warrants were never
recognized by the common law as processes whicb might be availed of by
individuals in the course of civil proceedings, or for the maintenance of any mere
private right; but their use was confined to the case of pqblic prosecutions
instituted and pursued for the suppression of crime, and the detection and
punishment of criminals. Even in those cases, if we may rely on the authority
of Lord Coke, their legality was formerly doubted; and Lord Camden said that
they crept into the law by imperceptible practice. But their legality has long
been considered to be established, on the ground of public necessity ; because
without them felons and other malefactors would escape detection." Merrick, J.,
in Robinson " · Richardson, 13 Gray, 456. "To enter a man's house," said
Lord Camden, '' by virtue of a nameless warrant, in order to procure evidence,
is worse tban the Spanish Inquisition ; a law under which no Englishman would
wish to live an hour." ~ee his opinion in Entick v. Carrington, 19 State Trials,
1029; s. c. 2 Wils. 276; and Broom, Const. Law, 558; Huckle "·Money, 2
Wils. 205; Leach "· Money, 19 State Trials, 1001; s. c. · S Burr. 1692; and
1 W. Bl. 565; Note to Entick "·Carrington, Broom, Const. Law, 613.
v Barnard"· Bartlett, 10 Cush. 501.
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protected by the warrant, and can only justify himself as in other
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cases where he assumes to act without process.‘ Obeying strictly

the command of his warrant, he may break open outer or inner

doors, and his justiﬁcation does not depend upon his discover-

ing that for which he is to make search?

In other eases than those to which we have referred, and

subject to the general police power of the State, the law favors

the complete and undisturbed dominion of every man over his

own premises, and protects him therein with such jealousy that

he may defend his possession against intruders, in person or by

his servants or guests, even to the extent of taking the life of

the intruder, if that seem essential to the defence.”

I.

Quartering Soldiers in Private Hbuses.

A provision is found incorporated in the constitution of nearly

every State, that “ no soldier shall in time of peace be quartered in

any house without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war

but in a manner to be prescribed by law.” To us, after four-ﬁfths

of a century have passed away since occasion has existed for

protected by the warrant, and can only justify himself as in other
cases where ho assumes to act without process. 1 Obeying strictly
the command of his warrant, he may break open outer or inner
doors, and his justification does not depend upon his discovering that for which he is to make search.2
In other cases than those to which we have referred, and
subject to the general police power of the State, the law favors
the complete and undisturbed dominion of every man over his
own premises, and protects him therein with such jealousy that
he may defend his possession against intruders, in person or by
his servants or guests, even to the extent of taking the life of
the intruder, if that seem essential to the defence.8

complaint of the action of the government in this particular, the

repetition of this declaration seems to savor of idle form and

' Crozier v. Cudney, 9 D. & R. 224; Same case, 6 B. & C. 232; State v.

Quartering Soldiers in Private Hauses.
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Brennan’s Liquors, 25 Conn. 278.

’ 2 Hale, P. C. 151; Barnard v. Bartlett, 10 Cush. 501.

‘ That in defence of himself, any member of his family or his dwelling, a man

has a right to employ all necessary violence, even to the taking of life, see

Shorter v. People, 2 N .Y. 193; Yates v. People, 32 N. Y. 509; Logue v. Com-

monwealth, 88 Penn. St. 265; Pond v. People, 8 Mich. 150; Maher v. People,

24 Ill. 241. But except where a forcible felony is attempted against person or

property, he should avoid such consequences if possible, and cannot justify

standing up and resistin to the death, when the assailant might have been

avoided by retreat. Peogle v. Sullivan, 7 N. Y. 896. But a man assaulted in

A provision is found incorporated in the constitution of nearly
every State, that " no soldier shall in time of peace be quartered in
any house without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war
but in a manner to be prescribed by law." To us, after four-fifths
of a century have passed away since occasion has existed for
complaint of the action of the government in this particular, the
repetition of this declaration seems to savor of idle form and

his dwelling is under no obligation to retreat; his house is his castle, which

he may defend to any extremity. And this means not simply the dwelling-

house proper, but includes whatever is within the curtilage as understood at

the common law. Pond v. People, 8 Mich. 150. And in deciding what force

it is necessary to employ in resisting the assault, a person must act upon the

circumstances as they appear to him at the time; and he is ‘not to be held

criminal because on a calm survey of the facts afterwards it appears that the

force employed in defence was excessive. See the cases above cited. Also

Schiner v. People, 23 Ill. 17; Patten v. People, 18 Mich. 314; Henton v. State,

24 Texas, 454.
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1 Crozier v. Cudney, 9 D. & R. 224; Same case, 6 B. & C. 232; State "·
Brennan's Liquors, 25 Conn. 278.
1 2 Hale, P. C. 151; Barnard"· Bartlett, 10 Cush. 501.
~ That in defence of himself, any member of his family or his tlwelling, a man
has a right to employ all necessary violence, even to the taking of life, see
Shorter v. People, 2 N.Y. 193; Yates"· People, 32 N.Y. 509; Logue"· Commonwealth, 88 PenR. St. 266; Pond "· People, 8 Mich. 150; Maher v. People,
24 Ill. 241. But except where a forcible felony is attempted against person or
property, he should avoid such consequences if possible, and cannot justify
standing up and resistin~ to the death, when the assailant might have been
avoided by retreat. People v. Sullivan, 7 N.Y. 896. But a man assaulted in
his dwelling is under no obligation to retreat; his house is his castle, which
he may defend to any extremity. And this means not simply the dwellinghouse proper, but includes whatever is within the curtilage as underAtood at
the common law. Pond v. People, 8 Mich. 150. And in deciding what force
it is necessary to employ in resisting the assault, a person must act upon the
circumstances as they appear to him at the time ; and he is •not to be held
criminal because on a calm survey of the facts afterwards it appears that the
force employed in defence was excessive. See the cases above cited. Also
Schiner v. People, 23 lll. 17; Patten v. People, 18 Mich. 314; Henton "· State,
24 Texas, 464.
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ceremony ; but“ a frequent recurrence to the fundamental principles

(ca. x.

of the constitution” can never be unimportant, and indeed may

well be regarded as “ absolutely necessary to preserve the advan-

tages of liberty, and to maintain a free government,” 1 It is

diﬁicult to imagine a more terrible engine of oppression than the

power in the executive to ﬁll the house of an obnoxious person

with a company of soldiers, who are to be fed and warmed at his

expense, under the direction of an ofﬁcer accustomed to the exer-

cise of arbitrary power, and in whose presence the ordinary laws

of courtesy, not less than the civil restraints which protect person

and property, must give way to unbridled will; who is sent

[' 309] as an instrument of "' punishment, and with whom insult

and outrage may appear quite in the line of his duty. How-

ever contrary to the spirit of the age such a proceeding may be,’it

may always be assumed as possible that it may be resorted to in times

of great excitement, when party action is generally violent; and “the

dragonades of Louis XIV. in France, of James II. in Scotland, and

those of more recent and present date in certain countries, furnish

suﬁicient justiﬁcation of this speciﬁc guaranty.” 2 The clause, as we

ﬁnd it in the national and State constitutions, has come down to us

through the Petition of Right, the Bill of Rights of 1688, and the

Declaration of Independence; and it is but a branch of the consti-
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tutional principle, that the military shall in time of peace be in

strict subordination to the civil power.”

Criminal Accusations.

Perhaps the most important of the protections to personal

liberty consists in the mode of trial which is secured to every

person accused of crime. At the common law, accusations of

felony were required to be made by grand jury, by bill of indict-

‘ Constitutions of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, Florida, Illinois,

and North Carolina. See also Constitutions of Virginia, Nebraska, and Wiscon-

sin, for a similar declaration.

’ Lieber, Civil Liberty and Self-Government, c. 11.

" Story on the Constitution, §§ 1899, 1900; Rawle on Constitution, 126. In

exceptional cases, however, martial law may be declared and enforced, whenever

ceremony ; but" a frequent recurrence to the fundamental principles
of the constitution" can never be unimportant, and indeed may
well be regarded as " absolutely necessary to preserve the advantages of liberty, and to maintain a free government," 1 It is
difficult to imagine a more terrible engine of oppression than the
power in the executive to fill the house of an obnoxious person
with a company of soldiers, who are to be fed and warmed at his
expense, under the direction of an officer accustomed to the exercise of arbitrary power, and in whose presence the ordinary laws
of courtesy, not less than the civil restraints which protect person
and property, must give way to unbridled will; who is sent
[• 309] as an instrument of • punishment, and with whom insult
and outrage may appear quite in the line of his duty. However contrary to the spirit of the age such a proceeding may be, 'it
may always be assumed as possible that it may be resorted to in times
of great excitement, when party action is generally violent; and" the
dragonades of Louis XIV. in France, of James II. in Scotland, and
those of more recent and present date in certain countries, furnish
sufficient justification of this specific ~uaran ty." 2 The clause, as we
find it in the national and State constitutions, has come down to us
through the Petition of Right, the Bill of Rights of 1688, and the
Declaration of Independence ; and it is but a branch of the constitutional principle, that the military shall in time of peace be in
strict subordination to the civil power. 3

the ordinary legal authorities are unable to maintain the public peace, and sup-

press violence and outrage. Todd, Parliamentary Government in England, Vol.

Criminal Accusations.

I. p. 342; 1 Bl. Com. 413-415. As to martial law in general, see Ea: parle

Milligan, 4 ‘Val. 129.
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Perhaps the most important of the protections to personal
liberty consiRts in the mode of trial which is secured to every
person accused of crime. At the common law, accusations of
felony were required to be made by grand jury, by bill of indict1 Constitutions of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, Fl?rida, Illinois,
and North Carolina. See also Constitutions of Virginia, Nebraska, and Wisconsin, for a similar declaration.
1 Lieber, Civil Liberty and Self-Government, c. 11.
~ Story on the Constitution, §§ 1899, 1900; Rawle on Constitution, 126. In
exceptional cases, however, martial law may be declared and enforced, whenever
the ordinary legal authorities are unable to maintain the public peace, and suppress violence and outrage. Todd, Parliamentary Government in England, Vol.
I. p. 8!2; 1 Bl. Com. 413-415. As to martial Jaw in general, see Ex parte
Milligan, 4 Wal. 129.
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ment; and this process is still retained in many of the States,
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while others have substituted in its stead an information ﬁled by

the prosecuting oﬁicer of the State or county. The mode of

investigating the facts, however, is the same in all; and this is

through a trial by jury, surrounded by certain safeguards which

are a well understood part of the system, and which the govern-

ment cannot dispense with.

First, we may mention that the humanity of our law always

presumes an accused party innocent until he is proved to be guilty.

This is a presumption which attends all the proceedings against

him, from their initiation until they result in a verdict, which

either ﬁnds the p'arty guilty or converts the presumption of inno-

cence into an adjudged fact}

If there were any mode short of conﬁnement which would

with reasonable certainty insure the attendance of the accused

to answer the accusation, it would not be justiﬁable to inﬂict upon

him that indignity, when the eifect is to subject him, in a

greater or less degree, to the punishment of a guilty person while

as yet it is not determined that he has committed any crime.

If the punishment on conviction cannot exceed in severity the

forfeiture of a large sum of money, then it is reasonable to suppose

that such ‘a sum of money, or an agreement by responsible
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*parties to pay it to the government in case the accused ["‘ 310]

should fail to appear, -would be suﬂicient security for his

attendance; and therefore, at the common law, it was customary to

take security of this character in all cases of misdemeanor; one or

more friends of the accused undertaking for his appearance for

trial, and agreeing that a certain sum of money should be levied

of their goods and chattels, lands and tenements, if he made default.

But in the case of felonies, the privilege of giving bail before trial

' It is sometimes claimed that where insanity is set up as a defence in a crimi-

nal case, the defendant takes upon himself the burden of proof to establish it,

and that he must make it out beyond a reasonable doubt. The later and better

considered cases do not support this view. The burden of proof rests through-

out upon the prosecution to establish all the conditions of guilt; and the pre-

sumption of innocence that all the while attends the prisoner entitles him to an

acquittal, if the jury are not reasonably satisﬁed of his guilt. A reasonable doubt

of his capacity to commit the crime as justly entitles him to an acquittal, as a

reasonable doubt on any other branch of the case. See State v. Marler, 2 Ala.

43; People v. McCann, 16 N. Y. 58; Commonwealth v. Kimball, 24 Pick. 373;

Commonwealth v. Dana, 2 Met. 340; Hopps v. People, 31 111. 385; People v.

Garbutt, 17 Mich. 23.
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ment; and this process is still retained in many of the States,
while others have substituted in its stead an information filed by
the prosecuting officer of the State or county. The mode of
investigating the facts, however, is the same in all; and this is
through a trial by jury, surrounded by certain safeguards which
are a well understood part of the system, and which the government cannot dispense with.
First, wo may mention that the humanity of our law always
presumes an accused party innocent until he is proved to be guilty.
This is a presumption which attends all the proceedings against
him, from their initiation until they result in a verdict, which
either finds the party guilty or converts the presumption of innocence into an adjudged fact.l
If there were any mode short of confinement which would
with reasonable certainty insure the attendance of the accused
to answer the accusation, it would not be justifiable to inflict upon
him that indignity, when the effect is to subject him, in a
greater or less degree, to the punishm~nt of a guilty person while
as yet it is not determined that he bas comm.tted any crime.
If the punishment on conviction cannot exceed in severity the
forfeiture of a large sum of money, then it is reasonable to suppose
that such ·a sum of money, or an agreement by responsible
• parties to pay it to the government in case the accused [* 310]
should fail to appear, ·would be sufficient security for his
attendance ; and therefore, at the common law,· it was customary to
take security of this character in all cases of misdemeanor; one or
more friends of the accused undertaking for his appearance for
trial, and agreeing that a certain sum of money should be levied
of their goods and chattels, lands and tenements, if he made default.
But in the case of felonies, the privilege of giving bail before trial
1 It is sometimes claimed that where insanity is set up as a defence in a criminal case, the defendant takes upon himself the burden of proof to establish it,
and that he must make it out beyond a reasonable doubt. The later and better
considered cases do not support this view. The burden of proof rests throughout upon the prosecution to establish all the conditions of guilt; and the presumption of innocence that all the while attends th(l prisoner entitles him to an
acquittal, if the jury are not reasonably satisfied of his guilt. A reasonable doubt
of his capacity to commit the crime as justly entitles him to an acquittal, as a
reasonable doubt on any other branch of the case. See State 11. Marler, 2 Ala.
43; People 11. McCann, 16 N. Y. 58; Commonwealth 11. Kimball, 24 Pick. 373;
Commonwealth 11. Dana, 2 Met. 340; Hopps 11. People, 31 Dl. 385; People u.
Garbutt, 17 Mich. 23.
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was not a matter of right; and in this country, although the
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criminal code is much more merciful than it formerly was in

England, and in some eases the allowance of bail is almost a matter

of course, there are others in which it is discretionary with the

magistrate to allow it or not, and where it will sometimes be

refused if the evidence of guilt is strong or the presumption great.

Capital offences are not generally regarded as bailable; at least,

after indictment, or when the party is charged by the ﬁnding of a

cor0ner’s jury ;1 and this upon the supposition that one who may

be subjected to the terrible punishment that would follow a convic-

tion, would not for any mere pecuniary considerations remain to

abide the judgment.” And where the death penalty is abolished

and imprisonment for life substituted, it is believed that the rule

would be the same notwithstanding this change, and bail would

still be denied in the case of the highest oﬂences, except under

very peculiar circumstances.“ In the case of other felonies it is not

usual to refuse bail, and in some of the State constitutions it has

been deemed important to make it a matter of right in all cases

except on capital charges “ when the proof is evident or-the

presumption great.”4

When bail is allowed, unreasonable bail is not to be

[* 311] required ; " but the constitutional principle that demands
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this is one which, from the very nature of the case,

addresses itself exclusively to the judicial discretion and sense

of justice of the court or magistrate empowered to ﬁx upon the

amount. That bail is reasonable which, in view of the nature

of the offence, the penalty which the law attaches to it, and the

probabilities that guilt will be established on the trial, seems no

‘ Matter of Barronet, 1 El. & Bl. 1; Em parts Tsyloe, 5 Cow. 39.

' State 1:. Summons, 19 Ohio, 189.

' The courts have power to bail, even in capital cases. United States v.

Hamilton, 3 Dsll. 18; United States v. Jones, 3 Wash. 224; State v. Rockafel-

low, 1 Halst. 332; Commonwealth v. Semmes, 11 Leigh, 665; Commonwealth

v. Archer, 6 Grat. 705; People v. Smith, 1 Cal. 9; People v. Van Horne, 8

Barb. 158. In England when all felonies were capital, it was discretionary with

the courts to allow bail before trial. 4 Bl. Com. 297 and note.

‘ The Constitutions of Mississippi, Illinois, Kentucky, and Missouri, contain

provisions to this elfect. And see Foley v. People, Breese, 31 ; Ullery v. Com-

monwealth, 8 B. Monr. 3; Shore v. State, 6 Mo. 640; State v. Summons, 19

Ohio, 139; Eazparte Wray, 30 Miss. 673; Moore v. State, 36 Miss. 137; E2:

was not a matter of right ; and in this country, although the
criminal code is much more merciful than· it formerly was in
England, and in some cases the allowance of hail is almost a matter
of course, there are others in which it is discretionary with the
magistrate to allow it or not, and where it will sometimes be
refused if the evidence of guilt is strong or the presumption great.
Capital offences are not generally regarded as bailable ; at least,
after indictment, or when the party is charged by the finding of a
coroner's jury ; 1 and this upon the supposition that one who may
be subjected to the terrible punishment that would follow a conviction, would not for any mere pecuniary considerations remain to
abide the judgment.2 And where the death penalty is abolished
and imprisonment for life substituted, it is believed that the rule
would be the same notwithstanding this change, and bail would
still be denied in the case of the highest offences, except under
very peculiar circumstances.3 In the case of other felonies it is not
usual to refuse hail, and in some of the State constitutions it has
been deemed important to make it a matter of right in all cases
except on capital charges " when the proof is evident or .the
presumption great." 4
When bail is allowed, unreasonable bail is not to be
[* 311] required ; • but the constitutional principle that demands
this is one which, from the very nature of the case,
addresses itself exclusively to the judicial discretion and sense
of justice of the court or magistrate empowered to fix upon tbe
amount. That bail is reasonable which, in view of the nature
of the offence, the penalty which the law attaches to it, and the
probabilities that guilt will he established on the trial, seems no

parte Banks, 28 Ala. 89.
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Matter of Barronet, 1 EI. & Bl. 1; E~ parte Tayloe, 5 Cow. 39.
State v. Summons, 19 Ohio, 189.
3 The courts have power to bail, even in capital cases.
United States "·
Hamilton, 3 Dall. 18; United States "· Jones, S Wash. 224; State v. Rockafellow, 1 Haist. 332; Commonwealth "· Semmes, 11 Leigh, 665; Commonwealth
v. Archer, 6 Grat. 705; People v. Smith, 1 Cal. 9; People v. Van Horne, 8
Barb. 158. In England when all felonies were capital, it was discretionary with
the courts to allow bail before trial. 4 Bl. Com. 297 and note.
' The Constitutions of Mississippi, Illinois, Kentucky, and Missouri, contain
provisions to this effect. And see Foley v. People, Breese, 31 ; IDiery v. Commonwealth, 8 B. Monr. 8; Shore v. State, 6 Mo. 640; State v. Summons, 19
Ohio, 139; Ex parte Wray, SO Miss. 673 i Moore v. State, 36 Miss. 137; Ez
parte Banks, 28 Ala. 89.
1

1
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more than suﬂicient to secure the party’s attendance. In determin-
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ing this, some regard should be had to the prisoner’s pecuniary

circumstances; that which is reasonable bail to a man of wealth,

being equivalent to a denial of right if exacted of a poor man

charged with the like offence. When the court or magistrate

requires greater security than in his judgment is needful to secure

attendance, and keeps the prisoner in conﬁnement for failure to

give it, it is plain that the right to bail which the constitution

attempts so carefully to secure has been disregarded; and though

the wrong is one for which, in the nature of the case, no remedy

exists, the violation of constitutional privilege is aggravated,

instead of being diminished, by that circumstance.‘

The presumption of innocence is an absolute protection against

conviction and punishment except either, ﬁrst, on confession in

open court; or, second, on proof which places the guilt beyond any

reasonable doubt. Formerly, if a prisoner arraigned for felony

stood mute wilfully, and refused to plead, a terrible mode was

resorted to for the purpose of compelling him to do so; and this

might even end in his death :2 but a more merciful proceeding is

now substituted ; the court entering a plea of not guilty for a party

who, for any reason, fails to plead for himself.

Again, it is required that the trial be speedy ; and here also the
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injunction is addressed to the sense of justice and sound judgment

of the court. In this country, where oﬁicers are specially ap-

pointed or elected to represent the people in these prosecutions,

their position gives them an immense power for oppression; and

it is to be feared they do not always suﬂiciently appreciate the

' The magistrate in taking bail exercises an authority essentially judicial.

Regina u. Badger, 4 Q. B. 468; Linford v. Fitzroy, 13 Q. B. 240. As to his

duty to look into the nature of the charge and the evidence to sustain it, see

Barronet’s Case, 1 El. & Bl. 1.

' 4 Bl. Com. 324. In treason, petit felony, and misdemeanors, wilfully stand-

ing mute was equivalent to a conviction, and the same punishment might be

imposed; but in other cases there could be no trial or judgment without plea;

and an accused party might therefore sometimes stand mute and suffer himself

to be pressed to death, in order to save his property from forfeiture. Poor Giles

Corey, accused of witchcraft, was perhaps the only person ever pressed to death

for refusal to plead in America. 3 Bancroﬁfs U. S. 93; 2 Hildreth’s U. S. 160.

For English cases, see Cooley’s Bl. Com. 825, note. Now in England the court

more than sufficient to secure the party's attendance. In determining this, some regard should be had to the prisoner's pecuniary
circumstances ; that which is reasonable bail to a man of wealth,
being equivalent to a denial of right if exacted of a poor man
cha11ged with the like offence. When the court or magistrate
requires greater security than in his judgment is needful to secure
attendance, and keeps the prisoner in confinement for failure to
give it, it is plain that the right to bail which the constitution
attempts so carefully to secure has been disregarded ; and though
the wrong is one for which, in the nature of the case, no remedy
exists, the violation of constitutional privilege is aggravated,
instead of being diminished, by that circumstance.1
The presumption of innocence is an absolute protection against
conviction and punishment except either, first, on confession in
open court; or, second, on proof which places the guilt beyond any
reasonable doubt. Formerly, if a prisoner arraigned for felony
stood mute wilfully, and refused to plead, a terrible mode was
resortetl to for the purpose of compelling him to do so; and this
might even end in his death: 2 but a more merciful proceeding is
now substituted ; the court entering a plea of not guilty for a party
who, for any reason, fails to plead for himself.
Again, it is required that the trial be spetdy ,· and here also the
injunction is addressed to the sense of justice and sound judgment
of the court. In this country, where officers are specially appointed or elected to represent the people in these prosecutions,
their position gives them an immense power for oppression; and
it is to be feared they do not always sufficiently appreciate the

enters a plea of not guilty for a prisoner refusing to plead, and the trial proceeds

as in other cases.
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1 The magistrate in taking bail exercises an authority essentially judicial.
Regina o. Badger, 4 Q. B. 468; Linford o. Fitzroy, 13 Q . B. 240. As to his
duty to look into the nature of the charge and the evidence to sustain it, see
Barronet's Case, 1 El. & Bl. 1.
1 4 Bl. Com. 324. In treason, petit felony, and misdemeanors, wilfully standing mute was equivalent to a conviction, and the same punishment might be
imposed; but in other cases there could be no trial or judgment without plea;
and an accused party might therefore sometimes stand mute and suffer himself
to be pressed to death, in order to save his property from forfeiture. Poor Giles
Corey, accused of witchcraft, was perhaps the only penon ever pressed to death
for refusal to plead in America. 3 Bancroft's U. S. 93; 2 Hildreth's U. S. 160.
For English cases, see Cooley's Bl. Com. 825, note. Now in England the court
enters a plea of not guilty for a prisoner refusing to plead, and the trial proceeds
as in other cases.
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responsibility and wield -the power with due regard to the legal
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rights and privileges of the accused} When a person charged

with crime is willing to proceed at once to trial, no delay on the

part of the prosecution is reasonable, except only that_ which

is necessary for proper preparation and to secure the

[* 312] attendance of "witnesses? Very much, however, must

be left to the judgment of the prosecuting oﬂicer in these

cases ; and the court would not compel the government to proceed

t0 trial at the ﬁrst term after indictment found or information

ﬁled, if the oﬁicer who represents it should state, under the respon-

sibility of his official oath, that he was not and could not be ready

at that time.“ But further delay would not generally be allowed

without a more speciﬁc showing of the causes which prevent the

State proceeding to trial, including the names of the witnesses, the

steps taken to procure them, and the facts expected to be proved

by them, in order that the court might judge of the reasonableness

of the application, and that the prisoner might, if he saw ﬁt to take

that course, secure an immediate trial by admitting that the wit-

messes, if present, would testify to the facts which the prosecution

have claimed could be proved by them.‘

It is also requisite that the trial be public. By this is not

meant that every person who sees ﬁt shall in all cases be permitted
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to attend criminal trials; because there are many cases where,

' It is the duty of the prosecuting attorney to treat the accused with judicial

fairness; and to inﬂict injury at the expense of justice is no part of the purpose

for which he is chosen. Unfortunately, however, we sometimes meet with cases

, in which these oﬂicers appear to regard themselves as the counsel for the com-

plaining party rather than the impartial representative of public justice. But

we trust it is not often that cases occur like a recent one in Tennessee, in which

the Supreme Court felt called upon to set, aside a verdict in a criminal case,

where by the artiﬁce of the prosecuting officer the prisoner had been induced to

go to trial under the belief that certain witnesses for the State were absent, when

in fact they were present and kept in concealment by this functionary. Curtis v.

responsibility and wield the power with due regard to the legal
rights and privileges of the accused.1 When a person charged
with crime is willing to proceed at once to trial, no delay on the
part of the prosecution is reasonable, except only that. which
is necessary for proper p~eparation and to secure the
312] attendance of • witnesses.2 Very much, however, must
be left to the judgment of the prosecuting officer in these
cases ; and the court would not compel the government to proceed
to trial at the first term after indictment found or information
filed, if the officer wl1o represents it should state, under the responsibility of his official oath, that he was not and could not bo ready
a.t that time.8 But further delay would not generally be allowed
without a more specific showing of the causes which prevent the
State proceeding to trial, including the names of the witnesses, the
steps taken to procure them, and the facts expected to be proved
by them, in order that the court might judge of the reasonableness
of the application, and that the prisoner might, if he saw fit to take
that course, secure an immediate trial by admitting that the witnesses, if present, would testify to the facts which the prosecution
have claimed could be proved by them.~
It is also requisite that the trial be public. By this is not
meant that every person who sees fit shall in all cases be permitted
to attend criminal trials; because there are many cases where,

e•

State, 6 Cold. 9.

' See this discussed in Ez parte Stanley, 4 Nev. 113.

' \Vatts v. State, 26 Geo. 231.

4 The Habeas Corpus Act, 31 Ch. II. c. 2, § 1, required a prisoner charged

with crime to be released on bail, if not indicted the ﬁrst term after the commit-

ment, unless the king’s witnesses could not be obtained; and that he should be

brought to trial as early as the second term after the commitment. The prin-

ciples of this statute are considered as having been adopted into the American

common law: post, 345.
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I It is the duty of the prosecuting attorney to treat the accused with judicial
fairness; and to inflict injury at the expense of justice is no part of the purpose
for which he is chosen. Unfortunately; however, we sometimes meet with cases
• in which these officers appear to regard themselves as the counsel for the complaining party rather than the impartial representative of public justice. But
we trust it is not often that cases occur like a recent one in Tennessee, in which
the Supreme Court felt called upon to set. aside a verdict in a criminal case,
where by the artifice of the prosecuting officer the priHoner had betln induced to
go to trial under the belief that certain witnesses for the State were absent, when
in fact they were present and kept in concealment by this functionary. Curtis"·
State, 6 Cold. 9.
• See this discussed inEz parte Stanley, 4 Nev. 113.
~ Watts"· State, 26 Geo. 231.
4 The Habeas Corpus Act, 31 Ch. II. c. 2, § 1, required a prisoner charged
with crime to be released on bail, if not indicted the first term afier the commitment, unless the king's witnesses could not be obtained ; and that he should be
brought to trial as early as the second term after the commitment. The principles of this statute are considered as having been adopted into the American
common law : post, 8:1:5.
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from the character of the charge, and the nature of the evidence
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by which it is to be supported, the motives to attend the trial on

the part of portions of the community would be of the worst char-

acter, and where a regard to public morals and public decency

would require that at least the young be excluded from hearing

and witnessing the evidences of human depravity which the trial

must necessarily bring to light. The requirement of a public trial is

for the beneﬁt of the accused; that the public may see he is fairly

dealt with and not unjustly condemned, and that the presence of

interested spectators may keep his triers keenly alive to a sense

of their responsibility and to the importance of their functions;

and the requirement is fairly met with,if, without partiality or

favoritism, a reasonable proportion of the public is suffered to

attend, notwithstanding that those persons whose presence could

be of no service to the accused, and who would only be drawn

thither by a prurient curiosity, are excluded altogether.

‘ But a far more important requirement is that the pro- ["' 313]

ceeding to establish guilt shall not be inquisitorial._ A

peculiar excellence of the common-law system of trial over that

which has prevailed in other civilized countries, consists in the

fact that the accused is never compelled to give evidence against

himself. Much as there was in that system that was heartless and
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cruel, it recognized fully the dangerous and utterly untrustworthy

character of extorted confessions, and was never subject to the

reproach that it gave judgment upon them}

It is the law in some of the States, when a person is charged

with crime, and is brought before an examinihg magistrate, and

‘ See Lieber’s paper on Inquisitorial Trials, Appendix to Civil Liberty and

Self-Government. Also the article on Criminal Procedure in Scotland and Eng-

land, Edinb. Review, Oct. 1858. And for an illustration of inquisitorial trials in

our own day, see Trials of Troppman and Brince Pierre Bonaparte, Am. Law

Review, Vol. V. p. 14. Judge Foster relates from “lhitelocke, that the bishop

of London having said to Fclton, who had assassinated the Duke of Bucking-

ham, “ If you will not confess, you must go to the rack,” the man replied, “ If it

must be so, I know not whom I may accuse in the extremity of my torture, —

Bishop Laud, perhaps, or any lord of this board.” “ Sound sense,” adds Foster,

“ in the mouth of an enthusiast and ruﬁian.” Laud having proposed the rack, the

matter was shortly debated at the board, and it ended in a reference to the judges,

who unanimously resolved that the rack could not be legally used. De Lolme on

from the character of the charge, and the nature of the evidence
by which it is to be supported, the motives to attend the trial on
the part of portions of the community would be of the worst character, and where a regard to pu~lic morals and public decency
would require that at least the young be excluded from hearing
and witnessing the evidences of human depravity which the trial
must necessarily bring to light. The requirement of a public trial is
for the benefit of the accuRed ; that the public may see he is fairly
dealt with and not unjustly condemned, and that the presence of
interested spectatm·s may keep his triers keenly alive to a sense
of their responsibility and to the importance of their functions ;
and the requirement is fairly met with, if, without partiality or
favoritism, a reasonable proportion of the public is suffered to
attend, notwithstanding that those persons whose presence could
be of no service to the accused, and who would only be drawn
thither by a prurient curiosity, are excluded altogether.
• But a far more important requirement is that the pro- [• 313]
ceeding to establish guilt shall not be inquisitorial. A
peculiar excellence of the common-law system of trial over that
which has prevailed in other civilized countries, consists in the
fact that the accused is never compelled to give evidence against
himself. Much as there was in that system that was heartless and
cruel, it recognized fully the dangerous and utterly untrustworthy
character of extorteil confessions, and was never subject to the
reproach that it gave judgment upon them. 1
It is the law in some of the States, when a person is charged
with crime, and is brought before an examinii1g magistrate, and

Constitution of England (ed. of 1807), p. 181, note; 4 Bl. Com. 825; Broom,

Const. Law, 148; Trial of Felton, 3 State Trials, 368, 371; Brodie, Const. Hist.

c. 8.
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See Lieber's paper on Inquisitorial Trials, Appendix to Civil Liberty and
Self-Government. Also the article on Criminal Procedure in Scotland and Eugland, Edinb. Review, Oct. 1858. And for an illustration of inquisitorial trial:~ in
our own day, see Trials of Troppman and ~rince Pierre Bonaparte, Am. Law
Review, Vol. V. p. 14. Judge Foster relates from Whitelocke, that the bishop
of London having said to Felton, who had assassinated the Duke of Buckingham, "If you will not confess, you must go to the rack," the man replied, " If it
must be so, I know not whom I may accuse in the extremity of my torture, Bishop Laud, perhaps, or any lord of this board." " Sound sense," adds Foster,
"in the mouth of an enthusiast and ruffian." Laud having proposed the rack, the
matter was shortly debated at the board, and it ended in a reference to the judges,
who unanimously resolved that the rack could not be legally used. De Lolme on
Constitution of England (ed. of 1807), p. 181, note; 4 Bl. Com. 825; Broom,
Const. Law, 148; Trial of Felton, 8 State Trials, 368, 371; Brodie, Const. Hist.
c. 8.
1
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the witnesses in support of the charge have been heard, that the

[cu. x.

prisoner may also make a statement concerning the transaction

charged against him, and that this may be used against him on the

trial if supposed to have a tendency to establish guilt. But the

prisoner is to be ﬁrst cautioned that he is under no obligation to

answer any question put to him unless he chooses, and that what-

ever he says and does must be entirely voluntary! He is also to be

allowed the presence and advice of counsel; and if that privilege

is denied him it may be suﬁicient reason for discrediting any dam-

aging statements he may have made.” When, however, the statute

has been complied with, and no species of coercion appears to

have been employed, the statement the prisoner may have made is

evidence which can be used against him on his trial, and is gener-

ally entitled to great weight.“ And in any other case

[‘!‘ 314] ‘except treason‘ the confession of the accused may be

received in evidence to establish his guilt, provided no

circumstance accompanies the making of it which should detract

from its weight in producing conviction.

But to make it admissible in any case it ought to appear that it

was made voluntarily, and that no motives of hope or fear were

employed to induce the accused to confess. The evidence ought

to be clear and satisfactory that the prisoner was neither threat-
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ened nor cajoled into admitting what very possibly was untrue.

Under the excitement of a charge of crime, coolness and self-pos-

session are to be looked for in very few persons; and however

‘ See Rev. Stat. of New York, Pt. 4, c. 2, tit. 2, §§ 14-16.

‘ Rex v. Ellis, Ry. & Mood. 432. However, there is no absolute right to the

presence of counsel, or to publicity in these preliminary examinations, unless

given by statute. Cox v. Coleridge, 1 B. & C. 37.

3 It should not, however, be taken on oath, and if it is, that will be suflicient

reason for rejecting it. Rex v. Smith, 1 Stark. 242; Rex v. Webb, 4 C. & P.

564; Rex v. Lewis, 6 C. & P. 161; Rex,v. Rivers, 7 C. & P. 177; Regina v.

Pikesley, 9 C. & P. 124; People v. McMahon, 15 N.Y. 384. " The view of

the English judges, that an oath, even where a party is informed he need answer

no questions unless he pleases, would, with most persons, overcome that caution,

is, I think, founded on good reason and experience. I think there is no country

the witnesses in support of tl}e charge have been beard, that the
prisoner may also make a statement concerning the transaction
charged against him, and that this may be used against him on the
trial if supposed to have a tendency to establish guilt. But the
prisoner is to be first cautioned that he is under no obligation to
answer any question put to him unless he chot>ses, and that whatever he says and does must be entirely voluntary. 1 He is also to be
allowed the presence and advice of counsel ; and if that privilege
is denied him it may be sufficient reason for discrediting any darnaging statements he may have made.2 When, however, the statute
has been complied with, and no species of coercion appears to
have been employed, the statement the prisoner may have made is
eviden~e which can ~ used against him on his trial, and is generally entitled to great weight. 3 And in any other case
[! 314] • except treason 4 the confession of the accused may be
received in evidence to establish his guilt, provided no
circumstance accompanies the making of it which should detract
from its weight in producing convictioo.
But to make it admissible in any case it ought to appear that it
was made voluntarily, and that no motives of hope or fear were
employed to induce the accused to confess. The evidence ought
to be clear and satisfactory that the prisoner was neither threatened nor cajoled into admitting what very possibly was untrue.
Under the excitement of a charge of crime, coolness and self-possession are to be looked for in very few persons ; and however

—certainly there is none from which any of our legal notions are b0rrowed—

where a prisoner is ever examined on oath.” People v. Thomas, 9 Mich. 318,

per Campbell, J .

‘ In treason there can be no conviction unless on the testimony of two wit-

nesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court. Const. of United

States, art. 3, § 3.
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See Rev. Stat. of New York, Pt. 4, c. 2, tit. 2, §§ 14-16.
Rex v. Ellis, Ry. & Mood. 432. However, there is no absolute nght to the
presence of counsel, or to publicity in these preliminary examina.tions, unless
given by statute. Cox v. Coleridge, 1 B. & C. 37.
3 It should not, however, be taken on oath, and if it is, that will be sufficient
reason for rejecting it. Rex v. Smith, 1 Stark. 242; Rex v. Webb, 4 C. & P.
564; Rex v. Lewis, 6 C. & P. 161; Rex. v. Rivers, 7 C. & P. 177; Regina v.
Pikesley, 9 C. & P. 124; People v. McMahon, 15 N.Y. 384. "The view of
the English judges, that an oath, even where a party is informed he need answer
no questions unless he pleases, would, with most persons, overcome that caution,
is, I think, founded on good reason anrl experience. I think there is no country
-certainly there is none from which any of our legal notions are borrowed where a prisoner is ever examined on oath." People v. Thomu, 9 Mich. 318,
per Campbell, J.
' In treason there can be no conviction unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court. Const. of United
States, art. 3, § 3.
1

1
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strongly we may reason with ourselves that no one will confess a
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heinous offence of which he is not guilty, the records of criminal

courts bear abundant testimony to the contrary. If confessions

could prove a crime beyond doubt, no act which was ever punished

criminally would be better established than witchcraft;1 and the

judicial executions which have been justiﬁed by such confessions

ought to constitute a solemn warning against the too ready reli-

ance upon confessions as proof of guilt in any case.‘ As “Mr.

Justice Parke several times observed” while holding one of his

circuits, “too great weight ought not to be attached to evidence of

what a party has been supposed to have said, as it very frequently

happens, not only that the witness has misunderstood what the

party has said, but that by unintentionally altering a few of the

expressions really used, he gives an effect to the statement com-

pletely at variance with what the party really did say.”2 And

when the admission is full and positive, it perhaps quite as often

happens that it has been made under the inﬂuence of the terrible

fear excited by the charge, and in the hope that confession

may ward “off some of the consequences likely to follow [* 315]

if guilt were persistently denied. -

A confession alone ought not to be sufficient evidence of the

corpus delicti. There should be other proof that a crime has actu-
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ally been committed; and the confession should only be allowed

for the purpose of connecting the defendant with the oﬁ'ence.3 And

' See Mary Smith’s Case, 2 Howell’s State Trials, 1049; Case of Essex Witches,

4 ib. 817; Case of Suffolk Witches, 6 ib. 647; Case of Devon Witches, 8 ib.

1017. It is true that torture was employed freely in cases of alleged witchcraft,

but the delusion was one which often seized upon the victims as well as their

accusers, and led the former to freely confess the most monstrous and impossible

actions. Much curious and valuable information on this subject may be found

in “ Superstition and Force,” by Lea; “A Physician’: Problems," by Elam; and

Leckey, History of Rationalism. _ _

' Note to Earle v. Picken, 5 C. & P. 542. See also 1 Greenl. Ev. § 214 and

note; Commonwealth v. Curtis, 97 Mass. 574.

’ In Stringfellow v. State, 26 Miss. 157, a confession of murder was held not

strongly we may reason with ourselves that no one will confess a
heinous offence of which he is not guilty, the records of criminal
courts bear abundant testimony to the contrary. If confessions
could prove a crime beyond doubt, no act which was ever punished
criminally would be better established than witchcraft ; 1 and the
judicial executions which have been justified by such confessions
ought to constitute a solemn warning against the too ready reliance upon confessions as proof of guilt in any case. As " Mr.
Justice Parke several times observed" while holding one of his
circuits, " too great weight ought not to be attached to evidence of
what a party has been supposed to have said, as it very frequently
happens, not only that the witness has misunderstood what the
party has said, but that by unintentionally altering a few of the
expressions really used, he gives an effect to the statement completely at variance with what the party really did say." 2 And
when the admission is full and positive, it perhaps quite as often
happens that it has been made under the influence of the terrible
fear excited by the charge, and in the hope that confession
may ward • off some of the consequences likely to follow (* 315]
if guilt were persistently denied.
A confession alone ought not to be sufficient evidence of the
corpus delicti. There should be other proof that a crime has actually been committed ; and the confession should only be allowed
for the purpose of connecting the defendant with the offence.3 And

suﬂicient to warrant conviction, unless the death of the person alleged to have

been murdered was shown by other evidence. In People 1:. Hennessey, 15 Wend.

147, it was decided that a confession of embezzlement by a clerk would not war-

rant a conviction where that constituted the sole evidence that an embezzlement

had been committed. So on an indictment for blasphemy, the admission by the

defendant that he spoke the blasphemous charge, is not suﬁcient evidence of

the uttering. People 0. Porter, 2 Park. Cr. B. 14. And see State v. Guild,
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1 See Mary Smith's Case, 2 Howell's State Trials, 10!9; Case of Essex Witches,
4 io. 817; Case of Suffolk Witches, 6 ib. 647; Case of Devon Witches, 8 ib.
1017. It is true that torture was employed freely in cases of alleged witchcraft,
but the delusion was one which often seized upon the victims as well as their
accusers, and led the former to freely confess the most monstrous and impossible
actions. Much curious and valuable iqformation on this subject may be found
in "Superstition and Force," by Lea; "A Physician'11 Problems," by Elam; and
Leckey, History of Rationalism.
1 Note to Earle v. Picken, 5 C. & P. 542.
See also 1 Greenl. Ev. § 214 and
note; Commonwealth v. Curtis, 97 Mas~~. 574.
1 In Stringfellow v. State, 26 Miss. 157, a confession of murder was held not
sufficient to WJU'rant conviction, unless the death of the person alleged to have
been murdered was shown by other evidence. In People v. Hennessey,15 Wend.
147, it was decided that a confession of embezzlement by a clerk would not warrant a conviction where that constituted the sole evidence that an embezzlement
had been committed. So on an indictment for blasphemy, the admission by the
defendant that he spoke the blasphemous charge, is not sufficient evidence of
the uttering. People o. Porter, 2 Park. Cr. R. 14. And see State o. Guild,
22
.
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if the party’s hopes or fears are operated upon to induce him to

make it, this fact will be suﬁicient to preclude the confession being

received; the rule upon this subject being so strict that even

saying to the. prisoner it will be better for him to confess, has been

decided to be a holding out of such inducements to confession,

especially when said by a person having a prisoner in custody, as

should render the statement obtained by means of it inad-

[* 316] missible} If, however, * statements have been made

before the confession, which were likely to do away with

5 Halst. 163; Long’s Case, -1 Hayw. 524; People v. Lambert, 5 Mich. 349;

Rulolf v. State, 18 N. Y. 179.

‘ Rex v. Enoch, 5 C. & P. 539; State v. Bostick, 4 Harr. 563 ; Boyd v. State,

2 Humph. 390; Morehead v. State, 9 Humph. 635; Commonwealth 0. Taylor,

5 Cush. 605; Rex v. Partridge, 7 C. & P. 551; Commonwealth v. Curtis, 97

[cH. x.

if the party's hopes or fears are operated upon to induce him to
make it, this fact will be sufficient to preclude the confession being
received ; the rule upon this subject being so strict that even
saying to the. prisoner it will be better for him to confess, has been
decided to be a holding out of such inducements to confession,
especially when said by a person having a prisoner in custody, as
should render the statement obtained by means of it inad[* 316] missible.1 If, however, • statements have been made
before the confession, which were likely to do away with

Mass. 574; State v. Staley, 14 Minn. 105. Mr. Phillips states the rule thus: “ A

promise of beneﬁt or favor, or threat or intimation of disfavor, connected with

the subject of the charge, held out by a person having authority in the matter,

will be sutlicient. to exclude a confession made in consequence of such induce-

ments, either of hope or fear. The prosecutor, or prosecutor's wife or attorney,

or the prisoner‘s master or mistress, or a constable, or a person assisting him in

the apprehension or custody, or a magistrate acting in the business, or other
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magistrate, has been respectively looked upon as having authority in the matter;

and the same principle applies if the principle has been held out by a person

without authority, in the presence of a person who has such authority, and with

his sanction, either express or implied.” 1 Phil. Ev. by Cowen, Hill, and

Edwards, 544, and cases cited. But we think the better reason is in favor of

excluding confessions where inducements have been held out by any person,

whether acting by authority or not. Rex v. Simpson, 1 Mood. C. C. 410 ; State

0. Guild, 5 Halst. 163; Spears v. State, 2 Ohio, N. s. 583; Commonwealth v.

Knapp, 9 Pick. 496; Rex v. Clewes, 4 C. & P. 221; Rex v. Kingston, ib. 387;

Rex v. Dunn, ib. 543; Rex v. Walkley, 6 C. & P. 175; Rex v. Thomas, ib. 353.

“ The reason is, that in the agitation of mind in which the party charged is sup-

posed to be, he is liable to be inﬂuenced by the hope of advantage or fear of

injury to state things which are not true.” Per Morton, J ., in Commonwealth

v. Knapp, 9 Pick. 496; People v. McMahon, 15 N.Y. 387. There are not

wanting many opposing authorities, which proceed upon the idea, that “ a prom-

ise made by an indifferent person, who interfered ofliciously without any kind of

authority, and promised without the means of performance, can scarcely be

deemed sufficient to produce any effect, even on the weakest mind, as an

inducement to confess.” 1 Greenl. Ev. § 223. No supposition could be more

fallacious; and in point of fact a case can scarcely occur in which some one, from

age, superior wisdom or experience, or from his relations to the accused or to

the prosecutor, would not be likely to exercise more inﬂuence upon his mind

than some of the persons who are regarded as “ in authority " under the rule as

stated by Mr. Phillips. Mr. Grecnleaf thinks that, while as a rule of law all

~ ~ __ _.
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5 Haist. 163; Long's Case, ·1 Hayw. 524; People v. Lambert, 5 Mich. 3!9 ;
Ruloff v. State, 18 N.Y. 179.
1 Rex v. Enoch, 5 C. & P. 539; State v. Bostick, 4 Harr. 56:>; Boyd v. State,
2 Humph. 390; Morehead v. State, 9 Humph. 635; Commonwealth v. Taylor,
[) Cush. 605; Rex v. Partridge, 7 C. & P. 551; Commonwealth v. Curtis, 97
Mass. 574; State 11. Staley, 14 Minn. 105. Mr. Phillips states the rule thus: "A
promise of benefit or favor, or threat or intimation of disfavor, connected with
the subject of the charge, held out by a person h~~oving authority iu the matter,
will be sufficient to exclude a confession made in consequence of such inducements, either of hope or fear. The prosecutor, or prosecutor's wife or attorney,
or the prisoner's master or mistress, or a constable, or a person assisting him in
the apprehension or custody, or a magistrate acting in the business, or other
magistrate, has been respectively looked upon as having authority in the matter;
and the same principle applies if the principle has been held out by a perl>on
without authority, in the presence of a person who bas such authority, and with
his sanction, either express or implied." 1 Phil. Ev. by Cowen, Hill, and
Edwards, 544, and cases cited. But we think the better reason is in favor of
excluding confessions where inducements have been peld out by any person,
whether acting by authority or not. Rex v. Simpson, 1 Mood. C. C. !10; State
"· Guild, 5 Haist. 163; Spears v. State, 2 Ohio, N. s. 583; Commonwealth v.
Knapp, 9 Pick. 496; Rex v. Clewes, 4 C. & P. 221; Rex v. Kingston, ib. 387;
Rex v. Dunn, ib. 543; Rex 11. Walkley, 6 C. & P. 175; Rex v. Thomas, ib. 353.
" The reason is, that in the agitation of mind in which the party ch~rged is supposed to be, he is liable to be influenced by the hope of advantage or fear of
injury to state things which are not true." Per Morton, J., in Commonwealth
"· Knapp, 9 Pick. 496; People "· McMahon, 15 N.Y. 387. There are not
wanting many opposing authorities, which proceed upon the idea, that " a prmuise made by an indifferent person, who interfered officiously without any kind of
authority, and promised without the means of performance, can scarcely be
deemed Buflicient to produce any effect, even on the weakest mind, as an
inducement to confess." 1 Greenl. Ev. § 223. No supposition could be more
fallacious ; and in point of fact a case can scarcely occur in which some one, from
age, superior wisdom or experience, or from hi!' relations to the accused or to
the prosecutor, would not be likely to exercise more influence upon his mind
than some of the persons who are regarded as " in authority" under the rule as
stated by Mr. Phillips. Mr. Greenleaf thinks that, while as a rule of law all
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posed to have acted under their inﬂuence, the confession may be

received in evidence ;1 but the showing ought to be very satisfac-

confessions made to persons in authority should be rejected, “ promises and threats

by private persons, not being found so uniform in their operation, perhaps may,

with more propriety, be treated as mixed questions of law and fact; the princi-

the effect of the inducements, so that the accused cannot be supposed to have acted under their influence, the confession may be
received in evidence ; 1 but the showing ought to be very satisfac-

ple of law, that a confession must be voluntary, being strictly adhered to, and the

question, whether the promises or threats of the private individuals who employed

them were sufficient to overcome the mind of the prisoner, being left to the dis-

cretion of the judge under all the circumstances of the case.” 1 Greenl. Ev.

§ 223. This is a more reasonable rule than that which admits such confessions

under all circumstances; but it is impossible for a judge to say whether induce-

ments, in a particular case, have inﬂuenced the mind or not; if their nature were

such that they were calculated to have that effect, it is safer, and more in accord-

ance with the human principles of our criminal law, to presume, in favor of life

and liberty, that the confessions were “ forced from the mind by the ﬂattery of

hope, or by the torture of fear" (per Eyre, C. B., Warickshall’s Case, 1 Leach,

C. C. 299), and exclude them altogether. This whole subject is very fully con-

sidered in note to 2 Leading Criminal Cases, 182. And see Whart. Cr. Law,

§686 at seq. The cases of People v. McMahon, 15 N. Y. 384, and Common-

wealth v. Curtis, 97 Mass. 574, have carefully considered the general subject.
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In the second of these, the prisoner had asked the ofﬁcer who made the arrest,

whether he had better plead guilty, and the oﬁicer had replied that “ as a general

thing it was better for a man who was guilty to plead guilty, for he got a lighter

sentence." After this he made statements which were relied upon to prove

guilt. These statements were not allowed to be given in evidence. Per Foster, J. :

“ Therc is no doubt that any inducement of temporal fear or favor coming from

one in authority, which preceded and may have inﬂuenced a confession, will cause

it to be rejected, unless the confession is made under such circumstances as to

show that the influence of the inducement had passed away. N 0 cases require

more careful scrutiny than those of disclosures made by the party under arrest to

the oﬁicer who has him in custody, and in none will slighter threats or promises

of favor exclude the subsequent confessions. Commonwealth v. Taylor, 5 Cush.

610; Commonwealth v. Tuckerman, 10 Gray, 193; Commonwealth v. Morey,

1 Gray, 461. ‘ Saying to the prisoner that it will be the worse for him if he

does not confess, or that it will be the better for him if he does, is sufficient to

exclude the confession‘, according to constant experience.’ 2 Hale, P. C. 659; 1

Greenl. Ev. § 219 ; 2 Bennett and Heat-d‘s Lead. Cr. Cas. 164. Each case depends

largely on its own special circumstances. But we have before us an instance in

which the oﬂicer actually held out to the defendant the hope and inducement of

a lighter sentence if he pleaded guilty. And a determination to plead guilty at

the trial, thus induced, would naturally lead to an immediate disclosure of guilt.”

And the court held it an unimportant circumstance that the advice of the oflicer

was given at the request of the prisoner, instead of being volunteered.

‘ State v. Guild, 5 Halst. 163; Commonwealth v. Harman, 4 Penn. St. 269;

State v. Vaigneur, 5 Rich. 391; Rex v. Cooper, 5 C. & P. 535; Rex v. Howes,

6 C. & P. 404; Rex 0. Richards, 5 C. & P. 318.
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confessions made to persons in authority should be rejected, "promises and threats
by private persone, not being found so uniform in their operation, perhaps may,
with more propriety, be treated as mixed questions of law and fact; the principle oflaw, that a confession must be voluntary, being strictly adhered to, and the
question, whether the promises or threats of the private individuals who employed
them were sufficient to overcome the mind of the prisoner, being left to the dis·
cretion of the judge under all the circumstances of the case." 1 GreenI. Ev.
§ 223. This is a more reasonable rule than that which admits such confessions
under all circumstances; but it is impossible for a judge to say whether inducements, in a particular case, have influenced the mind or not; if their nature were
such that they were calculated to have that dfect, it is safer, and more in ac<:ordance with the human principles of our criminal law, to presume, in favor of life
and liberty, that the confessions were "forced from the mind by the flattery of
hope, or by the torture of fear" (per Eyre, C. B., Warickshall's Case, 1 Leach,
C. C. 299), and exclude them altogether. This whole subject is very fully considered in note to 2 Leading Criminal Cases, 182. And see Whart. Cr. Law,
§ 686 et seq. The cases of People v. 1\JcMahon, 15 N. Y. 384, and Commonwealth "· Curtis, 97 Mass. 574, have carefully considered the general subject.
In the second of these, the prisoner had asked the officer who made the arrest,
whether he had better plead guilty, and the officer had replied that '' as a general
thing it was better for a man who was guilty to plead guilty, for he got a lighter
sentence." After this he made statements which were relied upon to prove
guilt. These statements were not allowed to be given in evidence. Per Foster, J. :
" There is no doubt that any inducement of temporal fear or favor coming from
one in authority, which precedecl and may have influenced a confession, will cause
it to be rejected, unless the confession is made under such circumstances as to
show that the influence of the inducement had passed away. No cases require
more careful scrutiny than those of disclosures made by the party under arrest to
the officer who bas Lim in custody, and in none will slighter threats or promises
of favor exclude the subsequent confessions. Commonwealth v. Taylor, 5 Cush.
610; Commonwealth "·Tuckerman, 10 Gray, 198; Commonwealth v. Morey,
1 Gray, 461. 'Saying to the prisoner that it will be the worse for him if he
does not confess, or that it will be the better for him if be does, is sufficient to
exclude the confession~ according to constant experience.' 2 Hale, P. C. 659; 1
Green!. Ev. § 219; 2 Dennett and Helft"tl's Lead. Cr. Cas. 164. Each case depends
largely on its own special circumstances. But we have before us an instance in
which the offi('er a<:tually held out to the defendant the hope and inducement of
a lighter sentence if he pleaded guilty. And a determination to plead guilty at
the trial, thus induced, would naturally lead to an immediate disclosure of guilt."
And the court held it an unimportant circumstance that the advice of the officer
was given at the request of the prisoner, instead of being volunteered.
1 State v. Guild, 6 Haist. 163; Commonwealth v. Harman, 4 Penn. St. 269;
State"· Vaigneur, 5 Rich. 391; Rex"· Cooper, 5 C. & P. 635; Rex v. Howes,
6 C. & P. 404; Rex v. Richards, 5 C. & P. 318.
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tory on this point before the court should presume that the pris-

oner’s hopes did not still cling to, or his fears dwell upon, the ﬁrst
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inducements}

Before prisoners were allowed the beneﬁt of assistance from

counsel on trials for high crimes, it was customary for them to

make such statements as they saw ﬁt concerning the charge

‘against them, during the progress of the trial, or after the evi-

dence for the prosecution was put in ; and upon these statements

the prosecuting ofﬁcer or the court would sometimes ask questions,

which the accused might answer or not at his option. And

although this practice has now become obsolete, yet if the ac-

cused in any case should manage or assist in his own defence,

and should claim the right of addressing the jury, it would be

diﬂicult to conﬁne him to “the record” as the counsel

[“ 317] may be conﬁned in his ‘argument. A disposition has

been manifested of late to allow the accused to give

evidence in his own behalf; and statutes to that effect are in

existence in some of the States, the operation of which is be-

lieved to have been generally satisfactory.” These statutes, how-

ever, cannot be so construed as to authorize compulsory process

against an accused to compel him to disclose more than he chooses ;

they do not so far change the old system as to establish an in-
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quisitorial process for obtaining evidence ; they confer a. privilege,

which the defendant may use at his option ; if he does not choose

to avail himself of it, unfavorable inferences are not to be drawn

to his prejudice from that circumstance ;3 and if he does testify,

he is at liberty to stop at any point he chooses, and it must

be left to the jury to give a statement, which he declines to

‘ See State v. Roberts, 1 Dev. 259:, Rex v. Cooper, 5 C. & P. 535.

' See American Law Register, Vol. V. (N. s.) pp. 129, 705.

' People v. Tyler, 36 Cal. 522; State v. Cameron, 40 Vt. 555. For a case

resting upon an analogous principle, see\Carne v. Litchﬁeld, 2 Mich. 340. A

different view would seem to be taken in Maine. See State v. Bartlett, 55 Me.

200. In Devries v. Phillips, 63 N. C. 53, the Supreme Court of North Carolina

held it not admissible for counsel to comment to the jury on the fact that the

opposite party did not come forward to be sworn as a witness as the statute per-

mitted. See also Crandall '0. People, 2 Lansing, 309. In Michigan the wife of

an accused party may be sworn as a witness with his assent; but it has been held

that his failure t.o call her was not to subject him to inferences of guilt, even

though the case was such that if his defence was true, his wife must have been

cognizant of the facts. Knowles v. People, 15 Mich. 408.

tory on this point before the court should presume that the prisoner's hopes did not still cling to, or his fears dwell upon, the first
inducements. 1
Before prisoners were allowed the benefit of assistance from
counsel on trials for high crimes, it was customary for them to
make such statements as they saw fit concerning the charge
'against them, during the progress of the trial, or after the evidence for the prosecution was put in ; and upon these statements
the prosecuting officer or the court would sometimes ask questions,
which the accused might answer or not at his option. And
although this practice has now become obsolete, yet if the accused in any case should manage or assist in his own defence,
and should claim the right of addressing the jury, it would be
difficult to confine him to " the record " as the counsel
[• 317] may be confined in his • argument. A disposition bas
been manifested of late to allow the accused to give
evidence in his own behalf; and statutes to that effect are in
existence in some of the States, the operation of which is believed to have been generally satisfactory.2 These statutes, however, cannot be so construed as to authorize compulsory process
against an accused to compel him to disclose more than he chooses ;
they do not so far change the old system as to establish an inquisitorial process for obtaining evidence ; they confer a privilege,
which the defendant may use at his option ; if he does not choose
to avail himself of it, unfavorable inferences are not to be drawn
to his prejudice from that circumstance ; 3 and if he does testify,
he is at liberty to stop at any point he chooses, and it must
be left to the jury to give a statement, which he declines to

[340] -
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See State 11. Roberta, 1 Dev. 259; Rex v. Cooper, 5 C. & P. os:>.
1 See American Law Register, Vol. V. (N. s .) pp. 129, 705.
1 People "·Tyler, 86 Cal. 522; State"· Cameron, 40 Vt. 655.
For a cue
resting upon an analogous principle, se8'Carne "· Litchfield, 2 Mich. 840. A
differe~t view would seem to be taken in Maine. See State "· Bartlett, 65 Me.
200. In Devnes "· Phillips, 68 N. C. 58, the Supreme Court of North Carolina
held it not admissible for counsel to comment to the jury on the fact that the
opposite p&rty did not come forward to be sworn as a witness as the statute permitted. See also Crandall"· People, 2 Lansing, 809. In Micb.igan the wife of
an accused party may be sworn as a witness with his assent ; but it has been held
that his failure to call her was not to subject him to inferenees of guilt, even
thoqgh the case was such that if his defence was true, his wife must have been
cognizant of the facts. Knowles"· People, 15 Mich. 408.
1
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think it entitled to; otherwise the statute must have set aside

and overruled the constitutional maxim which protects an ac-

cused party against being compelled to testify against himself,

and the statutory privilege becomes a snare and a danger.‘

‘The testimony for the people in criminal cases can [‘ 318]

only, as a general rule, be given by witnesses who are

present in court.’ The defendant is entitled to be confronted

with the witnesses against him; and if any of them be absent

from the Commonwealth, so that their attendance cannot be

compelled, or if they be dead, or have become incapacitated to

give evidence, there is no mode by which their statements against

' The statute of Michigan of 1861, p. 169, removed the common-law disabili-

ties of parties to testify, and added, “ Nothing in this act shall be construed as

giving the right to compel a_defendant in criminal cases to testify; but any such

defendant shall be at liberty to make a statement to the court or jury, and may

be cross-examined on any such statement. It has been held that this statement

should not be under oath. People v. Thomas, 9 Mich. 314. That its purpose

make a full one, such weight as, under the circumstances, they
think it entitled to ; otherwise the statute must have set aside
and overruled the constitutional maxim which protects an accused party against being compelled to testify against himself,
and the statutory privilege becomes a snare and a danger. 1
• The testimony for the people in criminal cases can [• 318]
only, as a general rule, be given by witnesses who are
present in court.2 The defendant is entitled to be confronted
with the witnesses against him; and if any of them be absent
from the Commonwealth, so that their attendance cannot be
compelled, or if they be dead, or have become incapacitated to
give evidence, there is no mode by which their statements against

was to give every person on trial for crime an opportunity to make full explana-

tion to the jury, in respect to the circumstances given in evidence which are sup-

posed to have a bearing against him. Annis v. People, 13 Mich. 511. That the

statement is evidence in the case, to which the jury can attach such weight as
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they think it entitled to. Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212. That the court has

no right to instruct the jury that, when it conﬂicts with the testimony of an un-

impeached witness, they must believe the latter in preference. Durant v. People,

13 Mich. 3-51. And that the prisoner, while on the stand, is entitled to the

assistance of counsel in directing his attention to any branch of the charge, that

he may make explanations concerning it if he desires. Annis v. People, 13 Mich.

511. The prisoner does not cease to be a defendant by becoming a witness, nor

forfeit rights by accepting a privilege. In People v. Thomas, 9 Mich. 321,

Campbell, J ., in speaking of the right which the statute gives to cross-examine s.

defendant who has made his statement, says: “ And while his constitutional right

of declining to answer questions cannot be removed, yet a refusal by a party

to answer any fair question, not going outside of what he has offered to explain,

wonldhave its proper weight with the jury.” See Commonwealth v. Mullen, 97

Mass. 547; Commonwealth v. Curtis, ib. 574.

' State v. Thomas, 64 N. C. 74; Goodman v. State, Meigs, 197. By the old

common law a party accused of felony was not allowed to call witnesses to con-

tradict the evidence for the crown; and this seems to have been on some idea

that it would be derogatory to the royal dignity to permit it. Afterwards when

they were permitted to be called, they made their statements without oath; and

it was not uncommon for both the prosecution and the court to comment upon

their testimony as of little weight because unsworn. It was not until Queen

Anne’s time that they were put under oath.

[ 2.41 ]

The statute of Michigan of 1861, p. 169, removed the common-law disabilities of parties to testify, and added, " Nothing in this act shall be construed aa
giving the right to .compel a.defendant in criminal caaes to testify; but any such
defendant shall be at liberty to make a statement to the court or jury, and may
be cross-examined on any such statement. It has been held that this statement
should not be under oath. People "· Thomas, 9 Mich. 814. That its purpose
was to give every person on trial for crime an opportunity to make full explanation to the jury, in respect to the circumstances given in evidence which are supposed to have a bearing against him. Annis o. People, 13 Mich. 511. That the
statement is evidence in the caae, to which the jury can attach such weight aa
they think it entitled to. Maher"- People, 10 Mich. 212. That the court has
no right to instruct the jury that, when it conflicts with the testimony of an unimpeached witness, they must believe the latter in preference. Durant "- People,
13 Mich. 351. And that the prisoner, while on the stand, is entitled to the
assistance of counsel in directing his attention to any branch of the charge, that
he may make explanations concerning it if he desires. Annis o. People, 13 Mich.
511. The prisoner does not cease to be a defendant by becoming a witness, nor
forfeit rights by accepting a privilege. In People 11. Thomas, 9 Mich. 321,
Campbtll, J., in speaking of the right which the statute gives to cross-enmine a
defendant who has made his statement, says: "And while his conatitutional right
of declining to answer questions cannot be removed, yet a refusal by a party
to answer any fair question, not going outside of what he has offered to explain,
would.bave its proper weight with the jury." See Commonwealth o. Mullen, 97
Mass. 547; Commonwealth v. Curtis, ib. 574.
1 Sta.te "· Thomas, 64 N. C. 74; Goodman o. State, Meigs, 197.
By the old
common law a party accused of felony was not allowed to call witnesses to contradict the evidence for the crown; and this seems to have been on some idea
that it would be derogatory to the royal dignity to permit it. Afterwards when
they were permitted to be called, they made their statements without oath; and
it was not uncommon for both the prosecution and the court to comment upon
their testimony as of little weight because unsworn. It was not until Queen
Anne's time that they were put under oath.
1
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the prisoner can be used for his conviction. The exceptions

[ca. :x:•

to this rule are of cases which are excluded from its reasons

by their peculiar circumstances ; but they are far from numerous.

If the witness was sworn before the examining magistrate, or

before a coroner, and the accused had an opportunity then to cross-

examine him, or if there were a former trial on which he was

sworn, it seems allowable to make use of his deposition, or of the

minutes of his examination, if the witness has since deceased,

or is insane, or sick and unable to testify, or has been sum-

moned but appears to have been kept away by the opposite

party.‘ So, also, if a person is on trial for homicide, the decla-

rations of the party whom he is charged with having killed, if

made under the solemnity of a conviction that he was at the point

of death, and relating to matters of fact concerning the homicide,

which passed under his own observation, may be given in evidence

against the accused; the condition of the party who made

them being such that every motive to falsehood must be supposed

to have been silenced, and the mind to be impelled by the most

powerful considerations to tell the truth? Not that such evidence

is of very conclusive character: it is not always easy for the

hearer to determine how much of the declaration'related to

what was seen and positively known, and how much was

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:21 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105011581
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

[*319] surmise *and suspicion only; but it is admissible from

the necessity of the case, and the jury must judge of the

weight to be attached to it.

In cases of felony, where the prisoner’s life or liberty is in peril,

he has the right to be present, and must be present, during the

whole of the trial, and until the ﬁnal judgment. If he be

absent, either in prison or by escape, there is a. want of jurisdiction

over the person, and the court cannot proceed with the trial, or

' 1 Greenl. Ev. §§ 163-166; Bishop, Cr. Pro. §§ 520-527; Whart. Cr. Law,

§ 667; 2 Phil. Ev. by Cowen, Hill, and Edwards, 217, 229. \Vhether evidence

that the witness cannot be found after diligent inquiry, or is out of the jurisdic-

tion, would be sufficient to let in proof of his former testimony, see Bul. N. P.

239, 242; Rex v. Hagan, 8 C. & P. 167; Sills v. Brown, 9 C. & P. 601.

* 1 Greenl. Ev. § 156; 1 Phil. Ev. by Cowen, Hill, and Edwards, 285-289;

Whart. Cr. Law, §§ 669-682; Donnelly v. State, 2 Dutch. 463; Hill's Case, 2

Grat. 594; State v. Freeman, 1 Speers, 57 ; State 1-. Brunette, 13 La. An. 45;

Dunn v. State, 2 Pike, 229; Mose v. State, 35 Ala. 421 ; Brown v. State, 32 Miss.

433; \Vhitley v. State, 38 Geo. 70; State v. Quick, 15 Rich. 158. This whole

subject was largely considered in Morgan v. State, 31 Ind. 193.
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the prisoner can be used for his conviction. The exceptions
to this rule are of cases which are excluded from its reasons
by their peculiar circumstances; but they are far from numerous.
If the witness was sworn before the examining magistrate, or
before a coroner, and the accused had au opportunity then to crossexamine him, or if there were a former trial on which he was
sworn, it seems allowable to make use of his deposition, or of the
minutes of his examination, if the witness has since deceased,
or is insane, or sick and unable to testify, or has been summoned but appears to have been kept away by the opposite
party .1 So, also, if a person is on trial for homicide, the declarations of the party whom he is charged with having killed, if
made under the solemnity of a conviction that he was at the point
of death, and relating to matters of fact concerning the homicide,
which passed under his own observation, may be given in evidence
against the accused ; the condition of the party who made
them being such that every motive to falsehood must be supposed
to have been silenced, and the mind to be impelled by the most
powerful considerations to tell the truth.2 Not that such evidence
is of very conclusive character: it is not always easy for the
hearer to determine how much of the declaration ' related to
what was seen and positively known, and how much was
[• 319] surmise • and suspicion only ; but it is admissible from
the necessity of the case, and the jury must judge of the
weight to be attached to it.
In cases of felony, where the prisoner's life or liberty is in peril,
he has the right to be present, and must be present, during the
whole of the trial, and until the final judgment. If he be
absent, either in prison or by escape, there is a want of jurisdiction
over the person, and the court cannot proceed with the trial, or
1 1 Green!. Ev. §§ 163-166; Bishop, Cr. Pro. §§ 520-527; Whart. Cr. Law,
§ 667; 2 Phil. Ev. by Cowen, Hill, and Edwards, 217, 229. Whether evidence
that the witness cannot be found after diligent inquiry, or is out of the jurisdiction, would be sufficient to let in proof of his former testimony, see Bul. N. P.
239, 242; Rex 1'. Hagan, 8 C. & P. 167; Sills v. Brown, 9 C. & P. 601.
1 1 Green!. Ev. § 156; 1 Phil. Ev. by Cowen, Hill, and Edwards, 285-289;
Wbart. Cr. Law, §§ 669-682; Donnelly v. State, 2 Dutch. 463; Hill's Case, 2
Grat. 594; State "· Freeman, 1 Speers, 57 ; State r·. Brunetto, 18 La. An. 45;
Dunn "· State, 2 Pike, 229; Mose v. State, 85 Ala. 421 ; Brown v. State, 32 Miss.
433; Whitley "· State, 38 Geo. 70; State v. Quick, 15 Rich. 158. This whole
subject was largely considered in Morgan v. State, 81 Ind. 193.
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receive the verdict, or pronounce the ﬁnal judgment} But
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misdemeanors may be tried in the absence of the accused.

receive the verdict, or pronounce the final judgment.1 But
misdemeanors may be tried in the absence of the accused.

The Traverse Jury.

The trial of the guilt or innocence of-th-o-in-ny must be by jury ; 2

and wherever the right to this trial is guaranteed by the constitu-

tion without qualiﬁcation or restriction, it must be understood as

retained in all those cases which were triable by jury at the

The Traverse Jury.

common law, and with all the commoh-law incidents to a jury

trial, so far, at least, as they can be regarded as tending to the

protection of the accused.”

A petit, petty, or traverse jury is a body of twelve men, who are

sworn to try the facts of a case, as they are presented in the

evidence placed before them. Any less than this number of

twelve would not be a common-law jury, and not such a jury as

the constitution guarantees to accused parties, when a less number

is not allowed in express terms; and the necessity of afull panel

could not be waived—at least, in case of felony-—even by

consent.‘ The inﬁrmity in case of a trial by a jury of less than

1 See Andrews v. State, 2 Sneed, 550; Jacobs v. Cone, 5 S. & R. 335; Witt

v. State, 5 Cold. 11; State v. Alman, 64 N. C. 364; Gladden v. State, 12 Fla.

577; Note to VVinchell v. State, 7 Cow. 525. In capital cases the accused

stands upon all his rights, and waives nothing. Dempsey v. People, 47 Ill. 325.
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' It is worthy of note that all that is extant of the legislation of the Plymouth

Colony for the ﬁrst ﬁve years, consists of the single regulation, “ that all criminal

facts, and also all manner of trespasses and debts between man and man, shall

be tried by the verdict of twelve honest men, to be impanelled by authority in

form of a jury, upon their oath." 1 Palfrey‘s New England, 340.

' See note to p. 410, post. A citizen not in the land or naval service, or in

the militia in actual service, cannot be tried by court martial or military commis-

sion, on a charge of discouraging volunteer enlistments or resisting a military

•

The trial of~ guilt or innocence ef ~lt8 jYP! must be by jury ; 2
and wherever the right to this trial is guaranteed by the constitution without qualificat1on or restriction, it must be understood as
retained in all those cases which were triable by jury at the
common law, and with all the common-law incidents to a jury
trial, so far, at least, as they can be regarded as tending to the
protection of the accused.8
A petit, petty, or traverse jury is a body of twelve men, who are
sworn to try the facts of a case, as they are presented in the
evidence placed before them. Any less than this number of
twelve would not be a common-law jury, and not such a jury as
the constitution guarantees to accused parties, when a less number
is not allowed in express terms ; and the necessity of a full panel
could not be waived- at least, in case of felony- even by
consent.f The infirmity in case of a trial by a jury of less than

conscription. In re Kemp, 16 Wis. 359. See Ea: parte Milligan, 4 Wal. 2.

The constitutional right of trial by jury extends to newly created oﬂ'ences.

Plimpton v. Somerset, 33 Vt. 283; State v. Peterson, 41 Vt. 504. But not to

oﬁ‘ences against city by-laws. McGear v. VVoodruﬂ', 4 Vroom, 213.

‘ Work v. State, 2 Ohio, N. s. 296; Cancemi v. People, 18 N. Y. 128;

Brown v. State, 8 Blackf. 561; 2 Lead. Cr. Cas. 337; Hill v. People, 16 Mich.

351. And see State v. Everett, 14 Minn. 447. In Commonwealth v. Dailey, 12

Cush. 80, it was held that, in a case of misdemeanor, the consent of the defend-

ant that a. verdict might be received from eleven jurors was binding upon him,

and the verdict was valid. See also State v. Cox, 3 Eng. 436; Murphy v. Com-

monwealth, 1 Met. (Ky.) 365; Tyzee v. Commonwealth, 2 Met. (Ky.) 1; State

[343]

1 See Andrews "· State, 2 Sneed, 550; Jacobs "· Cone, 5 S. & R. 835; Witt
"· State, 5 Cold. 11; State"· Alman, 64 N. C. 864; Gladden "· State, 12 Fla.
577; Note to Winchell "· State, 7 Cow. 525. In capital cases the accused
stands upon all his rights, and waives nothing. Dempsey "· People, 47 lll. 825.
1 It is worthy of note that all that is extant of the legislation of the Plymouth
Colony for the first five years, consists of the single regulation, " that all criminal
facts, and also all manner of trespasses and debts between man and man, shall
be tried by the verdict of twelve honest men, to be impanelled by authority in
form of a jury, upon their oath." 1 Palfrey's New England, 840.
3 See note to p. 410, post.
A citizen not in the land or naval service, or in
the militia in actual service, cannot be tried by.court martial or military commiseion, on a charge of discouraging volunteer enlistments or resisting a military
conscription. In re Kemp, 16 Wis. 859. See Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wal. 2.
The constitutional right of trial by jury extends to newly created offences.
Plimpton"· Somerset, 88 Vt. 288; State v. Peterson, 41 Vt. 504. But not to
offences against city by-laws. McGear "· 'Voodruff, 4 Vroom, 213.
• Work t1. State, 2 Ohio, N. s. 296 ; Cancemi "· People, 18 N. Y. 128;
:Srown "· State, 8 Blackf. 561; 2 Lead. Cr. Cas. 337; Hill v. People, 16 Mich.
351. And see State v. Everett, 14 Minn. 4!7. In Commonwealth v. Dailey, 12
Cush. 80, it was held that, in a case of misdemeanor, the consent of the defendant that a verdict might be received from eleven jurors was binding upon him,
and the verdict was valid. See also State"· Cox, 8 Eng. 486; Murphy v. Commonwealth, 1 MeL (Ky.) 865; Tyzee "·Commonwealth, 2 Met. (Ky.) 1; State
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unknown to the law, created by mere voluntary act of the parties;

and it would in effect be an attempt to submit to a species of

arbitration the question whether the accused has been guilty of an

offence against the State. But in those cases which formerly were

not triable by jury, if the legislature provide for such a trial now,

they may doubtless create for the purpose a statutory tribunal,

composed of any number of persons, and no question of constitu-

tional power or right could arise.

Many of the incidents of a common-law trial by jury are essential

elements of the right. The jury must be indifferent between the

prisoner and the commonwealth; and to secure impartiality

challenges are allowed, both for cause, and also peremptory

without assigning cause. The jury must also be summoned

[* 320] ‘from the vicinage where the crime is supposed to have

been committed;1 and the accused will thus have the

beneﬁt on his trial of his own good character and standing with

his neighbors, if these he has preserved; and also of such

knowledge as the jury may possess of the witnesses who may give

evidence against him. He will also be able with more certainty to

secure the attendance of his own witnesses. The jury must unani-

mously concur in the verdict. This is a very old requirement in
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v. Mansﬁeld, 41 Mo. 470; Brown v. State, 16 Ind. 496; Opinions of Judges,

41 N. H. 550. In Hill v. People, 16 Mich. 356, it was decided that if one of

the jurors called was an alien, the defendant did not waive the objection by fail-

ing to challenge him, if he was not aware of the disqualiﬁcation; and if the court

refused to set aside the verdict on atﬁdavits showing these facts, the judgment

upon it would be reversed on error. The case of State v. Quarrel, 2 Bay, 150,

is contra. The case of Stone v. State, 2 Scam. 826, in which it was held compe-

tent for the court, even in a capital case, to strike off a juryman alter he was

sworn, because of alienage, affords some support for Hill v. People.

‘ Offences against the United States are to be tried in the district, and those

twelve, by consent, would be that· the tribunal would be one
unknown to the law, created by mere voluntary act of the parties;
and it would in effect be an attempt to submit to a species of
arbitration the question whether the accused has been guilty of an
offence against the State. But in those cases which formerly were
not triable by jury, if the legislature provide for such a trial now,
they may doubtless create for the purpose a statutory tribunal,
composed of any number of persons, and no question of constitutional power or right could arise.
Many of the incidents of a common-law trial by jury are essential
elements of the right. The jury must be indifferent between the
prisoner and the commonwealth ; and to secure impart~ality
challenges are allowed, both for cause, and also peremptory
without assigning cause. The jury must also be summoned
[• 320] • from the vicinage where the crime is supposed to have
been committed ; 1 and the accused will thus have the
benefit on his trial of his own good character and standing with
his neighbors, if these he has preserved ; and also of such .
knowledge as the jury may possess of the witnesses who may give
evidence against him. He will also be able with more certainty to
secure the attendance of his own witnesses. The jury must unanimously concur in the verdict. This is a very old requirement in

against the State in the county in_ which they are charged to have been com-

mitted; but courts are generally empowered, on the application of an accused

party, to order a change of venue, where for any reason a fair and impartial trial

cannot be had in the locality. It has been held incompetent to order such a

change of venue on the application of the prosecution. Kirk v. State, 1 Cold.

344. See also Wheeler v. State, 24 Wis. 52; Osborn v. State, 24 Ark. 629.

And in another case in Tennessee it was decided that a statute which permitted

oﬂ'ences committed near the boundary line of two countiesito be tried in either

was an invasion of the constitutional principle stated in the text. Armstrong v.

State, 1 Cold. 338. See also State 0. Denton, 6 Cold. 539. But see State v.

Robinson, 1-L Minn. 447.
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o. Mansfield, 41 Mo. 470; Brown o. State, 16 Ind. 496 ; Opinions of Judges,
41 N. H. 550. In Hill o. People, 16 Mich. 356, it was decided that if one of
the jurors called was an alien, the defendant did not waive the objection by failing to challenge him, if he was not aware of the disqualification ; and if the court
refused to set aside the verdict on affidavits showing these facts, the judgment
upon it would be reversed on error. The case of State"· Quarrel, 2 Bay, 150,
is contra. The case of Stone o. State, 2 Scam. 326, in which it was held competent for the court, even in a capital case, to strike off a juryman after he was
sworn, because of alienage, affords some support for Hill "· People.
1 Offences ngainst the United States are to be tried in the district, and those
against the State in the county in. which they are charged to have been committed ; but courts are generally empowered, on the application of an accused
party, to order a change of venue, where for any reason a fair and impartial trial
cannot be had in the locality. It has been held incompetent to order such a
change of venue on the application of the prosecution. Kirk !1. State, 1 Cold.
844. See also Wheeler "· State, 24 Wis. 52; Osborn v. State, 24 Ark. 629.
· And in another case in Tennes11ee it was decided that a statute which permitted
offences committed near the boundary line of two counties to be tried in either
was an invasion of tbe constitutional principle stated in tbe text. Armstrong o.
State, 1 Cold. 338. See also State "· Denton, 6 Cold. 539. But see State "·
Robinson, 14 Minn. 447.
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the English common law, and it has been adhered to, notwithstand-
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ing very eminent men have assailed it as unwise and inexpedient}

the English common law, and it has been adhered to, notwithstanding very eminent men have assailed it as unwise and inexpedient.I
And the jurors -must be left free to act in accordance with the
dictates of their judgment. The final decision upqn the facts is to
rest with them, and interference by the court with a view to coerce
them into a verdict against their convictions, is unwarrantable and
irregular. A judge is not justified in expressing his opinion to
the jury that the defendant is guilty upon the evidence adduced.l1
Still less wouid he be justified in refusing to receive and record the
verdict of the jury, because of its being, in his opinion, rendered
in favor of the prisoner when it ought not to have been.

And the jurors -must be left free to act in accordance with the

dictates of their judgment. The ﬁnal decision upqn the facts is to

rest with them, and interference by the court with a view to coerce

them into a verdict against their convictions, is unwarrantable and

irregular. A judge is not justified in expressing his opinion to

the jury that the defendant is guilty upon the evidence adduced.”

Still less would he be justiﬁed in refusing to receive and record the

verdict of the jury, because of its being, in his opinion, rendered

in favor of the prisoner when it ought not to have been.

‘ For the origin of this principle, see Forsyth, Trial by Jury, c. 11. The

requirement of unanimity does not prevail in Scotland, or on the Continent.

Among the eminent men who have not approved it may be mentioned Locke

and Jeremy Bentham. See Forsyth, supra; Lieber, Civil Liberty and Self-

Government, c. 20.

' A judge who urges his opinion upon the facts to the jury decides the cause,

while avoiding the responsibility. How often would a jury be found bold enough

words would fall upon their ears with all the weight which experience, learning,

and commanding position must always carry with them? What lawyer would

care to sum up his case, if he knew that the judge, whose words would be so
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much more inﬂuential, was to declare in his favor, or would be bold enough to

argue the facts to the jury, if he knew the judge was to declare against him?

Blackstone has justly remarked that “in settling and adjusting a. question of fact,

where intrusted to any single magistrate, partiality and injustice have an ample

ﬁeld to range in; either by boldly asserting that to be proved which is not so, or

by more artfully distinguishing away the remainder.” 3 Bl. Com. 380. These

are evils which jury trial is designed to prevent; but the effort must be vain if

the judge is to control by his opinion where the law has given him no power to

command. In Lord Campbell’s Lives of the Chancellors, c. 181, the author

justly condemns the practice with some judges in libel cases, of expressing to the

jury their belief in the defendant"s guilt. On the trial of parties, charged with

a libel on the Empress of Russia, Lord Kenyon, sneering at the late Libel Act,

said: " I am bound by my oath to declare my own opinion, and I should forget

my duty were I not to say to you that it is a gross libel.” Upon this Lord

Campbell remarks: “ Mr. F ox’s act only requires the judges to give their opinion

on matters of law in libel cases as in other cases. But did any judge ever say,

‘ Gentlemen, I am of opinion that this is a wilful, malicious, and atrocious mur-

der ’? For a considerable time after the act passed, against the unanimous opposi-

tion of the judges, they almost all spitefully followed this course. I myself heard

one judge say: ‘ As the legislature requires me to give my own opinion in the

present case, I am of opinion that this is a diabolically atrocious libel.’ " Upon

this subject, see McGutiie v. State, 17 Geo. 497; State v. McGinnis, 5 Nev.

337.
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For the origin of this principle, see Forsyth, Trial by Jury, c. 11. The
requirement of unanimity does not prevail in Scotland, or on the Continent.
Among the eminent men who have not approved it may be mentioned Locke
and Jeremy Bentham. See Forsyth, mpra; Lieber, Civil Liberty and SelfGovernment, c. 20.
' A judge who urges his opinion upon the facts to the jury decides the cause,
while avoiding the responsibility. How often would a jury be found bold enough
to declare their opinion in opposition to that of the judge upon the bench, whose
words would fall upon their ears with all the weight which experience, learning,
and commanding position must always carry with them P What lawyer would
care to sum up his case, if he knew that the judge, whose words would be so
much more influential, was to declare in his favor, or would be bold enough to
argue the facts to the jury, if he knew the judge was to declare against him?
Blackstone has justly remarked that "in settling and adjusting a question of fact,
where intrusted to any single magistrate, partiality and injustice hJLve an ample
field to range in ; either by boldly asserting that to be proved which is not so, or
by more artfully distinguishing away the remainder." S BI. Com. 380. These
are evils which jury trial is designed to prevent; but the effort must be vain if
the judge is to control by his opinion where the law has given him no power to
command. In Lord Campbell's Lives of the Chancellors, c. 181, the author
justly condemns the practice with some judges in libel cases, of expressing to the
jury their belief in the defendant's guilt. On the trial of parties, charged with
a libel on the Empress of Russia, Lord Kenyon, sneering at the late Libel Act, •
said: "I am bound by my oath to declare my own opinion, and I should forget
my duty were I not to say to you that it is a gross libel." Upon this Lord
Campbell remarks: "Mr. Fox's act only requires the judges to give their opinion
on matters of law in libel cases as in other cases. But did any judge ever say,
'Gentlemen, I am of opinion that this is a wilful, malicious, and atrocious murder' ? For a considerable time after the act passed, against the unanimous opposition of the judges, they almost all spitefully followed this course. I myself heard
one judge say : • As the legislature requires me to give my own opinion in the
present case, I am of opinion that this is a diabolically atrocious libel.'" Upon
this subject, see McGuffie 11. State, 17 Geo. 497; State v. McGinnis, 5 Nev.
337.
1

to declare their opinion in opposition to that of the judge upon the bench, whose

•
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when he informs them what in his view the law is which

is applicable to the ease before them, and what is essential

to constitute the_§oﬁ'ence charged; and the jury should be left free

and unbiassed by his opinion to determine for themselves whether

the facts in evidence are such as, in the light of the instructions of

the judge, make out beyond any reasonable doubt that the accused

party is guilty as alleged}

How far the jury are to judge of the law as well as of the facts,

is a question a discussion of which we do not propose to enter

upon. If it be their choice to do so, they may return specially

what facts they ﬁnd established by the evidence, and allow the

court to apply the law to those facts, and thereby to determine

whether the party is guilty or not. But they are not obliged in

any case to ﬁnd a special verdict; they have a right to apply for

themselves the law to the facts, and to express their own opinion,

upon the whole evidence, of the defendant/s guilt. Where a general

verdict is thus given, the jury necessarily determine in their own

mind what the law of the case is;2 and if their determination is

favorable to the prisoner, no mode is known to the law in which it

can be reviewed or reversed. A writ of error does not lie on behalf

of the Commonwealth to reverse an acquittal, unless
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[* 322] expressly given by statute;3 nor can a new "‘t.rial be

' The independence of the jury, so far as regards the matters of fact in issue

before them, was settled by Penn’s Case, 6 Howe1l’s State Trials, 951, and by

Bushel’s Case, which grew out of it, and is reported in Vaughan’s Reports, 135.

A very full account of these cases is also found in Forsyth on Trial by Jury,

397. See Bushel’s Case also in Broom’s Const. Law, 120, and the valuable note

thereto. Bushel was foreman of the jury which refused to ﬁnd a verdict of guilty

at the dictation of the court, and he was punished as for contempt of court for

his refusal, but was released on habeas cm-pus.

' “As the main object of the institution of the trial by a jury is to guard

accused persons against all decisions whatsoever by men intrusted with any

permanent oﬂicial authority, it is not only a settled principle that the opinion

(* 321]

*He discharges his duty of giving instructions to the jury
when he informs them what in his view the law is which
is applicable to the case before them, and what is e~sential
to constitute th~offence charged; and the jury should be left free
and unbiassed by his opinion to determine for themselves whether
the facts in evidence are such as, in the light of the instructions of
the judge, make out beyond any reasonable doubt that the accused
party is guilty as alleged.1
How f~r the jury are to judge of the law as well as of the facts,
is a question a discussion of which we do not propose to enter
upon. If it be their choice to do so, they may return specially
what facts they find established by the evidence, and allow the
court to apply the law to those facts, and thereby to determine
whether the party is guilty or not. But they are not obliged in
any case to find a special verdict; they have a right to apply for
themselves the law to the facts, and to express their own opinion,
upon the whole evidence, of the defendant's guilt. Where a general
verdict is thus given, the jury necessarily determine in their own
mind what the law of the case is; 2 and if their determination is
favorable to the prisoner, no mode is known to the law in which it
can be reviewed or reversed. A writ of error does not lie on behalf
of the Commonwealth to reverse an acquittal, unless
(* 322] expressly given by statute ; 3 nor can a new * trial be

which the judge delivers has no weight but such as the jury choose to give it, but

their verdict must besides [unless they see ﬁt to return a special ﬁnding] com-

prehend the whole matter in trial, and decide as well upon the fact as upon the

point of law which may arise out of it; in other words, they must pronounce both

on the commission of a certain fact, and on the reason which makes such fact to

be contrary to law.” De Lolme on the Constitution of England, c. 13.

3 See State v. Reynolds, 4 Hayw. 110; United States v. More, B Cranch, 174;

People c. Dill, 1 Scam. 257; People v. Royal, ib. 557; Commonwealth u. Cum-
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The independence of the jury, so far as regards the matters of fact in issue
before them, was settled by Penn's Case, 6 Howell's State Trials, 951, and by
Bushel's Case, which grew out of it, and is reported in Vaughan's Reports, 135.
A very full account of these cases is also found in Forsyth on Trial by Jury,
897. See Bushel's Case also in Broom's Const. Law, 120, and the valuable note
thereto. Bushel was foreman of the jury which refused to find a verdict of guilty
at the dictation of the court, and he was punished as for contempt of court for
his refusal, but was released on habeas COTpUS.
1 " As the main object of the institution of the trial by a jury is to guard
accused persons against all decisions whatsoever by men intrusted with any
permanent official authority, it is not only a settled principle that the opinion
which the judge delivers has no weight but such as the jury choose to give it, but
their verdict must besides [unless they see fit to return a special finding] comprehend the whole matter in trial, and decide as well upon the fact as upon the
point of law which may arise out of it; in other words, they must pronounce both
on the commission of a certain fact, and on the reason which makes such fact to
be contrary to law." DeLolme on the Constitution of England, c. 13.
J See State v. Reynolds, 4 Hayw. 110; United States v. More, 3 Cranch, 174;
People v. Dill, 1 Scam. 257 ; People "· Royal, ib. 557; Commonwealth "· Cum1
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granted in such a case;1 but neither a writ of error nor a
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motion for a new trial could reach an erroneous determination by

the jury, because, as they do not give reasons for their verdict, the

precise grounds for it can never be legally known, and it is always

presumable that it was given in favor of the accused because the

evidence was not suﬁicient in degree or satisfactory in character;

and no one is at liberty to allege or suppose that they have

disregarded the law.

Nevertheless, as it is the duty of the court to charge the jury

upon the law applicable to the case, it is still an important question

whether it is the duty of the jury to receive and act upon the law

as given to them by the court, or whether, on the other hand, his

opinion is advisory only, so that they are at liberty either to follow

it if it accords with their own convictions, or to disregard it if it

does not.

In one class of cases, that is to say, in criminal prosecutions for

libels, it is now very generally provided by the State constitutions,

or by statute, that the jury shall determine the law and the

facts.” How great a change is made in the common law by these

mings, 3 Cush. 212; People v. Corning, 2 N. Y. 9; State v. Kemp, 17 Wis. 669.

A constitutional provision, saving " to the defendant the right of appeal " in crimi-

nal cases, does not, by implication, preclude the legislature from giving to the
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prosecution the same right. State v. Tait, 22 Iowa, 143.

‘ People v. Comstock, 8 Wend. 549; State v. Brown, 16 Conn. 54; State v.

Kanouse, 1 Spencer, 115; State v. Burns, 3 Texas, 118; State v. Taylor, 1 Hawks,

462.

‘ ' See Constitutions of Alabama, Arkansas, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Michi-

gan, Missouri, New York, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Texas. The Consti-

granted in such a case; 1 but neither a writ of error nor a
motion for a new trial could reach an erroneous determination by
the jury, because, as they do not give reasons for their verdict, the
precise grounds for it can never be legally known, and it is always
pres-umable that it was given in favor of the accused because the
evidence was not sufficient in degree or satisfactory in character;
and no one is at liberty to allege or suppose that they have
diRregarded the law.
Nevertheless, as it is the duty of the court to charge the jury
upon the law applicable to the case, it is still an important question
whether it is the duty of the jury to receive and act upon the law
as given to them by the court, or whether, on the other hand, his
opinion is advisory only, so that they are at liberty either to follow
it if it accords with their own convictions, or to disregard it if it
does not.
In one class of cases, that is to say, in criminal prosecutions for
libels, it is now very generally provided by the State constitutions,
or by statute, that the jury shall determine the law and the
facts. 2 How great a change is made in the common law by these

tution of Maryland, art. 15, § 5, makes the jury the judges of the law in all

criminal cases; and the same rule is established by constitution or statute in

some other States. In Holder v. State, 5 Geo.444, the following view was taken

of such a statute: "Our penal code declares, ' On every trial of a crime or

offence contained in this code, or for any crime or offence, the jury shall be judges

ofthe law and the fact, and shall in every case give a general verdict of guilty or

not guilty, and on the acquittal of any defendant or prisoner, no new trial shall on

any account be granted by the court.’ Juries were, at common law, in some sense

judges of the law. Having the right of rendering a general verdict, that right

involved a judgment on the law as well as the facts, yet not such a judgment as

necessarily to control the court. The early commentators on the common law,

notwithstanding they concede this right, yet hold that it is the duty of the jury

to receive the law from the court. Thus Blackstone equivocally writes: ‘ And

such public or open verdict may be either general, guilty or not guilty, or special,

setting forth all the circumstances of the case, and praying the judgment of the
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mings, 3 Cush. 212; People"· Coming, 2 N.Y. 9; State"· Kemp, 17 Wis. 669.
A constitutional provision, saving " to the defendant the right of appeal" in criminal cases, does not, by implication, preclude the legislature from giving to the
prosecution the 88.me right. State "· Tait, 22 Iowa, 143.
1 People"· Comstock, 8 Wend. 549; State"· Brown, 16 Conn. 54; State"·
Kanouse, 1 Spencer, 115; State"· Burns, 3 Texas, 118; State"· Taylor, 1 Hawka,
462.
- ' See Constitution!! of Alabama, Arkansas, Tilinois, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, New York, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Texas. The Constitution of Maryland, art. 15, § 5, makes the jury the judges of the law in all
criminal cases; and the same rule is established by constitution or statute in
some other States. In Holder " · State, 5 Geo. 444, the following view was taken
of such a statute : " Our penal code declares, • On every trial of a crime or
offence contained in this code, or for any crime or offence, the jury shall be judges
of'the law and the fact, and shall in every case give a general verdict of guilty or
not gnilty, and on the acquittal of any defendant or prisoner, no new tJ·ial shall on
any account be granted by the court.' Juries were, at common law, in some sense
judges of the law. Having the right of rendering a general verdict, that right
involved a judgment on the law as well as the facts, yet not such a judgment as
necessarily to control the court. The early commentators on the common law,
notwithstanding they concede this right, yet hold that it is the duty of the jury
to receive the law from the court. Thus Blackstone equivocally writes: ' And
such public or open verdict may be either general, guilty or not guilty, or special,
setting forth all the circumstances of the case, and praying the judgment of the
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[* 323] * provisions it is diﬂicult to say, because the rule of the

[cH. x.

common law was not very clear upon the authorities ; but

for that very reason, and because the law of libel was sometimes

administered with great harshness, it was\certaiuly proper, and

highly desirable, that a deﬁnite and liberal rule should be thus

established.‘

\ In all other cases the jury have the clear legal right to return a

simple verdict of guilty or not guilty, and in so doing they necessa-

rily decide such questions of law as well as of fact as are involved

in the general question of guilt. If their view conduce to an

acquittal, their verdict to that eﬁ'ect can neither be reviewed nor

set aside. In such a case, therefore, it appears that they pass upon

the law as well as the facts, and that their ﬁnding is conclusive. If,

on the other hand, their view leads them to a verdict of guilty, and

it is the opinion of the court that such verdict is against law, the

verdict will be set aside and a new trial granted. In such a ease,

although they have judged of the law, the court sets aside their

conclusion as improper and unwarranted. But it is clear that the

court whether, for instance, on the facts stated, it be murder or manslaughter, or

no crime at all. This is where they doubt the matter of law, and therefore choose

to leave it to the determination of the court, though they have an unquestionable

right of determining upon all the circumstances, and of ﬁnding a general verdict
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ifthey think proper so to hazard a breach of their oath,‘ &c. 4 Bl. Com. 361;

Co. Lit. 228 a; 2 Hale, P. C. 3.13. Our legislature have left no doubt about

this matter. The juries in Georgia can ﬁnd no special verdict at law. They are

declared to be judges of the law and the facts, and are required in every case to

give a general verdict of guilty or not guilty; so jealous and rightfully jealous

[• 323] • provisions it is difficult to say, because the rule of the
common law was not very clear upon the authorities ; but
for that very reason, and because the law of libel was sometimes
administered with great harshness, it was ,certainly proper, and
highly desirable, that a definite and liberal rule should be thus
established.1
\ In all other cases the jury have the clear legal right to return a
simple verdict of guilty or not guilty, and in so doing they necessarily decide such questions of law as well as of fact as are involved
in the general question of guilt. If their view conduce to an
acquittal, their verdict to that effect can neither be reviewed nor
set aside. In such a case, therefore, it appears that they pass upon
the law as well as the facts, and that their finding is conclusive. If,
on the other hand, their view leads them to a verdict of guilty, and
it is the opinion of the court that such verdict is against law, the
verdict will be set aside and a new trial granted. In such a case,
although they have judged of the law, the court sets aside their
conclusion as improper and unwarranted. But it is clear that the
I

were our ancestors of the inﬂuence of the State upon the trial of acitizen charged

with crime. We are not called upon in this case to determine the relative strength

of the judgment of the court and the jury, upon the law in criminal cases, and

shall express no opinion thereon. We only say it is the right and duty of‘ the

court to declare the law in criminal cases as well as civil, and that it is at the

same time the right of the jury to judge of the law as well as of the facts in crimi-

nal cases. I would not be understood as holding that it is not the province of

the court to give the law of the case distinctly in charge to the jury; it is unques-

tionably its privilege and its duty to instruct them as to what the law is, and

oﬁicially to direct their ﬁnding as to the law, yet at the same time in such way as

not to limit the range of their judgment." See also McGuﬂie v. State, 17 Geo.

497; Clem v. State, 31 Ind. 480.

' For a condensed history of the struggle in England on this subject, see

May’s Constitutional History, c. 9. See also Lord Campbell’s Lives of the

Chancellors, e. 178; Introduction to Speeches of Lord Erskine, edited by James

L. High; Forsyth's Trial by Jury, c. 12.
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court whether, for instance, on the facts stated, it be murder or manslaughter, or
no crime at all. This is where they doubt the matter of law, and therefore choo&e
to leave it to the determination of the court, though they have an unquestionable
right of determining upon all the circumstances, and of finding a general verdict
if they think proper so to hazard a breach of their oath,' &c. 4: Bl. Com. 361;
Co. Lit. 228 a; 2 Hale, P. C. 3.13. Our legislature have left no doubt about
this matter. The juries in Georgia can find no special verdict at law. They are
• declared to be judges of the law and the facts, and are required in every case to
give a general verdict of guilty or not guilty; so jealous and rightfully jealous
were our ancestors of the influence of the State upon the trial of a citizen charged
with crime. We are not called upon in this case to determine the relative strength
of the judgment of the court and the jury, upon the law in criminal cases, and
shall express no opinion thereon. We only say it is the right and duty of the
court to declare the law in criminal cases as well as civil, and that it is at the
same time the right of the jury to judge of the law as well as of the facts in criminal cases. I would not be understood as holding that it is not the proYinco of
the court to give the law of the case distinctly in charge to the jury; it is unquestionably its privilege and its duty to instruct them as to what the law is, and
officially to direct their finding as to the law, yet at the same time in such way as
not to limit the range of their judgment." See also McGuffie v. State, 17 Geo.
497; Clem "· State, 31 Ind. 4:80.
1 For a condensed history of the struggle in England on this subject, see
May's Constitutional History, c. 9. See also Lord Campbell's Lives of the
Chancellors, c. 178 ; Introduction to Speeches of Lord Erskine, edited by James
L. High; Forsyth's Trial by Jury, c. 12.
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jury are no more the judges of the law when they acquit than
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when they condemn, and the different result in the two cases

comes from the merciful maxim of the common law, which will not

suffer an accused party to be twice put in jeopardy for the same

cause, however erroneous may have been the ﬁrst acquittal. In

theory, therefore, the rule of law would seem to be, that it

is the duty of the “ jury to receive and follow the law as [“ 324]

delivered to them by the ‘court; and such is the clear

weight of authority}

There are, however, opposing decisions} and it is evident that

the judicial prerogative to direct conclusively upon the law cannot

be carried very far or insisted upon with much pertinacity, when the

jury have such complete power to disregard it, without the -action

degenerating into something like mere scolding. Upon this subject

' United States v. Battiste, 2 Sum. 240; Stittinus v. United States, 5 Cranch,

C. C. 573; United States v. Morris, 1 Curt, 53; United States v. Riley, 5Blatch.

206; Montgomery v. State, 11 Ohio, 427; Robbins v. State, 8 Ohio, N. s. 181;

Commonwealth v. Porter, 10 Met. 263; Commonwealth v. Anthes, 5 Gray, 185;

Commonwealth v. Rock, 10 Gray, 4; State v. Peace, 1 Jones, 251; Handy v.

State, 7 Mo. 607; Nels v. State, 2 Texas, 280; People v. Pine, 2 Barb. 566;

Carpenter v. People, 8 Barb. 603; McGowan v. State, 9 Yerg. 184; Pleasant v.

jury are no more the judges of the law when they acquit than
when they condemn, and the different result in the two cases
comes from the merciful maxim of the common law, which will not
suffer an accused party to be twice put in jeopardy "for the same
cause, however erroueous may have been the first acquittal. In
theory, therefore, the rule oflaw would seem to be, that it
is the duty of the • jury to receive and follow the law as [• 324]
delivered to them by the 'court; and such is the clear
weight of authority. 1
There are, however, opposing decisions,2 and it is evident that
the judicial prerogative to direct conclusively upon the law cannot · ·
be carried very far or insisted upon :with much pertinacity, when the
jury have such complete power to disregard it, without the .action
degenerating into something like mere scolding. Upon this subject

State, 13 "Ark. 360; Montee v. Commonwealth, 3 J . J . Marsh. 132; Common-
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wealth o. Van Tuyl, 1 Met. (Ky.) 1; Pierce v. State, 13 N. H. 536; People v.

Stewart, 7 Cal. 40; Batre v. State, 18 Ala. 119, reviewing previous cases in the

same State. “ As the jury have the right, and if required by the prisoner are

bound to return a general verdict of guilty or not guilty, they must necessarily,

in the discharge of their duty, decide such questions of law as well as of fact as

are involved in the general question, and there is no mode in which their opinions

on questions of law can be reviewed by this court or any other tribunal. But

this does not diminish the obligation of the court to explain the law. The in-

structions of the court in matters of law may safely guide the consciences of the

jury, unless they know them to be wrong; and when the jury undertake to

decide the law (as they undoubtedly have the power to do) in opposition to the

advice of the court, they assume a high responsibility, and should be very careful

to see clearly that they are right.” Commonwealth v. Knapp, 10 Pick. 496, cited

with approval in McGowan v. State, 9 Yerg. 195, and Dale v.'State, 10 Yerg.

555. - ‘

’ See especially State v. Croteau, 23 Vt. 14, where will be found a very full

and carefully considered opinion, holding that at the common law the jury are

the judges of the law in criminal cases. See also State v. Wilkinson, 2 Vt. 280;

Doss v. Commonwealth, 1 Grat. 557; State v. Jones, 5 Ala. 666; State v. Snow,

6 Shep. 346; State v. Allen, 1 McCord, 525; Armstrong v. State, 4 Blackf. 247;

Warren v. State, ib. 150; Stocking v. State, 7 Ind. 326; Lynch v. State, 9 Ind.

541; Nelson v. State, 2 Swan, 482; McPherson v. State, 22 Geo. 478.
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' United States v. Battiste, 2 Sum. 240; Stittinus tl. United States, 5 Cranch,
C. C. 578; United States"· Morris, 1 Curt~ 58; United States"· Riley, 5 Blatch.
206 ; Montgomery t~. State, 11 Ohto, 427 ; Robbins v. State, 8 Ohio, N. s. 181 ;
Commonwealth"· Porter, 10 Met. 263; Commonwealth t1• .Anthes, fj Gray, 18D;
Commonwealth v. Rock, 10 Gray, 4; State 1:1. Peace, 1 Jones, 251; Handy 1:1.
State, 7 l\lo. 607 ; Nels v. State, 2 Texas, 280 ; People v. Pine, 2 Barb. 566 ;
Carpenter t1. People, 8 Barb. 603; McGowan c. State, 9 Yerg. 184; Pleasant t~.
State, 13 Ark. 360; Montee v. Commonwealth, 3 J. J. Marsh. 182; Commonwealth v. VanTuyl, 1 Met. (Ky.) 1; Pierce"· State, 18 N. H. 586; People t~.
Stewart, 7 Cal. 40; Batre c. State, 18 Ala. 119, reviewing previous cases in the
same State. " As the jury have the right, and if required by the prisoner are
bound to return a general verdict of guilty or not guilty, they must necessarily,
in the discharge of their duty, decide such questions of law as well as of fact as •
are involved in the general question, and there is no mode in which their opinions
on questions of law can be reviewed by this court or any other tribunal. But
this does not diminish the obligation of the court to explain the law. The instructions of the court in matters of law may safely guide the consciences of the
jury, unless they know them to be wrong ; and when the jury undertake to
decide the law (as they undoubtedly have the power to do) in opposition to the
advice of the court, they assume a high responsibility, and should be very careful
to see clearly that they are right." Commonwealth c. Knapp, 10 Pick. 496, cited
with approval in McGowan c. State, 9 Yerg. 195, and Dale 11. State, 10 Yerg.
555.
1 See especially State c. Croteau, 28 Vt. 14, where will be found a very full
and carefully considered opinion, holding that at the common law the jury are
the judges of the law in criminal cases. See also State c. Wilkinson, 2 Vt. 280;
Doss c. Commonwealth, 1 Grat. fjfj7; State c. Jones, 6 .Ala. 666; State c. Snow,
6 Shep. 346; State v . .Allen, 1 McCord, {)25; Armstrong c. State, 4 Blackf. 247;
Warren c. State, ib. 150; Stocking "· State, 7 Ind. 326 ; Lynch v. State, 9 Ind.
541; Nelson o. State, 2 Swan, 482 i MePhenon v. State, 22 Goo. 478.
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the remarks of Mr. Justice Baldwin, of the Supreme Court of the

[CH. X.

United States, to a jury assisting him in the trial of a criminal

charge, and which are given in the note, seem peculiarly digniﬁed

and appropriate, and at the same time to embrace about all that

can properly be said to a jury on this subject.‘

‘ “ In repeating to you what was said on a former occasion to another jury,

that you have the power to decide on the law, as well as the facts of this case,

and are not bound to ﬁnd according to our opinion of the law, we feel ourselves

constrained to make some explanations not then deemed necessary, but now

the remarks of Mr. Justice Baldwin, of the Supreme Court of the
United States, to a jury assisting him in the trial of a criminal
charge, and which are given in the note, seem peculiarly dignified
and appropriate, and at the same time to embrace about all that
can properly be said to a jury on this subject. 1

called for from the course of the defence. You may ﬁnd a general verdict of

guilty or not guilty, as you think proper, or you may ﬁnd the facts specially,

and leave the guilt or innocence of the prisoner to the judgment of the court.

If your verdict acquit the prisoner, we cannot grant a new trial, however much

we may differ with you as to the law which governs the case; and in this respect

a jury are the judges of the law, if they choose to become so. Their judgment

is ﬁnal, not because they settle the law, but because they think it not applicable,

or do not choose to apply it to the case.

“ But if a jury ﬁnd a prisoner guilty against the opinion of the court on the

law of the case, a new trial will be granted. No court will pronounce a judg-

ment on a prisoner against what they believe to be the law. On an acquittal

there is no judgment; and the court do not act, and cannot judge, there remain-

ing nothing to act upon.
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“ This, then, you will understand to be what is meant by your power to decide

on the law, but you will still bear in mind that it is a very old, sound, and valuable

maxim in law, that the court answers to questions of law, and the jury to facts.

Every day's experience evinces the wisdom of this rule.” United States v. Wil-

son, Baldw. 108. VVe quote also from an Alabama case: “ When the power of

juries to ﬁnd a general verdict, and consequently their right to determine without

appeal both law and fact, is admitted, the abstract question whether it is or is not

their duty to receive the law from the court becomes rather a question of casuistry

or conscience than one of law; ~nor can we think that any thing is gained in the

administration of criminal justice by urging the jury to disregard the opinion of

the court upon the law of the case. It must, we think, be admitted, that the

judge is better qualiﬁed to expound the law, from his previous training, than the

jury; and in practice unless he manifests a wanton disregard of the rights of

the prisoner,--a circumstance which rarely happens in this age of the world

and in this country, — his opinion of the law will be received by the jury as an

authoritative exposition, from their conviction of his superior knowledge of the

subject. The right of the jury is doubtless one of inestimable value, especially

in those cases where it may be supposed that the government has an interest in

the conviction of the criminal; but in this country where the government in all

its branches, executive, legislative, and judicial, is created by the people, and is

in fact their servant, we are unable to perceive why the jury should be invited

or urged to exercise this right contrary to their own convictions of their capacity

to do so, without danger of mistake. It appears to us that it is suﬁicicnt that it is

admitted that it is their peculiar province to determine facts, intents, and pur-

[350] '

1 " In repeating to you what was said on a former occasion to another jury,
that you have the power to decide on the law, as well as the facts of this case,
and are not bound to find according to our opinion of the law, we feel ourselves
constrained to make some explanations not then deemed necessary, but now
called for from the course of the defence. You may find a general verdict of
guilty or not guilty, as you think proper, or you may find the facts specially,
and leave the guilt or innocence of the prisoner to the judgment of the court.
If your verdict acquit the prisoner, we cannot grant a new trial, however much
we may differ with you as to the law which governs the case; and in this respect
a jury are the judges of the law, if they ~boose to b~come so. Their judgment
is final, not because they settle the law, but because they think it not applicable,
or do not choose to apply it to the case.
" But if a jury ,find a prisoner guilty against the opinion of the court on the
law of the case, a new trial will be granted. No court will pronounce a judgment on a prisoner against what they believe to be the law. On an acquittal
there is no judgment ; and the court do not act, and cannot judge, there remaining nothing to act upon.
" This, then, you will understand to be what is meant by your power to decide
on the law, but you will still bear in mind that it is a very old, sound, and valuable
maxim in law, that the court answers to questions of law, and the jury to facts.
Every day's experience evinces the wisdom of this rule." United States "· WilBon, Baldw. 108. 'Ve quote also from an Alabama case: "When the power of
juries to find a general verdict, and consequently their right to determine without
appeal both law and fact, is admitted, the abstract question whether it is or is not
tbeir duty to receive the law from the court becomes rather a question of casuistry
or conscience than one of law; nor can we think that any thing is gained in the
administration of criminal justice by urging the jury to disregard the opinion of
the court upon the law of the case. It must, we think, be admitted, that the
judge is better qualified to expound the law, from hi~ previous training, than the
jury; and in practice unless he manifests a wanton disregard of the rights of
the prisoner, - a circumstance which rarely happens in this age of the world
and in this country,- his opinion of the law will be received by the jnry as an
authoritative exposition, from their conviction of his superior knowledge of the
subject. The right of the jury is doubtless one of inestimable value, !"specially
in those cases where it may be supposed that the government has an interest in
the conviction of the criminal; but in this country where the government in all
its branches, executive, legislative, and judicial, is created by the pt,ople, and is
in fact their serv&nt, we are unable to perceive why the jury should be invite1l
or urged to exercise this right contrary to their own convictions of their capacity
to do so, without clanger of mistake. It appears to us that it is sufficient that it is
admitted that it is their peculiar province to determine facts, intents, and pur-
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‘One thing more is essential to a proper protection of [*‘ 325]

accused parties, and that is that one shall not be subject

poses; that it is their right to ﬁnd a general verdict, and consequently that they

must determine the law; and whether in the exercise of this right they will distrust

• One thing more is essential to a. proper protection of [• 825]
accused parties, and that is that one shall not be subject

the court as expounders of the law, or whether they will receive the law from the

court, must be left to their own discretion under the sanction of the oath they

have taken.” State v. Jones, 5 Ala. 672. But as to this case, see Batre v. State,

18 Ala. 119.

It cannot be denied that discredit is sometimes brought upon the administra-

tion of justice by juries ncquitting parties who are suﬂiciently shown to be guilty,

and where, had the trial been by the court, a conviction would have been sure to

follow. In such cases it must be supposed that the jury have been controlled by

their prejudices or their sympathies. However that may be, it by no means fol-

lows that because the machinery of jury trial does not work satisfactorily in

every case, we must therefore condemn and abolish the system, or, what is still

worse, tolerate it, and yet denounce it as being unworthy of public conﬁdence.

Jury trial, when considered in all its aspects, -- as an instrument in the admin-

istration of justice; as an educator of the people in law and politics; and as a

means of making them feel their responsibility in the government, and the

important part they bear in its administration,—is by far the best system of

trial yet devised; and we must take it with all its concomitants, among which is
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a due sense of independence in the jurors. The institution loses its value

when the jury becomes a mere instrument for receiving and echoing back the

opinions of the judge on the case in trial. Concede its defects, and the truth

still remains, that its beneﬁts are indispensable. The remarks of Lord Erskine,

the most distinguished jury lawyer known to English history, may be quoted as

peculiarly appropriate in this connection: “ It is of the nature of every thing

that is great and useful, both in the animate and inanimate world, to be wild and

irregular, and we must be content to take them with the alloys which belong to

them, or live without them. . . . Liberty herself, the last and best gift of God

to his creatures, must be taken just as she is. You might pare her down into

bashful regularity, shape her into a perfect niodel of severe, scrupulous law; but

she would then be Liberty no longer; and you must be content to die under

the lash of this inexorable justice which you had exchanged for the banners of

freedom.”

The province of the jury is sometimes invaded by instructions requiring them

to adopt, as absolute conclusions of law, those deductions which they are at

liberty to draw from a particular state of facts, if they regard them as reason-

able: such as that a homicide must be presumed malicious, unless the defendant

proves the contrary; which is a rule contradictory of the results of common

observation; or that evidence of a previous good character in the defendant

ought to be disregarded, unless the other proof presents a doubtful case; which

would deprive an accused party of his chief protection in many cases of false

accusations and conspiracies. See People v. Garbutt, 17 Mich. 9; People v.

Lamb, 2 Keyes, 360; People v. Revisen, Court of Appeals of New York, October

term, 1870. Upon the presumption of malice in homicide, the reader is referred

to the Review of the Trial of Professor \Vebster, by Hon. Joel Parker, in the
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poses; that it is their right to find a general verdict, and consequently that they
must determine the law; and whether in the exercise of this right they will distrust
the court as expounders of the law, or whether they will receive the law from the
court, must be left to their own discretion under the sanction of the oath they
have taken." State v. Jones, 5 Ala. 672. But as to this case, see Batre v. State,
18 Ala. 119.
It cannot be denied that discredit is sometimes brought upon the administration of justice by juries acquitting parties who are sufficiently shown to be guilty,
and where, had the trial been by the court, a conviction would have been sure to
follow. In such cases it must be supposed that the jury have been controlled by
their prejudiced or their sympathies. However that may be, it by no means follows that because the machinery of jury trial does not work satisfactorily in
every case, we must ~herefore condemn and abolish the system, or, what is still
worse, tolerate it, and yet denounce it as being unworthy of public confidence.
Jury trial, when considered in all its aspects, -as an instrument in the administration of justice ; as an educator of the people in law and politics ; and as a
means of making them feel their responsibility in the government, and the
important part they bear in its administration, -is by far the best system of
trial yet devised ; and we mlJ8t take it with all its concomitants, among which is
a due sense of independence in the jurors. The institution loses its value
when the jury becomes a mere instrument for receiving and echoing back the
opinions of the judge on the case in trial. Concede its defects, and the truth
still remains, that its benefits are indispensable. The remarks of Lord Erskine,
the most distinguished jury lawyer known to English history, may be quoted as
peculiarly appropriate in this connection : " It is of the nature of every thing
that is great and useful, both in the animate and inanimate world, to be wild and
irregular, and we must be content to take them with the alloys which belong to
them, or live without them. • . • Liberty herself, the last and best gift of God
to his creatures, must be taken just as she is. You might pare her down into
bashful regularity, shape her into a perfect model of severe, scrupulous law; but
she would then be Liberty no longer; and you must be content to die under
the lash of this inexorable justice which you had exchanged for the banners of
freedom."
The province of the jury is sometimes invaded by instructions requiring them
to adopt, as absolute conclusions of law, those de,ductions which they are at
liberty to draw from a particular state of facts, if they regard them as reasonable : such as that a homicide must be presumed malicious, unless the defendant
proves the contrary; which is a rule contradictory of the results of common
observation ; or that evidence of a previous good character iu the defendant
ought to be disregarded, unless the other proof presents a doubtful case; which
would deprive an accused party of his chief protection in many cases of false
accusations and conspiracies. See People v. Garbutt, 17 Mich. 9; People v.
Lamb, 2 Keyes, 860; People 11. Revisen, Court of Appeals of New York, October
term, 1870. Upon the presumption of malice in homicide, the reader is referred
to the Review of the Trial of Professor Webster, by Hon. Joel Parker, in the
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[* 326] to be twice put in jeopardy * upon the same charge. One

trial and verdict must, as a general rule, protect him

against any subsequent accusation of the same oﬂence, whether

the verdict be for or against him, and whether the courts are satis-

ﬁed with the verdict or not. We shall not attempt in this place to

collect together the great number of judicial decisions bearing

upon the question of legal jeopardy, and the exceptions to the gen-

eral rule above stated: for these the reader must be referred to

the treatises on criminal law, where the subject will be found to be

extensively treated. It will be suﬁicient for our present purpose

to indicate very brieﬂy some general principles.

A person is in legal jeopardy when he is put upon trial, before a

court of competent jurisdiction, upon indictment or infor-

[* 327] mation * which is suﬁicient in form and substance to sus-

tain a conviction, and a jury has been charged with his

deliverance} And a jury is said to be thus charged when they

have been impanelled and sworn.“ The defendant then becomes

entitled to a verdict which shall constitute a bar to a new prose-

cution ; and he cannot be deprived of this bar by a nolle prosequi
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entered by the prosecuting oﬁicer against his will, or by a dis-

charge of the jury and continuance of the cause.“

North American Review, No. 72, p. 178. See also upon the functions of judge

and jury respectively, the cases of Commonwealth v. \'Vood, 11 Gray, 86; Maher

v. People, 10 Mich. 212; Commonwealth u. Billings, 97 Mass. 405; State v.

Patterson, 63 N. C. 520; State v. Newton, 4 Nev. 410. ' I

‘ Commonwealth v. Cook, 6 S. & R. 586; State v. Norvell, 2 Yerg. 24;

Williams v. Commonwealth, 2 Grat. 568; People v. McGowan, 17 \Vend. 386;

Mounts v. State, 14 Ohio, 295; Price v. State, 19 Ohio, 423; Vllright 0. State,

[• 326] to be twice put in jeopardy • upon the same charge. One
trial and verdict must, as a general rule, protect him
against any subsequent accusation of the same offence, whether
the verdict be for or against him, and whether the courts are satis-·
fied with the verdict or not. We shall not attempt in this place to
collect together the great number of judicial decisions bearing
upon the question of legal jeopardy, and the exceptions to the general rule above stated : for these the reader must be referred to
the treatises on criminal law, where the subject will be found to be
extensively treated. It will be sufficient for our present purpose
to indicate very briefly some general principles.
A person is in legal jeopardy when he is put upon trial, before a
court of competent jurisdiction, upon indictment or infor[• 327] mation • which is sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, and a jury has been charged with his
deliverance.1 And a jury is said to be thus charged when they
have been impanelled and sworn. 2 The defendant then becomes
entitled to a verdict which shall constitute a bar to a new prosecution ; and he cannot be deprived of this bar by a nolle prosequi
entered by the prosecuting officer against his will, or by a discharge of the jury and continuance of the cause.3

5 Ind. 292; State v. Nelson, 26 Ind. 366; State v. Spier, 1 Dev. 491; State 0.

Ephraim, 2 Dev. & Bat. 162; Commonwealth v. Tuck, 20 Pick. 356; People v.

Webb, 28 Cal. 467; People v. Cook, 10 Mich. 164; State v. Ned, 7 Port. 217;

State v. Callendine, 8 Iowa, 288. It cannot be said, however, that a party is in

legal jeopardy in a prosecution brolght about by his own procurement; and a

former conviction or acquittal is consequently no bar to a second indictment, if

the former trial was brought about by the procurement of the defendant, and the

conviction or acquittal was the result of fraud or collusion on his part. Common-

wealth 0. Alderman, 4 Mass. 477; State v. Little, 1 N. H. 257 ; State v. Green,

16 Iowa, 239. See also State v. Reed, 26 Conn. 202. And if a jury is called

and sworn, and then discharged for the reason that it is discovered the defendant

has not been arraigned, this will not constitute a bar. United States v. Riley,

5 Blatch. 205.

’ McFadden 0. Commonwealth, 23 Penn. St. 12.

3 People v. Barrett, 2 Caines, 304; Commonwealth v. Tuck, 20 Pick. 365;
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North American Review, No. 72, p. 178. See also upon the functions of judge
and jury respectively, the cases of Commonwealth"· \Vood, 11 Gray, 86; Maher
"· People, 10 Mich. 212; Commonwealth v. Billings, 97 Mass. 405; State "·
Patterson, 63 N.C. 520; State"· Newton, 4 Nev. 410.
,
1 Commonwealth v. Cook, 6 S. & R. 586; State v. Norvell, 2 Yerg. 24;
Williams v. Commonwealth, 2 Grat. 568; People v. McGowan, 17 Wend. 386;
Mounts v. State, 14 Ohio, 295; Price "· State, 19 Ohio, 423; Wright v. State,
5 Ind. 292; State "· Nelson, 26 Ind. 366; State"· Spier, 1 Dev. 491; State "·
Ephraim, 2 Dev. & Bat. 162; Commonwealth"· Tuck, 20 Pick. 856; People "·
Webb, 28 Cal. 467; People "·Cook, 10 Mich. 164; State "·Ned, 7 Port. 217;
State "· Callendine, 8 Iowa, 288. It cannot be said, however, that a party is in
legal jeopardy in a prosecution brolght about by his own procurement ; and a
former conviction or acquittal is consequently no bar to a second indictment, if
· the former trial was brought about by the procurement of the defendant, a.nd the
conviction or acquittal was the result of fraud or collusion on his part. Commonwealth "·Alderman, 4 Mass. 477; State "· Little, 1 N.H. 251; State v. Green,
16 Iowa, 239. See also State v. Reed, 26 Conn. 202. And if a jury is called
and sworn, and then discharged for the reason that it is discovered the defendant
bas not been arraigned, this will not constitute a bar. United States v. Riley,
5 Blatch. 205.
1 McFadden "· Commonwealth, 23 Penn. St. 12.
3 People "· Barrett, 2 Caines, 804; Commonwealth v. Tuck, 20 Pick. 365;
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indictment was so far defective that no valid judgment could be

rendered upon it,’ or if by any overruling necessity the jury are dis-

charged without a. verdict,“ which might happen from the sickness

or death of the judge holding the court,‘ or of a juror,“ or the

inability of the jury to agree upon a verdict after reasonable time

for deliberation and effort ;° or if the term of the court as ﬁxed by

law comes to an end before the trial is ﬁnished ;7 or the jury are

discharged with the consent of the defendant expressed or implied ;8

or if, after verdict against the accused, it has been set

aside on ‘ his motion for a new trial or on writ of error,” ["' 328]

or the judgment thereon been arrested,1°-—in any of these

Mounts v. State, 14 Ohio, 295; State v. Connor, 5 Cold. 311; State v. Callen-

dine, 8 Iowa, 288; Baker 0. State, 12 Ohio, N. s. 214.

l Commonwealth v. Goddard, 13 Mass. 455; People v. Tyler, 7 Mich. 161.

’ Gerard v. People, 3 Scam. 363; Pritchett v. State, 2 Sneed, 285; People

v. Cook, 10 Mich. 164; Mount v. Commonwealth, 2 Duv. (Ky.) 93; People v.

McNealy, 17 Cal. 333; Kohlheimer v. State, 89 Miss. 548; State v. Kason,

20 La. An. 48; Black v. State, 36 Geo. 447.

If, however, the court had no jurisdiction of the cause,1 or if the
indictment was so far defective that no valid judgment could be
rendered upon it,2 or if by any overruling necessity the jury are discharged without a verdict,3 which might happen from the sickness
or death of the judge holding the court,i or of a juror,!; or the
inability of the jury to agree upon a verdict after reasonable time
for deliberation and effort ; 6 or if the term of the court as fixed by
law comes to an end before the trial is finished ; 7 or the jury are
discharged with the consent of the defendant expressed or implied; s
or if, after verdict against the accused, it has been set
aside on • his motion for a new trial or 011 writ of error,9
328]
or the judgment thereon been arrested,Io_ in any of these

r·

° United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579; State v. Ephraim, 2 Dev. & Bat.

166; Commonwealth v. Fells, 9 Leigh, 620; People v. Goodwin, 18 Johns. 205;

Commonwealth v. Bowden, 9 Mass. 194; Hoffman v. State, 20 Md. 425; Price
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v. State, 36 Miss. 533.

‘ Nugent v. State, 4 Stew. & Port. 72.

° Hector v. State, 2 Mo. 166; State v. Curtis, 5 Humph. 601; Mahala v.

State, 10 Yerg. 532; Commonwealth v. Fells, 9 Leigh, 613.

' People v. Goodwin, 18 Johns. 187; Commonwealth v. Olds, 5 Lit. 140;

Dobbins v. State, 14 Ohio, N. s. 493; Miller v. State, 8 Ind. 325; State v.

Walker, 26 Ind. 346; Commonwealth 1:. Fells, 9 Leigh, 613; Winsor v. The

Queen, L. R. 1 Q. B. 289; sea; v. Prince, as N. c. 529.

" State v. Brooks, 3 Humph. 70; State v. Battle, 7 Ala. 259; Mahala v. State,

10 Yerg. 532‘ State v. Spicr, 1 Dev. 491; Wright v. State, 5 Ind. 290.

‘ State v. Slack, 6 Ala. 676; Elijah v. State, 1 Humph. 103; Commonwealth

v. Stowell, 9 Met. 572.

' And it seems, if the verdict is so defective that no judgment can be rendered

upon it, it may be set aside even against the defendant's objection, and a new

trial had. State v. Redman, 17 Iowa, 329.

‘° Casborus v. People, 13 Johns. 351. But where the indictment was good,

and the judgment was erroneously arrested, the verdict was held to be a bar. State

0. Norvell, 2 Yerg. 24. See People v. Webb, 28 Cal. 467. So if the error was

in the judgment and not in the prior proceedings, if the judgment is reversed,

the prisoner must be discharged. See post, p. 330. But it is competent for the

legislature to provide that on reversing the erroneous judgment in such case,

the court, if the prior proceedings are regular, shall remand the case for the

proper sentence. McKee v. People, 32 N. Y. 289. It is also competent, we
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Mounts 17. State, 14 Ohio, 295; State 17. Connor, 5 Cold. 811; State 17. Callendine, 8 Iowa, 288; Baker v. State, 12 Ohio, N. s. 214.
1 Commonwealth v. Goddard, 13 Mass. 455; People"· Tyler, 7 Mich. 161.
1 Gerard "· People, 8 Scam. 863; Pritchett v. State, 2 Sneed, 285; People
"·Cook, 10 Mich. 164; Mount"· Commonwealth, 2 Duv. (Ky.) 93; People"·
McNealy, 17 Cal. 888; Kohlheimer 17. State, 89 Miaa. 548; State "· Kason,
20 La. An. 48; Black 17. State, 86 Geo. 447.
~ Unite•l States "· Perez, 9 Wheat. 579; State v. Ephraim, 2 Dev. & Bat.
166; Commonwealth"· Fells, 9 Leigh, 620; People v. Goodwin, 18 .Johns. 205;
Commonwealth "· Bowden, 9 Mass. 194; Hoffman "· State, 20 1\ld. 425; Price
"· State, 36 1\liss. 538.
' Nugent"· State, 4 Stew. & Port. 72.
6 Hector "· State, 2 Mo. 166; State "· Curtis, 5 Humph. 601 ; Mahala 11.
State, 10 Yerg. 532; Commonwealth v. Fells, 9 Leigh, 618.
' People v. Goodwin, 18 Johns. 187; Commonwealth 1'. Olds, 5 Lit. 140;
Dobbins "· State, 14 Ohio, N. s. 498; Miller o. State, 8 Ind. 325; State ~'·
·Walker, 116 Ind. 346; Commonwealth o. Fells, 9 Leigh, 613; Winsor 1'. The
Queen, L. R. 1 Q. B. 289; State"· Prince, 63 N.C. 529.
7 State o. Brooks, 8 Humph. 70; State " · Battle, 7 Ala. 259; Mahala ~'· State,
10 Yerg. 532 · State 1'. Spier, 1 Dev. 491; Wright o. State, 5 Ind. 290.
1 State o. Slack, 6 Ala. 676; Elijah "· State, 1 Humph. 103; Commonwealth
o. Stowell, 9 Met. 572.
• And it seems, if the verdict is so defective that no judgment can be rendered
upon it, it may be set aside even against the defendant's objection, and a new
trial had. State"· Redman, 17 Iowa, 829.
1° Casborua ~'· People, 18 Johns. 351.
But where the indictment was good,
and the judgment was erroneously arrested, the verdict was held to be a bar. State
" · NorveU, 2 Yerg. 24. See People o. Webb, 28 Cal. 467. So if the error was
in the judgment and not in the prior proceedings, if the judgment is reversed,
the prisoner must be discharged. See post, p. 880. But it is competent for the
legislature to provide that on reversing the erroneous judgment in such case,
the court, if the prior proceedings are regular, shall remand the case for the
proper sentence. McKee ~'·People, 82 N. Y. 239. It is also competent, we
28
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cases the accused may again be put upon trial upon the same facts

[CH. X.

before charged against him, and the proceedings had will constitute

no protection. But where the legal bar has once attached, the

government’ cannot avoid it by varying the form of the charge in a

new accusation: if the ﬁrst indictment or information were such

that the accused might have been convicted under it on proof of

the facts by which the second is sought to be sustained, then the

jeopardy which attached on the ﬁrst must constitute a protection

against a trial on the second.‘ And if a prisoner is acquitted on

some of the counts in an indictment, and convicted on others, and

a new trial is obtained on his motion, he can be put upon trial the

second time on those counts only on which he was before convicted,

and is for ever discharged from the others?

Excessive Fines and Cruel and Unusual Punishments.

It is also a constitutional requirement that excessive bail shall

not be required, nor cruel and unusual punishments inﬂicted.

Within such bounds as may be prescribed by law, the question

what ﬁne shall be imposed is one addressed to the discretion of the

court. But it is a discretion to be judicially exercised; and\there

may be cases in which a punishment, though not beyond any limit

cases the accused may again be put upon trial upon the same facts
before charged against him, and the proceedings had will constitute
no protection. But where the legal bar has once attached, the
governmenf cannot avoid it by varying the form of the charge in a
new accusation: if the first indictment or information were such
that the accused might have been convicted under it on proof .of
the facts by which the second is sought to be sustained, then the
jeopardy which attached on the first must constitute a protection
against a trial on the second.1 And if a prisoner is acquitted on
some of the counts in an indictment, and convicted on others, and
a new trial is obtained on his motion, he can be put upon trial the
second time on those counts only on which he was before convicted,
and is for ever discharged from the others.2

ﬁxed by statute, is nevertheless so clearly excessive as to be

erroneous in law.“ A ﬁne should have some reference to the
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suppose, in the absence of express constitutional prohibition, to allow an appeal

or writ of error to the prosecution, in criminal cases. See State v. Tait, 22

Excessive Fines and Cruel and Unu8ual Punisltmer,tB.

Iowa, 141.

‘ State v. Cooper, 1 Green, 360; Commonwealth v. Roby, 12 Pick. 504;

People v. McGowan, 17 Wend. 386; Price v. State, 19 Ohio, 423; Leslie v. State,

18 Ohio, N. s. 395; State v. Benham, 7 Conn. 414.

' Campbell v. State, 9 Yerg. 333; State v. Kettle, 2 Tyler, 475; Morris v.

State, S S. & M. 762; Eamon v. State, 1 Swan, 14; Guenther v. People, 24

N. Y. 100; State v. Kattleman, 35 Mo. 105. A nollc prosequi on one count of

an indictment after a jury is called and sworn, is a bar to a new indictment for

the offence charged therein. Baker v. State, 12 Ohio. N. s. 214.

’ The subject of cruel and unusual punishments was somewhat considered in

Barker v. People, 3 Cow. 686, in which case the opinion was expressed by Chan-

cellor Sargford that a forfeiture of fundamental rights--e. g., the right to jury

It is also a constitutional requirement that excessive bail shall
not be required, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
Within such bounds as may be prescribed hy law, the question
what fine shall be imposed is one addressed to the discretion of the
court. But it is a discretion to be judicially exercised ; and' there
may be cases in which a punishment, though not beyond any limit
fixed by statute, is nevertheless so clearly excessive as to be
erroneous in law.8 A fine should have some reference to the

trial—could not be imposed as a punishment for crime, but that a forfeiture of

the right to hold oﬂice might be. In Done v. People, 5 Park. 364, the cruel

punishments of colonial times, such as burning alive and breaking on the wheel,
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suppose, in the absence of express constitutional prohibition, to allow an appeal
or writ of error to the prosecution, in criminal cases. See State v. Tait, 22
Iowa, . 141.
1 State v. Cooper, 1 Green, 860; Commonwealth v. Roby, 12 Pick. 504;
People v. McGowan, 17 Wend. 886; Price v. State, 19 Ohio, 423; Leslie"· State,
18 Ohio, N. s. 395; State v. Benham, 7 Conn. 414.
1 Campbell v. State, 9 Yerg. 338; State v. Kettle, 2 Tyler, 475; Morris v.
State, 8 S. & M. 762; Eamon v. State, 1 Swan, 14; Gu~nther v. People, 24
N. Y. 100; State v. Kattleman, 35 Mo. 10.5. A nolle proatqlli on one count of
an indictment after a jury ie called and sworn, is a bar to a new indictment for
the offence charged therein. Baker v. State, 12 Ohio, N. s. 214.
' The eubject of cruel and unusual punishments was somewhat considered in
Barker v. People, 3 Cow. 686, in which case the opinion was e~pressed by Chancellor Sanford that a forfeiture <>f fundamental rights-e. g., the right to jury
trial-could not be imposed as a punishment for crime, but that a forfeiture of
the right to hold office might be. In Done v. People, 5 l'ark. 364, the cruel
punishments of colonial times, such as burning alive and breaking on the wheel,
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was not to be amerced for a small fault, but according to
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the degree of the fault, and for a great crime in proportion to

the heinousness of it, saving to him his contenement; and after the

same manner a merchant, saving to him his merchandise. And a

villein was to be amerced after the same manner, saving to him his

wainage. The merciful spirit of these provisions addresses itself

to the criminal courts of the American States through the provi-

sions of their constitutions.

It has been decided by the Supreme Court of Connecticut that it

was not competent in the punishment of a common-law offence to

inﬂict ﬁne and imprisonment without limitation. The precedent,

it was said, cited by counsel contending for the opposite doctrine,

of the punishment for a libel upon Lord Chancellor Bacon, was

deprived of all force of authority by the circumstances attending

it; the extravagance of the punishment being clearly referable to

the temper of the times. “ The common law can never require a

ﬁne to the extent of the otfender’s goods and chattels, or sentence

of imprisonment for life. The punishment is both uncertain and

unnecessary. It is no more difiicult to limit the imprisonment of

an atrocious offender to an adequate number of years than to pre-

scribe a limited punishment for minor oﬂences. And when there
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exists no ﬁrmly established practice, and public necessity or conve-

nience does not imperiously demand the principle contended for, it

cannot be justiﬁed by the common_law, as it wants the main ingre-

dients on which that law is founded. Indeﬁnite punishments are

fraught with danger, and ought not to be admitted unless the

written law should authorize thcm.”1

It is certainly diﬁicult to determine precisely what is meant by

cruel and unusual punishments. Probably any punishment de-

clared by statute for an offence which was punishable in the same

way at the common law, could not be regarded as cruel or unusual

in the constitutional sense. And probably any new statutory

were enumerated by W. W. Campbell, J ., who was of opinion that they must be

regarded as “cruel” if not “ unusual,” and therefore as being now forbidden by

the Constitution.

' Per Hosmer, Ch. J., in State v. Danforth, 3 Conn. 115. Peters, J ., in the

same case, pp. 122-124, collects a number of cases in which perpetual imprison-

ment was awarded at the common law, but, as his associates believed, unwar-

rantably.

[ass]

party's ability to pay it. • By Magna Charta a freeman [• 329]
was not to be amerced for a small fault, but according to
the degree of the fault, and for a great crime in proportion to
the heinousness of it, saving to him his contenement; and after the
same manner a merchant, saving to !tim his merchandise. And a
villein was to be amerced after the same manner, saving to him his
wainage. The merciful spirit of these provisions addresses itself
to the criminal courts of the Ameri<·an States through the provisions of their constitutions.
It has been decided by the Supreme Court of Connecticut that it
was not competent in the punishment of a common-law offence to
inflict fine and imprisonment without limitation. The precedent,
it was said, cited by counsel contending for the opposite doctrine,
of the punishment for a libel upon Lord Chancellor Bacon, was
deprived of all force of authority by the circumstances attending
it; the extravagance of the punishment being clearly referable to
the temper of the times. "The common law can never require a
fine to the extent of the offender's goods and chattels, or sentence
of imprisonment for life. The punishment is both uncertain and
unnecessary. It is no more difficult to limit the imprisonment of
an atrocious offender to an adequate number of years than to prescribe a limited punishment for minor offences. And when there
exis~s no firmly established practice, and public necessity or conveuience does not imperiously demand the principle contended for, it
cannot be justified by the common .Jaw, as it wants the main ingredients on which that law is founded. Indefinite punishments are
f;aught with danget·, and ought not to be admitted unless the
written law should authorize them." 1
It is certainly difficult to determine precisely what is meant by
cruel and unusual punishments. Probably any punishment declared by statute for au offence which was punishable in the same
way at the common law, could not be regarded as cruel or unusual
in the coustituLioual sense. And probably any new statutory
were enumerated by W. W. Campbell, J., who was of opinion that they must be
regarded as •• cruel" if not '' unusual," and therefore as being now forbidden by
the Constitution.
1 }Jer Hosmer, Cb. J., in State v. Danforth, 3 Conn. 115.
Peters, J., in the
same case, pp. 122-124, collects a number of cases in which perpetual imprisonment was awarded at the common law, but, as his associates believed, unwarrantably.
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offence may be punished to the extent and in the mode permitted

• 329

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

by the common law for offences of similar nature. But those

[cH: x .

degrading punishments which in any State had become obsolete

before its existing constitution was adopted, we think may well be

held forbidden by it as cruel and unusual. We may well doubt

the right to establish the whipping-post and the pillory

[* 330] in ‘States where they were never recognized as instru-

ments of punishment, or in States whose constitutions,

revised since public opinion had banished them, have forbidden cruel

and unusual punishments. In such States the public sentiment

must be regarded as having condemned them as “ cruel,” and any

punishment which, if ever employed at all, has become altogether

obsolete, must certainly be looked upon as “ unusual.”

A defendant, however, in any case is entitled to have the

precise punishment meted out to him which the law provides,

and no other. A diﬂerent punishment cannot be substituted on

the ground of its being less in severity. Sentence to transpor-

tation for a capital offence would be void ; and as the error in such

a case would be in the judgment itself, the prisoner would be

entitled to his discharge, and could not be tried again.‘ If, how-

ever, the legal punishment consists of two distinct and severable

things,—- as ﬁne and imprisonment, — the imposition of either is
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legal, and the defendant cannot be heard to complain that the

other was not imposed also?

The Right to Counsel.

Perhaps the privilege most important to the person accused of

crime, connected with his trial, is that to be defended by counsel.

From very early days a class of men, who have made the laws of

their country their special study, and who have been accepted

for the conﬁdence of the court in their learning and integrity,

have been set apart as officers-of the court, whose special duty it

1 Bourne v. The King, 7 Ad. & El. 58; Lowenberg v. People, 27 N. Y. 336.

See also Whitebread v. The Queen, 7 Q. B. 582; Rex v. Fletcher, Russ. & Ry.

58. In this last case the court was equally divided on the question whether the

omission, in a sentence of death, of the subsequent directions which the law pro-

offence may be punished to the extent and in the mode permitted
by the common law for offences of similar nature. But those
degrading punishments which in any State had become obsolete
before its existing constitution was adopted, we think may well be
held forbidden by it as cruel and unusual. We may well doubt
the right to establish the whipping-post and the pillory
[* 330] in • States where they were never recognized as instruments of punishment, or in States whose constitutions,
revised since public opinion had banished them, have forbidden cruel
and unusual punishments. In such States the public sentiment
must be regarded as having condemned them as " cruel," and any
punishment which, if ever employed at all, has become altogether
obsolete, must certainly be looked upon as "unusual."
A defendant, however, in any case is entitled to have the
precise punishment meted out to him which the law provides,
and no other. A different punishment cannot be substituted on
the ground of its being less in severity. Sentence to transportation for a capital offence would be void ; and as the error in such
a case would be in the judgment itself, the prisoner would be
entitled to his discharge, and could not be tried again.1 If, however, the legal punishment consists of two distinct and severable
things,- as fine and imprisonment,- the impo~ition of either is
legal, and the defendant cannot be heard to complain that the
other was not imposed also.2

vided for, rendered‘ the sentence void. See further, Hartung v. People, 26 N. Y.

167 ; Elliott v. People, 13 Mich. 365.

’ See Kane v. People, 8 Wend. 203.

The Right to Counsel.
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Perhaps the privilege most important to the person accused of
crime, connected with his trial, is that to be defended by counsel.
From very early days a class of men, who have made the laws of
their country their special study, and who hav,e been accepted
for the confidence of the court in their learning and integrity,
have been set apart as officers-of the court, whose special duty it
1 Bourne v. The King, 7 Ad. & El. 58; Lowenberg v. People, 27 N.Y. 336.
See also Whitebread v. The Queen, 7 Q. B. 582; Rex v. Fletcher, Russ. & Ry.
58. In this last case the court was equally divided on the question whether the
omission, in a sentence of death, of the subsequent directions which the law provided for, renderechhe sentence void. See further, Hartung v. People, 26 N.Y.
167; Elliott"· People, 13 Mich. 365.
1 See Kane v. People, 8 Wend. 203.
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should be to render aid to the parties and the courtl in the

CB. X.]

CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY.

* 330

application Br the law to legal controversies. These persons,

before entering upon their employment, were to take an oath of

ﬁdelity to the courts whose oﬂicers they were, and to

their clients ; 2 and it was their special "‘duty to see that [* 331]

no wrong was done their clients by means of false or

prejudiced witnesses, or through the pervers_ion or misapplication

of the law by the court. Strangely enough, however, the aid of this

profession was denied in the very cases in which it was needed

most, and it has cost a long struggle, continuing even into the

present century, to rid the English law of one of its most horrible

' In Commonwealth 0. Knapp, 9 Pick. 498, the court denied the application

of the defendant that Mr. Rantoul should be assigned as his counsel, because,

though admitted to the Common Pleas, he was not yet an attorney of the Supreme

Court, and that court, consequently, had not the usual control over him; and,

besides, counsel was to give aid to the court aswell as to the prisoner, and there-

fore it was proper that a person of more legal experience should be assigned.

should be to render aid to the parties and the court 1 in the
application
the law to legal controversies. These persons,
before entering upon their employment, we1·e to take an oath of
fidelity to the courts whose officers they were, and to
their clients ; ~ and it was their special *duty to see that [* 331]
no wrong was done their clients by means of false or
prejudiced witnesses, or through tho pervers,ion or misapplication
of the law by the court. Strangely enough, however, the aid of this
profession was denied in the very cases in which it was needed
most, and it has cost a long struggle, continuing even into the
present century, to rid the English law of one of its most horrible

of

’ “Every countor is chargeable by the oath that he shall do no wrong nor

falsity, contrary to his knowledge, but shall plead for his client the best he can,

according to his understanding.” Mirror of Justices, c. 2, § 5. The oath in

Pennsylvania, on the admission of an attorney to the bar, “to behave himself

in the otﬁce of an attorney, according to the best of his learning and ability, and
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with all good ﬁdelity, as well to the court as to the client; that he will use no false-

hood, nor delay any man’s cause, for lucre or malice," is said, by Mr. Sharswood,

to present a comprehensive summary of his duties as a practitioner. Sharswood’s

Legal Ethics, p. 3. The advocate‘s oath, in Geneva, was as follows: “ I solemnly

swear, before Almighty God, to be faithful to the Republic, and to the canton of

Geneva; never to depart from the respect due to the tribunals and authoities;

never to counsel or maintain a cause which does not" appear to be just or equita-

ble, unless it be the defence of an accused person; never to employ, knowingly,

for the purpose of maintaining the causes conﬁded to me, any means contrary to

truth, and never seek to mislead the judges by any artiﬁce or false statement

of facts or law; to abstain from all offensive personality, and to advance no fact

contrary to the honor and reputation of the parties, if it be not indispensable to

the cause with which I may be charged; not to encourage either the commence-

ment or continuance of a suit from any motives of passion or interest; nor to

reject, for any consideration personal to myself, the cause of the weak, the

stranger, or the oppressed.” In “The Lawyer‘s Oath, its Obligations, and some

of the Duties springing out of them,” by D. Bethune Duﬂield, Esq., a masterly

analysis is given of this oath; and he well says of it: “Here you have the creed

of an upright and honorable lawyer. The clear, terse, and lofty language in

which it is expressed needs no argument to elucidate its principles, no eloquence

to enforce its obligations. It has in it the sacred savor of divine inspiration,

and sounds almost like a restored reading from Sinai"s original, but broken

tablets."

[ as": ]

1 In Commonwealth "· Knapp, 9 Pick. 498, the court denied the application
of the defendant that 1\Ir. Rantoul should be aesigned as his counsel, because,
though admitted to t.he Common Pleae, he wa11 not yet an attorney of the Supreme
C-ourt, and that court, consequently, had not the ufual control over him; and,
besides, counsel wae to give aid to the court ae well ae to the prisoner, and therefore it wae proper that a person of more legal expl•rience should be assigned.
1 "Every countor is chargeable by the oath that he shall do no wrong nor
falsity, contrary to his knowledge, but shall plead for his client the best he can,
according to his understanding." MiiTor of Justices, c. 2, § 5. The oath in
Pennsylvania, on the admission of an attorney to the bar, "to behave himself
in the office of an attorney, according to the best of his learning and ability, and
with all good fidelity, ae well to the court as to the client; that he will use no falsehood, nor delay any man's cause, for lucre or malice," is said, by Mr. Sharswood,
to present a comprehensive summary of his duties as a practitioner. Sharswood's
Legal Ethics, p. 3. The advocate's oath, in Geneva, was as follows: "I 11olemnly
swear, before Almighty God, to be faithful to the Republic, and to the canton of
Geneva; never to depart from thtl respect due to the tribunals and authollities ;
never to counsel or maintain a cause which does not' appear to be just or equitable, unless it be the defence of an accused person; never to employ, knowingly,
for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to me, any means contrary to
truth, and never seek to mislead the judges by any artifice or false statement
of facts or law; to abstain from all offi•nsive personality, and to advance no fact
contrary to the honor and reputation of the parties, if it be not indispensable to
the cause with which I may be charged; not to t>ncouragc either the commencement or continuance of a suit from any motives of paesion or interest; nor to
reject, for any consideration personal to myself, the cause of the weak, the
stranger, or the oppressed." In ••The Lawyer's Oath, its Obligations, and some
of the Duties springing out of them," by D. Bethune Duffield, Esq., a masterly
analysis is given of this oath; and he well says of it: ''Here you have the creed
of an upright and honorable lawyer. The clear, terse, and lofty language in
which it is expl'l·ssed needs no argument to elucidate its principles, no eloquence
to enforce its obligations. It has in it the sacred savor of divine inspiration,
and sounds almost like a restored reading from Sinai's original, but broken
tablets."
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features. In civil causes and on the trial of charges of mis-

[cu. x.

demeanor, the parties were entitled to the aid of counsel in elicit-

ing the facts, and in presenting both the facts and the law

to the court and jury ; but when the government charged

a person with treason or felony, he was denied this privi-

[* 332] lege.1 Only such ‘legal questions as he could suggest

was counsel allowed to argue for him; and this was but

a poor privilege to one who was himself unlearned in the law,

and who, as he could not fail to perceive the monstrous injustice of

the whole proceeding, would be quite likely to accept any per-

version of the law that might occur in the course of it as

regular and proper, because quite in the spirit that denied

him a defence. Only after the revolution of 1688 was a full

defence allowed on trials for treason,” and not until 1836 was

‘ When an ignorant person, unaccustomed to public assemblies, and perhaps

feeble in body or in intellect, was put upon trial on a charge which, whether

true or false, might speedily consign him to an ignominious death, with able

counsel arrayed against him, and all the machinery of the law ready to be em-

ployed in bringing forward the evidence of circumstances indicating guilt, it is

painful to contemplate the harbarity which could deny him professional aid.

Especially when in most cases he would be imprisoned immediately on being

features. In civil causes and on the trial of charges of misdemeanor, the parties were entitled to the aid of counsel in eliciting the facts, and in presenting both the facts and the law
to the court and jnry ; but when the government charged
a person with treason ot· felony, he was denied this privi[* 332] lege.1 Only such *legal questions as he could suggest
was counsel allowed to argue for him ; and this was but
a poor privilege to o;1e who was himself unleamed in the law,
and who, as he could not fail to perceive the monstrous injustice of
tlle whole proceeding, would be quite likely to accept any perversion of the law that might occur in the course of it as
regular and proper, because quite in the spirit that denied
him a defence. Only after the revolution of 1688 was a full
defence allowed on tl'ials for treason,2 and not until 1836 was

apprehended, and would thereby be prevented from making even the feeble
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preparations which might otherwise have been within his power. A “trial”

under such circumstances would be only a judicial murder in very many cases.

The spirit in which the old law was administered may be judged of from the case

of Sir \Villiam Parkins, tried for high treason before Lord Ilolt and his associates

in IQ5, after the statute 7 William III. c. 3, allowing counsel to prisoners

indicted for treason, had been passed, but one day before it was to take effect.

He prayed to be allowed counsel, and quoted the preamble to the statute that

such allowance was just and reasonable. His prayer was denied, Lord Holt

declaring that he must administer the law as he found it, and could not anticipate

the operation of an act of Parliament even by a single day. The accused was

convicted and executed. See Lieber‘s Hermeneutics, c. 4, § 15; Sedgwick on

Stat. & Const. Law, 81. In proceedings by the Inquisition against suspected

heretics the aid of counsel was expressly prohibited. Lea’s Superstition and

Force, 377.

" See an account of the ﬁnal passage of this bill in Macaulay’s “England,”

Vol. IV. c. 21. It is surprising, that the eﬂbrt to extend the same right to all

persons accused of felony was so strenuously resisted afterwards, and that, too,

notwithstanding the best lawyers in the realm admitted its importance and jus-

tice. “ I have myself,” said Mr. Scarlett. “ often seen persons I thought inno-

cent convicted, and the guilty escape, for want of some acute and intelligent

counsel to show the bearings of the diﬁerent circumstances on the conduct and

situation of the prisoner.” House of Commons Debates, April 25, l826. “ It

[358]

1 When an ignorant per;on, unaccustomed to public assemblie11, and perhaps
feeble in body or in intellect, was put upon trial on a charge which, whether
true or false, might speedily consign him to an ignominious death, with able
counsel arrayed against him, and all the machinery of the law ready to be employed in bringing forward the evidence of circumstances indicating guilt, it is
painful to contemplate the barbarity which could deny him professional aid.
Especially wht•n in most cases he would b~ imprisoned immediately on being
apprehended, and would thereby be prevented from making even the feeble
prep!Ll'ations which might otherwise have been within his power. A "trial"
under such circumstances would be only a judicial murder in very many cases.
The spirit in which the old law was administered may be judged of from the case
of Sir William Parkins, tried for high treason before Lord Holt and his associates
in lfi5, after the statute 7 William III. c. 3, allowing counsel to prisoners
indicted for treason, ha<l been passed, but one day before it was to take effect.
He prayed to be allowed counsel, and quoted the preamble to the statute that
such allowance was just and reasonable. His prayer was denied, Lord Holt
declaring that he must administer the law as he found it, and could not anticipate
the operation of an act of Parlianwnt even by a single day. The accused was
convicted and executed. See Lieber's Hermeneutics, c. 4, § 15; Sedgwick on
Stat. & Const. Law, 81. In proceedings by the Inquisition against suspected
heretics the aid of counsel was expressly prohibited. Lea':~ Superstition and
Force, 3i7.
' See an account of the final passage of this bill in Macaulay's "England,"
Vol. IV. c. 21. It is surprising, that the effort to extend the same right to all
persons accused of felony was so strenuously resisted afterwards, and that, too,
notwithstanding the best lawyers in the realm admitted its importance and justice. "I have myself," said :Mr. Scarlett, "often seen persons I thought inno·
cent convicted, and the guilty escape, for want of some acute and intelligent
counsel to show the bearings of the different circumstances on the conduct and
situation of the prisoner." House of Commons Debates, April 25, 1826. "It
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" the same privilege extended to persons accused of other ["* 333]
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY.

•

333

felonies}

has lately been my lot,” said Mr, Denman, on the same occasion, “to try two

prisoners who were deaf and dumb, and who could only be made to understand

what was passing by the signs of their friends. The cases were clear and sim-

• the same privilege extended to persons accused or other [• 333]
felonies.I

ple; but if they had been circumstantial cases, in what a situation would the

judge and jury be placed, when the prisoner could ha_ve no counsel to plead for

him.” The cases looked clear and simple, to Mr. Denman; but how could he

know they would not have looked otherwise, had the coloring of the prosecution

been relieved by a counter-presentation for the defence? See Sydney Smith’s

article on Counsel for Prisoners, 45 Edinb. Rev. p. 74; \Vorks, Vol. II. p. 353.

The plausible objection to extending the right was, that the judge would be coun-

sel for the prisoner, —-a pure fallacy at the best, and, with some judges, a fright-

ful mockery. Baron Garrow, in a charge to a grand jury, said: “ It has been

truly said that, in criminal cases, judges were counsel for the prisoners. So,

undoubtedly, they were, as far as they could be, to prevent undue prejudice, to

guard against improper inﬂuence being excited against prisoners; but it was

impossible for them to go further than this, for they could not suggest the course

of defence prisoners ought to pursue; for judges only saw the deposition -so

short a time before the accused appeared at the bar of their country, that it was

quite impossible for them to act fully in that capacity."

If one would see how easily, and yet in what a shocking manner, a judge might
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pervert the law and the evidence, and act the part of both prosecutor and king’s

counsel, while assuming to be counsel for the prisoner, he need not go further

back than the early trials in our own country, and he is referred for a specimen

to the trials of Robert Tucker and others for piracy, before Chief Justice T rott,

at Charleston, S. C., in 1718, as reported in 6 Hargrave’s State Trials, 156 at

seq. Especially may he there see how the statement of prisoners in one case,

to which no credit was given for their exculpation, was used as hearsay evidence

to condemn a prisoner in another case. All these abuses would have been

checked, perhaps altogether prevented, had the prisoners had able and fear-

less counsel. But without counsel for the defence, and under such a judge,

the witnesses were not free to testify, the prisoners could not safely make even

the most honest explanation, and the jury, when they retired, could only feel

that returning a verdict in accordance with the opinion of the judge was only

matter of form. Sydney Smith's lecture on “ The judge that smites contrary to

the law ” is worthy of being carefully pondered in this connection. “ If ever a

nation was happy, if ever a nation was visibly blessed by God, if ever a nation

was honored abroad, and lelt at home under a government (which we can now

conscientiously call a liberal government) to the full career of talent, industry,

and vigor, we are at this moment that people, and this is our happy lot. First,

the Gospel has done it, and then justice has done it; and he who thinks it his

duty that this happy condition of existence may remain must guard the piety of

' By statute 6 & 7 William IV c. 114; 4 Cooley’s Bl. Com. 355; May’s

Const. Hist. e. 18.
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has lately been my lot," said Mr. Denman, on the same occasion, '' to try two
prisoners who were deaf and dumb, and who could only be made to understand
what was passing by the signs of their friends. The cases were clear and simple; but if they had been circumstantial cases, in what a situation would the
judge and jury be placed, when the prisoner could h~ve no counsel to plead for
him." The cases looked clear and simple, to Mr. Denman; but how could he
know they would not have looked otherwise, bad the coloring of the prosecution
been relieved by a counter· presentation for the defence P See Sydney Smith's
artirle on Counsel for Prisoners, 45 Edinb. Rev. p. 74; 'Vorks, Vol. II. p. 353.
The plausible objection to extending the right was, that the judge would be counsel for the prisoner,- a pure fallacy at the best, and, with some judges, a frightful mockery. Baron Garrow, in a charge to a grand jury, said: "It bas been
truly said that, in criminal cases, judges were counsel for the prisoners. So,
undoubtedly, they were, as far as they could be, to prevent undue prejudice, to
guard against improper influence being excited against prisoners; but it was
impossible for them to go further than this, for they could not suggest the course
of defence prisoners ought to pursue; for judges only saw the deposition ·SO
short a time before the accused appeared at the bar of their country, that it was
quite impossible for them to act fully in that capacity."
If one would see how easily, and yet in what a shocking manner, a judge might
pervert the law and the evidence, and act the part of both prosecutor and king's
coun~el, while assuming to be counsel for the prisoner, he need not go further
back than the early trials in our own country, and he is referred for a specimen
to the trials of Robert Tucker and others for piracy, before Chief Justice Trott,
at Charleston, S. C., in 1718, as reported in 6 Hargrave's State Trials, 156 et
seq. Especially may he there see how the statement of prisoners in one case,
to which no credit was given for their exculpation, was used as hearsay evidence
to condemn a prisoner in another case. All these abuses would have been
checked, perhaps altogether prevented, had the prisonerll had able and fearless counsel. But without counsel for the defence, and under such a judge,
the witnesses were not free to testify, the prisoners could not safely make even
the most honest explanation, and the jury, when they retired, could only feel
that returning a verdict in accordance with the opinion of the judge was only
matter of form. Sydney Smith's lecture on "The judge that smites contrary to
the law " is worthy of being carefully pondered in this connection. " If ever a
nation was happy, if ever a nation was visibly blessed by God, if ever a nation
was honored abroad, and left at home under a government (which we can now
conscientiously call a liberal government) to the full eareer of talent, industry,
and vigor, we are at this moment that pPople, and this is our happy lot. First,
the Gospel has done it, and then justice has done it; and he who thinks it his
duty that this happy condition of existence may remain must guard the piety of

By statute 6 & 7 William IV c. 114; 4 Cooley's Bl.
Const. Hist. c. 18.
1

Co~J?.

355; May'a
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[* 334] ‘With us it is a universal principle of constitutional

[ca. x.

law, that the prisoner shall be allowed a defence by coun-

sel. And generally it will be found that the humanity of the law

has provided that, if the prisoner is unable to employ counsel, the

court may designate some one to defend him who shall be paid by

the government; but when no such provision is made, it is a duty

which counsel so designated owes to his profession, to the court

engaged in the trial, and to the cause of humanity and justice, not

to withhold his assistance nor spare his best exertions, in the de-

fence of one who has the double misfortune to be stricken by

poverty and accused of crime. No one is at liberty to decline

such an app0intm6nt,1 and few, it is to be hoped, would be dis-

posed to do so.

In guaranteeing to parties accused of crime the right to the aid

of counsel, the constitution secures it, with all its accustomed

incidents. Among these is that shield of protection which is thrown

around the confidence the relation of counsel and client requires,

and which does not permit the disclosure by the former, even in the

courts of justice, of communications which may have been made to

him by the latter with a view to pending or anticipated litigation.

This is the client’s privilege; the counsel cannot waive it; and the

I
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these times, and he must watch over the spirit of justice which exists in these

times. First, he must take care that the altars of God are not polluted, that the

Christian faith is retained in purity and in perfection; and then, turning to

human alfairs, lct him strive for spotless, incorruptible justice; praising, honor-

ing, and loving the just judge, and abhorring as the worst enemy of mankind

him who is placed there to ‘judge after the law, and who smitcs contrary to the

law.’ ”

‘ Vise v. Hamilton County, 1.9 Ill. 18. It has been held that, in the absence

of express statutory provisions, counties are not obliged to compensate counsel

[• 334]

• With us it is a universal principle of constitutional
law, that the prisoner shall be allowed a defence by counsel. And generally it will be found that the humanity of the law
has provided that, if the prisoner is unable to employ counsel, the
court may designate some one to defend him who shall be paid by
the government; but when no such provision is made, it is a duty
which counsel so designated owes to his profession, to the court
engaged in the trial, and to the cause of humanity and justice, not
to withhold his assistance nor spare his best exertions, in the defence of one who has the double misfortune to be stricken by
poverty and accused of crime. No one is at liberty to decline
such an appointment,1 and few, it is to be hoped, would be disposed to do so.
In guaranteeing to parties accused of crime the right to the aid
of counsel, the constitution secures it, with all its accustomed
incidents. Among these is that shield of protection which is thrown
around the confidence the relation of counsel and client requires,
and which does not permit the disclosure by the former, even in the
courts of justice, of communications which may have been made to
him by the latter with a view to pending or anticipated litigation.
This is the client's privilege; the counsel cannot waive it; and the

assigned by the court to defend poor prisoners. Bacon v. \Vayne County,

1 Mich. 461. But there are several cases to the contrary. Webb v. Baird,

6 Ind. 13; Hall v. Washington County, 2 Greene'(Iowa), 473; Carpenter v.

Dane County, 9 Wis. 277. But we think a court has a right to require the ser-

vice whether compensation is to be made or not; and that counsel who should

decline to perform it, for no other reason than that the law does not provide

pecuniary compensation, is unworthy to hold his responsible oﬂice in the admin-

istration of justice. Said Chief Justice Hale in one case: “ Although sergeants

have a monopoly of practice in the Common Pleas, they have a right to practise,

and do practise, at this bar; and if we were to assign one of them as counsel, and

he was to refuse to act, we should make bold to commit him to prison.” Life of

Chief Justice Hale in Campbell's Lives of the Chief Justices, Vol. II.
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these times, and he must watch over the spirit of justice which exists in these
times. First, he must take care that the altars of God are not polluted, that the
Christian faith is retained in purity and in perfection ; and then, turning to
human affairs, let him strive for spotless, incorruptible justice; praising, honoring, and loving the just judge, and abhorring as the worst enemy of mankind
him who is placed there to 'judge after the law, and who smites contrary to the
.
law ..'"
1 Vise"· Hamilton County, 19 Ill. 18.
It has been held that, in the absence
of express statutory provisions, counties are not obliged to compensate counsel
assigned by the court to deftmd poor prisoners. Bacon "· Wayne County,
1 Mich. 461. But there are several cases to the contrary. Webb 11. Baird,
6 Ind. 13; Hall v. Washington County, 2 Greene '(Iowa), 473; Carpenter "·
Dane County, 9 Wis. 277. But we think a court has a right to require the service whether compensation is to be made or not; and that counsel who should
decline to perform it, for no other reason than that the law does not provicle
pecuniary compensation, is unworthy to hold his responsible office in the administration of justice. Said Chief Justice Hale in one case: " Although sergeants
have a monopoly of practice in the Common Pleas, they have a right to practise,
and do practise, at this bar; and if we were to assign one of them as counsel, and
he was to rt>fuse to act, we should make bold to commit him to prison." Life of
Chief Justice Hale in Campbell's Lives of the Chief Justices, Vol. II.

[ 360]

on. x.] consrrrurroma PROTECTIONS ro PERSONAL LIBERTY. " 334

CH. X.]

CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY.

•

334

court would not permit the disclosure even if the client were not

present to take the objection.‘

"‘Having once engaged in a cause, the counsel is not [* 335]

afterwards at liberty to withdraw from it without the

consent of his client and of the court; and even though he may

be impressed with a belief in his client’s guilt, it will nevertheless

be his duty to see that a conviction is not secured contrary to the

law.” The worst criminal is entitled to be judged by the laws;

and if his conviction is secured by means of a perversion of the

law, the injury to the cause of public justice will be more serious

and lasting in its results than his being allowed to escape

altogether.”

' The history and reason of the rule which exempts counsel from disclosing

professional communications are well stated in Whiting v. Barney, 30 N. Y. 330.

And see 1 Phil. Ev. by Cowen, Hill, and Edwards, 130 ct seq. The privilege

would not cover communications made, not with a view to professional assistance,

but in order to induce the attorney to aid in a criminal act. People v. Blakeley,

4 Park. Cr. R. 176; Bank of Utica v. Mersereau, 3 Barb. Ch. 398. And see the

court would not permit the disclosure even if the client were not
present to take the objection. 1
• Having once engaged in a cause, the counsel is not [• 335]
afterwards at liberty to withdraw from it without the
consent of his client and of the court; and even though he may
be impressed with a belief in his client's guilt, it will nevertheless
he his duty to see that a conviction is not secured contrary to the
law.2 The worst criminal is entitled to be judged by the laws;
and if his conviction is secured by means of a perversion of the
law, tho injury to the cause of public justice will be more serious
and lasting in its results than his being allowed to escape
altogether. a

analogous case of Hewitt v. Prince, 21 Wend. 79. Communications extraneous or

impertinent to the subject-matter of the professional consultation are not privi-

leged. Dixon v. Parmelee, 2 Vt. 185. See Brandon v. Gowing, 7 Rich. 459.

It has been intimated in New York that the statute making parties witnesses
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has done away with the rule which protects professional communications. Mitch-

ell's Case, 12 Abb. Pr. R. 249; Note to 1 Phil. Ev. by Cowen, Hill, and Edwards,

p. 159 (marg.). Supposing this to be so in civil cases, the protection would

still be the same in the case of persons charged with crime, for such persons

cannot be compelled to give evidence against themselves, so that the reason for

protecting professional conﬁdence is the same as formerly. '

' If one would consider this duty and the limitations upon it fully, he should

read the criticisms upon the conduct of Mr. Charles Phillips on the trial of Cour-

voisier for the murder of Lord William Russell. Sec Sharswood, Legal Ethics,

46; Littell, Living Age, Vol. XXIV. pp. 179, 230; Vol. XXV. pp. 289, 306;

\Vc-st. Rev. Vol. XXXV. p. 1.

' There may be cases in which it will become the duty of counsel to interpose

between the court and the accused, and fearlessly to brave all consequences

personal to himself, where it appears to him that in no other mode can the law

be vindicated and justice done to his client; but these cases are so rare, that

doubtless they will stand out in judicial history as notable exceptions to the

ready obedience which the bar should yield to the authority of the court. The

famous scene between Mr. Justice Buller and Mr. Erskine on the trial of the

Dean of St. Asaphs for libel—-5 Campbell’s Lives of the Chancellors, c. 158;

Erskine’s Speeches, by Jas. L. High, Vol. I. p. 242—will readily occur to the

reader as one of the exceptional cases. Lord Campbell says of Erskine‘s con-

duct: “ This noble stand for the independence of the bar would alone have

entitled Erskine to the statue which the profession aﬁectionatcly erected to his
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The history and reason of the rule which exempts counsel from disclosing
communications are well stated in Whiting v. Barney, 30 N.Y. 330.
And see 1 Phil. Ev. by Cowen, Hill, and Edwards, 130 et seq. The privilege
would not cover communications made, not with a view to professional assistance,
bnt in order to induce the attorney to aid in a criminaiRct. People v. Blakeley,
4 Park. Cr. R. 176; Bank of Utica v. Mersereau, 3 Barb. Ch. 3!J8. And see the
analogous case of Hewitt v. Prince, 21 Wend. 79. Communications extraneous or
impertinent to the subject-matter of the professional consultation are not privileged. Dixon v. Parmelee, 2 Vt. 185. See Brandon v. Gowing, 7 Rich. 459.
It has been intimated in New York that the statute making parties witnesses
has done away with the rule which protects professional communications. Mitchell's Case, 12 Abb. Pr. R. 249; Note to 1 Phil. Ev. by Cowen, Hill, and Edwards,
p. 169 (marg.). Supposing this to be so in civil cases, the protection would
still be the same in the case of persons charged with crime, for such persons
cannot be compelled to give evidence against themselves, so that the reason for
protecting professional confidence is t.he same as formerly.
1 If one would consider this duty and the limitations upon it fully, he should
read the criticisms upon the conduct of Mr. Charles Phillips on the trial of Courvoisier for the murder of Lord William Russell. Sec Sharswood, Legal Ethics,
46; Littell, Living Age, Vol. XXIV. pp. 179, 280; Vol. XXV. pp. 289, 306;
W('st. Rev. Vol. XXXV. p. 1.
1 There may be cases in which it will become the duty of counsel to interpose
between the court and the accused, and fearlessly to brave all consequences
personal to himself, where it appears to him that in no other mode can the law
be vindicated and justice done to his client; but these cases are so rare, that
doubtless they will stand out in judicial history as notable exceptions to the
ready obedience which the bar should yield to the authority of the court. The
famous scene between Mr. Justice Buller and Mr. Erskine on the trial of the
Dean of St. Asaphs for libel- 5 Campbell's Lives of the Chancellors, c. 158;
Erskine's Speeches, by Jas. L. High, Vol. I. p. 242-will readily oceur to tho
reader as one of the exceptional cases. Lord Campbell says of Erskine's conduct: " This noble stand for the independence of the bar would alone have
entitled Erskine to the statue which the profession affectionately erectt!d to his
1

prof~~sional
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But how persistent counsel may be in pressing for the acquittal

of his client, and to what extent he may be justiﬁed in throwing his

own personal character as a. weight in the scale of justice, are

questions of ethics rather than of law. N0 counsel is justiﬁable

who defends even a just cause with\the weapons of fraud and false-

hood, and no man on the other hand can excuse himself for

accepting the conﬁdence of the accused, and then betraying it by a

feeble and heartless defence. And in criminal cases we think the

court may sometimes have a duty to perform in seeing

["‘ 336] that the prisoner suffers nothing *‘ from inattention or haste

on the part of his counsel, or impatience on the part of

the prosecuting oﬂicer or of the court itself. Time may be precious

to the court, but it is inﬁnitely more so to him whose life or whose

liberty may depend upon the careful and patient consideration of

the evidence, when the counsel for the defence is endeavoring to

sift the truth from the falsehood, and to subject the whole to logical

analysis, so as to show that how suspicious soever the facts may be,

they are nevertheless consistent with innocence. Often indeed it

must happen that the impression of the prisoner’s guilt, which the

judge and the jury unavoidably receive when the case is opened to

memory in Lincoln’s Inn Hall. We are to admire the decency and propriety of
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his demeanor during the struggle, no less than its spirit, and the felicitous pre-

cision with which he meted out the requisite and justiﬁable portion of deﬁance.

His example has had a salutary effect in illustrating and establishing the relative

duties of judge and advocate in England.” And elsewhere, in speaking of Mr.

Fox‘s Libel Act, he makes the following somewhat extravagant remark: “ I

have said, and I still think, that this great constitutional triumph is mainly to be

ascribed to Lord Camden, who had been ﬁghting in the cause for half a century,

But how persistent counsel may be in pressing for the acquittal
of his client, and to what extent he may be justified in throwing his
own personal character as a weight in the scale of justice, are
questions of ethics rather than of law. No counsel is justifiable
who defends even a just cause with,the weapons of fraud and falsehood, and no man on the other hand can excuse himself for
accepting the confidence of the accused, and then betraying it by a
feeble and heartleBB defence. And in criminal cases we think the
court may sometimes have a duty to perform in seeing
[• 336] that the prisoner suffers nothing • from inattention or haste
on the part of his counsel, or impatience on the part of
the prosecuting officer or of the court itself. Time may be precious
to the court, but it is infinitely more so to him whose life or whose
liberty may depend upon the careful and patient consideration of
the evidence, when the counsel for the defence is endeavoring to
sift the truth from the falsehood, and to subject the whole to logical
analysis, so as to show that how suspicious soever the facts may be,
they are nevertheless consistent with innocence. Often indeed it
must \1appen that the impression of the prisoner's guilt, which the
judge and the jury unavoidably receive when J.he case is opened to

and uttered his last words in the House of Lords in its support; but had he not

received the invaluable assistance of Erskine, as counsel for the Dean of St.

Asaphs, the Star Chamber might have been re-established in this country.” And Lord

Brougham says of Erskine: “ He was an undaunted man; he was an undaunted

advocate. To no court did he ever truckle, neither to the Court of the King,

neither to the Court of the King‘s Judges. Their smiles and their frowns he

disregarded alike in the fearless discharge of his duty. He upheld the liberty

of the peers against the one; he defended the rights of the people against both

combined to destroy them. If there be yet amongst us the power of freely dis-

cussing the acts of our rulers; if there be yet the privilege of meeting for the

promotion of neerlful reforms; if he who desires wholesome changes in our

Constitution be still recognized as a patriot, and not doomed to die the death

of a traitor, —let us acknowledge with gratitude that to this great man, under

Heaven, we owe this felicity of the times.” Sketches of Statesmen of the Time of

George III.
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memory in Lincoln's Inn Hall. We are to admire the decency and propriety of
his demeanor during the struggle, no less than its spirit, and the felicitous precision with which he meted out the requisite and justifiable portion of defiance.
His example has had a salutary effect in illustrating and establishing the relative
duties of judge and advocate in Englahd." And elsewhere, in speaking of Mr.
Fox's Libel Act, he makes the following somewhat extravagant remark: " I
have said, and I still think, that. this great constitutional triumph is mainly to be
ascribed to Lord Camden, who had been fighting in the cause for half a century,
and uttered his last words in the House of Lords in its support; but had he not
received the invaluable assistance of Erskine, as counsel for the Dean of St.
Asaphs, the Star Chamb~ miglLt hafJt been re-established in thi8 country." And Lord
Brougham says of Erskine: ''He was an undaunted man; he was an undaunted
advocate. To no court did he ever truckle, neither to the Court of the King,
neither to the Court of the King's Judges. Their smiles and their frowns be
disregarded alike in the fearless discharge of his duty. He upheld the liberty
of the peers against the one ; he defended the rights of the people against both
combined to destroy them. If there be yet amongst us the power of freely discussing the acts of our rulers ; if there be yet the privilege of meeting for the
promotion of needful reforms ; if he who desires wholesome changes in our
Constitution be still recognized as a patriot., and not doomed to die the death
of a traitor, -let us acknowledge with gratitude that to this great man, under
Heaven, we owe this felicityoftbe times." Sketches of Statesmenofthe Time of
George III.
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them by the prosecuting ofﬁcer, will, insensibly to themselves, color

all the evidencejn the ease, so that only a sense of duty will induce

a due attention to the summing up for the prisoner, which after all

may prove unexpectedly convincing. Doubtless the privilege of

counsel is sometimes abused in these eases; we cannot think an

advocate of high standing and character has a right to endeavor to

rob the jury of their opinion by asseverating his own belief in the

innocence of his client; and cases may arise in which the court

will feel compelled to impose some reasonable restraints upon the

address to the jury,1 but it is better in these eases to err on the

side of liberality; and restrictions which do not leave to counsel,

who are apparently acting in good faith, such reasonable time and

opportunity as they may deem necessary for presenting their

client’s case fully, may possibly in some~cases be so far erroneous

in law as to warrant setting aside a verdict of guilty.’

Whether counsel are to address the jury on questions of law in

criminal eases, generally, is a point which is still in dispute. If

the jury, in the particular ease, by the constitution or statutes of

tho State, are judges of the law, it would seem that counsel should

be allowed to address them fully upon it,3 though the contrary
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seems to have been held in Maryland;'* while in Massa-

chusetts, where it is ‘expected that the jury will receive [*‘ 337]

the law from the court, it is nevertheless held that counsel

has a right to address them upon the law.5 It is unquestionably

more deeorous and more respectful to the bench that argument

upon the law should always be addressed to the court; and such,

we believe, is the general practice. The jury hear the argument,

' Thus it has been held, that, even though the jury are the judges of the law

in criminal cases. the court may refuse to allow counsel to read law books to the

jury. Murphy v. State, 6 Ind. 490. And see Lynch v. State, 9Ind. 541 ; Phae-

nix Insurance Co. v. Allen, 11 Mich. 501.

' In People v. Keenan, 13 Cal. 581, a verdict in a capital case was set aside

on this ground.

' Lynch v. State, 9 Ind. 541; ‘Murphy v. State, 6 Ind. 490.

‘ Franklin v. State, 12 Md. 236. \Vhat was held in that case was, that counsel

should not be allowed to argue the constitutionality of a statute to the jury; and

that the Constitution, in making the jury judges of the law as well as of the

them by the prosecuting officer, will, insensibly to themselves, color
all the evidence,in the case, so that only a sense of duty will induce
a due attention to the summing up for the prisoner, which after all
may prove unexpectedly convincing. Doubtless the privilege of
counsel is sometimes abused in these cases; we cannot think an
advocate of high standing and character has a right to endeavor to
rob the jury of their opini01i by asseverating his own belief in the
innocence of his client ; aud cases may arise in which the court
will feel compelled to impose some reasonable restraints upon the
address to the jury,1 but it is better in these case! to err on the
side of liberality ; and restrictions which do not leave to counsel,
who are apparently acting in good faith, such reasonable time and
opportunity as they may deem necessat·y for presenting their
client's case fully, may possibly in some· cases be so far erroneous
in law as to warrant setting aside a verdict of guilty.2
Whether counsel are to address the jury on questions of law in
criminal cases, generally, is a point which is still in dispute. If
the jury, in the particular case, by the constitution or statutes of
tho State, are judges of the law, it would seem that counsel ahould
be allowed to address them fully upon it, 3 though the contrary
seems to have been held in Maryland ; 4 while in Massachusetts, where it is • expected that the jury will receive [* 337]
the law from the court, it is nevertheless held that counsel
has a right to address them upon the law.6 It is unquestionably
more decorous aad more respectful to the bench that argument
upon the law should always be addressed to the court; and such,
we believe, is the general practice. The jury hear the argument,

facts, did not empower them to decide a statute invalid. This ruling corresponds

to that of Judge Chase in United States v. Callendar, Whart. State Trials, 688,

710. But see remarks of Perkins, J ., in Lynch v. State, 9 Ind. 542.

° Commonwealth v. Porter, 10 Met. 263; Commonwealth v. Austin, 7 Gray, 51.
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Thus it has been held, that, even though the jury are the judges of the law
in criminal cases, the court may refuse to allow counsel to read law books to the
jury. Murphy v. State, 6 Ind. 490. And see Lynch v. State, 9 Ind. 541; Phcenix Insurance Co. v. Allen, 11 Mich.•501.
1 In People v. Keenan, 13 Cal. 581, a verdict in a capital case was set aside
on this ground.
a Lynch v. State, 9 Ind. 541 ; 'Murphy v. State, 6 Ind. 490.
4 Franklin v. State, 12 Md. 236.
\Vbat was held in that case was, that counsel
should not be allowed to argue the constitutionality of a statute to the jury; and
that the Constitution, in making the jury judges of the law as lvell as of the
facts, did not empower them to decide a !!t&tute invalid. This ruling corresponds
te that of Judge Chase in United States v. Callendar, Whart. State Trials, 688,
710. But see remarks of Perkiru, J., in Lynch v. State, 9 Ind. 542.
6 Commonwealth v. Porter, 10 Met. 263; Commonwealth v. Austin, 7 Gray, 51.
1
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and they have a right to give it such weight as it seems to them

[cH. :x:.

properly to be entitled to.

For misconduct in their practice the members of the legal

profession may be summarily dealt with by the courts, who will not

fail, in all proper cases, to use their power to protect clients or the

public, as well as to preserve the profession from the contamina-

tion and disgrace of a vicious associate} A man of bad reputation

may be expelled for that alone;” and counsel who has once taken

part in litigation, and been the adviser or become intrusted with

the secrets of one party, will not afterwards be suffered to engage

for an opposing party, notwithstanding the original employment

has ceased, and there is no imputation upon his motives.“

‘ “ As a class, attorneys are supposed to be, and in fact have always been,

the vindicators of individual rights, and the fearless assertors of the principles

of civil liberty, existing, where alone they can exist, in a government, not of par-

ties nor ofmen, but of laws. On the other hand, to declare them irresponsible to

any power but public opinion and their consciences, would be incompatible with

free government. Individuals of the class may, and sometimes do, forfeit their

and they have a right to give it such weight as it seems to them
properly to be entitled to.
For misconduct in their practice the members of the legal
profession may be summarily dealt with by the courts, who will not
fail, in all proper cases, to use their power to protect clients or the
public, as well as to preserve the profession from the contamination and disgrace of a vicious associate. 1 A man of bad reputation
may be expelled for that alone ; 2 and counsel who has once taken
part in litigation, and been the adviser or become intrusted with
the secrets of one party, will not afterwards be suffered to engage
for an opposing party, notwithstanding· the original employment
has ceased, and there is no imputation upon his. motives.8

professional franchise by abusing it; and a power to exact the forfeiture must be

lodged somewhere. Such a power is indispensable to protect the court, the

administration of justice, and themselves. Abuses must necessarily creep in;

and having a deep stake in the character of their profession, they are vitally
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concerned in preventing it from being sullied by the misconduct of unworthy

members of it. No class of community is more dependent on its reputation for

honor and integrity. It is indispensable to the purposes ofits creation to assign

it a high and honorable standing; but to put it above the judiciary, whose oﬂicial

tenure is good behavior, and whose members are removable from office by the

legislature, would render it intractable; and it is therefore necessary to assign it

but an equal share of independence. In the absence of speciﬁc provision to the

contrary, the power of removal is, from its nature, commensurate with the power

of appointment, and it is consequently the business of the judges to deal with

delinquent members of the bar, and withdraw their faculties when they are incor-

rigible.” Gibson, Ch. J., In re Austin et al. 5 Rawle, 203. See State v. Kirkc,

12 Fla. 278.

An attorney may be disbarred for a personal attack upon the judge for his

conduct as such; but the attorney is entitled to notice, and an opportunity to

be heard in defence. Beene 1:. State, 22 Ark. 149. See In re Wallace, L. R.

1 P. C. 283; Ea: parts Bradley, 7 VVal. 364; \Vithers v. State, 35 Ala. 252;

Matter of Moore et al. 63 N. C. 397; Biggs, Ea: parie, 64 N. C. 202.

' For example, one whose reputation for truth and veracity is such that his

neighbors would not believe him when underoath. Matter of Mills, 1 Mich.

393. An attorney convicted and punished for perjury, and disbarred, was refused

restoration, notwithstanding his subsequent behavior had been 1ln8XC8Pi.l0h8lJlt!'.

Ex parts Garbett, 18 C. B. 403.

1' In Gaulden v. State, 11 Geo. 47, the late solicitor-general was not suffered

[364] _

1 "As a class, attorneys are supposed to be, and in fact have always been,
the vindicators of individual rights, and the fearless assertors of the principles
of civil liberty, existing, where alone they can exist, in a government, not of parties nor of men, but of laws. On the other hand, to declare them irresponsible to
any power but public opinion and their consciences, would be incompatible with
free government. Individuals of the class may, and sometimes do, forf~it their
professional franchise by abusing it; and a power to exact the forf~iture must be
lodged somewhere. Such a power is indispensable to protect the court, the
administration of justice, and themselves. Abuses must necessarily creep in;
and having a deep stake in the character of their profession, they are vitally
concerned in preventing it from being sullied by the misconduct of unworthy
members of it. No class of community is more dependent on its reputation for
honor and integrity. It is indispensable to the purposi.'B of its creation to assign
it a high and hQnorable standing; but to put it above the judiciary, whose official
tenure is good behavior, and whose mcmbel'tl arc removable from office by the
legislature, would render it intractable; and it is therefore ;ecessary to assign it
but an equal share of independence. In the absence of specific provision to the
contrary, the power of removal is, from its nature, commensurate with the power
of appointm~nt, and it is consequently the busine~s of the judges to deal with
delinquent members of the bar, and withdraw their faculties whl'n they are int·orrigible." Gibson, Ch. J., In re Austin et al. 5 Rawle, 203. See State 11. Kirke,
12 Fla. 278.
An attorney may be disbarred for a personal attack upon the judge for his
conduct as such; but the attorney is entitled to notice, and an opportunity to
be heard in defence. Beene v. State, 22 Ark. 149. See In re Wallace, L. R.
1 P. C. 283; Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wal. 864; Withers t'. State, :J5 Ala. 252;
Matter of Moore eJ, aJ. 68 N.C. S9i; Biggs, Ex part~. 64 N.C. 202.
' For example, one whose reputation for truth aad veracity is such that his
neighbors would not believe him when underoath. Matter of Mills, 1 Mich.
898. An attorney convicted and punished for perjury, and disbarrerl, was refused
restoration, notwithstanding his subsequent behavior had been unexceptionablt!'.
E-x parte Garbett, 18 C. B. 403.
a In Gaulden 17. State, 11 Geo. 47, the late solicitor-general was not suffered
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And, on the * other hand the court will not allow counsel to [* 338]

be made the instrument of injustice, nor permit the client

to exact of him services which are inconsistent withthe obligation

he owes to the court and to public justice; a higher and more

sacred obligation than any which can rest upon him to gratify a

client’s whims, or_ to assist in his revenge}

to assist in the defence of a criminal case, because he had, in the course of his

ofﬁcial duty, instituted the prosecution, though he was no longer connected with

And, on the • other hand the court will not allow conns;l to [* 338]
be made the instrument of injustice, nor permit the cl!ent
to exact of him servieeR which are inconsistent with· the obligation
he owes to the court and to public justice ; a higher and more
sacred obligation than any which can rest upon him to gratify a
client's whims, 01: to assist in his revenge. 1

it. And see VVilson v. State, 16 Ind. 392.

‘ Upon this subject the remarks of Chief Justice Gibson in Rush v. Cavanaugh,

2 Penn. St. 189, are worthy of being repeated in this connection. The prose-

cutor in a criminal case had refused to pay the charges of the counsel employed

by him to prosecute in the place of the attorney-general, because the counsel,

after a part of the evidence had been put in, had consented that the charge might

be withdrawn. In considering whether this was sufﬁcient reason for the refusal,

the learned judge said: “ The material question is, did the plaintiﬂ‘ violate his

professional duty to his client in consenting to withdraw his charge . . . instead

of lending himself to the prosecution of one whom he then and has since believed

to be an innocent man?
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"It is a popular but gross mistake to suppose that a lawyer owes no ﬁdelity

to any one except his client, and that the latter is the keeper of his professional

conscience. He is expressly bound by his ofﬁcial oath to behave himself in his

oﬁicc of attorney with all due ﬁdelity to the court as well as to the client; and

he violates it when he consciously presses for an unjust judgment; much more so

when he presses for the conviction of an innocent man. But the prosecution was

depending before an alderman, to whom, it may be said, the plaintiff was bound

to no such ﬁdelity. Still he was hound by those obligations which, without oaths,

rest upon all men. The high and honoralﬂe oﬁice of a counsel would be degraded

to that of a mercenary, were he compellable to do the bidding of his client against

the dictates of his conscience. The origin of the name proves the client to be

subordinate to the counsel as his patron. Besides, had the plaintiﬂ' succeeded

in having Crean held to answer, it would have been his duty to abandon the

prosecution at the return of the recognizance. As the oflice of attorney-general

is a public trust which involves, in the discharge of it, the exercise of an almost

boundless discretion, by an oﬂicer who stands as impartial as a judge, it might

be doubted whether counsel retained by a private prosecutor can be allowed to

perform any part of his duty ; certainly not unless in subservienee to his will and

instructions. With that restriction usage has sanctioned the practice of employ-

ing professional assistants, to whom the attorney-general or his regular substitute

may, if he please, conﬁde the direction of the particular prosecution; and it has

been beneﬁcial to do so where the prosecuting oﬂicer has been overmatched or

overborne by numbers. In that predicament the ends of justice may require him

to accept assistance. But the professional assistant, like the regular deputy,

exercises not his own discretion, but that of the attorney-general, whose locum

tenens at sutferance he is; and he consequently does so under the obligation of

the oﬂicial oath.”
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to 1188ist in the defence of a criminal case, because he had, in the course of his
official duty, instituted the prosecution, though he was no longer connected with
it. And see Wilson v. State, 16 Ind. 392.
1 Upon this ~ubject the remarks of Chief Justice Gz:bson in Rush v. Cavanaugh,
2 Penn. St. 189, are worthy of being repeated in this connection. The prosecutor in a criminal case had refused to pay the charges of the counsel employed
by him to prosecute in the place of the attorney-general, because the counsel,
after a part of the evidence had been put in, had consented that the charge might
be withdrawn. In considering whether this was sufficient reason for the refusal,
the learned judge said: "The material question is, did the plaintiff violate his
professional duty to his client in consenting to withdraw his charge • . . instead
of lending himself to the prosecution of one whom he then and has since believed
to be an innocent man P
•• It is a popular but gross mistake to suppose that a lawyer owes no fidelity
to any one except his client, and that the latter is the keeper of his professional
conscience. He is expressly bound by his official oath to behave himst!lf in his
office of attorney with all due fidelity to the court as well as to the client; and
he violates it when be consciously presses for an unjust judgment; much more so
when be presses for the conviction of an innocent man. But the prosecution was
depending before an alderman, to whom, it may be said, the plaintiff was bound
to no such fidelity. Still he was bound by those obligations which, without oaths,
rest upon all men. The high and honoraUie office of a counsel would be degraded
to that of a mercenary, were he compellable to do the bidding of his client against
the dictates of his conscience. The origin of the name proves the client to be
subordinate to the counsel as his patron. Besides, had the plaintiff succeeded
in ha\·ing Crean held to answer, it would have been his duty to abandon the
prosecution at the return of the recognizance. As the office of attorney-general
is a public trust which involves, in the discharge of it, tbe exercise of an almost
boundless discretion, by an officer who stands as impartial as a judge, it might
be doubted whether counsel rt'tained by a private prosecutor can be allowed to
perform any part of his duty ; certainly not unless in subservience to his will and
instructions. With that restriction usage has sanctioned the practice of employing professional assistants, to whom the attorney-general or his regular substitute
may, if he please, confide the direction of the particular prosecution; and it baa
been beneficial to do so where the prosecuting officer has been overmatched or
overborne by numbers. In that predicament the ends of justice may require him
to accept assistance. But the professional assistant, like the regular deputy,
exercises not his own discretion, but that of the attorney-general, whose locum
tenem at sufferance he is ; and he consequently does so onder the obligation of
the official oath.,
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It still remains to mention one of the principal safe-

["‘ 339] guards to personal liberty, "‘ and the means by which ille-

gal restraints upon it are most speedily and etfectually

Tlte Writ of Habeas Corpus.

remedied. To understand this guaranty, and ‘the instances in

which the citizen is entitled to appeal to the law for its enforce-

ment, we must ﬁrst have a correct idea of what is understood by

personal liberty in the law, and inquire what restraints, if any,

must exist to its enjoyment. ‘

Sir William Blackstone says, personal liberty consists in the

power of locomotion, of changing situation, or moving one’s person

to whatsoever place one’s own inclination may direct, without im-

prisonment or restraint, unless by due course of law.1 It appears,

therefore, that this power of locomotion is not entirely unrestricted,

but that by due course of law certain qualiﬁcations and limitations

may be imposed upon itwithout infringing upon constitutional

liberty. Indeed, in organizedisoeiety, liberty is the creature of law,

and every man will possess it in proportion as the laws, while

imposing no unnecessary restraints, surround him and every other

citizen with protections against the lawless acts of others."

If we examine the qualiﬁcations and restrictions which the law

imposes upon personal liberty, we shall ﬁnd that they range them-
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‘ 1 Bl. Com. 134. Montesquieu says: “ In governments, that is, in societies

directed by laws, liberty can consist only in the power of doing what we ought

to will, and in not being constrained to do what we ought not to will. We must

have continually present to our minds the difference between independence and

liberty. Liberty is a right of doing whatever the laws permit, and if a citizen

could do what they forbid, he would no longer be possessed of liberty, because

all his fellow-citizens would enjoy the same power.” Spirit of the Laws, Book

11, c. 3.

' “Liberty,” says Mr. Webster, “is the creature of law, essentially differ-

ent from that authorized licentiousness that trespasses on right. It is a legal and

a reﬁned idea, the offspring of high civilization, which the savage never under-

stood and never can understand. Liberty exists in proportion to wholesome

restraint; the more restraint on others to keep off from us, the more liberty we

It still remains to mention one of the principal safe[* 339] guards to personal liberty, • and the means by which illegal restraints upon it are most speedily and effectually
remedied. To understand this guaranty, and •the instances in
which the citizen is entitled to appeal to the law for its enforcement, we must first have a correct idea of what is understood by
personal liberty in the law, and inquit·e what restraints, if any,
must exist to its enjoyment.
Sir William Blackstone says, personal liberty consists in the
power of locomotion, of changing situation, or moving one's person
to whatsoever place one's own inclination may direct, without imprisonment or restraint, unless by due course of law.1 It appears,
therefore, that this power of locomotion is not entirely unrestricted,
but that by due course of law certain qualifications and limitations
may be imposed upon it. without infringing upon constitutional
liberty. Indeed, in organized. society, liberty is the creature of law,
and every man will possess it in proportion as the laws, while
• imposing no unnecessary restraints, surround him and every other
citizen with protections against the lawless acts of others.2
If we examine the qualifications and restrictions which the law
imposes upon personal liberty, we shall find that they range them-

have. It is an error to suppose that liberty consists in a paucity of laws. If

one wants few laws, let him go to Turkey. The Turk enjoys that blessing. The

working of our complex system, full of checks and restraints on legislative, execu-

tive, and judicial power, is favorable to liberty and justice. Those checks and

restraints are so many safeguards set around individual rights and interests.

That man is free who is protected from injury.” Works, Vol. II. p. 393.

[ 366 ]

1 Bl. Com. 184. l\lontesquieu say"s: "In governments, that is, in societies
by laws, liberty can consist only in the power of doing what we ought
to will, and in not being constrained to do what we ought not to will. We must
have continually present to our minds the difference between independence and
liberty. Liberty is a right of doing whatever the laws permit, and if a citizen
could do what they forbitl, he would no longer be possessed of liberty, because
all his fellow-citizens would enjoy the same power.'' Spirit of the Laws, Book
11, c. 3.
1 "Liberty," says Mr. Webster, " is the creature of law, essentially different from that authorized licentiousness that trespasses on right. It is a legal and
a refined idea, the offspring of high civilization, which the savage never under·
stood and never cm understand. Liberty exists in proportion to wholesome
restraint; the more restraint on others to keep ofF from us, the more liherty we
have. It is an error to suppose that liberty consists in a paucity of laws. If
one wants few laws, let him go to Turkey. The Turk enjoys that blessing. The
working of our complex system, full of checks and restraints on legislative, executive, and judicial power, is favorable to liberty and justil·e. Those checks and
restraints are so many safeguards set around individual rights and interests.
That man is free who is proteetcd from injury." Works, Vol. II. p. 893.
1
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selves in two classes ; ﬁrst, those of a public, and, second, those of
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a private nature.

The ﬁrst class are those which spring from the relative duties

and obligations of the citizen to society and to his fellow-citizen.

These may be arranged into sub-classes as follows: 1. Those

imposed to prevent the commission of crime which is threatened;

2. Those in punishment of crime committed; 3. Those in pun-

ishment of contempts of court or legislative bodies, or to render

their jurisdiction cﬂectual; 4. Those necessary to enforce the

duty citizens owe in defence of the State; 5. Those which may

become important to protect the community against the acts of

those who, by reason of mental inﬁrmity, are incapable of self-

control. All these limitations are well recognized and generally

understood, but a particular discussion of them does not belong to

our subject. The second class are those which spring from the

helpless or dependent condition of individuals in the various rela-

tions of life.

1. The husband, at the common law, is recognized as having

legal custody of and power of control over the wife, with the right

to direct as to her labor, and to insist upon its performance. The

precise nature of the restraints which may be imposed by the hus-

band upon the wife’s actions, it is not easy, from the nature of
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the case, to point out and deﬁne; but at most they can only be

such gentle restraints upon her liberty as improper conduct on her

part may appear to render necessary ;‘ and the general tendency

of public sentiment, as well as of the modern decisions, has been

in the direction of doing away with the arbitrary power which the

husband was formerly supposed to possess, and of placing

the two sexes in the marriage relation upon *a footing [‘ 340]

nearer equality. It is believed that the right of the hus-

band to chastise the wife, under any circumstances, would not

be recognized in this country; and such right of control as the

‘ 2 Kent, 181. See Cochran‘s Case, 8 Dowl. P. C. 630. The husband, how-

ever, is under no obligation to support his wife except at his own home; and it is

only when he wrongfully sends her away, or so conducts himself as to justify her

in leaving him, that he is hound to support her elsewhere. Rumney v. Keyes,

7 N. H. 570; Allen v. Aldrich, 9 Fost. 63; Shaw v. Thompson, 16 Pick. 198;

Clement v. Mattison, 3 Rich. 93. In such a case his liability to supply her with

necessaries cannot be restricted by giving notice to particular persons not to trust

her. Bolton v. Prentice, 2 Strange, 1214; Harris v. Morris, 4 Esp. 41.
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selves in two classes; first, those of a public, and, second, those of
a private nature.
The fit·st class are those which spring from the relative duties
and obligations of the citizen to society and to his fellow-citizen.
These may be arranged into sub-classes as follows: 1. Those
imposed to prevent the commission of crime which is threatened ;
2. Those in punishment of crime committed ; 3. Those in punishment of contempts of court or legislative bodies, or to render
their jurisdiction effectual ; 4. Those necessary to enforce the
duty citizens owe in defence of the State; 5. Those which may
become important to protect the community against the acts of
those who, by reason of mental infirmity, are incapable of selfcontrol. All these limitations are well recognized and generally
understood, but a particular discussion of them does not belong to
our subject. The second class are those which spring from the
helpless or dependent condition of individuals in the various relations of life.
·1. The husband, at the common law, is recognized as having
legal custody of and power of control over the wife, with the right
to direct as to her labor, and to insist upon its performance. 'l'he
precise nature of the restraints which may be imposed by the husband upon the wife's actions, it is not easy, from the nature of
the case, to point out and define ; but at most they can only be
such gentle restraints upon her liberty as improper conduct on her
part may appear to render necessary ; 1 and the general tendency
of public sentiment, as well as of the modern decisions, has been
in the direction of doing away with the arbitrary power which the
husband was formerly supposed to possess, and of placing
the two sexes in the marriage relation upon • a footing [• 340]
nearer equality. It is believed that the right of the husband to chastise the wifo, under any circumstances, would not
be recognized in this country ; and such right of control as the
2 Kent, 181. See Cochran's Case, 8 Dowl. P. C. 630. The husband, bowever, is under no obligation to support his wife except at his own home; and it is
only when he wrongfully sends her away, or so conducts himself as to justify her
in leavin~ him, that he is bound to support her elaewhere. Rumney"· Keyes,
7 N. H. 570; Allen "· Aldrich, 9 .Fost. 63; Shaw v. Thompson, 16 Pick. 198;
Clement "· Mattison, 3 Rich. 93. In such a case his liability to supply her with
necessaries cannot be restricted by giving notice to particular persons not to tMl!t
her. Bolton "· Prentice, 2 Strange, 1214; Harris "· Morris, 4 Esp. 4L
1
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law gives him would in any case be forfeited by such conduct
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towards the wife as was not warranted by the relation, and

which should render it improper for her' to live and cohabit with

him, or by such conduct as, under the laws of the State, would

entitle her to a divorce} And he surrenders his right of control

also, when he consents to her living apart under articles of sep-

aration?

2. The father of an infant, being obliged by law to support his

child, has a corresponding right to control his actions and to em-

ploy his services during the continuance of legal infancy. The

child may be emancipated from this control before coming of age,

either by the express assent of the father, or by being turned away

from his father’s house and left to care for himself ;3 though in

neither ease would the father be released from an obligation which

the law imposes upon him to prevent the child becoming a public

charge, and which the State may enforce whenever necessary.

The mother, during the father’s life, has a power of control subor-

dinate to his; but on his death‘ or conviction and sentence to im-

prisonment for felony,5 she succeeds to the relative rights which

the father possessed before.

3. The guardian has a power of control over his ward, corre-

sponding in the main to that which the father has over his child,
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though in some respects more restricted, while in others it is

broader. The appointment of guardian when made by the courts

is of local force only, being conﬁned to the State in which it is

made, and the guardian would have no authority to change the

domicile of the ward to another State or country. But the appoint-

ment commonly has reference to the possession of property by the

ward, and over this property the guardian possesses a power of

control which is not possessed by the father, as such, over the

property owned by his child.“

' Hutchcson v. Peck, 5 Johns. 196; Love v. Moynahan, 16 Ill. 277.

' Saunders v. Rodway, 16 Jur. 1005, 13 Eng. L. & Eq. 468.

’ Whiting v. Earle, 3 Pick. 201; McCoy v. Huffman, 8 Cow. 841; State v.

Barrett, 45 N. H. 15; W'olcott v. Rickey, 22 Iowa, 171; Fairhurst v. Lewis,

23 Ark. 435; Hardwick v. Pawlet, 36 Vt. 320.

‘ Dedham v. Natick, 16 Mass. 135. See p. 348.

‘ Bailey’s Case, 6 Dowl. P. C. 311. If, however, there be a guardian ap-

pointed for the child by the proper court, his right to the custody of the child is

superior to that of the parent. Macready v. Wolcott, 33 Conn. 321.

‘ 1 Cooley’s Bl. Com. 462, and cases cited.
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law gives him would in any case be forfeited by such conduct
towards the wife as was not warranted by the relation, aud
which should render it improper for her· to live and cohabit with
him, or by such conduct as, under the laws of the State, would
entitle her to a divorce. 1 And he surrenders his right of control
also, when he consents to her living apart under articles of separation.2
2. The father of an infant, being obliged by law to support his
child, has a corresponding right to control his actions and to em~
ploy his services during the continuance of legal infancy. The
child may be emancipated from this control before coming of age,
either by the express assent of the father, or by being turned away
from his father's house and left to care for himself; 8 though in
neither case would the father be released from an obligation which
the law imposes upon him to prevent the child becoming a public
charge, and which the State may enforce whenever necessary.
The mother, during the father's life, bas a power of control subordinate to his ; but on his death' or conviction and sentence to imprisonment for felony,6 she succeeds to the relative rights which
the father possessed before.
3. The guardian has a power of control over his ward, corresponding in the main to that which the father has over his child,
though in some respects more restricted, while in others it is
broader. The appointment of guardian when made by the courts
is of local force only, being confined to the State in which it is
made, and the guardian would have no authority to change the
domicile of the ward to another State or country. But the appointment commonly has reference to the possession of property by the
ward, a.ud over this property the guardian possesses a power of
control which is not possessed by the father, as such, over the
property owned by his child.6
Hutcheson v. Peck, 5 Johns. 196 j Love v. Moynahan, 16 ru. 277.
Saunders v. Rodway, 16 Jur. 1005, 13 Eng. L. & Eq. 463.
1 Whiting v. Earle, 3 Pick. 201; l\IcCoy v. Huffman, 8 Cow. 841; State r1.
Barrett, 4l> N. H. 15; Wolcott "· Rickey, 22 Iowa, 171 ; Fairhurst "· Lewi11,
23 Ark. 435; Hardwick v. Pawlet, 86 Vt. 320.
4 Dedham v. Natick, 16 Mass. 135.
Seep. 348.
6 Bailey's Case, 6 Dowl. P. C. 311.
If, however, there be a guardian appointed for the child by the proper court, his right to the custody or the child is
superior to that of the parent. Macready "· Wolcott, 83 Conn. 821.
e 1 Cooley's Bl. Com. 462, and cases cited.
I
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4. The relation of master and apprentice is founded on a con-
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tract between the two, generally with the consent of the parent

or party standing in loco parentis to the latter, by which

the "‘ master is to teach the apprentice some speciﬁed trade [* 341]

or means of living, and the apprentice, either wholly or

in part in consideration of the instruction, is to perform services

for the master while receiving it. This relation is also statutory

and local, and the power to control the apprentice is assimilated

to that of the parent by the statute law.‘

5. The power of the master to impose restraints upon the action

of the servant he employs, is of so limited a nature that practically

it may be said to rest upon continuous voluntary assent. If the

servant misconducts himself, or refuses to submit to proper control,

the master may discharge him, but cannot resort to conﬁnement

or personal chastisement.

6. The relation of teacher and scholar places the former more

nearly in place of the parent than either of the two preceding

relations places the master. While the pupil is under his care, he

has a right to enforce obedience to his commands lawfully given in

his capacity of teacher, even to the extent of bodily chastisement

or conﬁnement. And in deciding questions of discipline he acts

judicially, and is not to be made liable, either civilly or criminally,
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unless he has acted with express malice, or been guilty of such

excess in punishment that malice may fairly be implied. All pre-

sumptions favor the correctness and justice of his action.”

7. ‘Wlrere parties bail another, in legal proceedings, they are

regarded in law as his jailers, selected by himself, and with the right

to his legal custody for the purpose of seizing and delivering him

up to the_ oﬁicers of the law at any time before the liability of the

bail has become ﬁxed by a forfeiture being judicially declared on

his failure to comply with the condition of the bond.” This is a

' The relation is one founded on personal trust and conﬁdence, and the master

cannot assign the articles of apprenticeship except by consent of the apprentice

and of his proper guardian. Haley v. Taylor, 3 Dana, 222; Nickcrson v. How-

ard, 19 Johns. 113; Tucker v. Magee, 18 Ala. 99.

' State v. Pcndergrass, 2 Dev. & Bat. 365; Cooper v. McJunkin, 4 Ind.

290; Commonwealth v. Randall, 4 Gray, 38.

3 Harp v. Osgood, 2 Hill, 216; Commonwealth v. Brickett, 8 Pick. 138.

The principal may be followed, if necessary, out of the jurisdiction of the court

in which the bail was taken, and arrested there. Parker v. Bidwell, 3 Conn. 84.
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4. The relation of master and apprentice is founded on a contract between the two, generally with the consent of the parent
or party standing in loco parentis to the latter, by which
the *master is to teach the apprentice some specified trade [* 341]
or means of living, and the apprentice, either wholly or
in part in consideration of the instruction, is to perform services
for the master while receiving it. This relation is also statutory
and local, and the power to control the apprentice is assimilated
to that of the parent by the statute law.1
5. The power of the master to impose restraints upon the action
of the servant he employs, is of so limited a nature that practically
it may be said to rest upon continuous voluntary assent. If the
servant misconducts himself, or refuses to submit to proper control,
the master may discharge him, but cannot resort to confinement
or personal chastisement.
6. The relation of teacher and scholar places the rormer more
nearly in place of the parent than either of the two preceding
relations places the master. While the pupil is under his care, he
has a right to enforce obedience to his commands lawfully given in
his capacity of teacher, even to the extent of bodily chastisement
or confinement. And in deciding questions of discipline he acts
judicially, and is not to be made liable, either civilly or criminally,
unless he has acted with express malice, or been guilty of such
excess in punishment that malice may fairly be implied. All presumptions favor the correctness and justice of his action. 2
7. ·where parties bail another, in legal proceedings, they are
regarded in law as his jailers, selected by himself, and with the right
to his legal custody for the purpose of seizing and delivering him
up to the. officers of the law at any time before tho liability of the
bail has become fixed by a forfeiture being judicially declared on
his failure to comply with the condition of the .bond.8 This is a
The relation is one founded on personal trust and confidence, and the master
cannot assign the articles of apprenticeship except by consent of the apprentice
and of his proper guardian. Haley v. Taylor, 3 Dana, 222; Nickerson v. Howani, 19 Johns. 113; Tucker v. Magee, 18 Ala. 99.
1 State v. Pendergrass, 2 Dev. & Bat. 365; Cooper"· McJunkin, 4 Ind.
290; Commonwealth v. Randall, 4 Gray, 38.
~ Harp v. Osgood, 2 Hill, 216 ; Commonwealth v. Briekett, 8 Pick. 138.
The principal may be followed, if necessary, out of the jurisdiction of the court
in which the bail was taken, and arrested there. Parker v. Bidwell, 3 Conn. 84.
1
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right which the bail may exercise in person or by agent, and with-

[ca. x.

out resort to judicial process.‘

8. The control of the creditor over the person of his debtor,

through the process which the law gives for the enforcement of his

demand, is now very nearly abolished, thanks to the humane pro-

visions which have been made of late by statute or by constitution.

In cases of torts and where debts were fraudulently contracted, or

where there is an attempt at a fraudulent disposition of property

with intent to delay the creditor, or to deprive him of payment,

the body of the debtor is allowed to be seized and conﬁned ; but the

reader must be referred to the constitution and statutes of his

State for speciﬁc information on this subject.

[‘* 342] *'l‘hese, then, are the legal restraints upon personal

liberty. For any other restraint, or for any abuse of the

legal rights which have been speciﬁed, the party restrained is enti-

tled to immediate process from the courts, and to speedy relief.

The right to personal liberty did not depend in England on any

statute, but it was the birthright of every freeman. As slavery

ceased it became universal, and the judges were bound to protect it

by proper writ when infringed. But in those times when the power

of parliament was undeﬁned and in dispute, and the judges held

their oﬂices only during the king’s pleasure, it was almost a matter
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of course that rights should be violated, and that legal redress

should be impracticable, however clear those rights might he. But

in many eases it was not very clear what the legal rights of parties

were. The courts which proceeded according to the course of the

common law, as well as the courts of chancery, had limits to their

authority which could be understood, and a deﬁnite course of pro-

ceeding was marked out for them by statute or by custom; and if

they exceeded their jurisdiction and invaded the just liberty of the

subject, the illegality of the process would generally appear in the

proceedings. But there were two tribunals unknown to the com-

mon law, but exercising a most fearful authority, against whose

abuses it was not easy for the most upright and conscientious

judge in all cases to afford relief. These were, 1. The Court of

Star Chamber, which became fully recognized and established in

Even though it be out of the State. Harp v. Osgood, 8‘ll])I‘(1. And ‘doors, if neces-

sary, may be broken in order to make the arrest. Read’s Case, 4 Conn. 166;

Nicolls v. Ingersoll, 7'Johns. 145.

' Parker v. Bidwell, 3 Conn. 84; N icolls v. Ingersoll, 7 Johns. 145.
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right which the bail may exercise in person or by agent, and without resort to judicial process.1
8. The control of the creditor over the person of his debtor,
through the process which the law gives for the enforcement of his
demand, is now very nearly abolished, thanks to the humane pro,·isions which have been made of late by statute or by constitution.
In cases of torts and where debts were fraudulently contracted, or
where there is an attempt at a fraudulent disposition of property
with intent to delay the creditor, or to deprive him of payment,
the body of the debtor is allowed to be seized and confined ; but the
reader must be referred to tho constitution and statutes of his
State for specific information on this subject.
[* 342] • These, then, are the legal restraints upon personal
lib01-ty. For any other restraint, or for any abuse of the
legal rights which have been specified, the party restrained is entitled to immediate process from the courts, and to speedy relief.
The right to personal liberty did not depend in England on any
statute, but it was the birthright of every freeman. As slavery
ceased it became universal, and the judges were bound to protect it
by proper writ when infringed. But in those times when the power
of parliament was undefined and in dispute, and the judges held
their offices only during the king's pleasure, it was almost a matter
of course that rights should be violated, and that legal redress
should be impracticable, however clear those rights might be. But
in many cases it was not very clear what the legal rights of parties
were. The courts which proceeded according to the course of the
common law, as well as the courts of chancery, had limits to their
authority which could be understood, and a definite course of proceeding was marked out for them by statute or by custom ; and if
they exceeded their jurisdiction and invaded the just liberty of the
subject, the illegality of the process would generally appear in the
proceedings. But there were two tribunals unknown to the common law, bu~ exercising a most fearful authority, against whose
abuses it was not easy for the most upright and conscientious
judge in all cases to afford relief. These were, 1. The Court of
Star Chamber, which became fully recognized and established in
Even though it be out of the State. Harp v. Osgood, supra. And doors, if necessary, may be broken in order to make the arrest. Read's Ca.sc, 4 Conn. I6G;
Nicolls v. Ingcr~oll, 7 ·Johns. 145.
1 Parker v. Bidwell, 3 Conn. 84; Nicolls v. Ingersoll, 7 Johns. 145.
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the time of Henry VII., though originating long before. Its juris-
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diction extended to all sorts of offences, contempts of authority

and disorders, the punishment of which was not supposed to be

adequately provided for by the common law; such as slanders of

persons in authority, the propagation of seditious news, refusal to

lend money to the king, disregard of executive proclamations, &c.

It imposed ﬁnes without limit, and inﬂicted any punishment in the

discretion of its judges short of death. Even jurors were punished

in this court for verdicts in State trials not satisfactory to the

authorities. Although the king’s chancellor and judges were enti-

tled to seats in this court, the actual exercise of its powers appears

to have fallen into the hands of the king’s _privy council, which sat

as a species of inquisition, and exercised almost any authority it

saw ﬁt to assume} The court was abolished by the Long Par-

liament in 1641. 2. The Court of High Commission,

established ‘in the time of Elizabeth, and which exer- [* 3-'13]

cised a power in ecclesiastical matters corresponding to

that which the Star Chamber assumed in other cases, and in an

equally absolute and arbitrary manner. This court was also abol-

ished in 1641, but was afterwards revived for a short time in the

reign of James II.

It is evident that while these tribunals existed there could
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be no eﬂbctual security to liberty. A brief reference to the

remarkable struggle which took place during the reign of Charles I.

will perhaps the better enable us to understand the importance of

those common-law protections to personal liberty to which we shall

have occasion to refer, and also of those statutory securities which

have since been added.

When the king attempted to rule without the parliament, and in

1625 dissolved that body, and resorted to forced loans, the grant of

monopolies, and the levy of ship moneys as the means of replenish-

ing a treasury that could only lawfully be supplied by taxes granted

by the commons, the privy council was his convenient means of

enforcing compliance with his will. Those who refused to contribute

to the loans demanded were committed to prison. When they

' See Hallam, Constitutional History, c. 1 and 8; Todd, Parliamentary Gov-

ernment in England, Vol. II. c. 1. The rise and extension of authority of this

court, and its arbitrary character, are very fully set forth in Brodic‘s Constitu-

tional History of the British Empire, to which the reader is referred for more

particular information. -
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the time of Henry VII., though originating long before. Its jurisdiction extended to all sorts of offences, contempts of authority
and disorders, the punishment of which was not supposed to be
adequately provided for by the common law; such as slanders of
persons in authority, the propagation of seditious news, refusal to
lend money to the king, disregard of executive proclamations, &c.
It imposed fines without limit, and inflicted any punishment in the
discretion of its judges short of death. Even jurors were punished
in this court for verdicts in State trials not satisfactory to the
authorities. Although the king's chancellor and judges were entitled to seats in this court, the actual exercise of its powers appears
to have fallen into the hands of the king's .privy council, which sat
as a species of inquisition, and exercised almost any authority it
saw fit to assume. 1 The court was abolished by the Long Parliament in 1641. 2. The Court of High Commission,
established • in the time of Elizabeth, and which exer- [• 343]
cised a power in ecclesiastical matters corresponding to
that which the Star Chamber assumed in other cases, and in an
equally absolute and arbitrary manner. This court was also abolished in H341, but was afterwards reviYed for a short time in the
reign of James II.
It is evident that while these tribunals existed there could
be no effectual security to liberty. A brief reference to the
remarkable struggle which took place during the reign of Charles I.
will perhaps the better enable us to understand the importance of
those common-law protections to personal liberty to which we shall
have occasion to refer, and also of those statutory securities which
have since been added.
When the king attempted to rule without the parliament, and in
1625 dissolved that body, and resorted to forced loans, tho grant of
monopolies, and the levy of ship moneys as the means of replenishing a treasury that could only lawfully be supplied by taxes granted
by the commons, the privy council was his convcnim~t means of
enforcing compliance with his will. Those who refused to contt·ibute
to the loans demanded were committed to prison. When they
See Hallam, Constitutional History, c. 1 and 8; Todd, Parliamentary Go\·crnment in England, Vol. II. c. 1. The rise and extension of authority of this
court, and its arbitrary character, are very fully set forth in Brodie's Constitutional History of the British Empire, to which the reader is referred for more
particular infonnation.
1
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petitioned the Court of the King’s Bench for their discharge, the

(CH.

:X:.

warden of the ﬂeet made return to the writ of habeas corpus, that

they were detained by warrant of the privy council, informing him

of no particular cause of imprisonment, but they were committed

by the special command of his majesty. Such a return presented

for the decision of the court the question, “Is such a warrant,

which does not specify the cause of detention, valid by the laws of

England ? ” The court held that it was, justifying their decision

upon supposed precedents, although, as Mr. Hallam says, “it was

evidently the consequence of this decision that every statute from

the time of Magna Charta, designed to protect the personal

liberties of Englishmen,_became a dead letter, since the insertion of

four words in a warrant ( per speciale mandatum regis), which

might become matter of form, would control their remedial effi-

cacy. And this wound was the more deadly in that the notorious

cause of these gentlemcn’s imprisonment was their withstanding an

illegal exaction of money. Every thing that distinguished our

constitutional laws, all that rendered the name of England valuable,

was at stake in this issue.” 1 This decision, among other violent

acts, led to the Petition of Right, one of the principal charters of

English liberty, but which was not assented to by the king

[’* 3-14] until the judges had "' intimated that if he saw ﬁt to violate
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it by arbitrary commitments, they would take care that it

should not be enforced by their aid against his will. And four years

later, when the king committed members of parliament for words

spoken in debate, oﬂ°ensive to the royal prerogative, the judges evaded

the performance of their duty on habeas corpus, and the members

were only discharged when the king gave his consent to that course?

The Habeas Corpus Act was passed in 1679, mainly to prevent

such abuses and other evasions of duty by judges and ministerial

oﬁicers, and to compel prompt action in any case in which illegal

imprisonment was alleged. That act gave no new right to the

subject, but it furnished the means of enforcing those which

existed before.3 The preamble recited that “ whereas great delays

have been used by sheriﬂs, jailers, and other oﬂicers, to whose

custody any of the king’s subjects have been committed for

‘ Hallam, Const. Hist. c. 7. See also Brodie, Const. Hist. Vol. II. c. 1.

* Hallam, Const. Hist. c. 8; Brodie, Const. Hist. Vol. I. c. 8.

‘ Hallam, Const. Hist. c. 13; Beeching’s Case, 4 B. & C. 136; Matter of

Jackson, 15 Mich. 436.

3- _ m _
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petitioned the Court of the King's Bench for th~ir discharge, the
warden of the fleet made returu to the writ of habeas corpus, that
they were detained by warrant of the privy council, informing him
of no particular cause of imprisonment, but they were committed
by the special command of his majesty. Such a return presented
for the decision of the court the question, " Is such a warrant,
which does not specify the cause of detention, valid by the laws of
England ? " The court held that it was, justifying their decision
upon supposed precedents, although, as Mr. Hallam says, "it was
evidently the consequence of this decision that every statute from
the time of :Magna Charta, designed to protect the personal
liberties of Englishmen,. became a dead letter, since the insertion of
four words in a warrant (per speciale mandatum regis), which
might become matter of form, would control their remedial efficacy. And this wound was the more deadly in that the notorious
cause of these gentlemen's imprisonment was their withstanding an
illegal exaction of money. Every thing that distinguished our
constitutional laws, all that rendered the name of England valuable,
was at stake in this issue." 1 This decision, among other violent
acts, led to the Petition of Right, one of the principal charters of
English liberty, but which was not assented to by the king
[* 344] until the judges had • intimated that if he saw fit to violate
it by arbitrary commitments, they would take care that it
should not be enforced by their aid against his will. And four years
later, when the king committed members of parliament for words
spoken in debate, offensive to the royal prerogative, the judges evaded
the performance of their duty on habeas corpus, and the members
were only discharged when the king gave his consent to that course.2
The Habeas Corpus Act was passed in 1679, mainly to prevent
such abuses and other evasions of duty by judges and ministerial
officers, and to compel prompt action in any case in which illegal
imprisonment was alleged. That act gave no new right to the
subject, bu,t it furnished the means of enforcing those which
existed before.3 The preamble recited that" whereas great delays
have been used by sheriffs, jailers, and other officers, to whose
custody any of the kiug's subjects have been committed for
Hallam, Con st. Hist. c. 7. See also Brodie, Const. Hist. Vol. n. c. 1.
Hallam, Const. Hist. c. 8; Brodie, Const. Hist. Vol. I. c. 8.
3 Hallam, Const. Hist. c. 18; Beecbing's Case, 4 B. & C. 136; Matter of
Jackson, 15 Mich. 436.
I
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of habeas corpus, to them directed, by standing out on alias or plurjies

habeas corpus, and sometimes more, and by other shifts, to avoid

their yielding obedience to such writs, contrary to their duty and

the known laws of the land, whereby many of the king’s subjects

have been and hereafter may be long detained in prison in such

cases, where by law they are bailable, to their great charge and

vexation. For the prevention whereof, and the more speedy relief

of all persons imprisoned for any such criminal or supposed

criminal matters,” the act proceeded to make elaborate and care-

ful provisions for the future. The important provisions of the act

may be summed up as follows: That the writ of habeas corpus

might be issued by any court of record or judge thereof, either in

term-time or vacation, on the application of any person conﬁned,

or of any person for him; the application to be in writing and on

oath, and with a copy of the warrant of commitment attached,

if procurable; the writ to be returnable either in court or at

chambers; the person detaining the applicant to make return to

the writ by bringing up the prisoner with the cause of his

detention, and the court or judge to discharge him unless the

imprisonment appeared to be legal, and in that case to take bail if

the case was bailable; and performance of all these duties
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was made compulsory, under heavy penalties. ‘Thus the [* 345]

duty which the judge or other ofﬁcer might evade with im-

punity before, he must now perform or suffer punishment. The

act also provided for punishing severely a second commitment for

the same cause, after a party had once been discharged on habeas

corpus, and also made the sending of inhabitants of England, Wales,

and Berwick-upon-Tweed abroad for imprisonment illegal, and

subject to penalty. Important as this act was‘ it was less broad

in its scope than the remedy had been before, being conﬁned

to cases of imprisonment for criminal or supposed criminal

matters;2 but the attempt in parliament nearly a century later

to extend its provisions to other cases was defeated by the oppo-

sition of Lord Zifansﬁeld, on the express ground that it was

unnecessary, inasmuch as the common-law remedy was suﬂi-

‘ Mr. Hurd, in the appendix to his excellent treatise on the \Vrit of Habeas

Corpus, gives a complete copy of the act. See also appendix to Lieber, Civil

Liberty and Self-Government; Broom, Const. Law, 21.8.

* See Mayor of London‘s Case, 3 \Vils. 198; \Vilson’s Case, 7 Q. B. 984.
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criminal or supposed criminal matters, in making returns
of writs
\
of habeas corpus, to them directed, by standing out on alias or plur:ies
habeas corpus, and sometimes more, and by other shifts, to avoid
their yielding obedience to such writs, contrary to their duty and
the known laws of the land, whereby many of the king's subjects
have been and hereafter may be long detained in prison in such
cases, where by law they are bailable, to their great charge and
vexation. For the prevention whereof, and the mo~e speedy relief
of all persons imprisoned for any such criminal or supposed
criminal matters," the act proceeded to make elaborate and careful provisions for the future. The important provisions of the act
may be summed up as follows: That the writ of habeas corpus
might be issued by any court of record or judge thereof, either in
term-time or vacation, on the application of any person confined,
or of any person for him; the application to be in writing and on
oath, and with a copy of the warrant of commitment attached,
if procurable; the writ to be returnable either in court or at
chambers; the person detaining the applicant to make return to
the writ by bringing up the prisoner with the cause of his
detention, and the court or judge to discharge him unless the
imprisonment appeared to be legal, and in that case to take bail if
the case was bailable ; and performance of all these duties
was made compulsory, under heavy penalties. • Thus the (* 345]
duty which the judge or ot~1er officer might evade with impunity before, he must now perform or suffer punishment. The
act also provided for punishing severely a second commitment for
the same cause, after a party had once been discharged on habeas
corpus, and also made the sending of inhabitants of England, Wales,
and Berwick-upon-Tweed abroad for imprisonment illegal, and
subject to penalty. Important as this act was 1 it was less broad
in its scope than the remedy had been before, being confined
to cases of imprisonment for criminal or supposed criminal
matters; 2 but the attempt in parliament nearly a century later
to extend its provisions to other cases was defeated by the opposition of Lord J.liansfield, on the express ground that it was
unnecessary, inasmuch as the common-law remedy was suffi1 l\lr. Hurd, in the appendix to his excellent treatise on the Writ of Habeas
Corpus, gives a complete copy of the act. See also appendix to Lieber, Civil
Liberty and Self-Government; Broom, Const. Law, 218.
1 See Mayor of London's Case, 8 Wils. 198; Wilson's Case, 7 Q. B. 984.
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to perform their duty. Another attempt in 1816 was successful.“

The Habeas Corpus Act was not made, in express terms, to

extend to the American colonies, but it was in some expressly, and

in others by silent acquiescence, adopted and acted upon, and all the

subsequent legislation in the American States has been based upon

it, and has consisted in little more than a re-enactment of its

essential provisions.

What Courts issue the Writ.

The protection of personal liberty is for the most part conﬁded

to the State authorities, and to the State courts the party must

apply for relief on habeas corpus when illegally restrained. There

are only a few cases in which the federal courts can interfere; and

cient; 1 as perhaps might have been had officers been always disposed
to perform their duty. Another attempt in 1R16 was successful.2
The Habeas Corpus Act was not made, in express terms, to
extend to the American colonies, but it was in some expressly, and
in others by silent acquiescence, adopted and acted upon, and all the
subsequent legislation in the .American States has been based upon
it, and has consisted in little more than a re-enactment of its
essential provisions.

those are cases in which either the illegal imprisonment is under

pretence of national authority, or in which this process becomes

Wltat Courts issue tlte Writ.

important or convenient in order to enforce or vindicate some right,

or authority under the constitution or laws of the United States.

The Judiciary Act of 1789 provided that each of the several

federal courts should have power to issue writs of scire faaias,

habeas corpus, and all other writs not specially provided for by

statute, which might be necessary for the exercise of their respective

jurisdictions and agreeable to the principles and usages of law;
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and that either of the justices of the Supreme Court, as well

as the district judges, should havelpower to grant writs of

habeas corpus for the purposes of an inquiry into the cause of

commitment: provided that in no case should such writs

[*‘ 346] extend to "‘prisoners in jail, unless where they were in

custody under or by color of the authority of the United

States, or were committed to trial before some court of the same,

or were necessary to be brought into court to testify? Under this

statute no court of the United States or judge thereof could issue a

habeas corpus to bring up a prisoner in custody u11der a sentence

or execution of a State court, for any other purpose than to be

used as a witness. And this was so whether the imprisonment

was under civil or criminal process.‘

1 Life of Mansﬁeld by Lord Campbell, 2 Lives of Chief Justices, c. 35; 15

Hansm-d’s Debates, 897 et seq.

“’ By Stat. 56 Geo. III. c. 100. See Broom, Const. Law, 224.

“ 1 Statutes at Large, 81. ‘ E2: partc.Dorr, 3 How. 103.

\
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The protection of personal liberty is for the most part confided
to the State authorities, and to the State courts the party must
apply for relief on habeas corpus when illegally restrained. There
are only a few cases in which the federal courts can interfere ; and
thoRe are cases in which either the illegal imprisonment is under
pretence of national authority, or in which this process becomes
important or convenient in order to enforce or vindicate some right,
or authority under the constitution or laws of the United States.
The Judiciary Act of 1789 provided that each of the several
federal courts should have power to issue writs of scire facias,
habeas corpus, and all other writs not specially provided for by
statute, which might be necessary for the exercise of ~heir respective
jurisdictions and agreeable to the principles and usages of law ;
and that either of the justices of the Supreme Court, as well
as the district judges, should have ·power to grant writs of
habeas corpus for the purposes of an inquiry into the cause of
commitment : provided that in no case should such writs
[• 346] extend to • prisoners in jail, unless where they were in
custody under or by color of the authority of the United
States, or were committed to trial befot·e some court of the same,
or were necessary to be brought into court to testify. 8 Under this
statute no court of the United States or judge thereof could issue a
habeas corpus to bring up a prisoner in custody under a sentence
or execution of a State court, for any other purpose than to be
used as a witness. And this was so whether the imprisonment
was under civil or criminal process.4
1 Life of Mansfield by Lord Campbell, 2 Lives of Chief Justices, c. 35; 15
Hansard's Debates, 897 et seq.
' By Stat. 66 Geo. III. c. 100. See Broom, Const. Law, 224.
a 1 Statutes at Large, 81.
' Ez parte.Dorr, 3 How. 103.
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During what were known as the nulliﬁcation troubles in South
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Carolina, the defect of federal jurisdiction in respect to this writ

became apparent, and another act was passed, having for its object,

among other things, the protection of persons who might be prose-

cuted under assumed State authority for acts done under the laws

of the United States. This act provided that either of the justices

of the Supreme Court, or a judge of any District Court of the

United States, in addition to the authority already conferred by law,

should have power to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases of a

prisoner or prisoners in jail or conﬁnement, where he or they shall

be committed or conﬁned on or by any authority of law, for any act

done or omitted to be done, in pursuance of a law of the United

States, or any order, process or decree of any judge or court

thereof.‘

In 1842 further legislation seemed to have become a neces-

sity, in order to give to the federal judiciary jurisdiction upon this

writ of cases in which questions of international law were in-

volved, and which, consequently, could only properly be disposed

of by the jurisdiction to which international concerns were by the

Constitution committed. The immediate occasion for this legis-

lation was the arrest of a subject of Great Britain by the

authorities of the State of New York, for an act which his
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government avowed and took the responsibility of, and which

was the subject of diplomatic correspondence between the two

nations. An act of Congress was consequently passed, which

provides that either of the justices of the Supreme Court, or

any judge of any District Court of the United States in which

a prisoner is conﬁned, in addition to the authority previously

conferred by law, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus

in all cases of any prisoner or prisoners in jail or conﬁnement,

where he, she, or they, being subjects or citizens of a foreign

State, and domiciled therein, shall be committed, or conﬁned,

or in custody, under or by any authority, or law, or process

founded thereon, of the United States or of any one of them,

for or on account of any act done or omitted under any alleged

right, title, authority, privilege, protection, or exemption, set up

‘ 4 Stat. at Large, 63-L. See Ea: parte Robinson, 6 McLean, 355. Rob-

inson was United States marshal, and was imprisoned under a warrant issued by

a State court for executing process under the Fugitive Slave Law, and was dis-

charged by a justice of the Supreme Court of the United States under this act.

I
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During what were known as the nullification troubles in South
Carolina, the defect of federal jurisdiction in respect to this writ
became apparent, and another act was passed, having for its object,
among other things, the protection of persons who might be prosecuted under assumed State authority for acts done under the laws
of the United States. This act provided that either of the justices
of the Supreme Court, or a judge of any Distdct Court of the
United States, in addition to the authority ah·eady conferred by law,
. should have power to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases of a
prisoner or prisoners in jail or confinement, where he or they shall
be committed or confined on or by any authority of law, for any act
done or omitted to be done, in pursuance of a law of the United
States, or any order, process or decree of any judge or court
thercof. 1
In 1842 further legislation seemed to have become a necessity, in order to give to the federal judiciary jurisdiction upon this
writ of cases in which questions of international law were involved, and which, consequently, could only properly be disposed
of by the jurisdiction to which international concerns were by the
Constitution committed. The immediate occasion for this legislation was the arrest of a subject of Great Britain by the
authorities of the State of Ncw York, for an act which his
government avowed and took the responsibility of, and which
was the subject of diplomatic correspondence between the two
nations. An act of Congress was consequently passed, which
provides that either of the justices of the Supreme Court, or
any judge of any District Court of the United States in which
a prisoner is confined, in addition to the authority previously
conferred by law, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus
in all cases of any prisoner or prisoners in jail or confinement,
where he, she, or they, being subjectK or citizens of a foreign
State, and domiciled therein, shall be committed, or confined,
or in custody, under or by any authority, or law, or process
founded thereon, of the United States or of any one of them,
for or on account of any act done or omitted under any alleged
right, title, authority, privilege, protection, or exemption, set up
1 4 Stat. at Large, 634.
See Ex parte Robinson, 6 :McLean, 355. Robinson was United States marshal, and was imprisoned under a warrant issued by
a State court for executing proce~s under the Fugitive Slave Law, and was discharged by a justice of the Supreme Court of the United States under this act.
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or claimed under the commission, or order, or sanction of any

[cu. x.

foreign'State or sovereignty, the validity or effect whereof depends

upon the law of nations, or under color thereof.‘

In 1867 a further act was passed, which provided that the

several courts of the United States, and the several justices

and judges of such courts, within their respective jurisdictions,

in addition to the authority already conferred by law, shall have

power to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases where any

person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the

Constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States?

These are the cases in which the national courts and judges

have jurisdiction of this writ: in other cases the party must seek

his remedy in the proper State tribunal.“ And although

[* 347] the State courts formerly ‘claimed and exercised the

right to inquire into the lawfulness of restraint under

the national authority,‘ it is now settled by the decision of the

Supreme Court of the United States, that the question of the

legality of the detention in such cases is one for the determination,

exclusively, of the federal judiciary, so that although a State

court or judge may issue this process in any case where illegal

restraint upon liberty is alleged, yet when it is served upon

any officer or person who detains another ‘in custody under the
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national authority, it is his duty, by proper return, to make

known to the State court or judge the authority by which he

holds such person, but not further to obey the process ; and that

as the State judiciary have no authority within the limits of

the sovereignty assigned by the Constitution to the United States,

the State court or judge can proceed no further with the case.5

‘ 5 Stat. at Large, 539. McLeod’s Case, which was the immediate occasion

of the passage of this act, will be found reported in 25 \Vend. 482. It was

reviewed by Judge Talmadge in 26 Wend. 663, and a reply to.the review appears

in 8 Hill, 635.

' 14 Stat. at Large, 385.

‘ Eacparle Dorr, 3 How. 103; Barry v. Mercein, 5 How. 103; Dekraft v.

Barney, 2 Black, 704. See United States v. French, 1 Gall. 1; Ex pm-te Barry,

2 How. 65.

‘ See the cases collected in Hurd on Habeas Corpus, B. 2, c. 1, §5, and in

Abb. Nat. Dig. 609, note.

" Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506. See Norris v. Newton, 5 McLean, 92;

United States v. Rector, 5 McLean, 174; Spangler’s Case, 11 Mich. 298; In re

Hopson, 40 Barb. 34; Ea: parts Hill, 5 Nev. 154. Notwithstanding the decision

or claimed under the commission, or order, or sanction of any
foreign •state or sovereignty, the validity or effect whereof depends
upon the law of nations, or under color thereof.l
In 1867 a further act was passed, which provided that the
several courts of the United States, and the several justices
and judges of such courts, within their respective jurisdictions,
in addition to the authority already conferred by law, shall have
power to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases where any
person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the
Constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States.2
These are the cases in which the national courts and judges
have jurisdiction of this writ: in other cases the party must seek
his remedy in the proper State tribunaLS And although
[* 347] the State courts formerly • claimed and exercised the
right to inquire into the lawfulness of restraint under
the national authority,' it is now settled by the decision of the
Supremo Court of the United States, that the question of the
legality of the detention in such cases is one for the determination,
exclusively, of the federal judiciary, so that although a State
court or judge may issue this process in any case where illegal
restraint upon liberty is alleged, yet when it is served upon
any officer or person who detains another ·in custody under the
national authority, it is his duty, by proper return, to make
known to the State court or judge the authority by which he
holds such person, but not further to obey the process; and that
as the State judiciary have no authority within the limits of
the sovereignty assigned by the Constitution to the United States,
the State court or judge can proceed no further with the case.6
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1 5 Stat. at Large, 539.
McLeod's Case, which was the immediate occasion
of the passage of this act, will be found reported in 26 Wend. 482. It was
reviewed by Judge Talmadge in 26 Wend. 663, and a reply to..tbe review appears
in 3 Hill, 635.
1 14 Stat. at Large, 385.
1 &
parte Dorr, S How. 103; Barry tt. Mercein, 6 How. 103; Dekraft o.
Barney, 2 Black, 704. See United States tt. French, 1 Gall. 1; Ez parte Barry,
2 How. 65.
• See the cases collected in Hurd on Habeas Corpus, B. 2, c. 1, § 5, and in
Abb. Nat. Dig. 609, note.
• Ableman tt. Booth, 21 How. 606. See Norris "· Newton, 6 McLean, 92;
United States tt. Rector, 5 McLean, 174; Spangler's Case, 11 Mich. 298; In re
Hopson, 40 Barb. 84; Ez part~ Hill, 5 Nev. 154. Notwithstanding the decision
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The State constitutions recognize the writ of habeas corpus

as an existing remedy in the cases to which it is properly appli-
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cable, and designate the courts or oﬂicers which may issue it ; but

they do not point out the cases in which it may be employed.

Upon this subject the common law and the statutes must be

our guide; and although the statutes will be found to make

speciﬁc provision for particular cases, it is believed that in no

instance which has fallen under our observation has there been

any intention toirestrict the remedy, and make it less broad

and effectual than it was at the common law.1

We have elsewhere referred to certain rules regarding the

validity of judicial proceedings.” In the great anxiety on the

part of our legislators to make the most ample provision for

speedy relief from unlawful conﬁnement, authority to issue the writ

of habeas corpus has been conferred upon inferior judicial oﬁicers,

who make use of it sometimes as if it were a writ of error,

under which they might correct the errors and irregularities of

other judges and courts, whatever their relative jurisdiction

and dignity. Any such employment of the writ is an

abuse? . Where a ‘party who is in conﬁnement under ["‘ 348]

of Ableman v. Booth, the State courts have frequently since assumed to pass

deﬁnitively upon cases of alleged illegal restraint under federal authority, and
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this, too, by the acquiescence of the federal oﬁicers. As the remedy in the State

courts is generally more expeditious and easy than can be aﬁbrded in the national

tribunals, it is possible the} the federal authorities may still continue to acquiesce

in such action of the State courts, in cases where there can be no reason to fear

that they will take different views of the questions involved from those likely to

be held by the federal courts. Nevertheless, while the case of Ableman v. Booth

stands unreversed, the law must be held to be as there declared.

1 See Matter of Jackson, 15 Mich. 417, where this whole subject is fully con-

The State constitutions recognize the writ of habeas corpus
as an existing remedy in the cases to which it is properly applicable, and designate the courts or officers which may issue it; but
they do not point out the cases in which it may be employed.
Upon this subject the common law and the statutes must be
our guide ; and although the statutes will be found to make
specific provision for particular cases, it is believed that in no
instance which has fallen under our observation has there been
any intention to ·restrict the remedy, and make it less broad
and effectual than it was at the common law.1
We have elsewhere referred to certain rules regarding the
validity of judicial proceedings.2 In the great anxiety on the
part of our legislators to make the most ample provision for
speedy relief from unlawful confinement, authority to issue the writ
of habeas corpus has been conferred upon inferior judicial officers,
who make use of it sometimes as if it were a writ of error,
under which they might correct the errors and irregularities of
other judges and courts, whatever their relati,•e jurisdiction
and dignity. Any such employment of the writ is an
abuse.3 • Where a • party who is in confinement under [• 348]

sidered. The application for the writ is not necessarily made by the party in

person, but may be made by any other person on his behalf, if a sulﬁcient reason

is stated for its not being made by him personally. The Hottentot Venus Case,

13 East, 195; Child’s Case, 29 Eng. L. & Eq. 259. A wife may have the writ

to release her husband from unlawful imprisonment, and may herself be heard on

the application. Cobbett’s Case, 15 Q. B. 181, note; Cobbett v. Hudson, 10

Eng. L. & Eq. 318; Same Case, 15 Q. B. 988. Lord Campbell in this case cites

the case of the wife of John Bunyan, who was heard on his behalf when in

prison.

' See post, p. 397 el seq.

" It is worthy of serious consideration whether, in those States where the

whole judicial power is by the Constitution vested in certain speciﬁed courts, it

is competent by law to give to judicial ofﬁcers not holding such courts authority
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of Ableman "· Booth, the State courts have frequently since assumed to pass
definitively upon cases of a1leged illegal restraint under federal authority, and
this, too, by the acquiescence of the federal officers. As the remedy in the State
courts is generally more expeditious and easy than can be afforded in the national
tribunals, it is possible thA the federal authorities JUay still continue to acquiesce
in such action of the State courts, in cases where there can be no reason to fear
that they will take different views of the questions involved from those likely to
be held by the federal courts. Nevertheless, while the case of Ableman v. Booth
stands unreyersed, the law must be held to be as there declared. '
1 See Matter of Jackson, 15 Mich. 417, where this whole subject is fully considered. Tbc application for the writ is not necessarily made by the party in
person, but may be made by any other person on his behalf, if a sufficient reason
is stated for its not being made by him personally. The Hottentot Venus Case,
13 East, 195; Child's Case, 29 Eng. L. & Eq. 259. A wife may have the writ
to release her husband from unlawful imprisonment, and may herself be heard on
the application. Cobbett's Case, 15 Q. B. 181, note; Cobbett "· Hudson, 10
Eng. L. & Eq. 318; Same Case, 15 Q. B. 988. Lord Campbell in this case cites
the case of the wife of John Bunyan, who was heard on his behalf when in
prison.
1 See post, p. 397 el seq.
a It is worthy of serious consideration whether, in those States where the·
whole judicial power is by the Constitution vested in certain specified courts, it
is t.'Ompeteut by law to give to judicial officers not holding such courts authority
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judicial process is brought up on habeas corpus, the court or

[cu. x.

judge before whom he is returned will inquire: 1. Whether

the court or oﬂicer issuing the process under which he is de-

tained had jurisdiction of the case, and has acted within that

jurisdiction in issuing such process.‘ If so, mere irregularities

or errors of judgment in the exercise of that jurisdiction must

be disregarded on this writ, and must be corrected either by the

court issuing the process, or on regular appellate proceedings?

2. If the process is not void for want of jurisdiction, the further

inquiry will be made, whether, by law, the case is bailable,

and if so, bail will be taken if the party offers it; otherwise

he will be remanded to the proper custody?

This writ is also sometimes employed to enable a. party to enforce

to review, even indirectly, the decisions of the courts, and to discharge persons

committed under their judgments. Such oﬂicers could exercise only a special

statutory authority. Yet its exercise in such cases is not only judicial, but it is

in the nature of appellate judicial power. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court

of the United States to issue the writ in cases of conﬁnement under the order of

the District Courts, was sustained in Ea: paﬂe Bollman and Swartwout, 4 Cranch,

75, and Matter of Metzger, 5 How. 190, on the ground that it was appellate.

judicial process is brought up on habeas corpus, the court or
judge before whom he is returned will inquire: 1. Whether
the court or officer issuing the process under which he is detained had jurisdiction of the case, and has acted within that
jurisdiction in issuing such process.l If so, mere irregularities
or errors of judgment in the exercise of that jurisdiction must
be disregarded on this writ, and must be corrected either by the
court issuing the process, or on regular appellate proceedings~2
2. If the process is not void for want of jurisdiction, the further
inquiry will be made, whether, by law, the case is bailable,
and if so, bail will be taken if the party offers it ; otherwise
he will be remanded to the proper custody.3
This writ is also sometimes employed to enable a party to enforce

See also Ex parte Kearney, 7 Wheat. 38; Ez.parte Watkins, 7 Pet. 568; Ea:

par-te Milburn, 9 Pet. 704; Matter of Kaine, 14 How. 103.

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:21 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105011581
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

‘ The validity of the appointment or election of an oﬁicer de facto cannot be

inquired into on habeas corpus. Ea: parte Strahl, 16 Iowa, 369; Russell v.

Whiting, 1 Wins. (N. C.) 463. Otherwise if a mere usurper issues process for

the imprisonment of a citizen. Ea: parts Strahl, suprl.

’ People v. Cassels, 5 Hill, 164; Bushnell‘s Case, 9 Ohio, N. s. 183; Ezparte

Watkins, 7 Pet. 568; Matter of Metzger, 5 How. 191; Petition of Smith, 2 Nev.

338; E1: parle Gibson, 31 Cal. 619; Hammond v. People, 32 Ill. 472, per

Breese, J. In State 15. Shattuck, 45 N. H. 211, Bellows, J., states the rule very

correctly, as follows: “ If the court had jurisdiction of the matter embraced in

these causes, this court will not, on habeas corpus, revise the judgment. Statc v.

Towle, -L2 N. H. 541 ; Ross and Riley’s Case, 2 Pick. 166, and Riley’s Case, ib.

171; Adams v. Vose, 1 Gray, 51. If in such case the proceedings are irregular

or erroneous, the judgment is voidable and not void, and stands good until

revised or annulled in a proper proceeding instituted for that purpose; but when

it appears that the magistrate had no jurisdiction, the proceedings are void, and

the respondent may be discharged on habeas corpus. State v. Towle, before

cited; Kellogg, Er parte, 6 Vt. 509. See also State v. Richmond, 6 N. H. 232;

Burnham v. Stevens, 33 N. H. 247; Hurst v. Smith, 1 Gray, 49.”

3 It is not a matter of course that the party is to be discharged even where

the authority under which he is held is adjudged illegal. For it may appear that

he should be lawfully conﬁned in diﬂerent custody; in which case, the proper

order may be made for the transfer. Matter of Mason, 8 Mich. 70; Matter of
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to review, even indirectly, the decisions of the courts, and to discharge persons
committed under their judgments. Such officers could exercise only a special
statutory authority. Yet its exercise in su,.h cases is not only judicial, but it is
in the nature of appellate judicial power. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
of the United States to issue the writ in cases of confinement under the order of
the District Courts, was sustained in Ex parte Bollman and Swartwout, 4 Crancb,
7fi, and Matter of Metzger, 6 How. 190, on the ground that it was appellate.
See also Ex parte Kearney, 7 Wheat. 38; Ex, parte Watkins, 7 Pet. 568; Ez
parte Milburn, 9 Pet. 704; Matter of Kaine, 14 How. 103.
1 The validity of the appointment or election of an officer de facto cannot be
inquired into on habeas corpus. Ex parte Strahl, 16 Iowa, 369; Russell v.
Whiting, 1 Wins. (N. C.) 463. Otherwise if a mere usurper issues process for
the imprisonment of a citizen. Ex parte Strahl, suprl.
1 People "· Cassels, o Hill, 164; Bushnell's Case, 9 Ohio, N. s. 183; Ex parte
Watkins, i Pet. 568; Matter of Metzger, 5 How. 191; Petition of Smith, 2 Nev.
338; Ex parte Gibson, 31 Cal. 619; Hammond "· People, 32 Ill. 472, per
Breese, J. In State b. Shattuck, 45 N. H. 211, BtUowa, J., states the rule very
correctly, as follows: "If the court had jurisdiction of the matter t!mbraced in
these causes, this court will not, on habeas corpus, revise the judgment. State v.
Towle, 42 N.H. 541; Ross and Riley's Case, 2 Pick. 166, and Riley's Case, ib.
171; Adams v. Vose, 1 Gray, 51. If in such case the proceedings are irregular
or erroneous, the judgment is voidable and not void, and stands good until
revised or annulled in a proper proceeding instituted for that purpose ; but when
it appears that the magistrate had no jurisdiction, the proceedings are void, and
the respondent may be discharged on habeas corpus. State v. Towle, before
cited; Kellogg, Ex parte, 6 Vt. 509. See also State v. Richmond, 6 N. H. 232;
Burnham v. Stevens, 33 N.H. 247; Hurst"· Smith, 1 Gray, 49."
1 It is not a matter of course that tlte party is to be discharged even where
the authority under which he is held is adjudged illegal. For it may appear that
he should be lawfully confined in different custody; in which case, the proper
order may be made for the transfer. Matter of Mason, 8 Mich. 70; Matter of
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one of the domestic relations; especially to enable a parent to

obtain the custody and control of his ehild,.where it is detained

from him by some other person. The courts, however, do not

generally go farther in these eases than to determine what is for

the best interest of the child; and they do not feel compelled to

remand him to any custody where it appears not to be for the

ehild’s interest. The theory of the writ is, that it relieves from

improper restraint; and if the child is of an age to render it proper

to consult his feelings and wishes, this may be done in any case ;1

and it is especially proper in many cases where the parents are

living in separation and both desire his custody. The right of the

father, in these cases, is generally recognized as best; but this must

depend very much upon circumstances, and the tender age of the

child may often be a controlling consideration against his claim.

The courts have large discretionary power in these cases, and the

tendency of modern decisions has been to extend, rather than

restrict it.’

There is no common-law right to a trial by jury of the issues of

fact joined in these cases; but the issues both of fact and of law are

tried by the court orjudge before whom the proceeding is had; 3

though without doubt a jury trial might be provided for by statute,

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:21 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105011581
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

and perhaps even ordered by the court in some cases.‘

Ring, 28 Cal. 247; E1: partc Gibson, 31 Cal. 619. And where he is detained for

trial on an imperfect charge of crime, the court, if possessing power to commit

dc novo, instead of discharging him, should proceed to inquire whether there is

probable cause for holding him for trial, and if so, should order accordingly.

Hurd on Habeas Corpus, 416.

' Commonwealth 1:. Aves, 18 Pick. 193.

' Barry‘s Case may almost be said to exhaust all the law on this subject. We

refer to the various judicial decisions made in it, so far as they are reported in

the regular reports. 8 Paige, 47 ; 25 Wend. 64; People v. Mercein, 3 Hill, 399;

2 Ilow. 65; Barry v. Mercein, 5 How. 105. See also the recent case of Adams

v. Adams, 1 Duv. 167. For the former rule, see The King 1:. De Manneville,

a right of control which by law he .may have, springing from some
one of the domestic relations; especially to enable a parent to
obtain the custody and control of his child, where it is detained
from him by some other person. The courts, however, do not
, generally go farther in these cases than to determine what i~:~ for
tho best interest of the child ; and they do not feel compelled to
remand him to any custody where it appears not to be for the
child's interest. The theory of the writ is, that it relieves from
improper restraint; and if the child is of an age to render it proper
to consult his feelings and wishes, this may be done in any case ; 1
and it is especially proper in many cases where the parents are
living in separation and both desire his custody. The right of the
father, in these cases, is generally recognized as best; but this must
depend very much upon circumstances, and the tender age of the
child may often be a controlling consideration against his claim.
The courts have large discretionary power in these cases, and the
tendency of modern decisions has been to extend, rather than
restrict it.2
There is no common-law right to a trial by jury of the issues of
fact joined in these cases; but the issues both of fact and of law are
tried by the court or judge before whom the proceeding is had ; 3
though without doubt a jury trial might be provided for by statute,
and perhaps even ordered by the court in some cases}

5 East, 221; E1: parie Skinner, 9 J. B. Moore, 278. \Vhere the court is satis-

ﬁed that the interest of the child would be subserved by refusing the custody to

either of the parents, it may be conﬁded to a third party. Chetwynd 0. Chet-

wynd. L. R. 1 P. & D. 39; In re Goodenough, 19 \Vis. 274.

' See Hurd on Habcas Corpus, 297-302, and cases cited; Baker v. Gordon,

23 Ind. 209.

‘ See Matter of Hakewell, 22 Eng. L. & Eq. 395; Same Case, 12 C. B. 223.
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Ring, 28 Cal. 247; Ex parte Gibson, 31 Cal. 619. And where he is detained for
trial on an imperfect charge of crime, the court, if possessing power to commit
de r10uo, instead of discharging him, should proceed to inquire whether there is
probable l'anse for holding him for trial, and if so, should order accordingly.
Hurd on Habeas Corpus, 416.
1 Commonwealth v. Aves, 18 Pick. 193.
1 Barry's Case may almost be said to exhaust all the law on this subject.
\Ve
refer to the various judicial decisions made in it, so far as they are reported in
the regular report8. 8 Paige, 47 ; 25 Wend. 64; People v. Mercein, 3 Hill, 39!);
2 How. 65; Barry v. 1\Iercein, 5 How. 105. See also the recent case of Adams
v. Atlams, 1 Duv. 167. For the former rule, see The King v. De Manneville,
5 East, 2:21; Ex parte Skinner, 9 J. B. :Moore, 27M. 'Vhere the court is satisfied that the interest of the child would be subserved by refusing the custody to
either of the parents, it may be confided to a third party. Chetwynd t~. Chetwynd, L. R. 1 P. & D. 89; In re Goodenough, 19 Wis. 274.
' See Hurd on Habeas Corpus, 297-30:?, and cases cited; Baker v. Gordon,
23 Ind. 209.
• See Matter of Hakewell, 22 Eng. L. & Eq. 395; Same Case, 12 C. B. 223.
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The right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the

-government for a redress of grievances, is one which “ would seem

unnecessary to be expressly provided for in a republican govern-

• Right of IJiscussion and Petition.

ment, since it results from the very nature and structure of its

institutions. It is impossible that it could be practically denied

until the spirit of liberty had wholly disappeared, and the people

had become so servilc and debased as to be unﬁt to exercise any of

the privileges of frecmen.”1 But it has not been thought unim-

portant to protect this right by statutory enactments in England;

and indeed it will be remembered that one of the most notable

attempts to crush the liberties of the kingdom made the right of

petition the point of attack, and selected for its contemplated victims

the chief officers in the episcopal hierarchy. The trial and acquittal

of the seven bishops in the reign of ‘James II. constituted one of

the decisive battles in English constitutional history;2 and the

right which was then vindicated is “ a sacred right which in

difﬁcult times shows itself in its full magnitude, frequently serves

as a safety-valve if judiciously treated by the recipients, and may

give to the representatives or other bodies the most valuable infor-

mation. It may right many a wrong, and the deprivation of it

would at once be felt by every freeman as a degradation. The
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right of petitioning is indeed a necessary consequence of the right

of free speech and deliberation,—a simple, primitive, and natural

right. As a privilege it is not even denied the creature in address-

ing the Deity.” 3 Happily the occasions for discussing and defending

it have not been numerous in this country, and have been conﬁned

to an exciting subject now disposed of.‘

' Story on the Constitution, § 1894.

" See this case in 12 Howell’s State Trials, 183; 3Mod. 212. Also in Broom,

Const. Law, 408. See also the valuable note appended.by Mr. Broom, p. 493,

in which the historical events bearing on the right ‘of petition are noted. Also

May, Const. Hist. c. 7; 1 Bl. Com. 143.

3 Lieber, Civil Liberty and Self-Government, c. 12.

‘ For the discussions on the right of petition in Congress, particularly with

reference to slavery, see 1 Benton’s Abridgment of Debates, 397; 2 ib. 57-60,

182-188, 209, 436-4-14; 12 ib. 660-679, 705-743; 13 ib. 5-28, 266-290, 557-

562. Also Benton’s Thirty Years‘ View, Vol. I. c. 185, Vol. II. c. 32, 33, 36,

37. Also the current political histories and biographies.
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The right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
·government for a redress of grievances, is one which " would seem
unnecessary to be expressly provided for in a republican government, since it results from the very nature and structure of its
institutions. It is impossible that it could be practically denied
until the spirit of liberty had wholly disappeared, and the people
had become so servile and debased as to be unfit to exercise any of
the privileges of freemen." 1 But it has not been thought unimportant to protect this right by statutory enactments in England ;
and indeed it will be remembered that one of the most notable
attempts to crush the liberties of the kingdom made the right of
petition the point of attack, and selected for its contemplated victims
the chief officers in the episcopal hierarchy. The trial and acquittal
of the seven bishops in the reign of·James II. constituted one of
the decisive battles in English constitutional history ; 2 and the
right which was then vindicated is " a sacred right which in
difficult times shows itself in its full magnitude, frequently serves
as a safety-valve if judiciously treated by the recipients, and may
give to the representatives or other bodies the most valuable information. It may right many a wrong, and ·the deprivation of it
would at once be felt by every freeman as a degradation. The
right of petitioning is indeed a necessary consequence of the right
of free speech and deliberation,- a simple, primitil"e, and natural
right. As a privilege it is not even denied the creature in addressing the Deity." a Happily the occasions for discussing and defending
it have not been numerous in this country, and have been confined
to an exciting subject now disposed of.~
Story on the Constitution, § 1894.
See this case in 12 Howell's State Trials, 188; 8 Mod. 212. Also in Br:oom,
Const. Law, 408. See also the valuable note appended. by Mr. Broom, p. 498,
in which the historical events bearing on the right 'of petition are noted. Also
May, Const. Hist. c. 7; 1 BI. Com. 143.
1 Lieber, Civil Liberty and Self-Gov~rnment, c. 12.
• For the discussions on the right of petition in Congress, particularly with
reference to slavery, see 1 Benton's Abridgment of Debates, 397; 2 ib. 57-60,
182-188, 209, 436-444:; 12 ib. 660-679, 705-743 i 18 ib. 5-28, 266-290, 55766:l. A1so Benton's TbirtyYears' View, Vol. I. c. 185, Vol. II. c. 82, 83, 86,
37. Also tbe current political histories and biographies.
1
1
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i * Right to bear Arms. [*‘ 350]

CH. X.]

* 350

CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS TO PERSONAL LIBERTY.

Among the other safeguards to liberty should be mentioned the

right of the people to keep and bear arms} A standing army is

peculiarly obnoxious in any free government, and the jealousy of

• Rigltt to bear Arms.

such an army has at times been so strongly demonstrated in

[* 350]

England as to lead to the belief that even though recruited from

among themselves, it was more dreaded by the people as an

instrument of oppression than a tyrannical monarch or any foreign

power. So impatient did the English people become of the very

army that liberated them from the tyranny of James II. that they

demanded its reduction even before the liberation became complete;

and to this day the British Parliament render a standing army

practically impossible by only passing a mutiny act from session to

session. The alternative to a standing army is “ a well-regulated

militia;” but this cannot exist unless the people are trained to

bearing arms. The federal and State constitutions therefore provide

that the right of the people to bear arms shall not be infringed;

but how far it may be in the power of the legislature to regulate

the right we shall not undertake to say, as happily there neither

has been, nor perhaps is likely to be, much occasion for a discussion

of that question by the courts?

' 1 Bl. Com. 143.
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1 In Bliss v. Commonwealth, 2 Lit. 90, the statute “ to prevent persons wear-

ing concealed arms” was held unconstitutional, as infringing on the right of the

people to bear arms in defence of themselves and the State. But see Nunn v.

State, 1 Kelly, 243. As bearing also upon the right of self-defence, see Ely v,

Thompson, 3 A. K. Marsh. 73, where it was held that the statute subjecting free

persons of color to corporal punishment for “ lifting their hands in opposition ”

to a white person was unconstitutional.
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Among the other safeguards to liberty should be mentioned the
right of the people to keep and bear arms.l A standing army is
peculiarly obnoxious in any free government, and the jealousy of
such an army has at times been so strongly demonstrated in
England as to lead to the belief that even though recruited from
among themselves, it was more dreaded by the people as an
instrument of oppression than a tyrannical monarch or any foreign
power. So impatient did the English people become of the 'Very
army that liberated them from the tyranny of James II. that they
demanded its reduction even before the liberation became complete ;
and to this day the British Parliament render a standing army
practically impossible by only pas~ing a mutiny act from session to
session. The alternative to a standing army is "a well-regulated
militia ; " but this cannot exist unless the people are trained to
bearing arms. The federal and State constitutions therefore provide
that the right of the people to bear arms shall not be infringed ;
but how far it may he in the power of the legislature to regulate
the right we shall not undertake to say, as happily there neither
has been, nor perhaps is likely to be, much occasion for a discussion
of that question by the courts.2
• 1 Bl. Com. 143.
In Bliss v. Commonwealth, 2 Lit. 90, the statut~ "to prevent persons wearing concealed arms" was held unconstitutional, as infringing on the right of the
people to bear arms in defence of themselves and the State. But see Nunn "·
State, 1 Kelly, 243. As bearing also upon the right of self-defence, see Ely v.
Thompson, 3 A. K. Marsh. 73, where it was held that the statute subjecting free
persons of color to corporal punishment for " lifting their hands in opposition "
to a white person was unconstitutional.
2
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.• 351

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

(CH. XI •

1’

OF THE PROTECTION TO PROPERTY BY “ THE LAW OF THE LAND.

THE protection of the subject in the free enjoyment of his life,

his liberty, and his property, except as they might be declared

by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land to be

forfeited, was guaranteed by the twenty-ninth chapter of Magna

Charta, “which alone,” says Sir William Blackstone, “ would

have merited the title that it bears of the Great Charter.” 1 The

[• 351]

•CHAPTER XI.

people of the American States, holding the sovereignty in their

own hands, have no occasion to exact pledges from any one for

a due observance of individual rights ; but the aggressive tendency

OF THE PROTECTION TO PROPERTY BY "THE LAW OF THE LAND."

of power is such, that they have deemed it of no small im-

portance, that, in framing the instruments under which their

governments are to be administered by their agents, they should

repeat and re-enact this guaranty, and thereby adopt it as a

principle of constitutional protection. In some form of words it

‘ 4 Bl. Com. 424. The chapter, as it stood in the original charter of John,

was: “ Ne corpus liberi hominis capiatur nee imprisonetur nee disseisietur nec

utlagetur nec exuletur nec aliquo modo destruatur nec rex eat vel mittat super

eum vi nisi per judicium parium suorum vel per legem terre.” No freeman shall

be taken, or imprisoned, or disseised, or outlawed, or banished, or any ways
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destroyed, nor will the king pass upon him, or commit him to prison, unless by

the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land. In the charter of Henry III.

it was varied slightly, as follows : “ Nullus libcr homo capiatur, vel imprisonetnr,

aut disscisietur de libero tenemento suo vel libertatibus vel liberis consuetudini-

bus suis, aut utlagetur, aut exuletur, aut aliquo mode destruatur, nec super eum

ibimus nec super eum mittemus, nisi per legale judicium parium suorum vel per

legem terrze." Sec Blackstone‘s Charters. The Petition of Right—l Car. I.

c. 1 — prayed, among other things, “ that no man be compelled to make or yield

any gift, loan, benevolence, tax, or such like charge, without common consent,

by -act of Parliament; that none be called upon to make answer for refusal so to

THE protection of the subject in the free enjoyment of his life,
his liberty, and his property, except as they might be declared
by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land to be
forfeited, Waf.\ guaranteed by the twenty-ninth chapter of :Magna
Charta, " which alone," says Sir William Blackstone, " would
have merited the title that it bears of the Great Charter." 1 The
people of the American States, holding the sovereignty in their
own hands, have no occasion to exact pledges from auy one for
a due observance of individual rights ; but the aggressive tendency
of power is such, that they have deemed it of no small importance, that, in framing the instruments under which their
governments are to be administered by their agents, they should
repeat and re-enact this guaranty, and thereuy adopt it a::~ a
principle of constitutional protection. In some form of words it

do; that frecmcn be imprisoned or detained only by the law of the land, or by

due process of law, and not by the king’s special command, without any charge."

The Bill of Rights-—-1 VVm. and Mary, §2, c. 2—was conﬁned to an enu-

meration and condemnation of the illegal acts of the preceding reign; but the

Great Charter of Henry III. was then, and is still, in force.

[382]

1 4 Bl. Com. 424.
The chapter, as it stood in the original charter of John,
was : " N e corpus liberi hominis capiatur nee imprisonetur nee disseisietur nee
utlagetur nee exuletur nee aliquo modo destruatur nee rex eat vel mittat super
eum vi nisi per judicium parium suorum vel per legem terre." No freeman shall
be taken, or imprisoned, or disseised, or outlawed, or banished, or any ways
destroyed, nor will the king pass upon bim, or commit him to prison, unless by
the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land. In the charter of Henry III.
it was varied slightly, as follows: "Nullus liber homo capiatur, vel imprisonetur,
aut disscisietur de libt>ro tenemento suo vel libt>rtatibus vel liberis consuetudinibus suis, aut utlagetur, aut cxuletur, aut aliquo modo destruatur, nee super eum
ibimus nee !!Uper eum mittemus, nisi per legale judicium parium suorum vel per
legem terrre." See Blackstone's Charters. The Petition of Right -1 Car. I.
c. 1 - prayed, among other things, "that no man be compelled to make or yield
any gift, loan, benevolence, tax, or sueh like charge, without common consent,
by -act of Parliament ; that none be <'ailed upon to make answt•r for refusal so to
do; that freemen be impri~:Joned or detained only by the law of the land, or by
due process of law, and not by the king's special command, without any cha1·ge."
The Bill of Rights -1 Wm. and :Mary, § 2, c. 2- was confined to an enumeration and condemnation of the illegal acts of the preceding reign; but the
Great Charter of Henry Ill. was then, and is still, in force.
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is to be found in each of the State constitutions;1 and

CH. XI.]

PROTECTION TO PROPERTY.

though verbal dit'ferences *appear in the different pro- [* 352]

' The following are the constitutional provisions in the several States: —

Alabama : “ That. in all criminal prosecutions, the accused . . . shall not be

compelled to give evidence against himself, or be deprived of his life, liberty, or

is to be found in each of the State constitutions ; 1 and
though verbal difrerences • appear in the different pro- [• 352]

property, but by due process of law.” Art. 1, § 8. - Arkansas : “ That no man

shall be taken or imprisoned, or disseised of his freehold, liberties, or privileges,

or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty,

or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land." Art. 2,

§ 10. — California: Like that of Alabama, substituting “ process of law” for

“ course of law.” Art. 1, § 8. — Connecticut: Same as Alabama. Art. 1, § 9.—

Delaware : Like that of Alabama, substituting for " course of law,” “ the judg-

ment of his peers, or the law of the land.” Art. l, § 7.— Florida: “ That no

person shall be taken, imprisoned, or disseised of his freehold, liberties, or privi-

lcgcs, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed, or deprived of his life,

liberty, or property, but by the law of the land." Art. 1, § 9. — Georgia: “ No

person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, except by due process of

law.” Art. 1, § 2. — Illinois and Iowa : " No person shall be deprived of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Art. 1, § 9. —Kentucky : “ Nor

can he be deprived of his life, liberty, or property, unless by the judgment of his

peers, or the law of the land.” Art. 13, § 12. — Maine : “ Nor be deprived of

his life, liberty, property, or privileges, but by the judgment of his peers, or the
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law of the land.” Art. 1, § 6. — Maryland: “ That no man ought to be taken,

or imprisoned, or disseised of his freehold, liberties, or privileges, or outlawed, or

exiled, or in any manner destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty, or property,

but by the judgment of his peers, or by the law of the landl’ Declaration of

Rights, § 23. — Massachusetts: “ No subject shall be arrested. imprisoned, de-

spoiled, or deprived of his property, immunities, or privileges, put out of the

protection of the law, exiled or deprived of his life, liberty, or estate, but by the

judgment of his peers, or the law of the land.” Declaration of Rights, Art. 12. --

Michigan: “ No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, with-

out due process of law.” Art. 6, § 32. —Minnesota : "No member of this State

shall be disfranchised, or deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured to

any citizen thereof, unless by the law of the land, or the judgment of his peers.”

Art. 1, § 2.-—.llississippi : “ Nor can he be deprived of his life, liberty, or property,

but by due course of law.” Art. 1,§ 10. —Missouri: Same as Delaware. Art.

1, § 18.—.\"ez-nda : “ Nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due

process of law.” Art. 1, § 8. —New Hampshire : Same as Massachusetts. Bill of

Rights, § 17. — New York: Same as Nevada. Art. 1, § 6. — North Carolina:

“ That no person ought Lo be taken, imprisoned, or disseised of his freehold,

liberties, or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed, or

deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the law of the land.” Declara-

tion of Rights, § 17.—PennsyIvam'a: Like Delaware. Art. 9, § 9.—Rhodc

Island: Like Delaware. Art. 1, § 10. — South Carolina : “ No person shall be

arrested, imprisoned, despoiled, or dispossessed of his property, immunities, or

privileges, put out of the protection of the law, exiled, or deprived of his life,

_ [ass]

1 The following are the constitutional prm•isions in the several States : .Alabama : •• That. in all criminal prosecutions, the accused . . . shall not be
compelled to give evidence against hi~self, or be deprived of his life, liberty, or
property, but by due process oflaw." Art. 1, § 8.- ArkaTUJas: "That no man
shall be taken or imprisoned, or disseised of his freehold, liberties, or privileges,
or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed, or depri\·ed of his life, liberty,
or property, but by the judgment of hi~ peers, or the law of the land." Art. 2,
§ 10.- California: Like that of Alabama, substituting "process of law" for
"course of law." Art. 1, § 8.- Connecticut: Same as Alabama. Art. 1, § 9.-·
Delmt'are: Like that of Alabama, substituting for "course of law," " the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land." Art. 1, § 7.- FlQT'ida: "That no
person shall be taken, imprisoned, or disseised of his freehold, liberties, or pri vilt·gcs, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed, or deprived of his life,
liberty, or property, but by the law of the land." Art. 1, § 9.- Georgia: "No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, except by due process of
law." Art. 1, § 2.- Illinois and lotca: "No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or propert~·, without due process of law." Art. 1, § 9. -Kmtucky: "Nor
can he be deprived of his life, liberty, or property, unless by the ju•lgment of his
peers, or the law of the land." Art. 13, § 12.- ..lfaine: "Nor be deprived of
his life, liberty, property, or privileges, but by the judgment of his peers, or the
law of the land." Art. 1, § 6.- Maryland: "That no man ought to be taken,
or irupri~onetl, or disseised of his freehold, liberties, or privileges, or outlawed, or
exiled, or in any manner destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty, or property,
but by the judgment of his peers, or by the la'v of the land." Declaration of
Rights, § 23.- Afassaclmsetts: "No ~ubject ~hall be arrested . imprisoned, despoilt•d, or dt•privcd of his property, immunities, or privileges, put out of the
protection of the law, exiled or deprived of his life, liberty, or estate, but Ly the
judguumt of his peers, or the law of the land." Declaration of Rights, Art. 12.-Michigan: "No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, O!" property, without due process of law." Art. 6, § 32. - ,lfirmesota: "No member of this State
shall btl di~franchised, or deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured to
any citizen thereof, unless hy the law of the land, or the judgment of his peers."
Art. 1, § 2. -.Uis.•issippi: •• Nor can be be depri,·cd of his life, liberty, or property,
but by due course of law." Art.1,§ 10.-Missouri: Same as Delawat·e. Art.
1, § 18.-.Xaada: "Nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." Art. 1, § 8.- New Hampshire: Same as 1\fassacbusctts. Bill of
Rights,§ 17.- Seu:t J"ork: Same as Kcvada. Art. 1, § 6.- North Carolina:
''That no pt•rson ought to be taken, imprisoned, or disseised of his freehold,
liberties, or pri\'ileges, or outlawed, or exiletl, or in any manner destroyed, or
deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the law of the land." Declaration of Rights, § 17.- Pennsylumia: Like Delaware. Art. !), § 9.- Rlwde
Island: Like Delaware. Art. 1, § 10.- South Cai"Olina: "No pPrson shall be
arrested, imprisoned, dt•spoiled, or dispossessed of his property, immunities, or
privileges, put out of the protection of the law, exiled, or deprived of his life,
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visions, no change in language, it is thought, has in any

(CH. XI.

[‘353] ease been made with a view to essential ‘change in

legal effect; and the differences in phraseology will not,

therefore, be of importance in our discussion. Indeed, the lan-

guage employed is generally ncarly identical, except that the phrase

“ due process [or course] of law” is sometimes used, sometimes

“the law of the land,” and in some cases both ; but the meaning

is the same in every case} And, by the fourteenth amendment

the guaranty is now incorporated in the Constitution of the

United States.’ ‘

If now we shall ascertain the meaning of the phrases “due

process of law” and “the law of the land” in the several con-

stitutional provisions which we have referred to, when they

have in view the protection of rights in property, we shall be

able, perhaps, to indicate the rule, by which may be determined

the cases in which legislative action is objected to, as not being

“the law of the land;” or judicial, or ministerial action is con-

tested as not being “due process of law,” within the meaning

of these terms as the Constitution employs them.

If we examine such deﬁnitions of these terms as are met with

in the reported eases, we shall ﬁnd them so various, that some

diﬂiculty must arise in ﬁxing upon one which shall be accurate,
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complete in itself, and at the same time appropriate in all the

liberty, or estate, but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land.”

Art. 1, § 14. — Tennessee : “ That no man shall be taken or imprisoned, or dis-

seised of his freehold, liberties, or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any

manner destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the judg-

ment of his peers, or the law of the land.” Art. 1, § 8. —- Teras: “ No citizen

of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, or privileges, outlawed,

exiled, or in any manner disfranchised, except by due course of the law of the

land.” Art. 1, § 16. ——- West Virginia: “No person, in time of peace, shall be

deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of A law.” Art. 2, § 6.

Under each of the remaining Constitutions, equivalent protection to that which

visions, no change in language, it is thought, has in any
[• 353] case been made with a view to essential • change in
legal effect ; and the differences in phraseology will not,
therefore, be of importance in our discussion. Indeed, the language employed is generally nearly identical, except that the phrase
" due process [or course] of law" is sometimes used, sometimes
"the law of the land," and in some cases both; but the meaning
is the same in every case. 1 And, by the fourteenth amendment
the guaranty is now incorporated in the Constitution of the
'
United States.2
If now we shall ascertain the meaning of the phrases "due
process of law" and " the law of the land" in the several constitutional provisions which we have referred to, when th'ey
have in view the protection of rights .i n property, we· shall be
able, perhaps, to indicate the rule, by which may be determined
the cases in which legislath·e action is objected to, as not being
" the law of the land ; " or judicial, or ministerial action is contested as not being "due process of law," within the meaning
of these terms as the Constitution employs them.
If we examine such definitions of these terms as are met with
in the reported cases, we shall find them so various, that some
difficulty must aris~ in fixing upon one which shall be accurate,
complete in itself, and at the same time appropriate in all the

these provisions give, is believed to be aﬂbrded by fundamental principles recog-

nized and enforced by the courts.

' 2 Inst. 50; Bouv. Law Die. “ Due process of Law,” “Law of the land ”;

Slate v. Simons, 2 Spears, 767; Vanzant v. Waddell, 2 Yerg. 260; Wally‘s

Heirs v. Kennedy, ib. 554; Greene o. Briggs, 1 Curt. 311; Murray’s Lessee v.

Hoboken Land Co. 18 How. 276, per Curtis, J.; Parsbns v. Russell, 11 Mich.

129, per rllanning, J .; Ervine’s Appeal, 16 Penn. St. 256; Banning v. Taylor,

24 Penn. St. 292; State v. Staten, 6 Cold. 2-14.

' See ante, p. 11.
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liberty, or estate, but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land."
Art. 1, § 14.- Tennessee: "That no man shall he taken or imprisoned, or disseised of his freehold, liberties, or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any
manner destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land." Art. 1, § 8.- Texas: "No citizen
of this State shall he deprived of life, liberty, property, or privileges, outlawed,
exiled, or in any manner disfranchised, except by due course of the law of the
land." Art. 1, § 16. - Wut Virginia: "No person, in time of peace, shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process oflaw." Art. 2, § 6.
Under each of the remaining Constitution1.1, equivalent protection to that which
these provisions give, is believed to be aft'orded by fundamental principles recognized and enforced by the courts.
1 2 lnst. liO; Bouv. Law Die. "Due process of Law," "Law of the land";
State "· Simons, 2 Spears, 767; Vanzant "· Wad dell, 2 Yerg. 260; Wally's
Heirs"· Kennedy, ib. 654; Greene v. Briggs, 1 Curt. 311; Murray's Lessee "·
Hoboken Land Co. 18 How. 276, per CUJ·tia, J.; Pars~·ms "· Russell, 11 Mich.
129, per Manning, J.; Ervine's Appeal, 16 Penn. St. 256; Banning v. Taylor,
24: Penn. St. 292; State 11. Staten, 6 Cold. 244.
1 See ante, p. 11.
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cases. The diversity of deﬁnition is certainly not surprising,

CH. XI.] PROTEm'ION TO PROPERTY BY" THE LAW OF THE LAND."

•353

when we consider the diversity of cases for the purposes of which

it has been attempted, and reﬂect that a deﬁnition that is

suﬁicient for one case and applicable to its facts may be altogether

insufficient or entirely inapplicable in another.

Perhaps no deﬁnition is more often quoted than that given by

Mr. Webster in the Dartmouth College Case : “By the law of the

land is most clearly intended the general law ; a law which hears

before it condemns; which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders

judgment only after trial. The meaning is that every citizen shall

hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities under the

protection of the *" general rules which govern society. ['* 354]

Every thing which may pass under the form of an

enactment is not therefore to be considered the law of the land.” 1

The deﬁnition here given is apt and suitable as applied to

judicial proceedings, which cannot be valid unless they “ proceed

upon inquiry” and “render judgment only after trial.” It is

entirely correct, also, in assuming that a legislative enactment is

not necessarily the law of the land. “ The words ‘ by the law of

the land,’ as used in the Constitution, do not mean a statute

passed for the purpose of working the wrong. That construction

would render the restriction absolutely nugatory, and turn this
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part of the Constitution into mere nonsense. The people would

be made to say to the two houses: ‘ You shall be vested with the

legislative power of the State, but no one shall be disfranchised or

deprived of any of the rights or privileges of a citizen, unless

you pass a statute for that purpose. In other words, you shall

not do the wrong unless you choose to do it.’ ” 2 But there are

' Dartmouth College v. \Voodward, 4 Wheat. 519; W'orks of Webster, Vol.

V. p. 487. And he proceeds: “ If this were so, acts of attainder, bills of pains

and penalties, acts of conﬁscation, acts reversing judgments, and acts directly

transferring one man’s estate to another, legislative judgments, decrees and for-

feitures in all possible forms, would be the law of the land. Such a strange

construction would render constitutional provisions of the highest importance

completely inoperative and void. It would tend directly to establish the union

of all powers in the legislature. There would be no general permanent law for

courts to administer or men to live under. The administration of justice would

be an empty form, an idle ceremony. Judges would sit to execute legislative

judgments and decrees, not to declare the_ law or administer the justice of the

country.”

' Per Bronson, J., in Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill, 140. See also Jones v. Perry,

10 Yerg. 59; Ervine‘s Appeal, 16 Penn. St. 256; Arrowsmith v. Burlingim,
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cases. The diversity of definition is certainly not surprising,
when we consider the diversity of cases for the purposes of which
it has been attempted, and reflect that a definition that is
sufficient for one case and applicable to its facts may be altogether
insufficient or entirely inapplicable in another.
Perhaps no definition is more often quoted than that given by
Mr. Webster in the Dartmouth College Case: "By the law of the
land is most clearly intended the general law ; a law which hears
before it condemns ; which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders
judgment only after trial. The meaning is that every citizen shall
hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities under the
protection of the • general rules which govern society. [• 354]
Every thing which may pass under the form of an
enactment is not therefore to be considered the law of the land." 1
The definitio·n here given is apt and suitable as applled to
judicial proceedings, which cannot be valid unless they " proceed
upon inquiry" and "render judgment only after trial.'' It is
entirely correct, also, in assuming that a legislative enactment is
not necessarily the law of the land. "The words' by the law of
the land,' as used in the Constitution, do not mean a statute
passed for the purpose of working the wrong. That construction
would render the restriction absolutely nugatory, and turn this
part of the Constitution into mere nonsense. The people would
be made to say to the two houses: 'You shall be vested with the
legislative power of the State, but no one shall be disfranchised or
deprived of any of the rights or privileges of a citizen, unless
you pass a statute for that purpose. In other words, you shall
not do the wrong unless you choose to do it.'" 3 But there are
1 Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 519; 'Vorks of Webster, Vol.
V. p. 487. And be proceeds: "If this were so, acts of attainder, bills of pains
and penalties, acts of confiscation, acts reversing judgments, and acts directly
transferring one man's estate to another, legislative judgments, decrees and forfeitures in all possible forms, would be the law of the land. Such a stmnge
construction would render constitutional provisions of the highest importance
completely inoperative and void. It would tend directly to establish the union
of all powers in the legislature. There would be no general permanent law for
courts to administer or men to live under. The administntion of justice would •
be an empty form, an idle ceremony. Judges would sit to execute legi:dative
judgments and decrees, not to declare the. law or administer the justice of the
country."
1 Per Bronso-n, J., in Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill, 140.
See also Jones "·Perry,
10 Yerg. 59; En·ine's Appeal, 16 Penn. St. 256; Arrowsmith v. Burlingim,

25
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many cases in which the title to property may pass from one person

[CH. XI,

to another, without the intervention of judicial proceedings, prop-

erly so called ; and we have already seen that special legislative acts

designed to accomplish the like end have also been held

["‘ 355] valid in * some cases. The necessity for “general rules,”

therefore, does not preclude the legislature from establish-

ing special rules for particular cases, provided the particular

cases range themselves under some general rule of legislative

power; nor is there any requirement of judicial action which

demands that{ in every case, the parties interested shall have

a hearing in court!)

4 McLean, 498; Lane v. Dorman, 3 Scam. 238; Reed v. Wright, 2 Greene,

(Iowa) 15; \Voodcock v. Bennett, 1 Cow. 740; Kinney v. Beverley, 2 H. & M.

536. “ Those terms, ‘law of the land,’ do not mean merely an act of the general

assembly. If they did, every restriction upon the legislative authority would be

at once abrogated. For what more can the citizen suffer than to be taken, im-

prisoned, disseised of his freehold, liberties, and privileges; be outlawed, exiled,

many cases in which the title to property may pass from one person
to another, without the intervention of judicial proceedings, propedy so called ; and we bave already seen that special legislative acts
designed to accomplish the like end have also been held
[• 355] valid in • some cases. The necessity for "general rules,"
therefore, does not preclude the legislature from establishing special rules for particular cases, provided the particular
cases range themselves under some general rule of legislative
power ; nor is there any requirement of judicial action which
demands that( in every case, the parties interested shall have
a hearing in court.1 )

and destroyed, and be deprived of his property, his liberty, and his life, without

crime? Yet all this he may suﬂ'er if an act of the assembly simply denouncing

those penalties upon particular persons, or a particular class of persons, be in

itself a law of the land within the sense of the Constitution; for what is in that

sense the law of the land must be duly observed by all, and upheld and enforced
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by the courts. In reference to the inﬂiction of punishment and devesting the

rights of property, it has been repeatedly held in this State, and it is believed in

every other of the Union, that there are limitations upon the legislative power, not-

withstanding these words; and that the clause itself means that such legislative

acts as profess in themselves directly to punish persons, or to deprive the citizen

of his property without trial before the judicial tribunals, and a decision upon the

matter of right, as determined by the laws under which it vested, according to the

course, mode, and usages of the common law, as derived from our forefathers,

are not effectually ‘ laws of the land ’ for those purposes." Hoke v. Henderson,

4 Dev. 15. Mr. Broom says: “ It is indeed an essential principle of the law of

England, ‘that the subject hath an undoubted property in his goods and posses-

sions; otherwise there shall remain no more industry, no more justice, no more

valor; for who will labor? who will hazard his person in the day of battle for

that which is not his own?‘ The Bankers‘ Case, by Tumor, 10. And therefore

our customary law is not more solicitous about.any thing than ‘to preserve the

property of the subject from the inundation of the prerogative.’ I bid.” Broom‘s

Const. Law, p. 228.

‘ See Wynehamer '0. People, 13 N. Y. 482, per Selden, J. In James v.

Reynolds, 2 Texas, 251, Chief Justice Hempkill says: “ The terms ‘law of the

land’ . . . are now, in their most usual acceptation, regarded as general public

laws, binding upon all the members of the community, under all circumstances,

and not partial or private laws, affecting the rights of private individuals or

classes of individuals.” And see Vanzant v. Waddell, 2 Yerg. 269, per Peck, J . ;

[ass]

4 McLean, 498; Lane "· Donnan, 3 Scam. 238; Reed "· Wright, 2 Greene,
(Iowa) 15; Woodcock v. Bennett, 1 Cow. 740; Kinney"· BevE.'rley, 2 H. & M.
536. "Those terms, 'law of the land,' do not mean merely an act of the general
assembly. If they did, every restriction upon the legislative authority would be
at once abrogated. For what more can the citizen suffer than to be taken, imprisoned, disseised of his freehold, liberties, and privileges; be outlawed, exiled,
and destroyed, and be deprived of hia property, hia liberty, and his life, without
crime P Yet all this be may suffer if an act of the assembly simply denouncing
those penalties upon particular persons, or a particular claas of persons, be 10
ltaelf a law of the land within the sense of the Constitution ; for what is in that
sense the law of the land must be duly observed by all, and upheld and enforced
by the court&. In reference to the infliction of punishment and deveating the
right& of property, it has been repeatedly held in this State, and it is believed in
every other of the Union, that there are limitations upon the legislative power, notwithstanding these W'Ords; and that the clau11P. itself means that such legislative
acts all profeaa in themselves directly to punish persona, or to deprive the citizen
of bis property without trial before the judicial tribunal&, and a deciaion upon the
matter of right, as determined by the laws under which it vested, according to the
course, mode, and usages of the common law, as derived from our forefathers,
arc not effectually 'lawa of the land' for those purposes." Hoke v. Henderson,
4 Dev. 15. l\Ir. Broom says: "It is indeed an essential print:iple of the Jaw of
England, 'that the subject hath an undoubted property in his goods and possessions; otherwise there ahall remain no more industry, no more justice, no more
valor; for who will labor? who will hazard his person in the day of battle for
that which is not his own P' The Bankera' Case, by Tumor, 10. And therefore
our customary law is not more solicitous about. any thing than 'to preserve the
property of the subject from the inundation of the prerogative.' Ibid." Broom's
Const. Law, p. 228.
1 See Wynehamer 1v. People, 13 N. Y. 432, per Selden, J.
In James "·
Reynolds, 2 Texaa, 251, Chief Juatice Hemphill saya: "The tenns •Jaw of the
laud' ..• are now, in their most UlMlal acceptation, regarded as general public
laws, binding upon all the members of the community, under all circumstances,
and not partial or private laws, affecting the rights of prrvatc individuals or
classes of individuala." And see Vanzant "· Waddell, 2 Yerg. 269, per Peck, J. ;

[ 386]

en. xI.] PROTECTION ro PROPERTY av “ rm-1 LAW or run LAND.” "‘355

On the other hand we shall ﬁnd that general rules may some-

times be as obnoxious as special, if they operate to deprive
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individual citizens of vested rights. While every man has a right

to require that his own controversies shall be judged by the same

rules which are applied in the controversies of his neighbors, the

whole community is also entitled, at all times, to demand the

protection of the ancient principles which shield private rights

against arbitrary interference, even though such interference may

be under a rule impartial in its operation. It is not the partial

nature of the rule, so much as its arbitrary and unusual character,

which condemns it as unknown to the law of the land. Mr.

Justice Edwards has said in one ease: “Due process of law

undoubtedly means, in the due course of legal proceedings,

according to those rules and forms which have been established

for the protection of private rights.”1 And we have met in no

judicial decision a statement that embodies more tersely and

accurately the correct view of the principle we are considering,

than the following, from an opinion by Mr. Justice Johnson of the

Supreme Court of the United States: “As to the words from

Magna Charta incorporated in the Constitution of Maryland, after

volumes spoken and written with a view to their exposition,

the good sense of mankind has at length settled down to this, —
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that they were intended to secure the individual from the arbi-

trary exercise of the powers of government, unrestrained by

the established principles of private rights and distributive

justice.” 2

Hard v. Nearing, 44 Barb. 472. Nevertheless there are many cases, as we have

shown, ante, pp. 97, 109, in which private laws may be passed in entire accord

with the general public rules which govern the State ; and we shall refer to more

cases further on.

' Westervelt v. Gregg, 12 N. Y. 209. See also State v. Staten, 6 Cold. 233.

' Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 4 Wheat. 235. “ \Vhnt is meant by ‘the law

of the land‘? In this State, taking as our guide Z_vlstra's Case, 1 Bay, 384;

\Vhite v. Kendrick, 1 Brev. 471; State v. Coleman and Mnxy, 1 Mchlull. 502,

there can be no hesitation in saying that these words mean the common law

and the statute law existing in this State at the adoption of our constitution.

Altogether they constitute a body of law prescribing the course of justice to

which a free man is to be considered amenable for all time to come.” Per

On the other hand we shall find that general rules may sometimes be as obnoxious as special, if they operate to deprive
individual citizens of vested rights. While evet·y man has a right
to require that his own controversies shall be judged by the same
rules which are applied in the controversies of his neighbors, the
whole community is also entitled, at all times, to demand the
protection of the ancient principles which shield private rights
against arbitrary interference, even though such interference may
be under a rule impartial in its operation. It is not the partial
nature of the rule, so much as its arbitrary and unusual character,
which condemns it as unknown to the law of tho land. :Mr.
Justice Edwards has said in one case: "Due process of law
undoubtedly means, in the due course of legal proceedings,
according to those rules and forms which have been established
for the protection of private rights.'' 1 And we have met in no
judicial decision a statement that embodies more tersely and
accurately the correct view of the principle we are considering,
than the following, from au opinion by Mr. Justice Johnson of the
Supreme Court of the United States: "As to the words from
:Magna Charta incorporated in the Constitution of Maryland, after
volumes spoken and written with a view to their exposition,
the good sense of mankind has at length settled down to this, that they were intended to secure the individual from the arhitl'llry exercise of the powers of government, unrestrained by
the established principles of private rights and distributive
justice." 2

0’r\’eill. J ., in State v. Simona, 2 Speers, 767. It must not be understood from

this, however, that it would not be competent to change either the common law

or the statute law, so long as the principles therein embodied, and which pm.

tccted private rights, were not departed from.

[381]

Hard v. Nearing, 44 llarb. 4i2. Nevertheless there are many t•ases, as we have
shown, aule, pp. 97, 109, in which private laws may be passed in entire accord
with the g•·neral public rules which govern the State ; and we shall reft·r to more
cases further on.
1 We~tcrvclt v. Gregg, 12 N.Y. 209.
See also State v. Staten, 6 Cold. 233.
7 Rank of Columbia t!. Okely, .J, Wheat. 235.
"What is meant by 'the bw
of the land'? In this State, taking as our guide Zylstra's Case, 1 Bay, 384;
White t!. Kcn:lrick, 1 Brcv. 471; State v. Coleman and l\Iaxy, 1 l\ld\[ull. 502,
there can be no hesitation in saying that these words mean the common law
and the statute law cxisting in this State at the adoption of our con~titution.
Altogether they constitute a body of law presc•·ibing the course of justice to
whieh a free man is to be considered amenable for all time to come." Per
o·seill. J., in State v. Simons, 2 Speers, 7G7. It must not be understood from
thi~. how••ver, that it would not be competent to change eitlwr the common law
or the statute law, MO long as the prineiplcs therein embodied, and whieh protected private rights, were not departed from.
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[* 356] * The principles, then, upon which the process is based

[cu. xi.

are to determine whether it is “ due process ” or not, and

not any considerations of mere form. Administrative and remedial

process may change from time to time, but only with due regard to

the landmarks established for the protection of the citizen. When

the government through its established agencies interferes with the

title to one’s property, or with his independent enjoyment of it,

and its action is called in question as not in accordance with the

law of the land,we are to test its validity by those principles of

civil liberty and constitutional protection which have become es-

tablished in our system of laws, and not generally by rules that

pertain to forms of procedure merely. In judicial proceedings the

law of the land requires a hearing before condemnation, and judg-

ment before dispossession;1 but when property is appropriated

by the government to public uses, or the legislature interferes to

give direction to its title through remedial statutes, diﬁerent con-

siderations. from those which regard the controversies between

man and man must prevail, different proceedings are required,

and We have only to see whether the interference can be justiﬁed

by the established rules applicable to the special case. Due pro-

cess of law in each particular case means, such an exertion of the

powers of government as the settled maxims of law permit and

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:21 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105011581
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

sanction, and under such safeguards for the protection of individ-

ual rights as those maxims prescribe for the class of cases to

which the one in question belongs? .

Private rights may be interfered with by either the legislative, ex-

ecutive, or judicial department of the government. The executive

department in every instance must show authority of law

[*‘ 357] for its action, and occasion does not often arise‘ for an

examination of the limits which circumscribe its powers.

The legislative department may in some case constitutionally

‘ Vanzant v. Waddell, 2 Yerg. 260; Lenz v. Charlton, 23 Wis. 478.

' See Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 432, per Selden, J. In State v. Allen,

2 McCord, 56, the court, in speaking of process for the collection of taxes, say:

“We think that any legal process which was originally founded in necessity,

has been consecrated by time, and approved and acquiesced in by universal

consent, must be considered an exception to the right of trial by jury, and is

embraced in the alternative ‘law of the land.‘ ” And see Hard v. Nearing, 44

Barb. 472; Sears v. Cottrell, 5 Mich. 251; Gibson v. Mason, 5 Nev. 302.

\
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[• 356]

. • The principles, then, upon which the process is based
are to determine whether it is '' due process " or not, and
not any considerations of mere form. Administrative and remedial
process may change from time to time, but only with due regard to
the landmarks established for the protection of the citizen. When
the government through its established agencies interferes with the
title to one's property, or with his independent enjoyment of it,
and its action is called in question as not in accordance with the
law of the land, we are to test its validity by those principles of
civil liberty and constitutional protection which have become established in our system of laws, and not generally by rules that
pertain to forms of procedure merely. In judicial proceedings the
law of the laud requires a hearing before condemnation, and judg·
ment before dispossession; 1 but when property is appropriated
by the government to public uses, or the legislature interferes to
give direction to its title through remedial statutes, different considerations, from those which regard the controversies between
man and man must prevail, different proceedings are required,
and we have only to see whether the interference can be justified
by the established rules applicable to the special case. Due process of law in each particular case means, such an exertion of the
powers of government as the settled maxims of law permit and
sanction, and under such safeguards for the protection of individual rights as those maxims prescribe for the class of cases to
which the one in question belongs.2
Private rights may be interfered with by either the legislative, executive, or judicial department of the government. The executive
department in every instance must show authority of law
[* 357] for its action, and occasion does not often arise • for an
examination of the limits which circumscribe its powers.
The legislative department may in some cases constitutionally
Vanzant"· Waddell, 2 Yerg. 260; Lenz v. Charlton, 23 Wis. 478.
See Wynehamer "· People, 13 N.Y. 432, per Selden, J . In State"· Allen,
2 McCord, 56, the court, in speaking of process for the collection of taxes, say :
" We think that any legal process which was originally founded in necessity,
has been consecrated by time, and approved and acquiesced in by universal
consent, must be considered an exception to the right of trial by jury, and is
embraced in the alternative 'law of the land.'" And see Hard"· Nearing, 44
Barb. 472; Sears"· Cottrell, 5 Mich. 251; Gibson"· Mason, 5 Nev. 302.
1

1
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authorize interference, and in others may interpose by direct
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action. Elsewhere we shall consider the police power of the State,

and endeavor to show how completely all the property, as well as

all the people within the State, are subject to control under it, within

certain limits, and for the purposes for which that power is exer-

cised. The right of eminent domain and the right of taxation will

also be discussed separately, and it will appear that under each

the law of the land sanctions devesting individuals of their prop-

erty against their will, and by somewhat summary proceedings.

In every government there is inherent authority to appropriate the

property of the citizen for the necessities of the State, and consti-

tutional provisions do not confer the power, though they generally

surround it with safeguards to prevent abuse. The restraints are,

that when speciﬁc property is taken, a. pecuniary compensation,

agreed upon or determined by judicial inquiry, must be paid ; and

in other cases property can only be taken for the support of the

government, and each citizen can only be required to contribute

his proportion to that end. But there is no rule or principle

known to our system under which private property can be taken

from one person and transferred to another for the private use and

benefit of such other person, whether by general law or by special

enactment. The purpose must be public, and must have reference
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to the needs of the government. No reason of general public

policy will be suﬁicient, it seems, to validate such transfers when

they operate upon existing vested rights.‘

Nevertheless in many cases and many ways remedial legislation

may affect the control and disposition of property, and in some

cases may change the nature of rights, give remedies where none

existed before, and even devest legal titles in favor of substantial

equities where the legal and equitable rights do not chance to con-

cur in the same persons. '

' Taylor v. Porter,4 Hill. 140; Osborn v. Hart. 24 Wis. 91. In Matter of

Albany Street, 11 \Vend.149, it is intimated that the clause in the Constitution of

New York, withholding private property from public use except upon compensa-

tion made, of itself implies that it is not to be taken in invitum for individual

use. And see Matter of John and Cherry Streets, 19 \Vend. 676. A different

opinion seems to have been held by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, when

they decided in Harvey v. Thomas, 10 Watts, 63, that the legislature might

authorize the laying out of private ways over the lands of unwilling parties, to

connect the coal-beds with the works of public improvement, the constitution

not in terms prohibiting it. See note to p. 531, post.
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authorize interference, and in others may interpose by direct
action. Elsewhere we shall consider the police power of the State,
and endeavor to show how completely all the property, as well as
all the people within the State, are subject to control under it, within
certain limits, and for the purposes for which that power is exercised. The right of eminent domain and the right of taxation will
also be discussed separately, and it will appear that under each
the law of the land sanctions de>esting individuals of their property against their will, and by somewhat summary proceedings.
In every government there is inherent authority to appropriate the
property of the citizen for the necessities of the State, and constitutional provisions do not conf~r the power, though they generally
surround it with safeguards to prevent abuse. The restr&.ints are,
that when specific property is taken, a pecuniary compensation,
agreed upon or determined by judicial inquiry, must be paid ; and
in other cases property can only be taken for the support of the
government, and each citizen can only be required to contribute
his proportion to that end. But there is no rule or principle
known to our system under which prh·ate property can be taken
from one person and transferred to another for the private use and
benefit of such other person, whether by general law or by special
enactment. The purpose must be public, and must have reference
to the needs of the government. No reason of general public
pol.icy will be sufficient, it seems, to >alidate such transfers when
they operate upon existing vested rights. 1
Nevertheless in many cases and many ways remedial legislation
may affect tho control and disposition of property;, and in some
cases may change the nature of rights, give remedies where none
existed before, and even devest legal titles in favor of substantial
equities w.here the legal and equitable rights do not chance to concur in the same persons.
1 Taylor o. Porter, 4 Hill. 140; Osborn o. Hart, 24 Wis. 91.
In Matter of
Albany Street, 11 \Vend.149, it is intimated that the clause in the Constitution of
New York, withholding private property from public use except tlpon compensation made, of itself implies that it is not to be taken in invitum for individual
use. And see l\latter of John and Cherry Streets, 19 Wend. 676. A different
opinion seems to have been held by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, when
they decided in Harvey v. Thomas, 10 Watts, 63, that the legislature might
authorize the laying out of private ways over the lands of unwilling parties, to
connect the coal-beds with the works of public improvement, the constitution
not in terms prohibiting it. See note to p. 031, post.
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The chief restriction upon this class of legislation is,

[‘* 358] that vested rights must not be disturbed ;* but in its ap-

plication as a shield of protection, the term “vested

rights” is not used in any narrow or technical sense, or as im-

porting a power of legal control merely, but rather as implying a

vested interest which it is right and equitable that the government

should recognize and protect, and of which the individual could

not be deprived arbitrarily without injustice. The right to private

property is a sacred right; not, as has been justly said, “intro-

duced as the result of princes’ edicts, concessions and charters,

but it was the old fundamental law, springing from the original

frame and constitution of the realm.” 1

But as it is a right which rests upon equities, it has its reason-

able limits and restrictions ; it must have some regard to the

general welfare and public policy ; it cannot be a right which is to

be examined, settled, and defended on a distinct and separate con-

sideration of the individual case, but rather on broad and general

grounds, which embrace the welfare of the whole community, and

which seek the equal and impartial protection of the interests of

all?

' And it may be well at this point to examine in the light of the

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:21 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105011581
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

reported cases the question, What is a vested right in the constitu-

tional sense? and when we have solved that question, we may be

the better able to judge under what circumstances one may be jus-

tiﬁed in resisting a change in the general laws of the State aﬂecting

his interests, and how far special legislation may control his rights

without coming under legal condemnation. In organized society

every man holds all he possesses, and looks forward to all he hopes

for,_ through the aid and under the protection of the laws; but as

changes of circumstances and of public opinion, as well as other

reasons affecting the public policy, are all the while calling for

changes in the laws, and as these changes must inﬂuence more or

‘ Arg. Nightingale v. Bridges, Show. 138. See also Case of Alton \Voods,

1 Rep. 45a; Alcock v. Cook, 5 Bing. 340; Bowman v. Middleton, 1 Bay, 282;

ante, p. 37 and note, p. 175 and note.

' The evidences of a man’s rights—the deeds, bills of sale, promissory notes,

and the like——are protected equally with his lands and chattels, or rights and

franchises of any kind; and the certiﬁcate of registration and right to vote may be

properly included in the category. State v. Staten, 6 Cold. 243. See Davies

v. McKeeby, 5 Nev. 369.

[390]

The chief restriction upon this class of legislation is,
[• 358] that vested rights must not be disturbed ; • but in its application as a shield of protection, the term " vested
rights" is not used in any narrow or technical sense, or as importing a power oflegal control merely, but rather as implying a
vested interest which it is right and equitable that the government
should recognize and protect, and of which the individual could
not be deprived arbitrarily without injustice. The right to private
property is a sacred right; not, as has been justly said, '' introduced as the result of princes' edicts, concessions and chat·ters,
hut it was the old fundamental law, springiug from the original
frame and constitution of the realm." 1
But as it is a right which rests upon equities, it has its reasonable limits and restrictions ; it must have some regard to the
geueral welfare and public policy ; it cannot be a right which is to
be examined, settled, and defended on a distinct and separate consideration of the individual case, but rather on broad and general
grounds, which embrace the welfare of the whole community, and
which seek the equal and impartial protection of the interests of
all. 2
• And it may be well at this point to examine in the light of the
reported cases the question, What is a vested right in the constitutional sense? and when we have solved that question, we may be
the better able to judge under what circumstances one may be justified in resisting a change in the general laws of the State affecting
his interests, and bow far special legislation may control his rights
without coming under legal condemnation. In organized society
every man holds all he possesses, and looks forward to all he hopes
for, through the aid and under the protection of the laws; but as
changes of circumstances and of public opinion, as well as other
reasons affecting the public policy, are all the while calling for
changes in the laws, and as these changes must influence more or
Arg. Nightingale 11. Bridges, Show. 138. See also Case of Alton 'Voods,
1 Rep. 45 a; Alcock v. Cook, 5 Bing. 340; Bowman 11. Middleton, 1 Bay, 282;
ante, p. 37 and note, p. 175 and nottl.
1 The evidences of a man's rights- the deeds, bills of sale, promissory notes,
and the like- are protected equally with his lands and chattels, or rights and
franchises of any kind; and the certificate of registration and right to vottl may be
properly included in the category. State 11. Stattln, 6 Cold. 2!3. Sec Davies
11. McKeeby, 5 Nev. 36!).
1
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less the value and stability of private possessions, and strengthen

. CH.XI.] PROTECTION TO PROPERTY BY "THE LAW OF THE LAND.''

*358

or destroy. well-founded hopes, and as the power to make very

many of them could not be disputed without denying the right of

the political community to prosper and advance, it is obvious that

many rights, privileges, and exemptions which usually pertain to

ownership under a particular State of the law, and many reason-

able expectations, cannot be regarded as vested rights in any legal

sense. In many cases the courts, in the exercise of their ordinary

jurisdiction, cause the property vested in one person to be trans-

ferred to another, either through the exercise of a statutory power,

or by the direct force of their judgments or decrees, or by means

of compulsory conveyances. If in these cases the courts have

jurisdiction, they proceed in accordance with “ the law of the

land ; ” and the right of one man is devested by way of enforcing a

higher and better right in another. Of these cases we do not pro-

pose to speak : constitutional questions cannot well arise concern-

ing them, unless they are attended by circumstances of irregularity

which are supposed to take them out of _the general rule. All

vested rights are held subject to the laws for the enforcement

of public duties and private contracts, and for the punishment of

wrongs; _and if they become devested through the operation of

those laws, it is only by way of enforcing the obligations of justice
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and good order. What we desire to reach in this connection is

the true meaning of the term “vested rights ” when employed for

the purpose of indicating the interests of which one cannot be

deprived by the mere force of legislative enactment, or by

any other than the * recognized modes of transferring title [‘ 359]

against the consent of the owner, to which we have

alluded.

Interests in Expectancy.

And it would seem that a right cannot be regarded as a vested

right, unless it is something more than such a mere expectation

as may be based upon an anticipated continuance of the present

general laws: it must have become a title, legal or equitable,

to the present or future enjoyment of property, or to the present

or future enforcement of a demand, or a legal exemption from

a demand made by another. Acts of the legislature, as has

been well said by Mr. Justice Woodbury, cannot be regarded as

I
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less the value and stability of private possessions, and strengthen
or destroy well-founded hopes, and as the power to make very
many of them could not be disputed without denying the right of
the political community to prosper and advance, it is obvious that
many rights, privileges, and exemptions which usually pertain to
ownership under a particular State of the law, and many reasonable expectations, cannot be regarded as vested rights in any legal
sense. In many cases the courts, in the exercise of their ordinary
jurisdiction, cause the property vested in one person to be transferred to another, either through the exercise of a statutory power,
or by the direct force of their judgments or decrees, or by means
of compulsory conveyances. If in these cases the courts have
jurisdiction, they proceed in accordance with " the law of the
land ; " and the right of one man is devested by way of enforcing a
higher and better right in another. Of these cases we do not propose to speak : constitutional questions cannot well arise concerning them, unless they are attended by circumstances of irregularity
which are supposed to take them out of .the general rule. All
vested rights are held subject to the laws for the enforcement
of public duties and private contracts, and for the punishment of
wrongs ; .and if they become devested through the operation of
those laws, it is only by way of enforcing the obligations of justice
and good order. What we desire to reach in this connection is
the true meaning of the term " vested rights " when employed for
the purpose of indicating the interests of which one cannot be
deprived by the mere force of legislative enactment, or by
any other than the • recognized modes of transferring title [* 359]
against the consent of the owner, to which we have
alluded.

Interests in Expectancy.
And it would seem that a right cannot be regarded as a vested
right, unless it is something more than such a mere expectation
as· may be based upon an anticipated continuance of the present
general laws: it must have become a title, legal or equitable,
to the present or future enjoyment of property, or to the present
or future enforcement of a demand, or a legal exemption from
a demand made by another. Acts of the legislature, as has
been well said by Mr. Justice Woodbury, cannot be regarded as
[ 391]

* 359 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [cu. x1.
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opposed to undamental axioms of legislation, “ unless they im-

[cu.

XI.

pair rights which are vested ; because most civil rights are

derived from public laws; and if, before the rights become vested

in particular individuals, the convenience of the State procures

amendments or repeals of those laws, those individuals have no

cause of complaint. The power that authorizes or proposes to give

may always revoke before an interest is perfected in the douee.”1

And Chancellor Kent, in speaking of retrospective statutes, says

that while such a statute, “ affecting and changing vested rights,

is very generally regarded in this country as founded on unconsti-

tutional principles, and consequently inoperative and void,” yet

that “ this doctrine is not understood to apply to remedial statutes,

which may be of a retrospective nature, provided they do not

impair contracts, or disturb absolute vested rights, and only go to

conﬁrm rights already existing, and in furtherance of the remedy

by curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing

obligations. ' Such statutes have been held valid when clearly just

and reasonable, and conducive to the general welfare, even though

they might operate in a degree upon vested rights.”2

And it is because a mere expectation of property in the future

is not considered a vested right, that the rules of descent are held

subject to change in their application to all estates not already
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passed to the heir by the death of the owner. No one is heir to the

living; and the heir presumptive has no other reason to rely upon

succeeding to the property than the promise held out by the

[* 360] statute of descents. But this promise is no *more than

a declaration of the legislature as to its present view of

public policy as regards the proper order of succession; a view

which may at any time change, and then the promise may properly

be withdrawn, and a new course of descent be declared. The

expectation is not property; it cannot be sold or mortgaged; it is

not subject to debts; and it is not in any manner taken notice of by

the law until the moment of the‘ ancest0r’s death, when the statute

of deseents comes in, and for reasons of general public policy

transfers the estate to persons occupying particular relations to the

deceased in preference to all others. It is not until that moment

that there is any vested right in the person who becomes heir, to

' Merrill v. Sberbume, 1 N. H. 213.

’ 1 Kent, Com. 455.
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opposed to undamental axioms of legislation, " unless they impair rights which are vested; because most civil rights are
derived from public laws ; and if, before the rights become vested
in particular individuals, the convenience of the State procures
amendments or repeals of those laws, those individuals have no
cause of complaint. The power that authorizes or proposes to give
may always revoke before an interest is perfected in the donee." 1
And Chancellor Kent, in speaking of retrospective statutes, says
that while such a statute, " affecting and changing vested rights,
is very generally regarded in this country as founded on unconstitutional principles, and consequently inoperative and void," yet
that "this doctrine is not understood to apply to remedial statutes,
which may be of a retrospective nature, provided they do not
impair contracts, or disturb absolute vested rights, and only go to
confirm rights already existing, and in furtherance of the remedy
by curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing
obligations. · Such statutes have been held valid when clearly just
and reasonable, and conducive to the general welfare, even though
they might operate in a degree upon vested rights." 2
And it is because a mere expectation of property in the future
is not considered a vested right, that the rules of descent are held
subject to change in tbeir application to all estates not already
passed to the heir by the death of the owner. No one is heir to the
living; and the heir presumptive has no other reason to rely upon
succeeding to the property than the promise held out by the
[• 360] statute of descents. But this promise is no • more than
a declaration of the legislature as to its present view of
public policy as regards the proper order of succession ; a view
which may at any time change, and then the promise may properly
be withdrawn, and a new course of descent be declared. The
expectation is not property; it cannot be sold or mortgaged; it is
not subject to debts ; and it is not in any manner taken notice of by
the law until the moment of the· ancestor's death, when the statute
of descents comes in, and for reasons of general public policy
transfers the estate to persons occupying particular relations to the
deceased in preference to all others. It is not until that moment
that there is any vested right in the person who becomes heir, to
:Merrill v. Sherburne, 1 N. H. 213.
s 1 Kent, Com. 455.

1
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be protected by the Constitution. An anticipated interest in prop-
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erty cannot be said to be vested in any person so long as the owner

of the interest in possession has full power, by virtue of his own-

ership, to cut oil‘ the expectant right by grant or devise}

If this be so, the nature of estates must, to a certain extent, be

subject to legislative control and modiﬁcation.’ In this country

estates tail have been very generally changed into estates in fee-

simple, by statutes the validity of which is not disputed? Such

statutes operate to increase and render more valuable the interest

which the tenant in tail possesses, and are not therefore open to

objection by him.‘ But no other person in these cases has any

vested right, either in possession or expectancy, to be affected by

such change; and the expectation of the heir presumptive must be

subject to the same control as in other cases.“

The cases of rights in property to result from the marriage

relation must be referred to the same principle. At the common

law the husband immediately on the marriage succeeded to certain

rights in the real and personal estate which the wife then pos-

sessed. These rights became vested rights at once, and any sub-

sequent alteration in the law could not take them away.“

But other interests ‘* were merely in expectancy. He [* 361]

could have a right as tenant by the curtesy initiate in the
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wife’s estates of inheritance the moment a child was born of the

marriage, who might by possibility become heir to such estates.

This right would be property, subject to conveyance and to be

taken for debts; and must therefore be regarded as a vested right,

' In re Lawrence, 1 Redﬁeld, Sur. Rep. 310.

' Smith on Stat. and Const. Construction, 412.

3 De Mill v. Lockwood, 8 Blatch. 56.

‘ On the same ground it has been held in Massachusetts that statutes convert-

ing existing estates in joint tenancy into estates in common were unobjectionable.

They did not impair vested rights, but rendered the tenure more beneﬁcial.

Holbrook v. Finney, 4 Mass. 567 ; Miller v._ Miller, 16 Mass. 59 ; Anable v. Patch,

3 Pick. 363; Burghardt v. Turner, 12 Pick. 534. Moreover, such statutes do

no more than either tenant at the common law has a right to do, by conveying

his interest to a stranger. See Bombaugh v. Bombaugh, 11 S. & R. 192; Wildes

v. Vanvoorhis, 16 Gray, 147.

‘ See 1 \Vashb. Real Pr. 81-S4 and notes. The exception to this statement,

be protected by the Constitution. An anticipated interest in property cannot be said to be vested in any person so long as the owner
of the interest in possession has full power, by virtue of his ownership, to cut off the expectant right by grant or devise. 1
If this be so, the nature of estates must, to a certain extent, be
subject to legislative control and modification. 2 In this country
estates tail have been very generally changed into estates in feesimple, by statutes the validity of which is not disputed.3 Such
statutes operate to increase and render more valuable the interest
which the tenant in tail possesses, and are not therefore open to
objection by him.4 But no other person in these cases has any
vested right, either in possession or expectancy, to be affected by
such change ; and the expectation of the heir presumptive must be
subject to the same control as in other cases.6
The cases of rights in property to result from the marriage
· relation must be referred to the same principle. At the common
law the husband immediately on the marriage succeeded to certain
rights in the real and personal estate which the wife then possessed. These rights became vested rights at once, and any subsequent alteration in the law could not take them away.6
But other interests • were merely in expectancy. He [• 361]
could have a right as tenant by the curtesy initiate in the
wife's estates of inheritance the moment a child was born of the
marriage, who might by possibility become heir to such estates.
This right would be property, subject to conveyance and to be
taken for debts ; and must therefore be regarded as a vested right,

if any, must be the case of tenant in tail after possibility of issue extinct; where

the estate of the tenant has ceased to be an inheritance, and a reversionary right

has become vested.

' Westervelt v. Gregg, 12 N. Y. 208.
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In re Lawrence, 1 Redfield, Sur. Rep. 810.
Smith on Stat. and Const. Construction, 412.
a De Mill v. Lockwood, S Blatch. 56.
• On the same ground it has been held in Massachusetts that statutes converting existing estates in joint tenancy into estates in common were unobjectionable.
They did not impair vested rights, but rendered the tenure more beneficial.
Holbrook v. Finney, 4 Mass. 567; Miller v~Miller, 16 Mass. 59; Anable v. Patch,
3 Pick. 363; Burghardt v. Turner, 12 Pick. 534:. Moreover, such statutes do
no more than either tenant at the common law has a right to do, by conveying
his interest to a stranger. See Bombaugh v. Bombaugh, 11 S. & R. 192; Wildes
1:1. Vanvoorhis, 16 Gray, 147.
6 See 1 Wuhb. Real Pr. 81-84 and notes. The exception to this statement,
if any, must be the case of tenant in tail after possibility of issue extinct; where
the estate of the tenant has ceased to be an inheritance, and a reversionary right
has become vested.
• Westervelt v. Gregg, 12 N.Y. 208.
1

1
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no more subject to legislative interference than other expectant
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interests which have ceased to be mere contingencies and become

ﬁxed. But while this ‘interest remains in expectancy merely,-

that is to say, until it becomes initiate,- the legislature must have

full right to modify or even to abolish it.1 And the same rule will

apply to the case of dower; though the difference in the requisites

of the two estates are such that the inchoate right to dower does

not become property, or any thing more than a mere expectancy, at

any time before it is consummated by the husband’s death? In

neither of these cases does the marriage alone give a vested right.

It gives only a capacity to acquire a right. The same remark

may be made regarding the husband’s expectant interest in the

after-acquired personalty of the wife: it is subject to any changes

in the law made before his right becomes vested by the acquisi-

tion.“

Change iof Remedies.

' Again: the rig/it to a particular remedy is not a vested right. This

is the general rule ; and the exceptions are of those peculiar cases

in which the remedy is part of the right itself.‘ As a general rule

every State has complete control over the remedies which it offers

to suitors in its courts.5 It may abolish one class of courts and

create another. It may give anew and additional remedy for a

no more subject to legislative interference than other expectant
interests which have ceased to be mere contingencies and become
fixed. But while this 'interest remains in expectancy merely,that is to say, until it becomes initiate,- the legislature must have
full right to modify or even to abolish it.1 And the same rule will
apply to the case of dower; though the difference in the requisites
of the two estates are such that the inchoate right to dower does
not become property, or any thing more than mere expectancy' at
any time before it is consummated by the husband's death. 2 In
neither of these cases does the marriage alone give a vested right.
It gives only a capacity to acquire a right. The same remark
may be made regarding the husband's expectant interest in . the
after-acquired personalty of the wife: it is subject to any changes
in the law made before his right becomes vested by the acquisition.8

a
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‘ Hathorn v. Lyon, 2 Mich. 93; Tong v. Marvin, 15 Mich. 60. And see the

cases cited in the next note.

’ Barbour v. Barbour, 46 Me. 9; Lucas v. Sawyer, 17 Iowa, 517; Noel v.

Change ·of Remedies.

Ewing, 9 Ind. 57; Moore v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 4 Sandf. 456, and

8 N. Y. 110; Pratt v. Tefft, 14 Mich. 191; Reeve, Dom. Rel. 103, note. A

doubt as to this doctrine is intimated in Dunn v. Sargeant, 101 Mass. 340.

" VVestervelt v. Gregg, 12 N. Y. 208; Norris v. Beyea, 13 N. Y. 273; Kelly

v. McCarthy, 3 Bradf. 7. And see Plumb v. Sawyer, 21 Conn. 351; Clark v.

McCreary, 12 S. & M. 347; Jackson v. Lyon, 9 Cow. 664; ante, 287-292. If,

however, the wife has a right to personal property subject to a contingency,

the husband’s contingent interest therein cannot be taken away by subsequent

legislation. Dunn v. Sargeant, 101 Mass. 336.

‘ See ante, p. 290, and cases cited.

‘ Rosier v. Hale, 10 Iowa, 470; Smith v. Bryan, 34 Ill. 377; Lord v. Chad-

r
Again: the rigltt to a particular remedy is not a vested right. This
is the general rule ; and the exceptions are of those peculiar cases
in which the remedy is part of the right itself.4 .As a general rule
every State has complete control over the remedies which it offers
to suitors in its courts.6 It may abolish one class of courts and
create another. It may give a new and additional remedy for a.

bourne, 42 Me. -129; Rockwell v. lIuhbell‘s Adm’rs, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 197;

Cusic v. Douglas, B Kansas, 123; Holloway v. Sherman, 12 Iowa, 282; McCor-

mick v. Rusch, 15 Iowa, 127.
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Hathorn "· Lyon, 2 Mich. 93; Tong "· Marvin, 15 Mich. 60. And see the
cases cited in the next note.
1 Barbour v. Barbour, 46 Me. 9; Lucas v. Sawyer, 17 Iowa, 617; Noel "·
Ewing, 9 Ind. 57; Moore "· Mayor, &c., of New York, 4 Sandf. 456, and _
8 N.Y. 110; Pratt "· Teftt, 14 Mich. 191; Reeve, Dom. Rei. 103, note. A
doubt as to this doctrine is intimated in Dunn "· Sargeant, 101 Mass. 340.
~ Westervelt v. Gregg, 12 N.Y. 208; Norris"· Beyea, 13 N.Y. 278; Kelly
"·McCarthy, 3 Bradf. 7. And see Plumb "· Sawyer, 21 Conn. 351; Clark "·
McCreary, 12 S. & M. 847; Jackson "·Lyon, 9 Cow. 664; ante, 21:17-292. If,
however, the wife bas a right to personal property subject to a contingency,
the husband's contingent interest therein cannot be taken away by subsequent
legislation. Dunn "· Sargeant, 101 Mass. 836.
' See ante, p. 290, and cases ciwd.
6 Rosier "· Hale, 10 Iowa, 470; Smith v. Bryan, 84 Ill. 377 ; Lord v. Chadbourne, 42 Me. 429; Rockwell "· Hubbell's Adm'nt, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 197;
Cusic "· Douglas, 3 Kansas, 123 ; Holloway v. Sherman, 12 Iowa, 282 ; McCormick "· Rusch, 15 Iowa, 127.
1
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right already in existence.‘ And it may abolish old reme-

CH. XI.] PROTECTION TO PROPERTY BY u THE LAW OF THE LAND."

*361

dies and ‘substitute new. If a statute providing aremedy [* 362]

is repealed while proceedings are pending, such proceed-

ings will be thereby determined, unless the legislature shall other-

wise provide;2 and if it be amended instead of repealed, the

judgment pronounced in such proceedings must be according to

the law as it then stands.” And any rule or regulation in regard

to the remedy which does not, under pretence of modifying or

regulating it, take away or impair the right itself, cannot be

regarded as beyond the proper province of legislation.‘

But a. vested right of action is property in the same sense in

which tangible things are property, and is equally protected against

arbitrary interference. Where it springs from contract, or from

the principles of the common law, it is not competent for the legis-

lature to take it away.‘ Nor can a party by his misconduct so

‘ Hope v. Jackson, 2 Yerg. 125; Foster v. Essex Bank, 16 Mass. 245; Pas-

chall v. lVhitsett, 11 Ala. 472; Commonwealth v. Commissioners, &c., 6 Pick.

508; \Vhipple v. Farrar, 3 Mich. 436; United States v. Samperyac, 1 Hemp.

118; Sutherland v. De Leon, 1 Texas, 250; Anonymous, 2 Stew. 228. See

also Lewis v. McElvain, 16 Ohio, 347; Trustees, &c., v. McCaughey, 2 Ohio,

N. s. 152; Hepburn v. Curts, 7 \Vatts, 300; Schenley v. Commonwealth,

36 Penn. St. 29; Bacon v. Callender, 6 Mass. 303; Brackett v. Norcross,

right already in existence. 1 And it may abolish old remedies and *substitute new. If a statute providing a remedy [* 362]
is repealed while proceedings are pending, such proceedings will be thereby determined, unless the legislature shall otherwise provide ; 2 and if it be amended instead of repealed, the
judgment pronounced in such proceedings must be according to
the law as it then stands.3 And any rule or regulation in regat·d
to the remedy which does not, under pretence of modifying or
regulating it, take away or impair the right itself, cannot be
regarded as beyond the proper province of legislation.4
But a vested right of action is property in the same sense in
which tangible things are property, and is equally protected against
arbitrary interference. Where it springs from contract, or from
the principles of the common law, it is not competent for the legislature to take it away.6 Nor can a party by his misconduct so

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:21 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105011581
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

1 Greenl. 92; Ralston v. Lothain, 18 Ind. 303; White School House v. Post,

31 Conn. 2-ll.

’ Bank of Hamilton v. Dudley, 2 Pet. 492; Ludlow v. Jackson, 3 Ohio, -553;

Eaton v. United States, -5 Cranch, 281; Schooner Rachel v. United States,

6 Cranch, 329.

' See cases cited in the last note. Also Commonwealth v. Duane, 1 Binney,

601,; United States v. Passmore, 4 Dall. 372; Commonwealth v. Marshall, 11

Pick. 350; Commonwealth v. Kimball, 21 Pick. 373; Hartung v. People, 21

N. Y. 99; State v. Daley, 29 Conn. 272; Rathbun v. Wheeler, 29 Ind. 601;

State v. Norwood, 12 Md. 195; Bristol v. Supervisors, &e., 20 Mich. 95; Sum-

ner v. Miller, 64 N. C. 688.

‘ See ante, pp. 287-292.

° Dash v. Van Kleek, 7 Johns. 477; Streubel v. Milwaukee and M. R.R. Co.

_12 \Vis. 67; Clark v. Clark, 10 N. H. 386; Westervelt v. Gregg, 12 N. Y. 211;

Thornton v. Turner, 11 Minn. 339; lVard v. Brainerd, 1 Aik. 121; Keith v.

\Vare, 2 Vt. 17-/1; Lyman v. Mower, ib. 517; Kendall v. Dodge, 3 Vt. 360;

State v. Auditor, &c., 33 Mo. 287; Griﬁin v. Wilcox, 21 Ind. 370; Norris 1:.

Doniphan, 4 Met. (Kym) 385; Terrill v. Rankin, 3 Bush, 453. An equitable

title to lands, of which the legal title is in the State, is under the same constitu-

tional protection that the legal title would be. lVright v. Hawkins, 28 Texas,

4:32. Where an individual is allowed to recover s. sum as a penalty, the right

may be taken away at any time before judgment. Oriental Bank v. Freeze,

[395]

1 Hope v. Jackson, 2 Yerg. 125; Foster v. Essex Bank, 16 Mass. 245; Paschall t:'. \Vhitsett, 11 Ala. 472 ; Commonwealth "· Commissioners, &c., 6 Pick.
508; Whipple v. Farrar, 3 Mich. 436; United States v. Samperyac, 1 Hemp.
118; Sutherland v. De Leon, 1 Texas, 250; Anonymous, 2 Stew. 228. See
also Lewis v. McElvain, 16 Ohio, 347; Trustees, &c., v. l\IcCaugbey, 2 Ohio,
N. s. 15~; Hepburn "· Curts, 7 Watts, 300; Schenley "· Commonwealth,
36 Penn. St. 29; Bacon v. Callendllr, 6 1\lass. 308; Brackett v. Norcross,
1 Greenl. 92; Ralston v. Lothain, 18 Ind. 303; White School House v. Post,
31 Conn. 2-H.
1 Bank of Hamilton v. Dudley, 2 Pet. 492; Ludlow v. Jackson, 3 Ohio, 553;
Eaton v. United States, 5 Cranch, 281; Schooner Rachel v. United States,
6 Cranch, 32:.1.
3 See eases cited in the last note.
Also Commonwealth "· Duane, 1 Binney,
601.; United States v. Passmore, 4 Dall. 872; Commonwealth v. Mar~hall, 11
Pick. 350; Commonwealth "· Kimball, 21 Pick. 373; Hartung v. People, 21
N.Y. 99; State v. Daley, 29 Conn. 272; Rathbun v. Wheeler, 29 Ind. 601;
State v. Norwood, 12 1\Jd. 195; Bristol"· Supervisors, &c., 20 Mich. 95; Sumner"· :Miller, 64 N. C. 688.
4 See ante, pp. 287-292.
• Dub"· Van Kleek, 7 Johns. 477; Streubel v. Milwaukee and M. R.R. Co.
12 Wis. 67 ; Clark v. Clark, 10 N. H. 386; W esterYelt v. Gregg, 12 N. Y. 211 ;
·Thornton "·Turner, 11 Minn. 339; 'Vard v. Brainerd, 1 Aik. 121; Keith v.
Ware, 2 Vt. 17,1; Lyman v. Mower, ib. 517; Kendall v. Dodge, 3 Vt. 360;
State "· Au•litor, &c., 33 .Mo. 287; Griffin v. Wileox, 21 Ind. 3i0; Norris v.
Doniphan, 4 l\Iet. (Ky.) 385; Terrill v. Rankin, 3 Bush, 453. An equitable
title to lands, of which the legal title is in thll State, is under the same constitutional protection that the legal title would be. Wright v. Hawkins, 28 Texas,
452. 'Vherc an individual is allowed to recover a sum as a penalty, the right
~~>)' be taken away at any tin•e before judgment. Oriental Bank v. Freeze,
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forfeit a right that it may be taken from him without judicial
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proceedings in which the forfeiture shall be declared in due form.

Forfeitures of rights and property cannot be adjudged by legislative

act, and conﬁscations without a judicial hearing after due notice

would be void as not being due process of law.‘ Even Congress,

it has been held, has no power to protect parties assuming to act

under the authority of the general government, during the exist-

ence of a civil war, by depriving persons illegally arrested

[* 363] by them of all redress in the courts.” ' And if the legis-

6 Shep. 109; Engle v. Shurtz, 1 Mich. 150; Conﬁscation Cases, 7 W'al. 454;

Washbum v. Franklin, 35 Barb. 599; VVelch v. Wadsworth, 30 Conn. 149;

O‘Kelly v. Athens Manuf. Co. 36 Geo. 51; post, 383. See also Curtis 0. Leavitt,

17 Barb. 309, and 15 N. Y. 9; post, 375-376. -

‘ Griﬁin v. Mixon, 38 Miss. 434. See next note. Also Rison v. Farr, 24

forfeit a right that it may be taken from him without judicial
proceedings in which the forfeiture shall be declared in due form.
Forfeitures of rights pnd property cannot be adjudged by legislative
act, and confis·cations without a judicial hearing after due notice
would be void as not being due process of law. 1 Even Congress,
it has been held, has no power to protect parties assuming to act
under t.he authority of the general government, during the existence of a civil war, by depriving persons illegally arrested
[• 363] by them of all redress in the courts.2 • And if the legis-

Ark. 161; Hodgson v. Millward, 3 Grant’s Cas. 406. But no constitutional

principle is violated by a statute which allows judgment to be entered up against

a defendant who has been served with process, unless within a certain number of

days he ﬁles an aﬂidavit of merits. Hunt v. Lucas, 97 Mass. 404.

' Griﬁin v. Wilcox, 21 Ind. 370. In this ease the act of Congress of March

3, 1863, which provided “ that any order of the president or under his authority,

made at any time during the existence of the present rebellion, shall be a defence

in all courts, to any action or prosecution, civil or criminal, pending or to be
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commenced, for any search, seizure, arrest, or imprisonment, made, done, or

committed, or acts omitted to be done, under and by virtue of such order, or

under color ofany law ofCongress,” was held to be unconstitutional. The same

decision was made in Johnson v. Jones, 44 Ill. 142. It was said in the ﬁrst of

these cases that “ this act was passed to deprive the citizens of all redress for

illegal arrests and imprisonments; it was not needed as a» protection for making

such as are legal, because the common law gives ample protection for making

legal arrests and imprisonments." And it may be added that those acts which

are justified by military or martial law are equally legal with those justiﬁed by

the common law. So in Hubbard v. Brainerd, 35 Conn. 563, it was decided that

Congress could not take away a vested right to sue for and recover back an

illegal tax which had been paid under protest to s collector of the national

revenue. See also Bryan v. Walker, 64 N. C. 146. The case of Norris v. Doni-

phan, 4 Met. (Ky.) 385, may properly be cited in this connection. It was there

held that the act of Congress of July 17, 1862, “ to suppress insurrection, to

punish treason and rebellion, to seize and conﬁscate the property of rebels, and

for other purposes,” in so far as it undertook to authorize the conﬁscation of the

property of citizens as a punishment for treason and other crimes, by proceedings

in rem in any district in which the property might be, withoiit presentment and

indictment by a grand jury, without arrest or summons of the owner, and upon

such evidence of his guilt only as would be proof of any fact in admiralty or

revenue eases, was unconstitutional and void, and therefore that Congress had

no power to prohibit the State courts from giving the owners of property seized
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6 Shep. 109; Engle v. Shurtz, 1 Mich. 150; Confiscation Cases, 7 Wal. 45!;
Washburn v. Franklin, 35 Barb. 599; Wdch v. Wadsworth, 30 Conn. 149;
O'Kelly v. Athens 1\lanuf. Co. 36 Geo. 51; post, 383. See also Curtis v. Leavitt,
17 Barb. 309, and 15 N. Y. 9; post, 375-376.
1 Griffin v. Mixon, 38 Miss. 43-l.
See next note. Also Rison ,, Farr, 24
Ark. 161 ; Hodgson ,, Millward, 3 Grant's Cas. 406. But no constitutional
principle is violated by a statute which allows judgment to be entered up against
a defendant who has been served with process, unlet~s within a certain number of
days he files an afiidavit of merits. Hunt v. Lucas, 97 Mass. 404.
1 Griffin o. Wilcox, 21 Ind. 370.
In thi:t case the act of Congress of March
8, 1863, which pro\'ided "that any order of the president or under his authority,
made at any time during the existence of the present rebellion, shall be a defence
in all courts, to any action or prosecution, civil or criminal, pending or to be
commenced, for any search, seizure, arrest, or imprisonment, made, done, or
committed, or acts omitted to be done, under and by virtue of such order, or
under color ofany law ofCongress," was held to bo unconstitutional. The same
decision was made in Johnson v. Jones, 44 Ill. 142. It was said in the first of
tbt•se ca~cs that " this act was passed to deprive the citizens of all redrt!ss for
illegal arrests and imprisonments ; it was not needed as a protection for making
such as are legal, because the common law gives ample protection for making
legal arrests and imprisonments." And it may be added that those acts which
are justified by military or martial law are equally legal with those justified by
the common law. So in Hubbard v. Brainerd, 85 Conn. 563, it was decided that
Congress could not take away a vested right to sue for and recover back an
illegal tax which had been paid under protest to a collector of the national
revenue. See.also Bryan ,. Walker, 64 N. C. 146. The case of Norris v. Doniphan, 4 Met. (Ky.) 385, may properly be cited in this connection. It was there
held that the act of Congress of July 17, 1862, " to suppress insurrection, to
punish treason and rebellion, to seize and confiscate the property of rebels, and
for other purposes," in so far as it undertook to authorize the confiscation of the
property of citizens as a punishment for treason and other cri~cs, by proceedings
in rem in any district in which the property might be, without presentment and
indictment by a grand jury, without arrest or summons of the owner, and upon
such evidence of his guilt only as would be proof of any fact in admiralty or
revenue cases, was unconstitutional and void, and therefore that Congress had
no power to prohibit the State courts from giving the owners of property seized
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lature cannot conﬁscate property or rights, neither can it author-

ize individuals to assume at their option powers of police,

which they may exercise in the condemnation and sale of property

offending against their regulations, or for the satisfaction of their

charges and expenses in its management and control, rendered

or incurred without the consent of its owners.‘ And a statute

the relief they would be entitled to under the State laws. A statute which makes

a constitutional right to vote depend upon an impossible condition is void.

Davies v. McKeeby, 5 Nev. 369. See further, State v. Staten, 6 Cold. 243;

lature cannot confiscate property or rights, neither can it authorize individuals to assume at their option powers of police,
which they may exercise in the condemnation and sale of property
offending against their regulations, or for the satisfaction of their
charges and expenses in its management and control, rendered
or incurred without the consent of its owners. 1 And a statute

Rison v. Farr, 24 Ark. 161; Hodgson v. Millward, 3 Grant, 406. ~

‘ The log-driving and booming corporations, which were authorized to be

formed under a general law in Michigan, were empowered, whenever logs or lum-

ber were put into navigable streams without adequate force and means provided

for preventing obstructions, to take charge of the same, and cause it to be run,

driven, boomed, &c., at the owner‘s expense, and it gave them a lien on the same

to satisfy all just and reasonable charges, with power to sell the property for

those charges and for the expenses of sale, on notice, either served personally on

the owner, or posted as therein provided. In Ames v. Port Huron Log-Driving

and Booming Co. 11 Mich. 147, it was held that the power which this law as-

sumed to confer was in the nature ofa public ofﬁce; and Campbell, J., says:
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“It is ditlicult to perceive by what process a public oflice can be obtained or

exercised without either election or appointment. The powers of government are

parcelled out by the Constitution, which certainly contemplates some otﬁcial re-

sponsibility. Every oﬂicer not expressly exempted is required to take an oath of

oﬂice as a preliminary to discharging his duties.. It is absurd to suppose that

any otlicial power can exist in any person by his own assumption, or by the

employment of some other private person; and still more so to recognize in such

an assumption a power of depriving individuals of their property. And it is

plain that the exercise of such a power is an act in its nature public, and not

private. The case, however, involves more than the assumption of control. The

corporation, or rather its various agents, must of necessity determine when the

case arises justifying interference; and having assumed possession, it assesses its

own charges; and having assessed them, proceeds to sell the property seized to

pay them, with the added expense of such sale. These proceedings are all ea:

parte, and are all proceedings in invitum. Their validity must therefore be

determined by the rules applicable to such cases. Except in those cases where

proceedings to collect the public revenue may stand upon a peculiar footing of

their own, it is an inﬂexible principle of constitutional right that no person can

legally be devested of his property without remuneration, or against his will,

unless he is allowed a hearing before an impartial tribunal, where he may contest

the claim set up against him, and be allowed to meet it on the law and the facts.

When his property is wanted in specie, for public purposes, there are methods

assured to him whereby its value can be ascertained. Where a debt or penalty

or forfeiture may be set up against him, the determination of his liability becomes

a judicial question; and all judicial functions are required by the Constitution to
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the relief they would be entitled to under the State laws. A statute which makes
a constitutional right to vote depend upon an impost~ible condition is void.
Davies v. McKeeby, 5 Nev. 369. See further, State v. Staten, 6 Cold. 243;
Rison "· Farr, 24 Ark. 161; Hodgson v. Millward, 3 Grant, 406. ·
1 The log-driving and booming corporations, which were authorized to be
formed under a general law in :\licbigan, were empowered, whenever logs or lumber were put into navigable streams without adequate force and means provided
for preventing obstructions, to take charge of the same, and cause it to be run,
driven, boomed, &c., at the owner's expense, and it gave them a lien on the same
to satisfy all just and reasonable charges, with power to sell the property for
those charges and for the expenses pf sale, on notice, either served personally on
the owner, or posted as therein provided. In Ames"· Port Huron Log-Driving
and Booming Co. l l Mich. 147, it was held that the power which this law assumed to confer was in the nature of a public office; and Campbell, J., says:
"It is difficult to perceive by what process a public office can be obtained or
exercised 'vithout either election or appointment. The powers of government are
parcelled out by the Constitution, which certainly contemplates some official responsibility. Every officer not expressly exempted is required to take an oath of
office as a preliminary to discharging his duties., It is absurd to suppose that
any official power can exist in any person by his own assumption, or by the
employment of some other private person; and still more so to recognize in such
an assumption a power of depriving individuals of their property. And it is
plain that the exerci~e of such a power is an act in its nature public, and not
private. The case, howm·er, involves more than the assumption of control. The
corporation, or rather its various agents, must of necessity determine when the
case arises ju~tifying interference; and having assumed possession, it assesses its
own charges; and having assessed them, proceeds to sell the property seized to
pay them, with the added expense of such sale. These proceedings are all ez
parte, and are all proceedings in invitum. Their validity must therefore be
dewrmined by the rules applicable to such cases. Except in those ca~es where
proceedings to collect the public revenue may stand upon a peculiar footing of
their own, it is an inflexible principle of constitutional right that no person can
legally be devested of his property without remuueration, or against his will,
unless he is allowed a hearing before an impartial tribunal, where he may contest
the daim set up against him, and be allowed to meet it on the law and the facts.
"When his property is wanted in specie, for public purposes, there are methods
assured to him whereby its value C'an be ascertained. Where a debt or penalty
or forfeiture may be set up against him, the determination of his liability becomes
a judicial question; and all judicial functions are required by the Constitution to
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without process or warrant, and to sell it without notiﬁ-

cation to the owner, for the punishment of a private trespass, and

to enforce a penalty against the owner, can ﬁnd no justiﬁcation in

the Constitution.‘

Limitation Laws.

Notwithstanding the protection which the law gives to vested

rights, it is possible for a. party to debar himself of the right to

assert the same in the courts, by his own negligence or

[• 364] • which authorizes a party to seize the property of another,
without process or warrant, .and to sell it without notification to the owner, for tho punishment of a private trespass, and
to enforce a penalty against the owner, can find no justification in
the Constitution.1

[* 365] laohes. * If one who is dispossessed “ be negligent for a

long and unreasonable time, the law refuses afterwards to

Limitation Laws.

lend him any assistance to recover the possession merely, both to

punish his neglect (mam Zeges vigilantibus, non dorm-ientibus sub-

be exercised by courts of justice, or judicial oﬂicers regularly chosen. He can

only be reached through the forms of law upon a regular hearing, unless he has

by contract referred the matter to another mode of determination."

‘ A statute of New York authorized any person to take into his custody and

possession any animal which might be trespassing upon his lands, and give notice

of the seizure to a justice or commissioner of highways of the town, who should

proceed to sell the animal after posting notice. From the proceeds of the sale,

the oﬁieer was to retain his fees, pay the person taking up the animal ﬁfty cents,

and also compensation for keeping it, and the balance to the owner, if he should

Notwithstanding the protection which the law gives to vested
rights, it is possible for o. party to debar himself of the right to
assert the same in the courts, by his own negligence or
[• 365] lacl1es. • If one who is dispossessed " be negligent for a
long and unreasonable time, the law refuses afterwards to
lend him any assistance to recover the possession merely, both to
punish his neglect ( nam leges vigilantibus, non dormientibus sub-
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claim it within a year. In Rockwell v. Nearing, 35 N. Y. 307, 308, Porter, J .,

says of this statute: “ The legislature has no authority either to deprive the citi-

zen of his property for other than public purposes, or to authorize its seizure

without process or warrant, by persons other than the owner, for the mere pun-

ishment of a private trespass. So far as the act in question relates to animals

trespassing on the premises of the captor, the proceedings it authorizes have not

even the mocking semblance of due process of law. The seizure may be pri-

vately made; the party making it is permitted to conceal the property on his own

premises; he is protected, though the trespass was due to his own connivance or

neglect; he is permitted to take what does not belong to him without notice to

the owner, though that owner is near and known; he is allowed to sell, through

the intervention of an ollicer, and without even the form of judicial proceedings,

an animal in which he has no interest by way either of title, mortgage, pledge, or

lien; and all to the end that he may receive compensation for detaining it with-

out the consent of the owner, and a fee of ﬁfty cents for his services as an

informer. He levies without process, condemns without proof‘, and sells without

execution." And he distinguishes these proceedings from those in distraining

cattle damagefeas-ant, which are always remedial, and under which the party was

authorized to detain the propertyin pledge for the payment of his damages. See

also opinion by Morgan, J ., in same case, pp. 314-317, and the opinions of the

several judges in Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 395, 419, 434, and 468.

[ass]

be exercised by courts of justice, or judicial officers regularly chosen. He can
only be reached through the forms of law upon a regular hearing, unless he has
by contract referred the matter to another mode of determination."
1 A statute of New York authorized any person to take into his custody and
possession any animal which might be trespassing upon his lands, and give notice
of the seizure to a justice or commissioner of highways of the town, who should
proceed to sell the animal after posting notice. From the proceeds of the sale,
the officer was to retain his fees, pay the person taking up the animal fifty cents,
and also compensation for keeping it, and the balance to the owner, if be should
claim it within a year. In Rockwell"· Nearing, 85 N. Y. 307, 308, Porter, J.,
says of this statute : " The legislature bas no authority either to deprive the citizen of his property for other than public purposes, or to authorize its seizure
without process or warrant, by persons other than the owner, for the mere punishment of a private trespass. So far as the act in question relates to animals
trespassing on the premises of the captor, the proceedings it authorizes have not
even the mocking semblance of due process of law. 'fhe seizure may be privately made ; the party making it is permitted to conceal the property on his own
premises ; he is protected, though the trespass was due to his own connivance or
neglect; he is permitted to take what does not belong to him without notice to
the owner, though that owner is near and known; be is allowed to sell, through
the intervention of an officer, and without even the form of judicial proceedings,
an animal in which he has no interest by way either of title, mortgage, pledge, or
lien; and all to the en1l that he may receive compensation for detaining it without the consent of the owner, and a fee of fifty cents for his services as an
informer. He levies without process, condemns without proof. and sells without
execution." And he distinguishes tht>se proceedings from those in distraining
cattle damage feasant, which are alwap remedial, and under which the party was
authorized to detain t.he property in pledge for the payment of his damages. See
also opinion by llforgan, J., in same case, pp. 314-317, and the opinions of the
several judges in Wynehamer "· People, 13 N. Y. 395, 419, 434, and 468.
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veniunt), and also because it is presumed that the supposed

wrong-doer has in such a length of. time procured a legal title,

otherwise he would sooner have been sued.” 1 Statutes of limita-

tion are passed which ﬁx upon a reasonable time within which a

party is permitted to bring suit for the recovery of his rights, and

which, on failure to do so, establish a legal presumption against

him that he has no rights in the premises. Such a statute is a

statute of repose.” Every government is under obligation to its

citizens to afford them all needful legal remedies;3 but it is not

bound to keep its courts open indeﬁnitely for one who neglects or

refuses to apply for redress until it may fairly be presumed that

the means by which the other party might disprove his claim are

lost in the lapse of time.‘

When the period prescribed by statute has once run, so as to cut

off the remedy which one might have had for the recovery of

property in the possession of another, the title to the property,

irrespective of the original right, is regarded in the law as vested

in the possessor, who is entitled to the same protection in respect

to it which the owner is entitled to in other cases. A subsequent

repeal of the limitation law could not be given a retroactive effect,

so as to disturb this title.“ It is vested as completely and per-
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fectly, and is as safe from legislative interference as it would have

' 3 Bl. Com. 188; Broom, Legal Maxims, 857.

' Such a statute was formerly construed with strictness, and the defence under

it was looked upon as unconscionable, and not favored; but Mr. Justice Story has

well said, it has often been matter of regret in modern times that the decisions

had not proceeded upon principles better adapted to carry into effect the real

objects of the statute; that instead of being viewed in an unfavorable light as an

unjust and discreditable defence, it had not received such support as would have

made it what it was intended to be, emphatically a statute of repose. It is a

wise and beneﬁcial law, not designed merely to raise a presumption of payment

veniunt ), and also because it is presumed that the supposed
has in such a length of. time procured a legal title,
otherwise he would sooner have been sued." 1 Statutes of limitation are passed which fix upon a reasonable time within which a
party is permitted to bring suit for the recovery of his rights, and
which, on failure to do so, establish a legal presumption against
him that he has no rights in tho premises. Such a statute is a
statute of reposc. 2 Every government is under obligation to its
citizens to afford them all needful legal remedies ; 8 but it is not
bound to keep its courts open indefinitely for one who neglects or
refuses to apply for redress until it may fairly be presumed that
the means by which the other party might disprove his claim are
lost in the lapse of time.4
When the period prescribed by statute has once run, so as to cut
off the remedy which one might h,!lve had for the recovery of
property in the possession of another, the title to the property,
irrespective of the original right, is regarded in the law as vested
in the possessor, who is entitled to the same protection in respect
to it which the owner is entitled to in other cases. A subsequent
repeal of the limitation law could not be given a retroactive effect,
so as to disturb this title. 6 It is vested as completely and perfectly, and is as safe from legislative interference as it would have
wr~mg-doer

of a just debt from lapse of time, but to afford security against State demands

after the true state of the transaction may have been forgotten, or be incapable

of explanation by reason of the death or removal of witnesses. Bell v. Mor-

rison, 1 Pet. 360. See Leﬂingwell v. \Varren, 2 Black, 599.

' Call v. Hagger, 8 Mass. 430.

‘ Baal v. Nason, 2 Shep. 344; Bell v. Morrison, 1 Pet. 360; Stearns v. Git-

tings, 23 Ill. 387; State v. Jones, 21 Md. 437.

° Brent v. Chapman, 5 Cranch, 358; Newby’s Adm’rs v. Blakey, 3 H. & M.

57; Parish v. Eager, 15 ‘Vial. 532; Baggs’ Appeal, 43 Penn. St. 512; Leﬁing-

well v. 1Varren, 2 Black, 599. See cases cited in next note.
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1 3 Bl. Com. 188 ; Broom, Legal Maxims, 857.
' Such a statute was formerly construed with strictness, and the defence under
it was looked upon as unconscionable, and not favored; but Mr. Justice Story has
well said, it has often been matter of regret in modern times that the decisions
had not proceeded upon principles better adapted to carry into effect the real
objects of the statute; that instead of being viewed in an unfavorable light as an
unjust and discreditable defence, it had not received such support as would have
made it what it was intended to be, emphatically a statute of repose. It is a
wise and b(•neficiallaw, not designed merely to raise a presumption of payment
of a just debt from lapse of time, but to afford security against State demands
after the true state of tho transaction may have been forgotten, or be it~eapable
of explanation by reason of the death or removal of witnesses. Bell v. Morrison, 1 Pet. 3GO. See Leffingwell v. Warren, 2 Black, 599.
1 Call v. Hagger, 8 Mass. 480.
4 Beal v. Nason, 2 Shep. 844; Bell t1. Morrison, 1 Pet. 860; Steams v. Gittings, 23 Ill. 387; State v. Jones, 21 Md. 487.
~ Brent v. Chapman, 5 Cranch, 858; Newby's Adm'rs v. Blakey, 3 H. & M.
57; Parish v. Eager, 15 Wis. 582; Baggs' Appeal, 43 Penn. St. 512; Leffingwell v. 'Varren, 2 Black, 699. See cases cited in next note.
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been if it had been perfected in the owner by grant, or any species

[cR. :xJ.

of assurance.‘ I _

All limitation laws, however, must proceed on the theory that

the party, by lapse of time and omissions on his part, has forfeited

his right to assert his title in the law? Where they

[“ 366] relate to * property, it seems not to be essential that the

adverse claimant should be in actual possession ;3 but one

who is himself in the legal enjoyment of his property cannot have

his rights therein forfeited to another, for failure to bring suit

against that other within a time speciﬁed to test the validity of a

claim which the latter asserts, but takes no steps to enforce. It has

consequently been held that a statute which, after a lapse of ﬁve

years, makes a recorded deed purporting to be executed under a.

statutory power conclusive evidence of a good title, could not be

valid as a limitation law against the original owner in possession of

the land. Limitation laws cannot compel a resort to legal proceed-

ings by one who is already in the complete enjoyment of all he

claims.‘

' See Knox v. Cleveland, 13 \Vis. 249; Sprecker v. Wakelee, 11 Wis. 432;

Hill v. Kricke, 11 W'is. 442; Pleasants v. Rohrer, 17 Wis. 557; Morton v.

Sharkey, McCahon (Kan.) 113; McKinney v. Springer, 8 Blaekf. 506; Stipp v.

Brown, 2 Ind. 647; Wires v. Farr, 25 Vt. 41; Davis v. Minor, 1 How. (Miss.)
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183; Holden v. James, 11 Mass. 396; Lewis v. \Vebb, 3 Greenl. 326; Woart v.

Winnick, 3 N. H. 473; Martin v. Martin, 35 Ala. 560; Briggs v. Hubbard, 19

Vt. 86; Thompson v. Caldwell, 3 Lit. 137; Wright v. Oakley, 5 Met. 400;

Couch v. McKee, 1 Eng. 495; Atkinson v. Dunlap, 50 Me. 111. But the stat-

ute of limitations may be suspended for a period as to demands not already

been if it had been perfected in the owner by grant, or any species
of assurance.l
All limitation laws, however, must proceed on the theory that
the party, by lapse of time and omissions on his part, has forfeited
his right to assert his title in the law.2 Where they
[• 366] relate to • property, it seems not to be essential that the
adverse claimant should be in actual possession; 3 but one
who is himself in the legal enjoyment of his property cannot have
his rights therein forfeited to another, for failure to bring suit
against that other within a time specified to test the validity of a
claim which the latter asserts, but takes no steps to enforce. It has
consequently been held that a statute which, after a lapse of five
years, makes a recorded deed purporting to be executed under a
statutory power conclusive evidence of a good title, could not be
valid as a limitation law against the original owner in possession of
the land. IJimitation laws cannot compel a resort to legal proceedings by one who is already in the complete enjoyment of all he
.claims.'

barred. Wardlaw v. Buzzard, 15 Rich. 158.

' Stearns v. Gittings, 23 Ill. 389, per Walker, J.; Sturgis v. Crowninshield,

4 \Vheat. 207, per Marshall, Ch. J.; Pearce v. Patton, 7 B. Monr. 162; Grifﬁn

v. McKenzie, 7 Geo. 163.

1 Stearns v. Gittings, 23 Ill. 389; Hill v. Kricke, 11 \Vis. 442.

‘ Groesbeck v. Seeley, 13 Mich. 329. In Case v. Dean, 16 Mich. 12, it was

held that this statute could not be enforced as a limitation law in favor of the

party in possession, inasmuch as it did not proceed on the idea of limiting the

time for bringing suit, but by a conclusive rule of evidence sought to pass over

the property to the claimant under the statutory sale in all cases, irrespective

of possession. See also Baker v. Kelley, 11 Minn. 480. The case of Letting-

well v. Warren, 2 Black, 599, is contra. That case purports to be based on

Hill v. Kricke, 11 Wis. 442; but there the holder of the original title was not

in possession; and what was decided was only that it was not necessary for

the holder of the tax title to be in possession in order to claim the beneﬁt of the
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_ _ _4

1 See Knox v. Cleveland, 13 Wis. 249; Sprecker v. Wakelee, 11 Wis. 432;
Hill v. Kricke, 11 Wis. 442; Pleasants v. Rohrer, 17 Wis. 557; Morton v.
Sharkey, McCahon (Kan.) 113; McKinney v. Springer, 8 Blackf. 506; Stipp tl .
Brown, 2 Ind. 647; Wires v. Farr, 25 Vt. 41; Davis v. Minor, 1 How. (Miss.)
183; Holden v. James, 11 Mass. 896; Lewis v. ·webb, 8 Greenl. 826; Woart v.
Winnick, 3 N. H. 473; Martin v. Martin, 35 Ala. 560; Briggs v. Hubbard, 19
Vt. 86; Thompson v. Caldwell, 8 Lit. 137 ; Wright ""· Oakley, 5 Met. 400;
Couch v. McKee, 1 Eng. 495; Atkinson v. Dunlap, 50 Me. 111. But the statute of limitations may be suspended for a period as to demands not already
barred. Wardla.w v. Buzzard, 15 Rich. 158.
1 Stearns v. Gittings, 28 Ill. 889, per Walker, J.; Sturgis v. Crowninshield,
4 Wheat. 207, per Mar1hall, Ch. J.; Pearce v. Patton, 7 B. Monr. 162; Griffin
tl. McKenzie, 7 Geo. 163.
' Stearns v. Gittings, 23 III. 889; Hill "· Kricke, 11 Wis. 442.
• Groesbeck v. Seeley, 13 Mich. 329. In Case v. Dean, 16 Mich. 12, it was
held that this statute .could not be enforced as a limitation law in favor of the
party in possession, inasmuch as it did not proceed on the idea of limiting the
time for bringing suit, but by a conclusive rule of evidence sought to pass over
the property to the claimant under the statutory sale in all cases, irrespective
of possession. See also Baker v. Kelley, 11 Minn. 480. The case of Leffingwell v. Warren, 2 Black, 599, is contra. That case purports to be based on
Hill "· Kricke, 11 Wis. 442; but there the holder of the original title was not
in possession ; and what was decided was only that it was not necessary for
the holder of the tax title to be in possession in order to claim the benefit of the
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cu. x1.] PROTECTION TO PROPERTY BY “ run LAW or rm-1 LAND.” *36(i

All statutes of limitation, also, must proceed on the idea that

CH. XI.] PROTECTION TO PROPERTY BY" THE LAW OF THE LAND." *3(j(i

the party has full opportunity afforded him to try his right in the

courts. A statute could not bar the existing right of claimants

without aﬁbrding this opportunity: if it should attempt to do so, it

would be not a statute of limitations, but an unlawful attempt to

extinguish rights arbitrarily, whatever might be the purport of its

provisions. It is essential that such statutes allow a reasonable

time after they take effect for the commencement of suits upon

existing causes of action;1 though what shall be considered a

reasonableitime must be settled by the judgment of the

legislature, into the wisdom of * whose decision in estab- [* 367]

lishing the period of legal bar it does not pertain to the

jurisdiction of the courts to inquire?

Alterations in the Rules qf Evidence.

It must also be evident that a right to have one’s controversies

determined by existing rules of evidence is not a vested right. These

rules pertain to the remedies which the State provides for its

citizens; and generally in legal contemplation they neither enter

statute; ejectment against a claimant being permitted by law when the lands

were unoccupied. This circumstance of possession or want of possession in the

All statutes of limitation, also, must proceed on the idea that
the party has full opportunity afforded him to try his right in the
courts. A statute could not bar the existing right of claimants
without affording this opportunity: if it should attempt to do so, it
would be not a statute of limitations, but an unlawful attempt to
extinguish rights arbitrarily, whatever might be the purport of its
prov1s1ons. It is essential that such statutes allow a reasonable
time after they take effect for the commencement of suits upon
existing causes of action ; 1 though what shall be considered a
reasonable· time must be settled by the judgment of the
legislature, into the wisdom of * whose decision in estab- [* 367]
lishing the period of legal bar it does not pertain to the
jurisdiction of the courts to inquire. 2

person whose right is to be extinguished seems to us of vital importance. How

can a man justly be held guilty of laches in not asserting claims to property,
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when he already possesses and enjoys the property? The old maxim is, “ That

which was originally void cannot by mere lapse of time be made valid;” and

Alteratior~A

in the Rules of Evidence.

if a void claim by force of an act of limitation can ripen into a conclusive title as

against the owner in possession, the policy underlying that species of legislation

must be something beyond what has been generally supposed.

' So held of a statute which took ctfect some months after its passage, and

which, in its operation upon certain classes of cases, would have extinguished ad-

verse claims unless asserted by suit before the act took etfect. Price v. Hopkin,

It must also be evident that a right to have one's controversies
determined by existing rules of evidence is not a vested right. These
rules pertain to the remedies which the State provides for its
citizens ; and generally in legal contemplation they neither enter

13 Mich. 318. See also Call v. Hagger, 8 Mass. 423 ; Proprietors, &c. v. Laboree,

2 Greenl. 294; Society, &c. v. \Vheeler, 2 Gall. 141; Blackford v. Peltier,

1 Blackf. 36; Thornton v. Turner, 11 Minn. 339; Osborn v. Jaines, 17 \Vis.

573; Morton v. Sharkey, McCahon, (Kan.) 113; Berry v. Ramsdell, 4 Met. (Ky.)

296. In the last case cited it was held that a statute which only allowed thirty

days in which to bring action on an existing demand was um-easonable and void.

And see what is said in Auld v. Butcher, 2 Kansas, 135.

’ Stearns v. Gittings, 23 Ill. 387; Call v. Hugger, 8 Mass. 430; Smith 1;.

Morrison, 2'2 Pick. 430; Price v. Hopkin, 13 Mich. 318; De Moss v. Newton,

31 Ind. 219. But see Berry v. Rsmsdell, cited in preceding note.

2s . [401]

statute; ejectment against a claimant being permitted by law when the lands
were unoccupied. This circumstance of possession or want of possession in the
person whose right is to be extinguished seems to us of vital importance. How
can a man ju~tly be held guilty of laches in not asserting claims to property,
when he already possesses and enjoys the property? The old maxim is, " That
which was originally void cannot by mere lapse of time be made valid;" and
if a void claim by force of an act of limitation can ripen into a conclusive title as
against the owner in possession, the policy underlying that species of legislation
must be something beyond what bas been generally supposed.
1 So held of a statute which took effect some months after its passage, and
which, in its operation upon certain classes of cases, would have extinguished adverse claims unless asserted by suit before the act took effect. Price v. Hopkin,
13 Mich. 318. See also Calli'. Hagger, 81\lass. 423; Prop.rietors, &c. v. Laboree,
2 Greenl. ~94; Society, &c. "· Wheeler, 2 Gall. 141; Blackford v. Peltier,
1 Blackf. 36; Thornton v. Turner, 11 Minn. 339; Osborn "· Jaines, 17 Wis.
573; Morton v. Sharkey, McCahan, (Kan.) 113; Berry v. Ramsdell, 4 Met. (Ky.)
296. In the last case cited it was held that a statute which only allowed thirty
days in which to bring action on an existing demand was unreasonable and void.
And see what is said in Auld v. Butcher, 2 Kansas, 135.
1 Steams "· Gittings, 23 Ill. 387; Call v. Hagger, 8 Mass. 430; Smith ,,
Morrison, 22 Pick. 430; Price "·Hopkin, 13 Mich. 318; De Moss v. Newton,
81 Ind. 219. But see Berry "· Ramsdell, cited in preceding note.
26

. [
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* 367 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [c11. xx.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIHITATIONS.

into and constitute a part of any contract, nor can be regarded as

[CH. XI.

being of the essence of any right which a party may seek to

enforce. Like other rules atfecting the remedy, they must there-

fore at all times be subject to modiﬁcation and control by the

legislature ;1 and the changes which are enacted may lawfully be

made applicable to existing causes of action, even in those States

in which retrospective laws are forbidden. For the law as

changed would only prescribe rules for presenting the evidence in

legal controversies in the future; and it could not therefore be

called retrospective even though some of the controversies upon

which it may act were in progress before. It has accordingly been

held in New Hampshire that a statute which removed the disquali-

ﬁcation of interest, and allowed parties to suits to testify, might

lawfully apply to existing causes of action? So may a statute

which modiﬁes the common-law rule excluding parol evidence to

vary the terms of a written contract;3 and a statute making the

protest of a promissory note evidence of the facts therein stated.‘

These and the like cases will sufﬁciently illustrate the general rule,

that the whole subject is under the control of the legislature, which

prescribes such rules for the trial and determination, as well of

existing as of future rights and controversies as in its judgment will

most completely subserve the ends of justice?
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[* 368] *A strong instance in illustration of legislative control

over evidence will be found in the laws of some of the States

in regard to conveyances of lands upon sales to satisfy delinquent

taxes. Independent of special statutory rule on the subject, such con-

veyances would not be evidence of title. They are executed under

a statutory power; and it devolves upon the claimant under them

to show that the successive steps which under the statute lead to

such conveyance have been taken. But it cannot be doubted that

‘ Kendall v. Kingston, 5 Mass. 533; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 349, per

Marshall, Ch. J.; Fales v. Wadsworth, 23 Me. 533; Kamey v. Paisley, 13

Iowa, 89; Commonwealth v. Williams, 6 Gray, 1; Hickox v. Tallman, 88 Barb.

608. See ante, p. 288 and note 2.

’ Rich v. Flanders, 39 N. H. 323. A very full and satisfactory examination

of the whole subject will be found in this case.

’ Gibbs v. Gale, 7 Md. 76.

‘ Fales v. \Vadsworth, 23 Me. 553.

‘ Per Marshall, Ch. J ., in Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 249; Webb v.

Den, 17 How. 577 ; Delaplaine v. Cook, 7 Wis. 54; Kendall v. Kingston, 5Mass.

534; Fowler v. Chatterton, 6 Bing. 258.
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into and constitute a part of any contract, nor can be regarded as
being of the essence of any right which a party may seek to
enforce. Like other rules affecting the remedy, they must therefore at all times be subject to modification and control by tile
legislature; I and the changes which are enacted may lawfully be
made applicable to existing causes of action, even in those States
in which retrospective laws are forbidden. For the law as
changed would only prescribe rules for presenting the evidence in
legal controversies in the future ; and it could not therefore be
called retrospective even though some of the controversies upon
which it may act were in progress before. It has accordingly been
held in New Hampshire that a statute which removed the disqualification of interest, and allowed parties to suits to testify, might
lawfully apply to existing causes of action. 2 So may a statute
which modifies the common-law rule excluding parol evidence to
vary the terms of a written contract ; 8 and a statute making the
protest of a promissory note evidence of the facts therein stated.•
These and the like cases will sufficiently illustrate the general rule,
that the whole subject is under the control of the legislature, which
prescribes such rules for the trial and determination, as well of
existing as of future rights and controversies as in its judgment will
most completely subserve the ends of justice.6
[* 368]
• A strong instance in illustration of legislative control
over evidence will be found in the laws of some of the States
in regard to conveyances of lands upon sales to satisfy delinquent
taxes. Independent of special statutory rule on the subject, such conveyances would not be evidence of title. They are executed under
a statutory power; and it devolves upou the claimant under them
to show that the successive steps which under the statute lead to
such conveyance have been taken. But it cannot be doubted that
1 Kendall v. Kingston, 5 Mass. 533; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 849, per
Marshall, Ch. J. ; Fales v. Wadsworth, 23 Me. 533; Kamey v. Paisley, 13
Iowa, 89; Commonwealth v. Williams, 6 Gray, 1; Hickox v. Tallman, 88 Barb.
608. See ante, p. 288 and note 2.
1 Rich v. Flanders, 39 N. H. 323.
A very full and satisfactory examination
of the whole subject will be found in this case.
• Gibbs v. Gale, 7 Md. 76.
' Fales v. Wadsworth, 23 Me. 558.
• Per Marshall, Ch. J., in Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 249; Webb v.
Den, 17 How. 577; Delaplaine v. Cook, 7 Wis. 54; Kendall v. Kingston, 5Mass.
b34; Fowler v. Chatterton, 6 Bing. 258.
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on. xI.] PROTECTION TO PROPERTY BY “ THE LAW or THE LAND.” *368

this rule may be so changed as to make a tax deed prima facie

CH. XI.

J PROTECTION TO PROPERTY BY "THE LAW OF THE LAND."

*368

evidence that all the proceedings have been regular, and that the

purchaser has acquired under them a complete title} The burden

of proof is thereby changed from one party to the other; the legal

presumption which the statute creates in favor of the purchaser

being suﬁicient, in connection with the deed, to establish his case,

unless it is overcome by countervailing testimony. Statutes making

defective records evidence of valid conveyances are of a similar

nature; and these usually, perhaps always, have reference to

records before made, and provide for making them competent

evidence where before they were merely void? But they devest no

title, and are not even retrospective in character. They merely

establish what the legislature regards as a reasonable and just rule

for the presentation by the parties of their rights before the courts

in the future.

But there are ﬁxed bounds to the power of the legislature over

this subject which cannot be exceeded. As to what shall be evi-

dence, and which party shall assume the burden of proof in civil

cases, its authority is practically unrestricted, so long as its regu-

lations are impartial and uniform; but it has no power to establish

rules which, under pretence of regulating the presentation of evi-

dence, go so far as altogether to preclude a party from exhibiting
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his rights. Except in those cases which fall within the familiar

doctrine of estoppel at the common law, or other cases resting

upon the like reasons, it would not, we apprehend, be in the power

of the legislature to declare that a particular item of evidence

should preclude a party from establishing his rights in opposition

to it. In judicial investigations the law of the land

requires an opportunity for a trial ;8 and there * can be no [* 369]

trial if only one party is suffered to produce his proofs.

The most formal conveyance may be a fraud or a forgery; public

oﬂicers may connive with rogues to rob the citizen of his property;

‘ Hand v. Ballou, 12 N. Y. 543; Forbes v. Halsey, 26 N. Y. 53; Delaplaine

v. Cook, 7 Wis. 54; Allen v. Armstrong, 16 Iowa, 508; Adams u. Beale, 19

Iowa, 61; Amberg v. Rogers, 9 Mich. 332; Lumsden v. Cross, 10 \Vis. 289;

Lacey v. Davis, 4 Mich. 140; Wright v. Dunham, 13 Mich. 414. The rule once

established may be abolished, even as to existing deeds. Hickox v. Tallman,

38 Barb. 608.

’ See Webb v. Den, 17 How. 577.

‘ Tift v. Grifﬁn, 5 Geo. 185; Lenz v. Charlton, 23 Wis. 482; Conway v.

Cable, 37 Ill. 89; post, 382-3 and notes.
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this rule may be so changed as to make a tax deed prima facie
evidence that all the proceedings have been regular, and that the
purchaser has acquired under them a complete title. 1 The burden
of proof is thereby changed from one party to the other ; the legal
presumption which the statute creates in favor of the purchaser
being sufficient, in connection with the deed, to establish his case,
unless it is overcome by countervailing testimony. Statutes making
defective records evidence of valid conveyances are of a similar
nature; and these usually, perhaps always, have reference to
records before made, and provide for making them competent
evidence where before they were merely void. 2 But they devest no
title, and are not even retrospective in character. They merely
establish what the legislature regards as a reasonable and just rule
for the presentation by the parties of their rights before the courts
in the future.
But there are fixed bounds to the power of the legislature over
this subject which cannot be exceeded. As to what shall be evidence, and which party shall assume the burden of proof in civil
cases, its authority is practically unrestricted, so long as its regulations are impartial and uniform ; but it has no power to establish
rules which, under pretence of regulating the presentation of evidence, go so far as altogether to preclude a party from exhibiting
his rights. Except in those cases which fall within the familiar
doctrine of estoppel at the common law, or other cases resting
upon the like reasons, it would not, we apprehend, be in the power
of the legislature to declare that a particular item of evidence
should preclude a party from establishing his rights in opposition
to it. In judicial investigations the law of the land
requires an opportunity for a trial ; 8 and there • can be no [* 369]
trial if only one party is suffered to produce his proofs.
The most formal conveyance may be a fraud or a forgery ; public
officers may connive with rogues to rob the citizen of his property ;
1 Hand "·Ballou, 12 N.Y. 543; Forbes v. Halsey, 26 N.Y. 53; Delaplaine
"· Cook, 7 Wis. 54; Allen v. Armstrong, 16 Iowa, 508; Adams v. Beale, 19
Iowa, 61; Amberg "· Rogers, 9 Mich. 332; Lumsden "· Cross, 10 Wis. 289;
Lacey"· Davis, 4 Mich. 140; Wright"· Dunham, 13 Mich. 414. The rule once
established may be abolished, even as to existing deeds. Hickox v. Tallman,
88 Barb. 608.
1 See Webb"· Den, 17 How. 577.
1 Tift "· Griffin, 5 Geo. 185; Lenz "· Charlton, 23 Wis. 482; Conway "·
Cable, 87 Ill. 89; p08t, 382-3 and notes.
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* 369 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [cn. xr.

witnesses may testify or oﬂicers certify falsely, and records may be

• 369

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

[cH. XI.

collnsively manufactured for dishonest purposes ; and that legisla-

tion vvhich would preclude the fraud or wrong being shown, and

deprive the party wronged of all remedy, has no justiﬁcation in

the principles of natural justice or of constitutional law. A statute,

therefore, which should make a tax-deed conclusive evidence of a

complete title, and preclude the owner of the original title from

showing its invalidity, would be void, because being not a law regu-

lating evidence, but an unconstitutional conﬁscation of property.‘

And a statute which should make the certiﬁcate or opinion of an

oﬂicer conclusive evidence of the illegality of an existing contract

would be equally nugatory ;z though perhaps if parties should enter

into a contract in view of such a statute then existing, its provi-

sions might properly be regarded as assented to and incorporated

in their contract, and therefore binding upon them.”

‘ Groesbcck v. Seeley, 13 Mich. 329; Case v. Dean, 16 Mich. 13; VVhite v.

Flynn, 23 Ind. 46 ; Corbin v. Hill, 21 Iowa, 70. And see the well-reasoned case

of McCready -v. Sexton in the Supreme Court of Iowa, reported in iVestern

Jurist, Vol. IV. p. 284. Also Wright v. Cradlebaugh, 3 Nev. 849. As to how

far the legislature may make the tax-deed conclusive evidence that mere irregu-

larities have not intervened in the proceedings, see Smith v. Cleveland, 17 \Vis.

556; Allen v. Armstrong, 16 Iowa, 508. Undoubtedly the legislature may dis-

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:21 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105011581
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

pense with mere matters of form in the proceedings as well after they have taken

witnesses may testify or officers certify falsely, and records may be
collusively manufactured for dishonest purposes; and that legislation which would preclude the fraud or wrong being shown, and
deprive the party wronged of all remedy, has no justification in
the principles of natural justice or of constitutional law. A statute,
therefore, which should make a tax-deed conclusive evidence of a
complete title, and preclude the owner of the original title from
showing its invalidity, would be void, because being not a law regulating evidence, but an unconstitutional confiscation of property.1
And a statute which should make the certificate or opinion of an
officer conclusive evidence of the illegality of an existing contract
would be equally nugatory; 2 though perhaps if parties should enter
into a contract in view of such a statute then existing, its provisions might properly be regarded as assented to and incorporated
in their contract, and therefore binding upon them.2

place as before; but this is quite a different thing from making tax-deeds con-

clusive on points material to the interest of the property owner. See further,

Wantlan v. White, 19 Ind. 470; People v. Mitchell, 45 Barb. 212; McCready

v. Sexton, supra. It is not competent for the legislature to compel an owner of

land to redeem it from ‘a void tax-sale as a tondition on which he shall be allowed

to assert his title against it. Conway v. Cable, 37 Ill. 82; Hart v. Henderson,

17 Mich. 218. But it seems that if the tax purchaser has paid taxes and made

improvements, the payment for these may be made a condition precedent to

a suit in ejectment against him. Pope v. Macon, 23 Ark. 644. The case of

Wrightirv. Cradlebaugh, 3 Nev. 349, is valuable in this connection. “ lVe ap-

prehend,” says Beatiyl Ch. J., “ that it is beyond the power of the legislature to

restrain a defendant in any suit from setting up a good defence to an action

against him. The legislature could not directly take the property of A. to pay

the taxes of B. Neither can it indirectly do so by depriving A. of the right of

setting up in his answer that his separate property has been jointly assessed with

that of B., and asserting his right to pay his own taxes without being encumbered

with those of B. . . . Due process of law not only requires that a party shall

be properly brought into court, but that he shall have the opportunity when in

court to establish any fact which, according to the usages of the common law

or the provisions of the Constitution, would be a protection to him or his prop-

erty.” ’ See post, p. 403, note.
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1 Groesbeck o. Seeley, 13 Mich. 329; Case v. Dean, 16 Mich. 13; White v.
Flynn, 28 Ind. 46; Corbin v. Hill, 21 Iowa, 70. And see the well-reasoned case
of McCready v. Sexton in the Supreme Court of Iowa, reported in W e11tem
Jurist, Vol. IV. p. 284. Also Wright v. Cradlebaugh, 3 Nev. 849. As to how
far the legislature may make the tax-deed conclusive evidence that mere irregularities have not intervened in the proceedings, see Smith v. Cleveland, 17 Wis.
556; Allen v. Armstrong, 16 Iowa, 508. Undoubtedly the legislature may dispense with mere matters of form in the proceedings as well after they have taken
place as before ; but this is quite a different thing from making tax-deeds conclusive on points material to the interest of the property owner. See further,
Wantlan v. White, 19 Ind. 470; People v. Mitchell, 45 Barb. 212; McCready
v. Sexton, supra. It is not competent for the legislature to compel an owner of
land to redeem it from a void tax-sale as a t 'Jndition on which he shall be allowed
to assert his title against it. Conway o. Cable, 37 Ill. 82; Hart v. Henderson~
17 1\Iicb. 218. But it seems that if the tax purchaser has paid taxes and made
improvements, the payment for these may be made a condition precedent to
a suit in ejectment against him. Pope v. Macon, 23 Ark. 644. The case of
Wright v. Cradlebaugh, 8 Nev. 349, is valuable in this connection. "We apprehend," says Beatty: Cb. J., "that it is beyond the power of the legislature to
restrain a defendant in any suit from setting' up a good defence to an a~tion
against him. The legislature could not directly take the propt>rty of A. to pay
the taxes af B. Neither can it indirectly do so by depriving A. of the right of
setting up in his answer that his separate property has been jointly assessed with
that of B., and asserting his right to pay his own taxes without being encumbered
with those of B. . . . Due process of law not only requires that a party shall
be properly brought into court, but that be shall have the opportunity when in
court to establish any fact which, according to the usages of the common law
or the provisions of the Constitution, would be a protection to him or his prop1 See poat, p. 408, note.
erty."
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on. xI.] PROTECTION T0 PROPERTY BY “ ran LAW or run LAND.” "*369

Retrospective Laws.

CH. XI.] PROTECTION TO PROPERTY BY" THE LAW OF THE LAND."

*369

Regarding the circumstances under which a. man may be said to

have a vested right to a defence against a demand made by another,

it is somewhat diﬁicult to lay down a comprehensive rule which

Retrospective Laws.

the authorities will justify. It is certain that he who has satis-

ﬁed a demand cannot have it revived against him, :?he,_who

has become released from a demand by the operation o \0l\ibeL§t!i4u_te ’

of limitations is equally protected} In both cases tllQ%~ 1,

gone, and to restore it would be to create a new coiiti-a~ie»'

parties,—-a thing quite beyond the power of legislation. LS0 he

who was never bound, either legally or equitably, cannot have a

demand created against him by mere legislative enactment? But

there are many cases in which, by existing laws, defences based

upon mere informalities are allowed in suits upon contracts,

or in respect to legal proceedings, in some of which a regard to

substantial justice would warrant the legislature in interfering to

take away the defence if it possesses the power to do so.

’* In regard to these cases, We think investigation of the [*‘ 370]

authorities will show that a party has no vested right

in a defence based upon an informality not afeeting his substantial

equities. And this brings us to a particular examination of a class

of statutes which is constantly coming u11der the consideration of
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the courts, and which are known as retrospective laws, by reason of

their reaching back to and giving some different legal effect to

some previous transaction to that which it had under the law

when it took place.

There are numerous cases which hold that retrospective laws are

not obnoxious to- constitutional objection, while in others they have

been held to be void. The different decisions have been based

upon diversities in the facts which make different principles appli-

cable. There is no doubt of the right of the legislature to pass

statutes which reach back to and change or modify the eH'ect of

prior transactions, provided retrospective laws are not forbidden,

' Ante, p. 365, note 5, and cases cited.

’ In Medford v. Learned, 16 Mass. 215, it was held that where a pauper had

received support from the parish, to which by law he was entitled, a subse-

quent legislative act could not make him liable by suit to refund the cost of the

support.

‘ ~ [ 405 ]

Regarding the circumstances under which a man may be said to
have a vested right to a defence against a demand made by another,
it is somewhat difficult to lay down a comprehensive rule which
the authorities will justify. It is certain that he who has satisfied a demand cannot have it revived against him, an~ho
has become released from a demand by the operation o~~~~~!fi~
of limitations is equally protected.1 In both cases tht\,~
gone, and to restore it would be to create a new contra
'eiAtllf
parties,- a thing quite beyond the power of legislation.
o e
who was never bound, either legally or equitably, cannot have a
demand created against him by mere legislative enactment.2 But
there are many cases in which, by existing laws, defences based
upon mere informalities are allowed in suits upon contracts,
or in respect to legal proceedings, in some of which a regard to
substantial justice would warrant the legislature in interfering to
take away the defence if it possesses the power to do so.
• In regard to these _cases, we think investigation of the [* 370]
authorities will show that a party. has no vested right
in a difence based upon an informality not affecting !tis substantial
equities. And this brings us to a particular examination of a class
of statutes which is constantly coming under the consideration of
the courts, and which are kno_wn as retrospective laws, by reason of
their reaching back to and giving some different legal effect to
some previous transaction to that which it had under the law
when it took place.
There are numerous cases which hold that retrospective laws are
not obnoxious to· constitutional objection, while in others they have
been held to be void. The different decisions have been based
upon diversities in th~ facts which make different principles applicable. There is no doubt of the right of the legislature to pass
statutes which reach back to and change or modify the effect of
prior transactions, provided retrospective laws are not forbidden,

bt

1

Ante, p. 365, note 5, and cases cited.
In Medford v. Learned, 16 Mass. 215, it was held that where a pauper had
received support from the parish, to which by law be was entitled, a subsequent legislative act could not make him liable by suit to refund the cost of the
support.
1
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eo nomine by the State constitution, and provided further that no
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other objection exists to them than their retrospective character.‘

Nevertheless legislation of this character is exceedingly liable to

abuse; and it is a sound rule of construction that a statute should

have a prospective operation only, unless its terms show clearly a

legislative intention that it should operate retrospectively.” And

some of the States have deemed it just and wise to forbid such laws

altogether by their constitutions.”

[* 371] *A retrospective statute curing defects in legal pro-

ceedings where they are in their nature irregularities only,

and do not extend to matters of jurisdiction, is not void on consti-

tutional grounds unless expressly forbidden. Of this class are

‘ Thornton v. McGrath, 1 Duvall, 349; State 0. Squires, 26 Iowa, 340; Beach

v. Walker, 6 Conn. 197; Schenley v. Commonwealth, 36 Penn. St. 57.

’ Dash v. Vankleek, 7 Johns. 477; Norris v. Beyea, 13 N. Y. 273; Plumb v.

Sawyer, 21 Conn. 351; Whitman 1:. Hapgood, 13 Mass. 464; Medford v‘. Learn-

ed, 16 Mass. 215; Ray v. Gage, 36 Barb. 447; Watkins v. Haight, 18 Johns.

138; Garrett v. Beaumont, 24 Miss. 377; Briggs v. Hubbard, 19 Vt. 86; Per-

kins v. Perkins, 7 Conn. 558; Hastings v. Lane, 3 Shep. 184; Guard v. Rowan,

eo nomine by the State constitution, and provided further that no

other objection exists to them than their retrospective character.l
Nevertheless legislation of this character is exceedingly liable to
abuse ; and it is a sound rule of construction that a statute should
have a prospective operation only, unless its terms show clearly a
legislative intention that it should operate retrospectively.~ And
some of the States have deemed it just and wise to forbid such laws
altogether by their constitutions.8
[* 371]
• A retrospective statute curing defects in legal proceedings where they are in their nature irregularities only,
and do not extend to matters of jurisdiction, is not void on constitutional grounds unless expressly forbidden. or this class are

2 Scam. 499; Sayre v. VVisner, 8 Wend. 661; Quackenbos v. Danks, 1 Denio,

128; Garrett v. Doe, 1 Scam. 335; Thompson v. Alexander, 11 Ill. 54; State

v. Barbee, 3 Ind. 258; Allbyer v. State, 10 Ohio, N. s. 588; State v. Atwood,
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11 Wis. 422; Bartrulf v. Remey, 15 Iowa, 257; Tyson v. School Directors, 51

Penn. St. 9; Atkinson v. Dunlop, 50 Me. 111; E1: parts Graham, 13 Rich. 277;

Hubbard v. Brainerd, 35 Conn. 576; Conway v. Cable, 37 Ill. 82; Clark v.

Baltimore, 29 Md. 277 ; \Villiams v. Johnson, 30 Md. 500; State 0. The Auditor,

41 Mo. 25. '

3 See the provision in the Constitution of New Hampshire, considered in

Woart v. \Vinnick, 3 N. H. 481; Clark v. Clark, 10 N. H. 386; and Rich v.

Flanders, 39 N. H. 304; and that in the Constitution of Texas, in De Cordova v.

Galveston, 4 Texas, 470. The Constitution of Ohio provides that “ the General

Assembly shall have no power to pass retroactive laws, or laws impairing the

obligation of contracts; provided, however, that the General Assembly may, by

general laws, authorize the courts to carry into effect the manifest intention of

parties and oﬂicers, by curing omissions, defects, and errors in instruments and

proceedings, arising out of their want of conformity with the laws of this State,

and upon such terms as shall be just and equitable.” Under this clause it was

held competent for the General Assembly to pass an act authorizing the courts

to correct mistakes in deeds of married women previously executed, whereby

they were rendered ineffectual. Goshorn v. Purcell, 11 Ohio, N. s. 641. Under

a provision in the Constitution of Tennessee that no retrospective law shall be

passed, it has been held that a law authorizing a bill to be ﬁled by slaves, by

their next friend, to emancipate them, although it applied to cases which arose

before its passage, was not a retrospective law within the meaning of this clause.

Fisher‘s Negroes v. Dobbs, 6 Yerg. 119.
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1 Thornton v. McGrath, 1 Duvall, 349; State v. Squires, 26 Iowa, 340; Beach
v. Walker, 6 Conn. 197; Schenley v. Commonwealth, 86 Penn. St. 57.
t Dash v. Vankleek, 7 Johns. 477; Norris v. Beyea, 13 N.Y. 273; Plumb"·
Sawyer, 21 Conn. 351; Whitman v. Hapgood, 131\Iass. 464; Medford r/. Learned, 16 Mass. 215; Ray v. Gage, 36 Barb. 447; Watkins v. Haight, 18 Johns.
138; Garrett v. Beaumont, 24 Miss. 377; Briggs v. Hubbard, 19 Vt. 86; Perkins v. Perkins, 7 Conn. 558; Hastings v. Lane, 3 Shep. 134; Guard "· Rowan,
2 Scam. 49!); Sayre v. Wisner, 8 Wend. 661; Quackenbos v. Danks, 1 Denio,
128; Garrett v. Doe, 1 Scam. 335; Thompson v. Alexander, 11 Ill. 54; State
v. Barbee, 3 Ind. 258; Allbyer v. State, 10 Ohio, N. 8. 588; State v. Atwood,
11 Wis. 422; Bartruff v. Remey, 15 Iowa, 257; Tyson v. School Directors, 51
Penn. St.!); Atkinson v. Dunlop, 50 l\Ie. 111; Ex parte Graham, 13 Rich. '1:77;
Hubbard v. Brainerd, 35 Conn. 576; Conway v. Cable, 37 Til. 82; Clark "·
Baltimore, 29 Md. 277; Williams v. Johnson, 30 Md. 500; State v. The Auditor,
41 Mo. 25.
3 See the provision in the Constitution of New Hampshire, considered in
Woart v. Winnick, 3 N.H. 481; Clark v. Clark, 10 N.H. 386; and Rich o.
Flanders, 39 N.H. 304; and that in the Constitution of Texas, in De Cordova "·
Galveston, 4 Texas, 470. The Constitution of Ohio provides that "the General
Assembly shall have no power to pass retroactive laws, or laws impairing the
obligation of contracts; provided, however, that the General Assembly may, by
general laws, authorize the courts to carry into effect the manifest intention of
parties and officers, by curing omissions, defects, and errors in instruments and
proceedings, arising out of their want of conformity with the laws of this State,
and upon such terms as shall be just and equitable." Under this clause it was
held competent for the General Assembly to pass an act authorizing the courts
t.o correct mistakes in deeds of married women previously executed, whereby
they were rendered ineffectual. Goshorn v. Purcell, 11 Ohio, N. 8. 641. Under
a provision in the Constitution of Tennessee that no retrospective law shall be
passed, it has been held that a law authorizing a bill to be filed by slaves, by
their next friend, to emancipate them, although it applied to cases which arose
before its passage, was not a retrospective law within the meaning of this clause.
Fisher's Negroes v. Dobbs, 6 Yerg. 119.
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the statutes to cure irregularities in the assessment of property
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for taxation and the levy of taxes thereon;1 irregularities in the

organization or elections of corporations? irregularities in the

votes or other action by municipal corporations, or the like, where

a statutory power has failed of due and regular execution through

the carelessness of officers, or other cause;" irregular proceed-

ings in courts, &c.

The rule applicable to cases of this description is substantially

the following: If the thing wanting, or which failed to be done,

and which constitutes the defect in the proceedings, is something

the necessity for which the legislature might have dispensed with

by prior statute, then it is not beyond the power of the legislature

to dispense with it by subsequent statute. And if the irregularity

consists in doing some act, or_ in the mode or manner of doing

some act which the legislature might have made immaterial by

prior law, it is equally competent to make the same immaterial

by a subsequent law.

A few of the decided cases will illustrate this principle. In

Kearney v. Taylor‘ a sale of real estate belonging to infant tenants

in common had been made by order of court in a partition suit,

and the land bid off by a company of persons, who proposed subdi-

viding and selling it in parcels. The sale was conﬁrmed in their
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names, but by mutual arrangement the deed was made to one only,

for convenience "in selling and conveying. This deed failed to

convey the title, because not following the sale. The legislature

afterwards passed an act providing that, on proof being made to

the satisfaction of the court or jury before which such deed was

offered in evidence that the land was sold fairly and with-

out fraud, " and the deed executed in good faith and for [*‘ 372]

a sufficient consideration, and with the consent of the

persons reported as purchasers, the deed should have the same

' Butler v. Toledo, 5 Ohio, N. s. 225; Strauch v. Shoemaker, 1 W. & S. 175;

Mc(‘-oy v. Michew, 7 W. & S. 390; Montgomery v. Meredith, 17 Penn. St.

42; Dunden v. Snodgrass, 18 Penn. St. 151 ; \Villiston v. Colkett, 9 Penn. St. 38;

Boardman v. Beckwith, 18 Iowa, 292. And see Walter v. Bacon, 8 Mass. 472;

Locke v. Dane, 9 Mass. 360; Patterson v. Philbrook, 9 Mass. 153; Trustees v.

Mt-Caughy, 2 Ohio, N’. s. 152.

' Syracuse Bank 0. Davis, 16 Barb. 188; Mitchell v. Deeds, 49 Ill. 416.

' See Menges v. Wertman, 1 Penn. St. 218; Yost‘s Report, 17 Penn. St. 524;

Bennett v. Fisher, 26 Iowa, 497; Allen v. Archer, 49 Me. 346.

‘ 15 How. 494.
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the statutes to cure irregularities in the assessment of property
for taxation and the levy of taxes thereon ; 1 irregularities in the
organization or elections of corporations ; 2 irregularities in the
votes or other action by municipal corporations, or the like, where
a statutory power has failed of due and regular execution through
the carelessness of officers, or other cause ; s irregular proceedings in courts, &c.
The rule applicable to cases of this description is substantially
the following: If the thing wanting, or which failed to be done,
and which constitutes the defect in the proceedings, is something
the necessity for which the legislature might have dispensed with
by prior statute, then it is not beyond the power of the legislature
to dispense with it by subsequent statute. And if the irregularity
consists in doing some act, or. in tlte mode or manner of doing
some act which the legislature might have made immaterial by
prior law, it is equally competent to make the same immaterial
by a subsequent law.
A few of the decided cases will illustrate this principle. In
Kearney v. Taylor • a sale of real estate belonging to infant tenants
in common had been made by order of court in a partition suit,
and the land bid off by a company of persons, who proposed subdivid~ng and selling it in parcels. The sale was confirmed in their
names, but by mutual arrangement the deed was made to one only,
for convenience 'in selling and conveying. This deed failed to
convey the title, because not following the sale. The legislature
afterwards passed an act providing that, on proof being made to
the satisfaction of the court or jury before which such deed was
offered in evidence that the land was sold fairly and without fraud, • and the deed executed in good faith and for [• 372]
a sufficient consideration, and with the consent of the
persons reported as purchasers, the deed should have the same
Butler v. Toledo, 5 Ohio, N. s. 225; Strauch v. Shoemaker, 1 W. & S. 175;
McCoy v. Micbew, 7 W. & S. 390; Montgomery v. .MI!retlith, 17 Penn. St.
42; Dunden v. Snodgrass, 18 Penn. St. 151; Williston v. Colkett, 9 Penn. St. 88;
Boardman "·Beckwith, 18 Iowa, 292. And see Walter 11. Bacon, 8 Mass. 472;
Locke 11. Dane, 9 Mass. 360; Patterson v. Philbrook, 9 Mass. 153; Trustees "·
McCaughy, 2 Ohio, N . s. 152.
1 Syracuse Bank v. Davis, 16 Barb. 188; l\Iitcbell 11. Deeds, 49 Til. 416.
a See Menges v. Wertman, 1 Penn. St. 218; Yost's Report, 17 Penn. St. 524;
Bennett v. Fisher, 26 Iowa, 497; Allen v. ArcheJ:, 49 Me. 346.
' 15 How. 494.
1
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effect as though it had been made to the purchasers. That this

[cH. XI.

act was unobjectionable in principle was not denied ; and it cannot

be doubted that a prior statute, authorizing the deed to be made

to one for the beneﬁt of all and with their assent, would have been

open to no valid objection} '

In certain Connecticut cases it was insisted that sales made of

real estate on execution were void, because the oﬂicer had included

in the amount due several small items of fees not allowed by law.

It appeared, however, that after the sales were made, the legisla-

ture had passed an act providing that no levy should be deemed

void by reason of the officer having included greater fees than

were by law allowable, but that all such levies, not in other respects

defective, should be valid and eifectualto transmit the title of the

real estate levied upon. The-liability of the officer for receiving

more than his legal fees was at the same time left unaffected. In

the leading case the court say: “ The law, undoubtedly, is retrospec-

tive; but is it unjust? All the charges of the ofﬁcer on the exe-

cution in question are perfectly reasonable, and for necessary

services in the performance of his duty; of consequence they are

eminently just; and so is the act conﬁrming the levies. A law,

although it be retrospective, if conformable to entire justice, this

court has repeatedly decided is to be recognized and enforced.”2
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In another Connecticut case it appeared that certain marriages

had been celebrated by persons in the ministry who were not

empowered to perform that ceremony by the State law, and that

the marriages were therefore invalid. The legislature had after-

wards passed an act declaring all such marriages valid, and the

court sustained the act. It was assailed as an exercise of the

judicial power; but this it clearly was not, as it purported to settle

no controversies, and merely sought to give effect to the desire of

1 See Davis v. State Bank, 7 Ind. 316, and Lucas v. Tucker, 17 Ind. 41, for

decisions under statutes curing irregular sales by guardians and executors. In

many of the States general laws will be found providing‘ that such sales shall not

be defeated by certain speciﬁed defects and irregularities.

’ Beach 0. “falker, 6 Conn. 197; Booth v. Booth, 7 Conn. 350. And see

Mather v. Chapman, 6 Conn. 54; Norton v. Pettibone, 7 Conn. 319; Welch v.

Wadsworth, 30 Conn. 149; Smith v. Merchand’s Ex’rs, 7 S. & R. 260; Under-

wood v. Lilly, 10 S. & R. 97; Bleakncy v. Bank of Greencastle, 17 S. & R. 64;

Menges v. Wertman, 1 Penn. St. 218; Weister v. Hade, 52 Penn. St. 474; Ahl

v. Gleim, 52 Penn. St. 432; Selsby v. Redlon, 19 Wis. 17; Parmelee v. Law-

rence, 48 Ill._331‘.
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effect as though it had been made to the purchasers. That this
act was unobjectionable in principle was not denied ; and it cannot
be doubted that a prior statute, authorizing the deed to be made
to one for the benefit of all and with their assent, would have been
open to no valid objection. 1
In certain Connecticut cases it was insisted that sales made of
real estate on execution were void, because the officer had included
in the amount due several small items of fees not allowed by law.
It appeared, however, that after the sales were made, the legislature had passed an act providing that no levy should be deemed
void by reason of the officer having included greater fees than
were by law allowable, but that all such levies, not in other respects
defective, should be valid and effectual"to transmit the title of the
real estate levied upon. The-liability of the officer for receiving
more than his legal fees was at the same time left unaffected. In
the leading case the court say:" The law, undoubtedly, is retrospective; but is it unjust? All the chat·ges of the officer on the execution in question are perfectly reasonable, and for necessary
services in the performance of his duty; of' consequence they are
eminently just; and so is the act confirming the levies. A law,
although it be retrospective, if conformable to entire justice, this
court has repeatedly decided is to be recognized and enforced." 2
In another Connecticut case it appeared that certain marriages
had been celebrated by persons in the ministry who were not
empowered to perform that ceremony by the State law, and that
the marriages were therefore invalid. The legislature had afterwards passed an act deClaring all such marriages valid, and the
court sustained the act. It was assailed as an exercise of the
judicial power; but this it clearly was not, as it purported to settle
no controversies, and merely sought to give effect to the desire of
1 See Davis v. State Bank, 7 Ind. 816, and Lucas v. Tucker, 17 Ind. 41, for
decisions under statutes curing irregular sales by guardians and executors. In
many of the States general laws will be found providing· that such sales shall not
be defeated by certain specified defect• and irregularities.
1 Beach v. Walker, 6 Conn. 197; Booth v. Booth, 7 Conn. 850.
And see
Mather v. Chapman, 6 Conn. 54; Norton v. Pettibone, 7 Conn. 319; Welch v.
Wadsworth, 30 Conn. 149; Smith v. l\Icrchand's Ex'rs, 7 S. & R. 260; Underwood v. Lilly, 10 S. & R. 97; Bleakney v. Bank of Greencastle, 17 S. & R. 6-1;
Menges v. W crtman, 1 Penn. St. 218 ; W eister v. Hade, 52 Penn. St. 47 4; Ahl
v. Gleim, 52 Penn. St. 432; Selsby v. Recllon, 19 Wis. 17; Parmelee v. Lawrence, 48 Ill .. 831.
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the parties, which they had iueffectually attempted to carry out by
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means of the ceremony which proved insuﬂicient. And while it

was not claimed that the act was void in so far as it made

effectual the legal relation ‘of matrimony between the [* 373]

parties, it was nevertheless insisted that rights of property

dependent upon that relation could not be affected by it, inasmuch

as, in order to give such rights, it must operate retrospectively.

The court in disposing of the case are understood to express

the opinion that, if the legislature possesses the power to validate

an imperfect marriage, still more clearly does it have power to

aﬁ'ect incidental rights. “ The man and the woman were unmar-

ried, notwithstanding the formal ceremony which passed between

them, and free in point of law to live in celibacy, or contract mar-

riage with any other persons at pleasure. It is a strong exercise of

power to compel two persons to marry without their consent, and

a palpable perversion of strict legal right. At the same time the

retrospective law thus far directly operating on vested rights is

admitted to be unquestionably valid, because manifestly just.”1

It is not to he inferred from this language that the court under-

stood the legislature to possess power to select individual mem-

bers of the community, and force them into a relation of marriage

with each other against their will. That complete control which
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the legislature is supposed to possess over the domestic relations

can hardly extend so far. The legislature may perhaps divorce

parties, with or without cause, according to its own view of

justice or public policy; but for the legislature to marry parties

against their consent, we conceive to be decidedly against “the

law of the land.” The learned court must be understood as

speaking here with exclusive reference to the case at bar, in which

the legislature, by the retrospective act, were merely removing a

formal impediment to that marriage which the parties had assented

to, and which they had attempted to form. Such an act, unless

special circumstances conspired to make it otherwise, would

certainly be “ manifestly just,” and therefore might well be held

“ unquestionably valid.” And if the marriage was rendered valid,

the legal incidents would follow of course. In a Pennsylvania

case the validity of certain grading and paving assessments was

involved, and it was argued that they were invalid for the reason

1 Goshen v. Stonington, 4 Conn. 224, per Hosmer, J .
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the parties, which they had ineffectually attempted to carry out by
means of the ceremony which proved insufficient. And while it
was not claimed that the act was void in so far as it made
effectual the legal relation • of matrimony between the [* 373]
parties, it was nevertheless insisted that rights of property
dependent upon that relation could not be affected by it, inasmuch
as, in order to give such rights, it must operaie retrospectively.
The court in disposing of the case are understood to express
the opinion that, if the legislature possesses the power to validate
an imperfect marriage, still more clearly does it have power to
affect incidental rights. " The man imd the woman were unmarried, notwithstanding the formal ceremony which passed between
them, and free in point of law to live in celibacy, or contract marriage with any other persons at pleasure. It is a strong exercise of
power to compel two persons to marry without their consent, and
a palpable perversion of strict legal right. At the same time the
retrospective law thus far directly operating on vested rights is
admitted to be unquestionably valid, because manifestly just." 1
It is not to he inferred from this language that the court understood the legislature to possess power to select individual mem. hers of the community, and force them into a relation of marriage
with each other against their will. That complete control which
the legislature is supposed to possess over the domestic relations
can hardly extend so far. The legislature may perhaps divorce
parties, with or without cause, according to its own view of
justice or public policy ; but for the legislature to marry parties
against their consent, we conceive to be decidedly against "the
law of the land." The learned court must be understood as
speaking here with exclusive reference to the case at bar, in which
the legislature, by the retrospective act, were merely removing a
formal impediment to that marriage which the parties had assented
to, and which they had attempted to form. Such an act, unless
special circumstances conspired to make it otherwise, would
certainly be " manifestly just," and therefore might well be held
"unquestionably valid." And if the marriage was rendered valid,
the legal incidents would follow of course. In a Pennsylvania
case the validity of certain grading and paving assessments was
involved, and it was argued that they were invalid for the reason
1

Goshen 11. St<>nington, 4 Conn. 224, per Honn.er, J.
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that the city ordinance under which they had been made was inop-

CONSTITUTION A.L LIMITATIONS.

(CH. XI.

erative because not recorded as required by law. But the legisla-

ture had passed an act to validate this ordinance, and had declared

therein that the omission to record the ordinance should not affect

or impair the lien of the assessments against the lot owners. In

passing upon the validity of this act the court express the following

views: “ Whenever there is a right, though imperfect, the consti-

tution does not prohibit the legislature from giving a remedy. In

Hepburn v. Curts,1 it was said, ‘ The legislature, provided it does

not violate the constitutional provisions, may pass retro-

[* 374] spective laws, -* such as in their operation may affect suits

pending, and give to a party a remedy which he did not

previously possess, or modify an existing remedy, or remove an

impediment in the way of legal proceedings.’ What more has

been done in this case? . . . While [the ordinance] was in force,

contracts to do the work were made in pursuance of it, and the

liability of the city was incurred. But it was suffered to become

of no effect by the failure to record it. Notwithstanding this the

grading and paving were done, and the lots of the defendants

received the beneﬁt at the public expense. Now can the omission

to record the ordinance diminish the equitable right of the public

to reimbursement? It is at most but a formal defect in the
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remedy provided—an oversight. That such defects may be cured

by retroactive legislation need not be argued.”

On the same principle legislative acts validating invalid contracts

have been sustained. When these acts go no farther than to bind

a party by a contract which he has attempted to enter into, but

which was invalid by reason of some personal inability on his part

to make it, or through neglect of some legal formality, or in conse-

quence of some ingredient in the contract forbidden by law, the

question which they suggest is one of policy, and not of constitu-

tional power.

By statute of Ohio, all bonds, notes, bills, or contracts negotiable

' 7 Watts, 300.

' Schenley v. Commonwealth, 36 Penn. St. 29, 57. See also State v. Newark,

3 Dutch. 185; Den v. Downam, 1 Green (N.J.), 135; People v. Seymour, 16

Cal. 332; Grim v. \Veisenburg School District, 57 Penn. St. 433; State v.

Union, 33 N. J . 355. The legislature has the same power to ratify and conﬁrm

an illegally appointed corporate body that it has to create a new one. Mitchell

v. Deeds, 49 Ill. 416. _

=_ — _'- _ __ _ __ ___, _
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that the city ordinance under which they had been made was inoperative because not recorded as required by law. But the legislature had passed au act to validate this ordinance, and had declared
therein that the omission to record the ordinance should not affect
or impair the lien of the assessments against the lot owners. In
passing upon the validity of this act the court express the following
views : " Whenev.er there is a right, though imperfect, the constitution does not prohibit the legislature from giving a remedy. In
Hepburn v. Curts,1 it was said, 'The legislature, provided it does
not violate the constitutional provisions, may pass retro[* 374] s'pective laws,·* such as in their operation may affect suits
pending, and give to a party a remedy which he did not
previously possess, or modify an existing remedy, or remove an
impediment in the way of legal proceedings.' What more has
been done in this case ? . . . While [the ordinance] was in force,
contracts to do the work were made in pursuance of it, and the
liability of the city was incurred. But it was suffered to become
of no effect by the failure to record it. Notwithstanding this the
grading and paving were done, and the lots of the defendants
received the benefit at the public expense. Now can the omission
to record the ordinance diminish the equitable right of the public
to reimbursement? It is at most but a formal defect in the
remedy provided-an oversight. That such defects may be cured
by retroactive legislation need not be argued." 2
On the same principle legislative acts validating invalid contracts
have been sustained. When these acts go no farther than to bind
a party by a contract which he has attempted to enter into, but
which was invalid by reason of some personal inability on his part
to make it, or through neglect of some legal formality:, or in consequence of some ingredient in the contract forbidden by law, the
question which they suggest is one of policy, and not of constitutional power.
By statute of Ohio, all bonds, notes, bills, or contracts negotiable
7 Watts, 300.
Schenley v. Commonwealth, 36 Penn. St. 29, 57. See also State v. Newark,
3 Dutch. 185; Den v. Downam, 1 Green (N.J.), 135; People v. Seymour, 16
Cal. 3:32; Grim v. Weisenburg School District, 57 Penn. St. 433; State v.
Union, 33 N. J. 355. The legislature bas the same power to ratify and confirm
an illegally appointed corporate body that it has to create a new one. Mitchell
v. Deeds, 49 Ill. 416.
1

1
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or payable at any unauthorized bank, or made for the purpose of
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being discounted at any such bank, were declared to be void.

While this statute was in force a note was made for the purpose of

being discounted at one of these institutions, and was actually dis-

counted by it. Afterwards the legislature passed an act, reciting

that many persons were indebted to such bank, by bonds, bills,

notes, &c., and that owing, among other things, to doubts of its right

to recover its debts, it was unable to meet its own obligations, and

had ceased business, and for the purpose of winding up its affairs

had made an assignment to a trustee ; therefore the said act

authorized the said trustee to bring suits on the said bonds, bills,

notes, &c., and declared it should not be lawful for the defendants

in such suits “ to plead, set up, or insist upon, in defence, that the

notes, bonds, bills, or other written evidences of such indebtedness

are void on account of being contracts against or in violation

of any statute *law of this State, or on account of their ["‘ 375]

being contrary to public policy.” This law was sustained as

a law “ that contracts may be enforced,” and as in furtherance of

equity and good morals} The original invalidity was only because

of the statute, and that statute was founded upon reasons of public

policy which had either ceased to be of force, or which the legislature

regarded as overborne by countervailing reasons. Under these
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circumstances it was reasonable and just that the makers of such

paper should be precluded from relying upon such invalidity.”

' Lewis v. McElvain, 16 Ohio, 347.

' Trustees v. McCaughy, 2 Ohio, N. s. 155; Johnson v. Bentley, 16 Ohio, 97.

See also Syracuse Bank v. Davis, 16 Barb. 188. By statute, notes issued by

unincorporated banking associations were declared void. This statute was

afterwards repealed, and action was brought against bankers on notes previously

issued. Objection being taken that the legislature could not validate the void

contracts, the judge says: “ I will consider this case on the broad ground of the

contract having been void when made, and of no new contract having arisen since

the repealing act. But by rendering the contract void it was not annihilated.

The object of the [original] act was not to vest any right in any unlawful banking

association, but directly the reverse. The motive was not to create a privilege,

or payable at any unauthorized bank, or made for the purpose of
being discounted at any such oank, were declared to be void.
While this statute was in force a note was made for the purpose of
being discounted at one of these institutions, and was actually discounted by it. Afterwards the legislature passed an act, reciting
that many persons were indebted to such bank, by bonds, bills,
notes, &c., and that owing, among other things, to doubts of its right
to recover its debts, it was unable to meet its own obligations, and
had ceased business, and for the purpose of winding up its affairs
had made an assignment to a trustee; therefore the said act
authorized the said trustee to bring suits on the said bonds, bills,
notes, &c., and declared it should not be lawful for the defendants
in such suits " to plead, set up, or insist upon, in defence, that the
notes, bonds, bills, or other written evidences of such indebtedness
are void on account of being contracts against or in violation
of any statute •Jaw of this S~ate, or on account of their [• 375]
being contrary to public policy." This law was sustained as
a law " that contracts may be enforced," and as in furtherance of
equity and good morals. 1 The original invalidity was only because
of the statute, and that statute was founded upon reasons of public
policy which had either ceased to be of force, or which the legislature
regarded as overborne by countervailing reasons. Under these
circumstances it was reasonable and just that the makers of such
paper should be precluded from relying upon such invalidity.2

or shield them from the payment of their just debts, but to restrain them from

violating the law by destroying the credit of their paper, and punishing those

who received it. How then can the defendants complain? As unauthorized

bankers they were violators of the law, and objects not of protection but of

punishment. The repealing act was a statutory pardon of the crime committed

by the receivers of this illegal medium. Might not the legislature pardon the

crime, without consulting those who committed it? . . . How can the defendants
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Lewis v. McElvain, 16 Ohio, 847.
Trustees v. McCaughy, 2 Ohio, N. s. 155; Johnson v. Bentley, 16 Ohio, 97.
See also Syracuse Bank v. Davis, 16 Barb. 188. By statute, notes issued by
unincorporated banking associations were declared void. This statute was
afterwards repealed, and action was brought against bankers on notes previously
issued. Objection being taken that the legislature coald not validate the void
contracts, the judge says : " I will consider this case on the broad ground of the
contract having been void when made, and of no new contract having arisen since
the repealing act. But by rendering the contract void it was not annihilated.
The object of the [original] act was not to Test any right in any unlawful banking
association, but directly the reverse. The motive was not to create a privilege,
or shield them from the payment of their just debts, but to restrain them trom
violating the law by destroying the credit of their paper, and punishing those
who received it. How then can the defendants complain? As unauthorized
bankers they were violators of the law, and objects not of protection but of
punishment. The repealing act was a statutory pardon of the crime committed
by the receivers of this illegal medium. Might not the legislature pardon the
crime, without consulting those who committed it P . • • How can the defendants
1

1
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By a statute of Connecticut. where loans of money were made,
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and a bonus was paid by the borrower over and beyond the interest

and bonus,permitted by law, the demand was subject to a deduc-

tion from the principal of all the interest and bonus paid. A

construction appears to have been put upon this statute by business

men which was different from that afterwards given by the courts ;

and a large number of contracts of loan were in consequence

subject to the deduction. The legislature then passed a “ healing

act,” which provided that such loans theretofore made should not

be held, by reason of the taking of such bonus, to be usurious,

illegal, or in any respect void; but that, if otherwise legal, they

were thereby conﬁrmed, and declared to be valid, as to

[" 376] principal, interest, and * bonus. The case of Goshen 1:.

Stonington 1 was regarded as sufficient authority in sup-

port of this act; and the principle to be derived from that case

was stated to be “ that where a statute is expressly retroactive, and

the object and effect of it is to correct an innocent mistake, remedy

a "mischief, execute the intention of the parties, and promote justice,

then both as a matter of right and of public policy affecting the

peace and welfare of the community, the law should be sustained.” 2

After the courts of the State of Pennsylvania had decided that

the relation of landlord and tenant could not exist in that State
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under a Connecticut title, a statute was passed which provided that

the relation of landlord and tenant“ shall exist and be held as

fully and effectually between Connecticut settlers and Pennsylva-

say there was no contract, when the plaintiff produces their written engagement

for the performance of a duty, binding in conscience if not in law? Although

the contract, for reasons of policy, was so far void that an action could not be

sustained on it, yet a moral obligation to perform it, whenever those reasons

ceased, remained; and it would be going very far to say that the legislature may

not add a legal sanction to that obligation, on account of some fancied constitu-

tional restriction.” Hess v. Werts, 4 S. & R. 361. See also Bleakney v. Bank

of Greencastlc, 17 S. & R. 64; Menges v. Wertman, 1 Penn. St. 218; Boyce

v. Sinclair, 3 Bush, 264.

' 4 Conn. 224. See ante, p. 272-3.

' Savings Bank v. Allen, 28 Conn. 97. See also Savings Bank 0. Bates,

8 Conn. 505; Andrews v. Russell, 7 Blackf. 474; Grimes v. Doe, 8 Blackf. 371 ;

By a statute of Connecticut. where loans of money were made,
and a bonus was paid by the borrower over and beyond the interest
and bonus. permitted· by law, the demand was subject to a deduction from the principal of all the interest and bonus paid. A
construction appears to have been put upon this statute by business
men which was different from that afterwards given by the courts;
and a large numbet· of contracts of loan were in consequence
subject to the deduction. The legislature then passed a " healing
act," which provided that such loans theretofore made should not
be held, by reason of the taking of such bonus, to be usurious,
illegal, or in any respect void ; but that, if otherwise legal, they
were thereby confirmed, and declared to be valid, as to
[• 376] principal, interest, and • bonus. The case of Goshen t'.
Stonington 1 was regarded as sufficient authority in support of this act; and the principle to be derived from that case
was stated to be "that where a statute is expressly retroactive, and
the object and effect of it is to correct an innocent mistake, remedy
a ·mischief, execute the intention of the parties, and promote justice,
then both as a matter of right and of public policy affecting the
peace and welfare of the community, the law should be sustained." 2
After the courts of the State of Pennsylvania had decided that
the relation of landlord and tenant could not exist in that State
under a Connecticut title, a statute was passed which provided that
the relation of landlord and tenant " shall exist and be held as
fully and effectually between Connecticut settlers and Pcnnsylva-

Thompson v. Morgan, 6 Minn. 292; Pannelee v. Lawrence, 48 lll. 331. In

Curtis v. Leavitt, 17 Barb. 309, and 15 N. Y. 9, a statute forbidding the inter-

position of the defence o_f usury was treated as a statute repealing a penalty.

See further, \Vilson v. Hardesty, 1 Md. Ch. 66; VVelch v. VVadsworth, 30 Conn.

149; Wood v. Kennedy, 19 Ind. 68; Washburn v. Franklin, 35 Barb. 599.

_ —- i— M T __ _ _____-_.
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say there was no contract, when the plaintiff produces their written engagement
for the performance of a duty, binding in conscience if not in law? Although
the contract, for reasons of policy, was so far void that an action could not be
sustained on it, yet a moral obligation to perform it, whenever those reasons
ceased, remained; and it would be going very far to say that the legislature may
not add a legal sanction to that obligation, on account of some fancied constitutional restriction." Hess v. Werts, 4 S. & R. 361. See also Bleakney v. Bank
of Greencastle, 17 S. & R. 64; Menges v. Wertman, 1 Penn. St. 218; Boyce
v. Sinclair, 3 Bush, 264.
1 4 Conn. 224.
See ante, p. 272-3.
1 Savings Bank v. Allen, 28 Conn. 97.
See also Savings Bank v. Bates,
8 Conn. 505; Andrewn. Russell, 7 Blackf. 474; Grimes v. Doe, 8 Blarkf. 371 ;
Thompson v. Morgan, 6 Minn. 292; Pannelee v. Lawrence, 48 Ill. 331. In
Curtis v. Leavitt, 17 Barh. 309, and 15 N.Y. 9, a statute forbidrling the interposition of the defence o[ u~ury was treated as a statute repe:lling a penalty.
See further, Wilson v. Hardesty, 1 Md. Ch. 66; Welch v. Wadsworth, 30 Conn.
149; Wood v. Kennedy, 19 Ind. 68; Washburn v. Franklin, 35 Barb. 599.
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nia claimants as between other citizens of this commonwealth, on

CH. XI.] PROTECTION TO PROPERTY BY

cc THE LAW OF. THE LAND." *376

the trial of any case now pending or hereafter to be brought within

this commonwealth, any law or usage to the contrary notwithstand-

ing.” In a suit which was pending and had been once tried before

the statute was passed, the statute was sustained by the Supreme

Court of tlfat State, and afterwards by the Supreme Court of the

United States, into which last-mentioned court it had been removed

on the allegation that it violated the obligation of contracts. As its

purpose and effect was to remove from contracts which the parties

had made a. legal impediment to their enforcement, there would

seem to be no doubt, in the light of the other authorities we have

referred to, that the conclusion reached was the only just and proper

one.‘

In the State of Ohio, certain deeds made by married women were

ineffectual for the purposes of record and evidence, by reason of the

omission on the part of the oﬂicer taking the acknowledgment to

state in his certiﬁcate that, before and at the time of the grantor

making the acknowledgment, he made the contents known to her by

reading or otherwise. An act was afterwards passed which

provided that “ any deed heretofore executed pursuant to

‘* law, by husband and wife, shall be received in evidence in [*‘ 377]

any of the courts of this State, as conveying the estate of the '
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wife, although the magistrate taking the acknowledgment of such

deed shall not have certiﬁed that he read or made known the contents

of such deed before or at the time she acknowledged the execution

thereof.” This statute, though with some hesitation at ﬁrst, was

held to be unobjeetionable. The deeds with the defective acknowl-

edgments were regarded by the legislature and by the court as

being sufficient for the purpose of conveying at least the grantor’s

equitable estate; and if sufﬁeient for this purpose, no vested rights

would be disturbed,,or wrong be done, by making them receivable

in evidence as conveyances?

' Satterlee v. Mathewson, 16 S. & R. 169, and 2 Pet. 380. And see Watson

v. Mercer, 8 Pet. 88; Lessee of Dulany v. Tilghman, 6 G. & J . 461; Payne v.

Treadwell, 16 Cal. 220; Maxey v. Wise, 25 Ind. 1.

’ Chestnut 0. Shane’:-1 Lessee, 16 Ohio, 599, overruling Connell v. Connell,

6 Ohio, 358; Good v. Zercher, 12 Ohio, 364; Meddock v. Williams, 12 Ohio,

377; and Silliman v. Cummins, 13 Ohio, 116. Of the dissenting opinion in the

last ease, which the court approve in 16 Ohio, 609-10, they say: “ That opinion

stands upon the ground that the act operates only upon that class of deeds where

enough had been done to show that a court of chancery ought, in each case, to

/.
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nia claimants as between other citizens of this commonwealth, on
the trial of any case now pending or hereafter to be brought within
this commonwealth, any Jaw or usage to the contrary notwithstanding." In a suit which was pending and had been once tried before
the statute was pa.~sed, the statute was sustained by the Supreme
Court of tliat State, and afterwards by the Supreme Court of the
United States, into which last-mentioned court it had been removed
on the allegation that it violated the obligation of contracts. As its
purpose and effect was to remove from contracts which the parties
bad made a legal impediment to their enforcement, there would
seem to be no doubt, in the light of the other authorities we have
referred to, that the conclusion reached was the only just and proper
one.1
Iu the State of Ohio, certain deeds made by married women were
ineffectual for the purposes of record and evidence, by reason of the
omission on the part of the officer taking the acknowledgment to
state in his certificate that, before and at the time of the grantor
making the acknowledgment, he made the contents known to her by
reading or otherwise. Au act was afterwards passed which
provided that "any deed heretofore executed pursuant to
•law, by husband and wife, shall be received in evidence in [* 377]
any of the courts of this State, as conveying the estate of the
·
wife, although the magistrate taki1~ the acknowledgment of such
deed shall not have certified that he read or made known the contents
of such deed before or at the time she acknow }edged the execution
thereof." This statute, though with some l1esitation at first, was
held to be unobjectionable. Tl~e deeds with the defective acknowledgments were regarded by the legislature and by the court as
being sufficient for the purpose of conveying at least the grantor's
equitable estate; and if sufficient for this purpose, no vested rights
would be disturbed,.or wrong be done, by making them receivable
in evidence as conveyances.2
1 Satterlee v. Mathewson, 16 S. & R. 169, and 2 Pet. 880.
And see Watson
o. Mercer, 8 Pet. 88; Lessee of Dulany v. Tilghman, 6 G. & J. 461; Payne o.
Treadwell, 16 Cal. 220 ; Maxey v. Wise, 25 Ind. 1.
1 Chestnut v. Shane's Le~see, 16 Ohio, 599, overruling Connell o. Connell,
6 Ohio, 858; Good v. Zercher, 12 Ohio, 364; 1\leddock v. Williams, 12 Ohio,
3i7 ; and Silliman v. Cummins, 13 Ohio, 116. Of the di~senting opinion in the
last case, which the court approve in 16 Ohio, 609-10, they say: "That opinion
standB upon the ground that th<! act operates only upon that class of deedB where
enough bad been done to show that a court of chancery ought, in each case, to
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Other cases go much farther than this, and hold that, although the

[ca. :n.

deed was originally ineﬂfectual for the purpose of conveying the title,

the healing statute may accomplish the intent of the parties by giv-

ing it effect} At ﬁrst sight these cases might seem to go beyond the

mere conﬁrmation of a contract, and to be at least techni-

[* 378] cally objectionable, as depriving a party of property *‘ with-

out an opportunity for trial, inasmuch as they proceeded

upon the assumption that the title still remained in the grantor, and

that the healing act was required for the purpose of devesting him of

it, and passing it over to the grantee? Apparently, therefore, there

would seem to be some force to the objection that such a statute

deprives a party of vested rights. But the objection is more specious

than sound. If all that is wanting to a valid contract or convey-

ance is the observance of some legal formality, the party may have

a legal right to avoid it; but this right is coupled with no equity,

even though the case be such that no remedy could be afforded the

other party in the courts. The right which the healing act takes away

render a decree for a conveyance, assuming that the certiﬁcate was not such as

the law required. And where the title in equity was such that a court of chan-

cery ought to interfere and decree a good legal title, it was within the power of

the legislature to conﬁrm the deed, without subjecting an indeﬁnite number

to the useless expense of unnecessary litigation.” See also Lessee of Dulany v.
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Tilghman, 6 G. & J. 461; Joumeay v. Gibson, 56 Penn. St. 57. But the legis-

lature, it has been declared, has no power to legalize and make valid the deed of

an insane person. Routsong u. Wolf, 35 Mo. 174.

Other cases go much farther than this, and hold that, although the
deed was originally ineffectual for the purpose of conveying the title,
the healing statute may accomplish the intent of the parties by gi>ing it effect.1 At first sight these cases might seem to go beyond the
mere confirmation of a contract, and to be at least techni[* 378] cally objectionable, as depriving a party of property * without an opportunity for trial, inasmuch as they proceeded
upon the assumption that the title still remained in the grantor, and
that the healing act was required for the purpose of devesting him of
it, and passing it over to the grantee.2 Apparently, therefore, there
would seem to be some force to the objection that such a statute
deprives a party of vested rights. But the objection is more specious
than sound. If all that is wanting to a valid contract or conveyance is the observance of some legal formality, the party may have
a legal right to avoid it; but this right is coupled with no equity,
even though the case be such that no remedy could be afforded the
other party in the courts. The right which the healing act takes away

‘ Lessee of Walton v. Bailey, 1 Binn. 477; Underwood v. Lilly, 10 S. & R.

101; Barnet v. Barnet, 15 S. & R. 72; Tate v. Stooltzfoos, 16 S. & R. 35;

\Vats0n v. Mercer, 8 Pet. 88; Carpenter v. Pennsylvania, 17 How. 456; Davis

v. State Bank, 7 Ind. 316; Goshorn v. Purcell, 11 Ohio, N. s. 641. In the last

case the court say: “The act of the married woman may, under the law, have

been void and inoperative; but in justice and equity it did not leave her right to

the property untouched. She had capacity to do the act_in a form prescribed by

law for her protection. She intended to do the act in the prescribed form. She

attempted to do it, and her attempt was received and acted on in good faith.

A mistake subsequently discovered invalidates the act; justice and equity require

that she should not take advantage of the mistake; and she has therefore no

just right to the property. She has no right to complain if the law which pre-

scribed forms for her protection shall interfere to prevent her reliance upon them

to resist the demands of justice.” Similar language is employed in the Pennsyl-

vania cases. See further, Deutzel v. Waldie, 30 Cal. 138.

’ This view has been taken in some similar cases. See Russell v. Rumsey,

35 Ill. 362; Alabama, &c., Ins. Co. v. Boykin, 3_8 Ala. 510; Orton v. Noonan,

23 Wis. 102; Dade 0. Medcalf, 9 Penn. St. 108.
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render a decree for a conveyance, asmming that the certificate was not such as
the law required. And where the title in equity was such that a court of chancery ought to interfere and c!ecree a good legal title, it was within the power of
the legislature to confirm the deed, without subjecting an indefinite number
to the useless expense of unnecessary litigation." See also Lessee of Dulany v.
Tilghman, 6 G. & J. 461; Journeay t•. Gibson, 56 Penn. St. 57. But the legislature, it has been declared, has no power to legalize and make valid the deed of
an insane person. Rout.song v. Wolf, 35 Mo. 174.
1 Lessee of Walton v. Bailey, 1 Binn. 477; Underwood !7. Lilly, 10 S. & R.
101; Barnet v. Barnet, 15 S. & R. 72; Tate v. Stooltzfoos, 16 S. & R. 35;
Watson !7. Mercer, 8 Pet. 88; Carpent-er v. Pennsylvania, 17 How. 456; Davis
v. State Bank, 7 Ind. 316; Goshorn v. Purcell, 11 Ohio, N. s. 641. In the last
case the court say: "The act of the married woman may, under the law, have
been void and inoperative; but in justice and equity it did not leave her right to
the property untouched. She had capacity to do the act in a form prescribed by
law for her protection. She intended to do the act in th~ prescribed form. She
attempted to do it, and her attempt was received and acted on in good faith.
A mistake subsequently discovered invalidates the act; justice and equity require
that she should not take advantage of the mistake ; and she has therefore no
just right to the property. She has no right to complain if the law which prescribed forms for her protection shall interfere to prevent her reliance upon them
to resist the demands of justice." Similar language is employed in the Pennsylvania cases. See further, Deutzel v. Waldie, 30 Cal. 188.
1 This view has been taken in some similar cases.
See Russell v. Rumsey,
85 Til. 362; Alabama, &c., Ins. Co. v. Boy kin, ~8 Ala. 510; Orton v. Noonan,
23 Wis. 102; Dade v. Medcalf, 9 Penn. St. 108.
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in such a case is the right in the party to avoid his contrat-t,—a

CH. XI.] PROTECTION TO PROPERTY BY" THE LAW OF THE LAND."

*378

naked legal right which it is usually unjust to insist upon, and

which no constitutional provision was ever designed to protect}

As the point is put by Chief Justice Parker of Massachusetts, a

party cannot have a vested right to do wrong; 2 or, as stated by

the Supreme Court of New Jersey, “Laws curing defects which

would otherwise operate to frustrate what must be presumed to be

the desire of the party affected, cannot be considered as taking

away vested rights. Courts do not regard rights as vested contrary

to the justice and equity of the case.” 3

The operation of these cases, however, must be carefully

restricted to the parties to the original contract, and to such other

persons as may have succeeded to their rights with no greater

equities. A subsequent bone ﬁde purchaser cannot be deprived of

the property which he has acquired, by an act which retrospec-

tively deprives his grantor of the title which he had when the pur-

chase was made. Conceding that the invalid deed may be made

good as between the parties, yet if, while it remained invalid, and

the grantor still retained the legal title to the land, a third person

has purchased and received a conveyance, with no notice

of any fact which should "‘ preclude his acquiring an [*‘ 379]

equitable as well as a legal title thereby, it would not be

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:21 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105011581
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

in the power of the legislature to so conﬁrm the original deed as

to devest him of the title he has acquired. The position of the

case is altogether changed by this purchase. The legal title is no

longer separated from equities, but in the hands of the second

purchaser is united with an equity as strong as that which exists

in favor of him who purchased ﬁrst. Under such circumstances

even the courts of equity must recognize the right of the second

purchaser as best, and as entitled to the usual protection which

the law accords to vested interests.‘

1 In Gibson v. Hibbard, 13 Mich. 215, s check, void at the time it was given,

for want of a revenue stamp, was held valid after being stamped as permitted by

a subsequent act of Congress. A similar ruling was made in Harris v. Rutledge,

19 Iowa, 389. The case of State v. Norwood, 12 Md. 195, is still stronger.

The curative statute was passed alter judgment had been rendered against the

right claimed under the defective instrument, and it was held that it must be

applied by the appellate court.

' Foster v. Essex Bank, 16 Mass. 245.

° State v. Newark, 3 Dutch. 197.

‘ Brinton v. Seevers, 12 Iowa, 389; Southard v. Central R.R. C0. 2 Dutch.
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in such a case is the right in the party to avoid his contract, - a
naked legal right which it is usually unjust to insist upon, and
which no constitutional provision was ever designed to protect.1
As the point is put by Chief Justice Parker of Massachusetts, a
party cannot; have a vested right to do wrong; 2 or, as stated by
the Supreme Court of New Jersey, "Laws curing defects which
would otherwise operate to frustrate what must be presumed to be
the desire of the party affected, cannot be considered as taking
away vested rights. Courts do not regard rights as vested contrary
to the justice and equity of the case." s
The operation of these cases, however, must be carefully
restricted to the parties to the original contract, and to such other
persons as may have succeeded to their rights with no greater
equities. A subsequent bona fide purchaser cannot be deprived of
the property which he has acquired, by an act which retrospectively deprives his grantor of the title which he had when the purchase was made. Conceding that the invalid deed may be made
good as between the parties, yet if, while it remained invalid, and
the grantor still retained the legal title to the land, a third person
has purchased and received a conveyance, with no notice
of any fact which should • preclude his acquiring an [* 379]
equitable as well as a legal title thereby, it would not be
in the power of the legislature to so confirm the original deed as
to devest him of the title he has acquired. The position of the
case is altogether changed by this purchase. The legal title is no
longer separated from equities, but in the hands of tho second
purchaser is united with an equity as strong as that which exists
in favor of him who purchased first. Under such circumstances
even the courts of equity must recognize the right of the second
purchaser as best, and as entitled to the usual protection which
the law accords to vested interests.4
1 In Gibson "· Hibbard, 13 Mich. 215, a check, void at the time it was given,
for want of a revenue stamp, was held valid after being stamped as pennitted by
a subsequent act of Congress. A similar ruling was made in Harris 11. Rutledge,
19 Iowa, 389. The case of State v. Norwood, 12 1\Id. 195, is still stronger.
The curative statute was passed after judgment had been rendered against the
right claimed under the defective instrument, and it was held that it must be
applied by the appellate court.
1 Foster"· Essex Bank, 16 Mass. 245.
3 State 11. Newark, S Dutch. 197.
' Brinton v. Seevers, 12 Iowa, 389; Southard 11. Central R.R. Co. 2 Dutch.
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* 379 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [cn. XI.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

If, however, a grantor undertakes to convey more than he pos-

(CH. XI.

sesses, or contrary to the conditions or qualiﬁcations which, for

the beneﬁt of others, are imposed upon his title, so that the defect

in his conveyance consists not in any want of due formality, nor in

any disability imposed by law, it is not in the power of the legis-

lature to validate it retrospectively, and we may add, also, that

it would not have been competent to authorize it in advance. In

such case the rights of others intervene, and they are entitled to

protection on the same grounds, though for still stronger reasons,

which exist in the case of the bona. ﬁde purchasers above

referred to.1 ,

22; Thompson v. Morgan, 6 Minn. 292; Meighen v. Strong, 6 Minn. 177; Nor-

man v. Heist, 5 W. & S. 171; Greenough v. Greenough, 11 Penn. St. 494;

McCarthy v. Hoffman, 23 Penn. St. 508. The legislature cannot validate an

invalid trust in a will, by act passed after the death of the testator, and after

title vested in the heirs. Hilliard v. Miller, 10 Penn. St. 338. See Snyder v.

Bull, 17 Penn. St. 58; McCarthy v. Hoffman, 23 Penn. St. 507; Bolton v.

If, however, a grantor undertakes to convey more than he possesses, or contrary to the conditions or qualifications which, for
the benefit of others, are imposed u,pon his title, so that the defect
in his conveyance consists not in any want of due formality, nor in
any disability imposed by law, it is not in the power of the legislature to validate it retrospectively, and we may add, also, that
it would not have been competent to authorize it in advance. In
such case the rights of others intervene, and they are entitled to
protection on the same grounds, though for still stronger reasons,
which exist in the case of the bona fide purchasers above
referred to.1

Johns, 5 Penn. St. 145; State v. ¥Varren, 28 Md. 338. The cases here cited

must not be understood as establishing any different principle from that laid

down in Goshen v. Stonington, 4 Conn. 209, where it was held competent to

validate a marriage, notwithstanding the rights of third parties would -be inci-

dentally affected. Rights of third parties are liable to be incidentally affected
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more or less in any case in which a defective contract is made good; but this

is no more than might happen in enforcing a contract or decreeing a divorce.

Such incidental injuries give no right to complain. See post, p. 384. Also

Tallman v. Janesville, 17 Wis. 71.

‘ In Shouk v. Brown, 61 Penn. St. 327, the'facts were that a married woman

held property under a devise, with an express restraint upon her power to

alienate. She nevertheless gave a deed of the same, and a legislative act was

afterwards obtained to validate this deed. Held void. Agnew, J.: “Many

cases have been cited to prove that this legislation is merely conﬁrmatory and

valid, beginning with Barnet v. Barnet, 15 S. & B.. 72, and ending with Journeay

v. Gibson, 56 Penn. St. 57. The most of them are cases of the defective ac-_

knowledgments of deeds of married women. But there is a marked difference

between them and this. In all of them there was a power to convey, and only

a defect in the mode of its exercise. Here there is an absolute want of power to

convey in any mode. In ordinary cases a married woman has both the title and

the power to convey or to mortgage her estate, but is restricted merely in the

manner of .its exercise. This is a restriction it is competent for the legislature

to remove, for the defect arises merely in the form of the proceeding, and not in

any want of authority. Those to whom her estate descends, because of the

omission of a prescribed form, are really not injured by the validation. It was

in her power to cut them oﬁ‘, and in truth and conscience she did so, though she

failed at law. They cannot complain, therefore, that the legislature interferes

to do justice. But the case before us is diﬁerent. [The grantor] had neither
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22; Thompson "· Morgan, 6 Minn. 292; Meighen "· Strong, 6 Minn. 177; Norroan "· Heist, 5 W. & S. 171 ; Greenough "· Greenough, 11 Penn. St. 49.1;
McCarthy v. Hoffman, 23 Penn. St. 508. The legislature cannot validate an
invalid trust in a will, by act passed after the death of the testator, and after
title vested in the heirs. Hilliard v. Miller, 10 Penn. St. 338. See Snyder"·
Bull, 17 Penn. St. 58; McCarthy "· Hoffman, 23 Penn. St. 507; Bolton "·
Johns, 5 Penn. St. 145; State "·Warren, 28 Md. 338. The cases here cited
must not be understood as establishing any different principle from that la.id
down in Goshen v. Stonington, 4 Conn. 209, where it was held competent to
validate a marriage, notwithstanding the rights of third parties would .be incidentally affected. Rights of third parties are liable to be incidentally affected
more or less in any case in which a defective contract is made good; but this
is no more than might happen in enforcing a contract or decreeing a divorce.
Such incidental injuries give no right to complain. See post, p. 384. AL!o
Tallman v. Janesville, 17 Wis. 71.
1 In Shonk v. Brown, 61 Penn. St.. 327, the'facts were that a married woman
held property under a devise, with an express restraint upon her power to
alienate. She nevertheless gave a deed of the same, and a legislative act was
afterwards obtained to validate this deed. Held void. .Agnew, J.: •• :Many
cases have been cited to prove that this legislation is merely confirmatory and
valid, beginning with Barnet"· Barnet, 15 S. & H.. 72, and ending with Joumeay
"· Gibson, 56 Penn. St. 57. The most of them are cases of the defective ac-.
knowledgments of deeds of married women. But there is a marked difference
between them and this. In all of them there was a power to convey, and only
a defect in the mode of its exercise. Here there is an absolute want of power to
convey in any mode. In ordinary cases a married woman bas both the title and
the power to convey or to mortgage her estate, but is restricted merely in the
manner of ,its exerci:;e. This is a restriction it is competent for the legislature
to remove, for the defect arises merely in the form of the proceeding, and not in
any want of authority. Those to whom her estate descends, because of the
omission of a prescribed form, are really not injured by the validation. It was
in her power to cut them off, and in truth and conscience she did so, though she
failed at law. They cannot complain, therefore, that the legislature interferes
to do justice. But the case before us is different. [The grantor] had neither
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We have already referred to the case of contracts by municipal
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corporations which, when made, were in excess of their authority,

but subsequently have been conﬁrmed by legislative action. If

the contract is one which the legislature might originally have

authorized, the case falls within the principle above laid down,

and the right of the legislature to conﬁrm it must be recognized}

This principle is one which has very often been acted upon in the

case of municipal subscriptions to works of internal improvement,

where the original undertaking was without authority of law, and

the authority given was conferred by statute retrospectively?

It has not been regarded as a matter of importance in these

eases, whether the enabling act was before or after the corporation

had entered into the contract in question; and if the legislature

possesses that complete control over the subject of taxation by

the right nor the power during coverture to cut otf her heirs. She was for-

bidden by the law of the gift, which the donor imposed upon it to suit his own

purposes. Her title was qualiﬁed to this extent. Having done an act she had

no right to do, there was no moral obligation for the legislature to enforce. Her

heirs have a right to say . . . ‘ the legislature cannot take our estate and vest it

in another who bought it with notice on the face of his title that our mother

could not convey to him.‘ The true principle on which retrospective laws are

We have already referred to tho case of contracts by municipal
corporations which, when made, were in excess of their authority,
but subsequently have been confirmed by legislative action. If
the contract is one which the legislature might originally have
authorized, the case falls within the principle above laid down,
and the right of the legislature to confirm it must be recognized.!
This principle is one which has ,·ery often been acted upon in the
case of municipal subscriptions to works of internal improvement,
where the original undertaking was without authority of law, and
the authority given was conferred by statute retrospectively. 2
It hn.s not been regarded as a matter of importance in these
cases, whether the enabling act was before or after the corporation
ltad entered into the contract in question; and if the legislature
possesses that complete contt·ol over the subject of taxation by

supported was stated long ago by Duncan, J., in Underwood v. Lilly, 10 S. & R.
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101 ; to wit, where they impair no contract, or disturb no vested right, but only

vary remedies, cure defects in proceedings otherwise fair, which do not vary

existing obligations contrary to their situation when entered into and when

prosecuted.“

‘ See Shaw v. Norfolk R.R. Corp. 5 Gray, 179, in which it was held that the

legislature might validate an unauthorized assignment of a franchise. Also May

v. Holdridge, 23 Wis. 93, and cases cited, in which statutes authorizing the

reassessment of irregulartaxes were sustained. In this case, Paine, J ., says:

“ This rule must of course be understood with its proper restrictions. The work

for which the tax is sought to be assessed must be of such a character that the

legislature is authorized to provide for it by taxation. The method adopted must

be one liable to no constitutional objection. It must be such as the legislature

might originally have authorized had it seen ﬁt. \Vith these redrictions, where-

work of this character has been done, I think it competent for the legislature to

supply a defect of authority in the original proceedings, to adopt and ratify the

improvement, and provide for a reassessment of the tax to pay for it.” And see

Brewster v. Syracuse, 19 N. Y. 116; Kunkle v. Franklin, 13 Minn. 127; Boyce

v. Sinclair, 3 Bush, 264.

’ See, among other. cases, Mr-Millan v. Boyles, 6 Iowa, 330; Gould 1:. Ster-

ling, 23 N. Y. 457; Thompson v. Lee County, 8 Wal. 327; Bridgeport v. Hou-

satonic R.R. Co. 15 Conn. 475; Board of Commissioners v. Bright, 18 Ind. 93;

Gibbons v. Mobile, &c., R.R. Co. 36 Ala. 410. ‘
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the right nor the power during coverture to cut off her heirs. She was forbidden by the law of the gift, which the donor imposed upon it to suit his own
purpt'ses. Her title was qualified to this extent. Having done an act she bad
no right to rlo, there was no moral obligation for the legislature to enforce. Her
heirs have a right to say . • . ' the legislature cannot take our estate and vest it
in another who bought it with notice on the face of his title that our mother
conld not convey to him.' The true principle on which retrospective laws are
supported was stated long ago by Duncan, J., in Underwood"· Lilly, 10 S. & R.
101; to wit, where they impair no contract, or disturb no vested right, but only
vary remedies, cure defects in proceedings otherwise fair, which do not vary
existing obligations contrary to their situation when entered into and when
prosecuted."
1 See Shaw o. Norfolk R.R. Corp. 5 Gray, 179, in which it was held that the
legislature might validate an unauthorized assignment of a franchise. Also l\Iay
"· Holdridge, 23 Wis. 93, and cases cited, in which statutes authorizing the
reassessment of irregular- taxes were sustained. In this case, Paine, J., says:
.. This rule must of course be understood with its proper restrictions. The work
for whit:h the tax is sought to he assessed must be of such a character that the
legh;lature i~ authorized to provide for it by taxation. The method adopted must
be one liable to no constitutional objection. It must be such as the legislature
might originally have authorized bad it seen fit. With these retttrictions, where
work of this character bas been done, I think it competent for the legislature to
supply a defect of authority in the original proceedings, to adopt and ratify the
improvement, and provide for a reassessment of the tax to pay for it." And see
Brewster o. Syraeuse, 19 N. Y. 116; Kunkle v. Franklin, 13 Minn . 127; Boyce
"· Sinclair, 8 Bush, 264.
s See, among other ca~es, M(•Millan v. Boyles, 6 Iowa, 330; Gould v. Sterling, 23 N. Y. 467 ; Thompson v. Lee County, 3 Wal. 327; Bridgeport v. Housatonic R.R. Co. 15 Conn. 475; Board of Commissioners"· Bright, 18 Ind. 93;
Gibbons v. Mobile, &c., R.R. Co. 36 Ala. 410.
27
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municipal corporations which has been declared in many cases, it
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is diﬂicult to perceive how such a corporation can successfully

contest the validity of a special statute, which only sanc-

[* 380] tions a contract previously made by the‘ corporation,

and which, though at the time ultra vires, was neverthe-

less for a public object, and compels its performance through an

exercise of the power of taxation}

‘ In Hasbrouck v. Milwaukee, 13‘\Vis. 37, it appeared that the city of Mil-

waukee had been authorized to contract for the construction of a harbor, at an

expense not to exceed $100,000. A contract was entered into by the city pro-

viding for a larger expenditure; and a special legislative act was afterwards

obtained to ratify it. The court held that the subsequent legislative ratiﬁcation

was not sufficient, proprio uigore, and without evidence that such ratiﬁcation was

procured with the assent of the city, or had been subsequently acted upon or

conﬁrmed by it, to make the contract obligatory upon the city. The court say,

per Dixon, Ch. J .: “The question is, can the legislature, by recognizing the

existence of a previously void contract, and authorizing its discharge by the city,

or in any other way, coerce the city against its will into a performance of it, or

does the law require the assent of the city as well as of the legislature, in order to

make the obligation binding and efficacious? I must say that, in my opinion, the

latter act, as well as the former, is necessary for that purpose, and that without

it the obligation cannot be enforced. A contract void for want of capacity in one
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or both of the contracting parties to enter into it is as no contract; it is as if

no attempt at an agreement had ever been made. And to admit that the legis-

lature, of its own choice, and against the wishes of either or both of the contract-

ing parties, can give it life and vigor, is to admit that it is within the scope of

legislative authority to devcst settled rights of property, and to take the property

of one individual or corporation and transfer it to another.” This reasoning, it

seems to us, would have required a different decision in many of the cases which

we have heretofore cited. The cases of Guilford v. Supervisors of Chenango, 18

Barb. 615, and 13 N. Y. 143; Brewster v. Syracuse, 19 N. Y. 116; and Thomas

v. Leland, 2-l \Vend. 65, especially go much further than is necessary to sustain

legislation of the character we are now considering. See also Bartholomew v.

Harwinton, 33 Conn. 408; People v. Mitchell, 35 N. Y. 551; Barbour v. Cam-

den, 51 Me. 608. In Brewster v. Syracuse, parties had constructed a sewer for

the city at a stipulated price, which had been fully paid to them. The charter of

the city forbade the payment of extra compensation to contractors in any case.

The legislature afterwards passed an act empowering the Common Council of

Syracuse to assess, collect, and pay over the further sum of $600 in addition to

the contract price; and this act was held constitutional. Ln Thomas v. Leland,

certain parties had given bond to the State, conditioned to pay into the treasury

a certain sum of money as an inducement to the State to connect the Chcnango

Canal with the Erie at Utica, instead of at Whitestown as originally contem-

plated, — the sum mentioned being the increased expense in consequence of the

change. Afterwards the legislature, deeming the debt thus contracted by indi-

viduals unreasonably partial and onerous, passed an act, the object of which was

7 — ~ — _-- §~€¢|
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municipal corporations which has been declared in many cases, it
is difficult to perceive how such a corporation can successfully
contest the validity of a special statute, which only sane[* 380] tions a contract previously made by the • corporation,
and which, though at the time ultra vires, was nevertheless for a public object, and compels its performance through an
exercise of the power of taxation.1
1 In Hasbrouck "· Milwaukee, 18 ·Wis. 87, it appeared that the city of Milwaukee bad been authorized to contract for the construction of a harbor, at an
expense not to exceed $100,000. A contract was entered into by the city providing for a larger expenditure ; and a special tcgislative act was afterwarda
obtained to ratify it. The court held that the subsequent legialative ratification
was not sufficient, proprio 'Digore, and without evidence that such ratification was
procured with the asaent of the city, or bad been subsequently acted upon or
confirmed by it, to make the contract obligatory upon the city. The court say,
per Dixon, Ch. J. : " The question is, can the legislature, by recognizing the
existence of a previously void contract, and authorizing ita discharge by the city,
or in any other way, coerce the city against ita will into a pert'ormance of it, or
does the law require the assent of the city as well as of the legi~lature, in order to
make the obligation binding and efficacious? I must say that, in my opinion, the
latter act, as well as the former, is necessary for that purpose, and that without
it the obligation cannot be enforced. A contract void for want of capacity in one
or both of the contracting parties to enter into it is as no contract; it is as if
no attempt at an agreement had eYer been made. And to admit that the legislature, of its own choice, and against the wishes of either or both of the contracting parties, can give it life and vigor, is to admit that it is within the ~Jcope of
legislative authority to devest settled rights of property, and to take the property
of one individual or corporation and transfer it to another." This reasoning, it
seems to us, would have required a different decision in many of the cases which
we have heretofore cited. The cases ofGuilford v. Supervisors of Chenango, 18
Barb. 616, and 13 N.Y. 148; Brewster v. Syracuse, 19 N.Y. 116; and Thomas
v. Leland, 2-l Wend. 65, especially go much further than is necessary to sustain
legislation of the character we are now considering. See also Bartholomew v.
Harwinton, 83 Conn. 408; People "· Mitchell, 35 N.Y. Ml; Barbour v. Camden, 61 Me. 608. In Brew~ter v. Syracuse, parties bad constructed a sewer for
the city at a stipulated price, which had been fully paid to them. The charter of
the city forbade the payment of extra compensation to contractors in any case.
The legislature afterwards passed an act empowering the Common Council of
Syracuse to assess, collect, and pay over the further sum of $600 in addition to
the contract price; and tl1is act was held constitutional. ln Thomas"· Leland,
certain parties had given bond to the State, conditioned to pay into the treasury
a certain sum of money as an inducement to the State to connect the Chenango
Canal with the Erie at Utica, instead of at Whitestown as originally contemplated, - the sum mentioned being the increased expense in consequence of the
change. Afterwards the legislature, deeming the debt thus contracted by individuals unreasonably partial and onerous, passed an act, the object of which was
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‘Nor is it important in any of the cases to which we [* 381]
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have referred, that the legislative act which cures the irreg-

ularity, defect, or want of original authority, was passed after suit

brought, in which such irregularity or defect became matter of

importance. The bringing of suit vests in a party no right to a

particular decision ;1 and his case must be determined on the law

as it stands, not when the suit was brought, but when the judgment

is rendered? It has been held that a statute allowing amendments

to indictments in criminal cases might constitutionally be applied

to pending suits ; 3 and even in those States in which retrospective

laws are forbidden, a cause must be tried under the rules of evi-

dence existing at the time of the trial, though ditferent from those

in force when the suit was commenced.‘ And if a case is ap-

pealed, and pending the appeal the law is changed, the appellate

court must dispose of the case under the law in force when their

decision is rendered.“

to levy the amount on the owners of real estate in Utica. This act seemed to

the court unobjectionable. “ The general purpose of raising the money by tax

was to construct a canal, a public highway, which the legislature believed would

be a beneﬁt to the city of Utica as such; and independently of the bond, the case

is the ordinary one of local taxation to make or improve a highway. If such an

act be otherwise constitutional, we do not see how the circumstance that a bond
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had before been given securing the same money can detract from its validity.

Should an individual volunteer to secure a sum of money, in itself properly

• Nor is it important in any of the cases to which we [• 381]
have referred, that the legislative act which cures the irregularity, defect, or wantof original authority, was passed after suit
brought, in which such irregularity or defect became matter of
importance. The bringing of suit vests in a party no right to a
particular decision ; 1 and his case must be determined on the law
as it stands, not when the suit was brought, but when the judgment
is rendered. 2 It has been held that a statute allowing amendments
to indictments in criminal cases might constitutionally be applied
to pending suits; 8 and even in those States in which retrospective
laws are forbidden, a cause must be tried under the rules of evidence existing at the time of the trial, though different from those
in force when the suit was commenced} And if a case is appealed, and pending the appeal the law is changed, the appellate
court must dispose of the case under the Ia w in force when their
decision is rendered.6

leviable by way oftax on a town or county, there would be nothing in the nature

of such an arrangement which would preclude the legislature from resorting, by

way of tax, to those who are primarily and more justly liable. Even should he

pay the money, what is there in the constitution to preclude his being reimbursed

by a tax? ” Here, it will be perceived, the corporation was compelled to assume

an obligation which it had not even attempted to incur, but which private persons,

for considerations which seemed to them sufﬁcient, had taken upon their own

shoulders. And while we think the case of Hasbrouck v. Milwaukee is not in

harmony with the current of authority on this point, we also think the case of

Thomas v. Leland may be considered as going to the opposite extreme.

‘ Bacon v. Callcnder, 6 Mass. 309; Butler v. Palmer, 1 llill, 32;; Cowgill v.

Long, 15 Ill. 203; Miller v. Graham, 17 Ohio, N. s. 1; State v. Squires, 26

Iowa, 340.

’ Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet. 88; Mather v. Chapman, 6 Conn. 54; Bristol v.

Supervisors, &c., 20 Mich. 93; Satterlee v. Mathewson, 16 S. & R. 169, and

2 Pet. 380.

’ State v. Manning, 11 Texas, 402.

‘ Rich v. Flanders, 39 N. H. 304.

‘ State v. Norwood, 12 Md. 195. In Eaton v. United States, 5 Craneh,

281, a vessel had been condemned in admiralty, and pending an appeal the act
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to levy the amount on the ownel'l! of real estate in Utica. This act seemed to
the court unobjectionable. " The general purpose of raising the money by tax
was to construct a eanal, a public highway, which the legislature believed would
be a benefit to the city of Utica as such; and independently of the bond, the case
is the ordinary one of local taxation to make or improve a highway. If such an
act be otherwise constitutional, we do not see how the circumstance that a bond
hacl before been given securing the same money can detract from its validity.
Should an individual volunteer to secure a sum of money, in itself properly
leviable by way of tax on a town or county, there would be nothing in the nature
of such an a~rangement which would preclude the legislature from resorting, by
way of tax, to those who are primarily and more justly liable. Even should he
pay the money, what is there in the constitution to preclude his being reimbursed
by a tax? " Here, it will be perceived, the corporation was compelled to assume
an obligation which it had not even atwmpted to incur, but which private persons,
for considerations which seemed to them sufficient, had taken upon their own
shoulders. And while we think the case of Hasbrouck v. Milwaukee is not in
harmony with the current of authority on this point, we also think the case of
Thomas v. Leland may be considered as going to the opposite extreme.
1 Bacon v. Callender, 61\fass. 309; Butler v. Palmer, 1 Ilill, S:!4; Cowgill v.
Long, 15 Ill. 203; Miller v. Graham, 17 Ohio, N. s. 1; State v. Squires, 26
Iowa, 340.
1 Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet. 88; Mather v. Cbapman, 6 Conn. 54; Bristol v.
Supervisors, &c., 20 l\Iich. 93; Satterlee v. Mathewson, 16 S. & R. 169, and
2 Pet. 380.
3 State v. Manning, 11 Texas, 402.
• Rich v. Flanders, 39 N.H. 30!.
• State v. Norwood, 12 Md. 195. In Eaton v. United States, 5 Cranch,
281, a Vl'Ssel had been condemned in admiralty, and pending an appeal the act
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But the healing statute must in all cases be conﬁned to vali-
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dating acts which the legislature might previously have

["‘ 382] authorized. * It cannot make good retrospectively acts

or contracts which it had no power to permit or sanction

in advance} There lies before us at this time a. volume of statutes

of one of the States, in which are contained acts declaring certain

tax-rolls valid and effectual, notwithstanding the following irreg-

nlarities and imperfections : a failure in the supervisor to carry out

separately, opposite each parcel of land on the roll, the taxes

charged upon such parcel, as required by law; a failure in the

supervisor to sign the certiﬁcate attached to the roll ; a failure in

the voters of the township to designate, as required by law, in a

certain vote by which they had assumed the payment of bounty

moneys, whether they should be raised by tax or loan ; corrections

made in the roll by the supervisor after it had been delivered to

the collector ; the including by the supervisor of a sum to be

raised for township purposes without the previous vote of the

township, as required by law; adding to the roll a sum to be

raised which could not lawfully be levied by taxation without legis-

lative authority ; the failure of the supervisor to make out the roll

within the time required by law ; and the accidental omission of a

parcel of land which should have been embraced by the roll. In
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each of these cases except the last, the act required bylaw, and which

failed to be performed, might-by previous legislation have been dis-

pensed with ; and perhaps in the last case there might be question

under which the condemnation was declared was repealed. The court held that

the cause must be considered as if no sentence had been pronounced; and if no

sentence had been pronounced, then, after the expiration or repeal of the law,

no penalty could be enforced or punishment inﬂicted for a violation of the law

committed while it was in force, unless some special provision of statute was

made for that purpose. See also Schooner Rachel v. United Slates, 6 Cranch,

329; Commonwealth 1:. Duane, 1 Binney, 601; United States v. Passmore, 4

Dall. 372; Commonwealth v. Marshall, 11 Pick. 350; Commonwealth v. Kim-

ball, 21 Pick. 373; Hartung v. People, 22 N. Y. 100; Norris u. Crocker, 13

How. 129; Insurance Co. v. Ritchie, 5 \Val. 541; Ea: pm-le McCardle, 7 \Val.

506; Engle v. Shurtz, 1 Mich. 150. In the McCardle case the appellate jurisdic-

But the healing statute must in all cases be confined to validating acts which the legislature might previously haYe
[* 382] authorized. • It cannot make good retrospectively acts
or contracts which it had no power to permit or sanction
in advance. 1 There lies before us at this time a volume- of statutes
of one of the States, in which are contained acts declaring certain
tax-rolls valid and effectual, notwithstanding the following irregularities and imperfections: a faihn·e in the supervisor to carry out
separately, opposite each parcel of land on the roll, the taxes
charged upon such parcel, as required by law; a failure in the
supervisor to sign the certificate attached to the roll ; a failure in
the voters of the townsllip to designate, as required by law, in a
certain vote by which they had assumed the payment of bounty
moneys, whether they should be raised by tax or loan; corrections
made in the roll by the supervisor after it had been delivered to
the collector ; the including by the supervisor of a sum to be
raised for township purposes without the previous Yote of the
township, as required by law ; adding to the roll a sum to be
raised which could not lawfully be levied by taxation without legislatife authority ; the failure of the supcr\·isor to make out the roll
within the time required by law ; and the accidental omission of a
parcel of land which should have been embraced by the roll. In
each of theRe cases except the last, the act required by law, and which
failed to be performed, might by previous legislation have been dispensed with ; and perhaps in the last caRe there might be question

tion of the United States Supreme Court in certain cases was taken away while

a case was pending. Per Chase, Ch. J.: " Jurisdiction is power to declare the

law; and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that

of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause. This is not lcss clear upon

authority than upon principle.”

' See ante, 379, and note 1.
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under which the condemnation was declarer! was repealed. The court held that
the cause must be considered as if no sentence had been pronounced ; and if no
Rentence had been p1·onounced, then, afkr the expiration or rt•peal of the law,
no penalty could be enforced or punishment inflit·ted for a violation of the law
committed while it was in force, unless some special provi~ion of statute was
made for that purpose. See also Schooner Racbd v. United State~, 6 Crancb,
:329; Commonwealth v. Dunne, 1 Binney, 601; United States t'. Passmore, 4
Dall. 372; Commonwealth v. Marshall, 11 Pick. 350; Commonwealth v. Kimball, 21 Pick. 373; Hartung v. People, 22 N. Y. 100; Nonis v. Crocker, 13
How. 129; Insurance Co. v. Ritchie, 5 Wal. M1; Ex parte l\lcCardle, 7 ""a!.
506; Engle t'. Shurtz, 1 .l\lil'h. 150. In the :\lcCardle case the appellate jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court in certain cases was taken 8\vay while
a case was pending. Per Chase, Ch. J. : ".Jurisdiction is power to dedare the
law; and when it cea~es to exist, the only li.ml'tion remaining to the conrt is that
of announcing the fact and dismi~sing the cause. Tbi~ is not less dear upon
authority than upon principle."
1 See ante. 379, and note 1.
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whether the roll was rendered invalid by the omission referred to,

CH. XI.) PROTECTION TO PROPERTY BY" THE LAW OF THE LAND."

•382

and ifit was, whether the subsequent act could legalize it.1 But

if township oﬂicers should assume to do acts under the power of

taxation which could not lawfully be justified as an exercise of

that power, no subsequent legislation could make them good. If,

for instance, a part of the property in a taxing district should be

assessed at one rate, and a part at_ another, for a burden resting

equally upon all, there would be no such apportionment as is essen-

tial to taxation, and the roll would be beyond the reach of curative

legislation.” And if persons or property should be as-

sessed for taxa.tion*‘ in a district which did not include [* 383]

them, the assessment would not only beinvalid, but a

healing statute would he ineffectual to charge them with the bur-

den. In such a case there would be a fatal want ‘of jurisdiction ;3

and even in judicial proceedings, if there was originally a failure of

jurisdiction, no subsequent law can confer it.‘

' See Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 VVis. 242; Dean v. Gleason, 16 W'is. 1; post,

515, note.

' Sec Billings v. Detten, 15 Ill. 218; Conway v. Cable. 37 Ill. 82; and Thames

Manufacturing Co. v. Lathrop, 7 Conn. 550, for cases where curative statutes

were held not effectual to reach defects in tax proceedings. As to what defects

may or may not be cured by subsequent legislation, see Allen v. Armstrong,
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16 Iowa, 508, Smith v. Cleveland, 17 Wis. 556, and Abbott v. Lindenbower,

42 Mp. 162. In Talhnan c. Jancsville, 17 Wis. 71, the constitutional authority

whether the roll was rendered invalid by the omisRion referred to,
and if it was, whether the subsequent act could legalize it.1 But
if township officers should assume to do acts under the power of
taxation which could not lawfully be justified aR an exercise of
that power, no subsequent legislation could make them good. If,
for instance, a part of the property in a taxing district should be
assessed at one rate, and a part at. another, for a burden resting
equally upon all, there would be no such app01tionmcnt as is essential to taxation, and the roll would be beyond the reach of curative
legislation.2 And if persons or property should be assessed for taxation • in a district which did not include [• 383]
them, the nssesstnent would not only be · invalid, hut a
healing statute would be ineffectual to charge them with the burden. In such a case there would be a fatal want 'of jurisdiction ; 8
and even in judicial proceedings, if there was originally a failure of
jurisdiction, no subsequent law can confer it. 4

of the legislature to cause an irregular tax to be reassessed in a subsequent year,

where the rights of bona. ﬁde purchasers had intervened, was disputed; but the

court sustained the authority as “ a salutary and highly beneﬁcial feature of our

systems of taxation," and “not to be abandoned because in some instances it

produces individual hardships.” Certainly bona ﬁde purchasers, as between

themselves and the State, must take their purchases subject to all public burdens

justly resting upon them. The case of Conway v. Cable is instructive. It

was there held among other things,—and very justly as we think, —that the

legislature could not make good a tax sale effected by fraudulent combination

between the oﬁicers and the purchasers. In Miller v. Graham, 17 Ohio, N. s. 1,

a statute validating certain ditch assessments was sustained, notwithstanding, the

defects covered by it were not mere irregularities; but that statute gave the par-

ties an opportunity to be heard as to these defects.

' See Wells v. Weston, 22 Mo. 385; People v. Supervisors of Chenango,

11 N. Y. 563; Hughey’s Lessee v. Howell, 2 Ohio, 231; Covington 0. South-

gate, 15 B. Monr. 491; Morford v. Ungcr, 8 Iowa, 82; post, 499, 500.

‘ So held in McDaniel v. Correll, 19 Ill. 228, where a statute came under

consideration which assumed to make valid certain proceedings in court which

were void for want of jurisdiction of the persons concerned. See also Denny v.

Mattoon, 2 Allen, 361; Nelson v. Rountree, 23 \Vis. 367. \Valpole v. Elliott,
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1 See Weeks 11. Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 2!2; Dean 11. Gleason, 16 Wis. 1; post,
515, note.
t Sec Billings "· Detten, 15 Til. 218; Conway 11. Cable, 37 Ill. 82; and Thames
:Manufacturing Co. 11. Lathrop, 7 Conn. 550, for cases where curative statute&
were held not effectual to reach defects in tax proceedings. As to what defects
may or may not be cured by subsequent legislation, see Allen 11. Armstrong.
16 Iowa, 508, Smith 11. Cleveland, 17 Wis. 556, and Abbott 11. Lindenbower,
42 ~~o. 162. In Tallman r. Janesville, 17 Wis. 71, the constitutional authority
of the legislature to cause an irregular tax to be reassessed in a subsequent year,
where the rights of bona .fi~ purchasers had intervened, was clisputed ; but the
court sustained the authority as " a salutary and highly beneficial feature of our
systems of taxation," and "not to be abandoned because in some instanl•es it
produces individual hardships." Certainly bona fide purchasers, as between
themselves and the State, must take their purchases subject to all public burdens
justly resting upon them. The case of Conway 11. Cable is instructive. It
was there held among other things,- and very justly as we think, -that the
legislature could not make good a tax sale eff11cted by fraudulent combination
between the offiet.'rs and the purchasers. In Miller v. Graham, 17 Ohio, N. s. 1,
a statute validating certain ditch assessments was sustained, notwithstandin~ the
defects covered by it were not mere irregularities; but that statute gave the parties an opportunity to be beard as to these defects.
1 See Wells !'.Weston, 22 l\:lo. 885; People 11. Supervisors of Chenango,
11 N.Y. 568; Hughey's Lessee "· Howell, 2 Ohio, 281; Covington "· Southgate, 15 B. Moor. 491; Morford"· Unger, 8 Iowa, 82; post, 499, 500.
' So held in McDaniel 11. Correll, 19 Ill. 228, where a statute came under
consideration which assumed to make valid certain proceedings in court which
were void for want of jurisdiction of the persons concerned. See also Denny v.
Mattoon, 2 Allen, 861; Nelson 11. Rountree, 23 Wis. 867. Walpole v. Elliott,
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Statutory Privileges and Exemptions.

• 383

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

(cH. XI .

The citizen has no vested right in statutory privileges and

exemptions. Among these may be mentioned,—exemptions

Statutory Privilege• and Exemption•.

from the performance of public duty upon juries, or in the militia,

and the like; exemptions of property or person from assess-

ment for the purposes of taxation; exemptions of property from

being seized on attachment, or execution, or for the payment

of taxes ; exemption from highway labor, and the like. All these

rest upon reasons of public policy, and the laws are changed

as the varying circumstances seem to require. The State de-

mands the performance of military duty by those persons only

who are within certain speciﬁed ages; but if, in the opinion of

the legislature, the public exigencies should demand military

service from all other persons capable of bearing arms, the

privilege of exemption might be recalled, without violation of

any constitutional principle. The fact that a party had passed

the legal age under an existing law, and performed the service

demanded by it, could not protect him against further calls,

when public policy or public necessity was thought to require

them! In like manner, exemptions from taxation are always

subject to recall, when they have been granted merely as a

privilege, and not for a consideration received by the public;
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as in the case of exemption of buildings for religious or edu-

cational purposes, and the like? So, also, are exemptions of

property from execution.“ So, a license to carry on a par-

ticular trade for a speciﬁed period, may be recalled before the

period has elapsed.‘ So, as before stated, a penalty given by

18 Ind. 259, is distinguishable from these cases. In that case there was not a

failure of jurisdiction, but an irregular exercise of it.

1 Commonwealth v. Bird, 12 Mass. 443; Swindle v. Brooks, 34 Geo. 67;

Mayer, Ex parts, 27 Texas, 715. And see Dale v. The Governor, 3 Stew. 387.

' See ante, 280, 281, and notes. All the cases concede the right in the legis-

lature to recall an exemption from taxation, when not resting upon contract.

The subject was considered in People v. Roper, 35 N. Y. 629, in which it was

decided that a limited immunity from taxation, tendered to the members of

voluntary military companies, might be recalled at any time. It was held not to

be a contract, but “ only an expression of the legislative will for the time being,

in a matter of mere municipal regulation."

3 Bull v. Conroe, 13 \Vis. 238.

‘ Of this there can be no question unless a fee was paid for the license; and

[422]

The citizen has no vested right in statutory privileges and
exemptions. Among these may be mentioned,- exemptions
from the performance of public duty upon juries, or in the militia,
and the like ; exemptions of property or person from assessment for the purposes of taxation ; exemptions of property from
being seized on attachment, or execution, or for the payment
of taxes; exemption from highway labor, and the like. All these
. rest upon reasons of public policy, and the laws are changed
as the varying circumstances seem to require. The State demands the performance of military duty by those persons only
who are within certain specified ages ; but if, in the opinion of
the legislature, the public exigencies should demand military
service from all other persons capable of bearing arms, the
privilege of exemption might be recalled, without violation of
any constitutional principle. The fact that a party had passed
the legal age under an existing law, and performed the service
demanded by it, could not protect him against further calls,
when public policy or public necessity was thought to require
them.1 In like manner, exemptions from taxation are always
suhject to recall, when they have been granted merely as a
privilege, and not for a. consideration received by the public ;
as in the case of exemption of buildings for religious oc edn·
cational purposes, and the like.2 So, also, are exemptions of
property from execution.8 So, a license to carry on a particular trade for a. specified period, may be recalled before the
period has elapsed.• So, as before stated, a penalty given by
18 lnrl. 259, is distinguishable from these cases. In that case thet-e was not a
failure of jurisdiction, but an irregular exercise of it.
1 Commonwealth v. Bird, 12 Mass. 443; Swindle v. Brooks, 34 Geo. 67;
Mayer, Ex parte, 27 Texas, 715. And see Dale v. The Govet'Ilor, 3 Stew. 387.
1 See ante, 280, 281, and notes. All the cases concede the right in the legislature to recall an exemption from taxation, when not resting upon contract.
The subject was considered in People v. Roper, 35 N.Y. 629, in which it was
decided that a limited immunity from taxation, tendered to the members of
voluntary military companies, might be recalled at any time. It was held not to
be a contract, but " only an expression of the legislative will for the time being,
in a matter of mere municipal regulation."
a Bull v. Conroe, 13 Wis. 238.
• Of this there can be no question unless a fee was paid for the license; and
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statute may be taken away by statute at any time before judg-

CH. XI.] PROTECTION TO PROPERTY BY "THE LAW OF THE LAND."

*383

ment is recovered.‘ So an offered bounty may be recalled,

except as to so much as was actually earned while

the oﬂ'er was a continuing one; ‘and the fact that ["384]

a party has purchased property or incurred expenses

in preparation for earning the bounty cannot preclude the recall .2

A franchise granted by the State with a reservation of a right of re-

peal must be regarded as a mere privilege while it is suffered to

continue, but the legislature may take it away at any time, and

the grantees must rely for the perpetuity and integrity of the

franchises granted to them solely upon the faith of the sover-

eign grantor.3 A statutory right to have cases reviewed on

appeal may be taken away, by a repeal of the statute, even as

to causes which had been previously appea1ed.4 A mill-dam

act, which confers upon the person erecting a dam the right

to maintain it, and ﬂow the lands of private owners on paying

such compensation as should be assessed for the injury done,

may be repealed even as to dams previously erected.“ These

illustrations must suﬂice under the present head.

Oonsequential Injuries.

It.is a general rule that no one has a vested right to be

protected against consequential injuries arising from a proper

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:21 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105011581
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

well-considered cases hold that it may be even then. See Adams v. Hackett,

5 Gray, 597; Metropolitan Board of Excise v. Barrie, 34 N. Y. 657; ante,

p. 283, note.

' Oriental Bank v. Freeze, 6 Shep. 109. The statute authorized the plaintiﬂ‘,

suing for a breach of a prison bond, to recover the amount of his judgment and

costs. This was regarded by the court as in the nature of a penalty; and it

statute may be taken away by statute at any time before judgment is recovered. 1 So an offered bounty may be recalled,
except as to so much as was actually earned while
the offer was a continuing one; • and the fact that [* 384]
a party has purchased property or incurred expenses
in preparation for earning the bounty cannot preclude the recall.2
A franchise granted by the State with a reservation of a right of repeal must be regarded as a mere privilege while it is suffered to
continue, but the legislature may take it away at any time, and
the grantees must rely for the perpetuity and integrity of the
franchises granted to them solely upon the faith of the sovereign grantor.8 A statutory right to have cases reviewed on
appeal may be taken away, by a repeal of the statute, even as
to causes which had been previously appealed.4 A mill-dam
net, which confers upon the person erecting a dam the right
to ~aintain it, and flow tho lands of priva.te owners ou paying
such compensation as should be assessed for the injury done,
may be repealed even as to dams previously erected.6 These
illustrations must suffice under the present head.

was therefore held competent for the legislature, even after breach, to so modify

the law as to limit the plaintiﬂ"s recovery to his actual damages. See ante,

p. 362, note 5, and cases cited.

' East Saginaw Salt Manuf. Co. 1:. East Saginaw City, 19 Mich. 271. 'But as

Consequential Injuries.

to so much of the bounty as was actually earned before the change in the law,

the party earning it has a vested right which cannot be taken away. People v.

State Auditors, 9 Mich. 327.

It is a general rule that no one has a vested right to be
protected against consequential injuries arising from a proper

3 Per Smith, J., in Pratt v. Brown, 3 Wis. 611.

‘ Ex parts McCardle, 7 Wal. 506.

' Pratt v. Brown, 3 l1Vis. 603. But if the party maintaining the dam had

paid to the other party a compensation assessed under the statute, it might he

otherwise.
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well-considered cases bold that it may be even then. See Adams 11. Hackett,
6 Gray, 597; Metropolitan Board of Excise 11. Barrie, 34 N.Y. 657; ante,
p. 283, note.
1 Oriental Bank v. Freeze, 6 Shep. 109. The statute authorized the plaintiff,
suing for a breach of a prison bond, to recover the amount of his judgment and
costs. This was regarded by the court as in the nature of a penalty; and it
was therefore held competent for the legislature, even after breach, to so modify
the law as to limit the plaintiff's recovery to his actual damages. See ante,
p. 362, note li, and cases cited.
1 East Saginaw Salt Manuf. Co. 11. East Saginaw City, 19 Mich. 271. 'But as
to so much of the bounty as was actually earned before the change in the Ja,v,
the party earning it hu a vested right which cannot be taken away. People 11.
State Auditors, 9 Mich. 327.
3 Per Smith, J., in Pratt 11. Brown, 3 Wis. 611.
• Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wal. 506.
• Pratt u. Brown, 3 Wis. 603. But if the party maintaining the dam bad
paid to tbe other party a compensation assessed under tbe statute, it might be
otherwise.

[ 423]

* 384‘ CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [cn. XI.

exercise of rights by_others.1 This rule is peculiarly applicable

• 384'

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

[CH. XI.

to injuries resulting from the exercise of public powers.

Under the police power the State sometimes destroys, for the

time being, and perhaps permanently, the value to the owner

of his property, without affording him any redress. The eon-

struction of a new way or the discontinuance of an old one

may very seriously affect the value of adjacent property; the

removal of a county or State capital will often reduce very

largely the value of all the real estate of the place from whence

it was- removed: but in neither case can the parties, whose

interests would beinjuriously aﬁected, enjoin the act, or claim

compensation from the public.’ The general laws of the State

may be so changed as to transfer, from one town to another,

the obligation to support certain individuals, who may become

entitled to support as paupers, and the Constitution will present

no impediments The granting of a charter to a new corporation

may sometimes render valueless the franchise of an existing

corporation; but unless the State by contract has pre-

[“‘ 385] eluded itself from such new grant, the incidental injury ‘can

constitute no obstacle} But indeed it seems idle to

‘ For the doctrine damnum absque injuria, see Broom's Maxims, 185; Sedg-

wick on Damages, 30, 112.
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’ See ante, p. 208, and cases cited in note 2.

i‘ Goshen v. Richmond, 4 Allen, 460; Bridgewater v. Plymouth, 97 Mass.

390.

‘ The State of Massachusetts granted to a corporation the right to construct

a toll-bridge across the Charles River, under u charter which was to continue for

forty years, afterwards extended to seventy, at the end of which period the bridge

was to become the property of the commonwealth. During the term the cor-

exercise of rights by others. 1 This rule is peculiarly applicable
to injuries resulting from the exercise of public powers.
Under the police power the State sometimes destroys, for the
time being, and perhaps permanently, the value to the owner
of his property, without affording him any redress. The construction of a new way or the discontinuance of an old one
may very seriously affect the value of adjacent property ; the
removal of a county or State capital will often reduce very
largely the value of all the real estate of the place from whence
it was. removed : but in neither case can the parties, whose
interests would be injuriously affected, enjoin the act, or claim
compensation from the public.2 The genet·al laws of the State
may be so changed as to transfer, from one town to another,
the obligation to support certain individuals, who may become
entitled to support as paupers, and the Constitution will present
no impediment.s The granting of a chartet· to a new corpora~ion
may sometimes render valueless the franchise of an existing
corporation; hut unless the State by contract has pre[• 385] eluded itself from such new grant, the incidental injury *can
constitute no obstacle.4 But indeed it seems idle to

poration was to pay 2001. annually to Harvard College. Forty-two years after

the bridge was opened for passengers, the State incorporated a company for the

purpose of erecting another bridge over the same river, a short distance only

from the ﬁrst, and which would accommodate the same passengers. The neces-

sary etfect would be to decrease greatly the value of the ﬁrst franchise, if not to

render it altogether worthless. But the ﬁrst charter was not exclusive in its

terms; no contract was violated in granting the second; the resulting injury was

incidental to the exercise of an undoubted right by the State, and as all the

vested rights of the ﬁrst corporation still remained, though reduced in value by

the new grant, the case was one of damage without legal injury. Charles River

Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 7 Pick. 344, and 11 Pet. 420. See also Turnpike Co.

v. State, 3 \Val. 210; Piscataqua Bridge v. New Hampshire Bridge, 7 N. H. 35;

English v. New Ilaven, &c., Co. 32 Conn. 2-L0; Binghamptou Bridge Case, 27

N. Y. 87, and 3 \Val. 51.
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1 For the doctrine damnum absque inj"ria, see Broom's Maxims, 185; Sedgwick on Damages, 30, 112.
1 See ante, p. 208, and eases cited in note 2.
1 Goshen t1. Richmond, 4 Allen, 460; Bridgewater t1. Plymouth, 97 Mass.

890.

'

The State of Massachusetts granted to a corporation the right tO construct
a toll-bridge across the Charles River, under a charter which was to continue for
forty years, afterwards extended to seventy, at the end of which period the bridge
was to become the property of the commonwealth. During the term the corporation was to pay 200l. annually to Harvard College. Forty-two years after
the bridge was opened for passengers, the State incorporated a company for the
purpose of erecting another bridge over the same river, a short distance only
from the first, and which would accommodate the same passengers. The necessary effect would be to decrease greatly the value of the first franchise, if not to
render it altogether worthless. But the first charter was not exclusive in its
terms; no contract was violated in granting the second; the resulting injury was
incidental to the exercise of an undoubted right by the State, and as all the
vested righta of the first corporation still remained, though reduced in value by
the new grant, the case was one of damage without legal injury. Charles River
Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 7 Pick. 3H, and 11 Pet. 420. See also Turnpike Co.
t1. State, 3 Wal. 210; Piscataqua Bridge v. New Hampshire Bridge, 7 N. H. 35;
English t1. New Haven, &c., Co. 32 Conn. 240; Binghampton Bridge Case, 27
N.Y. 87, and 3 Wal. 51.
4
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specify instances, inasmuch, as all changes in the laws of the

CR. XI.] PROTECTION TO PROPERTY BY "THE LAW OF THE LAND."
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State are liable to inﬂict incidental injury upon individuals, and

if every citizen was entitled to remuneration for such injury,

the most beneﬁcial and necessary changes in the law might‘ be

found impracticable of accomplishment.

We have now endeavored to indicate what are and what are not

to be regarded as vested rights, and to classify the cases in which

individual interests, in possession or expectancy, are protected

against being devested by the direct interposition of legislative

authority. Some other cases may now be considered, in.which

legislation has endeavored to control parties as to the manner in

which they should make use of their property, or has permitted

claims to be created against it through the action of other parties

against the will of the owners. We do not allude now to the

control which the State may possess through an exercise of the

police power,-—a power which is merely one of regulation with a

view to the best interests and the most complete enjoyment of

rights by all, — but to that which, undera claim of State policy, and

without any reference to wrongful act or omission by the owner,

would exercise a supervision over his enjoyment of undoubted

rights,or which, in some cases, would compel him to recognize and

satisfy demands upon his property which have been created without
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his assent.

In former times sumptuary laws were sometimes passed, and

they were even deemed essential in republics to restrain the luxury

so fatal to that species of government.1 But the ideas which

suggested such laws are now exploded utterly, and no one would

seriously attempt to justify them in the present age. The right of

every man to do what he will with his own, not interfering with the

reciprocal right of others, is accepted among the fundamentals of

our law. The instances of attempt to interfere with it have not

' Montesq. Sp. of the Laws, B. 7. Such laws, though common in some coun-

tries, have never been numerous in England. See references to the legislation

of this character, 4 Bl. Com. 170. Some of these statutes prescribed the num-

ber of courses permissible at dinner or other meal, while others were directed to

restraining extravagance in dress. See I-Iallain, Mid. Ages, c. 9, pt. II. ; and as

to Roman sumptuary laws, Eneyc. Metrop. Vol. X. p. 110. Adam Smith said of

such laws, “ It is the highest impertinence and presumption in kings and min-

isters to pretend to watch over the economy of private people. and to restrain

their expense, either by sumptuary laws, or by prohibiting the importation of

foreign luxuries.” Wealth of Nations, B. 2, c. 3. As toprohibitory liquor laws,

see post, 581-584.
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specify instances, inasmuch, as all changes in the laws of the
State are liable to inflict incidental injury upon individuals, and
if every citizen was entitled to remuneration for such injury,
the most beneficial and necessary changes in the law wight' be
found impracticable of accomplishment.
'Ve have now endeavored to indicate what are and what are not
to be regarded as vested rights, and to classify the cases in which
individual interests, in possession or expectancy, are protected
against being devested by the direct interposition of legislative
authority. Some other cases may now be cousidm·ed, in which
legislation has endeavored to control parties as to the manner in
which they should make use of their property, or has permitted
claims to be created against it through the action of other parties
against the will of the owners. We do not allude now to the
control which the State may possess through an exercise of the
police power,- a power which is merely one of regulation with a
view to the best interests and the most complete enjoyment of
rights by all,- but to that which, under a claim of State policy, and
without any reference to wrongful act or omission by the owner,
would exercise a supervision over his enjoyment of undoubted
rights, or which, in some cases, would compel him to recognize and
satisfy demands upon his property which have been created without
his assent.
In former times sumptuary laws were sometimes passed, and
they were even deemed essential in republics to restrain the luxury
so fatal to that species of government. 1 But the ideas which
suggested such laws are now exploded utterly, and no one would
seriously attempt to justify them in the present age. The right of
every man to do what he will with his own, not intet·fcring with the
reciprocal right of others, is accepted among the fundamentals of
our law. The instances of attempt to interfere with it have not
1 l\lontesq. Sp. of the Laws, B. 7.
Such laws, though common in some countries, have never been numerous in England. See references to the legislation
of thi~ character, 4 Bl. Com. 170. Some of these statutes preseribed the number of courses permissible at dinner or other meal, while others were directed to
restraining extravag1\nce in dress. See Hallam, 1\lid. Ages, c. 9, pt. II. ; and as
to Roman sumptuary laws, Encyc. l\letrop. Vol. X. p. 110. Adam Smith said of
such laws, " It is the highest impcrtinenee and pPcsumption in kings and ministers to pretend to wakh o\·er the economy of private people, and to restrain
their expense, eithl'r by sumptuary laws, or by prohibiting the importation of
foreign luxuries." Wealth of Nations, B. 2, c. 3. As to prohibitory liquor laws,
see post, 581-584.
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been numerous since the early colonial days. A notable instance
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XI.

of an attempt to substitute the legislative judgment for that of the

proprietor, regarding the manner in which he should use and

employ his property, may be mentioned. In the State of Kentucky

an act was at one time passed to compel the owners of wild lands

to make certain improvements upon them within a speciﬁed time,

and declared them forfeited to the State in case the statute was not

complied with. It would be diﬁicult to frame, consistently with

the general principles of free government, a plausible argument in

support of such a statute. It was not an exercise of the right of

eminent domain, for that appropriates property to some speciﬁc

public use on making compensation. It was not taxation, for that is

simply an apportionment of the burden of supporting the govern-

ment. It was not a police regulation, for that could not go beyond

preventing an improper use of the land with reference to

[* 386] * the due exercise of rights and enjoyment of legal

privileges by others. It was purely and simply a law to

forfeit a man’s property, if he failed to improve it according to a

standard which the legislature had prescribed. To such a power,

if possessed by the government, there could be no limit but the legis-

lative discretion, and if defensible on principle, then a law which

should authorize the oﬂicer to enter a man’s dwelling and seize
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and conﬁscate his furniture if it fell below, or his food if it

exceeded an established legal standard, would be equally so. But

in a free country such laws when mentioned are condemned

instinctively.‘

But cases may sometimes present themselves in which improve-

ments actually made by one man upon the land of another, even

though against the will of the owner, ought on grounds of strict

equity to constitute a charge upon the land improved. If they

have been made in good faith, and under a reasonable expectation

on the part of the person making them, that he was to reap the

beneﬁt of them, and if the owner has stood by and suffered them

to be made, but afterwards has recovered the land and appropriated

the improvements, it would seem that there must exist against him

at least a strong equitable claim for reimbursement of the expend-

itures made, and perhaps no suﬁicient reason why provision should

not be made by law for their recovery.

1 The Kentucky statute referred to was declared unconstitutional in Gaines v.

Buford, 1 Dana, 499. See also Violett v. Violett, 2 Dana, 326.
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been numerous since the early colonial days. A notable instance
of an attempt to substitute the legislative judgment for that of the
proprietor, regarding the manner in which he should use and
employ his property, may be mentioned. In the State of Kentucky
an act was at one time passed to compel the owners of wild lands
to make certain improvements upon them within a specified time,
and declared them forfeited to the State in case the statute was not
complied with. It would be difficult to frame, consistently with
the general principles of free government, a plausible argument in
support of such a statute. It was not an exercise of the right of
eminent domain, for that appropriates property to some specific
public use on making compensation. It was not taxation, for that is
simply an apportionment of the burden of supporting the government. It was not a police regulation, for that could not go beyond
preventing an improper use of the land with reference to
[ 111 386] • the due exercise of rights and
enjoyment of legal
privileges by others. It was purely and simply a law to
forfeit a man's pt·operty, if he failed to improve it according to a
standard which the legislature had prescribed. To such a power,
if possessed by the government, there could be no limit but the legislative discretion, and if defensible on principle, then a law which
should authorize the officer to enter a man's dwelling and seize
and confiscate his furniture if it fell below, or his food if it
exceeded an established legal standard, would be equally so. But
in a fl'ee country such laws when mentioned are condemned
instinctively .1
But cases may sometimes present themselves in which improvements actually made by one man upon the land of another, even
though against the will of the owner, ought on grounds of strict
equity to constitute a charge upon the land improved. If they
have been made in good faith, and under a reasonable expectation
on the part of the person making them, that he was to reap the
benefit of them, and if the owner has stood by and suffered them
to be made, but afterwards has recovered the land and appropriated
the improvements, it would seem that there must exist against him
at least a strong equitable claim for reimbursement of the expenditures made, and perhaps no sufficient reason why provision should
not be made by law for their recovery.
The Kentucky statute referreu t.o was d~clared unconstitutional in Gaines "·
Buford, 1 Dana, 499. See also Violett"· Violett, 2 Dana, 3:26.
1
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Accordingly in the several States statutes will be found which
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undertake to provide for these equitable claims. These statutes are

commonly known as betterment laws ; and as an illustration of the

whole class, we give the substance of that adopted in Vermont. It

provided that after recovery in ejectment, where he or those

through whom he claimed had purchased or taken a lease of the

land, supposing at the time that the title purchased was good, or

the lease valid to convey and secure the title and interest therein

expressed, the defendant should be entitled to recover of the

plaintiff the full value of the improvements made by him or by

those through whom he claimed, to be assessed by jury, and to be

enforced against the land, and not otherwise. The value was

ascertained by estimating the increased value of the land in conse-

quence of the improvements; but the plaintiff at his election might

have the value of the land without the improvements assessed, and

the defendant should purchase the same at that price within four

years, or lose the beneﬁt of his claim for improvements. But the

beneﬁt of the law was not given to one who had entered

on land "‘ by virtue of a contract with the owner, unless it [* 387]

should appear that the owner had failed to fulﬁl such

contract on his part} ~

This statute. and similar ones which preceded it, have been
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adjudged constitutional by the Supreme Court of Vermont, and

have frequently been enforced. In an early case the court explained

the principle of these statutes as follows: “ The action for better-

ments, as they are now termed in the statute, is given on the

supposition that the legal title is found to be in the plaintiﬂ‘ in

ejcctment, and is intended to secure to the defendant the fruit of

his labor, and to the plaintiff all that he is justly entitled to, which

is his land in as good a situation as it would have been had no

labor been bestowed thereon. The statute is highly equitable in

all its provisions, and would do exact justice if the value either of

the improvements or of the land was always correctly estimated.

The principles upon which it is founded are taken from the civil

law, where ample provision was made for reimbursing the bona ﬁde

possessor the expense of his improvements, if he was removed from

his possession by the legal owner. It gives to the possessor not

the expense which he has laid out on the land, but the amount

‘ Revised Statutes of Vermont of 1839, p. 216.
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Accordingly in the several States statutes will be found which
undertake to provide for these equitable claims. These statutes are
commonly known as betterment laws; and as an illustration of the
whole class, we give the substance of that adopted in Vermont. It
provided that after recovery in ejectment, wh~re he or those
through whom he claimed had purchased or taken a lease of the
land, supposing at the time that the title purchased was good, or
the lease valid to convey and secure the title and interest therein
expressed, the defendant should be entitled to recover of the
plaintiff the full value of the improvements made by him or by
those through whom he claimed, to be assessed by jury, and to be
enforced against the land, and not otherwise. The value was
ascertained by estimating the increased value of the land in consequence of the improvements; but the plaintiff at his election might
have the value of the land without the improvements assessed, and
the defendant should purchase the same at that price within four
years, or lose the benefit of his claim for improvements. But the
benefit of the law was not given to one who had entered
on land • by Yirtue of a contract with the owner, unless it [• 387]
should appear that the owner had failed to fulfil such
contract on his part. 1
This statute. and similar ones which preceded it, have been
adjudged constitutional by the Supreme Court of Vermont, and
have frequently been enforced. In an early case the court explained
the principle of these statutes as follows: "The action for betterments, as they are now termed in the statute, is given on the •
supposition that the legal title is found to be in the plaintiff in
ejectment, and is intended to secure to the defendant the fruit of
his labor, and to the plaintiff all that he is justly entitled to, which
is his land in as good a situation as it would have been had no
labor been bestowed thereon. The statute is highly equitable in
all its provisions, and would do exact justice if the value either of
the improvements or of the land was always correctly estimated.
The principles upon which it is founded are taken from the civil
law, whm·e ample provision was made for reimbursing the bona fide
possessor the expense of his improvements, if he was removed from
his possession by the legal owner. It gives to the possessor not
the expense which he has laid out on the land, but the amount
1

Revised Statutes of Vermont of 1839, p. 216.
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which he has increased the value of the land by his bettcrments

(CH. :XI.

thereon ; or, in other words, the difference between the value of the

land as it is when the owner recovers it, and the value if no improve-

ment had been made. It' the owner take the land together with

the improvements, at the advanced value which it has from the

labor of the possessor, what can be more just than that he should

pay the difference? But if he is unwilling to pay this difference,

by giving a deed as the statute provides, he receives the value as it

would have been if nothing had been done thereon. The only

objection which can be made is, that it is sometimes compelling

the owner to sell when he may have been content with the property

in its natural state. But this, when weighed against the loss to

the bona ﬁde possessor, and against the injustice of depriving him

of the fruits of his labor, and giving it to another, who, by his

negligence in not sooner enforcing his claim, has in some measure

contributed to the mistake under which he has labored, is not

entitled to very great consideration.” 1

[*‘ 388] *The last circumstance stated in this opinion—the

negligence of the owner in asserting his claim—is evi-

dently deemed important in some States, whose statutes only allow

a recovery for improvements by one who has been in possession a

certain number of years. But a later Vermont ease dismisses it
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from consideration as a necessary ground oh which to base the

right of recovery. “The right of the occupant to recover the value

of his improvements,” say the court, “ does not depend upon the

question whether the real owner has been vigilant or negligent in

the assertion of his rights. It stands upon a principle of natural

justice and equity; viz., that the occupant in good faith, believing

himself to be the owner, has added to the permanent value of the

land by his labor and his money; is in equity entitled to such

added value ; and that it would be unjust that the owner of the land

should be enriched by acquiring the value of such improvements,

without compensation to him who made them. This principle of

natural justice has been very widely, we may say universally,

recognized.” 2

l Brown v. Storm, 4Vt. 37. This class of legislation was also elaborately

examined and defended by Trumbull, J., in Ross v. Irving, 14 Ill. 171, and in

some of the other cases referred to in the succeeding note. See also Bright v.

Boyd, 1 Story, 478; s. 0. 2 Story, 607.

’ Whitney 1:. Richardson, 81 Vt. 306. For other cases in which similar laws
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which he has increased the value of the land by his betterments
thereon; or, in other words, the difference between the value of the
land as it is when the owner recovers it, and the value if no improvement had been mii.de. Ir the owner take the land togethet· with
the improvements, at the advanced value which it has from the
labor of the possessor, what can be more just than that he should
pay the difference? But if he is unwilling to pay this difference,
by giving a deed as the statute provides, he receives the value as it
would have been if nothing had been done thereon. The ouly
objection which can be made is, that it is sometimes compelling
the owner to sell when he may have been content with t~1e property
in its natural state. But this, when weighed against the loss to
the bona fide possessor, and against the injustice of depriving him
of the fruits of his labor, and giving it to another, who, by his
negligence in not sooner enforcing his claim, has in some measure
contributed to the mistake under which he has labored, is not
entitled to very great consideration." 1
[• 388]
• The last circumstance stated in this opinion -the
negligence of the owner in asserting his claim -is evidently deemed important in some States, whose statutes only allow
n recovery for improvements by one who has been in possession a.
certain number of years. But a later Vermont case dismisses it
from consideration as a ne~essary ground oi1 which to base the
right of recovery. "The right of the occupant to recover the valne
of his improvements," say the court, "does not depend upon the
• question whether the real owner has been vigilant or negligent in
the assertion of his rights. It stands upon a principle of naturnl
justice and equity; viz., that the occupant in good faith, believing
himself to be the owner, has added to tho permanent value of the
land by his labor and his money ; is in equity entitled to such
added value; and that it would be unjttst that the owner of the land
should be enriched by acquiring the value of such improvements,
without compensation to him who made them. This principle of
natural justice has been very widely, we may say universally,
recognized." 2
1 Brown n. Storm, 4 Vt. 37.
This class of legislation was also elaborately
examined and defended by Trumbull, J., in Ross v. Irving, 14 Ill. 171, and in
some of the other cases referred to in the succeeding not-e. See also Bright "·
Boyd, 1 Story, 478; s. c. 2 Story, 607.
1 Whitney "·Richardson, 31 Vt. 306.
For other cases in which similar laws
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‘Betterment laws, then, recognize the existence of an [* 389]
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equitable right, and give a remedy for its enforcement where

none had existed before. It is true that they make a man pay for

improvements which he has not directed to he made; but this leg-

islation presents no feature of ofﬁeious interference by the govern-

ment with private property. The improvements have been made

by one person in good faith, and are now to be appropriated by

another. The parties cannot be placed in statu qua, and the stat-

ute accomplishcs justice as near as the circumstances of the case

will admit, when it compels the owner of the land, who, if he

declines to sell, must necessarily appropriate the betterments

made by another, to pay the value to the person at whose expense

they have been made. The case is peculiar ; but a statute cannot

be void as an unconstitutional interference with private property

have been held constitutional, see Armstrong v. Jackson, 1 Blackf. 374; Fowler

v. Ilalbert, 4 Bibb, 54; \Vithington v. Corey, 2 N. H. 115; Bacon v. Callender,

6 Mass. 303; Pacquette o. Pickness, 19 Wis. 219; Childs v. Shower, 18 Iowa,

261 ; Scott v. Mather, 14 Texas, 235; Saunders v. Wilson, 19 Texas, 194;

Bracl<et't v. Norcross, 1 Greenl. 92; llunt"s Lessee v. McMahan, 5 Ohio, 132;

Longworth v. Worthington, 6 Ohio, 10. See further, Jones v. Carter, 12 Mass.

314; Dothage v. Stuart, 35 Mo. 251; Fenwick v. Gill, 38 Mo. 510; Howard v;

• Betterment laws, then, recognize the existence of an [• 389]
equitable right, and give a remedy for its enforcement where
none had existed before; It is true that they make a man pay for
improvements which he has not directed to he made; but this legislation presents no feature of officious interference by the government with private property. The improvements have been made
by one perRon in good faith, and are now to be appropriated by
another. The parties cannot be f)laced iu statu quo, and the statute accomplishes justice as ncar as the circumstances of the case
will admit, when it compels the owner of the laud, who, if ha
declines to sell, must necessarily appropriate the betterments
made by another, to pay the value to the person at whose expense
they have been made. The case is peculiar ; but a statute cannot
be void as an unconstitutional interference with private property

Zeyer, 18 Ls. An. 407 ; Pope v. Macon, 23 Ark. 64-4; Marlow v. Adams, 24 Ark.
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109; Ormond v. Martin, 37 Ala. 598; Love v. Shartzer, 31 Cal. 487. For a

contrary ruling, see Nelson v. Allen, 1 Yerg. 376. Mr. ‘Justice Story held in

Society, &c. v. Wheeler, 2 Gall. 105, that such a law could not constitutionally

be made to apply to improvements made before its passage; but this decision

was made umler the New Hampshire Constitution, which forbade retrospective

laws. The principles of equity upon which such legislation is sustained would

seem not to depend upon the time when the improvements were made. See

Davis's Lessee v. Powell, 13 Ohio, 808. In Childs v. Shower, 18 Iowa, 261, it

was held that the legislature could not constitutionally make the value of the

improvements a personal ‘charge against the owner of the land, and authorize a

personal judgment against him. The same ruling was had in McCoy v. Grandy,

3 Ohio, N. s. 463. 'A statute had been passed authorizing the occupying claimant

at his option, after judgment rendered against him for the recovery of the land,

to demand payment from the successful claimant of the full value of his lasting

and valuable improvements, or to pay to the successful claimant the value of the

land without the improvements, and retain it. The court ay: “ The occupying

claimant act, in securing to the occupant a compensation for his improvements

as a condition precedent to the restitution of the lands to the owner, goes to the

utmost stretch of the legislative power touching this subject. And the statute

. . . providing for the transfer of the fee in the land to the occupying claimant,

without the consent of the owner, is a palpable invasion -of the right of private

property, and clearly in conﬂict with the Constitution.”

A [429]

have been held constitutional, see Armstrong 11. Jackson, 1 Blackf. 874; Fowler
11. Halbert, 4 Bibb, M; Withington 11. Corey, 2 N.H. 115; Bacon v. Callender,
6 1\la~s. :!03; Pacquette 11. Pickness, 19 Wis. 219; Childs 11. Shower, 18 Iowa,
261; St"ott v. 1\lllthH, 14 Texas, 235; Saunders v. Wilson, 19 Texas, 194;
Brackelt "· N orcro~s, 1 Green I. 92 ; Hunt'~ Les~ee v. McMahan, 5 Ohio, 132;
J.ongworth "· Worthington, 6 Ohio, 10. See further, Jones v. Carter, 12 Mass.
314; Dothage v. Stuart, 35 Mo. 251; Fenwick v. Gill, ~38 Mo. 510; Howard v:
Zeyer, HS La. An. 407; Pope 11. 1\Iaeon, 23 Ark. 644; l\Iarlow v. Adams, 24 Ark.
109; Ormond v. Martin, 37 Ala. 598; Love 11. Shartzer, 81 Cal. 487. For a
contrary ruling, see Nelson v. Allen, 1 Ycrg. 376. .1\lr. ·Justice Story held in
Sot·iety, &c. r. Wheeler, 2 Gall. 105, that such a law could not constitutionally
be made to apply to improvements made before its pa~sage; but this decision
was made under the New Hampshire Constitution, whieh forbade retrospecth·e
laws. The prineiples of equity upon whit·h sueh legislation is sustained would
seem not to dt•pend upon the time when the improvements were made. See
D1n·is's Lessee v. Powell, 18 Ohio, 308. In Childs v. Shower, 18 Iowa, 261, it
was hel•l that the lt'gislature could not constitutionally make the value of the
improvements a personal ,charge again~t the owner of the land, and authorize a
per~onal jt11lgmcnt against him. The same ruling was bad in McCoy 11. Grandy,
3 Ol1io, N. s. 463. A statute had been passed authorizing the occupying d.jiimant
at his option, after judgment rcnder('d against him for the re1~o'·~ry of the land,
to <h·111and payment from the sueccssful elaimant of the full value of his lasting
and \'lllnable improvements, or to pay to the suceessful claimant the value of the
land without the improv,..ments, and rt'tain it. The court say: " The occupying
claimant at't, in securing to the occupant a eompt·n~ation for his improvements
as a condition preeedcnt to the restitution of the lands to the owner, goes to the
utmost streteh of the legislativ<! power touching this subject. And the statute
. . . providing for the transfer of thtJ fee in the land to the occupying claimant,
without the consent of the owner, is a palpable invasion ·of the right. of private
property, and clearly in conflict with the Con~titution."
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which adjusts the equities of the parties as near as possible accord-
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ing to natural justice.‘

Unequal and Partial Legislation.

In the course of our discussion of this subject it has been seen

that some statutes are void though general in their scope, while

which adjusts the equities of the parties as near as possible according to natural justice. 1

others are valid though establishing rules for single cases only.

An enactment may therefore be the law of the land without being

Unequal and Partial Legislation.

a general law. And this being so, it may be important to consider

in what cases constitutional principles will require a statute to be

general in its operation, and in what cases, on the other hand, it

may be valid without being general. We speak now in reference

to general constitutional principles, and not to any peculiar rules

which may have become established by special provisions in the

constitutions of individual States.

The cases relating to municipal corporations stand upon peculiar

grounds from the fact that those corporations are mere agencies of

government, and as such are subject to complete legislative con-

trol. Statiites authorizing the sale of property of minors and

other persons under disability are also exceptional, in that they

are applied for by the parties representing the interests of the

owners, and are remedial in their character. Such statutes are

supported by the presumption that the parties in interest would
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consent if capable of doing so, and in law are to he con-

[* 390] sidered as assenting in * the person of the guardians or

trustees of their rights. And perhaps in any other case,

if a party petitions for legislation and avails himself of it, he may

justly be held estopped from disputing its validity ; 2 so that the

l In Harris v. Inhabitants of Marblehead, 10 Gray, 44, it was held that the

betterment law did not apply to a town which had appropriated private property

for the purposes of a school-house, and erected the house thereon. The law, it

was said, did not apply " where a party is taking land by force of the statute,

and is bound to see that all the steps are regular. If it did, the party taking

the land might in fact compel a sale of the land, or compel the party to buy the

school-house, or any other building erected upon it.” But as a matter of con-

stitutional authority, we see no reason to doubt that the legislature might extend

such a law even to the cases of this description.

’ This doctrine was applied in Ferguson v. Landram, 5 Bush, 230, to parties

who had obtained a statute for the levy of a tax to refund bounty moneys, which

statute was held void as to other persons.

[430]

In the course of our discussion of this subject it has been seen
that some statutes are void though general in their scope, while
others are valid though establishing rules for single cases only.
An enactment may therefore be the law of the land without being
·a general law. And this being so, it may be important to consider
in what cases constitutional principles will require a statute to he
general in its operation, and in what cases, on the other hand, it
may be valid without being general. We speak now in reference
to general constitutional principles, and not to any peculiar rules
which may have become established by special provisions in the
constitutions of individual States.
The cases relating to municipal corporations stand upon peculiar
grounds from the fact that those corporations are mere agencies of
government, and as such are subject to complete legislative control. Stathtes authorizing the sale of property of minors and
other persons under disability are also exceptional, in that they
are applied for by the parties representing the interests of the
owners, and are remedial in their character. Such statutes are
supported by the presumption that the parties in interest would
consent if capable of doing so, and in law are to be con[• 390] sidered as assenting in • the pl'rson of the guar·dians or
trustees of their rights. And perhaps in any other case,
if a party petitions for legislation and avails himself of it, he may
justly be held estopped from disputing its validity ; 2 so that the
In Harris "· Inhabitants of Marblehead, 10 Gray, 44, it was held that the
betterment law did not apply to a town which had appropriated private property
for the purposes of a school-hou~e, and erected the house thereon. The law, it
was iaid, did not apply "where a party is taking land by force of the statute,
and is bound to see that all the steps are regular. If it did, the party taking
the land might in fact compel a sale of the land, or compel the party to buy the
school-house, or any other building creckd upon it." But as a matter of constitutional authority, we see no re11son to doubt that the legislature might extend
such a law even to the cas£>s of this description.
1 This doctrine was applied in Ferguson v. Landram, 5 Bush, 230, to parties
who had obtained a statute for the levy of a tax to refund bounty moneys, which
atatute was held void as to other persons.
1
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great bulk of private legislation which is adopted from year to
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year, may at once be dismissed from this discussion.

Laws public in their objects may, unless express constitutional

provision forbids,‘ be either general or local in their application;

they may embrace many subjects or one, and they may extend to

all citizens, or be conﬁned to particular classes, as minors or mar-

ried women, bankers or traders, and the like. The authority that

legislates for the State at large must determine whether particular

rules shall extend to the whole State and all its citizens, or, on the

other hand, to a subdivision of the State or a single class of its

citizens only. The circumstances of a particular locality, or the

prevailing public sentiment in that section of the State, may

require or make acceptable ditferent police regulations from those

demanded in another, or call for different taxation, and a differ-

ent application of the public moneys. The legislature may there-

fore prescribe or authorize different laws of police, allow the right

of eminent domain to be exercised in diﬂerent cases and through

different agencies, and prescribe peculiar restrictions upon taxation

in each distinct municipality, provided the State constitution does

not forbid. These discriminations are made constantly; and the

fact that the laws are of local or special operation only is not

supposed to render them obnoxious in principle. The legislature
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may also deem it desirable to prescribe peculiar rules for the

several occupations, and to establish distinctions in the rights,

obligations, duties, and capacities of citizens. The business of

common carriers, for instance, or of bankers, may require special

statutory regulations for the general beneﬁt, and it may be matter

of public policy to give laborers of one class a speciﬁc lien for their

wages, when it would be impracticable or impolitic to do the same

by persons engaged in some other employments. If the laws be

otherwise unobjectionable, all that can be required in these cases

is, that they be general in their application to the class or locality

to which they apply; and they are then public in character, and

of their propriety and policy the legislature must judge.

But a statute would not be constitutional which should prescribe

1 See ante, p. 128, note 1, and cases cited. To make a statute a public law

of general obligation, it is not necessary that it should be equally applicable to

all parts of the State; all that is required is that it shall apply equally to all

persons within the territorial limits described in the act. State v. County Com-

missioners of Baltimore, 29 Md. 516.

[ 431 ]

great bulk of private legislation which is adopted from year to
year, may at once be dismissed from this discussion.
Laws public in their objects may, unless express constitutio~al
provision forbids,1 be either general or local in their application;
they may embrace many subjects or one, and they may extend to
all citizens, or be confined to particular classes, as minors or married women, bankers or traders, and the like. The authority that
legislates for the State at large must determine whether particular
rules shall extend to the whole State and all its citizens, or, on the
other hand, to a subdivision of the State or a single class of its
citizens only. The circumstances of a particular locality, or the
prevailing public sentiment in that section of the State, may
require or make acceptable different police regulations from those
demanded in another, or call for different taxation, and a different application of the public moneys. The legislature may therefore prescribe or authorize different laws of police, allow the right
of eminent domain to be exercised in different cases and through
different agencies, and prescribe peculiar restrictions upon taxation
in each distinct municipality, provided the State constitution does
not forbid. These discriminations are made constantly; and the
fact that the laws are of local or special operation only is not
supposed to render them obnoxious in principle. The legislature
may also deem it desirable to prescribe peculiar rules for the
several occupations, and to establish distinctions in the rights,
obligations, duties, and capacities of citizens. The business of
common carriers, for instance, or of bankers, may require special
statutory regulations for the general benefit, and it may be matter
of public policy to give laborers of one class a specific lien for their
wages, when it would be impracticable or impolitic to do the same
by persons engaged in some other employments. If the laws be
otherwise unobjectionable, all that can be required in these cases
is, that they be general in their application to the class or locality
to which they apply; and they are then public in character, and
of their propriety and policy the legislature must judge.
But a statute would not be constitutional which should proscribe
1 See ante, p. 128, note 1, anu cases cited.
To make a statute a public law
of general obligation, it is not necessary that it should be equally applicable to
all parts of the State ; all that is reqUJred is that it shall apply equally to all
persons within the territorial limits described in the act. State v. County Commisaioners of Baltimore, 29 Md. 516.
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"‘ 390 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [cn. x1.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

a class or a party for opinion’s sake,‘ or which should

[CH. XI.

[* 391] select particular ‘*individnals from a class or locality, and

_ subject them to peculiar rules, or impose upon them

special obligations or burdens from which others in the same

locality or class are exempt?

The legislature may suspend the operation of the general laws

of the State; but when it does so the suspension must be general,

and cannot be made for individual cases or for particular localities!‘

' The sixth section of the Metropolitan Police Law of Baltimore (1859) pro-

vided that " no Black Republican, or indorser or supporter of the Helper book,

shall be appointed to any oﬂice " under the Board of Police which it established.

This was claimed to be unconstitutional, as introduing into legislation the prin-

ciple of prescription for the sake of political opinion, which was directly opposed

a class or a party for opinion's sake,1 or which should
[• 391] select particular • individuals from a class or locality, and
.
subject them to peculiar rules, or impose upon them
special obligations or burdens from which others in the same
locality or class are exempt. 2
The legislature may suspend the operation of the general laws
of the State; but when it does so the suspension must be general,
and cannot be made for individual cases or for particular localities.a

to the cardinal principles on which the Constitution was founded. The court

dismissed the objection in the following words: “That portion of the sixth

section which relates to Black Republicans, &c., is obnoxious to the objection

urged against it, if we are to consider that class of persons as proscribed on

account of their political or religious opinions. But we cannot understand,

oﬁicially, who are meant to be affected by the proviso, and therefore cannot ex-

press a judicial opinion on the question.” Baltimore v. State, 15 468. See

also p. 484. This does not seem to be a very satisfactory disposition of so grave

a constitutional objection to a legislative act. That courts may take judicial
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notice of the fact that the electors of the country are divided into parties with

well-known designations cannot be doubted; and when one of these is proscribed

by a name familiarly applied to it by its opponents, the inference that it is done

because of political opinion seems to be too conclusive to need further support

than that which is found in the act itself. And we know no reason why courts

should decline to take notice of those facts of general notoriety, which, like the

names of political parties, are a part of the public history of the times.

’ Lin Sing 0. \Vashburn, 20 Cal. 534. There is no reason, however, why

the law should not take notice of peculiar views held by some classes of people,

which unﬁt them for certain public duties, and excuse them from the performance

of such dutics ; as Quakers are excused from military duty, and persons denying

the right to inﬂict capital punishment are excluded from juries in capital cases.

These, however, are in the nature of exemptions, and they rest upon considera-

tions of obvious necessity.

3 The statute of limitations cannot be suspended in particular cases while

allowed to remain in force generally. Holden v. James, 11 Mass. 396; Davison

v. Johonnot, 7 Met. 393. The general exemption laws cannot be varied for

particular cases or localities. Bull v. Conroe, 13 VVis. 238, 244. The legislature,

when forbidden to grant divorces, cannot pass special acts authorizing the courts

to grant divorces in particular cases for causes not recognized in the general law.

Teft. v. Teft, 8 Mich. 67. The authority in emergencies to suspend the civil

laws in a part of the State only, by a declaration of martial law, we do not call

in question by any thing here stated.

[432]

The sixth section of the Metropolitan Police Law of Baltimore (1859) provided that" no Black Republican, or indorser or supporter of the Helper book,
shall be appointt•d to any office " under the Board of Polit:e which it establi~hl'd.
This was claimed to be unconstitutional, as introduing into l~gislation the principle of proscription for the sake of political opinion, which was directly opposed
to the cardinal principles on which the Constitution was founded. The court
dismissed the objection in the following words: "That portion of the sixth
section which relates to Black Rt>publicans, &c., is ob1~oxious to the objection
urged against it, if we are to consider that. dass of persons as proscribed on
account of their political or religious opinions. But we cannot understand,
officially, who are meant to be affected by the proviso, anrl therefore cannot express a judidal opinion on the question ." Baltimore v. State, 15 :Md. 468. See
also p. 484. This docs not seem to be a very satisfactory dispositio~ of so grave
a constitutional objection to a legi~lAtive act. That courts may take judicial
notice of the fact that the electors of the country are divid~d into parties with
well-known designations cannot be doubted; and when one of these is proscribed
by a name familiarly applied to it by its opponents, the inference that it is done
because of politital opinion seems to be too conclmive to need further snpport
than that which is found in the ad itself. And we know no reason why courts
should decline to take no~ice of those facts of general notoriety, which, like the
names of political pRrties, are a part of the public history of the times.
1 Lin Sing "· 'Vashburn, 20 Cal. 53!.
Tbere is no reason, however, why
the law should not take notice of peculiar views held by some classes of pl·ople,
whh:h unfit them for certain public dutits, and excuse them from the performance
of such dutit>s; as Quakers are excused from military duty, and persons denying
the right to inflid capital punishment are exduded from jurit>s in capital cases.
These, however, are in the nature of exemptions, and they rest upon considerations of obvious necessity.
3 The statute of limitations cannot be suspended in particular cases while
allowed to remain in force generally. Holden v. James, 11 Mass. 396; Davison
"· Johonnot, 7 :Met. 393. The general ~xemption laws cannot be varied for
particular cases or localities. Bull v. Conroe, 1~ Wis. 238, 244. The legislature,
when forbidden to grant di,·orccs, cannot pass ~peeial acts authorizing the <·ourts
to grant divorces in partil'ular cases for cau~es not r~cognized in the general law.
Teft v. Teft, 3 l\fi1·h. 67. The authority in em(·rgencics to suspend the civil
laws in a part of the State only, by a declaration of martial law, we do not call
in question by any thing here stated.
1
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on. xr.] PROTECTION TO PROPERTY BY “ ran LAW or was LAND.” * 391

Privileges may be granted to particular individuals when by so

CH. XI.) PROTECTION TO PROPERTY BY" THE LAW OF THE LAND."

* 391

doing the rights of others are not interfered with ; disabilities may

be removed; the legislature as parens patriw may grant authority

to the guardians or trustees of incompetent persons to exercise a

statutory control over their estates for their assistance, comfort, or

support, or for the discharge of legal or equitable liens upon their

property; but every one has a right to demand that he be governed

by general rules, and a special statute which, without his consent,

singles his case out as one to be regulated by a different

law from that which is applied * in all similar cases, [* 392]

would not be legitimate legislation, but would be such

an arbitrary mandate as is not within the province of free _gov-

ernments. Those who make the laws “ are to govern by pro-

mulgated, established laws, not to be varied in particular cases,

but to have one rule for rich and poor, for the favorite at court and

the countryman at plough.”1 This is a maxim in constitutional

law, and by it we may test the authority and binding force of legis-

lative enactments.” ‘

' Locke on Civil Government, § 142.

* In Lewis v. Webb, 3 Greenl. 326, the validity of a statute granting an

appeal from a decree of theVProbate Court in a particular case came under

review. The court say: "On principle it can never be within the bounds of
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legitimate legislation to enact a special law, or pass a resolve dispensing with

the general law in a particular case, and granting a privilege and indulgence to

one man, by way of exemption from the operation and effect of such general

law, leaving all other persons under its operation. Such a law is neither just nor

reasonable in its consequences. It is our boast that we live under a government

Privileges may be granted to particular individuals when by so
doing the rights of others are not interfered with; disabilities may
be removed; the legislature as parens patrim may grant authority
to the guardians or trustees of incompetent persons to exercise a
statutory control over their estates for their assistance, comfort, or
support, or for the discharge of legal or equitable liens upon their
property; but every one has a right to demand that he be governed
by general rules, and a special statute which, without his consent,
singles his case out as one to be regulated by a different
law from that which is applied *in all similar cases, (* 392]
would not be legitimate legislation, but would be such
an arbitrary mandate as is not within the province of free _governments. Those who make the laws " are to govern by promulgated, established laws, not to be varied in particular cases,
but to have one rule for rich and poor, for the favorite at court and
the countl·yman at plough." 1 This is a maxim in constitutional
law, and by it we may test the authority and binding force of legislative enactments.2
'

of laws, and not of men; but this can hardly be deemed a blessing, unless those

laws have for their immovable basis the great principles of constitutional equality.

Can it be supposed for a moment that, if‘ the legislature should pass a general

law, and add a section by way of proviso, that it never should be construed

to have any operation or effect upon the persons, rights, or property of Archelaus

Lewis or John Gordon, such a proviso would receive-the sanction or even the

countenance of a court of law? And how does the supposed case dill"er from

the present? A resolve passed after the general law can produce only the same

eﬁect as such proviso. In fact, neither can have any legal operation.” See also

Durham 1:. Lewiston, 4 Greenl. 1-10; Holden 0. James, 11 Mass. 396; Piquet,

Appellant, 5 Pick. 64; Budd v. State, 3 Humph. 483 ; W'ally’s Heirs v. Kennedy,

2 Yerg. 554. In the last ease it is said: “ The rights of every individual must

stand or fall by the same rule or law that governs every other member of‘ the

body politic, or land, under similar circumstances; and every partial or private

law, which directly proposes to destroy or affect individual rights, or does the

same thing by affording remedies leading to similar consequences, is unconstitu-

28 [433]

Locke on Civil Government, § 142.
In Lewis v. Webb, 3 GreenI. 326, thP validity of a statute granting an
appeal from a decree of the Probate Court in a particular case came under
review. The court say : •• On principle it can never be within the bounds of
legitimate legislation to enact a special law, or pass a resolve dispensing with
the general law in a particular case, and granting a privilege and indulgence to
one man, by way of exemption from the operation and effect of such general
law, leaving all other persons under its operation. Such a law is neither just nor
reasonable in its consequences. It is our boast that we live under a government
of laws, and not of men; but this ca~ hardly be deemed a blessing, unless those
laws have for their immovable basis the great principles of constitutional equality.
Can it be supposed for a moment that, if the legislature should pass a general
law, and add a section by way of proviso, that it never should be construed
to have any operation or effect upon the person~, rights, or property of Archclaus
Lewis or John Gordon, such a proviso would receive ·the sanction or even the
countenance of a court of law? And how does the supposed case differ from
the present? A resolve passed after the general law can produce only the same
effect as such proviso. In fact, neither can have any legal operation." See also
Durham v. Lewiston, 4 Greenl. 140; Holden v. James, 11 Mass. 396; J>iquet,
Appellant, 5 Pick. 64; Budd v. State, 3 Humph. 4!:!3; Wally's Heirs v. Kennedy,
2 Yerg. 554. In the last case it is said: "The rights of every individual must
stand or fall by the same rule or law that governs every other member of the
body politic, or land, under similar circumstances; and every partial or private
law, which directly proposes to destroy or affect individual rights, or does the
same thing by affording remedies leading to similar consequences, is unconstitu1

1

28
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* 392 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [cn. x1.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

Special courts cannot be created for the trial of the rights

[cu.

XI.

and obligations of particular parties;1 and those cases in which

legislative acts granting new trials or other special relief in judi-

cial proceedings, while they have been regarded as usurpations of

judicial authority, have also been considered obnoxious to the

objection that they undertook to suspend general laws in

[* 393] special *cases. The doubt might also arise whether a

regulation made for any one class of citizens, entirely

arbitrary in its character, and restricting their rights, privileges,

or legal capacities in a manner before unknown to the law, could

be sustained, notwithstanding its generality. Distinctions in these

respects must rest upon some reason upon which they can be de-

fended,—like the want of capacity in infants and insane persons;

and if the legislature should undertake to provide that persons

following some speciﬁed lawful trade or employment should not

have capacity to make contracts, or to receive conveyances, or to

build such houses as others were allowed to erect, or in any other

way to make such use of their property as was permissible to others,

it can scarcely be doubted that the act would transcend the due

bounds of legislative power, even though no express constitutional

provision could be pointed out with which it would come in conﬂict.

To forbid to an individual or a class the right to the acquisition or
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enjoyment of property in such manner as should be permitted to

the community at large, would be to deprive them of liberty in

particulars of primary importance to their “ pursuit of happiness ; ”*

and those who should claim a right to do so ought to be able to

tional and void. Were it otherwise, odious individuals and corporations would

be governed by one law; the mass of the community and those who made the

law by another; whereas the like general law affecting the whole community

equally could not have been passed.”

‘ As, for instance, the debtors of a particular bank. Bank of the State v.

Cooper, 2 Yerg. 599.

* Burlamaqui (Politic Law, c. 3, § 15) deﬁnes natural liberty as the right which

nature gives to all mankind of disposing of their persons and property after the

manner they judge most consonant to their happiness, on condition of their act-

ing within the limits of the law of nature, and so as not to interfere with an

equal exercise of the same rights by other men. See 1 Bl. Com. 125. Lieber

says: “ Liberty of social man consists in the protection of unrestrained action in

as high a degree as the same claim of protection of each individual admits of, or

Special courtS cannot be created for the trial of the rights
and obligations of particular parties ; 1 and those cases in which
legislative acts granting new trials or other special relief in judicial proceedings, while they have been regarded as usurpations of
judicial authority, have also been considered obnoxious to the
objection that they undertook to suspend general laws in
[* 393] special • cases. The doubt might also arise whether a
regulation made for any one class of citizens, entirely
arbitrary in its character, and restricting their rights, privileges,
or legal capacities in a manner before unknown to the law, could
be sustained, notwithstanding its generality. Distinctions in these
resp~cts must rest upon some reason upon which they can be defended, -like the want of capacity in infants and insane persons;
and if the legislature should undertake to provide that persons
following some specified lawful trade or employment should not
have capacity to make contracts, or to receive conveyances, or to
build such houses as others were allowed to erect, or in any other
way to make such use of their property as was permissible to others,
it can scarcely be doubted that the act would transcend the due
bounds of legislative power, even though no express constitutional
provision could be pointed out w~th which it would coltle in conflict.
To forbid to an individual or a class the right to the acquisition or
enjoyment of property in such manner as should be permitted to
the community at large, would be to deprive them of liberty in
particulars of primary importance to their "pursuit of happiness;" 2
and those who should claim a right to do so ought to be able to
tional and void. \Vere it otherwise, odious individuals and corporations would

in the most eﬂicient protection of his rights, claims, interests, as a man or citizen,

or of his humanity manifested as a social being.” Civil Liberty and Self-Gov-

ernment.

[434]

be governed by one law; the mass of the community and those who made the
law by another ; whereas the like general law affecting the whole community

equally could not have been passed."
1 As, for instance, the debtors of a particular bank.
Bank of the State !'.
Cooper, 2 Yerg. 599.
1 Burlamaqui (Politic Law, c. 3, § 15) defines natttralliberty as the right which
nature gives to all mankind of disposing of their persons and property after the
manner they judge most consonant to their happiness, on condition of their acting within the limits of the Jaw of nature, and so as not to interfere with an
equal exercise of the same rights by other men. See 1 Bl. Com. 125. Lieber
says : " Liberty o£ social man consists in the protection of unrestrained action in
as high a degree as the same claim of protection of each individual admits of, or
in the most efficient protection of his rights, claims, interests, as a man or citizen,
or of his humanity manifested as a social being." Civil Liberty and ~elf-Gov
ernment.

[ 434]

cu. xI.] PROTECTION TO PROPERTY BY “ THE LAW or THE LAND.” * 393

show a speciﬁc authority therefor, instead of calling upon others

CH. :XI.] PROTECTION TO PROPERTY BY" THE LAW OF THE LAND." • 393

to show how and where the authority is negatived.

Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably

should be the aim of the law; and if special privileges are granted,

or special burdens or restrictions imposed in any case, it must be

presumed that the legislature designed to depart as little as possible

from this fundamental maxim of government} The State, it is to

be presumed, has no favors to bestow, and designs to inﬂict no

arbitrary deprivation of rights. Special privileges are always ob-

noxious, and discriminations against persons or classes are still

more so, and, as a rule of construction, are always to be leaned

against as probably not contemplated or designed. It has been

held that a statute requiring attorneys to render services in suits for

poor persons without fee or reward, was to be conﬁned strictly

to the case/s therein prescribed; and if by its terms it

*‘expressly covered civil cases only, it could not be ex-

394]

tended to embrace defences of criminal prosecutions?

S0 where a constitutional provision conﬁned the elective franchise

to “white male citizens,” and it appeared that the legislation of

the State had always treated of negroes, mulattoes, and other colored

persons in contradistinction to white, it was held that although
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quadroons, being a recognized class of colored persons, must be

excluded, yet that the rule of exclusion would not be carried

further? So a ‘statute making parties witnesses against them-

In the Case of Monopolies, Darcy v. Allain, 11 Rep. 84, the grant of an

exclusive privilege of making playing cards was adjudged void, inasmuch as “ the

sole trade of any mechanical artiﬁce, or any other monopoly, is not only a dam-

age and prejudice to those who exercise the same trade, but also to all other sub-

jccts ; for the end of all these monopolies is for the private gain of the patentees.”

On this ground it has been denied that the State can exercise the power of tax-

ation on behalf of corporations who undertake to make or to improve the thor-

oughfares of trade and travel for their own beneﬁt. The State, it is said, can no

more tax the community to set one class of men up in business than another; can

no more subsidize one occupation than another; can no more make donations to

show a specific authority therefor, instead of calling upon others
to show how and where the authority is negatived.
Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably
should be the aim of the law; and if special privileges are granted,
or special burdens or restrictions imposed in any case, it must be
presumed that the legislature designed to depart as little as possible
from this fundamental maxim of government. 1 The State, it is to
be presumed, has no favors to bestow, and designs to inflict no
arbitrary deprivation of rights. Special privileges are always obnoxious, and discrimirrations against persons or clasl\es are still
more so, and, as a rule of construction, are always to be leaned
against as probably not contemplated or designed. It has been
held that a statute requiring attorneys to render services in suits for
poor persons without fee or reward, was to be confined strictly
to the cases therein prescribed; and if by its terms it
'
• expressly covered civil cases only, it could not be ex- [• 394]
tended to embrace defences of criminal prosecntions.2
So where a constitutional provision confined the elective franchise
to " wltite male citizens," and it appeared that the legislation of
the State had always treated of negroes, mulattoes, and otlter colored
persons in contradistinction to white, it was held that although
quadroons, being a recognized class of colored persons, must· be
excluded, yet that the rule of exclusion would not be carried
further.a So a ·statute making parties witnesses against them-

the men who build and own railroads in consideration of expected incidental

beneﬁts, than it can make them to the men who build stores or manufactories in

consideration of similar expected beneﬁts. People v. Township Board of Salem,

20 Mich.; s. c. 9 Am. Law Reg. N. s. 487; Garrard Co. Court v. Kentucky

River Nav. Co. in Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 1870.

’ Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 18.

‘ People v. Dean, 14 Mich. 406. See Bailey v. Fiske, 34 Me. 77. The de-

cisions'in Ohio were still more liberal, and ranked as white persons all who had

[435]

1 In the CILI!e of Monopolies, Darcy v. Allain, 11 Rep. 84, the grant of an
exclusive privilege of making playing cards was adjudged void, inasmuch as •• the
sole trade of any mechanical artifice, or any other monopoly, is not only a damage and prejudice to those who t>xercise the same traue, but also to all other subjects; for the end of all these monopolies is for the private gain of the patentees."
On this ground it baa been denied that the State can exercise the power of taxation on behalf of corporations who undertake to make or to improve the thoroughfares of trade and travel for their own benefit. The State, it is said, can no
more tax the community to set one class of men up in bu~iness than another ; can
no more subsidize one occupation than another; can no more make donations to
the men who build and own railroads in consideration of expected incidental
benefits, than it can make them to the men who build stores or manufactories in
consideration of similar expected benefits. People v. Township Doaru of Salem,
20 Mich.; 8. c. 9 Am. Law Reg. N. 8. 487; Garrard Co. Court v. Kentucky
River Nav. Co. in Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 1870.
1 Webb t~. Baird, 6 Ind. 13.
1 People v. Dean, 14 Mich. 406.
See Bailey v. Fiske, 84 Me. 77. The decisions "m Ohio were still more liberal, and ranked as white persons all who had

[ 435]

"‘ 394 - CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [CH. XI.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

selves cannot be construed to compel them to disclose facts which

(CH. XI.

would subject them to criminal punish1nent.1 And a statute which

authorizes summary process in favor of a bank against debtors

who have by express contract made their obligations payable at

such bank, being in derogation of the ordinary principles of private

right, must be subject to strict construction.“ These cases are

only illustrations of -a rule of general acce'ptauce.3

There are unquestionably cases in which the State may grant

privileges to speciﬁed individuals without violating any constitu-

tional principle, because, from the nature of the case, it is impos-

sible they should be possessed and enjoyed by all; and if it is

important that they should exist, the proper State authority must

be left to select the grantees. Of this class are grants of the

franchise to be a corporation. Such grants, however, which con-

fer upon a few persons what cannot be shared by the many, and

which, though supposed to be made on public grounds, are never-

theless frequently of great value to the corporators and therefore

sought with avidity, are never to be extended by construction be-

yond the plain terms in which they are conferred. No rule is

better settled than that charters of incorporation are to be con-

strued strictly against the corporatorsﬂl The just pre-

[*395] sumption in *every such case is, that the State has
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granted in express terms all that it designed to grant

at all. “ When a State,” says the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

“means to clothe a corporate body with a portion of her own

sovereignty, and to disarm herself to that extent of the power

that belongs to her, it is so easy to say so, that we will never

believe it to be meant when it is not said. . . . In the construction

a preponderance of white blood. Gray v. State, 4 Ohio, 354; Jellies 0. Ankeny,

11 Ohio, 372; Thacker v. Hawk, ib. 376; Anderson v. Millikin, 9 Ohio, N. s.

406. But see Van Camp 1:. Board of Education, 9 Ohio, IN. s. 406. Happily all

such questions are now disposed of by constitutional amendments.

' Broadbent v. State, 7 Md. 416. See Knowles v. People, 15 Mich. 408.

_ ' Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 4 Wheat. 241.

' See 1 Bl. Com. 89, and note.

‘ Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 51-1; Charles River Bridge v. Warren

Bridge, 11 Pet. 544 ; Perrine v. Chesapeake and Delaware Canal Co. 9 How. 172;

Richmond, &c., R.R. Co. v. Louisa R.R. Co. 13 How. 71; Bradley v. N. Y. &

N. H. R.R. Co. 21 Conn. 294; Parker v. Sunbury & Erie R.R. Co. 19 Penn.

St. 211; ‘Vales v. Stetson, 2 Mass. 143; Chenango Bridge Co. v. Binghamton

Bridge Co. 27 N. Y. 87, and 3 Wal. 51; State 0. Krebs, 64 N. C. 60-1.

selves cannot be construed to compel them to disclose facts which
would subject them to criminal punis~ment. 1 And a statute which
authorizes summary process in favor of a bank against debtors
who have by express contract made their obligations payable at
such bank, being in derogation of the ordinary principles of private
right, must be subject to strict construction.2 These cases are
only illustrations of. a rule of general acceptance.8
There are unquestionably cases in which the State may grant
privileges to specified individuals without violating any constitutional principle, because, from the nature of the case, it is impossible they should be possessed and enjoyed by all ; and if it is
important that they should exist, the proper State authority must
be left to select the grantees. Of this class are grantS of the
franchise to be a corporation. Such grants, however, which confer upon a few persons what cannot be shared by the many, and
which, though supposed to be made on public grounds, are nevertheless frequently of great value to the corporators and therefore
sought with avidity, are never to be extended by construction beyond the plain terms in which they are conferred. No rule is
better settled than that charters of incorporation are to be construed strictly against the corporators} The just pre[* 395] sumption in *every such ·case is, that the State has
granted in express terms all that it designed to grant
at all. " When a State," says the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
" means to clothe a corporate body with a portion of her own
sovereignty, and to disarm herself to that extent of the power
that belongs to her, it is so easy to say so, that we will never
believe it to be meant when it is not said.... In the construction
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a prcponderanc~ of white blood. Gray v. State, 4 Ohio, 354; Jeffies o. Ankeny,
11 Ohio, 372; Thacker v. Hawk, ib. 376; Anderson v. Millikin, 9 Ohio, N. s.
406. But see Van Camp v. Board of Education, 9 Ohio, 'N. 8. 406. Happily all
such questions are now disposed of by constitutional amendments.
1 Broadbent v. State, 7 1\fd. 416.
See Knowles v. People, 15 Mich. 408 .
• 1 Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 4 Wheat. 241.
~ See 1 Bl. Com. 89, and note.
' Providence Bank o. Billings, 4 Pet. 514; Charles River Bridge "· Warren
Bridge, 11 Pet. 544; Perrine v. Chesapeake and Delaware Canal Co. 9 How. 172;
Richmond, &c., R.R. Co. v. Louisa R.R. Co. 13 How. 71; Bradley"· N.Y. &
N.H. R.R. Co. 21 Conn. 294; Parker "·Sunbury & Erie R.R. Co. 19 Penn.
St. 211; Wales v. Stetson, 2 :Mass. 143; Chenango Bridge Co. "· Binghamton
Bridge Co. 27 N.Y. 87, and S Wal. 51; State t~. Krebs, 64 N.C. 604.
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of a charter, to be in doubt is to be resolvedj and every reso-
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lution which springs from doubt is against the corporation. If

the usefulness of the company would be increased by extending

[its privileges], let the legislature see to it, but remember that

nothing but plain English words will do it.”1

* And this rule is not conﬁned to the grant of a corpo- [‘* 396]

rate franchise, but it extends to all grants of franchises or

privileges by the State ,to individuals, in the beneﬁts of which

the people at large cannot participate. “Private statutes,” says

Parsons, Ch. J., “made for the accommodation of particular

citizens or corporations, ought not to be construed to aﬁ"eet the

rights or privileges of others, unless such construction results

‘ Pennsylvania R.R. Co. 0. Canal Commissioners, 21 Penn. St. 22. And see

Commonwealth v. Pittsburg, &c., R..R. Co. 24 Penn. St. l-'39 ; Chcnango Bridge

Co. v. Binghamton Bridge Co. 27 N. Y. 93, per Wrigltt, J .; Baltimore v. Bal-

timore, &c., R.R. Co. 21 Md. 50. We quote from the Supreme Court of Con-

necticut in Bradley v. N. Y. & N. H. R.R. Co. 21 Conn. 306: “ The rules of

construction which apply to general legislation, in regard to those subjects in

which the public at large are interested, are essentially different from those which

apply to private grants to individuals, of powers or privileges designed to be

exercised with special reference to their own advantage, although involving in

their exercise incidental beneﬁts to the community generally. The former are to
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be expounded largely and beneﬁcially for the purposesifor which they were

enacted; the latter liberally, in favor of the public, and strictly as against the

grantees. The power in the one case is original and inherent in the State or

sovereign power, and is exercised solely for the general good of the community;

in the other it is merely derivative, is special if not exclusive in its character,

and is in derogation of common right, in the sense that it confers privileges to

which the members of the community at large are not entitled. Acts of the

former kind, being dictated solely by a regard to the beneﬁt of the public gener-

ally, attract none of that prejudice or jealousy towards them which naturally

would arise towards those of the other description, from the consideration that

the lattfr were obtained with a view to the beneﬁt of particular individuals, and

the apprehension that their interests might be promoted ap_the sacriﬁce or to the

injury of those of others whose interests should be equally regarded. It is uni-

vcrsally understood to be one of the implied and necessary conditions upon which

men enter into society and form governments, that sacriﬁces must sometimes be

required of individuals for the general beneﬁt of the community, for which they

have no rightful claim to speciﬁc compensation; but, as between the several indi-

viduals composing the community, it is the duty of the State to protect them in

the enjoyment of just and equal rights. A law, therefore, enacted for the com-

mon good, and which there would ordinarily be no inducement to pervert from

that purpose, is entitled to be viewed with less jealousy and distrust than one

enacted to promote the interests of particular persons, and which would con-

stantly present a motive for encroaching on the rights of others."
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of a charter, to be in doubt is to be resolved ; and every resolution which springs from doubt is against the corporation. If
the usefulness of the company would be increased by extending
[its privileges], let the legiRlature see to it, but remember that
nothing but plain English words will do it." 1
• And this rule is not confined to the grant of a corpo- [* 396]
rate franchise, but it extends to all grants of franchises or
privileges by the Stato J,o individuals, in the benefits of which
the people at large cannot participate. "Private statutes," says
Parsons, Ch. J., "made for the accommodation of particular
citizens or corporations, ought not to be construed to affect the
rights or privileges of others, unless such construction results
1 Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Canal Commis~ioners, 21 Penn. St. 22.
And see
Commonwealth"· Pittsburg, &c., R.R. Co. 24 Penn. St. i59 ; Chenango Bridge
Co. "·Binghamton Bridge Co. 27 N.Y. 93, per Wright, J.; Baltimore v. Baltimore, &c., R.R. Co. 21 Md. 50. We quote from the Supreme Court of Connel·ticut in B•·adlcy v. N.Y. & N. H. R.R. Co. 21 Conn. 3U6: o; The rules of
construction which apply to general legislation, in regard to those subjects in
which the public at large are interested, are essentially different from those which
apply to private grants to individuais, of powers or privileges designed to be
exercised with special reference to their own advantage, although involving in
their exercise incidental benefits to the community generally. The former are to
be expounded largely and beneficially for the purposes· for which they were
enacted; the latter liberally, in favor of the public, and strictly as against the
grantees. The power in the one case is original and inherent in the State or
sovereign power, and is exercised solely for the general good of the community;
in the other it is merely derivative, is special if not exclusive in its character,
and is in derogation of common right, in the sense that it confers privileges to
which the members of the community at large are not entitled. Acts of the
former kind, being dictated solely by a regard to the benefit of the public generally, attract none of that prejudice or jealousy towards them which naturally
would arise towards those of the other description, from the consideration that
the latter were obtained with a view to the benefit of particular individuals, and
the app;ehension that their interests might be promoted ¥,the sacrifice or to the
injury of those of others whose interests should be equally regarded. It is universally understood to be one of the implied and necessary conditions upon which
men enter into society and fot·m governments, that sacrifices must sometimes be
required of individuals for the general benefit of the community, for which th~y
have no rightful claim to specific compensation; but, as between the several individuals composing the community, it is the duty of the State to protect them in
the enjoyment of just and equal rights. A law, therefore, enacted for the common good, and which there would ordinarily be no inducement to pervert from
that purpose, is entitled to be viewed with less jealousy and distrust than one
enacted to promote the interests of particular persons, and which would constantly present a motive for encroaching on the rights of others."
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grant of ferry rights, or the right to erect a toll-bridge, and the

like, is not only to be construed strictly against the grantees, but

it will not be held to exclude the grant of a similar and competing

privilege to others, unless the terms of the grant render such

construction imperative.“ _

[*397] *The Constitution of the United States contains pro-

visions which are important in this connection. One of

these is, that the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the

privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States? and

all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject

to its jurisdiction, are declared to be citizens thereof, and of

the State wherein they reside.* The States are also forbidden

‘ Coolidge v. lVilliams, 4 Mass. 140. See also Dyer v. Tuscaloosa Bridge

Co. 2 Port. (Ala.) 296: Grant v. Leach, 20 La. An. 329. In Sprague v. Bird-

sall, 2 Cow. 419, it was held that one embarking upon the Cayuga Lake six miles

from the bridge of the Cayuga Bridge Co., and crossing the lake in an oblique

direction so as to land within sixty rods of the bridge, was not liable to pay toll

under a provision in the charter of said company which made it unlawful for any

person to cross within three miles of the bridge without paying toll. In another

case arising under the same charter, whichauthorized the company to build a

bridge across the lake or the outlet thereof, and to rebuild in case it should be
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destroyed or carried away by the ice, and prohibited all other persons from erect-

ing s bridge within three miles of the place where a bridge should be erected by

the company, it was held, after the company had erected a bridge across the lake

and it had been carried away by the ice, that they had no authority afterwards to

rebuild across the outlet of the lake, two miles from the place where the ﬁrst

bridge was built, and that the restricted limits were to be measured from the

place where the ﬁrst bridge was erected. Cayuga Bridge Co. v. Magee, 2 Paige,

116; Same Case, 6 Wend. 85. In Chapin v. The Paper Works, 30 Conn. 461,

it was held that statutes giving a preference to certain creditors over others

should be construed with reasonable strictness, as the law favored equality. In

People v. Lambier, 5 Denio, 9, it appeared that an act of the legislature had

authorized a proprietor of lands lying in the East River. which is an arm of the

sea, to construct wharves and bulkheads in the river, in front of his land, and

there was at the time a public highway through the land, terminating at the

river. Held, that the proprietor could not, by ﬁlling up the land between the

shore and the bulkhead, obstruct the public right of passage from the land to

the water, but that the street was, by operation of law, extended from the former

terminus over the newly made land to the water.

' Mills v. St. Clair County, 8 How. 569; Mohawk Bridge Co. u. Utica & S.

R.R. Co. 6 Paige, 554; Chenango Bridge Co. v. Binghamton Bridge C0. 27

N. Y. 87; Same Case, 3 Wal. 51.

3 Const. of United States, art 4, § 2. See ante, pp. 15, 16.

‘ Const. of United States, 14th Amendment.
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from express words or from necessary implication." 1 And the
grant of ferry rights, or the right to erect a toll-bridge, and the
like, is not only to be construed strictly agai~st the grantees, but
it will not be held to exclude the grant of a similar and competing
privilege to others, unless the terms of the grant render such
construction imperative.2
[• 3 97]
* The Constitution of the United States contains provisions which are important in ~his connection. One of
these is, that the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States,8 and
all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject
to its jurisdiction, are declared to be citizens thereof, and of
the State wherein they reside.t The States are also forbidden
1 Coolidge tl. Williams, 4 Mass. 140.
See also Dyer v. Tuscaloosa Bridge
Co. 2 Port. (Ala.) 296; Grant tl. Leach, 20 La. An. 329. In Sprague v. Birdsall, 2 Cow. 419, it. was held that one embarking upon the Cayuga Lake six miles
from the bridge of the Cayuga Bridge Co., and crossing the lake in an oblique
direction so as to land within sixty rods of the bridge, was not liable to pay toll
under a provi:~ion in the charter of said company which made it unlawful for any
person to cross within three miles of the bridge without paying toll. In another
case arising under the same charter, which ·authorized the company to build a
bridge across the lake or the outlet therQOf, and to rebuild in case it should be
destroyed or carried away by the ice, and prohibited all other persons from erecting a bridge within three miles of the place where a bridge should be erected by
the company, it was held, after the company had erected a bridge across the lake
and it had been carried away by the ice, that they had no authority afterwards to
rebuild across the outlet of the lake, two miles from the plal'e where the first
bridge was built, and that the restricted limits were to be measured from the
place where the first bridge was erected. Cayuga Bridge Co. v. Magee;2 Paige,
116; Same Case, 6 \Vend. 85. In Chapin v. The Paper Works, 30 Conn. 461,
it was held that statutes giving a prderence to certain creditors over others
should be construed with reasonable strictness, as the law fa\'ored equality. In
People v. Lambier, 5 Denio, 9, it appeared that an act of the legislature had
authorized a proprietor of lands lying in the East River, which is an arm of the
sea, to construct wharves and bulkheads in the river, in front of his laud, and
there was at the time a public highway through the b.nd, terminating at the
river. Held, that the proprietor could not, by filling up the land between the
shore and the bulkhead, obstruct the public right of passage from the land to
the water, but that the street was, by operation of law, extended from the former
terminus over the newly made land to the water.
1 l\Iills v. St. Clair County, 8 How. 569; Mohawk Bridge Co. v. Utica & S.
R.R. Co. 6 Paige, 554; Chenango Bridge Co. v. Binghamton Bridge Co. 27
N.Y. 87; Same Case, 3 Wal. 51.
3 Const. of United States, art 4, § 2.
See ante, pp. H>. 16.
• Const. of United States, 14th Amendment.
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to make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
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immunities of the citizens of the United States, or to deprive any

person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,

or to deny to any person within their jurisdiction the equal

protection of the laws.‘ Although the precise meaning of “_privi-

leges and immunities” is not very deﬁnitely settled as yet, it ap-

pears to be conceded that the Constitution secures in each State to

the citizens of all other States the right to remove to, and carry on

business therein; the right by the usual modes to acquire and

hold property, and to protect and defend the same in the law;

the right to the usual remedies for the collection of debts and the

enforcement of other personal rights, and the right to be exempt,

in property and person, from taxes or burdens which the property,

or persons, of citizens of the same State are not subject to.“ To

this extent, at least, discriminations could not be made by State

laws against them. But it is unquestionable that many other

rights and privileges may be made—as they usually are—to

depend upon actual residence: such as the right to vote, to

have the benefit of exemption laws, to take ﬁsh in the waters of

the State, and the like. And the constitutional provisions are not

violated by a statute which allows process by attachment against

a debtor not a resident of the State, notwithstanding such process
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is not admissible against a resident? The protection by due

process of law has already been considered. It was not within

the power of the States before the adoption of the fourteenth

amendment, to deprive citizens of the equal protection of the laws;

but there were servile classes not thus shielded, and when these

were made freemen, there were some who disputed their claim to

citizenship, and some State laws were in force which established

discriminations against them. To settle doubts and preclude all

such laws, the fourteenth amendment was adopted ; and the same

securities which one citizen may demand, all others are now

entitled to.

‘ Const. of United States, 14th Amendment.

' Corﬁcld v. Coryell, 4 Wash. 380; Campbell v. Morris, 8 H. & McH. 554;

Crandall v. State, 10 Conn. 343; Oliver v. \Vashington Mills, 11 Allen, 281.

i’ Campbell v. Morris, 3 I-I. & McH. 554; State v. Medbury, 3 R. I. 141.

And see generally the cases cited, ante, p. 16, note.
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l

to make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of the citizens of the United States, or to deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,
or to deny to any person within their jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws. 1 Although the precise meaning of "privileges and immunities" is not very definitely settled as yet, it appears to be conceded that the Constitution secures in ea.ch State to
the citizens of all other States the right to remove to, and carry on
business therein ; the right by the usual modes to acquire and
hold property, and to protect and defend the same in the law;
the right to the usual remedies for the collection of debts and the
enforcement of other personal rights, and the right to be exempt,
in property and person, from taxes or burdens which the property,
or persons, of citizens of the same State are not subject to. 2 To
this extent, at least, discriminations could not be made by State
laws against them. But it is unquestionable that many other
rights and privileges may be made- as they usually are- to
depend upon actual residence : such as the right to vote, to
have the benefit of exemption laws, to take fish in the waters of
the State, and the like. And the constitutional provisions are not
violated by a statute which allows process hy attachment against
a debtor not a resident of the State, notwithstanding such process
is not admissible against a resident. 3 The protection by due
process of law has already been considered. It was not within
the power of the States before the adoption of the fourteenth
amendment, to deprive citizens of the equal protection of the laws;
but there were servile classes not thus shielded, and when these
were made freemen, there were some who disputed their claim to
citizenship, and some State laws were in force which established
discriminations against them. To settle doubts and preclude all
such laws, the fourteenth amendment was adopted ; and the same
securities which one citizen may demand, all others are now
entitled to.
Const. of United States, 14th Amendment.
Corfidd v. Coryell, 4: Wash. 380; Campbell tl. :Morris, 3 H. & McH. 554;
Crandall v. State, 10 Conn. 3!3; Oliver v. Washington ::\Iills, 11 Allen, 281.
3 Campbell v. :Morr-is, 3 H. & .McH. 55!; State tl. 1\Iedbury, 3 R. I. 141.
And see generally the cases cited, ante, p. 16, note.
1

1
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Judicial Proceedings.

Judicial Proceedings.

Individual citizens require protection against judicial action as

Well as against legislative ; and perhaps the question, what consti-

tutes due process of law, is as often made in regard to judicial

proceedings as in any other cases. But it is not so diﬁicult here to

arrive at satisfactory conclusions, since the bounds of the judicial

authority are much better deﬁned than those of the legislative,

and each case can generally be brought to a. deﬁnite and well-

settled test.

The proceedings in any court are void if it wants jurisdiction of

the case in which it has assumed to act. Jurisdiction

[* 398] is, ﬁrst, of *the subject-matter; and, second, of the per-

sons whose rights are to be passed upon.‘

A court has jurisdiction of any subject-matter, if, by the law of

its organization, it has authority to take cognizance of, try, and

determine cases of that description. If it assumes to act in a

case over which the law does not give it authority, the proceeding

and judgment will be altogether void, and rights of property can-
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not be devested by means of them.

And on this point there is an important maxim of the law, that

is to say, that consent will not confer jurisdiction :2 by which

is meant that the consent of parties cannot empower a. court

to act upon subjects which are not submitted to its judgment

by the law. The law creates courts, and with reference to

considerations of general public policy deﬁnes and limits their

‘ Bouvier deﬁnes jurisdiction thus: “ Jurisdiction is apower constitutionally

conferred upon a court, a single judge, or a magistrate, to take cognizance and

decide causes according to law, and to carry their sentence into execution. The

tract of land within which a court, judge, or magistrate has jurisdiction is called

his territory ; and his power in relation to his territory is called his territorial

jurisdiction.” 3 Bouv. Inst. 71.

' Coﬂin v. Tracy, 3 Caines, 129; Blin v. Campbell, 14 Johns. 432; Cuyler v.

Rochester, 12 Vl/end. 165; Dudley v. Mayhew, 3 N. Y. 9; Preston v. Boston,

12 Pick. 7; Chapman v. Morgan, 2 Greene (Iowa), 374; Thompson v. Steam-

boat Morton, 2 Ohio, N.5. '26; Gilliland v. Administrator of Sellers, ib. 223;

Individual citizens require protection against judicial action as
well as against legislative ; and perhaps the question, what constitutes due process of law, is as often made in regard to judicial
proceedings as in any other cases. But it is not so difficult here to
arrive at satisfactory conclusions, since the bounds of the judicial
authority are much better defined than those of the legislative,
and each case can generally be brought to a definite and wellsettled test.
The proceedings in any court are void if it wants jurisdiction of
the case in which it has assumed to act. Jurisdiction
[* 398] is, first, of • the subject-matter ; and, second, of the persons whose rights are to be passed upon.l
A court has jurisdiction of any subject-matter, if, by the law of
its organization, it has authority to take cognizance of, try, and
determine cases of that description. If it assumes to act in a
case over which the law does not give it authority, the proceeding
and judgment will be altogether void, aud rights of property cannot be devested by means of them.
And on this point there is an important ~axim of the law, that
is to say, that consent will not confer jurisdiction : 2 by which
is meant that the consent of parties cannot empower a court
to act upon subjects which, are not submitted to its judgment
by the law. The law creates courts, and with reference to
considerations of general public policy defines and limits their

Dicks 1'. Hatch, 10 Iowa, 380; Overstreet v. Brown, 4 McCord, 79; Green v.

Collins, 6 Ired. 139; Bostwicl: v. Perkins, 4 Geo. 47; Georgia R.R. &c. v. Har-

ris, 5 Geo. 527 ; State v. Bonney, 34 Me. 223; Little v. Fitts, 33 Ala. 3-13; Ginn

v. Rogers, 4 Gilm. 131; Neill v. Kecse, 5 Texas, 23; Amos v. Boland, 1 Minn.

365; Brady v. Richardson, 18 Ind. 1; \Vhite v. Buchanan, 6 Cold. 32.
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1 Bouvier defines jurisdiction thus: "Jurisdiction is a power constitutionally
conferred upon a court, a single judge, or a magistrate, to take cognizance and
deeide causes according to law, and to carry their sentence into execution. The
tract of land within which a court, judge, or magistrate bas jurisdiction is called
his territory ; and his power in relation to his territory is called his territorial
juri8diction." 3 Bouv. Inst. 71.
1 Coffin "· Tracy, 3 Caines, 129; Blin "· Campbell, 14 Johns. 432; Cuyler 11.
Rochester, 12 Wend. 165; Dudley "·Mayhew, 3 N.Y. 9; Preston 11. Boston,
12 Pick. 7; Chapman "· Morgan, 2 Greene (Iowa), 374:; Thompson 11. Steamboat Morton, 2 Ohio, N. 8. 26; Gilliland "· Administrator of Sellers, ib. 223;
Dicks v. Hatch, 10 Iowa, 380; Overstreet v. Brown, 4 McCord, 79; Green v.
Collins, 6 Ired. 139; Bostwick 11. Perkins, 4 Geo. 47 ; Georgia R.R. &c. v. Harris, 5 Geo. 527; State"· Bonney, 34 Me. 223; Little v. Fitts, 33 Ala. 3!3; Ginn
t), Rogers, 4 Gilm. 131; Neill 11. Keese, 5 Texas, 23; Ames t), Boland, 1 Minn.
365; Brady v. Richardson, 18 Ind. 1; White v. Buchanan, 6 Cold. 32.
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jurisdiction; and this can neither be enlarged nor restricted by
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the act of the parties. I

Accordingly, where a court by law has no jurisdiction of the

subject-matter of a controversy, a party whose rights are sought

to be affected by it is at liberty to repudiate its proceedings

and refuse to be bound by them, notwithstanding he may once

have consented to its action, either by voluntarily commencing

the proceeding as plaintitf, or as defendant by appearing and

pleading to the merits, or by any other formal or informal

action. This right he may avail himself of at any stage of the

case; and the maxim that requires one to move promptly who

would take advantage of an irregularity does not ‘apply here,

since this is not mere irregular action, but a total want of power

to act at all. Consent is sometimes implied from failure

to object; but there can be no *waiver of rights by [* 399]

laches in a case where consent would be altogether nuga-

tory.1

In regard to private controversies, the law always encourages

arrangements? and the settlements which the parties may make

for themselves, it allows to be made for them by arbitrators mutu-

ally chosen. But the courts of a country cannot have those

controversies referred to them by the parties which the law-making
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power has seen ﬁt to exclude from their cognizance. If the judges

should sit to-hear such controversies, they would not sit as a

court; at the most they would be arbitrators only, and their action

could not be sustained on that theory, unless it appeared that the

parties had designed to make the judges their arbitrators, instead

of expecting from them valid judicial action as an organized court.

Even then the decision could not be binding as a judgment, but

only as an award ; and a mere neglect by either party to object the

want of jurisdiction could not make the decision binding upon him

either as a judgment or as an award. Still less could consent in a

criminal case bind the defendant; since criminal charges are not

the subject of arbitration, and any inﬂiction of criminal punish-

ment upon an individual, except in pursuance of the law of the

land, is a wrong done to the State, whether the individual assented

‘ Bostwick v. Perkins. 4 Geo. 47; Hill v. People, 16 Mich. 351; White v.

Buchanan, 6 Cold. 32.

' Moore v. Detroit Locomotive VVorks, 14 Mich. 266; Coyner v. Lynde,

10 Ind. 282.
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jurisdiction ; and this can neither be enlarged nor restricted by
·
the act of the parties.
Accordingly, where a court by law has no jurisdiction of the
subject-matter of a controversy, a party whose rights are sought
to be affected by it is at liberty to repudiate its proceedings
and refuse to be bound by them, notwithstanding he may once
have consented to its action, either by voluntarily commencing
the proceeding as plaintiff, or as defendant by appearing and
pleading to the merits, or by any other formal or informal
action. This right he may avail himself of at any stage of the
case ; and the maxim that requires one to move promptly who
would take advantage of an irregularity does not ' apply here,
since this is not mere irregular action, but a total want of power
to act at all. Consent is sometimes implied from failure
to object ; but there can be no * waiver of rights by [* 399]
laches in a case where consent would be altogether nugatory.1
In regard to private controversies, the law always encourages
arrangements; 2 and the settlements which the parties may make
for themselves, it allows to be made for them by arbitrators mutually chosen. But the courts of a country cannot have those
controversies referred to them by the parties which the law-making
power has seen fit to exclude from their cognizance. If the judges
should sit to . hear such controversies, they would not sit as a
court; at the most they would be arbitrators only, and their action
could not be sustained on that theory, unless it appeared that the
parties had designed to make the judges their arbitrators, instead
of expecting from them valid judicial action as an organized court.
Even then the decision could not be binding as a judgment, but
only as an award ; and a mere neglect by either party to object the
want of jurisdiction could not make the decision binding upon him
either as a judgment or as an award. Still less could consent in a
criminal case bind the defendant; since criminal charges are not
the s~bject of arbitration, and any infliction of criminal punishment upon an individual, except in pursuance of the law of the
land, is a wrong done to the State, whether the indi-ridual assented
1 Bostwick "· Perkins. 4 Geo. 4i ; Hill "· People, 16 Mich. 351 ; White "·
Buchanan, 6 Cold. 32.
t l\loore v. Detroit Locomotive 'Vorks, 14 Mich. 266; Coyner "· Lynde,
10 Ind. 282.
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or not. Those cases in which it has been held that the constitu-
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tional right of trial by jury cannot be waived are strongly illustrative

of the legal view of this subject}

If the parties cannot confer jurisdiction upon a court by consent,

neither can they by consent empower any individual other than

the judge of the court to exercise its powers. Judges are chosen

in such manner as shall be provided by law; and a stipulation by

parties that any other person than the judge shall exercise his

functions in their case would be nugatory, even though the judge

should vacate his seat for the purposes of the hearing?

Sometimes jurisdiction of the subject-matter will depend upon

considerations of locality, either of the thing in dispute or of the

parties. At law certain actions are local, and others are

[* 400] transitory. “‘ The ﬁrst can only be tried where the prop-

erty is which is the subject of the controversy, or

in respect to which the controversy has arisen. The United

States courts take cognizance of certain causes by reason only of

the fact that the parties are residents of different States or coun-

tries? The question of jurisdiction in these cases is sometimes deter-

mined by the common law, and sometimes is matter of statutory

regulation. But there is a class of cases in respect to which the

courts of the several States of the Union are constantly being called
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upon to exercise authority, and in which, while the jurisdiction is

conceded to rest on considerations of locality, there has not, unfor-

tunately, at all times been entire harmony of decision as to what

shall confer jurisdiction. We refer now to suits for divorce from

the bonds of matrimony.

The courts of one State or country have no general authority to

grant divorce, unless for some reason they have control over the

particular marriage contract which is sought to be annulled. But

‘ Brown v. State, 8 Blackf. 561; \Vork v. Ohio, ‘2 Ohio, N. s. 296; Cancemi

v. People, 18 N. Y. 128; Smith v. People, 9 Mich. 193; Hill 1:. People, 16 Mich.

351. See also State v. Turner, 1 Wright, 20.

' \Vinchester v. Ayres, -1 Greene (Iowa), 104.

‘ See a case where a judgment of a United States court was treated as of no

force, because the court had not jurisdiction in respect to the plaintilf. Vose 0.

Morton, 4 Cush. ‘.27. As to third persons, a judgment against an individual may

sometimes be treated as void, when he was not suable in that court or in that

manner, notwithstanding he may have so submitted himself to the jurisdiction as

to be personally bound. See Georgia R..l{. &c. v. Harris, 5 Geo. 527; Hinch-

man v. Town, 10 Mich. 508.
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or not. Those cases in which it has been held that the constitutional right of trial by jury cannot be waived are strongly illustrative
of the legal view of this subject.l
If the parties cannot confer jurisdiction upon a court by consent,
neither can they by consent empower any individual other than
the judge of the court to exercise its powers. Judges are chosen
in such manner as shall be provided by law; and a stipulation by
parties that any other person than the judge shall exercise his
functions in their case would be nugatory, even though the judge
should vacate his seat for the purposes of the hearing.2
Sometimes jurisdiction of the subject-matter will depend upon
considerations of locality, either of the thing in dispute or of the
parties. At law certain actions are local, and others are
[* 400] transitory. • The first can only be tried whet·e the property is which is the subject of the controversy, or
in respect to which the controversy has arisen. The United
States courts take cognizance of certain causes by reason only of
the fact that the parties are residents of different States or countries.8 The question of jurisdiction in these cases is sometimes determined by the common law, and sometimes is matter of statutory
regulation. But there is a class of cases in respect to which the
courts of the several States of the Union are constantly being called
upon to exercise authority, and in which, while the jurisdiction is
conceded to rest on considerations of locality, there has not, unfortunately, at all times been entire harmony of decision as to what
shall confer jurisdiction. We refer now to suits for divorce from
the bonds of matrimony.
The courts of one State or country have no general authority to
grant divorce, unless for some reason they have control over the
particular marriage contract which is sought to be annulled. But
Brown "·State, 8 Blackf. 561; Work v. Ohio, 2 Ohio, N . s. 296; Cancemi
v. People, 18 N.Y. 128; Smith v. People, 9 Mich. 193; Hill v. People, 16 Mich.
1

351. See also State"· Turner, 1 Wright, 20.
1 Winchester"· Ayres, 4 Greene (Iowa), 104.
~ See a case where a judgment of a United States court was treated as of no
force, because t.he court had not jufisdiction in respect to the plaintiff. Vose "·
Morton, 4 Cush. 27. As to third persons, a judgment against an individual may
sometimes be treated as void, when he was not suable in that court or i11 that
manner, notwithstanding he may have so submitted himself to the jurisdiction as
to be personally bound. See Georgia R.H.. &c. "· Harris, 5 Geo. 527 i Hinchman "· Town, 10 Mich. 508.
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what circumstance gives such control? Is it the fact that the
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marriage was entered into in such country or State? Or that the

alleged breach of the marriage bond was within that jurisdiction?

Or that the parties resided within it either at the time of the

marriage or at the time of the offence? Or that the parties now

reside in such State or country, though both marriage and olfence

may have taken place elsewhere? Or must marriage, offence, and

residence, all or any two of them, combine to confer the authority?

These are questions which have frequently demanded the thought-

ful attention of the courts, who have sought to establish a rule at

once sound in principle, and that shall protect as far as possible

the rights of the parties, one or the other of whom, unfortunately,

under the operation of any rule which can be established, it will

frequently be found has been the victim of gross injustice.

We conceive the true rule to be that the actual, bona ﬁde

residence of either husband or wife within a State will

give to that ‘State authority to determine the status of ["‘ 401]

such party, and to pass upon any questions affecting his

or her continuance in the marriage relation, irrespective of the

locality of the marriage, or of any alleged offence; and that any

such court in that State as the legislature may have authorized to

take cognizance of the subject may lawfully pass upon such
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questions, and annul the marriage for any cause allowed by the

local law. But if a party goes to a jurisdiction other than that of

his domicile for the purpose of procuring a divorce, and has resi-

dence there for that purpose only, such residence is not luma ﬁrle,

and does not confer upon the courts of that State or country

jurisdiction over the marriage relation, and any decree they may

assume to make would be void as to the other party}

' There are a number of cases in which this subject has been considered. In

Inhabitants of Hanover v. Turner, 14 Mass. 227, instructions to a jury were

sustained, that if they were satisfied the husband, who had been a citizen of

Massachusetts, removed to Vermont merely for the purpose of procuring a

divorce, and that the pretended cause for divorce arose, if it ever did arise,

in Massachusetts, and that the wife was never within the jurisdiction of the court

of Vermont, then and in such case the decree of divorce which the husband had

obtained in Vermont must be considered as fraudulently obtained, and that it

could not operate so as to dissolve the marriage between the parties. See also

Vischcr v. Vischcr, 12 Barb. 6-10; and l\IcGiﬂ'ert v. McGiﬂ‘ert, 31 Barb. 69. In

Chase v. Chase, 6 Gray, 1-57, the same ruling was had as to a foreign divorce,

notwithstanding the wife appeared in and defended the foreign suit. In Clark
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what circumRtance gives such control ? Is it the fact that the
marriage was entered into in such country or State? Or that the
alleged breach of the maJTiage bond was within that jurisdiction?
Or that the parties resided within it either at the time of the
marriage or at the time of the offence ? 01· that the parties now
reRide in such State or conntry, though both marriage and offence
may have taken place elsewhere ? Or must marriage, offence, and
residence, all or any two of them, combine to c01ifer the authority?
These are questions which have frequently demanded the thoughtful attention of the courts, who have sought to establish a rule at
once sound in principle, anq that shall protect as far as possible
the rights of the parties, one or the other of whom, unfortunately,
under the operation of any rule which can be established, it will
frequently be found has been the victim of gross injustice.
We conceive the true rule to be that the actual, bona fide
residence of either husband or wife within a State will
give to that • State authority to determine the status of [* 401]
such party, and to pass upon any questions affecting his
or her continuance in the marriage relation, irrespective of the
locality of the marriage, or of any alleged offence; and that any
such court in that State as the legislature may have authorized to
take cognizance of the subject may lawfully pass upon such
questions, and annul the mart·iage for any cause allowed by tho
local law. But if a party goes to a jurisdiction other than that of
his domicile for the purpose of procuring a divorce, and has residence there for that. purpose only, such residence is not bona fide,
and does not confer upon the courts of that State or country
jurisdiction over the marriage relation, and any decree they may
assume to make would be void as to the other party ,1
1 There are a number of cases in which this subject has been considered.
In
Inhabitants of Hanover 11. Turner, 14 Mass. 227, instructions to a jury were
sustained, that if they were satisfied the husband, who bad been a citizen of
Masl!athusetts, removed to Vennont merely for the purpose of procuring a
divorcP, anrl that the pretended cause for divorce arose, if it ever did arise,
in Massaehusetts, and that the wife was ne,·er within the jurisdiction of the court
of Vermont, then and in such case the decree of divorce which the husband had
ohtaincd in Vennont must be considered as fraudulently obtained, and that it
could not operate so t\S to dissolve the marriage between the parties. See also
Vischcr 11. Vischer, 12 Barb. 640; and l\lcGilfert v. l\lcGiffert, 31 Barb. 69. In
Chase "· Chase, 6 Gray, 157, the same ruling was bad as to a foreign divorce,
notwithstanding the wife appeared in and defended the foreign suit. In Clark
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any case, it is necessary that the thing in controversy, or

[* 402]

* But to render the jurisdiction of a court effectual in

v. Clark, 8 N. H. 21, the court refused a divorce on the ground that the alleged

cause of divorce (adultery), though committed within the State, was so commit-

any case, it is necessary that the thing in controversy, or

ted while the parties had their domicile abroad. This decision was followed in

Greenlaw v. Greenlaw. 12 N. H. 200. The court say: “ If the defendant never

had any domicile in this State, the libellant could not come here, bringing with

her a cause of divorce over which this court had jurisdiction. If at the time

of the [alleged offence] the domicile of the parties was in Maine, and‘the facts

furnished no cause for a divorce there, she could not come here and allege those

matters which had already occurred, as a ground for a divorce under the laws of

this State. Should she under such circumstances obtain a decree of divorce

here, it mast be regarded as a mere nullity elsewhere.” In Frary v. Frary,

10 N. H. 61, importance was attached to the fact that the marria_r/e took place

in New Hampshire, and it was held that the court had jurisdiction of the w_ife’s

application for a divorce, notwithstanding the offence was committed in Vermont,

but during the time of the wife’s residence in New Hampshire. See also Kimball

v. Kimball, 13 N. H. 225; Bachelder v. Bachelder, 1-1 N. H. 380; Pays-on v.

Payson, 34 N. H. 518; Hopkins v. Hopkins, 35 N. H. 474. In \Vilcox v. IVil-

cox, 10 Ind. 436, it was held that the residence of the libellant at the time of

the application for a divorce was suﬁicient to confer jurisdiction, and a decree

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:21 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105011581
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

dismissing the bill because the cause for divorce arose out of the State was re-

versed. And see Tolen v. Tolen, 2 Blackf. 407. See also Jackson v. Jackson,

1 Johns. 424; Barber 0. Root, 10 Mass. 263; Borden v. Fitch, 15 Johns. 1'21;

Bradshaw v. Heath, 13 Wend. 407. In any of these cases the question of actual

residence will be open to inquiry wherever it becomes important, notwithstanding

the record of proceedings is in due form, and contains the aﬂidavit of residence

required by the practice. Leith v. Leith, 39 N. H. 20. And sec McGitI'ert 1:.

McGiﬁ'ert, 31 Barb. 69; Todd v. Kerr, 42 Barb. 817. The Pennsylvania cases

agree with those of New Hampshire, in holding that a divorce should not be

granted unless the cause alleged occurred while the complainant had domicile

within the State. Dorsey v. Dorsey, 7 Watts, 349; Hollister v. Hollister, 6 Penn.

St. 449; McDermott’s Appeal, 8 W. & S. 251. And they hold also that the

injured party in the marriage relation must seek redress in the forum of the

defendant, unless where such defendant has removed from what was before the

common domicile of both. Calvin v. Reed, 35 Penn. St. 375. For cases sup-

porting to a greater or less extent the doctrine stated in the text, see Harding v.

Alden, 9 Greenl. 140; Ditson v. Dit-.son,'4 R. I. S7; Pawling v. Bird's Exlrs,

13 Johns. 192; Kerr 0. Kerr, 41 N. Y. 272; Harrison v. Harrison, 19 Ala. 499;

Thompson v. State, 28 Ala. 12; Cooper v. Cooper, 7 Ohio, 59-1; Mansﬁeld s.

McIntyre, 10 Ohio, 28; Smith v. Smith, 4 Greene (Iowa), 266; Yates v. Yates,

2 Beasley, 280; Maguire v. Maguire, 7 Dana, 181 ; Waltz v. Waltz, 18 Ind. 449;

Hull v. Hull, 2 Strob. 174; Manley v. Manley, 4 Chand. 97; Hubbell v.

Hubbell, 3 Wis. 662; Gleason v. Gleason, 4 Wis. 6-1; Hare v. Hare, 10 Texas,

355. And see Story, Conﬂ. Laws, § 230a; Bishop on Mar. and Div. 727 clscq.;

ib. (4th ed.) Vol. II. § 155 ct seq. Anumber of the cases cited hold that the wife
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"·Clark, 8 N.H. 21, the court refused a divorce on the ground that the alleged
cause of divorce (adultery), though committE:'d within the State, was so committed while the parties had their domicile abroad. This decision was followed in
Greenlaw 11. Greenlaw. 12 N. H. 200. The court say: "If the defendant never
had any domicile in this State, the libeJiant could not cootc here, bringing with
her a cause of divorce over which this court bad jurisdiction. If at the time
of the [alleged offence] the domicile of the parties was in l\Iaine, and·the facts
furnished no cause for a divorce there, she could not come here and allege those
matters which had aiready occurred, as a ground for a divorce under the laws of
this State. Should sbe under such circumstances obtain a decree of divorce
here, it mnst be regarded as a mere nullity el:~ewbere." In Frary 11. Frary,
10 N. H. 61, importance was attached to the fact that the marria,qe took place
in New Hampshire, and it was held that the court had jurisdiction of the w.ife's
application for a divorce, notwithstanding the offence was committed in Vermont,
but during the time of the wife's residence in New Hampshire. See also Kimball
"·Kimball, 13 N.H. 225; Bachelder 11. Bachelder, 14 N.H. 380; Payson 11.
Payson, 34 N. H. 518; Hopkins c. Hopkins, 81) N. H. 474. In Wilcox c. Wilcox, 10 Ind. 486, it was held that the residence of the libellant at the time of
the application for a divorce was sufficient to confer jurisdiction, and a decree
dismissing the bill because the cause for divorce arose out of the State was reversed. And see Tolen c. Tolen, 2 Blackf. 407. See also Jackson "· Jackson,
1 Johns. 424; Barber 11. Root, 10 :Mass. 263; Borden v. Fitch, 15 Johns. 121;
Bra•lshaw 11. Heath, 18 Wend. 407. In any of these cases the question of actual •
residence will be open to inquiry wherever it becomes important, notwithstanding
the record of proceedings is in due form, and contains the affidavit of residence
required by the practice. Leith 11. Leith, 39 N. H. 20. And see :McGiffert 11.
McGitfert, 31 Barb. 69; Todd c. Kerr, 42 Barb. 817. The PennsylVI\nia cases
agree with those of _New Hampshire, in holding that a divorce should not be
granted unless the cause alleged occurred while the complainant bad domicile
within the State. Dorsey c. Dorsey, 7 Watts, 349; Hollister 11. Holli:~ter, 6 Penn.
St. 449; McDermott's Appeal, 8 W. & S. 251. And they hold also that the
injured party in the marriage relation must seek redress in the forum of the
def... ndant, unless where such defendant has removed from what was before the
common domicile of both. Calvin c. Reed, 35 Penn. St. 375. For cases supporting to a greater or less extent the doctrine stated in the text, see Harding 11.
Aldtm, 9 Green!. 140; Ditson v. Ditson, · 4 R. I. 87 ; Pawling v. Bird's Ex'rs,
13 Johns. 192; Kerr v. Kerr, 41 N.Y. 272; Harrison v. Harrison, 19 Ala. 499;
Thompson c. State, 28 Ala. 12; Cooper 11. Cooper, 7 Ohio, 594; Mansfield •·
Mcintyre, 10 Ohio, ~8; Smith c. Smith, 4 Greene (Iowa), 266; Yates c. Yates,
2 Be1111ley, 280; Maguire c. Maguire, 7 Dana, 181 ; Waltz v. Waltz, 181nd. 449;
Hull 11. Hull, 2 Strob. Eq. 174; Manley "· Manley, 4 Chand. 97; Hubbell"·
Hubbell, 3 Wis. 662; Gleason v. Gleason, 4 Wis. 64; Hare v. Hare, 10 Texas,
355. And see Story, Conti. Laws, § 230 a; Bishop on Mar. and Div. 727 et seq.;
ib. (4th ed.) Vol.ll. § 156 et seq. A number of the cases cited hold that the wife
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the parties interested, be subjected to the process of the court.

Certain cases are said to proceed in rem, because they take notice

rather of the thing in controversy than of the persons concerned ;

and the process is served upon that which is the object of

the suit, without ‘ specially noticing the interested parties ; [* 403]

while in other cases the parties themselves are brought

before the court by process. Of the ﬁrst class admiralty proceed-

ings are an illustration; the court acquiring jurisdiction by seizing

the vessel or other thing to which the controversy relates. In cases

within this class, notice to all concerned is required to be given

either personally or by some species of publication or proclamation ;

and if not given, the court which had jurisdiction of the property

will have none to render judgment.1 Suits at the common law,

however, proceed against the parties whose interests are sought to

be atfected; and only those persons are concluded by the adjudica-

tion who are served with process, or who voluntarily appear.” Some

may have a domicile separate from the husband, and may therefore be entitled

to a divorce, though the husband never resided in the State. These cases pro-

ceed upon the theory that, although in general the domicile of the husband is the

domicile of the wife, yct that if he be guilty of such act or dereliction of duty

in the relation as entitles her to have it partially or wholly dissolved, she is
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at liberty to establish a separate jurisdictional domicile of her own. Ditson

v. Ditson, 4 R. I. 87; Harding v. Alden, 9 Greenl. 140; Maguire v. Maguire,

the parties interested, be subjected to the process of the court.
Certain cases are said to proceed in rem, because they take notice
rather of the thing in controversy than of the persons concerned ;
and the process is served upon that which is the object of
the suit, without • specially noticing the interested parties; [• 403]
while in other cases the parties themselves are brought
before the court by process. Of the first class admiralty proceedings are an illustration ; the court acquiring jurisdiction by seizing
the vessel or other thing to which the controversy relates. In cases
within this class, notice to all concerned is required to be given
either personally or by some species of publication or proclamation ;
and if not given, the court which had jurisdiction of the property
will have none to render judgment. 1 Suits at the common law,
however, proceed against the parties whose interests are sought to
be affected ; and only those persons are concluded by the adjudication who are served with process, or who voluntarily appear.2 Some

7 Dana, 181 ; Hollister v. Hollister, 6 Penn. St. 449. The doctrine in New York

seems to be, that a divorce obtained in another State, without personal service of

process or appearance of the defendant, is absolutely void. Vischer v. Vischer,

12 Barb. G40; McGiﬂ'ert v. i\1cGiﬁ'crt, 31 Barb. 69; Todd v. Kerr, 42 Barb.

317.

Upon the whole subject of jurisdiction in divorce suits, no case in the books

is more full and satisfactory than that of Ditson v. Ditson, supra, which reviews

and comments upon a number of the cases cited, and particularly upon the

Massachusetts cases of Barber v. Root, 10 Mass. 265; Inhabitants of Hanover

v. Turner, 14 Mass. 227; llarteau v. Harteau, 14 Pick. 181; and Lyon v. Lyon,

2 Gray, 367. The divorce of one party divorces both. Cooper v. Cooper,

7 Ohio, 594. And will leave both at liberty to enter into new marriage relations,

unless the local statute expressly forbids the guilty party from contracting a

second marriage. See Commonwealth v. Putnam, l Pick. 136; Baker v. People,

2 Hill, 325. '

' Doughty v. Hope, 3 Denio, 594. See Matter of Empire City Bank, 18 N. Y.

199 ; Nations v. Johnson, 24 How. 204, 205; Blackwell on Tax Titles, 213.

2 Jack v. Thompson, 41 Miss. 49. As to the right of an attorney to notice of

proceedings to disbar him, see notes to pp. 337 and 404. “ Notice of some kind

is the vital breath that animates judicial jurisdiction over the person. It is the

primary element of the application of the judicatory power. It is of the essence
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may have a domicile separate from the husband, and may thel't'fore be entitled
to a divorce, though the husband never resided in the State. These cases proceed upon the theory that, although in general the domicile of the husband is the
domicile of the wife, yet that if he be guilty of such act or dereliction of duty
in the relation as entitles her to have it partially or wholly dissolved, she is
at liberty to establish a separate jurisdictioual domicile of her own. Ditson
!'. Ditson, 4 R. I. 87; Harding v. Alden, 9 Green!. 140; Maguire !'. Maguire,
7 Dana, 181; Hollister~'· Hollister, 6 Penn. St. 449. The doctrine in New York
seems to be, that a divorce obtained in another State, without personal senice of
process or appearance of the defendant, is absolutely void. Vischer v. Vischer,
12 Barb. 640; McGiffert "· .McGiffert, Sl Barb. 69; Todd "· Kerr, 42 Barb.
317.
Upon the whole subject of jurisdiction in divorce suits, no case in the books
is more full and satisfactory than that of Ditson "· Ditson, supra. which reviews
and comments upon a number of the cases cited, and particularly upon the
Massachusetts cases of Barber v. Root, 10 Mass. 265; Inhabitants of Hano\•er
"· Turner, 14 .Mass. 227; Harteau v. Hartcau, 14 Pick. 181; and Lyon"· Lyon,
2 Gray, 367. The divorce of one party divorces both. Cooper v. Cooper,
7 Ohio, 594. And will leave both at liberty to enter into new marriage relations,
unless the local statute expressly forbids the guilty party from contrading a
second marriage. See Commonwealth !'. Putnam, 1 Pick. 186; Baker !'. People,
2 Hill, 326.
1 Doughty v. Hope, 3 Denio, 594. See Matter of Empire City Bank, 18 N.Y.
199; Nations v. Johnson, 24 How. 204, 205; Blackwell on Tax Titles, 213.
' Jack!'. Thompson, 41 l\liss. ·19. As to the right of an attorney to notice of
proceed;ngs to disbar him, see notes to pp. 337 and 404. " Notice of some kind
is the vital breath that animates judicial jurisdiction over the person. It is the
primary element of the application of the judicatory power. It is of the essence
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cases also partake of the nature both of proceedings in rem and of

XI.

personal actions, since, although they proceed by seizing property,

they also contemplate the service of process on defendant parties.

Of this class are the proceedings by foreign attachment, in which

the property of a non-resident or concealed debtor is seized and

retained by the officer as security for the satisfaction of any judg-

ment that may be recovered against him, but at the same time

process is issued to be served upon the defendant, and which must

be served, or some substitute for service had before judgment can

be rendered.

In such cases, as well as in divorce suits, it will often happen

that the party proceeded against cannot be found in the State, and

personal service upon him is therefore impossible, unless it is

allowable to make it wherever he may be found abroad. But any

such service would be ineﬁfectual. No State has authority to

invade the jurisdiction of another, and by service of process com-

pel parties there resident or being to submit their controversies to

the determination of its courts; and those courts will consequently

be sometimes unable to enforce a jurisdiction which the State

possesses in respect to the subjects within its limits, unless

[’* -104] * a substituted service is admissible. A substituted service

is provided by statute for many such cases; generally in
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the form of a notice, published in the public journals, or posted, as

the statute may direct; the mode being chosen with a view to bring

it, if possible, home to the knowledge of the party to be aﬂected,

and to give him an opportunity to appear and defend. The right

of the legislature to prescribe such notice, and to give it effect as

process, rests upon the necessity of the case, and has been long

recognized and acted upon} ‘ '

of a cause. Without it there cannot be parties, and without parties there may

be the form of a sentence, but no judgment obligating the person.” Black v.

Black, 4 Bradﬁ Sur. Rep. 205. Where, however, a statute provides for the taking

of a certain security, and authorizes judgment to be rendered upon it on motion,

a

without proces, the party entering into the security must be understood to

assent to the condition, and to waive process and consent to judgment. Lewis

v. Garrett’s Adm’r, 6 Miss. 434; People v. Van Eps, 4 VVend. 390; Chappee v.

Thomas, 5 Mich. 58; Gildersleeve v. People, 10 Barb. B5; People v. Lott, 21

Barb. 130; Pratt v. Donovan, 10 ‘Via. 378; Murray v. Hoboken Land Co.

18 How. 272; Philadelphia v. Commonwealth, 52 Penn. St. 451.

‘ “ It may be admitted that a statute which authorized any debt or damages to

be adjudged against a person upon purely ex parte proceedings, without pretence

ti

cases also partake of the natu-re both of proceedings in rem and of ·
personal actions, since, although they proceed by seizing property,
they also contemplate the service of process on defendant parties.
or this class are the proceedings by foreign attachment, in which
the property of a non-resident or concealed debtor is seized and
retained by the officer as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered against him, but at the same time
process is issued to be served upon the defendant, and which must
be served, or some substitute for ser¥ice had before judgment can
be rendered.
In such cases, as well as in divorce suits, it will often happen
that the party proceeded against cannot be found in the State, and
personal service upon him is therefore impossible, unless it is
allowable to make it wherever he may be found abroad. But any
such service would be ineffectual. No State has authority to
invade the jurisdiCtion of ~nother, and by service of process compel parties there resident or being to submit their controversies to
the determination of its courts; and those courts will consequently
be sometimes unable to enforce a jurisdiction which the State
possesses in respect to the subjects within its limits, unless
[• 404] • a substituted service is admissible. A substituted service
is provided by statute for many such cases; generally in
the form of a notice, published in the public journals, or posted, as
the statute may direct; the mode being chosen with view to bring
it, if possible, home to the knowledge of the party to be affected,
and to give him an opportunity to appear and defend. The right
of the legislature to prescribe such notice, and to give it effect as
proce~s, rests upon the necessity of the case, and has been long
recognized and acted upon. 1

'
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of a cause. Without it there cannot be parties, and without parties there may
be the fonn of a sentence, but no judgment obligating the person." Black 17.
Black, 4 Bradf. Sur. Rep. 205. Where, however, a statute provides for the taking
of a certain security, and authorizes judgrmmt to be rendered upon it on motion,
without process, the party entering into the security must be understood to
assent to the condition, and to wah·e proeess and consent to judgment. Lewis
11. Garrett's Adm'r, 6 Mi~s. 434; People v. Van Ep5, 4 Wend. 390; Cbappee "·
Thomas, 5 Mich. 53; Gildersleeve v. People, 10 llarb. 35; People 17. J..ott, 21
Barb. 130; Pratt v. Donovan, 10 Wis. 378; :Murray 17. Hoboken Land Co.
18 How. 272; Philadelphia v. Commonwealth, 52 Penn. St. 451.
1 "It may be admitted that a statute which authorized any debt or damages h>
be adjudged against a person upon purely ez parte proceedings, without pretence
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But such notice is restricted in its legal effect, and cannot be

CH. XI.]
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404

made available for all purposes. It will enable the court to give

effect to the proceeding so far as it is one in rem, but when the res

is disposed of the authority of the court ceases. The statute may

give it effect so far as the subject-matter of the proceeding is within

the limits, and therefore under the control, of the State; but the

notice cannot be made to stand in the place of process, so as to

subject the defendant to a valid judgment against him personally.

In attachment proceedings, the published notice may be suﬂicient

to enable the plaintiﬂ' to obtain a judgment which he can enforce

by sale of the property attached, but for any other purpose such

judgment would be ineffectual. The defendant could not be

followed into another State or country, and there have recovery

against him upon the judgment as an established demand. The

fact that process was not personally served is a conclusive objection

to the judgment as a personal claim, unless the defendant caused

his appearance to be entered in the attachment proceedings}

Where a party has property in a State, and * resides else- ["4105]

where, his property is justly subject to all valid claims that

may exist against him there; but beyond this, due process of

of notice, or any provision for defending, would be a violation of the constitu-

tionfand void; but when the legislature has provided a kind of notice by which
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it is reasonably probable that the party proceeded against will be apprised of

what is going on against him, and an opportunity is ailbrdcd him to defend, I

am of opinion that the courts have not the power to pronounce the proceedings

illegal." Denio, J., in Matter of Empire City Bank, 18 N.Y. 200. See also,

per Morgan, J., in Rockwell v. Nearing, 35 N. Y. 314; Nations v. Johnson,

24 How. 195; Beard v. Beard, 21 Ind. 321 ; Mason v. Messenger, 17 Iowa, 261.

‘ Pawling v. VVillson, 13 Johns. 192; Heirs of Holman v. Bank of Norfolk,

But such notice is restricted in its legal effect, and cannot be
made available for all purposes. It will enable the court to give
effect to the proceeding so far as it is one in rem, but when the res
is disposed of the authority of the court ceases. The statute may
give it effect so far as the subject-matter of the proceeding is within
the limits, and therefore under the control, of the State; but the
notice cannot be made to stand in the place of process, so as to
subject the defendant to a valid judgment against him personally.
In attachment proceedings, the published notice may be sufficient
to enable the plaintiff to obtain a judgment which he can enforco
by sale of the property attached, but for any other purpose such
judgment would be ineffectual. The defEmdant could not be
followed into another State or country, and there have recovery
against him upon the judgment as an established demand. The
fact that process was not personally served is a conclusive objection
to the judgment as a personal claim, unless the defendant caused
his appearance to be entered in the attachment proceedings}
Where a party has property in a State, and • resides else- [* 405]
where, his property is justly subject to all valid claims that
may exist against him there; but beyond this, due process of

12 Ala. 369; Curtis v. Gibbs, 1 Penn. 399; Miller‘s Ex‘r v. Miller, 1 Bailey,

242; Cone v. Cotton, 2 Blackf. 82; Kilburn v. Woodworth, 5 Johns. 37; Rob-

inson v. Ward’s Ex'r, 8 Johns. 86; Hall v. Williams, 6 Pick. 232; Bartlet v.

Knight, 1 Mass. 401; St. Albans v. Bush, 4 Vt. 58; Fenton v. Gal-lick, 8 Johns.

194; Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. 462; Denison v. Hyde, 6 Conn. -508; Aldrich v.

Kinney, 4 Conn. 380; Hoxie v. Wright, 2 Vt. 263; Newell v. Newton, 10 Pick.

470; Starbuck v. Murray, 5 Wcnd. 161; Armstrong v. Harshaw, 1 Dev. 188;

Bradshaw v. Heath, 13 Wcnd. 407; Bates v. Delavan, 5 Paige, 299; \Vebster

v. Reid, 11 How. 460; Gleason v. Dodd, 4 Met. 333; Green v. Custard, 23 How.

486. In Ex parts Heyfron, 7 How. (Miss.) 127, it was held that an attorney

could not be stricken from the rolls without notice of the proceeding, and oppor-

tunity to be heard. And see ante, p. 337 n. Leaving notice with one’s family is

not equivalent to personal service. Rape v. Heston, 9 \Vis. 329. And see

Bimeler v. Dawson, 4 Scam. 536.
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of notice, or any provision for defending, would be a violation of the constitution,· and void; but when the legislature has provided a kind of notice by which
it is reasonably probable that the party proceeded against will be apprised of
what is going on against him, and an opportunity is afforded him to defend, I
am of opinion that the courts have not the power to pronounce the proceedings
illegal." Denio, J., in 1\fatwr of Empire City Bank, 18 N.Y. 200. See also,
per .~Vorgan, J., in Rockwell"· Nearing, 85 N.Y. 314; Nations "· Johnson,
24 How. 195; Beard"· Beard, 21 Ind. 3~1; Mason"· Messenger, 17 Iowa, 261.
1 Pawling v. Willson, 18 Johns. 192; Heirs of Holman v. Bank of Norfolk,
12 Ala. 869; Curtis v. Gibbs, 1 Penn. 399; Miller's Ex'r " · Miller, 1 Bailey,
242; Cone"· Cotton, 2 Blackf. 82; Kilburn "·Woodworth, 5 Johns. 87; Robinson "· Ward's Ex'r, 8 Johns. 86; Hall "· Williams, 6 Pick. ~82; Bartlet "·
Knight, 1 Mass. 401; St. Albans v. Bush, 4 Vt. 58; Fenton"· Garlick, 8 Johns.
194; Bi8sell "· Briggs, 9 Mass. 462; Denison v. Hyde, 6 Conn . .508; Aldrich "·
Kinney, 4 Conn. 380; Hoxie v. Wright, 2 Vt. 263; Newell"· Newton, 10 Pick.
470; Starbuck"· Murray, 5 Wend. 161; Armstrong"· Harshaw, 1 Dev.188;
Bradshaw "·Heath, 18 Wend. 407; Bates "· Delavan, 5 Paige, 299; Webster
"· Reid, 11 Bow. 460; Gleason"· Dodd, 4 Met. 383; Green r. Custard, 28 How.
486. In Ex part~ Heyfron, 7 How. (Miss.) 127, it was held that an ~&ttomey
could not be stri(~ken from the rolls without notice of the proceeding, and opportunity to be heard. And see ante, p. 88i n. Leaving notice with one's family is
not equivalent to personal service. Rape "· Heaton, 9 Wis. 329. And see
Bimeler "· Dawson, 4 Scam. 636.
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law would require appearance or personal service before the

•4:05

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS,

[CH. XI.

defendant could be personally bound by any judgment rendered.

The same rule applies in divorce cases. The courts of the State

where the complaining party resides have jurisdiction of the subject-

matter; and if the other party is a non-resident, they must be

authorized to proceed without personal service of process. The

publication which is permitted by the statute is suﬂicient to justify

a decree in these cases changing the status of the complaining

party, and thereby terminating the marriage;1 and it might be

suﬂicient also to empower the court to pass upon the question of

the custody and control of the children of the marriage, if they were

then within its jurisdiction. But a decree on this subject could only

be absolutely binding on the parties while the children remained

within the jurisdiction ; if they acquire a domicile in another State

or country, the judicial tribunals of that State or country would

have authority to determine the question of their guardianship

there?

[* 406] ‘But in divorce cases, no more than in any other, can

the court make a decree for the payment of money by a

defendant not served with process, and not appearing in the case,

which shall be binding upon him personally. It must follow, in

such a case, that the wife, when complainant, cannot obtain a valid
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decree for alimony, nor a valid judgment for costs. If the defend-

ant had property within the State, it would be competent to provide

by law for the seizure and appropriation of such property, under

the decree of the court, to the use of the complainant; but the legal

tribunals elsewhere would not recognize a decree for alimony or for

costs not based on personal service or appearance. The remedy of

' Hull v. Hull, 2 Strob. Eq. 174; Manley v. Manley, 4 Chand. 97; Hnbbell

v. Hubbell, 3 Wis. 662; Mansﬁeld v. McIntyre, 10 Ohio, 28; Ditson 0. I)itson,

4 R. I. 97; Harrison v. Harrison, 19 Ala. 499; Thompson u. State, 28 Ala. 12;

Harding v. Alden, 9 Greenl. 140; Maguire v. Maguire, 7 Dana, 181; Todd v.

Kerr, 42 Barb. 317. It is immaterial in these cases whether notice was actually

brought home to the defendant or not. And see Heirs of Holman v. Bank of

Norfolk, 12 Ala. 369.

’ This must be so on general principles, as the appointment of guardian for

minors is of local force only. See Monell v. Dickey, 1 Johns. Ch. 156; Wood-

worth v. Spring, 4 Allen, 321; Potter v. Hiscox, 30 Conn. 508; Kraft v. Wickey,

4 G. & J. 322. The case of Townsend v. Kendall, 4 Minn. 412, appears to be

contra, but some reliance is placed by the court on the statute of the State which

law would require appearance or personal service before the
defendant could be personally bound by any judgment rendered.
The same rule applies in divorce cases. The courts of the State
where the complaining party resides have jurisdiction of the subjectmatter ; and if the other party is a non-resident, they must be
authorized to proceed without personal service of prpcess. The
publication which is permitted by the statute is sufficient to justify
a decree in these cases changing the status of the complaining
party, and thereby terminating the marriage; 1 and it might be
sufficient also to empower the court to pass upon the question of
the custody and control of the children of the marriage, if they were
then within its jurisdiction. But a decree on this subject could only
be absolutely binding on the parties while the children remained
within the jurisdiction ; if they acquire a domicile in another State
or country, the judicial tribunals of that State or country would
have authority to determine the question of their guardianship
there.2
[• 406] • But in divorce cases, no more than in any o~her, can
the court make a decree for the payment of money by a
defendant not served with process, and not appearing in the case,
which shall be binding upon him personally. It must follow, in
such a case, that the wife, when complainant, cannot obtain a valid
decree for alimony, nor a valid judgment for costs. If the defendant had property within the State, it would be competent to provide
by law for the seizure and appropriation of such property, under
the decree of the court, to the use of the complainant; but the legal
tribunals elsewhere would not recognize a decree for alimony or for
costs not based on personal service or appearance. The remedy of

allows the foreign appointment to be recognized for the purposes of a sale of the

real estate of a ward.
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1 Hull"· Hull, 2 Stroh. Eq. 174; Manley"· Manley, 4 Chand. 97; Hubbell
"· Hubbell, 8 Wis. 662; Mansfield v. Mcintyre, 10 Ohio, 28; Ditson v. Ditson,
4 R. I. 97; Harrison v. Harrison, 19 Ala. 499; Thompson "· State, 28 Ala. 12;
Harding "· Alden, 9 Green!. 140; Maguire v. Maguire, 7 Dana, 181; Todd "·
Kerr, 42 Barb. 817. It is immaterial in these cases whether notice was actually
brought home to the defendant or not. And see Htlirs of Holman v. Bank of
Norfolk, 12 Ala. 869.
1 This must be so on general principles, as the appointment of guardian for
minors is of local force only. See Monell v. Dickey, 1 Johns. Ch. ~56; Woodworth v. Spring, 4 Allen, 321; Potter "· Hiscox, 30 Conn. 508; Kraft "· Wickey,
4 G. & J. 822. The case of Townsend v. Kendall, 4 Minn. 412, appears to be
contra, but some reliance is placed by the court on the statute of the State whil'h
allows the foreign appointment to btl recognized for the purposes of a sale of the
real estate of a ward.
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the complainant must generally, in these cases, be conﬁned to a

CH. XI.] PROTEm'!ON TO PROPERTY BY " THE LAW OF THE LAND.'' •

406

dissolution of the marriage, with the incidental beneﬁts springing

therefrom, and to an order for the custody of the children, if

within the State.‘

When the question is raised whether. the proceedings of a court

may not be void for want of jurisdiction, it will sometimes be im-

portant to note the grade of the court and the extent of its

authority. Some courts are of general jurisdiction, by which is

meant that their authority extends to a great variety of matters;

while others are only of special and limited jurisdiction, by which

it is understood that they have authority extending only to certain

speciﬁed cases. The want of jurisdiction is equally fatal in the

proceedings of each; but different rules prevail in showing it. It

is not to be assumed that a court of general jurisdiction has in any

case proceeded to adjudge upon matters over which it had no

authority; and its jurisdiction is to be presumed, whether there are

recitals in its records to show it or not. On the other hand, no

such intendment is made in favor of the judgment of a court of

limited jurisdiction, but the recitals contained in the minutes of

proceedings must be sufﬁcient to show that the case was one which

the law permitted the court to take cognizance of, and that the

parties were subjected to its jurisdiction by proper process.”
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*There is also another ditference between these two [" 407]

classes of tribunals in this, that the jurisdiction of the one

may be disproved under circumstances where it would not be

allowed in the case of the other. A record is not commonly suf-

fered to" be contradicted by parol evidence; but wherever a fact

‘ See Jackson v. Jackson, 1 Johns. 424; Harding v. Alden, 9 Greenl. 140;

Holmes v. Holmes, 4 Barb. 295; Crane v. Meginnis, 1 Gill & J. 463; Maguire

v. Maguire, 7 Dana, 181 ; Townsend v. Griflin, 4 Harr. 440. In Beard v. Beard,

21 Ind. 321, Perkins, J ., after a learned and somewhat elaborate examination of

the subject, expresses the opinion that the State may permit a personal judgment

for alimony in the case of a resident defendant, on service by publication

o_nly, though he‘conceded that there would be no such power in the case of non-

residents.

' See Dakin v. Hudson, 6 Cow. 221; Cleveland v. Rogers, 6 \Vend. 438;

People v. Koeber, 7Hill, 39; Sheldon v. “fright, 1 Scld. 511; Clark v. Holmes,

1 Doug. (Mich.) 390; Cooper v. Sunderland, 3 Iowa, 114; Wall 2:. Trumbull,

16 Mich. 228; Denning v. Corwin, 11 Wend. 647; Bridge v. Ford, 6 Mass. 641 ;

the complainant must generally, in these cases, be confined to a
dissolution of the marriage, with the incidental benefits springing
therefrom, and ro an order for the custody of the children, if
within the State.1
When the question is raised whether. the proceedi~gs of a court
may not be void for want of jurisdiction, it will sometimes be importal!t to note the grade of the court and the extent of its
authority. Some courts are of general jurisdiction, by which is
meant that their authority extends to a. great variety of matters ;
while others are only of special and limited jurisdiction, by which
it is understood that they have authority extending on.Jy to certain
specified cases. The want of jurisdiction is equally fatal in the
proceedings of each ; but different rules prevail in showing it. It
is not to be assumed that a. court of general jurisdiction has in any
case proceeded to adjudge upon matters over which it had no
authority ; and its jurisdiction is to be presumed, whether there are
recitals in its records to show it or not. On the other hand, no
such intendment is made in favor of the judgment of a court of
limited jurisdiction, but the recitals contained in the minutes of
proceedings must be sufficient to show that the case was one which
the law permitted the court to take cognizance of, and that the
parties were subjected to its jurisdiction by proper process.2
• There is also another difference between these two [• 40Y]
classes of tribunals in this, that the jurisdiction of the one
may be disproved under circumstances where it would not be
allowed in the case of the other. A record is not commonly suffered to• be contradicted by parol evidence; but wherever a fact

Smith v. Rice, 11 Mass. 511; Barrett 1:. Crane, 16 Vt. 246; Teft v. Grillin,

-5 Geo. 185; Jennings v. Stafford, 1 Ired. 404; llershaw v. Taylor, 3 Jones, 513;

Perrine v. Farr, 2 Zab. 356; State v. Metzger, 26 Mo. G5.
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See Jackson "· Jackson, 1 Johns. 424; Harding "· Alden, 9 Greenl. 140;
Holmes "· Holmes, 4 Barb. 295; Crane "· Meginnis, 1 Gill & J. 463; M~uire
"· Maguire, 7 Dana., 181; Townsend v. Griffin, 4 Harr. 440. In Beard v. Beard,
21 Ind. 321, Perkins, J., after a le~rned and somewhat elaborate examination of
the suhjett, expresses the opinion that the State may permit a personal judgment
for alimony in the case of a resident defendant, on service by publication
oply, though he' conceded that there would be no such power in the case of nonresidents.
t s~c Dakin t~. Hudson, 6 Cow. 221; Cleveland "· Rogers, 6 Wend. 438;
Pepple v. Kot!ber, 7 Hill, 39; Sheldon"· Wright, 1 Seld.oll; Clark 11. Holmes,
1 Doug. (Mich.) 390; Cooper 11. Sunderland, 3 Iowa, 114; Wall t1. Trumbu11,
16 Mich. i28; Denning"· Corwin, 11 Wend. 647; Bridge 11. Ford, 6 .Mass. 641 ;
Smith v. Rice, 11 .Mass. oil ; Barrett "· Crane, 16 Vt. 246; Teft v. Griffin,
5 Geo. 185; Jennings v. Stafford, 1 Ired. 404; Hcr~haw v. Taylor, 3 Jones, .513;
Perrine v. Fnrr, 2 Zab. 306; State"· Metzger, 26 Mo. 65.
1

29

[
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showing want of jurisdiction in a court of general jurisdiction can

• 407
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[cu. :n.

be proved without contradicting its recitals, it is allowable to do so,

and thus defeat its effect.‘ But in the case of a court of special

and limited authority, it is permitted to go still further, and to show

a want ofjurisdiction even in opposition to the recitals contained

in the record? This we conceive to be the general rule, though

there are apparent exceptions of those cases where the jurisdiction

may be said to depend upon the existence of a certain state of

facts, which must be passed upon by the courts themselves, and in

respect to which the decision of the court once rendered, if there

was any evidence whatever on which to base it, must be heldlﬁnal

and conclusive in all collateral inquiries, notwithstanding it may

have erred in its c0nclusions.3 _ .

‘ See this subject considered at some length in \Vilcox v. Kassick, 2 Mich.

165. And sce Rape v. Hcaton, 9 \Vis. 329; Bimclar v. Dawson, 4 Scam. 536;

\Vebster v. Reid, 11 How. 487.

’ Sheldon v. \Vright, 5 N. Y. 497; Dyckman v. Mayor, &c., ofN Y. 5 N. Y.

434; Clark v. Holmes, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 390; Cooper v. Sunderland, 3 Iowa,

114; Sears v. Terry, 26 Conn. 273; Brown v. Foster, 6 R. I. 564; Fawcett r.

Fowliss, 1 Man. & R. 102. But see Facey v. Fuller, 13 Mich. 527, where it was

showing want of jurisdiction in a court of general jurisdiction can
be proved without contradicting its recitals, it is allowable to do so,
and thus defeat its effect.! But in the case of a court of special
and limited authority, it is permitted to go still further, and to show
a want of jurisdiction even in opposition to the recitals contained
iu the record.2 This we conceive to be the general rule, though
there are apparent exceptions of those cases where the jurisdiction
may be said to depend upon the existence of a. certain state of
facts, which m'ust be passed upon by the courts themselves, and in
respect to which the decision of the court once rendered, if there
was any evidence whatever on which to base it, must be held· final
and conclusive in all collateral inquiries, notwithstanding it may
have erred in its conclusions.s

held that the entry in the docket of a justice that the parties appeared and pro-

ceeded to trial was conclusive. And see Sclin v. Snyder, 7 S. & R. 72.
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_“ Britain v. Kinnard, 1 B. & B. 432. Conviction under the Bumboat Act.

The record was fair on its face, but it was insisted that the vessel in question was

not a “ boat " within the intent of the act. Dallas, Ch. J. : “ The general prin-

ciple applicable to cases of this description is perfectly clear: it is established by

all the ancient, and recognized by all the modern decisions; and the principle is,_

that a conviction by a magistrate, who has jurisdiction over the subjectqnatter, is,

if no defects appear on the face of it, conclusive evidence of the facts stated in it.

Such being the principle, what are the facts of the present case? Ifthe subject-

matter in the present case were a boat, it is agreed that the boat would be for-

feited; and the conviction stated it to be a boat. But it is said that, in order to

give the magistrate jurisdiction, the subject-matter of his conviction must be a

boat; and that it is competent to the party to impeach the conviction by showing

that it was not a boat. I agree, that if he had not jurisdiction. the conviction

signiﬁes nothing. Had he then jurisdiction in this case? By‘ the act of Par-

liament he is empowered to search for and seize gunpowder in any boat on the

river Thames. Now, allowing, for the sake of argument, that ‘ boat’ is a word

of technical meaning, and somewhat different from a vessel, still, it was a matter

of fact to be made out before the magistrate, and on which he was to draw his

own conclusion. But it is said that a jurisdiction limited as to person, place,

and subject-matter is stinted in its nature, and cannot be lawfully exceeded. I

agree: but upon the inquiry before the magistrate, does not the person form a

question to be decided upon the evidence? Does not the place, docs not the

[450]

See this subject considered at some length in Wilcox v. Kassick, 2 l\lich. ·
165. And see Rape "· Heaton, 9 Wis. 3i9; Bimelar v. Dawson, 4 Scam. 536;
Webster v. Reid, 11 How. 437.
• Sheldon v. Wright, 5 N.Y. 497; Dyckman v. Mayor, &c., ofN. Y. 5 N.Y.
434; Clark v. Holmes, 1 Doug. (Mh:h.) 390; Cooper v. Sunderland, S Iowa,
114; Sears v. Terry, 26 Conn. 273; Brown v. Foster, 6 R. I. 56,1; Fawcett v.
Fowliss, 1 Man. & R . 102. But see Facey v. Fuller, 13 l\licb. 527, where it was
held that the entry in the docket of a justice that the parties appeared and proceeded to trial was conclusive. And see Selin v. Snyder, 7 S. & R. 72.
3 Britain v. Kinnard, 1 B. & B. 432.
Conviction under the Bumboat Act.
The record was fair on its face, but it was insisted that the vessel in question was
not a "boat" within the intent of the act. Dalla.t, Ch. J.: "The general principle applicable to cases of this description is perfectly clesr: it is established by
all the ancient, and recognized by all the modern decisions; and the principle is,
that a conviction by a magistrate, who has jurisdiction over the subject-matter, is,·
if no defeets appear on the face of it, conclusive evidence of the facts stated in it.
Such being the principle, what are the facts of the present case P If the subjectmatter in the present case were a boat, it is agreed that the boat would be forfeited ; and the conviction stated it to be a boat. But it is said that, in order to
give the magistrate jurisdiction, the 11ubject-matter of his conviction must be a
boat; and that it is competent to the party to impeach the conviction by showing
that it was not a boat. I agree, that if be bad not jurisdiction, the conviction
signifies nothing. Had he then jurisdic~ion in this case ? By- the act of Parliament he is empowered to search for and seize gunpowder in any boat on the
river Thames. Now, allowing, fur the sake of argument, that 'boat' is a word
of technical meaning, and somewhat different from a vessel, still, it was a matter
of fact to be made out before the magistrate, and on which he was to draw his
own conclusion. But it is said that a jurisdiction limited as to person, place,
and subject-matter is stinted in its nature, and cannot be lawfully exceeded. I
agree : but upon the imtuiry before the magistrate, does not the person form a
question to be decided upou the evidence P Does not the place, .docs not the
1
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ca. xI.] PROTECTION T0 PROPERTY BY “ ran LAW or THE LAND.” * 408

* When it is once made to appear that a court has juris- [* 408]

CH. XI.) PROTECTION TO PROPERTY BY" THE LAW OF THE LAND."

* 408

diction both of the subject-matter and of the parties, the

judgment which ‘it pronounces must be held conclusive [‘* 409]

and binding upon the parties thereto and their privies, not-

withstanding the court may have proceeded irregularly, or erred in

subject-matter, form such a question? The possession of a boat, therefore, with

gunpowder on hoard, is part of the offence charged; and how could the magis-

trate decide, but by examining evidence in proof of what was alleged? The

magistrate, it is urged, could not give himself jurisdiction by ﬁnding that to be a

• When it is once made to appear that a court has juris- [* 408]
diction both of the subject-matter and of the parties, the
judgment which • it pronounces must be held conclusive [* 409]
and binding upon the parties thereto and their privies, notwithstanding the court may have proceeded irregularly, or erred in

fact which did not exist. But he is bound to inquire as to the fact, and when he

has inquired his conviction is conclusive of it. The magistrates have inquired in

the present instance, and they ﬁnd the subject of conviction to be a boat. Much

has been said about the danger of magistrates giving themselves jurisdiction ; and

extreme cases have been put, as of a magistrate seizing a ship of seventy-four

guns, and calling it a boat. Suppose such a thing done, the conviction is still

conclusive, and we cannot look out of it. It is urged that the party is without

remedy; and so he is, without civil remedy, in this and many other cases; his

remedy is by proceeding criminally ; and if the decision were so gross as to call

a ship of seventy-four guns a boat, it would be good ground for a criminal pro-

ceeding. Formerly the rule was to intend every thing against a stinted jurisdic-

tion: that is not the rule now; and nothing is to be intended but what is fair

and reasonable, and it is reasonable to intend that magistrates will do what is
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right.” Richardson, J ., in the same case, states the real point very clearly:

°' Whether the vessel in question were a boat or no was a fact on which the

magistrate was to decide; and the fallacy lies in assuming that the fact which the

magistrate has to decide is that which Constitutes his jurisdiction. If a fact de-

cided as this has been might be questioned in a civil suit, the magistrate would

never be safe in his jurisdiction. Suppose the case for a conviction under the

game laws of having partridges in possession: could the magistrate, in an action

of trespass, be called on to show that the bird in question was really a partridge?

and yet it might as well be urged, in that case, that the magistrate had no juris-

diction unless the bird were a partridge, as it may be urged in the present case

that he has none unless the machine be a boat. So in the caselof a conviction for

keeping dogs for the destruction of game without being duly qualiﬁed to do so:

after the conviction had found that the oﬂendcr kept a dog of that description,

could he, in a civil action, be allowed to dispute the truth of the conviction? In

a question like the present we are not to look at the inconvenience, but at the

law; but surely if the magistrate acts bona ﬁde, and comes to his conclusion as

to matters of fact according to the best of his judgment, it would be highly

unjust if he were to have to defendhimselfin a civil action; and the more so, as

he might have been compelled by a mandamus to proceed on the investigation.

Upon the general principle, therefore, that where the magistrate has jurisdiction

his conviction is conclusive evidence of the facts stated in it, I think this rule

must be discharged." See also Mather v. Hudd, 8 Johns. 44; Mackaboy v.

Commonwealth, 2 Virg. Cas. 268; Ex parle Kellogg, 6 Vt. 509; State v. Scott,

1 Bailey, 29-L; Facey v. Fuller, 13 Mich. 527; \Vall v. Trumbull, 16 Mich. 228;

Sheldon v. Wright, 5 N. Y. 512.

I
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subjcct-mattt>r, form such a question P The possession of a boat, therefore, with
gunpowder on board, is part of the offence charged; and how could the magistrate decide, but by examining evidence in proof of what was alleged? The
magi~trate, it is urged, could not give himself jurisdiction by finding that to be a
fact whieh did not exist. But he is bound to inquire as to the fact, and when he
has in'luired hi~t conviction is conclusive of it. The magistrates have inquired in
the present instance, and they find the subject of conviction to be a boat. Much
has been said about the danger of magistrates giving themselves jurisdiction ; and
extreme cases have been put, as of a magistrate seizing a ship of seventy·four
guns, and calling it a boat. Suppose such a thing done, the conviction is still
conclusive, and we cannot look out of it. It is urged that the party is without
remedy; and so he is, without civil remedy, in this and many other cases; his
remedy is by proceeding criminally; an~ if the decision were so gross as to call
a ship of seventy-four guns a bo.t, it would be good ground for a criminal proeeeding. Formerly the rule was to intend every thing against a stinted jurisdiction : that is not the rule now ; and nothing is to be intended but what is fair
and reasonable, and it. is reasonable to intend that magistrates will do what is
right." Richardson, J., in the same cas~ states the real point very clearly:
" Whether the vesst!l in question were a boat or no was a fact on whieh the
magistrate was to decide; and the fallacy lies in assuming that the fad which the
magistrate has to decide is that which constitutes his jurisdiction. If a fact decided as this has been might be questioned in a civil suit, the magistrate would
never be safe in his jurisdiction. Suppose the case for a (•onviction under the
game laws of having partridges in possession : could the magistrate, in an action
of trespass, be called on to show that the bird in question was really a partridge P
and yet it might as well be urged, in that case, that the magistrate had no jurisdiction unless the bird were a partridge, as it may be urged in the present case
that he has none unless the machine be a boat. So in the ease.of a conviction for
keeping dogs for the destruetion of game without being duly qunlilietl to do so:
after the conviction had found that the offender kept a <log of that description,
could be, in a civil action, be allowed to dispute the truth of the comiction? In
a question like the present we are not to look at the inconvenience, but at the
law; but surely if the magistrate acts bona fide, and comes to his eonclu~ion as
to matters of fact according to the best of his judgment, it woulU be highly
unjust if he were to have to defend himself in a civil action; and the more so, as
he might have been eompelled by~ mandamus to proceed on the in\'cstigation.
Upon the general principle, thert>fore, that. where the magi~trate has juri~tliction
his conviction is l'Onclusive evidence of the facts stated in it, I think this rule
must be dit~charged." Sec also Mather v. Hodd, 8 Johns. 44; .1\Iackaboy v.
Commonwealth, 2 Virg. Cas. 268; Ex parte Kellogg, 6 Vt. 509; State v. Scott,
1 Bailey, 294; Facey v. Fuller, 13 Mich. 5:l7; Wall v. Trumbull, 16 l\lich. 22~;
Sheldon v. Wright, 5 N.Y. 512.
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"‘ 409 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [cn. XI.

its application of the law to the case before it. It is a general rule

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

(CH. XI.

that irregularities in the course of judicial proceedings do not

render them void} An irregularity may be deﬁned as the failure

to observe that particular course of proceeding which, conformably

with thevpractice of the court, ought to have been observed in the

case;? and if a party claims to be aggrieved by this, he must

apply to the court in which the suit is pending to set aside the

proceedings, or to give him such other redress as he thinks himself

entitled to; or he must take steps to have the judgment reversed

by removing the case for review to an appellate court, if any such

there be. Wherever the question of the validity of the proceedings

arises in any collateral suit, he will be held bound by them to the

same extent as if in all respects the court had proceeded according

to law. An irregularity cannot be taken advantage of collaterally ;

that is to say, in any other suit than that in which the irregularity

occurs, or on appeal or process in error therefrom. And evcn in

the same proceeding an irregularity may be waived, and will com-

monly be held to be waived if the party entitled to complain of it

shall take any subsequent step in the case inconsistent with an

intent on his part to take advantage of it.3

We have thus brieﬂy indicated the cases in which judicial action

may be treated as void because not in accordance with the
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[*‘ 410] *law of the land. The design of the present work does

not permit an enlarged discussion of the topics which

suggest themselves in this connection, and which, however inter-

esting and important, do not specially pertain to the subject of

constitutional law.

‘ Ea: parte Kellogg, 6 Vt. -509; Edgerton v. Hart, 8 Vt. 208; Carter v.

Walker, 2 Ohio, N. s. 339.

' “ The doing or not doing that in the conduct of a suit at law which, conform-

ably to the practice of the court, ought or ought not to be done.” Bouv. Law

Die.

3 Robinson v. West, 1 Sandf. 19; Malone v. Clark, 2 Hill, 657; IVood v.

Randall, 5 Hill, 285 ; Baker v. Kerr, 13 Iowa, 384; Loomis v. \Vadhams, 8 Gray,

557; \Varren v. Glynn, 37 N. H. 340. A strong instance of waiver is where,

on appeal from a court having no jurisdiction of the subject-matter to a court

having general jurisdiction, the parties going to trial without objection are held

bound by the judgment. Randolph Co. v. Rails, 18 Ill. 29; \Vells v. Scott,

4 Mich. 347; Tower v. Lamb, 6 Mich. 362. In Hoffman v. Locke, 19 Penn. St.

its application of the law to the case before it. It is a general rule
that irregularities in the course of judicial proceedings do not
render them void.1 An irregularity may be defined M the failure
to observe that particular course of proceeding which, conformably
with the ,practice of the court, ought to ~1ave been observed in the
case ; 2 and if a party claims to be aggrieved by this, he must
apply to the court in which the suit is pending to set aside the
proceedings, or to give him such other redress as he thinks himself
entitled to; or he must take steps to have the judgment reversed
by removing the case for review to an appellate court, if any such
there be. Wherever the question of the validity of the proceedings
arises in any collateral suit, he will be held bound by them to the
same extent as if in all respects the court had proceeded according
to law. An irregularity cannot be taken advantage of collaterally;
that is to say, in any other suit than that in which the irregularity
occurs, or on appeal or process in error therefrom. And even in
the same proceeding an irregularity may be waived, and will commonly be held to be waived if the party entitled to complain of it
shall take any subsequent step in the case inconsistent with an
intent on his part to take advantage of it.s
We have thus briefly indicated the cases in which judicial action
may be treated as void because not in accordance with the
[* 410] *law of the land. The design of the present work does
not permit an enlarged discussion of the topics which
suggest themselves in this connection, and which, however interesting and important, do not specially pertain to the subject of
constitutional law.

57', objection was taken on constitutional grounds to a statute which allowed

judgment to be entered up for the plaintilf in certain cases, if the defendant

failed to make and ﬁle an aﬁidavit of merits; but the court sustained it-.

in
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1 Ex parte Kellogg, 6 Vt. 509 j Edgerton c. Hart, 8 Vt. 208 i Carter "·
Walker, 2 Ohio, N. 8. 389.
1 •• The doing or not doing that in the conduct of a suit at law which, confonnably to the practice of the court, ought or ought not to be done." Bouv. Law
Die.
3 Robinson v. West, 1 Sandf. 19; Malone v. Clark, 2 Hill, 657; Wood "·
Randall, 5 Hill, 285; Bakerv. Kerr, 13 Iowa, 384; Loomiav. Wadhams,8Gray,
557; Warren v. Glynn, 87 N. H. 340. A strong instance of waiver is where,
on appeal from a court having no jurisdiction of the subject-matter to a court
having g1mcral jurisdiction, the parties going to trial without objection are held
bo\lnd by the judgment. Randolph Co. v. Ralls, 18 Ill. 29; Wells o. Stott,
4 Mich. 347; Tower 11. Lamb, 6 Mich. 862. In Hoffman v. Locke, 19 Penn. St.
57; objection was taken on constitutional grounds to a statute which allowed
judgment to be entered up for the plaintiff in certain cases, if the defendant
failed to make and file an affidavit of merits ; but the court sustained it.

[
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ca. x1.] PROTECTION 1'0 PROPERTY BY “ run LAW or ram LAND.” "* 410

But a party in any case has a right to demand that the judgment

of the court be given upon his suit, and he cannot be bound by

a delegated exercise of judicial power, whether the delegation be

by the courts or by legislative act devolving judicial duties on

ministerial oﬂicers} Proceedings in any such case would be void ;

but they must be carefully distinguished from those cases in which

the court has itself acted, though irregularly. Even the denial of

jury trial, in cases where that privilege is reserved by the Constitu-

tion, does not render the proceedings void, but only makes them

liable to be reviersed for the error.’ -

There is also a maxim of law regarding judicial action which

may have an important bearing upon the constitutional validity of

judgments in some cases. No one ought to be a judge in his own

cause; and so inﬂexible and so manifestly just is this rule, that

Lord Coke has laid it down that “even an act of Parliament made

against natural equity, as to make a man a judge in his own case,

is void in itself; for jura naturae aunt immutabilia, and they are

leges le_qum.” 3

' Hall v. Marks, 34 Ill. 363; Chandler v. Nash, 5 Mich. -109. For the dis-

tinction between judicial and ministerial acts, see Flournoy v. Jeifersonville, 17
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Ind. 173. '

’ The several State constitutions preserve the right of trial by jury, with per-

mission in some for the parties to waive the right in civil cases. Those cases

which before the constitution were not triable by jury need not be made so now.

Dane Co. v. Dunning, 20 \1Vis. 210; Crandall v. James, 6 R. I. 104; Lake

But a party in any case has a right to demand that the judgment
of the court be given upon his suit, and he cannot be bound by
a delegated exercise of judicial power, whether the delegation be
by the courts or by legislative act devolving judicial duties on
ministerial officers. 1 Proceedings in any such case would be void;
but they must be carefully distinguished from those cases in which
the court has itself acted, though irregularly. Even the denial of
jury trial, in cases where that privilege is reserved by the Constitution, docs not render the proceedings void, but only makes them
liable to be re;'ersed for the error.2
There is also a maxim of law regarding judicial action which
may have an important bearing upon the constitutional validity of
judgments in some cases. No one ought to be a judge in his own
cause ; and so inflexible and so manifestly just is this rule, that
Lord Coke has laid it down that "even an act of Parliament made
against natural equity, as to make a man a judge in his own easel
is void in itself; for fura naturte sunt immutabilia, and they are
leges legum." a

Erie, &c.. R.R.. Co. v. Heath, 9 Ind. 558; Backus v. Lebanon, 11 N. H. 19;

Tabor v. Cook, 15 Mich. 322; Stilwell v. Kellogg, 14 Wis. 461; Mead v. \Valk-

er, 17 \Vis. 189; Byers v. Commonwealth, 42 Penn. St. 89; State v. Peterson,

41 Vt. 50-1; Butfalo, &c., RR. Co. v. Burket, 26 Texas, 588; Sands v. Kim-

bark, 27 N. Y. 1-L7. And where a new tribunal is created without common-law

powers. jury trial need not be given. Rhines v. Clark, 51 Penn. St. 96; Haines

v. Levin, ib. 412. But the legislature cannot deprive a party of a common-

law right, —e. g., a right of navigation, — and compel him to abide the estimate

of commissioners upon his damages. Haincs v. Levin, 51 Penn. St. 412.

“’here the constitution gives the right, it cannot be made by statute to depend

upon any condition. Greene v. Briggs, 1 Curt. C. C. 311; Lincoln v. Smith, 27

Vt. 328; Norristown, &c., Co. 1:. Burket, 26 Ind. 53. Though it has been held

that, if a trial is given in one court without a jury, with a right to appeal and to

have a trial by jury in the appellate court, that is suﬂicient. Beers v. Beers, 4

Conn. 535; Stewart v. Mayor, &c., 7 Md. 500; Morford v. Barnes, 8 Yerg.

444; Jones v. Robbins, 8 Gray, 329.

3 Co. Lit. § 212. We should not venture to predict, however, that even in a

case of this kind, if one could be imagined to exist, the courts would declare the act

' [ 453 ]

1 Hall v. Marks, 34 Til. 363; Chandler 11. Nash, 5 Mich. 409. For the distinction between judicial and ministerial acts, see :Flournoy v. J efftlrsonville, 17
Ind. 173.
1 The several Stare constitutions preserve the right of trial by jury, with permission in some for the parties to waive the right in civil cases. Those cases
which before the constitution were not triable by jury need not be made so now.
Dane Co. v. Dunning, 20 Wis. 210; Crandall v. James, 6 R. I. 104; Lake
Erie, &c., R.R. Co. v. Heath, 9 Ind. 558; Backus 11. Lebanon, 11 N. H. 19;
Tabor v. Cook, 15 Mich. 322; Stilwell v. Kellogg, 14 Wis. 461; Mead v. Walker, 17 Wis. 189; Byers v. Commonwealth, 42 Penn. St. 89; State v. Peterson,
41 Vt. 50!; Buffalo, &c., R.R. Co. 11. Burket, 26 Texas, 588; Sands v. Kimbark, 27 N.Y. 147. And where a new tribunal is created without common-law
powers, jury trial need not be given. Rhines"· Clark, 51 Penn. St. 96; Haines
v. Levin, ib. 412. But the legislature cannot deprive a party of a commonlaw right,- e. g., a right of navigation,- and compel him to abide the estimate
of commissioners upon his damages. Haines v. Levin, 51 Penn. St. 412.
"rhere the constitution gives the right, it cannot be made by statute to depend
upon any condition. Greene v. Briggs, 1 Curt. C. C. 311; Lincoln v. Smith, 27
Vt. 328; Norristown, &c., Co. v. Burket, 26 Ind. 53. Though it has been held
that, if a trial is given in one court without a jury, with a right to appeal and to
have a trial by jury in the appellate court, that is sufficient. Beers v. Btlers, 4
Conn. 585; Stewart v. Mayor, &c., 7 Md. 500; Morford "· Barnes, 8 Yerg.
444; Jones v. Robbins, 8 Gray, 329.
3 Co. Lit. § 212.
We should not venture to predict, however, that even in a
case of this kind, if one could be imagined to exist, the courts would declare the act

.
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* 411 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [em x1.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

["111] "‘ This maxim applies in all cases where judicial functions

(CH. XI.

are to be exercised, and excludes all who are interested,

however remotely, from taking part in their exercise. It is not

left to the discretion of ajudge, or to his sense of decency, to

decide whether he shall act or not; all his powers are subject to

this absolute limitation ; and when his own rights are in question,

he has no authority to determine the cause.‘ Nor is it essential

that the judge be a party named in the record; if the suit is

brought or defended in his interest, or if he is a corporator in a.

corporation which is a party, or which will be beneﬁted or damniﬁed

by the judgment, he is equally excluded as if he were the party

named? Accordingly, where the Lord Chancellor, who was a

shareholder in a company in whose favor the Vice-Chancellor had

rendered a decree, aﬁirmed this decree, the House of Lords

reversed the decree on this ground, Lord Campbell observing : “ It

is of the last importance that the maxim that ‘ no man is to be a

judge in his own cause ’ should be held sacred. And that is not

to be conﬁned to a cause in which he is a party, but applies to a

cause in which he has an interest.” “ We have again and again

set aside proceedings in inferior tribunals, because an individual

who had an interest in a cause took a part in the decision.

And it will have a most salutary effect on these tribunals, when
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it is known that this high court of last resort, in a case in

which the Lord Chancellor of England had an interest, con-

sidered that his decree was on that account a decree not ae-

cording to law, and should be set aside. This will be a lesson

to all inferior tribunals to. take care, not only that in their

decrees they are not inﬂuenced by their personal interest, but

to avoid the appearance of laboring under such an in-

ﬂuence.”3 t

It is matter of some interest to know whether the legislatures

of the American States can set aside this maxim of the common

of Parliament void; though they would never ﬁnd such an intent in the statute, if

any other could possibly be made consistent with the words.

‘ \Vasbington Insurance Co. v. Price, Hopk. Ch. 2.

* Washington Insurance Co. v. Price, Hopk. Ch. 2; Dimes v. Proprietors of

Grand Junction Canal, 3 House of Lords Cases, 759; Pearce v. Atwood, 13

Mass. 340; Peek v. Freeholdcrs of Essex, Spencer, 457; Commonwealth v.

MeLane, 4 Gray, 427; Dively v. Cedar Rapids, 21 Iowa, 565.

3 Dimes v. Proprietors of Grand Junction Canal, 3 House of Lords Cases,

759.
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"
• This maxim applies in all cases where judicial
functions
are to be exercised, and excludes all who are interested,
however remotely, from taking part in their exercise. It is not
left to the discretion of a judge, or to his sense of decency, to
decide whether he shall act or not ; all his powers are subject to
this absolute limitation ; and when his own rights are in question,
he has no authority to determine the cause. 1 Nor is it ess(mtial
that the judge· be a party named in the record ; if the suit is
brought or defended in his interest, or if he is a corporator in a
corporation which is a party, or which will be benefited or damnified
by the judgment, he is equally excluded as if he were the P.arty
I
namcd.2 Accordingly, where the Lord Chancellor, who was a
sha1·eholder in a company in whose favor the Vice-Chancellor had
rendered a decree, affirmed this decree, the House· of Lords
reversed the decree on this ground, Lord Campbell observing : " It
js of the last importance that the maxim that ' no man is to be a
judge in his own cause' should be held sacred. And that is not
to be confined to a cause in which he is a party, but applies to a
cause in which he has an interest." " We have again aud again
set aside proceedings in inferior tribunals, becanse an individual
who had an interest in a cause took a part in the decision.
And it will have a most salutary effect on these tribunals, when
it is known that this high court of last resort, in a c~e in
which the Lord Chancellor of England had an interest, considered that his decree was on that account a decree not according to law, and should be set aside. This will be a lesson
to all inferior tribunals to. take care, not only that in their
decrees they are not influenced by their personal interest, but
to a\·oid the appearance of laboring under such an mfiuence." 3
It is matter of some interest to know whether the legislathres
of the American States can set aside this maxim of the common

[• 411]

of Parliament void ; though they would never find such an intent in the statute, if
any other could possibly be made consistent with the words.
1 Washington Insurance Co. "· Price, Hopk. Ch. 2.
1 Washington Insurance Co. "· Price, Hopk. Ch. 2; Dimes "· Proprietors of
Grand Junction Canal, 3 Hou~c of Lord11 Cases, 759; Pearce v. Atwood, 13
Mass. 340; Peck "· Freeholders of Essex, Spencer, 4b7; Commonwealth "·
McLane, 4 Gray, 427; Dively"· Cedar Rapids, 21 Iowa, 565.
3 Dimes v. Proprietors of Grand Junction Canal, 3 House of Lords Cases,
759.
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411

law, and by express enactment permit one to actjudicially

when "‘interested in the controversy. The maxim itself, [*‘412]

it is said, in some cases, does not apply where, from

necessity, the judge must proceed in the case, there being no

other tribunal authorized to act;1 but we prefer the opinion of

Chancellor Sandforcl of New York, that in such a ease it belongs

to the power which created such a court to provide another in

which this judge may be a party; and whether another tribunal

is established or not, he at least is not intrusted with authority

to determine his own rights, or his own wrongs.”

It has been held that where the interest was that of corporator

in a municipal corporation, the legislature might provide that

it should constitute no disqualiﬁcation where the corporation

was a party. But the ground of this ruling appears to be,-that

the interest is so remote, trifling, and insignificant, that it may

fairly be supposed to be incapable of affecting the judgment or of

inﬂuencing the conduct of an individual.“ And where penalties

are imposed, to be recovered only in a. municipal court, the judges

or jurors in which would be interested as corporators in the re-

covery, the law providing for such recovery must be regarded as

precluding the objection of interest} And it is very common, in
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a certain class of cases, for the law to provide that certain town-

ship and county oﬁicers shall audit their own accounts for services

rendered the public ; but in such case there is no adversary party,

unless the State, which passes the law, or the municipalities

which are its component parts and subject to its control, can be

regarded as such.

But except in cases resting upon such reasons, we do not see

how the legislature can have any power to abolish a maxim which

is among the fundamentals of judicial authority. The people,

indeed, when framing their constitution, may establish so great an

anomaly, if they see ﬁt ;5 but if the legislature is intrusted with

apportioning and providing for the exercise of the judicial power,

' Ranger v. Great Western R. 5 House of Lords Cases, 88; Stewart v. Me-

chanics and Farmers Bank, 19 Johns. 501.

’ \Vashington Insurance Co. v. Price, llopk. Ch. 2.

’ Commonwealth v. Reed, 1 Gray, 475.

‘ Commonwealth v. Ryan, 5 Mass. 90; Hill v. Wells, 6 Pick. 104; Common-

wealth v. Emery, 11 Cush. 406.

‘ Matter of Leefe, 2 Barb. Ch. 39.
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law, and by express enactment permit one to act judicially
when • interested in the controversy. The maxim itself, [* 412]
it is said, in some cases, does not apply where, from
necessity, the judge must proceed in the case, there being no
other tribunal authorized to act; 1 but we prefer the opinion of
Chancellor Sandford of New York, that in such a case it belongs
to the power which created such a court to provide another in
which this judge may be a party ; and whether another tribunal
is established or not, he at least is not intrusted with authority·
to determine his own rights, or his own· wrougs.2
It has been held that where the interest was that of corporator
in a municipal corporation, the legislature might provide that
it should constitute no disqualification where the corporation
was a party. But the ground of this ruling appears to be, .that
the interest is so remote, trifling, and insignificant, that it may
fairly be supposed to be incapable of affecting the judgment or of
influencing the conduct of an individual.3 And where penalties
are imposed, to be recovered only in a municipal court, the judges
or jurors in which would be interested as corporators in the recovery, the law providing for such recovery must be regarded as
precluding the objection of interest.4 And it is very common, in
a certain class of cases, for the law to provide that cet·tain township and county officers shall audit their own accounts for services
rendered the public; but in such case there is no adversary party,
unles~ the State, which passes the law, or the municipalities
which are its component parts and subject to its control, can be
regarded as such.
But except in cases resting upon such reasons, we do not see
how the legislature can have any power to abolish a maxim which
is among the fundamentals of judicial authority. The people,
indeed, when framing their constitution, may establish so gt·ea.t an
. anomaly, if they see fit; 6 but if the legislature is intntsted with
·apportioning and providing for the exercise of the judicial power,
1 Ranger v. Great Western R. 5 House of Lords Case~, 88; Stewart v. 1\Iecbanil's and Farmers Bank, 19 Johns. 501.
1 Washington Insurance Co. v. Price, Hopk. Ch. 2.
3 Commonwealth v. Reed, 1 Gray, 475.
• Commonwealth v. Ryan, 5 1\Iass. 90; Hill "· Wells, 6 Pick. 104; Commonwealth v. Emery, 11 Cush. 406.
6 l\latter of Leefe, 2 Barb. Ch. 39.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

we cannot understand it to be authorized, in the execution of

(CH. XI •

this trust, to do that which has never been recognized

[*-113] as ‘being within the province of the judicial authority.

To empower one party to a controversy to decide it for

himself is not within the legislative authority, because it is not

the establishment o_f any rule of action or decision, but is a plac-

ing of the other party, so far as that controversy is concerned, out

of the protection of the law, and submitting him to the control of

one whose interest it will be to decide arbitrarily and unjustly}

Nor do we see how the objection of interest can be waived by

the other party. If not taken before the decision is rendered, it

will avail in an appellate court; and the suit may there be dis-

missed on that ground? The judge acting in such a case is not

simply proceeding irregularly, but he is acting without jurisdic-

tion. And if one of the judges constituting a court is disquali-

ﬁed on this ground, the judgment will be void, even though

the proper number may have concurred in the result, not reckon-

ing the interested party.”

Mere formal acts necessary to enable the case to be brought

before a proper tribunal for adjudication, an interested judge

may do ;‘* but that is the extent of his power.

1 See Ames v. ‘Port Huron Log-Driving and Booming Co. 11 Mich. 139.
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i ' Richardson v. \Velcome, 6 Cush. 332; Dimes v. Proprietors of Grand Junc-

tion Canal, 3 I-Iouse of Lords Cases, 787. And see Sigourney v. Sibley, 21

Pick. 106; Oakley v. Aspinwall, 3 N. Y. 547. '

3 In Queen v. Justices of Hertfordshire, 6 Queen’s Bench, 753, it was decided

that, if any one of the magistrates hearing a case at sessions was interested, the

court was improperly constituted, and an order made in the case should be

quashed. It was also decided that it was no answer to the objection, that there

was a majority in favor of the decision without reckoning the interested party,

we cannot understand it to be authorized, in the execution of
this trust, to do that which has never been recognized
(* 413] as • being within the province of the judicial authority.
To empower one party to a controversy to decide it for
himself is not within the legislative authority, because it is not
the establishment o_f any rule of action or decision, but is a placing of the other party, so far as that controversy is concerned, out
of the protection of the law, and submitting him to the control of
· one whose interest it will be to decide arbitrarily and unjustly. 1
Nor do we see how tlie objection of interest cnn be waived by
the other party. If not taken before the decision is rendered, it
will avail in an appellate court; and tho suit may there be dismissed on that ground.2 The judge acting in such a case is not
simply proceeding irregularly, but he is acting without jurisdiction. And if one of the judges constituting a court is disqualified on this ground, the judgment will be void, even though
the proper number may have concurred in the result, not reckoning the interested party.a
:Mere formal acts necessary to enable the case to be brought
before a proper tribunal for adjudication, an interested judge
may do; 4 but that is the extent of his power.

nor that the interested party withdrew before the decision, if he appeared to

have joined in discussing the matter with the other magistrates. See also the

Queen v. Justices of Suffolk, 18 Q. B. 416; The Queen v. Justices of London,

ib. 421; Peninsula R.R. Co. v. Howard, 20 Mich. 26.

‘ Richardson v. Boston, 1 Curtis, C. C. 251; \/Vashington Insurance Co. v.

Price, Hopk. Ch. 1; Buckingham v. Davis, 9 Md. 324; Heydenfeldt v. Towns,

27 Ala. 430. If the judge who renders judgment in a cause had previously

been attorney in it, the judgment is a nullity. Reams v. Kearns, 5 Cold. 217.
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See Ames "· Port Huron Log-Driving and Booming Co. 11 Mich. 189.
Riehardson v. 'Velcome, 6 Cush. 882; Dimes v. Proprietors of Grancl Junction Canal, 3 House of Lords Cases, 787. And see Sigourney v. Sibley, 21
Pick. 106; Oakley v. Aspinwall, 3 N. Y. 547.
·
3 In Queen v. Justices of Hertfordshire, 6 Queen's Bench, 758, it was decided
that, if any one of the magistrates hearing a case at sessions was interested, the
court was improperly constituted, and an order made in the case should be
quashed. It was also decided that it was no answer to the objection, that there
was a majority in favor of the decision without reckoning the interested party,
nor that the interested party withdrew before the decision, if he appeared to
have joined in discussing the matter with the other magistrates. See also the
Queen v. Justices of Suffolk, 18 Q. B. 416; The Queen"· Justices of London,
ib. 421; Peninsula R.R. Co. "· Howard, 20 Mich. 26.
~ Richardson t'. Boston, 1 Curtis, C. C. 251; Washington Insurance Co. o.
Price, Hopk. Ch. 1; Buckingham v. Davis, 9 Md. 324; HeydenfelJt v. Towns,
27 Ala. 430. If the judge who renders judgment in a cause had previously
been attorney in it, the judgment is a nullity. Reams v. Kearns, 5 Cold. 217.
1

1
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‘CHAPTER XII. ["114]

ca. XII.]

•414

LIBERTY OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS.

ussarr or SPEECH AND or was PRESS.

Tm: ﬁrst amendment to the Constitution of the United States

provides, among other things, that Congress shall make no law

abridging the freedom of speech or of the press. With jealous

care of what is almost universally regarded a. sacred right,

essential to the existence and perpetuity of free government, a

provision of similar import has been embodied in each of the

•CHAPTER XII.

[•414]

State constitutions, and a constitutional principle is thereby

established which is supposed to form a. shield of protection to

the free expression of opinion in every part of our land.‘

LIBERTY OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS.

' The following are the constitutional provisions: Maine: Every citizen may

freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on any subject, being responsible

for the abuse of this liberty. No law shall he passed regulating or restraining

the freedom of the press; and, in prosecutions for any publication respecting

the oﬁicial conduct of men in public capacity, or the qualiﬁcations of those who

are candidates for the suﬁrages of the people, or where the matter published is

proper for public information, the truth thereof may be given in evidence; and

in all indictments for libcl, the jury, after having received the direction of the

court, shall have a right to determine, at their discretion, the law and the fact.

Declaration of Rights, § 4.—New Hampshire: The liberty of the press is

essential to the security of freedom in a State; it ought. therefore, to be inviola-
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bly preserved. Bill of Rights, § 22.-— Vermont : That the people have a right

to freedom of speech, and of writing and publishing their sentiments concerning

the transactions of government; therefore the freedom of the press ought not to

THE first amendment to the Constitution of the U nitcd States
provides, among other things, that Congress shall make no law
abridging the freedom of speech or of the press. With jealous
care of what is almost universally regarded a saCI·ed right,
essential to the existence and perpetuity of free government, a
provision of similar import has been embodied in each of the
State constitutions, and a constitutional principle is thereby
established which is supposed to form a shield of protection to
the free expression of opinion in every part of our laud. 1

be restrained. Declaration of Rights, Art. 13. -—MassachuseIts: The liberty

of the press is essential to the security of freedom in a State;,it ought not,

therefore. to be restrained in this Commonwealth. Declaration of Rights, Art.

16. —Rhode Island: The liberty of the press being essential to the security of

freedom in ﬂState, any person may publish his sentiments on any subject, being

responsible for the abuse of that liberty; and in all trials for libel, both civil and

criminal, the truth, unless published from malicious motives, shall be suﬁicient

defence to the person charged. Art. 1, § 20.— Conneclicut: No law shall ever

be passed to curtail or restrain the liberty of speech or of the press. In all

prosecutions or indictments for libel, the truth may be given in evidence, and the

jnpy shall have the right to determine the law and the facts, under the direction

of the court. Art. 1, §§ 6 and 7. — New York: Every person may freely speak,

write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse

[ 457 ]

1 The following are the con1titutional provisions: Mai11e: Every citizen may
freely speak, write, and publish hiil sentiments on any subject, being rc~ponsible
for the abuse of this liberty. No law t~hall be passed regulating or restraining
the freedom of the press; and, in prosecutions for any publication respecting
the official conduct of men in public capacity, or the qualifications of those who
are candidates for the suffrages of the people, or wht~re the matter published is
proper for public Information, the truth thereof may be giYen in evidence; and
in all indictments for libel, the jury, after having received the direction of the
court, shall have a right to determine, at their dil!Crt.'tion, the law and the fact.
Declaration of Rights, § 4.- New Hampshire: The liht.'rty of the press is
essential to the security of freedom in a State; it ought. therefore, to be inviolably preserved. Bill of Rights, § 22.- Vermo11t: That the people have a right
to freedom of speech, and of writing and publishing their sentiments concerning
the transa•·tions of government; therefore the freedom of the press ought not to
be restrained. Dedaration of Rights, Art. 13.- Massaclmselts: The liberty
of the press is es~ential to the security of freedom in a State;. it ought not,
therefore. to be restrained in this Commonwealth. Declaration of Rights, Art.
16.- Rhode !.~land: The liberty of the press being essential to the security of
freedom in aiState, any person may publish his sentiments on any subjl·ct, being
responsible for the abuse of that liberty; and in all trial~ for libel, both civil and
eriminal, the truth, unless publi~hecl from malieious motives, shall ue sufficient
defence to the person charged. Art. 1, § 20.- Cnm~eciicut: No law shall ever
be paned to curtail or restrain the liberty of speech or of the press. In all
prosecutions or indictments for libel, the truth may be givt!n in evidence, and the
jury shall have the right to determine the law and the facts, under the direction
of• the court. Art. 1, §§ 6 and 7.- New York: Every person may freely speak,
write, and publish his seutiments on aU subjects, being responsible for the abuse

[ 457]
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[‘41-5] ‘It is to be observed of these several provisions, that

• 415

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

[ca. :xrr.

they recognize certain rights as now existing, and seek

of that right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of

speech or the press. In all criminal prosecutions or indictments for llbcls, the

truth may be given in evidence to the jury, and if it shall appear to the jury that

the matter charged as libellous is true, and was published with good motives and

for justifiable ends, the party shall he acquitted, and the jury shall have the right

to determine the law and the fact. Art. 1, § 8.—New Jersey: Every person

may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being respon-

sible for_the abuse of that right. No law shall be passed to restrain or abridge

the liberty at speech or of the press. In all prosecutions or indictments for

libel, the truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall appear to

the jury that the matter charged as libellous is true, and was.published with

good motives, and for justiﬁable ends, the party shall be acquitted; and the

jury shall have the right to determine the law and the fact. Art. 1, § 5.-—

Pennsyleania : That the printing-presses shall be free to every person who

undertakes to examine the proceedings of the legislature, or any branch of gov-

ernment, and no law shall ever be made to restrain the right thereof. The free

communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the invaluable rights of man,

and every citizen may freely speak, write, and print on any subject, being

responsible for the abuse of the liberty. In prosecutions for the publication of

papers, investigating the oflicial conduct of oﬂicers or men in public capacity,
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or where the matter published is proper for public information, the truth thereof

may be given in evidence; and in all indictments for libels, the jury shall have a

right to determine the law and the facts, under the direction of the court, as in

other cases. Art. 9, § 7. '—Delaware: The press shall be free to every citizen

who undertakes to examine the oﬂicial conduct of men acting in public capacity,

and any citizen may print on any such subject, being responsible for the abuse

of that liberty. In prosecutions for publications investigating the proceedings of

ofﬁcers, or where the matter published is proper for public information, the truth

thereof may be given in evidence; and in all indictments for libels, the jury may

determine the facts and the law, as in other cases. Art. 1, § 5.—llIaryland:

That the privilege of the press ought to be inviolably preserved; that every citizen

of the State ought to be allowed to speak, write, and publish his sentiments on

all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty. Declaration of

Rights, Art. 40. — West Virginia : No law abridging the freedom of speech or

of the press shall be passed; but the legislature may provide for the restraint

and punishment of the publishing and vending of obscene books, papers, and

pictures, and of libel and defamation of character, and for the recovery in civil

action, by the aggrieved party, of suitable damages for such libel or defamation.

Attempts to justify and uphold an armed invasion of the State, or an organized

insurrection therein during the continuance of such invasion or insurrection, by

publicly speaking, writing, or printing, or by publishing or circulating such

writing or printing, may be by law declared a misdemeanor, and punished ac-

cordingly. In prosecutions and civil suits for libel, the truth may be given jn

evidence; and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as libellous

is true, and was published with good motives, and for justiﬁable ends, the verdict

[458]
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• It is to be observed of these several provisions, that
they recognize certain rights as uow existing, and seek

of that right; and no law ~hall be passed to restrain or abri•lge the liberty of
spt>ech or the press. In all criminal prosecutions or indictments for libels, the
truth may be given in evidence to the jury, and if it shall appear to the jury that
the matter charged as libellous is true, and was published with good motives and
for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted, and the jury shall have the right
to determine the law and the fact. Art. 1, § 8.- New Je1·sey: Every person
may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjeds, being responsible for_ the abuse of that right. No law shall be passed to restrain or abridge
the liberty of speech or of the prt>SS. In all prosecutions or indictments for
libel, the truth may he given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall appear to
the jury that the matter charged as libellous is true, and was•published with
good moti,·es, and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted; and the
jury shall have the right to determine the law and the fact. Art. 1, § 5.Pelln.Yylvauia: That the printing-presses shall be free to every person who
undertakes to examine the proceedings of the legislature, or aiiy branch of government, and no law shall e'·er be made to restrain the right thereof. The free
communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the invaluable rights of man,
and every citizen may freely speak, write, and print on any subject, being
responsible for the abuse of the liberty. In prosecutions for the publication of
papers, investigating the official conduct of offieers or men in public capacity,
or where the matter published is proper for public information, the truth thereof
may be given in evidenee; and in all indictments for libels, the jury shall have a
right to det,ermine the law and the facts, under the direction of the court, as in
other cases. Art. 9, § 7. :.._Delaware: The press shall be free to every citizen
who undertakes to examine the official conduct of men acting in public capacity,
and any citizen may print on any such subject, being responsible for the abuse
of that liberty. In prosecutions for publications investigating the proceedings of
officers, or where the matter published is proper for public information, the truth
thereof may be given in evidence; and in all indil'tmenta for libels, the jury may
determine the facts and the law, as in other cases. Art. 1, § 5. -ltfaryland:
That the privilege of the press ought to be inviolably preserved ; that every citizen
of the State ought to be allowed to speak, write, and publish his sentiments on
all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty. Declaration of
Rights, Art. 40.- West Vi1·ginia: No law abridging the freedom of speech or
of the pres11 shall be passed; but the legislature may provide for the restraint
and punishment of the publishing and vending of obscene books, papers, and
pictures, and of libel and defamation of character, and for the rec6Yery in civil
action, by the aggrieved party, of suitable damages for such liltel or defamation.
Attempts to justify and uphold an anned invasion of the State, or an organizedinsurrection therein during the continuance of such invasion or insurrection, by
publicly speaking, writing, or printing, or by publishing or circulating such
writing or printing, may be by law declared a misdemeanor, and punished accordingly. In prosecutions and civil suits for libel, the truth may be gi,·en jn
evidence; and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as libellous
is true, and was publi11hed with good motives, and for justifiable ends, the verdict
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to protect and perpetuate *them, by declaring that they [*-116]

CH. XII.]

LIBERTY OF SPEECH .AND OF THE PRESS.

shall not be abridged, or that they shall remain inviolate.

shall be for the defendant. Art. 2, §§ 4 and 5. — Tennessee: Nearly the same as

Pennsylvania. Art. 1, § 19. —Ohio : Every citizen may freely speak, write, and

publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of the

to protect and perpetuate • them, by declaring that they [* 416]
shnll not be abridged, or that they shall remain inviolate.

right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge liberty of speech or of

the press. In all criminal prosecutions for libel, the truth may be given in evi-

dence to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as

libellous is true, and was published with good motives and for justifiable ends,

the party shall be acquitted. Art. 1, § 11.—-Iowa, Art. 1, § 7, and Nevada,

Art. 1, § 9. Substantially same as Ohio.—Illinois: Every person may freely

speak, write, and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that

privilege; and in all trials for libel, both civil and criminal, the truth, when

published with good motives and for justifiable ends, shall be a sufficient defence.

Art. 2, § 4. — Indiana : N 0 law shall be passed restraining the free interchange

of thought and opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print freely

on any subject whatever; but for the abuse of that right every person shall be

responsible. In all prosecutions for libel, the truth of the matters alleged to

be libellous maybe given in justification. Art. 1, §§ 9 and 10.-—-Michigan:

In all prosecutions for libels, the truth may be given in evidence to the jury;

and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as libellous is true, and

was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the party shall be
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acquitted. The jury shall have the right to determine the law and the fact.

Art. 6, § 25. — W'[sz'0nsin : Same as New York. Art. 1, § 3. —]l[lnnes0la : The

liberty of the press shall forever remain inviolate, and all persons may freely

speak, write, and publish their sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for

the abuse of such right. Art. 1, § 3.— Oregon: No law shall be passed re-

straining the free expression of opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write,

or print freely on any subject whatever; but every person shall be responsible

for the abuse of this right. Art. 1, §8. — California: Same as New York.

Art. 1, § 9. -—Kansas : The liberty of the press shall be inviolate, and all per-

sons may freely speak, write, or publish their sentiments on all subjects, being

responsible for the abuse of such right; and in all civil or criminal actions for

libel, the truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall appear that

the alleged libellous matter was published for justifiable ends, the accused party

shall be acquitted. Bill of Rights, § 11.—liIi.-rsouri: That the free communi-

cation of thoughts and opinions is one of the invaluable rights of man; and that

every person may freely speak, write, and print on any subject, being responsible

for the abuse of that liberty; that in all prosecutions for libel, the truth thereof

may be given in evidence, and the jury may determine the law and the facts, under

the direction of the court. Art. 1, § 27.—Nebraska : Same as New York. Art. 1,

§3.—Arkansas: The liberty of the press shall forever remain inviolate. The

free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the invaluable rights of

man, and all persons may freely speak, write, and publish their sentiments on all

subjects, being responsible for the abuse of such right. In all criminal prosecu-

tions for libel, the truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall

appear to the jury that the matter charged as libellous is true, and was published

[ 459 ]

shall be for the defendant. Art. 2, §§ 4 and. 5.- Tennessee: Nearlr the same as
Pennsylvania. Art. I, § 19.- Ohio: Every citjzen may freely sp~>~k, write, and
publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of the
right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge liberty of speeeh or of
the press. In aU criminal prosecutions for libel, the truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as
libellous is true, and was published with good motives and for justifiable ends,
the party shall be acquitted. Art. I, § 11.- Iowa, Art. 1, § 7, and Nerada,
Art. 1, § 9. Substantially same as Ohio.- Illinois: Every person may freely
speak, write, and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that
privilege j and in all trials for libel, both civil and criminal, the truth, when
published with good motives and for justifiable ends, shall be a sufficient defence.
Art. 2, § 4. - IndiamJ : No law shall be passed restraining the free interchange
of thought and opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print freely
on any subject whatever; but for the abuse of that right every person shall be
responsible. In all prosecutions for lihel, the truth of the matters alleged to
be libellous may be given in justification. Art. 1, §§ 9 and 10. -Michi,qan:
In all prosecutions for libels, the truth may be given in evidence to the jury;
and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as libellous is true. and ·
was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the party shall be
acquitted. The jury shall have the right to detennine the law and the fact.
Art. 6, §25.- Wisconsin: Same as New York. Art.1, § 3.-ltftnnesota: The
liberty of the press shall forever remain inviolate, and all perso~ may freely
speak, write, and publish their sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for
the abuse of such right. Art. 1, § 3.- Oregon: No law shall be pa~sed restraining the free expression of opinion, or restricting the right to speak. write,
or print freely on any subject whatever; but every person shall be responsible
for the abuse of this right. Art. 1, § 8. - California: Same as New York.
Art. 1, § 9.- Kamas: The liberty of the press shall be iDliolate, and all persons may freely speak, write, or publish their sentiments on all subjects, being
responsible for the abuse of such right; and in all civil or criminal actions for
libel, the truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall appear that
the alleged libellous matter was published for justifiable ends, the accused party
shall be aequitted. Bill of Rights, § 11.- Missouri: That the free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the invaluable rights of man; and that
every person may fredy speak, write, and print on any subject, being responsible
for the abuse of that liberty; that in all prosecutions for libel, the tn1th thereof
may be given in evidence, and the jury may determine the law and the facts, under
the direction of the court. Art. 1, § 27.- Nebraska: Same as New York. Art. 1,
§ 8.- .Arkansas: The liberty of the press shall fore,·er remain inviolate. The
free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the invaluable rights of
man, and all persons may freely speak, write, and publish their sentiments on all
subjel·ts, being responsible for the abuse of such right. In all criminal prosecutions for libel, the truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall
appear to the jury that the matter charged as libellous is true, and was published
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purpose is to protect the citizen in the enjoyment of

those already possessed. We are at once, therefore, turned back

[* 417] They do not assume to create new rights, hut • their

from these provisions to the pre-existing law, in order that we

may ascertain what the rights are which are thus protected,

with good motives and for justiﬁablc ends, the party shall be acquitted. Art. 1,

§2. —-Florida: That every citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his

sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty; and

no law shall be passed to curtail, abridge, or restrain the liberty of speech or of

purpose is to protect the citizen in the enjoyment of
those already possessed. We are at once, therefore, turned back
from these provisions to the pre-existing law, in order that we
may ascertain what the rights are which are thus protected,

the press. Art. 1, § 6. — Georgia : Freedom of speech and freedom of the press

are inherent elements of political liberty. But while every citizen may freely

speak, or write, or print on any subject, he shall be responsible for the abuse of

the liberty. Art. 1, § 9.— Louisiana: The press shall be free; every citizen

may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being respon-

sible for the abuse of this liberty. Title 1, Art.’ 4.—North Carolina: The

freedom of the press is one of the great bulwarks of liberty, and therefore ought

never to be restrained; but every individual shall be held responsible for the

abuse of the same. Declaration of Rights, § 20. —- South Carolina : All persons

may freely speak, write, and publish their sentiments on any subject, being

responsible for the abuse of that ‘right; and no laws shall be enacted to restrain

or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press. In prosecutions for the publi-

cation of papers investigating the oﬂicial conduct of oflicers or men in public
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capacity, or when the matter published is proper for public information, the truth

thereof may be given in evidence; and in all indictments for libel the jury shall

be judges of the law and the facts. Art. 1, §§ 7 and 8. —Alabama: That in

prosecutions for the publication of papers investigating the oﬂicial conduct of

oﬂicers or men in public capacity, or when the matter published is proper for

public information, the truth thereof may be given in evidence, and that in all

indictments for libels the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the

facts, under the direction of the court. Art. 1, § l3.'— Mississippi: No law

shall ever be passed to curtail or restrain the liberty of speech or of the press.

In all prosecutions or indictments for libel the truth may be given in evidence;

and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as libellous is true, and

was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the party shall be

acquitted; and the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the facts.

Art. 1, §§ 7 and 8. — Texas: Every citizen shall be at liberty to speak, write, or

publish his opinions on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that privi-

lege; and no law shall ever be passed curtailing the liberty of speech or of the

press. In prosecutions for the publication of papers investigating the ofﬁcial

conduct of officers or men in a public capacity, or when the matter published is

proper for public information, the truth thereof may be given in evidence; and

in all indictments for libels, the jury shall have the right to determine the law

and the facts, under the direction of the court, as in other cases. Art. 1, §§ 5

and 6. — Virginia : That the freedom of the press is one of the great bulwarks

of liberty, and can never be restrained but by despotic governments. Bill of

Rights, § 12.
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with good motives and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted. Art. 1,
§ 2. - Flo1ida: That every citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his
sentiments on all suujects, being re!!ponsible for the abuse or that liberty; and
no law shall be passed to curtail, abridge, or restrain the liberty of speech or of
the press. Art. 1, § 6.- Georgia: Freedom of speech and freedom of the press
are inherent elements of political liberty. But while every citizen may freely
speak, or write, or print on any subject, be shall be responsible for the abuse of
the liberty. Art. 1, § 9.- Louisiana: The press shall be free; every citizen
may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this liberty. Title 1, Art. 4.- North Carolina: The
freedom of the press is one of the great bulwarks of liberty, and therefore ought
never to be restrained; but every individual shall be held responsible for the
abuse of the same. Declaration of Rights, § 20.- South Carolina: All persons
may freely speak, write, and publish their sentiments on any subject, being
responsible for the abuse of that right; and no laws shall be enacted to restrain
or abridge the liberty of speech ~r of the press. In prosecutions for the publication of papers investigating the official conduct of officers or men in public
capacity, or when the matter published is proper for public informat.ion, the truth
thereof may be given in evidence; and in all indietments for libel the jury shall
be judges of the law and the facts. Art. 1, §§ 7 and 8.- Alabama: Tuat in
prosecutinn~ for the publication of papers investigating the offil'ial conduct of
officers or men in public capacity, or when the matter published is proper for
public information, the truth thereof may be given in evidence, and that in all
indictments for libels tho jury shall have the right to determine the law and the
facts, under the direction of the court. Art. 1, § 13. ·-Mississippi: K o law
shall ever be passetl to curtail or restrain the liberty of speech or of the prc;;s.
In all prosecutions or indictments for libel the truth may be given in evidence;
and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as libellous is true, and
was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the party shall be
· acquitted ; and the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the facts.
Art. 1, §§ 7 and 8.- Texru: Every citizen shall be at liberty to spl'ak, write, or
publish his opinions on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege; and no law shall ever be passed curtailing the liberty of speech or of the
press. In prosecutions for the publication of papers investigating the official
conduct of officers or men in a. public capacity, or when the matter published is
pr,o per for public information, the truth thereof may be given in evidence; and
in all indictments for libels, the jury shall have the right to determine the law
and the facts, under the direction of the court, as in other cases. Art. 1, §§ 5
and 6.- Virginia: That the freedom of the press is one of the great bulwarkl!
of liberty, and can never be restrained but by despotic governments. Bill of
Rights, § 12.
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and what is the extent of the privileges they undertake to

CH.

xn.]

LIBERTY OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS.

assure.

At the common law, however, it will be found that liberty of

the press was neither well protected nor well deﬁned. The art

of printing, in the hands of private persons, has, until within a

comparatively recent period, been regarded rather as an instru-

ment of mischief, which required the restraining hand of the govern-

ment, than as a power for good, to be fostered and encouraged.

Like a vicious beast it might be made useful if properly harnessed

and restrained. The government assumed to itself the right to

determine what might or might not be published; and

censors were appointed ‘without whose permission it was ["‘ 418]

criminal to publish a book or paper upon any subject.

Through all the changes of government this censorship was

continued until after the revolution of 1688, and there are no

instances in English history of more cruel and relentless perse-

cution than for the publication of books which now would pass

unnoticed by the authorities. To a much later day the press

was not free to publish even -the current news of the day where

the government could suppose itself to be interested in its sup-

pression. Many matters, the publication of which now seems

important to the just, discreet, and harmonious working of free
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institutions, and to the proper observation of public oﬁicers by

those interested in the discharge of their duties, were treated

by the public authorities as offences against good order, and

contempts of their authority. By a ﬁction not very far removed

from the truth, the Parliament was supposed to sit with closed

doors. No oﬂicial publication of its debates was provided for,

and no other was allowed.‘ The brief sketches which found

their way into print were usually disguised under the garb of

discussions in a ﬁctitious parliament, held in a foreign country.

Several times the Parliament resolved that any such publication,

or any intermeddling by letter-writers, was a breach of their

privileges, and should be punished accordingly on discovery of

the offenders. For such a publication in 1747 the editor of the

“ Gentleman’s Magazine” was brought to the bar of the House

of Commons for reprimand, and only discharged on expressing

‘ In 1641, Sir Edward Deering was expelled and imprisoned for publishing a

collection of his own speeches, and the book was ordered to be burned by the

common hangman. See May’s Const. Hist. c. 7. I

I
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and what is the extent of the privileges they undertake to
assure.
At the common law, however, it will be found that liberty of
the press was neither well protected nor well defined. The art
of printing, in the hands of private persons, has, until within a
comparatively recent period, been regarded rather as an instrument of mischief, which required the restraining hand of the government, than as a power for good, to be fostered and encouraged.
Like a vicious beast it might be made useful if properly harnessed
and restrained. The government assumed to itself the right to
determine what might or might not be published ; and
censors were appointed • without whose permission it was [• 418]
criminal to publish a book or paper upon any subject.
Through all the changes of government this censorship was
continued until after the revolution of 1688, and there are no
instances in English history of more cruel and relentless persecution tha.n for the publication of books which now would pass
unnoticed by the authorities. To a much later day the press
was not free to publish even ·the current news of the day where
• the government could suppose itself to be interested in its suppression. :Many matters, the publication of which now seems
important to the just, discreet, and harmonious working of free
institutions, and to the proper observation of public officers by
those interested in the discharge of their duties, were treated
by the public authorities as offences against good order, and
contempts of their authority. By a fiction not very far rcmoYed
from the truth, the Parliament was supposed to sit with closed
doors. No official publication of its debates was provided for,
and no other was allowed. 1 The brief sketches which found
their way into print were usually disguised under the garb of
discussions in a fictitious parliament, held in a foreign country. ·
Several times the Parliament resolved that any such publication,
or any intermeddling by letter-writers, was a breach of their
privileges, and should be punished accordingly on discovery of
the offenders. For such a publicatiQn in 1747 the editor of the
" Gentleman's Magazine" was brought to the bar of the House
of Commons for reprimand, and only discharged on expressing
1 In 1641, Sir Edward Deering was expelled and imprisoned for publishing a
collection of his own speeches, and the book was ordered to be burned by the
common hangman. Sec :May's Con.st. Hi st. c. 7.

r 461 J

*418 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [cn. XII.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

his contrition. The general publication of Parliamentary debates

[CH. XII.

dates only from the American Revolution, and even then was

still considered a technical breach of privilege.‘

The American Colonies followed the practice of the parent

country.” Even the laws were not at ﬁrst published for general

circulation, and it seemed to be thought desirable by the magis-

trates to keep the people in ignorance of the precise

P419] boundary "' between that which was lawful and that which

was prohibited, as more likely to make them avoid all

doubtful actions. The magistrates of Massachusetts, when com-

pelled by public opinion to suffer the publication of general laws

in 1649, permitted it under protest, as a hazardous experiment.

For publishing the laws of one session in Virginia, in 1682, the

printer was arrested and put under bonds until the king’s pleasure

could be known, and the king’s pleasure was declared that no

printing should be allowed in the Colony.“ There were not

wanting instances of the public burning of books, as offenders

against good order. Such was the fate of Elliot’s book in defence

of unmixed principles of popular freedom,‘ and Calef’s book

against Cotton Mather, which was given to the ﬂames at Cam-

bridge.5 A single printing-press was introduced into the Colony

so early as 16-10, but the publication even of State documents
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did not become free until 1719, when, after a quarrel between

Governor Sliute and the House, he directed that body not to print

‘ See May‘s Constitutional History, c. 7, 9, and 10, for a complete account of

the struggle between the government and the press, resulting at last in the com-

plete enfranchisement and protection of the latter in the publication of all matters

of public interest, and in the discussion of public affairs. Freedom to report

proceedings and debates was due at last to \Vilkes, who, worthless as he was,

proved a great public benefactor in his obstinate defence of liberty of the press

and security from arbitrary search and arrest.

' The General Court of Massachusetts “appointed two persons, in October,

1662, licensers of the press, and prohibited the publishing any books or papers

which should not be supervised by them, and in 1668 the supervisors having

allowed of the printing ' Thomas a Kempis de imitatione Christi,‘ the court inter-

his contrition. The general publication of Parliamentary debates
dates only from the' American Revolution, and even then was
still considered a technical breach of privilege.1
The American Colonies followed the practice of the parent
country. 2 Even the laws were not at first published for general
circulation, and it seemed to be thought desirable by the magistrate:~ to keep the people in ignorance of the precise
419] boundary • between that which was lawful and that which
was prohibited, as more likely to make them avoid all
doubtful actions. The magistrates of Massachusetts, when compelled by public opinion to suffer the publication of general laws
in 1649, permitted it under protest, as a hazardous experiment.
For publishing the laws of one session in Virginia, in 1682, the
printer was arrested and put under bonds until tho king's pleasure
could be known, and the king's pleasure was declared that no
printing should be allowed in the Colony.3 There were not
wanting instances of the public burning of books, as offenders
against good order. Such was the fate of Elliot's book in defence
of unmixed principles of popular freedom,4 and Calef's book
against Cott6n Mather, which was given to the flames at Cambridge.6 A single printing-press was introduced into the Colony
so early as 1640, but the publication even of State documents
did not become free until 1719, when, after a quarrel between
Governot· Shute and the House, he directed that body not to print

r·

posed, ‘ it being wrote by a popish minister, and containing some things less safe

to be infused among the people,’ and therefore they commended to the licensers

a more full revisal, and ordered the press to stop in the mean time.” 1 Hutchin-

son's Mass. 257, 2d ed.

3 1 Hildreth, History of the United States, 561.

‘ 1 Hutchinson’s Mass. (2d ed.) 211; 2 Bancroft, 73; 1 Hildreth, 452; 2 Pal-

frey’s New England, 511, 512. ° 1 Bancroft, 97; 2 Hildreth, 166.
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See May':$ Constitutional History, c. 7, 9, and 10, for & <'Omplete account of
the struggle between the government and the press, resulting at last in the complete enfranchisement and protection of the latter in the publication of all matters
of public interest, and in the discussion of public affairs. Freedom to report
proceedings and debates was due at last to 'Vilkes, who, worthless as he was,
proved a great public benefactor in his obstinate defence of liberty of the press
· and security frotn arbitrary search and arrest.
1 The General Court of Massachusetts "appointed two persons, in October,
1662, licensers of the press, and prohibited the publishing any books or papers
which should not be supervi~cd by them, and in 1668 the supervisors having
allowed of the printing • Thomas a Kemp is de imitatione Christi,' the court interposed, 'it being wrote by a popish minister, and containing some things less safe
to be infused among the people,' and therefore they commended to the licensere
a more fullrevi~al, and ordered the press to stop in the mean time." 1 Hutchinson's 'Mass. 257, 2d ed.
3 1 Hilclreth, History of the United Statt-s, 561.
• 1 Hutchinson's Mass. (2d ed.) 211; 2 Bancroft, 73; 1 Hildreth, 4.?2; 2 Palfrey's New England, 511, 512.
' 1 Bancroft, 97; 2 Hildreth, 166.
1
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one of their remonstrances, and, on their disobeying, sought in
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vain to procure the punislnnent of their printer.‘ When Dongan

was sent out as Governor of New York in 1683, he was expressly

instructed to suffer no p1‘il1tlng,2 and that Colony obtained its

ﬁrst press in 1692, through a Philadelphia printer being driven

thence for publishing an address from a Quaker, in which he

accused his brethren in ofﬁce of being inconsistent with their

principles in exercising political authority.” So late as 1671,

Governor Berkley of Virginia expressed his thankfulness that

neither free schools nor printing were introduced in the Colony,

and his trust that these breeders of disobedience, heresy, and

sects, would long be unknown!

The public bodies of the united nation did not at once invite

publicity to their deliberations. The Constitutional Convention of

1787 sat with closed doors, and although imperfect reports of the

debates have since been published, the injunction of secrecy upon

its members was never removed.

The Senate for a time followed this example, and the

ﬁrst open ‘debate was had in 1793, on the occasion of ["120]

the controversy over the right of Mr. Gallatin to a scat in

that body. The House of Representatives sat with open doors

from the ﬁrst, tolerating the presence of reporters—ovcr whose
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admission, however, the Speaker assumed control —and refusing

in 1796 the pittance of two thousand dollars for full publication

of debates.

It must be evident from these brief references that liberty of the

press, as now understood and enjoyed, is of very recent origin,“

and commentators seem to be agreed in the opinion that the term

itself means only that liberty of publication without the previous

permission of the government, which was obtained by the abolition

of the censorship. In a strict sense, Mr. Hallam says, it consists

merely in exemption from a licenserﬁ A similar view is expressed

by De Lolme. “ Liberty of the press,” he says, “ consists in this:

that neither courts of justice, nor any other judges whatever, are

' 2 Hildreth, 298. ' 2 Hildreth, 77.

' 2 Hildreth, 171. ‘ 1 llildreth, 526.

‘ It is mentioned neither in the English Petition of Rights nor in the Bill of

Rights; of so little importance did it seem to those who were seeking to redress

grievances in those days. ' ~

° Hallanfs Const. Hist. of England, c. 15.
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one of their remonstrances, and, on their disobeying, sought in
vain to procure the punishment of their printer.l When Dougan
was sent out as Governor of New York in 1683, he was expressly
instructed to suffer no printing,2 and that Colony obtained its
first press in 1692, through a Philadelphia printer being driven
thence for publishing an address from a Quaker, in which he
accused his brethren in office of being inconsistent with their
principles in exercising political authority.a So late as 1671,
Governor Berkley of Virginia expressed his thankfulness that
neither free schools nor printing were introduced in the Colony,
and his tmst that these breeders of disobedience, heresy, and
sects, would long be unknown.4
Tho public bodies of the united nation did not at once invite
publicity to their deliberations. The Constitutional Convention of
1787 sat with closed doors, and although imperfect reports of the
debates have since been published, the injunction of secrecy upon
its members was never removed.
The Senate for a time followed this example, and the
first open • debate was had in 1793, on the occasion of [• 420)
the controversy over the right of Mr. Gallatin to a scat in
that body. The House of Representatives sat with open doors
from the first, tolerating the presence of reporters- over whose
admission, however, the Speaker assumed coutrol- and refusing
in 1 i96 the pittance of two thousand dollars for full publication
of debates.
It must be evident from these brief refet·ences that liberty of the
press, as now understood and enjoyed, is of very recent origin/)
and commentators seem to be agreed in the opinion that the term
itself means only that liberty of publication without the previous
permission of the government, which was obtained by the abolition
of the cettsorship. In a strict sense, Mr. Hallam says, it consists
merely in exemption from a 1icenser.6 A similar view is expressed
by De Lolme. " Liberty of the press," he says, " consists in this:
that neither courts of justice, nor any other judges whatever, are
1 2 Hildreth, 77.
2 Hiltlrcth, 298.
4 1 llildrcth, 5t6.
' 2 Hildreth, 171.
6 It is mentioned neither in the English Petition of Rights nor in the llill of
Rights; of 110 little imp01tance did it ~eem to those who were set-king to redress
gricnnccs in those days.
• Hallam's Const. Hist. of England, c. 15.

1
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authorized to take notice of writings intended for the press, but
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are conﬁned to those which are actually printed.”1 Blackstone

also adopts the same opinion,” and it has been followed by Ameri-

can commentators of standard authority as embodying correctly

the idea incorporated in the constitutional law of the country by

the provisions in the American Bills of Rights.“

It is conceded on all sides that the common-law rules that sub-

jected the libeller to responsibility for the private injury, or the

public scandal or disorder occasioned by his conduct, are not

abolished by the protection extended to the press in our consti-

tutions. The words of Ch. J. Parker of Massachusetts on this

subject have been frequently quoted, generally recognized as sound

in principle, and accepted as authority. “Nor does our consti-

tution or declaration of rights,” he says, speaking of his own

State, “abrogate the common law in this respect, as some have

insisted. The sixteenth article declares that ‘liberty of the press

is essential to the security of freedom in a State: it ought not

therefore to be restrained in this Commonwealth.’ The

[*421] liberty of the press, not its licentiousness: *this is the

construction which a just regard to the other parts of that

instrument, and to the wisdom of those who founded it, requires.

In the eleventh article it is declared that every subject of the
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Commonwealth ought to ﬁnd a certain remedy, by having recourse

to the laws, for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive in his

persbn, property, or character; and thus the general declaration

in the sixteenth article is qualiﬁed. Besides, it is well understood

and received as a commentary on this provision for the liberty of

the press, that it was intended to prevent all such prerioils re-

straints upon publications as had been practised by other govern-

ments, and in early times here, to stiﬁe the efforts of patriots

towards enlightening their fellow-subjects upon their rights and

the duties of rulers. The liberty of the press was to be unre-

strained, but he who used it was _to be responsible in case of its

abuse; like the right to keep ﬁre-arms, which does not protect

him who uses them for annoyance or destructiou.”4

‘ De Lolmc, Const. of England, 254. * 4 Bl. Com. 151.

’ Story on Const. § 1889; 2 Kent, 17 at seq.; Rawle on Const. e. 10.

‘ Commonwealth v. Blanding, 3 Pick. 313. See charge of Chief Justice

McKean of Penn. 5 Hildreth, 166 ; Wharton‘s State Trials, 323 ; State v. Lehre,

2 Rep. Const. Court, 809.
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authorized to take notice of writings intended for the press, but
are confined to those which are actually printed." 1 Blackstone
also adopts the same opinion/' and it has been followed by American commentators of standard authority as embodying correctly
the idea incorporated in the constitutional law of the country by
the provisions in the American Bills of Rights.8
It is conceded on all sides that the common-law rules that subjected the libeller to responsibility for the private· injury, or the
public scandal or disorder occasioned by his conduct, are not
abolished by the protection extended to the press in our constitutions. The words of Ch. J. Parker of Massachusetts on this
subject have been frequently quoted, generally recognized as sound
in principle, and accepted as authority. "Nor does our constitution or declaration of rights," he says, speaking of his own
State, "abrogate the common law in this respect, as some have
insisted. The sixteenth article declares that 'liberty of the press
is essential to the security of freedom in 6 State: it ought not
therefore to be restrained in this Commonwealth.' The
[• 421] liberty of the press, not its licentiousness : • this is the
construction which a just regard to the other parts of that
instrument, and to the wisdom of those who founded it, requires.
In the eleventh article it is declared that every subject of the
Commonwealth ought to find a certain remedy, by having recourse
to the laws, for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive in his
person, property, or character; and thus the general declaration
in the sixteenth article is qualified. Besides, it is well understood
and received as a commentary on this provision for the liberty of
the press, that it was intended to prevent all such previ01Ls restraints upon publications as had been practised by other governments, and in early times here, to stifle the efforts of patriots
towards enlightening their fellow-subjects upon their rights and
the duties of rulers. The liberty of the press was to be unrestrained, but he who used it was .to be responsible in case of its
abuse; like the right to keep fire-arms, which does not protect
him who :uses them for annoyance or destruction." 4
1 De Lolmc, Const. of England, 2M:.
• 4 Bl. Com. 151.
' Story on Con8t. § 1889; 2 Kent, 17 d seq.; Rawlc on Const. c. 10.
4 Commonwealth v. Blanding, 8 Pick. 313.
See charge of Chief Justice
McKean of Penn. 5 Hildreth, 166; Wharton's State Trials, 323; State v. Lehre,
2 Rcp. Const. Court, 809.
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But while we concede that liberty of speech and of the press does
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not imply complete exemption from responsibility for every thinga

citizen may say or publish, and complete immunity to ruin the

reputation or business of others so far as falsehood and detraction

may be able to accomplish that end, it is nevertheless believed

that the mere exemption from previous restraints cannot be all that

is secured by the constitutional provisions, inasmuch as of words

to be uttered orally there can be no previous censorship, and the

liberty of the press might be rendered a mockery and a delusion,

and the phrase itself a byword if, while every man was at liberty

to publish what he pleased, the public authorities might neverthe-

less punish him for harmless publications.

An examination of the controversies which have grown out of

the repressive measures resorted to for the purpose of restraining

the free expression of opinion will sufﬁciently indicate the purpose

of the guaranties which have since been secured against such

restraints in the future. Except so far as those guaranties relate

to the mode of trial, and are designed to secure to every accused

person the right to be judged by the opinion of a jury upon the

criminality of his act, their purpose has evidently been to protect

parties in the free publication of matters of public concern,

to * secure their right to a free discussion of public events [* 422]
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and public measures, and to enable every citizen at any time

to bring the government and any person in authority to the bar of

public opinion by any just criticism upon their conduct in the

exercise of the authority which the people have conferred upon

them. To guard against repressive measures by the several de-

partments of the government, by means of which persons in power

might secure themselves and their favorites from just scrutiny and

condemnation, was the general purpose; and there was no design

or desire to modify the rules of the common law which protected

private character from detraction and abuse, except so far as

seemed necessary to secure to accused parties a fair trial. The

evils to be guarded against were not the censorship of the press

merely, but any action of the government by means of which it

might prevent such free and general discussion of public matters

as seems absolutely essential to prepare the people for an intelligent

exercise of their rights as citizens.

The constitutional liberty of speech and of the press, as we un-

derstand it, implies a right to freely utter and publish whatever the
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But while we concede that liberty of speech and of the press does
not imply complete exemption from responsibility for every thing a
citizen may say or publish, and complete immunity to ruin the
reputation or business of others so far as falsehood and detraction
may be able to accomplish that end, it is nevertheless believed
that the mere exemption from previous restraints cannot be all that
is secured by the constitutional provisions, inasmuch as of words
to be uttered orally there can be no previous censorship, and the
liberty of the press might be rendered a mockery and a delusion,
and the phrase itself a byword if, while every man was at liberty
to publish what he pleased, the public authorities might nevertheless punish him for harmless publications.
An examination of the controversies which have grown out of
the repressive measures resorted to for the purpose of restraining
the free expression of opinion will sufficiently indicate the purpose
of the guaranties which have since been secured against such
restraints in the future. Except so far as those guaranties relate
to the mode of trial, and are designed to secure to every accused
person the right to be judged by the opinion of a jury upon the
criminality of his act, their purpose has evidently been to protect
parties in the free publication of matters of public concern,
to • secure their right to a free discussion of public events [• 422]
and public measures, and to enable every citizen at any time
to bring the government and any person in authority to the bar of
public opinion by any just criticism upon their conduct in the
exercise of the authority which the people have conferred upon
them. To guard against repressive measures by the several departments of the government, by means of which persons in power
might secure themselves and their favorites fromjust scrutiny and
condemnation, was the general purpose; and there was no design
or desire to modify the rules of the common law which protected
private character from detraction and abuse, except so far as
seemed necessary to secure to accused parties a fair trial. The
evils to be guarded against were not the censorship of the press
merely, but any action of the government by means of which it
might prevent such free and general discussion of public matters
as seems absolutely essential to prepare the people for an intelligent
exercise of their rights as citizens.
The constitutional liberty of speech and of the press, as we understand it, implies a right to freely utter and publish whateT"er the
~
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citizen may please, and to be protected against any responsibility
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for so doing, except so far as such publications, from their

blasphemy, obscenity, or scandalous character, may be a public

oﬂenee, or as by their falsehood and malice they may injuriously

aﬁ"ect the standing, reputation, or pecuniary interests of individuals.

Or, to state the same thing in somewhat diﬂerent words, we under-

stand liberty of speech and of the press to imply not only liberty to

publish, but complete immunity from legal censure and punishment

for the publication, so long as it is not harmful in its character,

when tested by such standards as the law affords. For these

standards we must look to the common-law rules which were in force

when the constitutional guaranties were established, and in refer-

ence to which they have been adopted.

At the common law an action would lie against any person

publishing a false and malicious communication tending to disgrace

or injure another. Falsehood, malice, and injury were the elements

of the action ; but as the law presumed innocence of crime or mis-

conduct until the contrary was proved, the falsity of an injurious

publication was presumed until its truth was averred and substan-

tiated by the defendant; and if false, malice in the publication was

also presumed unless the publication was privileged under rules to

be hereafter stated. There were many cases, also, where
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[*‘ 423] the law presumed injury, and did not call upon the * com-

plaining party to make any other showing that he was

damniﬁed than such implication as arose from the character of the

communication itself. If it accused him of a criminal offence,

involving moral turpitude, and such as would subject a party

proved guilty of it to punishment by imprisonment,1 if it charged

‘ Alexander v. Alexander, 9 Wend. 141; VVagan1an v. Byers, 17 Md. 183;

Castlebery v. Kelly, 26 Geo. 606; Redway v. Gray, 31 Vt. 292; Hoag v. Hatch.

23 Conn. 585; Burton v. Burton, 3 Greene (Iowa), 316; Wright v. Paige,

36 Barb. 438; Simmons v. Holster, 13 Minn. 249. But the charge must be

unequivocal. Van Rensselaer v. Dole, 1 Johns. Cas. 279; Dexter v. Taber,

12 Johns. 239; Hopkins v. Beedle, 1 Gaines, 347 ; Butterﬁeld v. Buffam, 9 N. H.

156; Holt v. Scoleﬁeld, 6 T. R. 691; Jacobs v. Fyler, 3 Hill, 572; Crone a.

Angel], 14 Mich. 340; Bonner v. McPhail, 31 Barb. 106; Mower v. \Vatson,

11 Vt. 536. Though it is not necessary that technical words be employed; if

the necessary inference, taking the words together, is a charge of crime, it is

suﬂicient. Morgan v. Livingston, 2 Rich. 573; True v. Plurnley, 36 Me. 466;

Curtis 1:. Curtis, 10 Bing. 477. It is not essential that the charge should be such

citizen may please, and to be protected against any responsibility
for so doing, except so far as such publications, from their
blasphemy, obscenity, or scandalous character, may be a public
offence, or as by their falsehood and malice they may injuriously
affect the standing, reputation, or pecuniary interests of individuals.
Or, to state the same thing in somewhat different words, we understand liberty of speech and of the press to imply not only liberty to
publish, but complete immunity from legal censure and punishment
for the publication, so long as it is not harmful in its character,
when tested by such standards as the law affords. For these
standards we must look to the common-law rules which were in force
when the constitutional guaranties were established, and in reference to which they have been adopted.
At the common law an action would lie against any person
publishing a false and malicious communication tending to disgrace
or injure another. Falsehood, malice, and injury were the elements
of the action; but as the law presumed innocence of crime or misconduct until the contrary was proved, the falsity of an injurious
publication was presumed until its truth was averred and substantiated by the defendant; and if false, malice in the publication was
also presumed unless the publication was privileged under rules to
be hereafter stated. There were many cases, also, where
[• 423] the law presumed injury, and did not call upon the • complaining party to make any other showing that he was
damnified than such implication as arose from the character of the
communication itself. If it accused him of a criminal offence,
in>olving moral turpitude, and fmch as would subject a party
proved guilty of it to punishment by im'prisonment,1 if it charged

as, if true, to subject the party now to punishment. It is the disgrace attending
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1 Alexander t'. Alexander, 9 Wend. 141; Wagaman v. Byers, 17 Md. 183;
Castlebery v.Kelly, 26 Geo. 606; Redway v. Gray, 31 Vt. 292; Hoag v. Hatch.
23 Conn. 58&; Burton v. Burton, 3 Greene (Iowa), 316; Wright v. Paige,
36 Barb. 438; Simmons v. Holster, 13 Minn. 249. But the charge must be
unequivocal. Van Rensselaer v. Dole, 1 Johns. Cas. 279; Dexter v. Taber,
12 Johns. 239; Hopkins v. Beedle, 1 Caines, 347; Butterfield v. Buffam, 9 N.H.
156; Holt v. Scolefield, 6 T. R. 691; Jacobs v. Fyler, 3 Hill, 572; Crone v.
Angell, 14 Mich. 340; Bonner v. l\IcPhail, 31 Barb. 106; Mower v. Watson,
11 Vt. 536. Though it is not necessary that technical words be employed; if
the neces8ary inference, taking the words together, is a charge of crime, it is
sufficient. Morgan v. Livingston, 2 Rich. 573; True v. Plumley, 36 Me. 466;
Curtis v. Curtis, 10 Bing. 477. It is not essential that the charge should be such
as, if true, to subject the party now to punishment. It is the disgrace attending
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him with an infectious disease, the effect of the charge, if believed,

being to exclude him from the society of his fellows ;1 if the charge

affected the party in his business, office, or means of livelihood, like

charging a trader with insolvency, and the like ; 2 or if any injurious

charge holding a party up to public contempt, scorn, or ridicule

was propagated by printing, writing, signs, burlesques, &c.,3—tl1e

law presumed injury, and the charge was said to be actionable per

se. And although it was formerly held that to charge a female

verbally with want of chastity was not actionable without proof of

special damage,‘ yet of late a disposition has been exhibited

to "‘ break away from this rule in favor of one more just [* 424]

and sensiblef’ and the statutes of several of the States

have either made adultery and incontinence punishable as crimes,

whereby to charge them becomes actionable per se under the com-

mon-law rule, or else in express terms have declared such a charge

actionable without proof of special damage.“

the charge that gives the right of action, and therefore to say that the person is a

returned convict is actionable. Baum v. Clause, 5 Hill, 196; Smith v. Stewart,

5 Pcnn. St. 372; Utley v. Campbell, 5 T. B. Monr. 396; Holley v. Burgess,

9 Ala. 728. Or to accuse him of a crime for which prosecution would be barred

by statute of limitations would be actionable. Van Ankin v. Westfall, 14 Johns.
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233; Poe v. Grever. 3 Sneed, 664; Stewart v. Howe, 17 Ill.-71.

‘ Carlslake v. Maplcdorum, 2 T. R. 473; Bloodworth v. Gray, 7 M. & G. 334;

him with an infectious disease, the eff0ct of the charge, if believed,
being to exclude him from the society of his fellows ; 1 if the charge
affected the party in his business, office, or means of livelihood, like
charging a trader with insolvency, and the like; 2 or if any injurious
charge holding a party up to public contempt, scorn, or ridicule
was propagated by printing, writing, signs, burlesques, &c., 3 - the
law presumed injury, and the charge was said to be actionable per
se. And although it was formerly held that to charge a female
verbally with want of chastity was not actionable without proof of
special damage,4 yet oflate a disposition has been exhibited
to • break away from this rule in favor of one more just [* 424]
and sensible,6 and the statutes of several of the States
have either made adultery and incontinence punishable as crimes,
whereby to charge them becomes actionable per se under the common-law rule, or else in express terms have declared such a charge
actionable without proof of special damage. 6

Nichols v. Guy, 2 Ind. 82; Watson v. McCarthy, 2 Kelly, 57.

" Lindsey v. Smith, 7 Johns. 360; Thomas v. Croswell, 7 Johns. 264; Riggs

v. Denniston, 3 Johns. Cas. 198; Fonvard v. Adams, 7 Wend. 204.

' Janson v. Stuart, 1 T. R. 748; Van Ness v. Hamilton, 19 Johns. 867; Clegg

v. Lalfer, 10 Bing. 250; Steele v. Southwick, 9 Johns. 214.

‘ Gascoign v. Ambler, 2 Ld. Raym. 1004; Graves v. Blanchet, 2 Salk. 696;

\Vilby v. Elston-, 8 C. B. 142; Buys u. Gillespie, 2Johns. 115 ; Br0oker'0. Coffin,

5 Johns. 188; Bradt v. Towsley, 13 \Vend. 253; Dyer v. Morris, 4 Mo. 214;

Stanﬁeld v. Boyer, 6 H. & J. 248; Woodbury v. Thompson, 3 N. H. 194; Berry

v. Carter, 4 Stew. & Port. 387; Elliot v. Ailsbury, 2 Bibb, 473; Lirmey v.

Malton, 13 Texas, 449; Undcrhill v. “Felton, 32 Vt. 40.

5 See the cases of Sexton v. Todd. \Vright, 317; 1Vilson v. Runyan, ib. 671;

Malone v. Stewart, 15 Ohio, 319; Moberly v. Preston, 8 Mo. 462; Sidgreaves

1:. Myatt, 22 Ala. 617; Terry v. Bright, 4 Md. 430; Spencer v. Mclilasters,

16 Ill. 405.

' See Frisbie v. Fowler, 2 Conn. 707; Miller v. Parish, 8 Pick. 384; Robbins

v. Fletcher, 101 Mass. 115; Pledger v. Hitchcock, 1 Kelley, 550; Smally v.

Anderson, 2 T. B. Monr. 56 ; Williams 1:. Bryant, 4 Ala. 44; Dailey v. Reynolds,

4 Greene (Iowa), 354; Symonds v. Carter, 32 N. H. 458; McBrayer v. Hill,

4 Ired. 136; Morris v. Barkley, 1 Lit. 64; Phillips v. Wiley, 2 Lit. 153; \Vatts

v. Grcenlee, 2 Dev. 115; Drummond v. Leslie, 5 Blackf. 453; Worth v. Butler,
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. the charge that gives the right of action, and therefore to say that the person is a
returned convict is actionable. Baum v. Clause, 5 Hill, 196; Smith v. Stewart,
5 Penn. St. 372; Utley 11. Campbell, 5 T. B. Monr. 396; Holley v. Burgess,
9 Ala. 728. Or to accuse him of a crime for which prosecution would be barred
by statute of limitations would be actionable. Van Ankin v. Westfall, 14 Johns.
233; Poe v. Grever, 3 Sneed, 664; Stewart v. Howe, 17 HI.. il.
1 Carlslake v. Mapledorum, 2 T. R. 473; Bloodworth v. Gray, 7 M. & G. 334;
Nichols v. Guy, 2 Ind. 82; Watson t•. McCarthy, 2 Kelly, 57.
• Lindsey v. Smith, 7 Johns. 360; Thomas "· Croswell, 7 Johns. 264; Riggs
v. Denniston, 3 Johns. Cas. 198; Fonvard v. Adams, 7 Wend. 20!.
3 Janson v. Stuart, 1 T. R. 748; Yan Ness v. Hamilton, 19Johns. 867; Clegg
v. Laff~r. 10 Bing. 250; Steele v. Southwil:k, 9 Johns. 214.
4 Gascoign "· Ambler, 2 Ld. Raym. 100!; Graves "· Blanchet, 2 Salk. 696;
Wilby v. Elston", 8 C. B. 142; Buys v. Gillespie, 2Johns. 115; Brooker'"· Coffin,
5 Johns. 188; Bradt v. Towsley, 13 Wend. 253; Dyer. v. Morris, 4 1\Io. 214;
Stanfield v. Boyer, 6 H. & J. 2!8; Woodbury v. Thompson, 3N. H. 194; Berry
v. Carter, 4 Stew. & Port. 387; Elliot v. Ailsbury, 2 Bibb, 473; Linney v.
Malton, 13 Texas, 449; Underbill v. Welton, 32 Vt. 40.
• Sec the cases of Sexton"· Todd, Wright, 317; Wilson tt. Runyan, ib. 6il;
Malone v. Stewart, 15 Ohio, 319; Moberly "· Preston, 8 Mo. 462; Sidgreaves
"· Myatt, 2i Ala. 617; Terry v. Bright, 4 Md. 430; Spencer v. Mcl\Iasters,
16 Ill. 405.
• See Frisbie v. Fowler, 2 Conn. 707 ; Miller v. Parish, 8 Pick. 384; Robbins
"· Fletcher, 101 Mass. 115; Pledger v. Hitchcock, 1 Kelley, MO; Smally v.
Anderson, 2 T. B.l\Ionr. 56 ; Williams v. Bryant, 4 Ala. 44; Dailey v. Reynolds,
4 Greene (Iowa), 354; Symonds v. Carter, 3:2 N. H. 458; McBrayer v. Hill,
4 Ired. 136; Morris "· Barkley, 1 Lit. 64; Phillips v. Wiley, 2 Lit. 158; Watts
v. Greenlee, 2 Dev. 115; Drummond v. Leslie, 5 Blackf. 403; Worth v. Butler,

[ 467]

* 424 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [on. x11.

• 424

I

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

•

[CH. XII.

But in any other case a party complaining of a false, malicious,

But in any other case a party complaining of a false, malicious,
and disparaging c~mmunication might maintain an action therefor,
on averment and proof of special damage,1 though the truth of the
charge, if pleaded and established, was generally a complete defence.2
In those cases in which the injurious charge was propagated by
printing, writing, signs, burlesques, &c., there might also be a
criminal prosecution, as well as a suit for private damages. The
criminal prosecution was based upon the idea that the tendency of
such publications was to excite to a breach of the public peace ; 8
and on similar grounds to publish injurious charges against
[• 425] a foreign • prince or ruler was also held punishable as a
public offence, as tending to embroil the two nations, and
disturb the p~ace of the world.•
We are not so much concerned, however, with the general rules
pertaining to the punishment of injurious publications, as with
those special cases where, for some reason of general public policy,
the publication is claimed to be privileged, and where, consequently,
it may be supposed to be within the constitutional protection. It
has always been held, notwithstanding the general rule that malice

and disparaging communication might maintain an action therefor,

on averment and proof of special damage} though the truth of the

charge, if pleaded and established, was generally a complete de-

fence.“

In those cases in which the injurious charge was propagated by

printing, writing, signs, burlesques, &c., there might also be a

criminal prosecution, as well as a suit for private damages. The

criminal prosecution was based upon the idea that the tendency of

such publications was to excite to a. breach of the public peace ; 3

and on similar grounds to publish injurious charges against

[* 425] a foreign *‘ prince or ruler was also held punishable as a

public offence, as tending to embroil the two nations, and

disturb the peace of the world.‘

We are not so much concerned, however, with the general rules

pertaining to the punishment of injurious publications, as with

those special cases where, for some reason of general public policy,

the publication is claimed to be privileged, and where, consequently,

it may be supposed to be within the constitutional protection. It

has always been held, notwitlistanding the general rule that malice

7 Blackf. 251; Richardson v. Roberts, 23 Geo. 215; Buford v. \Vible, 32 Penn.
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St. 95; Freeman v. Price, 2 Bailey, 115; Regnier v. Cabot, 2 Gil. 3;; Ranger

v. Goodrich, 17 Wis. 78; Adams v. Rankin, 1 Duvall, 58; Downing v. Wilson,

36 Ala. 717; Cox v. Bunker, Morris, 269; Smith v. Silence, 4 Iowa, 821; Tru-

man v. Taylor, ib. 424; Beardsley v. Bridgeman, 17 Iowa, 242; Patterson v.

\Vilkinson, 55 Me. 45. The injustice of the common-law rule is made prominent

in those cases where it has been held that an allegation that, in consequence of

the charge, the plaintiff had fallen into disgrace, contempt, and infamy, and

lost her credit, reputation, and peace of mind (Woodbury v. Thompson, 8 N. H.

194), and that she is shunned by her neighbors (Beach v. Ranney, 2 Hill, 310),

was not a suflicient allegation of special damage to support the action.

‘ Kelley v. Partington, 3 Nev. & M. IIQ; Steele v. Southwick, 9 Johns. 214;

Hallock v. Miller, 2 Barb. 630; Powers v. Dubois, 17 Wend. 63; Weed v. Foster,

11 Barb. 203; Cooper v. Greeley, 1 Denio, 347 ; Stone v. Cooper, 2 Denio, 293.

The damage, however, must be of a pecuniary character. Beach v. Ranncy, 2 Hill,

309. But very slight damage has been held suﬁicient to support considerable

recoveries. Williams v. Hill, 19 \Vend.‘305; Bradt v. Towsley, 13 Wend. 253;

Olmsted v. Miller, 1 Wend. 506; Moore v. Meagher, 1 Taunt. 89; Knight v.

Gibbs, 1 Ad. & El. 43.

” See 1 Hilliard on Torts, 410; Heard on Libel and Slander, § 151; Towns-

end on Libel and Slander, § 73.

“ Commonwealth v. Clap, 4 Mass. 168.

‘ 27 State Trials, 627; 2 May, Const. History of England, c. 9.
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7 Blackf. 251; Richardson v. Roberts, 28 Geo. 215; Buford"· Wible, 82 Penn .
St. 95; Freeman v. Price, 2 Bailey, 115; Regnier v. Cabot, 2 Gil. 34; Ranger
v. Goodrich, 17 Wis. 78; Adams v. Rankin, 1 Duvall, 58; Downing v. Wilson,
86 Ala. 717; Cox v. Bunker, Morris, 269; Smith v. Silence, 4 Iowa, 821; Truman v. Taylor, ib. 424; Beardsley v. Bridgeman, 17 Iowa, 242; Patterson v.
'Vilkinson, 55 Me. 45. The injustice of the common-law rule is wade prominent
in those cases where it has been held that an allegation that, in consequence of
the charge, the plaintiff had fallen into disgrace, contempt, and infamy, and
lost her credit, reputation, and peace of mind (Woodbury "· Thompson, 8 N. H.
194), and that she is shm1ned by her neighbors (Beach v. Ranney, 2 Hill, 810),
was not a sufficient allegation of special da!J1age to support the action.
1 Kelley v. Partington, S Nev. & M. llq; Steele v. Southwick, 9 Johns. 214;
Hallock v. Miller, 2 Barb. 680; Powers v. Dubois, 17 "\Vend. 68; Weed v. Foster,
11 Barb. 203; Cooper v. Greeley, 1 Denio, 347; Stone v. Cooper, 2 Denio, 293.
The damage, however, must be of a pecuniary character. Beach v. Ranney, 2 Hill,
309. But very slight damage bas been held sufficient to support considerable
recoveries. Williams v. Hill, 19 Wend. '305; Bradt v. Towsley, 18 Wend. 258;
Olmsted "·Miller, 1 Wend. 506; Moore v. Meagher, 1 Taunt. 89; Knight "·
Gibbs, 1 Ad. & El. 43.
1 See 1 Hilliard on Torts, 410; Heard on Libel and Slander, § 151; Townsend on Libel and Slander, § 73.
~ Commonwealth v. Clap, 4 Mass. 168.
' 27 State Trials, 627; 2 May, Const. History of England, c. 9.
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were some cases to which the presumption would not apply, and

where a private action could not be maintained without proof of

express malice. These are the cases which are said to be privi-

leged. The term “privileged,” as applied to a communication

alleged to be libellous, means generally that the circumstances

under which it was made were such as to rebut the legal inference

of malice, and to throw upon the plaintiff the burden of offering

some evidence of its existence beyond the mere falsity of the

charge} The cases falling within this classiﬁcation are those in

which a party has a duty to discharge which requires that he should

be allowed to speak freely and fully that which he believes; where

he is himself directly interested in the subject-matter of the

communication, and makes it with a view to the protection or

advancement of his own interest, or where he is communicating

conﬁdentially with a person interested in the communication, and

by way of advice or admonition.” Many such eases suggest them-

selves which are purely of private concern; such as answers to

inquiries into the character or conduct of one formerly employed

by the person to whom the inquiry is addressed, and of whom the

information is sought with a view to guiding the inquirer in his own

action in determining upon employing the same person ;3
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answers to inquiries by one tradesman of another * as to [* 426]

the solvency of a person whom the inquirer has been

desired to trust;‘* answers by a creditor to inquiries regarding the

conduct and dealings of his debtor, made by one who had become

surety for the debt ;"’ communications from an agent to his prin-

cipal, reﬂecting injuriously uponthe conduct of a third person in

a matter connected with the agency ;° communications to a near

' Lewis v. Chapman, 16 N. Y. 373, per Selderi, J., Townsend on Libel and

Slander, § 209.

' “ \Vhen a communication is made in conﬁdence, either by or to a person

interested in the communication, supposing it to be true, or by way of admonition

or advice, it seems to be a general rule that malice (i.e., express malice) is

essential to the maintenance of an action.” 1 Starkie on Slander, 321. See

Harrison v. Bush, 5 El. & Bl. 344; Somervillc v. Hawkins, 10 C. B. 589 ; “fright

v. \Voodgate, 2 Cr. M. & R. 573.

3 Pattison v. Jones, 8 B. & C. 578; Elam v. Badger, 23 Ill. 498; Bradley v.

Heath, 12 Pick. 163.

‘ Smith v. Thomas, 2 Bing. (N. C.) 372; Story v. Challands, 8 C. & P. 234.

‘ Dunman v-. Bigg, 1 Campb. 269, note.

5 Washburn v. Cooke, 3 Denio, 110. See Easley v. Moss, 9 Ala. 266

is to be inferred from a false and injurious publication, that there
were some cases to which the presumption would not apply, and
where a private action could not be maintained without proof of
expres~ malice. These are the cases which are said to be privileged. The term " privileged," as applied to a communication
alleged to be libellous, means generally that the circumstances
under which it was made were such as to rebut the legal inference
of malice, and to thro0w upon the plaintiff the burden of offering
some evidence of its existence beyond the mere falsity of the
charge.1 The cases falling within this classification are those in
which a party has a duty to discharge which requires that he should
be allowed to speak freely and fully that which he believes; where
he is himself directly interested in the subject-matter of the
communication, and makes it with a view to the protection or
advancement of his own interest, or where he is communicating
confidentially with a person interested in the communication, and
by way of advice or admonition.2 Many such cases suggest themselves which are purely of private concern ; such as answers to
inquiries into the character or conduct of one formerly employed
by the person to whom the inquiry is addressed, and of whom the
information is sought with a view to guiding the inquirer in his own
action in determining upon employing the same person; 8
answers to inquiries by one tradesman of another • as to [• 426]
the solvency of a person whom the inquirer has been
desired to trust; 4 answers by a creditor to inquiries regarding the
conduct and dealings of his debtor, made by one who had become
surety for the debt; 6 communications from an agent to his principal, reflecting injuriously upon ·the conduct of a third person in
a matter connected with the agency ; 6 communications to a near
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1 Lewis v. Chapman, 16 N.Y. 373, per Selden, J.; Townsend on Libel and
Slander, § 209.
' " When a communication is made in confidence, either by or to a person
interested in the communication, supposing it to be true, or by way of admonition
or advice, it seems to be a general rule that malice (i.e., express malice) is
essential to the maintenance of an action." 1 Starkie on Slander, 321. See
Harrison v. Bush. 5 El. & Bl. 344; Somerville v. Hawkins, 10 C. B. 589; Wright
"·Woodgate, 2 Cr. M. & R. 573.
3 Pattison 11. Jones, 8 B. & C. 578; Elam v. Badger, 23 Ill. 498; Bradley v.
Heath, 12 Pick. 163.
4 Smith 11. Thomas, 2 Bing. (N.C.) 372; Story v. Challands, 8 C. & P. 284.
6 Dunman v, Bigg, 1 Campb. 269, note.
' Washburn v. Cooke, 3 Denio, 110. See Easley v. Moss, 9 Ala. ~66
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relative respecting the character of a person with whom the relative
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is in negotiation for marriage ;1 and as many more like cases as

would fall within the same reasons? The rules of law applicable

to these cases are very well settled, and are not likely to be changed

with a view to greater stringency.3

Libels upon the Government.

At the common law it was indictable to publish any thing against

the constitution of the country, or the established system of

government. The basis of such a prosecution was the tendency of

relative respecting the character of a person with whom the relative
is in negotiation for marriage ; 1 and as many more like cases as
would fall within the same reasons.2 The rules of law applicable
to these cases are very well settled, and are not likely to be changed
with a view to greater stringency.s

publications of this character to excite disaffection with the govern-

ment, and thus induce a revolutionary spirit. The law

Libels upon tlte Government.

["' 427] always, ’*however, allowed a calm and temperate discus-

sion of public events and measures, and recognized in

every man a right to give every public matter a candid, full, and

free discussion. It was only when a. publication went beyond this,

and tended to excite tumult, that it became criminal.‘ It cannot

be doubted, however, that the common-law rules on this subject

‘ Todd v. Hawkins, 8 C. & P. 88. But there is no protection to such a com-

munication from a stranger. Johannes v. Bennet, 5 Allen, 170.

1 As to whether a stranger volunteering to give information injurious to

another, to one interested in the knowledge, is privileged in so doing, see Cox-

head u. Richards, 2 M. G. & S. 569; and Bennett 0. Deacon, ib. 628. lVhere
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a conﬁdential relation of any description exists between the parties, the commu-

nication is privileged; as where the tenant of a nobleman had written to inform

him of his gamekeeper‘s neglect of duty. Coekagne v. Hodgkisson, 5 C. 8: P.

5-13. Where a son-in-law wrote to warn his mother-in-law of the bad character

of a man she was about to marry. Todd v. Hawkins, 8 C. & P. 88. Where a

banker communicated with his correspondent concerning a note sent to him for

At the common law it was indictable to publish any thing against
the constitution of the country, or the established system of
government. The basis of such a prosecution was the tendency of
publications of this character to excite disaffection with the government, and thus induce a revolutionary spirit. The law
[• 427] always, • however, allowed a calm and temperate discussion of public events and measures, and recognized in
every man a right to give every public matter a candid, full, and
free discussion. It was only when a publication went beyond this,
and tended to excite tumult, that it became criminal.4 It cannot
be doubted, however, that the common-law rules on this subject

collection; the court saying that “ all that is necessary to entitle such communi-

cation to be privileged is, that the relation of the parties should be such as to

aﬁbrd reasonable ground for supposing an innocent motive for giving the infor-

mation, and to deprive the act of the appearance of oﬂicious intermeddling with

the affairs of others.” Lewis v. Chapman, 16 N. Y. 375. \Vhere one commu-

nicated to an employer his suspicions of dishonest conduct in a servant towards

himself. Amann v. Damm, 8 C. B. N. s. -597.

' See further, Harrison v. Bush, 5 El. & Bl 344; Shipley v. Todhunter, 7 C.

&P. 680; Lawler v. Earle, 5 Allen, 22; Grimes v. Coyle, 6 B. Monr. 301;

Rector 11. Smith, ll Iowa, 302; Gosslin v. Cannon, 1 Harr. 3; Joannes 0. Ben-

nett, 5 Allen, 169; State v. Burnham, 9 N. H. 3-L

‘ Regina v. Collins, 9 C. & P. 456, per Littledale, J . See the proceedings

against Thomas Paine, 27 State Trials, 357.
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1 Todd 11. Hawkins, 8 C. & P. 88.
But there is no protection to such a communication from a stranger. Johannes v. Bennet, 5 Allen, 170.
1 As to whether a stranger volunteering to give information injurious to
another, to one interested in the knowJedge, is privileged in so doing, see Coxhead"· Richards, 2 M. G. & S. 569; and Bennett v. Deacon, ib. 628. Where
a confidential relation of any description exists between the parties, the communication is privileged; as where the tenant of a nobleman had written to inform
him of his gamekeeper's neglect of duty. Cockagne v. Hodgkisson, 5 C. & P.
543. 'Vhere a son-in-law wrote to warn his mother-in-law of the bad character
of a man she was about to marry. Todd v. Hawkins, 8 C. & P. 88. Where a
banker communicated with his correspondent concerning a note sent to him for
collection; the court saying that " all that is necessary to entitle such communication t{) be pri,·ileged is, that the relation of the parties should be such as to
afford reasonable ground for supposing an innocent motive for giving the information, and to deprive the act of the appearance of officious intermeddling with
the affairs of otheril." Lewis v. Chapman, 16 N.Y. 375. Where one communicated to an employer his suspicions of dishonest conduct in a servant towards
himself. Amann 11. Damm, 8 C. B. N. s. -097.
1 See further, Harrison 11. Bush, 5 El. & Bl 344; Shipley 11. Todhunter, 7 C.
& P. 680; Lawler "· Earle, 5 Allen, 22; Grimes v. Coyle, 6 B. Monr. 301;
Rector v. Smith, 11 Iowa, 302; Gosslin v. Cannon, 1 Harr. 3; Joannes "· Bennett, 5 Allen, 169; State"· Burnham, 9 N. H. 34.
• Regina "· Collins, 9 C. & P. 456, per Littledale, J. See the proceedings
against Thomas Paine, 27 ~tate Trials, 857.
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were administered in many cases with great harshness, and that
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the courts in the interests of repression and at the instigation of

the government often extended them to cases not within their

reasons. This was especially true during the long and bloody

struggle with France, at the close of the last and beginning of the

present century, and for a few subsequent years, until a rising

public discontent with political prosecutions began to lead to

acquittals, and ﬁnally to abandonment of all such attempts to

restrain the free expression of sentiments on public affairs. Such

prosecutions have now altogether ceased in England. Like the

censorship of the press, they have fallen out of the British consti-

tutional system. “ When the press errs, it is by the press itself

that its errors are left to be corrected. Repression has ceased to

be the policy of rulers, and statesmen have at length realized the

Wise maxim of Lord Bacon, that ‘ the punishing of wits enhances

their authority, and a forbidden writing is thought to be a certain

spark of truth that ﬂies up in the faces of them that seek to tread

it out.’ ” 1

We shall venture to express a doubt if the common-law princi-

ples on this subject can be considered as having been practically

adopted in the American States. It is certain that no prosecutions

could now be maintained in the United States courts for libels on
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the general government, since those courts have no common-law

jurisdiction,’ and there is now no statute, and never was except

during the brief existence of the Sedition Law, which assumed to

confer any such power.

The Sedition Law was passed during the administration of the

elder Adams, when the fabric of government was still new and

untried, and when many men seemed to think that the breath of

heated party discussions might tumble it about their heads. ‘Its

constitutionality was always disputed by a large party, and its

impolicy was beyond question. It had a direct tendency to pro-

duce the very state of things it sought to repress; the

prosecutions *‘under it were instrumental, among other [* 428]

things, in the ﬁnal overthrow and destruction of the party

by which it was adopted, and it is impossible to conceive, at the

present time, of any such state of things as would be likely to bring

‘ May, Constitutional History. c. 10.

’ United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch, 32.
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were administered in many cases with great harshness, and that
the courts in the interests of repression and at the instigation of
the government often extended them to cases not within their
reasons. This was especially true during the long and bloody
struggle with France, at the close of the last and beginning of the
present century, and for a few subsequent years, until a rising
public discontent with political prosecutions began to lead to
acquittals, and finally to abandonment of all such attempts to
restrain the free expression of sentiments on public affairs. Snch
prosecutions have now altogether ceased in England. Like the
censorship of the press, they have fallen out of the British constitutional system. " When the press errs, it is by the press itself
that its errors are left to he corrected. Repression has ceased to
be the policy of rulers, and statesmen have at length realized the
wise maxim of Lord Bacon, that ' the punishing of wits enhances
their authority, and a forbidden writing is thought to be a certain
spark of truth that flies up in the faces of them that seek to tread
it out.' " 1
We shall venture to express a doubt if the common-law principles on this subject can be considered as having been practically
adopted in the American States. It is certain that no prosecutions
could now be maintained in the United States courts for libels on
the general government, since those courts have no common-law
jurisdiction,2 and there is now no statute, and never was except
during the brief existence of the Sedition Law, which assumed to
confer any such power.
The Sedition Law was passed during the administration of the
elder Adams, when the fabric of government was still new and
untried, and when many men seemed to think that the breath of
heated party discussions might tumble it about their heads. · Its
constitutionality was always disputed bJ a large party, and its
impolicy was beyond question. It had a direct tendency to produce the very state of things it sought to repress; the
prosecutions • under it were instrumental, among other [* 428]
things, in the final overthrow and destruction of the party
by which it was adopted, and it is impossible to conceive, at the
present time, of any such state of things as would be likely to bring
1
1

May, Constitutional History, '<· 10.
United States v. Hudson, 1 Crancb, 32.
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about its re-enactment, or the passage of any similar repressive
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statute.‘

When it is among the fundamental principles of the government

that the people frame their own constitution, and that in doing so

they reserve to themselves the power to amend it from time to time,

as the public sentiment may change, it is dilﬁcult to conceive of any

sound principle on which prosecutions for libels on the system of

government can be based, except when their evident intent and

purpose is to excite rebellion and civil war. It is very easy to lay

down a rule for the discussion of constitutional questions; that

they are privileged, if conducted with calmness and temperance,

and that they are not indictable unless they go beyond the bounds

of fair discussion. But what is calmness and temperance, and

what is fair in the discussion of supposed evils in the govern-

ment? And if something is to be allowed “ for a little feeling

in men’s minds,” 2 how great shall be the allowance? The heat of

the discussion will generally be in proportion to the magnitude of

the evil, as it appears to the party discussing it: must the question

whether he has exceeded due bounds or not, be tried by judge and

jury, who may sit under dilfereut circumstances from those under

which he has spoken, or at least after the heat of the occasion has

passed away, and who, feeling none of the excitement themselves,
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may think it unreasonable that any one else should ever have felt

it? The dangerous character of such prosecutions would be the

more glaring if aimed at those classes who, not being admitted to a

share in the government, attacked the constitution in the point

which excluded them. Sharp criticism, ridicule, and the exhibi-

tion of such feeling as a sense of injustice engenders, is to be

expected from any discussion in these cases; but when the very

classes who have established the exclusion as proper and reasonable

are to try as judges and jurors the assaults made upon it,

[* 429] they will be very likely to enter upon the ‘examination

with a preconceived notion that such assaults upon their

reasonable regulations must necessarily be unreasonable. If any

such principle of repression should ever be recognized in the

‘ For prosecutions under this law, see Lyon’s Case, Wharton‘s State Trials,

333; C0oper‘s Case, ib. 659; Haswell’s Case, ib. 684; Callendex-’s Case, ib. 688.

And see 2 Randall, Life of Jefferson, 417-421; 5 Hildreth, History of United

States, 247, 365.

’ Regina v. Collins, 9 C. & P. 460, per Littledale, J.
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about its re-enactment, or the passage of any similar repressive
statute. I
When it is among the fundamental principles of the government
that the people frame their own constitution, and that in doing so
they reserve to themselves the power to amend it from time to time,
as the public sentiment may change, it is difficult to conceive of any
sound principle on which prosecutions for libels on the system of
government can be based, except when their evident intent and
purpose is to excite rebellion and civil war. It is very easy to lay
down a rule for the discussion of constitutional questions ; that
they are privileged, if conducted with calmness and temperance,
and that they are not indictable unless they go beyond the bounds
of fair discussion . . But what is calmness and temperance, and
what is fair in the discussion of supposed evils in the government? .And if something is to be allowed " for a little feeling
in men's minds," 2 how great shall be the allowance? The heat of
the discussion will generally be in proportion to the magnitude of
the evil, as it appears to the party discussing it: must the question
whether he has exceeded due bounds or not, be tried by judge and
jury, who may sit under different circumstances from those under •
which he has spoken, or at least after the heat of the occasion has
passed away, and who, feeling none of the excitement themselves,
may think it unreasonable that any one else should ever have felt
it? The dangerous character of such prosecutions would be the
more glaring if aimed at those classes who, not being admitted to a
share iJ1 the government, attacked the constitution in the point
which excluded them. Sharp criticism, ridicule, and the exhibition of such feeling as a sense of injustice engenders, is to be
expected from any discussion in these cases ; but when the very
classes who have established the exclusion as proper and reasonable
are to try as juages and jurors the assaults made upon it,
[• 429] they will be very likely to enter upon the • examination
with a preconceived notion that such assaults upon their
reasonable regulations must necessarily be unreasonable. If any
such principle of repression should ever be recognized in the
For prosecutions under this law, see Lyon's Case, Wharton's State Trials,
838; Cooper's Case, ib. 669; Haswell's Case, ib. 684; Callender's Case, ib. 688.
And see 2 Randall, Life of Jefferson, 417-421; 5 Hildreth, History of United
States, 247, 365.
' R~gina v. Collins, 9 C. & P. 460, per Littledale, J.
1
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common law of America, it might reasonably be anticipated that
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in times of high party excitement it would lead to prosecutions

by the party in power, to bolster up wrongs and sustain abuses and

oppressions by crushing adverse criticism and discussion. The

evil, indeed, could not be of long continuance; for, judging from

experience, the reaction would be speedy, thorough, and eﬁectual ;

but it would be no less a serious evil while it lasted, the direct

tendency of which would be to excite discontent and to breed a

rebellious spirit. Repression of full and free discussion is danger-

ous in any government resting upon the will of the people. The

people cannot fail to feel that they are deprived of rights, and will

be certain to become discontented, when their discussion of public

measures is sought to be circumscribed by the judgment of others

upon their temperance or fairness. They must. be left at liberty to

speak with the freedom which the magnitude of the supposed

wrongs appears in their minds to demand; and if they exceed all

the proper bounds of moderation, the consolation must be, that the

evil likely to spring from the violent discussion will probably be

less, and its correction by public sentiment more speedy, than if

the terrors of the law were brought to bear to prevent the dis-

cussion.

The English common-law rule which made libels on the consti-
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tution or the government indictable, as it was administered by the

courts, seems to us unsuited to the condition and circumstances of

the people of America, and therefore never to have been adopted in

the several States. If we are correct in this, it would not be in the

power of the State legislatures to pass laws which should make

mere criticism of the constitution or of the measures of government

a crime, however sharp, unreasonable, and intemperate it might be.

The constitutional freedom of speech and of the press must mean a

freedom as broad as existed when the constitution which guarantees

it was adopted, and it would not be in the power of the legislature

to restrict it, unless it might be in those cases of publications inju-

rious to private character, or public morals or safety, which come

strictly within the reasons of civil or criminal liability at the

common law, but in which, nevertheless, the common law as we

have adopted it failed to provide a remedy. It certainly could not

be said that freedom of speech was violated by a law which

should * make imputing the want of chastity to a female [' 430]

actionable without proof of special damage; for the charge
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common law of America, it might reasonably be anticipated that
in times of high party excitement it would lead to prosecutions
by the party in power, to bolster up wrongs and sustain abuses and
oppressions by crushing adverse criticism and discussion. The
evil, indeed, could not be of long continuance; for, judging from
experience, the reaction would be speedy, thorough, and effectual;
but it would be no less a serious evil while it lasted, the direct
tendency of which would be to excite discontent and to breed a
rebellious spirit. Repression of full and free discussion is dangerous in any government resting upon the will of the people. The
people cannot fail to feel that they are deprived of rights, and will
be certain to become discontented, when their discussion of public
measures is sought to be circumscribed by the judgment of others
upon their temperance or fairness. They must be left at liberty to
speak with the freedom which the magnitude of the supposed
wro11gs appears in their minds to demand ; and if they exceed all
the proper bounds of model'ation, the consolation must be, that the
evil likely to spring from the violent discussion will probably be
less, and its correction by public sen tim en t more speedy, than if
the terrors of the law were brought to bear to prevent the discussion.
The English common-law rule which made libels on the constitution or the government indictable, as it was administered by the
courts, seems to us unsuited to the condition and circumstances of
the people of America, and therefore never to have been adopted in
the several States. If we are correct in this, it would not be in the
power of the State legislatures to pass laws which should niake
mere criticism of the constitution or of the measures of government
a crime, however sharp, unreasonable, and intemperate it might be.
The constitutional freedom of Rpeech and of the press must mean a
freedom as broad as existed when the constitution which guarantees
it was adopted, and it would not be in the power of the legislature
to restrict it, unless it might be in those cases of publications injurious to private character, or public morals or safety, wl1ich come
strictly within the reasons of civil or criminal liability at the
common law, but in which, nevertheless, the common law as we
have adopted it failed to provide a remedy. It certainly could not
be Raid that f1·eedom of speech was violated by a law which
should • make imputing the want of chastity to a female [* 430]
actionable without proof of special damage ; for the charge
[ 473]
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is one of grievous wrong, without any reason in public policy

[ca. xu.

demanding protection to the communication, and the case is strictly

analogous to many other cases where the common law made the

party responsible for his false accusations. The constitutional

provisions do not prevent the modiﬁcation of the common-law rules

of liability for libels and slanders, but they would not permit bring-

ing new cases within those rules when they do not rest upon the

same or similar reasons.1

‘ In Respnblica v. Dennie, 4 Yeates, 267, the defendant was indicted in 1805

for publishing the following in a public newspaper: “ A democracy is scarcely

tolerated at any period of national history. Its omens are always sinister, and

its powers are unpropitious. \Vith all the lights of experience blazing before our

eyes, it is impossible not to discover the futility of this form of government. It

is one of grievous wrong, without any reason in public policy
demanding protection to the communication, and the case is strictly
analogous to many other cases where the common law made the
party responsible for his false accusations. The constitutional
pro~isions do not prevent the modification of the common-law rules
of liability for libels and slanders, but they would not permit bringing new cases within those rules when they do not rest upon the
same or similar reasons.1

was weak and wicked at Athens, it was bad in Sparta, and worse in Rome. It

has been tried in France, and terminated in despotism. It was tried in England,

and rejected with the utmost loathing and abhorrence. It is on its trial here,

and its issue will be civil war, desolation, and anarchy. No wise man but discerns

its imperfections, no good man but shudders at its miseries. no honest man but

proclaims its fraud, and no brave man but draws his sword against its force.

The institution of a scheme of polity so radically conremptible and vicious is a

memorable example of what the villany of some men can devise, the folly of

others receive, and both establish in spite of reason, reﬂection, and sensation.”
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Judge Yeates charged the jury, among other things, as follows; “ The seventh

section of the ninth article of the constitution of the State must be our guide

upon this occasion: it forms the solemn compact between the people and the

three branches of the government, — the legislative, executive, and judicial

powers. Neither of them can exceed the limits prescribed to them respectively.

To this exposition of the public will every branch of the common law and of our

municipal acts of assembly must conform; and if incompatible therewith, they

must yield and give way. Judicial decisions cannot weigh against it when re-

pugnant thereto. It runs thus : ‘ The printing-presses shall be free to every per-

son who undertakes to examine the proceedings of the legislature, or any branch

of the government; and no law shall ever be madc to restrain the right thereof.

The free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the invaluable rights

of man ; and every citizen may freely speak, write, and print on any subject, being

responsible for the abuse of that liberty. In prosecutions for the publication of

papers, investigating the oﬁicial conduct of officers or men in a public capacity,

or where the matter published is proper for public information, the truth thereof

may be given in evidence; and in all indictments for libels, the jury shall have a

right to determine the law and the facts under the direction of the court, as in

other cases.‘ Thus it is evident that legislative acts, or of any branch of the

government, are open to public discussion; and every citizen may freely speak,

write, or print on any subject, but is accountable for the abuse of that privilege.

There shall be no lieensers of the press. Publish as you please in the ﬁrst instance,

without control; but you are answerable both to the community and the individ-

~

[4:14]

1 In Respublica v. Dennie, 4 Yeates, 267, the defendant was indicted in 1805
for publishing the follo:wing in a public newspaper: " A demo<'racy is scarcely
tolerated at any period of national history. Its omens are always sinister, and
its powers are unpropitious. With all the lights of experience blazing before our
eyes, it is impossible not to discover the futility of this form of government. It
was weak and wicked at Athens, it was bad in Sparta, and worse in Rome. It
has been tried in France, and terminated in despotism. It was tried in England,
aud rejected with the utmost loathing and abhorrence. It is on its trial here,
and its issue will be civil war, desolation, and anarchy. No wise man but discerns
its imperfections, no good man but shudders at its miseries, no honest man but
proclaims its fraud, and no brave man but draws his sword against its force.
The institution of a scheme of polity so radically contemptible and vicious is a
memorable example of what the villany of some men can devise, the folly of
others receive, and both establish in spite of reason, reflection, and sensation."
Judge Yeates charged the jury, among other things, as follows : " The seventh
section of the ninth article of the constitution of the State- must be our guide
upon this occasion: it forms the solemn compact between the people and the
three branches of the government,- the legislative, executive, and judicial
powers. Neither of them can exceed the limits prescribed to them respecti vcly.
To this exposition of the public will every branch of the common law and of our
municipal acts of assembly must conform ; and if incompatible therewith, they
must yield and give way. Judieial decisions cannot weigh against it when repugnant thereto. It runs thus: • The printing·presses shall be free to every person who undertakes to examine the proceedings of the legislature, or any branch
of the government; and no law shall ever be made to restrain the right thereof.
The free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the invaluable righiS
of man; and every citizen may freely speak, write, and print on any subject, being
responsible for the abuse of that liberty. In prosecutions for the publication of
papers, investigating the official conduct of officers or men in a public capacity,
or where the matter published is proper for public information, the truth thereof
may be given in evidence; and in all indictments for libel11, the jury shall have a
right to determine the law and the facts under the direction of the court, as in
other cases.' Thus it is evident that legislative acts, or of any branch of the
goven1ment, are open to public discussion; and every citizen may freely speak,
write, or print on any subject, but is accountable for the abuse of that privilege.
There shall be no licens('rs of the prel!s. Publish as you please in the first instance,
without control ; but you are answerable bot.h to the community and the individ-
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There are certain cases where criticism upon public officers,

their actions, character, and motives, is not only recognized

ual if you proceed to unwarrantable lengths. No alteration is hereby made in

the law as to private men affected by injurious publications, unless the discussion

• Criticism upon Officers and Candidates .(or Office. [* 431]

be proper for public information. But ‘if one uses the weapon of truth wan-

tonly for disturbing the peace of families, he is guilty of a libel.’ Per General

Hamilton, in Croswell’s Trial, p. 70. The matter published is not proper for

public information. The common weal is not interested in such a communication,

There are certain cases where criticism upon public officers,
their actions, character, and motives, is not only recognized

except to suppress it.

“ What is the meaning of the words ‘ being responsible for the abuse of that

liberty,’ if the jury are interdicted from deciding on the case? Who else can

constitutionally decide on it? The expressions relate to and pervade every part

of the sentence. The objection that the determinations of juries may vary at

diﬂ'erent times, arising from their diﬂbrent political opinions, proves too much.

The same matter may be objected against them when party spirit runs high, in

other criminal prosecutions. But we have no other constitutional mode of de-

cision pointed out to us, and we are bound to use the method described.

"It is no infraction of the law to publish temperate investigations of the

nature and forms of government. The day is long past since Algernon Sidney’s

celebrated treatise on government, cited on this trial, was considered as a trea-

sonable libcl. The enlightened advocates of representative republican govern-
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ment pride themselves in the reﬂection that the more deeply their system is

examined, the more fully will the judgments of honest men be satisﬁed that it is

the most conducive to the safety and happiness of a free people. Such matters

are ‘ proper for public information.’ But there is a marked and evident distinc-

tion between such publications, and those which are plainly accompanied with a

criminal intent, deliberately designed to unloosen the social band of union, totally

to unhinge the minds of the citizens, and to produce popular discontent with the

exercise of power by the known constituted authorities. These latter writings

are subversive of all government and good order. ‘ The liberty of the press

consists in publishing the truth, from good motives and for justiﬁable ends, though

it reﬂects on government or on magistrates.‘ Per General Hamilton, in Cros-

well’s Trial, pp. 63, 64. It disseniinates political knowledge, and, by adding to

the common stock of freedom, gives a just conﬁdence to every individual. But

the malicious publications which I have reprobated infect insidiously the public

mind with a subtle poison, and produce the most mischievous and alarming con-

sequences by their tendency to anarchy, sedition, and civil war. We cannot,

consistently with our official duty, declare such conduct dispunishable. \Ve be-

lieve that it is not justified by the words or meaning of our constitution. It is

true it may not be easy in every instance to draw the exact distinguishing line.

To the jury it peculiarly belongs to decide on the intent and object of the writing.

It is their duty to judge candidly and fairly, leaning to the favorable side when

the criminal intent is not clearly and evidently ascertained.

[475 1

ual if you proceed to unwarrantable lengths. No alteration is hereby made in
the law as to private men affected by injurious publications, unless the discussion
be proper for public information. But 'if one uses the weapon of truth wantonly for disturbing the peace of families, he is guilty of a libel.' Per General
Hamilton, in Croswell's Trial, p. 70. The matter published is not proper for
public information. The common weal is not interested in such a communication,
exeept to suppress it.
" What is the meaning of the words 'bPing responsible for the abuse of that
liberty,' if the jury are interdicted from deciding on the case? Who else can
constitutionally decide on it? The expressions relate to and pervade every part
of the sentence. The objection t.hat the determinations of juries may vary at
different times, arising from their different political opinions, proves too much.
The same matter may be objected against them when party spirit runs high, in
other criminal prosecutions. But we have no other constitutional mode of decision pointed out to us, and we are bound to use the method described.
"It is no infraction of the law to publish temperate investigations of the
nature and forms of government. The day is long past since Algernon Sidney's
celebrated treati~c on government, cited on this trial, was considered as a treasonable libl'l. The enlightened advocates of representative republican government pride themselves in the reflection that the more deeply their system is
examined, the more fully will the judgments of honest men be sati~fied that it is
the most conducive to the safety and happiness of a free people. Such matters
are • proper for public information.' But there is a marked and evid(•nt distinction between such publications, and those which are plainly accompanied with a
criminal intent, deliberately designed to unloosen the social band of union, totally
to unhinge the minds of the citizens, and tc produce popular discontent with the
exercise of power by the known coustituted authorities. These latter writings
are subversive of all government and good order. 'The liberty of the press
con~ists in publishing the truth, from good motives and for justifiable ends, though
it reflects on goven1ment or on magistrates.' Per General Hamilton, in Croswell'~ Trial, pp. 63, 64. It disseminates political knowledge, and, by adding to
the common stock of freedom, gives a just confidence to el'ery individual. But
the malicious publications which I ha\'e reprobated infect insidiously the public
mind with a subtle poison, and produce the most mischievous and alarming consequences by their tendency to anarchy, sedition, and civil war. We cannot,
consistently with our official duty, declare such conduct dispunishable. We believe that it is not justifiPd by the words or meaning of our constitution. It is
true it may not be easy in every instance to draw the exact distinguishing line.
To the jury it peculiarly belongs to dec·ide on the intent and object of the writing.
It is their duty to judge candidly and fairly, leaning to tlie favorable side when
the criminal intent is not clearly and evidently ascertained.
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[* -L32] as ‘legitimate, but large latitude and great freedom of
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS;
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expression are permitted, so long as good faith inspires

the communication. There are cases where it is clearly the duty

of every one to speak freely what he may have to say concerning

publicloﬁcers, or those who may present themselves for public

positions. Through the ballobbox the electors approve or con-

demn those who ask their suffrages; and if they condemn, though

upon_ grounds the most unjust or frivolous, the law affords no

redress. Some officers, however, are not chosen by the people

directly, but designated through some other mode of appoint-

“ It remains, therefore, under our most careful consideration of the ninth

article of the Constitution, for the jury to divest themselves of all political preju-

dices (if any such they have), and dispassionately to examine the publication which

is the ground of the present prosecution. They must decide on their oaths, as

they will answer to God and their country, whether the defendant, as a factious

and seditious person, with the criminal intentions imputed to him, in order to

[• 432] as *legitimate, but large latitude and great freedom of
expression are permitted, so long as good faith inspires
the communication. There are cases where it is clearly the duty
of every one to speak freely what he may have to say concerning
public· officers, or those who may present themselves for public
positions. Through the ballot-box the electors approve or condemn those who ask their suffrages ; and if they condemn, though
upon. grounds the most unjust or frivolous, the law affords no
redress. Some officers, however, are not chosen by the people
directly, but designated through some other mode of appoint-

accomplish the objects stated in the indictment, did make and publish the writing

in question. Should they ﬁnd the charges laid against him in the indictment to

he well founded, they are bound to find him guilty. They must judge for them-

selves on the plain import of the words, without any forced or strained construc-

tion of the meaning of the author or editor, and determine on the correctness

of the innuendoes. To every word they will assignits natural sense, but will col-
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lect the true intention from the context, the whole piece. They will accurately

weigh the probabilities of the charge against a literary main. Consequences they

will wholly disregard, but ﬁrmly discharge their duty. Representative republican

governments stand on immovable bases, which cannot be shaken by theoretical

systems. Yet if the consciences of the jury shall be clearly satisﬁed that the pub-

lication was seditiously, maliciously, and wilfully aimed at the independence of

the United States, the Constitution thereof or of this State, they should convict

the defendant. If, on the other hand, the production was honestly meant to in-

form the public mind, and warn them against supposed dangers in society, though

the subject may have been treated erroneously, or that the censures on democracy

were bestowed on pure unmixed democracy, where the people en masse execute

the sovereign power without the medium of ‘their representatives (agreeably to

our forms of government), as have occurred at different times in Athens, Sparta,

Rome, France, and England, then, however the judgments of the jury may in-

cline them to think individually, they should acquit the defendant. In the ﬁrst

instance the act would be criminal; in the last it would be innocent. If the jury

should doubt of the criminal intention, then also the law pronounces that be

should be acquitted. 4 Burr. 2552, per Lord Mansﬁeld.” Verdict, not guilty.

The fate of this prosecution was the same that would attend any of a similar char-

acter in this country, admitting its law to be sound, except possibly in cases of

violent excitement, and when a jury could be made to believe that the defendant

contemplated and was laboring to produce a change of government, not by con-

stitutional means, but by rebellion and civil war.

[476]

" It remains, therefore, under our most careful consideration of the ninth
article of the Constitution, for the jury to divest themselves of all political prejudices (if any such they have), and dispassionately to examine the publication which
is the ground of the present prosecution. They must decid., on their oaths, as
they will answer to God and their country, whether the defendant, as a factious
and seditious person, with the criminal intentions imputed to him, in order to
accomplish the objects stated in the indictment, did make and publi~h the writing
in question. Should they find the chargea laid against him in the indictment to
be well founded, they are bound to find him guilty. They must judge for themselves on the plain import of the words, without any forced or strained construction of the meaning of the author or editor, and determine on the correctness
of the innuendoes. To every word they will a~sign its natural sense, but will collect the true intention from the context, the whole piece. They will accurately
Wt'igh the probabilities of the charge against a literary man. Consequences they
will wholly disregard, but firmly discharge their duty. Representative republican
governments stand on immovable bases, which cannot be shaken by theoretical
systems. Yet if the consciences of the jury shall be clearly satisfied that the publication was seditiously, maliciously, and wilfully aimed at the independence of
the U mted States, the Constitution thereof or of this State, they should convict
the deft,ndant. If, on the other hand, the production was honestly meant to inform the public mind, and warn them against supposed dangers in 11ociety, though
the subject may have been treated erroneously, or that the censures on democracy
were bestowed on pure unmixed democracy, where the people en masse execute
the sovereign power without the medium of .their representatives (agreeably to
our forms of government), as have occurred at different times in Athens, Sparta,
Rome, France, and England, then, however the judgments of the jury may incline them to think individually, they should acquit the defendant. In the first
instance the act would be criminal ; in the last it would be innocent. If the jury
should doubt of the criminal intention, then also the law pronounces that he
should be acquitted. 4 Burr. 2552, per Lord Mansfield." Verdict, not guilty.
The fate of this prosecution was the same that would attend any of a Rimilar character in this country, admitting its law to be sound, ucept possibly in cases of
violent excitement, and when a jury could be made to believe that the defendant
contemplated and was laboring to produce a change of government, not by constitutional means, but by rebellion and civil war.
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ment. But the public have a right to be ‘heard on [’* 433]

CH. XII.]

LIBERTY OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS.

the question of their selection; and they have the right,

for such reasons as seem to their minds sufficient, to ask for their

dismissal afterwards. They have also the right to complain of

oﬂicial conduct affecting themselves, and to petition for a redress

of grievances. A principal purpose in perpetuating and guarding

the right of petition is to insure to the public the privilege of being

heard in these and the like cases. _

In a ease in the Court for the Correction of Errors of the State

o_f New York, a party was prosecuted for a libel contained in a

petition signed by him and a number of other citizens of his

county, and presented to the council of appointment, praying for

the removal of the plaintiff from the office of district attorney of

the county, which, the petition charged, he was prostituting to

private purposes. The defendant did not justify the truth of this

allegation, and the plaintiff had judgment. On error, the sole

question was, whether the communication was to be regarded as

privileged, that character having been denied it by the court

below. The prevailing opinion in the court of review character-

ized this as “a decision which violates the most sacred and

unquestionable rights of free citizens; rights essential to the very

existence of a free government; rights necessarily connected with
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the relations of constituent and representative; the right of peti-

tioning for a redress of grievances, and the right of remonstrating

to the competent authority against the abuse of oﬁicial functions.”

And it was held that the communication was privileged, and could

not support an action for libel, unless the plaintiff could show that

the petition was malicious and groundless and presented for the

purpose of injuring his character.‘ Such a petition, it was said,

although containing false and injurious aspersions, did not prima

facie carry with it the presumption of malice.’ A similar ruling

was made by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, where a party

was prosecuted for charges against a justice of the peace, con-

tained in a deposition made to be presented to the governor.”

The subsequent ease of Howard v. Thompson‘ has enlarged this

' Thorn v. Blanchard, 5 Johns. 528, per Clinton, Senator.

' I bid. p. 526, per L’Hommedieu, Senator.

3 Gray v. Pentland, 2 S. & R. 23.

‘ 21 Wend. 319. See Harris v. Harrington, 2 Tyler, 129; Bodwell v.

Osgood, 3 Pick. 379.
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ment. But the public have a right to be • heard on [* 433]
the question of their selection ; and they have the right,
for such reasons as seem to their minds sufficient, to ask for their
dismissal afterwards. They have also the right to complain of
official conduct affecting themselves, and to petition for a redress
of grievances. A principal purpose in perpetuating and guarding
the right of petition is to insure to the public the privilege of being
beard in these and the like cases.
In a case in the Court for the Correction of Errors of the State
of New York, a party was prosecuted for a libel contained in a
petition signed by him and a number of other citizens of his
county, and presented to the council of appointment, praying for
the removal of the plaintiff from the office of district attorney of
the county, which, the petition charged, he was prostituting to
private purposes. The defendant did not justify the truth of this
allegation, and the plaintiff had judgment. On error, the sole
question was, whether the communication was to be regarded as
privileged, that character having been denied it by the court
below. The prevailing opinion in the court of review characterized this as " a decision which violates the most sacred and
unquestionable rights of free citizens; rights essential to the very
existence of a free government; rights necessarily connected with
the relations of constituent and representative; the right of petitioning for a redress of grievances, and the right of remonstrating
to the competent authority against the abuse of official functions."
And it was held that the communication was privileged, and could
not support an action for libel, unless the plaintiff could show that
the petition was malicious and groundless and presented for the
purpose of injuring his character. 1 Such a petition, it was said,
although containing false and injurious aspersions, did not prima
facie carry with it the presumption of malice. 2 A similar ruling
was made by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, where a party
was prosecuted for charges against a justice of the peace, contained in a deposition made to be presented to the governor.8
The subsequent case of Howard v. Thompson 4 has enlarged this
Thorn "· Blanchard, l) Johns. 628, per Clinton, Senator.
Ibid. p. fd6, per L'Hommedie~, Senator.
3 Gray v. Pentland, 2 S. & R. 23.
4 21 Wend. 319.
See Harris "· Harrington, 2 Tyler, 129; Bodwell "·
Osgood, 3 Pick. 379.
1

1

[ 477]

*"433 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [cu. xn.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

rule somewhat, and has required of the plaintiff, in order to sus-

(CH. XII.

tain his action in any such case, to prove not only malice

[* 434] in the *defendant, but also a want of probable cause for

believing the injurious charges which the petition con-

tained. The action for libel, in such a ease, it was said, was in

the nature of an action for malicious prosecution; and in that

action malice and want of probable cause are both necessary ingre-

dients. And it has also been held that in such a. ease the court

will neither compel the oﬁicer to whom it was addressed to produce

the petition in evidence, nor will they suffer its contents to be

proved by parol.1

The rule of protection in these cases does not appear to be dis-

puted, and has been laid down in other cases coming within the

same reasons.2- The rule, however, is subject to this qualiﬁcation,

that the petition or remonstrance must be addressed to the body

or oﬂicer having the power of appointment or removal, or the

authority to give the redress or grant the relief which is sought;

or at least that the petitioner should really and in good faith

believe he is addressing himself to an authority possessing power

in the premises.3

' Gray 1:. Pentland, 2 S. & R. 23. See Hare v. Mellor, 3 Lev. 138.

* In Kershaw v. Bailey, 1 Exch. 743, the defendant was prosecuted for slander
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in a communication made by him to the vestry, imputing perjury to the plaintiff

as a reason why the vestry should not return him on the list of persons qualiﬁed

to serve as constables. The defendant was a parishioncr, and his communication

was held privileged. In O’Donaghue v. McGovern, 23 Wend. 26, a communica-

tion from a member of a church to his bishop, respecting the character, moral

conduct, and demeanor of a clergyman of the church, was placed upon the same

footing of privilege. And see Reid v. Dclorme, 2 Brev. 76; Chapman v. Calder,

14 Penn. St. 365. A remonstrance to the board of excise, against the granting of

rule somewhat, and has required of the plaintiff, in order to sustain his action in any such case, to prove not only malice
[* 434] in the • defendant, but also a want of probable cause for
believing the injurious charges which the petition contained. The action for libel, in such a case, it was said, was in
the nature of an action for malicious prosecution ; and in that
action malice and want of probable cause are both necessary ingredients. And it has also been held that in such a case the court
will neither compel the officer to whom it was addressed to produce
the petition in evidence, nor will they suffer its couteuts to be
proved by parol.I
The rule of protection in these cases does not appear to be disputed, and has been laid down in other cases coming within the
same reasons.2 • The rule, however, is subject to this qualification,
that the petition or remonstrance must be addressed to the body
or officer having the power of appointment or removal, or the
authority to give the redress or grant the relief which is sought;
or at least that the petitioner should really and in good faith
believe he is addressing himself to an authority possessing power
iu the premises.3

a license to the plaintiff, comes under the same rule of protection. Vanderzee v.

McGregor, 12 Wend. 545. See also Kendillon v. Malthy, 1 Car. & Marsh. 402 ;

\Voodward v. Lander, 6 C. & P. 548; Streety v. Wood, 15 Barb. 105; Bradley

v. Heath, 12 Pick. 163.

3 This principle is recognized in all the cases referred to. See also Fairman v.

Ives, 5 B. & Aid. 642. In that case a petition addressed by a creditor of an oili-

cer in the army to the Secretary of War, bona ﬁde and with a view of obtaining

through his interference the payment of a debt due, and containing a statement of

facts which, though derogatory to the ofﬁcer‘s character, the creditor believed to

be true, was held not tolsupport an action. A letter to the Postmaster-General

complaining of the conduct of a postmaster, with a view to the redress of griev-

ances, is privileged. Woodward v. Lander, 6 C. & P. 548; Cook v. Hill, 3 Sandf.

341. And a complaint to a master, charging a servant with a dishonest act which
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Gray v. Pentland, 2 S. & R. 23. See Hare v. Mellor, 3 Lev. 138.
In Kershaw v. Bailey, 1 Exch. 743, the defendant was prosecuted for slander
in a communication made by him to the vestry, imputing perjury to the plaintiff
as a reason why the vestry should not return him on the li~t of persons qualified
to serve as constables. The deft!ndant was a parishioner, and his communication
was held privileged. In O'Donaghuc v. 1\IeGovcrn, 23 Wend. 26, a communication from a member of a church to his bishop, respecting the character, moral
conduct, and demeanor of a clergyman of the church, was placecl upon the same
footing of privilege. And see Reid v. D~lorme, 2 Brev. 76; Chapman v. Calder,
14 Penn. St. 365. A remonstrance to the board of excise, against the granting of
a li~ense to the plaintiff, comes under the same rule of prot.et:tion. Vanderzee v.
McGregor, 12 Wend. Mb. Sec also KcndiliDn v.l\lalth~·. 1 Car. & 1\larsh. 402;
Woodward v. Landor, 6 C. & P. 548; Streety v. Wood, 15 Barb. 105; Bradley
v. Heath, 12 Pick. 163.
3 This principle is recognized in all the cases referred to.
See also Fairman v.
I vt•s, 5 B. & Ald. 642. In that case a petition addre~sed by a creditor of an officer in the army to the Secretary of War, bona fide and with a view of obtaining
through his inrerference the payment of a debt due, and containing a statement of
facts which, though derogatory to the officer's character, the creditor believed to
be true, was held not to support an action. A letter to the IJostmaster-Gencral
complaining of the conduct of a postmaster, with a view to the redress of grievances, is privileged. Woodward v. Lander, 6 C. & P. 548; Cook v. Hill, 3 Sandf.
341. And a complaint to a master, charging a servant with a dishonest act which
1

1
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* Such being the rule of privilege when one interested [* 435]
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LIBERTY OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS.

in the discharge of powers of a public nature is addressing

himself to the body having the authority of appointment, super-

vision, or removal, the question arises whether the same reasons

do not require the like privilege when the citizen addresses himself

-to his fellow-citizens in regard to the conduct of persons elevated

to office by their sutfrages, or in regard to the character, capacity,

or ﬁtness of those who may present themselves, or be presented by

their friends—which always assumes their assent--as candidates

for public positions.

When Morgan Lewis was Governor of the State of New York,

and was a candidate for re-election, a public meeting of his oppo-

nents was called, at which an address .was adopted condemning

his conduct in various particulars. Among other things, he was

charged with want of ﬁdelity to his party, pursuing a system of

family aggrandizement in his appointments, signing the charter of

a bank with notice that it had been procured by fraudulent prac-

tices, publishing doctrines unworthy of a chief magistrate and

subversive of the dearest interests of society, attempting to destroy

the liberty of the press by vexatious prosecutions, and calling out

the militia without occasion, thereby putting them to unnecessary

trouble and expense. These seem to have been the more serious
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charges. The chairman of the meeting signed the address, and he

was prosecuted by the governor for the libel contained therein.

No justification was attempted uponithe facts, and the Supreme

Court held the circumstances to constitute no protection in the

law. We quote from the opinion delivered by Mr. Justice

Thompson : —

“Where the act is in itself unlawful, the proof of justiﬁcation

or excuse lies on the defendant, and on failure thereof the law im-

plies a criminal intent.‘ Ifa libel contains an imputation of a crime,

or is actionable without showing special damage, malice is, prime

had been imputed to the complaining party, has also been held privileged. Cow-

ard v. Wellington, 7 C. & P. 531. And see further, Hosmer u. Love-land, 19

Barb.‘ 111. A petition is privileged while being circulated. Venderzee 1:.

McGregor, 12 lVend. 545; Streety v. \Vo0d, 15 Barb. 105. I If, however, a

petition is circulated and exhibited, but never presented, the fact that the libel-

lous charge has assumed the form of a petition will not give it protection. Slate

v. Bumham, 9 N. H. 34. And see Hunt v. Bennett, 19 N. Y. 171); Van Wyck

v. Aspinwall, 17 N. Y. 190

1 5 Burr. 2667; 4 T. R. 127
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• Such being the rule of privilege when one interested [* 435]
in the discharge of powers of a public nature is addressing
himself to the body having the authority of appointment, supervision, or removal, the question arises whether the same reasons
do not require the like privilege when the citizen addresses himself
.to his fellow-citizens in regard to the conduct of persons elevated
to office by their suffrages, or in regard to the character, capacity,
or fitness of those who may present themselves, or be presented by
their friends-which always assumes their assent-as candidates
for public positions.
When Morgan L~wis was Governor of the State of New York,
and was a candidate for re-election, a public meeting of his opponents was called, at which an address .was adopted condemning
bis conduct in various particulars. Among other things, he was
charged with want of fidelity to his party, pursuing a system of
family aggrandizement in his appointments, signing the charter of
a bank with notice that it had been procured by fraudulent practices, publishing doctrines unworthy of a chief magistrate and
subversive of the dearest interests of society, attempting to destroy
the liberty of the press by vexatious prosecutions, and calling out
the militia without occasion, thereby putting them to unnecessary
trouble and expense. These seem to have been the more serious
charges. The chairman of the meeting signed the address, and he
was prosecuted by the governor for the libel contained therein.
No justification was attempted upon the facts, and the Supreme
Court held the circumstances to constitute no protection in the
law. We quote from the opinion delivered by Mr. Justice
Thompson:" Where the act is in itself unlawful, the proof of justification
or excuse lies on the defendant, and on failure thereof the law implies a criminal intent. 1 If a libel contains an imputation of a crime,
or is actionable without showing special damage, malice is, prima
had been imputed to the complaining party, has also been held privilt·ged. Coward "· Wellington, 7 C. & P. 531. And see further, Ho~mer "· Lovdand, 19
Barb: 111. A petition is privileged wh1le being circulated. Vendt>rzee !1.
McGregor, 12 Wend. 545; Streety "·Wood, 1.) Barb. 105. ·If, howe,·cr, a
petition is circulated and exhibited, but never presented, the fact that the lil.ellous charge has assumed the form of a petition will not give it protection. State
"·Burnham, 9 N.H. 34. And see Hunt v. Bennett, 19 N.Y. 17:3; VanWyck
tl. Aspinwall, 17 N.Y. 190
1 5 Burr. 2667; 4 T. R. 1~7
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facie, implied; and if the defendant claims to be exonerated, on

*435
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[CH. XII.

the ground of want of malice, it lies on him to show it was pub-

lished under such circumstances as to rebut this presumption of

law} The manner and occasion of the publication have been

relied on for this purpose, and in justiﬁcation of the libel.

[* 436] It has * not been pretended but that the address in ques-

tion would be libellous if considered as the act of an indi-

vidual; but its being the act of a public meeting, of which the

defendant was a member, and the publication being against a

candidate for a public oﬂice, have been strenuously urged as

affording a complete justiﬁcation. The doctrine contended for by

the defendant’s counsel results in the position that every publica-

tion ushered forth under the sanction of a public political meeting,

against a candidate for an elective oﬁice, is beyond the reach of

legal inquiry. To such a proposition I can never yield my assent.

Although it was urged by the def'endant’s counsel, I cannot

discover any analogy whatever between the proceedings of such

meetings and those of courts of justice, or any other organized

tribunals known in our law for the redress of grievances. That

electors should have a right to assemble, and freely and openly to

examine the ﬁtness and qualiﬁcations of candidates for public

oﬁices, and communicate their opinions to others, is a position to
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which I most cordially accede. But there is a wide diﬁerence

between this privilege, and a right irresponsibly to charge a candi-

date with direct specific and unfounded crimes. It would, in my

judgment, be a monstrous doctrine to establish, that, when a man

becomes a candidate for an elective oﬁiee, he thereby gives to others

a right to accuse him of any imaginable crimes with impunity.

Candidates have rights as well as electors; and those rights and

privileges must be so guarded and protected as to harmonize one

with the other. If one hundred or one thousand men, when

assembled together, undertake to charge a man with speciﬁc crimes,

I see no reason why it should be less criminal than if each one

should do it individually, at different times and places. All that

is required, in the on_e case or the other, is, not to transcend. the

bounds of truth. If a man has committed a crime, any one has a

right to charge him with it, and is not responsible for the accusa-

tion; and can any one wish for more latitude than this? Can it

be claimed a privilege to accuse (Ill Zibitum a. candidate with the

‘ 1 T. R. 110.

—-' ~— t - _ __
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facie, implied; and if the defendant claims to be exonerated, on
the ground of want of malice, it lies on him to show h was published under such circumstances as to rebut this presumption of
law. 1 The manner and occasion of the publication have been
relied on for this purpose, and in justification of the libel.
[* 436] It has *not been pretended but that the address in question would be libellous if considered as the act of an individual ; hut its being the act of a public meeting, of which the
defendant was a member, and the publication being against a
candidate for a public office, have been strenuously urged as
affot·ding a complete justification. The doctrine contended for by
the defendant's counsel results in the position that every publication ushered forth under the sanction of a public political meeting,
against a candidate for an elective office, is beyond the reach of
legal itiquiry. To such a proposition I can never yield my assent.
Although it was urged by the defendant's counsel, I cannot
discover any analogy whatever between the proceedings of such
meetings and those of courts of justice, or any other organized
tribunals known in our law for the redress of grievances. That
electors should have a right to assemble, and freely and openly to
examine the fitness and qualifications of candidates for public
offices, and communicate theit· opinions to others, is a position to
which I most cordially accede. But thet·e is a wide difference
between this privilege, and a right irresponsibly to charge a candidate with direct specific and unfounded crimes. It would, in my
judgment, be a monstrous doctrine to establish, that, when a man
becomes a candidate for an elective office, he thereby gives to others
a right to accuse him of any imaginable crimes with impunity.
Candidates have rights as well as electors; and those rights and
privileges must be so guarded and protected as to harmonize one
with the other. If one hundred or one thousand men, when
assembled together, undertake to charge a man with specific crimes,
I see no reason why it should be less criminal than if each one
should do it individually, at different times and places. All that
is required, in the on.e case or the other, is, not to transcend. the
bounds of truth. If a man has committed a crime, any one has a
right to charge him with it, and is not responsible for the accusation; and can any one wish for more latitude than this? Can it
be claimed a privilege to accuse ad libitum a candidate with the
I

[
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most base and detestable crimes? There is nothing upon the

record showing the least foundation or pretence for the charges.
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The accusations, then, being false, the prime facie presumption of

law is, that the publication was malicious; and the circumstance

of the defendant being associated with others does not per se rebut

this presumption. How far this circumstance ought to

affect the measure of damages * is a question not arising [*" 437]

on the record. It may in some cases mitigate, in others

enhance them. Every case must necessarily, from the nature of

the action, depend upon its own circumstances, which are to be

submitted to the sound discretion of a jury. It is diﬁicult, and

perhaps impossible, to lay down any general rule on the subject.”1

The diﬁiculty one meets with in the examination of this opinion

is in satisfying himself in what manner the privileges of electors,

of which it speaks, are protected by it. It is not discovered that

the citizen who publicly discusses the qualiﬁcations and ﬁtness of

the candidate for public otlice who challenges his suffrage is, by

this decision, so far as suits for recovery of private damages are

concerned, placed on any different footing in the law from that

occupied by one who drags before the public the character of a

private individual. In either case, if the publication proves to be

false, the law, it seems, attaches to it a presumption of malice.
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Nothing in the occasion justifies or excuses the act in either case.

It is true it is intimated that it may lie in the sound discretion of a

jury to be moderate in the imposition of damages, but it is also

intimated that the jury would be at liberty to consider the circum-

stances of the public meeting an aggravation. There is abso-

lutely no privilege of discussion to the elector under such a rule;

nd right to canvass the ﬁtness of candidates beyond what exists in

other cases. Whatever reasons he may give his neighbors for

voting against a candidate, he must be prepared to support by

evidence in the courts. In criminal prosecutions, if he can prove

the truth of his charges, he may be protected in some cases where

he would not be if the person assailed was only a private in-

dividual; because in the latter case he must make a showing of

a justiﬁable occasion for uttering even the truth. But in all cases

‘ Lewis v. Few, 5 Johns. 1, 35. See also Curtis v. Mussey, 6 Gray, 261;

Aldrich v. Printing Co. 9 Minn. 133.
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most base and detestable crimes ? There is nothing upon the
record showing the least foundation or pretence for the charges.
The accusations, then, being false, the prima facie presumption of
law is, that the publication was malic!ous; and the circumstance
of the defendant being associated with others does not per se rebut
this presumption. How far this circumstance ought to
affect the measm·e of damages • is a question not arising (* 437]
on the record. It may in some cases mitigate, in others
enhance them. Every case must necessarily, from the nature of
the action, depend upon its own circumstances, which are to be
submitted to the sound discretion of a jury. It is difficult, and
perhaps impossible, to lay down any general rule on the subject." 1
The difficulty one meets with in the eiamination of this opinion
is in satisfying himself in what manner the privileges of electors,
of which it speaks, are protected by it. It is not discovered that
the citizen who publicly discusses the qualifications and fitness of
the candidate for public office who challenges his suffrage is, by
this decision, so far as suits for recovery of private damages are
concerned, placed 011 any different footing in the law from that
occupied by one who drags before the public the character of a
private individual. In either case, if the publication proves to be
false, the law, it seems, attaches to it a presumption of malice.
Nothing in the occasion justifies or excuses the act in either case.
It is true it is intimated that it may lie in the sound discretion of a
jury to be moderate in the imposition of damages, but it is also
intimated that the jury would be at liberty to consider the circumstances of the public meeting an aggravation. There is absolutely no privilege of discussion to the elector under such a rule;
nd right to canvass the fitness of candidates beyond what exists in
other cases. Whatever reasons he may give his neighbors for
voting against a candidate, he must be prepared to support by
evidence in the courts. In criminal prosecutions, if he can prove
the truth of his charges, he may be protected in some cases where
he would not be if the person assailed was only a private individual ; because in the latter case he must make a showing of
a justifiable occasion for uttering even the truth. But in all cases
1 Lewis t~. Few, 5 Johns. 1, 35.
See also Curtis v. Mussey, 6 Gray, 261;
Aldrich v. Printing Co. 9 Minn. 133.
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where the matter is proper for the public information, the truth

justiﬁes its publication.
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The case above quoted has the sanction of a subsequent de-

cision of the Court for the Correction of Errors, which in like

manner repudiated the claim of privilegel The oﬁice then in

question was that of Lieutenant-Governor, and the candidate

was charged in public newspapers with habits of intoxication

which unﬁtted him for the position. And this last decision has

since been followed as authority by the Superior Court of New

York; in a case, however, which does not seem to be

[* 438] analogous, since there the general public * was ad-

dressed in regard to a candidate for an oﬁiee which

was not elective, but was to be ﬁlled by an appointing board?

The case of King v. Root“ is certainly a very remarkable one,

when the evidence given in the case is considered. The Lieuten-

ant-Governor was charged in the public press with intoxication in

the Senate Chamber, exhibited as he was proceeding to take his

seat as presiding officer of that body. When prosecuted for libel,

the publishers justiﬁed the charge as true, and brought a number

of witnesses who were present on the occasion, and who testiﬁed to

the correctness of the statement. There was therefore abundant

reason for supposing the charge to have been published in the full
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belief in its truth. If it was true, there was abundant reason, on

public grounds, for making the publication. Nevertheless, the jury

were of opinion that the preponderance of evidence was against the

truth of the charge, and being instructed that the only privilege

the defendants had was “simply to publish the truth and nothing

more,” and that the unsuccessful attempt at justiﬁca.tion— which

in fact was only the forming of such an issue, and putting in such

evidence as showed the defendants had reason for making the

charge—was in itself an aggravation of the offence, they returned

a. verdict for the plaintiff with large damages. Throughout his

instructions to the jury by the judge presiding at the trial, no

privilege of discussion whatever is conceded to the elector, spring-

ing from the relation of elector and candidate, or of citizen and

' King v. Root, 4 Wend. 113.

’ Hunt v. Bennett, 4 E. D. Smith, 647; Same Case, 19 N. Y. 173. Sec Dun-

combe v. Daniell, 8 C. & P. 213.

3 4 Wend. 113. See the same case in the Supreme Court, 7 Cow. 613.

[482] “

where the matter is proper for the public information, the truth
justifies its publication.
The case above quoted has the sanction of a subsequent decision of the Court for the Correction of Errors, which in like
manner repudiated the claim of privilege 1 The office then in
question was that of Lieutenant-Governor, and the candidate
was charged in public newspapers with habits of intoxication
which unfitted him for the position. And this last decision has
since been followed as authority by the Superior Court of New
York ; in a case, however, which does not seem to be
[* 438] analogous, since there the general public • was addressed in regard to a candidate for an office which
was not elective, but was to be filled by an appointing board.2
The case of King v. Root 3 is certainly a very remarkable one,
when the evidence given in the case is aonsidered. The Lieutenant-Governor was charged in the public press with intoxication in
the Senate Chamber, exhibited as he was proceeding to take his
seat as presiding officer of that body. When prosecuted for libel,
the publishers justified the charge as true, and brought a number
of witnesses who were present on the occasion, and who testified to
the correctness of the statement. There was therefore abundant
reason for supposing the charge to have been published in the full
belief in its truth. If it was true, there was abundant reason, on
public grounds, for making the publication. Nevertheless, the jury
were of opinion that the preponderance of evidence was against the
truth of the charge, and being instructed that the only privilege
the defendants had was "simply to publish the truth and nothing
more," and that the unsuccessful attempt at justification- which
in fact was only the forming of such an issue, and putting in such
evidence as showed the defendants had reason for making the
charge- was in itself an aggravation of the offence, they returned
a verdict for the plaintiff with large damages. Throughout his
instructions to the jury by the judge presiding at the trial, no
privilege of discussion whatever is conceded to the elector, springing from the relation of elector and candidate, or of citizen and
King v. Root, 4 Wend. 113.
Hunt v. Bennett, 4 E. D. Smith, 6-li; Same Case, 19 N.Y. 173. Sec Duncombe v. Danidl, 8 C. & P. 213.
3 4 Wend. 113.
See the same case in the Supreme Court, 7 Cow. 613.
1

1
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representative, but the case is considered as one where the accusa-

tion was to be defended precisely as if no public considerations

CR. XII.)
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had in any way been involved.‘

The law of New York is not placed by these decisions on a foot

ing very satisfactory to those who claim the utmost freedom of

discussion in public affairs. The courts have considered the sub-

ject as if there were no middle ground between absolute immunity

for falsehood and the application of the same strict rules which

prevail in other cases. Whether they have duly considered the

importance of publicity and discussion on all matters of general

concern in a representative government must be left to the con-

sideration of judicial tribunals, as these questions shall come be-

fore them in the future. It is perhaps safe to say that the

general public ‘sentiment and the prevailing customs al- [*-139]

low a greater freedom of discussion, and hold the elector

less strictly to what he may be able to justify as true than is done

by these decisions.”

A much more reasonable rule— though still, we think, not

sufficiently comprehensive and liberal— was indicated by Pollock,

C. B., in a case where it was urged upon the court that a sermon,

preached but not published, was the subject of criticism in the

enlarged style of commentary which that word seems to introduce
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according to the decided cases ; and that the conduct of a clergy-

man with reference to the parish charity, and especially the rules

of it, justified any bonaﬁrle remarks, whether founded in truth in

point of fact, or justice in point of commentary, provided only

‘ See also Onslow v. Hone, 3 \\"ils. 177; Harwood v. Astley, 1 New Rep. 47.

* “ Freedom of speech is a principal pillar of a free government; when this

support is taken away, the constitution of a free society is dissolved, and tyranny

is erected on its ruins. i Republics and limited monarchies derive their strength

and vigor from a popular examination into the action of the magistrates; this

privilege in all ages has been and always will be abused. The best of men could

not escape the censure and envy of the times they lived in. Yet this evil is not so

great as it might appear at ﬁrst sight. A magistrate who sincerely aims at the

good of society will always have the inclinations of a great majority on his side,

and an impartial posterity will not fail to render him justice. Those abuses of

the freedom of speech are the excesses of liberty. They ought to be repressed;

but to whom dare we commit the care of doing it? An evil magistrate, intrusted

with power to punish for irords, would be armed with a weapon the most de-

representative, but the case is considered as one where the accusation was to be defended precisely as if no public considerations
bad in any way been involved. 1
The law of New York is not placed by these decisions on a footing very satisfactory to those who claim the utmost freedom of
discussion in public affairs. The courts have considered the subject as if there were no middle ground between absolute immunity
for falsehood and the application of the same strict rules which
prevail in other cases. Whether they have duly considered the
·importance of pubticity and discussion on all matters of general
concern in a representative government must be left to the consideration of judicial tribunals, as these questions shall come before them in the future. It is perhaps safe to say that the
general public • sentiment and the prevailing customs al- [* 439]
low a greater freedom of discussion, and hold the elector
less strictly to what he may be able to justify as true than is done
by these decisions. 2
A much more reasonable rule- though still, we think, not
sufficiently comprehensive and liberal- was indicated by Pollock,
C. B., in a case where it was urged upon the court that a sermon,
preached but not published, was the subject of criticism in the
enlarged style of commentary which that word seems to introduce
according to the decided cases ; and that the conduct of a clergyman with reference to the parish charity, and especially the rules
of it, justified any bona fide remarks, whether founded in truth in
point of fact, or justice in point of commentary, provided only

structive and terrible. Under pretence of pruning off the exuberant branches,

he would be apt to destroy the tree." Franklin, Works by Sparks, V ol. II.

p. 285.
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See also Onslow"· Hone, 3 Wils. 177; Harwood v. Astley, 1 New Rep. 47.
' " Freedom of speech is a principal pillar of a free government; when this
support is taken away, the constitution of a free society is dissolved, and tyranny
is erected on its ruins. · Republics and limited monarchies derive their stt·engtb
and vigor from a popular examination into the action of the magistrates ; this
privilege in all ages bas been and always will be abused. The best of men could
not escape the censure and envy of the times they lived in. Yet this evil is not so
great as it might appear at first sight. A magistrate who sincerely aims at the
good of soeiety will always have the inclinations of a great majority on his ~ide,
and an impartial posterity will not fail to render him justice. Those abuses of
the freedom of speech are the excesses of liberty. They ought to be repressed;
but to whom dare we commit the care of doing it? An evil magistrate, intrusted
with power to prmialt for !l'orda, would be armed with a weapon the most destructive and terrible. Under prdenee of pruning off the exuberant branche:;,
he would be apt to destroy the tree." Franklin, Works by Sparks, Vol. II.
p. 285.
1
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they were an honest and bona ﬁde comment. “ My brother Wilde,”

he says, “urged upon the court the importance of this question ;
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and I own I think it is a question of very grave and deep impor-

tance. He pressed upon us that,.whenever the public had an in-

terest in such a discussion, the law ought to protect it, and work

out the public good by permitting public opinion, through the

medium of the public press, to operate upon such transactions. I

am not sure that so extended a rule is at all necessary to the pub-

lie good. I do not in any degree complain ; on the contrary, I

think it quite right that all matters that are entirely of a public

nature-conduct of ministers, conduct of judges, the proceedings

of all persons who are responsible to the public at large— are

deemed to be public property; and that all bona ﬁde and honest

remarks upon such persons, and their conduct, may be made with

perfect freedom, and without being questioned too nicely for either

truth or justice.” 1 But these remarks were somewhat aside from

the case then before the learned judge, and though supported by

similar remarks from his associates, yet one of those associates

deemed it important to draw such a distinction as to detract very

much from the value of this privilege. “ It seems,” he says, “ that

there is a distinction, although I must say I really can hardly tell

what the limits of it are, between the comments on a man’s public
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conduct and on his private conduct. I can understand that you

have a right to comment on the public acts of a minister, upon the

public acts of a general, upon the public judgments of a, judge,

upon the public skill of an actor; I can understand that; but I

do not know where the limit can be drawn distinctly

["‘4~10] between where the * comment is to cease, as being applied

solely to a 1nan’s public conduct, and where it is to begin

as applicable to his private character ; because, although it is

quite competent for a person to speak of a judgment of a judge as

being an extremely erroneous and foolish one,— and no doubt

comments of that sort have great tendency to make persons care-

ful of what they say, -— and although it is perfectly competent for

persons to say of an actor that he is a remarkably bad actor, and

ought not to be permitted to perform such and such parts, because

he performs them so ill, yet you ought not to be allowed to say of

an actor that he has disgraced himself in private life, nor to say of

' Gathercole v. Miall,15 M. &VV. 331-333. See Commonwealth v. Clap,

4 Mass. 163, per Parsons, Ch. J . ; Townsend on Libel and Slander, § 260.
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they were an honest and bona fide comment. " My brother Wildet
he says, " urged upon the court the importance of this question ;
and I own I think it is a question of very grave and deep importance. He pressed upon us that, whenever the public had an interest in such a discussion, the law ought to protect it, and work
· out the public good by permitting public opinion, through the
medium of the public press, to operate upon such transactions. I
am not sure that so extended a rule is at all necessary to the public good. I do not in any degree complain ; on the contrary, I
think it quite right that all matters that are entirely of a public ·
nature- conduct of ministers, conduct of judges, the proceedings
of all persons who are responsible to the public at large- are
deemed to be public property ; and that all bona fide and honest
remarks upon such persons, and their conduct, may be made with
perfect freedom, and without being questioned too nicely for either
truth or justice." 1 But these remarks were somewhat aside from
the case then before the learned judge, and though supported by
similar remarks from his associates, yet one of those associates
deemed it important to draw such a distinction as to detract very
much from the value of this privilege. "It seems," he says, "that
there is a distinction, although I must say I really can hardly tell
what the limits of it are, between the comments on a man's public
conduct and on his private conduct. I can understand that you
have a right to comment on the public acts of a minister, upon the
public acts of a general, upon the public judgments of a . judge,
upon the public skill of an actor ; I can understand that ; but I
do not know where the limit can be drawn distinctly
440] between where the • comment is to cease, as being applied
solely to a man's public conduct, and where it is to begin
as applicable to his private character ; because, although it is
quite competent for a person to speak of a judgment of a judge as
being an extremely erroneous and foolish one,- and no doubt
comments of that sort have great tendency to make persons careful of what they say,- and although it is perfectly competent for
.persons to say of an actor that he is a remarkably bad actor, and
ought not to be permitted to perform such and such parts, because
he performs them so ill, yet you ought not to be allowed to say of
an actor that he has disgraced himself in private life, nor to say of

e··

1 Gathercole v. 1\liall, li'> M. & W. 331-333.
See Commonwealth v. Clap,
4 Mass. 163, per Parsons, Ch. J.; Townsend on Libel and Slander, § 260.
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a judge or a minister that he has committed felony, or any thing
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of that description, which is in no way connected with his public

conduct or public judgment; and therefore there must be some

limits, although I do not distinctly see where those limits are to

be drawn. No doubt, if there are such limits, my brother Wilde

is perfectly right in sayingthat the only ground on which the ver-

dict and damages can go is for the excess, and not for the lawful

exercise of the criticism.”1

The radical defect in this rule, as it seems to us, consists in its

assumption, that the private character of a public officer is some-

thing aside from, and not entering into or inﬂuencing, his public

conduct ; that a thoroughly dishonest man may be a just minister,

and that a. judge who is corrupt and debauched in private life may

be pure and upright in his judgments ; in other words, that an

'evil tree is as likely as any other to bring forth good fruits. Any

such assumption is false to human nature, and contradictory to

general experience; and whatever the law may say, the general

public will still assume that a corrupt life will inﬂuence public

conduct, however plausibly it may be glossed over. They are,

therefore, interested in knowing what the character of their public

servants is, and what sort of persons are offering themselves for

their suifrages. And if this be so, it would seem that there should
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be some privilege of comment; that that privilege could only be

limited by good faith and just intention ; and that of these it was

the province of a jury to judge, in view of the nature of the charges

made and the reasons which existed for making them.

Recent English cases give considerable latitude of comment to

publishers of public journals, upon subjects in the discussion of

which the public may reasonably be supposed to have an

interest, and they hold the discussions to be ‘privileged if ["1141]

conducted within the bounds of moderation and reason.“

' Alderson, B., same case, p. 338.

' In Kelley v. Sherlock, 1 Law Rep. Q. B. 686, it was held that a sermon

commenting upon public affairs —e. g., the appointment of chaplains for prisons

and the election of a Jew for mayor— was a proper subject for comment in the

papers. And in Kelley v. Tinling, 1 Law Rep. Q. B. 699, a church-warden,

having written to the plaintiff, the incumbent, accusing him of having desecrated

the church by allowing books to be sold in it during service, and by turning the

vestry-room into a cooking-apartment, the correspondence was published without

the plaintiﬂ"s permission in the defendant's newspaper, with comments on the

plaintiﬂ“s conduct. Held, that this was a matter of public interest, which might
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a-judge or a minister that he has committed felony, or any thing
of that description, which is in no way connected with his public
conduct or public judgment ; and therefore there must be some
limits, although I do not distinctly see where those limits are to
be drawn. No doubt, if there are such limits, my brother Wilde
is perfectly right in saying 'that the only ground on which the verdict and damages can go is for the excess, and not for the lawful
exercise of the criticism." I
The radical defect in this rule, as it seems to us, consists in its
assumption, that the private character of a public officer is something aside from, and not entering into or influencing, his public
conduct; that a thoroughly dishonest man may be a just minister,
and that a judge who is corrupt and debauched in private life may
be pure and upright in his judgments ; in other words, that an
'evil tree is as likely as any other to bring forth good fruits. Any
such assumption is false to hu~an nature, and contradictory to
general experience; and whatever the law may say, the general
public will still assume that a corrupt life will influence public
conduct, however plausibly it may be glossed over. They are,
therefore, interested in knowing what the character of their public
servants is, and what sort of persons are offering themselves for
their suffrages. And if this be so, it would seem that there should
be some privilege of comment; that that privilege could only he
limited by good faith and just intention; and that of these it was
the province of a jury to judge, in view of the nature of the charges
made and the reasons which existed for making them.
Recent English cases give considerable latitude of comment to
publishers of public journals, upon subjects in the discussion of
which the public may reasonably be supposed to have au
intere8t, and they hold the discussions to be • privileged if [• 441]
conducted within the bounds of moderation and reason.2
Alderson, B., same case, p. 838.
In Kelley "· Sherlock, 1 Law Rep. Q. B. 686, it was held that a sennon
commenting upon public affairs- e. g., the appointment of chaplains for prisons
and the election of a Jew for mayor- was a proper subject for comment in the
papers. And in Kelley "· Tinling, 1 Law Rep. Q. B. 699, a church-warden,
having written to the plaintiff, the incumbent, accusing him of having desecrated
the church by allowing books to be sold in it during service, and by turning the
vestry-room into a cooking-apartment, the correspondence was published without
the plaintiff's permission in the defendant's newspaper, with comments on the
plaintiff's conduct. Held, that this was a matter of public interest, which might
1

1
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And in this country it has been held that where a charge against

[CH. XII.

an officer or a candidate respects only his qualiﬁcations for the

ofﬁce, and does not impugn his character, it forms no basis for a

recovery of damages. To address to the electors of a district let-

ters charging that a candidate for oﬁice is of impaired understand-

ing, and his mind weakened by disease, is presenting that subject

to “the proper and legitimate tribunal to try the question.”

“ Talents and qualiﬁcations for oﬁice are mere matters of opinion,

of which the electors are the only competent judges/’1

Statements in the Course of Judicial Proceedings.

There are some cases which are so absolutely privileged on rem

sons of public policy, that no inquiry into motives is permitted in

an action for slander or libel. Of these, the case of a party

who is called upon to give evidence in the course of judicial pro-

And in this country it has been held that where a charge against
an officer or a candidate respects only his qualifications for the
office, and does not impugn his character, it forms no basis for a
recovery of damages. To address to the electors of a district lettors charging that a candidate for office is of impaired understanding, and his mind weakened by disease, is presenting that subject
to " the proper and legitimate tribunal to try the question.''
"Talents and qualifications for office are mere matters of opinion,
of which the electors are the only competent judges." 1

ceedings is a familiar illustration. No action will lie against a

witness at the suit of a party aggrieved by his false testimony,

even though malice be charged. The remedy against a dishonest

witness is conﬁned to the criminal prosecution for perjury.’ So

Statements in the Course of Judicial Proceedings.

what a juror may say to his fellows in the jury room while they

are considering their verdict, concerning one of the parties to the

suit who has been a witness therein, cannot be the subject of an

action for slander? False accusations, however, contained in the
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affidavits or other proceedings, by which a prosecution is

[* 442] commenced for supposed crime, *‘ or in any other papers

in the course of judicial proceedings, are not so absolutely

protected. They are privileged} but the party making them is

be made the subject of public discussion ; and that the publication was therefore

not lihellous, unless the language used was stronger than, in the opinion of the

jury, the occasion justified. i

‘ Mayrant v. Richardson, 1 Nott & McC0rd, 348.

’ But a qualiﬁcation of this rule is made where what is said by the witness

is not pertinent or material to the cause, and he has been actuated by malice in

stating it. He is not, however, to be himself the judge of what is pertinent or

material when questions are put to him, and no objection or warning comes to

him from court or counsel. Calkins 0. Sumner, 13 Wis. 193. Sec also Warner

v. Paine, 2 Sandf. 195; Garr 0. Selden, 4 N. Y. 91; Jennings v. Paine, 4 \Vis.

3-58; Perkins v. Mitchell, 31 Barb. 461; Revis v. Smith, 18 C. B. 126.

3 Dunham v. Powers, 42 Vt. 1.

‘ Astley v. Younge, Burr. 807.

[486]

There are some cases which are so absolutely privileged on reasons of public policy, that no inquiry into motives is permitted in
an action for slander or libel. Of these, the case of a party
who is called upon to give evidence in the course of judicial proceedings is a familiar illustration. No action will lie against a
witness at the suit of a party aggrieved by his false testimony,
even though malice be charged. The remedy against a dishonest
witness is confined to the criminal prosecution for perjury.2 So
what a juror may say to his fellows in, the jury room while they
are considering their verdict, concerning one of the parties to the
suit who has been a witness therein, cannot be the subject of an
action for slander.3 False accusations, however, contained in the
affidavits or other proceedit~gs, by which a prosecution is
[* 442] commenced for supposed crime, *or in any other papers
in the course of judicial proceedings, are not so absolutely
protected. They are privileged,4 but the party making them is
be made the subject of public discussion; and that the publication was therefore
not libellous, unless the language used was stronger than, in the opinion of the
jury, the occasion justified.
·
1 Mayrant "·Richardson, 1 Nott & 1\fcCord, 348.
1 But a qualification of this rule is made where what is said by the witness
is not pertinent or material to the cause, and he bas been actuated by malice in
stating it. He is not, however, to be hiinself the judge of what is pertinent or
material when questions are put to him, and no objection or warning cornea to
him from court or counsel. Calkins 11. Sumner, 13 Wis. 193. See ~lso Warner
v. Paine, 2 Sandf. 195; Garr "·Selden, 4 N.Y. 91; Jennings "·Paine, 4 Wis.
858; Perkins v. Mitchell, 31 Barb. 461; Revis"· Smith, 18 C. B. 126.
3 Dunham v. Powers, 42 Vt. 1.
• Astley "· Younge, Burr. 807.
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liable to action, if actual malice be averred and proved} Prelim-

CH. XII.]
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inary information, furnished with a view to set on foot an inquiry

into an alleged offence, or to institute a criminal prosecution,

is, in like manner, privileged ;2 but the protection only extends to

those communications which are in the course of the proceedings

to bring the supposed offender to justice, or are designed for the

purpose of originating or forwarding such proceedings; and com-

munications not of that character are not protected, even although

judicial proceedings may be pending for the investigation of the

offence which the communication refers to.3 Still less would a

party be justiﬁed in repeating a charge of crime, after the person

charged has been examined on his complaint, and acquitted of all

guilt.‘

Privilege of Counsel.

One of the most important cases of privilege, in a constitutional

point of view, is that of counsel employed to represent a

party in *‘ judicial proceedings. The beneﬁt of the consti- [* 443]

tutional right to counsel depends very greatly on the frce- w

dom with which he is allowed to act, and to comment on the

‘ Padmore v. Lawrence, 11 Ad. & El. 380; Kine v. Sewell, 3 M. & W. 297;

liable to action, if actual malice be averred and proved. 1 Preliminary information, furnished with a view to set on foot an inquiry
into an alleged offence, or to institute a criminal p1·osecution,
is, in like manner, privileged ; 2 but the protection only extends to
those communications which are in the course of the proceedings
to bring the supposed offender to justice, or are designed for the
pmpose of originating or forwarding such proceedings; and communications not of that character are not protected, even although
judicial proceedings may he pending for the investigation of the
offence which the communication refers to.3 Still less would a
party be justified in repeating a charge of crime, after the person
charged has been examined on his complaint, and acquitted of all
guilt. 4

Burlingame v. Burlingame, 8 Cow. 141; Kidder v. Parkhurst, 3 Allen, 393;

Doyle v. O’Doherty, 1 Car. & Marsh. 418; Wilson v. Collins, 5 C. & P. 373;

Privilege of Counsel.
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Home v. Bentinck, 2 Brod. & Bing. 130; Jarvis v. Hatheway, 3 Johns. 180.

In Goslin_v. Cannon, 1 Harr. 3, it was held that where a. crime had been com-

mitted, cxpressions of opinion founded upon facts within the knowledge of the

party, or communicated to him, made prudently and in conﬁdence, to discreet

persons, and made obviously in good faith with a. view only to direct their watch-

fulness, and enlist their aid in recovering the money stolen, and detecting and

bringing to justice the offender, were privileged. The cause, occasion, object,

One of the most important cases of privilege, in a. constitutional
point of view, is that of counsel employed to represent a.
party in • judicial proceedings. The benefit of the consti- [* 443]
tutional right to counsel depends very greatly on the free- ,..
dom with which he is allowed to act, and to comment on the

and end, it was said, was justifiable, proper, and legal, and such as should actuate

every good citizen.

' Grimes v. Coyle, 6 B. Monr. 301.

' Dancaster v. Hewson, 2 M. & Ry. 176. .

‘ Burliugame v. Burlingame, 8 Cow. 141. In Mower v. \Vatson, 11 Vt. 536,

an action was brought for slander in saying to a witness who was giving his tes-

timony on a. material point in a cause then on trial to which defendant was a

party, “That's a lie,” and for repeating the same statement to counsel for the

opposite party afterwards. The words were held not to be privileged. To

the same effect are the cases of McClau-ghry v. Weunore, 6 Johns. 82, and Kean

v. McLaughlin, 2 S. & R. 469. See also Torrey v. Field, 10 Vt. 353; Gilbert v.

People, 1 Denio, 41. A report made by a grand-jury upon a subject which they

conceive to be within their jurisdiction, but which is not, is nevertheless privileged.

Rector v. Smith, 11 Iowa, 302.

[ 4s? ]

1 Padrnore v. Lawrence, 11 Ad. & El. 380; Kine v. Sewell, 8 J[. & W. 297;
Burlingame v. Burlingame, 8 Cow. 1-U; Kidder v. Parkhul'st, 8 Allen, :193;
Doyle v. O'Doherty, 1 Car. & Marsh. 418; Wilson v. Collin~. 5 C. & P. 373;
Home v. Bentiuck, 2 Brod. & Bing. 130; .Jarvis v. Hatheway, 3 .John~. 180.
In Goslin, v. Cannon, 1 Harr. 3, it was held that where a crime had been committed, expressions of opinion founded upon facts within the knowledge of the
party, or communicated to him, macle prudently and in confidence, to discreet
persons, and made obviously in good faith with a vi~w only to direct their watchfulnes~, and enlist their aid in recovering the money stolen, and detecting and
bringing to justice the off~nder, were privileged. The cauMc, occasion, object,
and end, it was said, was justifiable, proper, and legal, and such as should actuate
every good citizen.
1 Grimes"· Coyle, 6 B. M:onr. 301.
a Danca.~ter v. Hewson, 2M. & Ry. 176.
• Burlingame v. Burlingame, 8 Cow. 141. In l\lower v. Watson, 11 Vt. 536,
an action was brought for slander in saying to a. witness who was giving his testimony on a material point in a cause then on trial to wbid1 dt·f~ndant was a
party, "That's a lie," and for repeating the same ~tatement to counsel for the
opposite party afterwards. The words were held not to be privileged. To
the same eff~ct are the cases of McClaughry "· 'Vetmore, 6 .Johns. B~, and Kean
"· McLaughlin, 2 S. & R. 469. See also Torrey v. Field, 10 Vt. 353; Gilbert v.
People, 1 Denio, 41. A report made by a grand-jury upon a suloject which they
conceive to be within their jurisdiction, but which is not, is nevertheless privileged.
Rector v. Smith, 11 Iowa, 302.
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facts appearing in the case, and on the inferences deducible there-

[CH. XII.

from. The character, conduct, and motives of parties and their

witnesses, as well as of other persons more remotely connected

with the proceedings, enter very largely into any judicial inquiry,

and must form the subject of comment, if they are to be sifted and

weighed. To make the comment of value, there must be the liberty

of examination in every possible light, and of suggesting any view

of the circumstances of the case, and of the motives surrounding

it, which seems legitimate to the person discussing them. It will

often happen, in criminal proceedings, that, while no reasonable

doubt can exist that a crime has been committed, there may be

very great doubt whether the prosecutor or the accused is the guilty

party; and to conﬁne the counsel for the defence to such remarks

concerning the prosecutor as he might justify, if he had made them

without special occasion, would render the right to counsel, in

many cases, of no value. The law justly and necessarily, in view

of the importance of the privilege, allows very great liberty in these

cases, and surrounds them with a protection that is always a com-

plete shield except where the privilege of counsel has been plainly

and palpably abused.

The rule upon this subject was laid down in these words in an

early English case: “A counsellor hath privilege to enforce any
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thing which is informed him by his client, and to give it in

evidence, it being pertinent to the matter in question, and not to

examine whether it be true or false; for a counsellor is at his peril

to give in evidence that which his client informs him, being perti-

nent to the matter in question; but matter not pertinent to the

issue, or the matter in question, he need not deliver; for he is to

discern in his discretion what he is to deliver, and what not; and

although it be false, he is excusable, it being pertinent to the

matter. But if he give in evidence any thing not material to the

issue, which is scandalous, he ought to aver it to be true; other-

wise he is punishable; for it shall be considered as spoken ma-

liciously and without cause; which is a good ground for the

action. . . . So if counsel object matter against a witness which

is slanderous, if there be cause to discredit his testimony, and it be

pertinent to the matter in question, it is justiﬁable, what

[* 444] he "‘ delivers by information, although it be false.” 1 The

' Brook v. Montague, Cro. Jac. 90. See this case approved and applied in

Hodgson v. Scarlett, 1 B. & Ald. 232.

[ 488 ]

facts appearing in the case, and on the inferences deducible therefrom. The character, conduct, and motives of parties and their
witnesses, ns well as of other persons more remotely connected
with the proceedings, enter very largely into any judicial inquiry,
and must form the subject of comment, if they are to be sifted and
weighed. To make the comment of value, there must be the liberty
of examination in every possible light, and of suggesting any view
of the circumstances of the case, and of the motives surrounding
it, which seems legitimate to the person discussing them. It will
often happen, in criminal proceedings, that, while no reasonable
doubt can exist that a crime has been committed, there may be
very great doubt whether the prosecutor or the accused is the guilty
party ; and to confine the counsel for the defence to such remarks
concerning the prosecutor as he mightjustify, if he had made them
without special occasion, would render the right to counsel, in
many cases, of no value. The law justly and necessarily, in view
of the importance of the privilege, allows very great liberty in these
cases, and surrounds them with a protection that is always a complete shield except where the privilege of counsel has been plainly
and palpably abused.
The rule upon this subject was laid down in these words in an
early English case: " A counsellor hath privilege to enforce any
thing which is informed him by his client, and to give it in
evidence, it being pertinent to the matter in question, and not to
examine whether it be true or false; for a counsellor is at his peril
to give in evidence that which his client informs him, being pertinent to the matter in question ; but matter not pertinent to the
issue, or the matter in question, he need not deliver; for he iH to
discern in his discretion what he is to deliver, and what not; and
although it be false, he is excusable, it being pertinent to the
matter. But if he give in evidence any thing not material to the
issue, which is scandalous, he ought to aver it to be true ; otherwise he is punishable ; for it shall be considered as spoken maliciously and without cause; which is a good ground for the
action . . . . So if counsel object matter against a witness which
is slanderous, if there be cause to discredit his testimony, and it he
pertinent to the matter in question, it is justifiable, what
[* 444] he *delivers by information, although it be false." 1 The
1 Brook v. Montagne, Cro. Jac. 90.
Hodgson v. Scarlett, 1 B. & Ald. 232.

[ 488]

See tbis case approved and applied in
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privilege of counsel in these cases is the same with that of the
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party himself',1 and the limitation upon it is concisely suggested

in a Pennsylvania case, “ that if a man should abuse his privilege,

and under pretence of pleading his cause, designedly wander from

the point in question, and maliciously heap slander upon his adver-

sary, I will not say that he is not responsible in an action at law.”2

Chief Justice Shaw has stated the rule very fully and clearly:

“ We take the rule to be well settled by the authorities that words

spoken in the course of judicial proceedings, though they are such

as impute crime to another, and therefore if spoken elsewhere

would import malice and be actionable in themselves, are not

actionable, if they are applicable and pertinent to the subject of the

inquiry. The question, therefore, in such cases is, not whether

the words spoken are true, not whether they are actionable in

themselves, but whether they were spoken in the course of judi-

cial proceedings, and whether they are relevant or pertinent to

the cause or subject of the inquiry. And in determining what is

pertinent, much latitude must be allowed to the judgmept and

discretion of those who are intrusted with the conduct of a cause

in court, and a much larger allowance made for the ardent and

excited feelings with which a party, or counsel who naturally and

almost necessarily identiﬁes himself with his client, may become
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animated, by constantly regarding one side only of an interesting

and animated controversy, in which the dearest rights of such

party may become involved. And if these feelings sometimes man-

ifest themselves in strong inveetives, or exaggerated expressions,

beyond what the occasion would strictly justify, it is to be recol-

lected that this is said to a judge who hears both sides, in whose

mind the exaggerated statement may be at once controlled and met

by evidence and argument of a contrary tendency from the other

party, and who, from the impartiality of his position, will natu-

rally give to an exaggerated assertion, not warranted by the occa-

sion, no more weight than it deserves. Still, this privilege must be

restrained by some limit, and we consider that limit to be this:

that a party or counsel shall not avail himself of his situ-

ation to *gratify private malice by uttering slanderous [* 445]

expressions, either against a party, witness, or third

1 Hoar 1:. Wood, 3 Met. 194, per Shaw. Ch. J.

’ McMillan v. Birch, 1 Binney, 178, per Tilgh-man, Ch. J.

[ 489]

privilege of counsel in these cases is the same with that of the
party himself,1 and the limitation upon it is concisely suggested
in a Pennsylvania case," that if a man should abuse his privilege,
and under pretence of pleading his cause, designedly wander from
the point in question, and maliciously heap slander upon his adversary, I will not say that he is not responsible in an action at law." 2
Chief Justice Sltaw has stated the rule very fully and clearly :
" We take the rule to be well settled by the authorities that words
spoken in the course of judicial proceedings, though they are such
as impute crime to another, and therefore if spoken elsewhere
would import malice and be actionable in themselves, are not
actionable, if they are applicable and pertinent to the subject of the
inquiry. The question, therefore, in such cases is, not whether
the words spoken are true, not whether they are actionable in
themselves, but whether they were spoken in the course of judicial proceedings, and whether they are relevant or pertinent to
the cause or subject of the inquiry. And in determining what is
pertinent, much latitude must be allowed to the judgmept and
discretion of those who are intrusted with the conduct of a cause
in court, and a much larger allowance made for the ardent and
excited feelings with which a party, or counsel who naturally and
almost necessarily identifies himself with his client, may become
animated, by constantly regardiog one side only of an interesting
and animated controversy, in which the dearest rights of such
party may become involved. And if these feelings sometimes manifest themselves in strong invectives, or exaggerated expressions,
beyond what the occasion would strictly justify, it is to be recollected that this is said to a judge who hears both sides, in whose
mind the exaggerated statement may be at once controlled and met
by evidence and argument of a contrary tendency from the other
party, and who, from the impartiality of his position, will naturally give to an exaggerated assertion, not warranted by the occasion, no more weight than it deserves. Still, this privilege must be
restrained by some limit, and we consider that limit to be this:
that a party or counsel shall not avail himself of his situation to • gratiry private malice by uttering slanderous [* 44:j]
expressions, either against a party, witness, or third
1
1

Hoar v. Wood, 3 Met. 194, per Shmo, Ch. J.
McMillan v. Birch, 1 Binney, 178, per Tilghman, Ch. J.
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person, which have no relation to the cause or subject-matter of

(CH. XII.

the inquiry. Subject to this restriction, it is, on the whole, for

the public interest, and best calculated to subserve the purposes

of justice, to allow counsel full freedom of speech, in conducting

the cases and advocating and sustaining the rights of their constit-

uents; and this freedom of discussion ought not to be impaired

by numerous and reﬁned distinctions.”1

Privilege of Legislators.

The privilege of a legislator in the use of language in debate

is made broader and more complete than that of the counsel or

party in judicial proceedings by constitutional provisions, which

give him complete immunity, by forbidding his being questioned

person, which have no relation to the cause or subject-matter of
the inquiry. Subject to this restriction, it is, on the whole, for
the public interest, and best calculated to suhserve the pur·poses
of justice, to allow counsel full freedom of speech, in conducting
tl1e cases and advocating and sustaining the rights of their constitr
uents; and this freedom of discussion ought not to be impaired
by numerous and refined distinctions." 1

in any other place for any thing said in speech or debate.” I|1 an

early case in Massachusetts, the question of the extent of this

Privilege of Legislators.

constitutional privilege came before the Supreme Court, and was

largely discussed as well by counsel as by the court. The consti-

tutional provision then in force in that State was as follows: “The

freedom of deliberation, speech, and debate in either house cannot

be the foundation of any accusation or prosecution, action or com-

plaint, in any other court or place whatsoever.” The defendant

was a member of the General Court, and was prosecuted for utter-

ing slanderous words to a fellow-member, in relation to the plain-
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tiff. The member to whom the words were uttered had moved a

resolution, on the suggestion of the plaintiff, for the appointment

of an additional notary-public in the county where the

["146] plaintiff *resided. The mover, in reply to an inquiry

' Hoar v. Wood, 3 Met. 197. See also Padmore v. Lawrence, 11 Ad. & El.

380; Ring v. Wheeler, 7 Cow. 725; Mower v. Watson, 11 Vt. 536; Gilbert v.

People, 1 Denio, 41; Hastings v. Lusk, 22 “Tend. 410; Bradley v. Heath. 12

Pick. 163. In Hastings v. Lusk, it is said that the privilege of counsel is as

broad as that of a legislative body; however false and malicious may be the

charge made by him alfecting the reputation of another, an action of slander

will not lie, provided what is said be pertinent to the question under discussion.

And see \Varner v. Paine, 2 Sandf. 195; Garr v. Selden, 4 N. Y. 91; Jennings

'0. Paine, 4 Wis. 358.

' There are provisions to this eH'ect in every State constitution except those

of North Carolina, South Carolina, Mississippi, Texas, California, and Ne-

vada. Mr. Cushing, in his work on the Law and Practice of Legislative

Assemblies, § 602, has expressed the opinion that these provisions were unneces-

sary, and that the protection was equally complete without them.

The privilege Of a legislator in the use of language in debate
is made broader and more complete than that of the counsel or
party in judicial proceedings by constitutional provisions, which
give him complete immunity, by forbidding his being questioned
in any other place for any thing said in speech or debate.2 In an
early case in Massachusetts, the question of the extent of this
constitutional privilege came before the Supreme Court, and was
largel.r discussed as well by counsel as by the court. The constitutional provision then in force in that State was as follows: "The
freedom of deliberation, speech, and debate in either house cannot
be the foundation of any accusation or prosecution, action or complaint, in any other court or place whatsoever." The defendant
was a member of the General Court, and was prosecuted for uttering slanderous wm·ds to a fellow-member, in relation to the plaintiff. The member to whom the words were uttered had moved a
resolution, on the suggestion of the plaintiff, for the appointment
of an additional notary-public in the county where the
(* 446] plaintiff • resided. The mover, in reply to an inquiry

[ 490 ]

Hoar v. Wood, 8 Met. 197. See also Padmore v. Lawrence, 11 Ad. & El.
880; Ring "·Wheeler, 7 Cow. 725; Mower v. Watson, 11 Vt. 586; Gilbert "·
People, 1 Denio, 41; Hastings v. Lusk, 2:3 Wend. 410; Bradley v. Heath, 12
Pick. 163. In Hastings v. Lusk, it is said that the privilege of counsel ia as
broad as that of a legislative hotly ; however false and malicious may be the
charge made by him affecting the reputation of another, an action of slander
will not lie, provided what is said be pertinent to the que~tion under discussion.
And see Warner v. Paine, 2 Sandf. 195; Garr v. Selden, 4 N.Y. 9l; Jennings
v. Paine, 4 Wis. 858.
1 There are provisions to this effect in every State constitution except those
of North Carolina, South Carolina, Mississippi, Texas, California, and Nevada. Mr. Cushing, in his work on the Law and Practice of Legialative
Assemblies, § 602, has expressed the opinion that these provi11ions were unnecessary, and that the protection was equally complete without them.
1
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privately made by defendant, as to the source of his infor-
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mation that such appointment was necessary, had designated the

plaintiff, and the defendant had replied by a charge against the

plaintiff of a criminal offence. The question before the court was,

whether this reply was privileged. The house was in session at

the time, but the remark was not made in course of speech or de-

bate, and had no other connection with the legislative proceedings

than is above shown.

Referring to the constitutional provision quoted, the learned

judge who delivered the opinion of the court in this case thus

expressed himself: “ In considering this article, it appears to me

that the privilege secured by it is not so much the privilege of the

house as an organized body, as of each individual member com-

posing it, who is entitled to this privilege even against the declared

will of the house. For he does not hold this privilege at the

pleasure of the house, but derives it from the will of the people

expressed in the constitution, which is paramount to the will of

either or both branches of the legislature. In this respect, the

privilege here secured resembles other privileges attached to each

member by another part of the constitution, by which he is

exempted from arrest on mesne (or original) process, during

his going to, returning from, or attending the General Court.
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Of these privileges, thus secured to each member, he cannot

be deprived by a resolve of the house, or by an act of the legis-

lature. '

“These privileges are thus secured, not with the intention of

protecting the members against prosecutions for their own benefit,

but to support the rights of the people, by enabling their repre-

sentatives to execute the functions of their office without fear of

prosecution, civil or criminal. I therefore think the article ought

not to be construed strictly, but liberally, that the full design of it

may be answered. I will not conﬁne it to delivering an opinion,

uttering a speech, or haranguing in debate, but will extend it to the

giving of a vote, to the making of a written report, and to every

other act, resulting from the nature and in the execution of the

office’; and I would deﬁne the article as securing to every member

exemption from prosecution for every thing said or done by him,

as a representative, in the exercise of the functions of that oﬁice,

without inquiring whether the exercise was regular according to

the rules of the house, or irregular and against their rules.

[ 491 ]

privately made by defendant, as to the source of his information that such appointment was necessary, had designated the
plaintiff, and the defendant had replied by a charge against the
plaintiff of a criminal offence. The questiou before the court was,
whether this reply was privileged. The house was in session at
the time, but the remark was not made in course of speech or debate, and had no other connection with the legislative proceedings
than is above shown.
Referring to the constitutional provision quoted, the learned
judge who delivered the opinion of the court in this case thus
expressed himself: "In considering this article, it appears to me
that the privilege secured by it is not so much the privilege of the
house as an organized body, as of each individual member com·
posing it, who is entitled to this privilege even against the declared
will of the house. For he does not hold this privilege at the
pleasure of the house, but derives it from the will of the people
expressed in the co~titution, which is paramount to the will of
either or both branches of the legislature. In this respect, the
privilege here secured resembles other privileges attached to each
member by another part of the constitution, by which he is
exempted from arrest on mesne (or original) process, dul'ing
his going to, returning from, or attending the General Court.
Of these privileges, thus secured to each member, he cannot
be deprived by a resolve of the house, or by an act of the legislature.
'"These privileges are thus secured, not with the intention of
protecting the members against prosecutions for their own benefit,
but to support the rights of the people, by enabling their representatives to execute the functions of their office without fear of
prosecution, civil or criminal. I therefore think the article ought
not to be construed strictly, but liberally, that the full design of it
may be answered. I will not confine it to delivering an opinion,
uttering a speech, or haranguing in debate, but will extend it to the
gh·ing of a vote, to the making of a written report, and to every
other act, resulting from the nature and in the execution of the
office.; and I would define the article as securing to every member
exemption from prosecution for every thing said or done by him,
as a representative, in the exercise of the functions of that office,
without inquiring whether the exercise was regular according to
the rules of the house, or irregular and against their rules.

[ 491]

* 446 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [cn. xn.

[* 447] I do * not conﬁne the member to his place in the house, and

• 446

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

[CB. XII.

I am satisﬁed that there are cases in which he is entitled

to this privilege when not within the walls of the representatives’

chamber. He cannot be exercising the functions of his office as

member of a body, unless the body is in existence. The house

must be in session to enable him to claim this privilege, and it is in

session notwithstanding occasional adjournments for short intervals

for the convenience of the members. If a member, therefore, be

out of the chamber, sitting in committee, executing the commission

of the house, it appears to me that such member is within the

reason of the article, and ought to be considered within the privi-

lege. The body of which he is a member is in session, and he, as

a member of that body, is in fact discharging the duties of his oﬁice.

He ought therefore to be protected from civil or criminal prosecu-

tions for every thing said or done by him in the exercise of his

functions as a representative, in a committee, either in debating or

assenting to or draughting a report. Neither can I deny the

member his privilege when executing the duties of the ofﬁce, in a

convention of both houses, although the convention may be holden

in the Senate Chamber.” And after considering the hardships

that might result to individuals in consequence of this privilege, he

proceeds: “ A more extensive construction of the privilege of the
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members secured by this article I cannot give, because it could

not be supported by the language or the manifest intent of the

article. When a representative is not acting as a member of the

house, he is not entitled to any privilege above his fellow-citizens;

nor are the rights of the people affected if he is placed on the same

ground on which his constituents stand.” And coming more par-

ticularly to the facts then before the court, it was shown that the

defendant was not in the discharge of any oﬂicial duty at the time

of uttering the obnoxious words; that they had no connection or

relevancy to the business then before the house, but might with

equal pertinency have been uttered at any other time or place,

and consequently could not, even under the liberal rule of pro-

tection which the court had laid down, be regarded as within the

privilege.‘

‘ Coiﬁn v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1. See Jefferson‘s Manual, § 3; I-Iosmer 1:. Love-

land, 19 Barb. 111; State v. Burnham, 9 N. H. 3t.

[492]

[* 447] I do* not confine the member to his place in the house, and
I am satisfied that there are cases in which he is entitled
to this privilege when not within the walls of the representatives'
chamber. He cannot be exercising the functions of his office as
member of a body, unless the body is in existence. The house
must be in session to enable him to claim this privilege, and it is in
session notwithstanding occasional adjournments for short intervals
for the convenience of the members. If a member, therefore, be
out of the chamber, sitting in committee, executing the commission
of the house, it appears to me that such member is within the
reason of the article, and ought to be considered within the privilege. The body of which he is a member is in session, and he, as
a member of that body, is in fact discharging the duties of his office.
He ought therefore to bo protected from civil or criminal prosecutions for every thiug said or done hy him in the exercise of his
functions as a representative, in a committee, either in debating or
assenting to or draughting a report. Neither can I deny the
member his privilege when executing the duties of the office, in a
convention of both houses, although the convention may be holden
in the Senate Chamber." And after considering the hardships
that might result to individuals in consequence of this privilege, he
proceeds: ".A. more extensive construction of the privilege of the
members secured by this article I cannot give, because it could
not be supported by the language or the manifest intent of the
article. When a representati·c;e is not acting as a member of the
house, he is not entitled to any privilege above his fellow-citizens ;
nor are the rights of the people affected if he is placed on the same
ground on which his constituents stand." And coming more particularly to the facts then before the court, it was shown that the
defendant was not in the discharge of any official duty at the time
of uttering the obnoxious words ; that they had no connection or
relevancy to the business then before the house, but might with
equal pertinency have been uttered at any other time or place,
and consequently could not, even under the liberal rule of protection which the court had laid down, be regarded as within the
privilege. 1
1 Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1.
See Jefferson's Manual, § 3; Hosmer v. Loveland, 19 Barb. 111; State v. Burnham, 9 N.H. 3~.
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* Publication of privileged C'o~mmunicati0ns through the [*4-18])

CH. XII.]

LIBERTY OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS.

Press.

If now we turn from the rules of law which protect communica-

tions because of the occasion on which they are made and

the duty resting upon the person making them, to those rules

which concern the spreading before the world the same communi-

• Publication of privileged Commum:cations tltroug!t the [* 448]
Press.

I

cations, we shall discover a very remarkable difference. It does

not follow because a counsel may freely speak in court as he

believes or is instructed, that therefore he may publish his speech

through the public press. The privilege in court is necessary to

the complete discharge of his duty to his client; but when the suit

is ended, that duty is discharged, and he is not called upon

to appeal from the court and the jury to the general public.

Indeed such an appeal, while it could not generally have beneﬁt to

the client in view, would be unfair and injurious to the parties

reﬂected upon by the argument, inasmuch as it would take only a

partial and one-sided view of the case, and the public would not

have, as the court and jury did, all the facts of the case as given in

evidence before them, so that they might be in position to weigh

the arguments fairly and understandingly, and reject injurious in-

ferences not warranted by the evidence.

The law, however, favors publicity in legal proceedings, so far as
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that object can be attained without injustice to the persons imme-

diately concerned. The public are permitted to attend nearly all

judicial inquiries, and there appears to be no suﬁicient reason why

they should not also be allowed to see in print the reports of trials,

if they can thus have them presented as fully as they are in court,

or at least all the material portion of the proceedings stated

impartially, so that one shall not, by means of them, derive erro-

neous impressions, which he would not have received from hearing

the case in court.

It seems to be a settled rule of law, that a fair and impartial

account ofjudicial proceedings, which have not been e1: purte, but

in the hearing of both parties, is, generally speaking, a justi-

ﬁable publication} But it is said that, if a party is to be allowed

' Hoare v. Silverlock, 9 C. B. 20. And see Stanley v. \Vebb, 4 Sandf. 21;

Cincinnati Gazette Co. v. Timberlake, 10 Ohio, N. s. 548. But not if the matter

published is indecent or blasphemous. Rex v. Carlisle, 3 B. & Ald. 167; Rex

v. Creevey, 1 M. & S. 273.
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If now we turn from the rules of law which protect communications because of the occasion on which they are made and
the duty resting upon the person making them, to those rules
which concern the spreading before the world the same communications, we shall discover a very remarkable difference. It does
not follow because a counsel may freely speak in court as he
believes or is instructed, that therefore he may publish his speech
through the public press. The privilege in court is necessary to
the complete discharge of his duty to his cliei'lt; but when the suit
is ended, that duty is discharged, and he is not called upon
to appeal from the court and the jury to the general public.
Indeed such an appeal, while it could not generally have benefit to
the client in view, would be unfair and injurious to the parties
reflected upon by the argument, inasmuch as it would take only a
pa1·tial and one-sided view of the case, and the public would not
have, as the court and jury did, all the facts of the case as given in
evidence before them, so that they might be in position to weigh
the arguments fairly and understandingly, and reject injurious inferences not warranted by the evidence.
The law, however, fa>ors publicity in legal proceedings, so far as
that object can be attained without injustice to the persons immediately concerned. The public are permitted to attend nearly all
judicial inquiries, and there appears to be no sufficient reason why
they should not also be allowed to see in print the reports of trials,
if they can thus have them presented as fully as they are in court,
or at least all the material portion of the proceedings stated
impartially, so that one shall not, by means of them, derive erroneous impressions, which he would not have received from heariug
the case in court.
It seems to be a settled rule of law, that a fair and impartial
account of judicial proceedings, which haYe not been ex parte, but
in the hearing of both parties, is, generally speaking, a justifiable publication. I But it is said that, if a party is to be allowed
Hoare v. Silverlock, 9 C. B. 20. And see Stanley v. Webb, 4 Sandf. 21;
Cincinnati Gazette Co. v. Timberlake, 10 Ohio, N. s. 548. But not if the matter
publit~hed is indecent or blasphemous. Rex v. Carlisle, 3 B. & Ald. 167 ; Rex
v. Creevey, 1 M. & S. 273.
1
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to publish what passes in a court of justice, he must publish the

• 448

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

[CH. XII•

whole case, and not merely state the conclusion which he himself

draws from the evidence.‘ A plea that the supposed libel

[* 449] was, in *substance, a true account and report of a trial

has been held bad ; 2 and a statement of the circumstances

of a trial as from counsel in the case has been held not privileged?

The report must also be strictly conﬁned to the actual proceedings

in court, and must contain no defamatory observations or comments

from any quarter whatsoever, in addition to what forms strictly

and properly the legal proceedingsﬁ And if the nature of the case

is such as to make it improper that the proceedings should be

spread before the public, because of their immoral tendency, or of

the blasphemous or indecent character of thc evidence exhibited,

the publication, though impartial and full, will be a public oﬁence,

and punishable accordingly.“

It has, however, been held, that the publication of ea: parte pro-

ccedings, or mere preliminary, examinations, though of a judicial

character, is not privileged; and when they reﬂect injurious-

ly upon individuals, the publisher derives no protection from

their having already been delivered in court!’ The reason for

1 Lewis v. Walter, 4 B.“ & Ald. 611.

" Flint v. Pike, 4 B. & C. 473.
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5 Saunders u. Mills, 6 Bing. 213; Flint v. Pike, 4 B. & C. 473. And see

Stanley v. Webb, 4 Sandf. 26; Lewis v. \Valter, 4 B. & Ald. 605.

‘ Stiles v. Nokes, 7 East, 493; Delegal v. Highley, 3 Bing. (N. C.) 950.

And see Lewis v. Clement, 3 B. & Ald. 702.

° Rex v. Carlile, 3 B. & Ald. 167; Rex v. Creevey, 1 M. & S. 273.

° Duncan v. Thwaites, 3 B. & C. 556; Flint v. Pike, 4 B. & C. 473; Stanley

VVebb, 4 Sandf. 21 ; Charlton v. Watton, 6 C. & P. 385; Cincinnati Gazette

to publish what passes in a court of justice, he must publish the
whole case, and not merely state the conclusion which he himself
draws from the· evidence.1 A plea that the supposed libel
[• 449] was, in • substance, a true account and report of a trial
has been held bad; 2 and a statement of the circumstances
of a trial as from counsel in the case has been held not privileged.8
The report must also be strictly confined to the actual proceedings
in court, and must contain no defamatory observations or comments
from any quarter whatsoever, in addition to what foriiJ.S strictly
and properly the legal proceedings." And if the nature of the case
is such as to make it improper that the proceedings should be
spread before the public, because of their immoral tendency, or of
the blasphemous or indecent character of tho evidence exhibited,
the publication, though impartial and full, will be a public offence,
·
and punishable accordingly.6
It has, however, been held, that the publication of ex parte proceedings, or mere preliminary examinations, though of a judicial
character, is not privileged; and 'When they reflect injuriously upon individuals, the publisher derives 1w protection from
their having already been delivered in court. 6 The reason for

Co. v. Timberlnke, 10 Ohio, N’. s. 548; Mathews v. Beach, 5 Sandf. 256; Huif

v. Bennett, 4 Sandf. 120. It seems, however, that if the proceeding has resulted

in the discharge of the person accused, or in a decision that no cause exists for

proceeding against him, a publication of an account of it is privileged. ln Curry

v. Walter, 1 B. & P. 525, the Court of Common Pleas held that, in an action for

libel, it was a good defence, undcr the plea of not guilty, that the alleged libel

was a true account of what had passed upon a motion in the Court of King‘s

Bench for an information against two magistrates for corruption in refusing to

license an inn; the m\ot-ion having been refused for want of notice to the magis-

trates. In Lewis v. Levy, El. Bl. & El. 537, the publisher of a newspaper gave

a full report of an examination before a magistrate on a charge of perjury,

resulting in the discharge of the defendant; and the Court of Q,ueen’s Bench

sustained the claim of privilege; distinguishing the case from those where the

party was held for trial, and where the publication of the charges and evidence
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Lewis v. Walter, 4 B. & Ald. 611.
Flint v. Pike, 4 B. & C. 473.
3 Saunders v. Mills, 6 Bing. 213; Flint v. Pike, 4 B. & C. 473.
And see
Stanley v. Webb, 4 Sandf. 26; Le,vis v. W altt!r, 4 B. & Ald. 605.
4 Stiles "· Nokes, 7 J.:ast, 493; Delegnl "· Highley, 8 Bing. (N.C.) 950.
And see Lewis v. Clement, 3 B. & Ald. 702.
6 Rex v. Carlile, 3 B. & Ald. 167; Rex v. Creevey, 1M. & S. 273.
6 Duncan v. Thwaites, 3 B. & C. 556; Flint v. Pike, 4 n. & C. 473; Stanley
v. Webb, 4 Sandf. 21 ; Charltqn v. Watton, 6 C. & P. 385; Cincinnati Gazette
Co. v. Timberlake, 10 Ohio, N. s. 548; Mathews v. Beach, 5 Sandf. 256; Huff
v. Bennett, 4 Saudf. 120. It seems, however, that if the proceeding has resulted
in the discharge of the person accused, or in a decision that no cause exists for
proceedin~ against him, a publication of an account of it is privileged. In Curry
v. \V alter, 1 B. & P. 525, the Court of Common Pleas held that, in an action for
libel, it was a good defence, under the plea of not guilty, that the alleged libel
was a true account of what had passed upon a motion in the Court of King's
Bench for an information against two magistrates for corruption in refusing to
license an inn ; the motion having been refused for want of notice to the magistrates. In Lewis v. Levy, El. Bl. & El. 537, the publisher of a newspaper gave
a full report of an examination bt'fore a magistrate on a charge of perjury,
resulting in the discharge of the defendant; and the Court of Queen's Bench
sustained the claim of privilege; distinguishing the case from those where the
party was held for trial, and whex:e the publication of the charges and evidence
1

1
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* distinguishing these cases from those where the parties are [* 450]
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• 450

LIBERTY OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS.

heard is thus stated by Lord Ellenboro-ugh, in the early case

of the King v. Fisher: 1 “ Jurors and judges are still but men; they

cannot always control feeling excited by inﬂammatory language.

If they are exposed to be thus warped and misled, injustice must

sometimes be done. Trials at law, fairly reported, although they

may occasionally prove injurious to individuals, have been held to

be privileged. Let them continue so privileged. The beneﬁt they

produce is great ‘and permanent, and the evil that arises from them

is rare and incidental. But these preliminary examinations have

no such privilege. Their only tendency is to prejudgethose whom

the law still presumes to be innocent, and to poison the sources of

justice. It is of inﬁnite importance to us all, that whatever has a

tendency to prevent a fair trial should be guarded against. Every

one of us may be questioned in a court of law, and called upon

to defend his life and character. We would then wish to meet a

jury of our countrymen with unbiassed minds. . But for this there

can be no security, if such publications are permitted.” And in

another case it has been said: “ It is our boast that we are

governed by that just and salutary rule upon which security of life

and character often depends, that every man is presumed innocent

of crimes charged upon him, until he is proved guilty. But the cir-
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might tend to his prejudice on the trial. The opinion of Lord Campbell in the

case, however, seems to go far towards questioning the correctness of the decis-

ions above cited. See especially his quotation from the opinion of Lord Denman,

delivered before a committee of the House of Lords in the year 1843, on the

law of libel: “ I have no doubt that [police reports] are extremely useful for the

detection of guilt by making facts notorious, and for bringing those facts more

correctly to the knowledge of all parties interested in unravelling the truth. The

public, I think, are perfectly aware that those proceedings are ea:'parte, and they

become more and more aware of it in proportion to their growing intelligence;

they know that such proceedings are only in course of trial, and they do not

• distinguishing these cases from those where the parties are (* 450]
heard is thus stated by Lord Ellenborouglt, in the early case
of the King v. Fisher: 1 "Jurors and judges are still bu~ men ; they
cannot always control feeling excited by inflammatory language.
If they are exposed to be thus warped and misled, injustice must
sometimes be done. Trials at law, fairly reported, although ~hey
may occasionally prove injurious to individuals, have been held to
be privileged. Let them continue so privileged. The benefit they
produce is great -and permanent, and the evil that arises from them
is rare and incidental. But these preliminary examinations have
no such privilege. Their only tendency is to prejudge' those whom
the law still presumes to be in'nocent, and to poison the sources of
justice. It is of infinite importance to us all, that whatever has a.
tendency to prevent a. fair trial should be guarded against. Every
one of us may be questioned in a court of law, and called upon
to defend his life and character. We would then wish to meet a
jury of onr countrymen with unbiassed minds .. But for this there
can be no security, if such publications are permitted." And in
another case it has been said : " It is our boast that we are
governed by that just and salutary rule upon which security of life
and character often depends, that every man is presumed innocent
of crimes charged upon him, until he is proved guilty. But the cir-

form their opinion until the trial is had. Perfect publicity in judicial proceed-

ings is of the highest importance in other points of view, but in its effects on

character I think it desirable. The statement made in open court will probably

ﬁnd its way to the ears of all in whose good opinion the party assailed feels an

interest, probably in an exaggerated form, and the imputation may often rest

upon the wrong person ; both these evils are prevented by correct reports.” In

the case of Lewis v. Levy, it was insisted that the privilege of publication only

extended to the proceedings of the superior courts of law and equity; but the

court gave no countenance to any such distinction.

' 2 Camp. 563.
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might tend to his prejudice on the trial. The opinion of Lord Campbell in the
case, however, St>cms to go far towards questioning the correctness of the decisions above cited. See especially his quotation from the opinion of Lord DemiWII,
delivered before a committee of the House of Lords in the year 1843, on the
law of libel: "I ha\·e no doubt that [police reports] are extremely useful for the
detection of guilt by making facts notorious, and fur bringing those facts more
correctly to the knowledge of all parties interested in unravclliug the truth. The
public, I think, are perfectly aware that those p•·ocecdings are ex·parte, anc.l they
become more and more aware of it in proportion to their growing intelligence;
they know that such proceedings are only in coul'iie of trial, and they do not
form their opinion until the trial is had. Perfect publicity in judicial proceedings is of the highest importance in other point!! of Yiew, but in its effects on
character I think it desirable. The statement made in open court will probably
find its way to the ears of all in whose good opinion the party assailed feels an
interest, probably in an exaggerated form, and the imputation n1ay often rest
upon the wrong person ; both these evils are prevented by correct reports." In
the case of Lewis v. Levy, it was insisted that the privilege of publication only
extended to the proceedings of the superior courts of law and equity; but the
court gave no countenanl!e to any such di:~tinction.
1 2 Camp. 563.
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culation of charges founded upon ez parte testimony, of statements

• 450
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XII •

made, often under excitement, by persons smarting under real or

fancied wrongs, may prejudice the public mind, and cause the

judgment of conviction to be passed long before the day of trial

has arrived. When that day of trial comes, the rule has

[* 451] been " reversed, and the presumption of guilt has been sub-

stituted for the presumption of innocence. The chances of

afair and impartial trial are diminished. Suppose the charge to be

utterly groundless. If every preliminary ex pm-te complaint which

may be made before a. police magistrate may, with entire immu-

nity, be published and scattered broadcast over the land, then the

character of the innocent, who may be the victim of a conspiracy,

or of charges proved afterwards to have arisen entirely from mis-

apprehension, may be cloven down, without any malice on the part

of the publisher. The refutation of slander, in such cases, gener-

ally follows its propagation at distant intervals, and brings often

but an imperfect balm to wounds which have become fostered, and

perhaps incurable. It is not to be denied, that occasionally the

publication of such proceedings is productive of good, and promotes

the ends of justice. But, in such cases, the publisher must ﬁnd

his justiﬁcation, not in privilege, but in the truth of the charges.” 1

Privilege of Publishers of News.
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Among the inventions of modern times, by which the world has

been powerfully inﬂuenced, and from which civilization has received

a new and wonderful impulse, must be classed the newspaper.

Beginning with a small sheet, insigniﬁcant alike in matter and

appearance, published at considerable intervals, and including but

few in its visits, it has become the daily vehicle, to almost every

family in the land, of information from all quarters of the globe,

and upon every subject. Through it, and by means of the electric

telegraph, the public proceedings of every civilized country, the

culation of charges founded upon ex parte testimony, of statements
made, often under excitement, by persons smarting under real or
fancied wrongs, may prejudice the public mind, and cause the
judgment of conviction to be passed long before the day of trial
has arrived. When that day of trial comes, the rule has
[• 451] been • reversed, and the presumption of guilt haH been substituted for the presumption of innocence. The chances of
a fair and impartial trial are diminished. Suppose the charge to be
utterly groundless. If every preliminary ex parte complaint which
may be made before a police magistrate may, with entire immunity, be published and scattered broadcast over the land, then the
character of the innocent, who may be the victim of a conspiracy,
or of charges proved afterwards to have arisen entirely from misapprehension, may be cloven down, without any malice on the part
of the publisher. The refutation of slander, in such cases, generally follows its propagation at distant intervals, and brings often
but an imperfect balm to wounds which have become festered, and
perhaps incurable. It is not to be denied, that occasionally the
publication of such proceedings is productive of good, and promotes
the ends of justice. But, in such cases, the publisher must find
his justification, not in privilege, but in the truth of the charges." 1

debates of the leading legislative bodies, the events of war, the

‘ Stanley v. Webb, 4 Sandf. 30. See this case approved and followed in

Cincinnati Gazette Co. v. Timberlake, 10 Ohio, N- 8. 5-18, where, however, the

Privilege of Publisl1ers of News.

court are careful not to express an opinion whether a publication of the proceed-

ings on preliminary examinations may not be privileged, where the accused is

present, with full opportunity of defence.

[496]

Among tho inventions of modern times, by which the world has
been powerfully influenced, and from which civilization has received
a new and wonderful impulse, must be classed the newspaper.
Beginning with a small sheet, insignificant alike in matter and
appearance, published at considerable intervals, and including but
few in its visits, it has become the daily vehicle, to almost every
family in the laud, of information from all quart~rs of the globe,
and upon every subject. Through it, and by means of the electric
telegraph, the public proceedings of every civilized country, the
debates of the leading legislative bodies, the events of war, the
Stanley v. Webb, 4 Sandf. 30. See this case approved and followed in
Cincinnati Gazette Co. v. Timberlake, 10 Ohio, N. 8. 548, where, however, the
court are careful not to express an opinion whether a publication of the proeeedings on preliminary examinations may not be privileged, where the accused is
present, with full opportunity of defence.
1
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triumphs of peace, the storms in the physical world, and the agita-
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tions in the moral and mental, are brought home to the knowledge

of every reading person, and, to a very large extent, before the day

is over on which the events have taken place. And not public

events merely are discussed and described, but the actions and

words of public men are made public property; and any

person sufficiently notorious "' to become an object of [" 452]

public interest will find his movements chronicled in this

index of the times. Every party has its newspaper organs; every

shade of opinion on political, religious, literary, moral, industrial,

or ﬁnancial questions has its representative ; every locality has its

press to advocate its claims, and advance its interests, and even the

days regarded as sacred have their special papers to furnish read-

ing suitable for the time. The newspaper is also the medium by

means of which all classes of the people communicate with each

other concerning their wants and desires, and through which they

offer their wares, and seek bargains. As it has gradually increased

in value, and in the extent and variety of its contents, so the

exactions of the community upon its conductors have also in-

creased, until it is demanded of the newspaper publisher, that he

shall daily spread before his readers a complete summary of the

events transpiring in the world, public or private, so far as those
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readers can reasonably be supposed to take an interest in them;

and he who does not comply with this demand must give way to

him who will.

The newspaper is also one of the chief means for the education

of the people. The highest and the lowest in the scale of intelli-

gence resort to its columns for information; it is read by those

who read nothing else, and the best minds of the age make it the

medium of communication with each other on the highest and most

abstruse subjects. Upon politics it may be said to be the chief‘

educator of the people; its inﬂuence is potent in every legislative

body; it gives tone and direction to public sentiment on each

important subject as it arises; and no administration in any free

country ventures to overlook or disregard an element so pervading

in its inﬂuence, and withal so powerful. »

And yet it may be doubted if the newspaper, as such, has ever

inﬂuenced at all the current of the common law, in any particular

important to the protection of the publishers. The railway has

become the successor of the king’s highway, and the plastic rules
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triumphs of peace, the storms in the physical world, and the agitations in the moral and mental, are brought home to the knowledge
of every reading person, and, to a very large extent, before the day
is over on which the events have taken place. And not public
events merely are discussed and described, but the actions and
words of public men are made public property ; and any
person sufficiently notorious • to become an object of [* 452]
public interest will find his movements chronicled in this
index of the times. Every party has its newspaper organs ; every
shade of opinion on political, religious, literary, moral, industrial,
or financial questions has its representative ; every locality has its
press to advocate its claims, and advance iFs il1terests, and even the
days regarded as sacred have their special papers to furnish reading suitable for the time. The newspaper is also the medium by
means of which all classes of the people communicate with each
other concerning their wants and desires, and through which they
offer their wares, and seek bargains. As it has gradually increased
in value, and in the extent and variety of its contents, so the
exactions of the community upon its conductors have also increased, until it is demanded of the newspaper publisher, that he
shall daily spread before his readers a complete summary of the
events transpiring in the world, public or private, so far as those
readers can reasonably be supposed to take an interest in them ;
and he who does not comply with this demand must give way to
him who will.
The newspaper is also one of the chief means for the education
of the people. The highest and the lowest in the scale of intelligence resort to its columns for information ; it is read by those
who read nothing else, and the best minds of the age make it ehe
medium of communication with each other on the highest and most
abstruse subjects. Upon politics it may be said to be -the chief
educator of the people ; its influence is potent in every legislative
body; it gives tone and direction to public sentiment on each
important subject as it arises ; and no administration in any free
country ventures to overlook or disregard an element so pervading
in its influence, and withal so powerful.
And yet it may be doubted if the newspaper, as such, has ever
influenced at all the current of the common law, in any particular
important to the protection of the publishers. The railway has
become the successor of the king's highway, and the plastic rules
32
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of the common law have accommodated themselves to the new

• 452

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

.

[CH. XII •

condition of things; but the changes accomplished by the public

press seem to have passed unnoticed in the law, and, save only

where modiﬁcations have been made by constitution or statute, the

publisher of the daily paper occupies to-day‘the_position in the

courts that the village gossip and retailer of scandal occupied

two hundred years ago, with no more privilege and no more

. protection.

["‘453] *‘We quote from an opinion by the Supreme Court of

New York, in a case where a publisher of a newspaper was

prosecuted for libel, and where the position was taken by counsel

that the publication was, privileged: “ It is made a point in this

case, and was insisted upon in argument, that the editor of a public

newspaper is at liberty to copy an item of news from another paper,

giving at the same time his authority, without subjecting himself

to legal responsibility, however libellous the article may be, unless

express malice is shown. It was conceded that the law did not,

and ought not, to extend a similar indulgence to any other class of

citizens; but the counsel said that a distinction should be made in

favor of editors, on the ground of the peculiarity of their occupa-

tion. That their business was to disseminate useful information

among the people ; to publish such matters relating to the current
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events of the day happening at home or abroad as fell within the

sphere of their observation, and as the public curiosity or taste

demanded; and that it was impracticable for them at all times to

ascertain the truth or falsehood of the various statements contained

in other journals. We were also told that if the law were not thus

indulgent, some legislative relief might become necessary for the

protection of this class of citizens. Undoubtedly if it be desirable

to pamper a depraved public appetite or taste, if there be any such,

by the republication of all the falsehoods and calumnics upon

private character that may ﬁnd their way into the press,——to give

encouragement to the widest possible circulation of these vile and

defamatory publications by protecting the retailers of them,— some

legislative interference will be necessary, for no countenance can be

found for the irresponsibility claimed in the common law. That

reprobates the libeller, whether author or publisher, and subjects

him to both civil and criminal responsibility. His 0iTenee is there

ranked with that of the receiver of stolen goods, the perjurer and

suborner of perjury, the disturber of the public peace, the conspir-
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of the common law have accommodated themselves to the new
condition of things ; but the changes accomplished by the public
press seem to have passed unnoticed in the law, and, save' only
where modifications have been made by constitution or statute, the
publisher of the daily paper occupies to-day 'the . position in the
courts that the village gossip and retailer of scandal occupied
two hundred years ago, with no more privilege and no more
protection.
[* 453] • We quote from an opinion by the Supreme Court of
New York, in a case where a publisher of a newspaper was
prosecuted for libel, and where the position was taken by counsel
that the publication wa&. privileged: " It is made a point in this
case, and was insisted upon in argument, that the editor of a public
newspaper is at liberty to copy an item of news from another paper,
giving at the same time his authority, without subjecting himself
to legal responsibility, however libellous the article may be, unless
express malice is shown. It was conceded that the law did not,
and ought not, to extend a similar indulgence to any other class of
citizens; but the counsel said that a distinction should he made in
favor of editors, on the ground of the peculiarity of their occupation. That their business was to disseminate useful information
among the people ; to publish such matters relating to the current
events of the day happening at home or abroad as fell within the
sphere of their observation, and as the public curiosity or taste
demanded ; and, that it was impracticable for them at all times to
ascertain the truth or falsehood of the various statements contained
in other journals. We were also told that if the law were not thus
indulgent, some legislative relief might become necessary for the
protection of this class of citizens. Undoubtedly if it be desirable
to pamper a depraved public appetite or ta8te, if there be any such,
by the republication of all the falsehoods and calumnies upon
private character that may find their way into the press, -to give
encouragement to the widest possible circulation of these vile and
defamatory publications by protecting the retailers of them,- some
legislative interference will be necessary, !or no countenance can be
found for the it·responsibility claimed in the common law. That
reprobates the libeller, whether author or publisher, and subjects
him to both civil and criminal responsibility. His offence is there
ranked with that of the receiver of stolen goods, the perjurer and
suborner of perjury, the disturber of the public peace, the conspir-
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act of publication is an adoption of the original calumny, which

must be defended in the same way as if invented by the defendant.

The republication assumes and indorses the truth of the charge,

and when called on by the aggrieved party, the publisher should

be held strictly to the proof. If he chooses to become the indorser

and retailer of private scandal, without taking the trouble to

inquire into the truth of what he publishes, there is no

ground for * complaint if the law, which is as studious to ["‘ 454]

protect the character as the property of a citizen, holds him

to this responsibility. The rule is not only just and wise in itself,

but, if steadily and inﬁexibly adhered to and applied by courts and

juries, will greatly tend to the promotion of truth, good morals,

and common decency on the part of the press, by inculcating

caution and inquiry into the truth of charges against private char-

acter before they are published and circulated throughout the

community.” 1

If this strong condemnatory language were conﬁned to the cases

where private character is dragged before the public for detraction

and abuse, to pander to a depraved appetite for scandal, its pro-

priety and justice and the force of its reasons would be at once

conceded. But a very large proportion of what the newspapers
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spread before the public relates to matters of public concern, but

in which, nevertheless, individuals ﬁgure, and must therefore be

mentioned in any account. '1‘o a great extent, also, the informa-

tion comes from abroad; the publisher can have no knowledge

concerning it, and no inquiries which he could make would be

likely to give him more deﬁnite information, unless he delays the

publication until it ceases to be of value to his readers. Whatever

view the law may take, the public sentiment does not brand the

publisher of a newspaper as libeller, conspirator, or villain, because

the telegraph despatches transmitted to him from all parts of the

world, without any knowledge on his part concerning the facts, are

published in his paper, in reliance upon the prudence, care, and

honesty of those who have charge of the lines of communication,

and whose interest it is to be vigilant and truthful. The public

demand and expect accounts of every important meeting, of every

‘ Hotchkiss 0. Oliphant, 2 Hill, 513, per Nelson, Ch. J. And see King v.

Root, 4 “lend. 138, per Walworth, Chancellor.
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ator, and other offenders of like character." And again: "The
act of publication is an adoption of the original calumny, which
must be defended in the same way as if invented by the defendant.
The republication assumes and indorses the truth of the charge,
and when called on by the aggrieved party, the publisher should
be held strictly to the proof. If he chooses to become the indorser
and retailer of private scandal, without taking the trouble to
inquire into the truth of what he publishes, there is no
ground for *complaint if the law, which is as studious to [* 454]
protect the character as the property of a citizen, holds him
to this responsibility. The rule is not 01ily just and wise in itself,
but, if steadily and inflexibly adhered to and applied by courts and
juries, will greatly tend to the promotion of truth, good morals,
and common decency on the part of the press, by inculcating
caution and inquit·y into the truth of charges against private character before they are published and circulated throughout the
community." 1
If this strong condemnatory language were confined to the cases
where private character is dragged before the public for detraction
and abuse, to pander to a depraved appetite for scandal, its propriety and justice and the force of its reasons would be at once
conceded. But a very large proportion of what the newspapers
spread before the public relates to matters of public concern, but
in which, nevertheless, inqividuals figure, and must therefore be
mentioned in any account. To a great extent, also, the information comes from abroad ; the publisher can have no knowledge
concerning it, and no inquiries which he could make would be
likely to give him more definite information, unless he delays the
publication until it ceases to be of value to his readers. Whatever
view the law may take, the public sentiment does not brand the
publisher of a newspaper as libeller, conspirator, or villain, because
the telegraph despatches transmitted to him from all parts of the
world, without any knowledge on his part concerning the facts, are
published in his paper, in reliance upon the prudence, care, and
honesty of those who have charge of the lines of communication,
and whose interest it is to be vigilant and truthful. The public
demand and expect accounts of every important meeting, of every
Hotchkiss "· Oliphant, 2 Hill, 513, per Nelson, Cb. J. And see King v.
Root, 4 'Vend. 13~, per Wal10orlh, Chancellor.
1
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important trial, and of all the events which have a bearing upon
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trade and business, or upon political affairs. It is impossible that

these shall be given in all cases without matters being mentioned

derogatory to individuals; and if the question were a. new one in

the law, it might be worthy of inquiry whether some line of dis-

tinction could not be drawn which would protect the publisher

when giving in good faith such items of news as would be proper,

if true, to spread before the public, and which he gives in the

regular course of his employment, in pursuance of a public demand,

and without any negligence, as they come to him from the

[‘* 455] *usual and legitimate sources, which he has reason to

rely upon; at the same time leaving him liable when he

makes his columns the vehicle of private gossip, detraction, and

malice.

The question, however, is not new, and the authorities have

generally held the publisher of a paper to the same rigid responsi-

bility with any other person who makes injurious communications.

Malice on his part is conclusively inferred, if the communications

are false. It is no defence that they have been copied with or

without comment from another paper;1 or that the source of the

information was stated at the time of the publication ;2 or that the

publication was made in the paper without the knowledge of
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the proprietor, as an advertisement or otherwise;3 or that it

consists in a criticism on the course and character of a candidate

for public office ;'* or that it is a correct and impartial account of a

‘ Hotchkiss v. Oliphant. 2 Hill, 510. Even though they be preceded by the

statement that they are so copied. Sanford 0. Bennett, 24 N. Y. 20.

2 Dole v. Lyon, 10 Johns. 447; Mapes v. Weeks, 4“/end. 659; Inman v.

Foster, 8 Wend. 602; Hotchkiss v. Oliphant, 2 IIill, 514.

3 Andres v. Wells, 7 Johns. 260; Huff v. Bennett, 4 Sandf. 120; Same Case,

6 N. Y. 337; Marten v. Van Schaick, 4 Paige, 479; Commonwealth v. Nichols,

10 llet. 259.

‘ King v. Root, 4 Wend. 113. The action was for a. libel, published in the

“ New York American,” reﬂecting upon Root, who was candidate for lieutenant-

governor. We quote from the opinion of the chancellor: “ It is insisted that

this libel was a. privileged communication. If so, the defendants were under no

obligation to prove the truth of the charge, and the party libelled had no right

important trial, and of all the events which have a bearing upon
trade and business, or upon political affairs. It is impossible that
these shall be given in all cases without matters being mentioned
derogatory to individuals ; and if the question were a new one in
the law, it might be worthy of inquiry whether some line of distinction could not be drawn which would protect the publisher
when giving in good faith such items of news as would be proper,
if true, to spread before the public, and which he gives in the
regular course of his employment, in pursuance of a public demand,
and without any negligence, as they come to him from the
[* 455] • usual aud legitimate.' sources, which he has reason to
rely upon; at the same time leaving him liable when he
makes his columns the vehicle of private gossip, detraction, and
malice.
The question, however, is not new, and the authorities have
generally held the publisher of a paper to the same rigid responsibility with any other person who makes injurious communications.
Malice on his part is conclusively inferred, if the communications
are false. It is no defence that they have/ been copied with or
without comment from another paper; 1 or that the source of the
information was stated at the time of the publication ; 2 or that the
publication was made in the paper without the knowledge of
the proprietor, as an advertisement or otherwise; a or that it
consists in a criticism on the course and character of a candidate
for public office ; ' or that it is a correct and impartial account of a

to recover, unless he established malice in fact, or showed that the editors knew

the charge to be false. The effect of such a doctrine would be deplorable.

Instead of protecting, it would be destroying the freedom of the press, if it

were understood that an editor could publish what he pleased against candidates

for olﬁce, without being answerable for the truth of such publications. N o honest

m _ _-__
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Hotchkiss v. Oliphant. 2 Hill, 510. Even though they be preceded by the
statement that they are so copied. Sanford v. Bennett, 24 N.Y. 20.
11 Dole v. Lyon, 10 Johns. 44 7; Mapes v. Weeks, 4 Wend. 659; Inman v.
Foster, 8 Wend. 602; Hotchkiss 11. Oliphant, 2 Hill, 514.
a Andres "· Wells, 7 Johns. 260 ; Huff v. Bennett, 4 Sandf. 120; Same CMe,
6 N.Y. 337; Marten v. Van Schaick, 4 Paige, 479; Commonwealth v. Nichols,
10 Met. 259.
4 King 1•. Root, 4 Wend. 113.
The action was for a libel, published in the
"New York American," reflecting upon Root, who was candidate for lieutt>nantgovernor. 'Ve quote from the opinion of the chancellor: " It is insisted that
this libel was a privileged communication. If so, the defendants were under no
obligation to prove the truth of the charge, and the party libelled had no right
to recover, unless he established malice in fact, or showed that the editors knew
the eharge to be false. The effect of such a doctrine would be deplorable.
Instead of protecting, it would be destroying the freedom of the press, if it
were understood that an editor could publish what he pleased against candidates
for office, without being answerable for the truth of such publications. No honest
1
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public *meeting,1 or of any proceedings in which the ["‘ 456]

public have an interest, unless they were legislative or

judicial in their character, and where both parties had

opportunity to be heard? Criticisms on "‘ works of art and [* 457]

man could afford to be an editor, and no man who had any character to lose

would be a candidate for office under such a construction of the law of libel.

The only safe rule to adopt in such cases, is to permit editors to publish what

they please in relation to the character and qualiﬁcations of candidates for oﬁice,

but holding them responsible for the truth of what they publish.” Notwithstand-

ing the deplorable consequences here predicted from too great license to the

press, it is matter of daily observation that the press, in its comments upon public

events and public men, proceeds in all respectsas though it were privileged; pub-

lic opinion would not sanction prosecutions by candidates for office for publica-

tions amounting to technical libels, but ‘which were nevertheless published with-

out malice in fact; and the man who has a “ character to lose ” presents himself

for the suifrages of his fellow-citizens in the full reliance that detraction by the

public press will be corrected through the same instrumentality, and that un-

merited abuse will react on the public opinion in his favor. Meantime the press

is gradually becoming more just, liberal, and digniﬁed in its dealings with polit-

ical opponents, and vituperation is much less common, reckless, and bitter now

than it was at the beginning of the century, when repression was more often
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resorted to as a remedy.

' Dawson v. Duncan, 7 El. & Bl. 2'29.

’ Sanford v. Bennett, 24 N. Y. 20. Bennett was sued for publishing in the

“New York Herald ” the speech of a person convicted of murder, made upon the

scaffold as he was about to be executed, and reﬂecting upon the counsel who had

defended him. The principal question in the case was, whether a statute of the

State, passed after the publication but before the trial, was applicable. The

statute privileged any fair’ and true report in a newspaper, of a judicial,.legis-

lative, or other public official proceeding, or statement, speech, argument, or

debate in the course of the same. The court held the statute not applicable,

both because it was not retrospective in its provisions, and therefore could not

apply to publications previously made, and also because this was not any such

proceeding as the statute contemplated. Upon the question whether the pub-

lication was not privileged, independent of the statute, Denio, J., says: “ The

want of legal connection between the words spoken and the proceeding which

was going forward at the same time and place, which has led me to the conclusion

that the statute does not apply, shows that it is not within the reason upon which

the common-law rule is based. That rule assumes that the public may have a

legitimate interest in being made acquainted with the proceedings of courts of

justice and of legislative bodies. The free circulation of such intelligence is of

vast advantage in every country, and particularly here, where all reforms in

legal or administrative polity must proceed from the people at large. But neither

the reason of the rule, nor, as I believe, the rule itself, has any application to a

proceeding in which neither forensic debate nor legislative or administrative de-

liberations or determinations haveany place. \Vhere the proceeding is a mere

act, with which neither oral nor written communications have any thing more than

[501]

public • meeting, 1 or of any proceedings in which the [* 456]
public have an interest, unless they wet·e legislative or
judicial in their character, aud where both parties had
opp01'tunity to be heard. 2 Criticisms on • works of art and [* 457]
man could afford to be an editor, and no man who had any character to lose
woultl be a candidate for office under such a construction of the law of libel.
The only safe rule to adopt in tmch cases, is to permit editors to publish what
they pleMe in relation to the character and qualifications of candidates for office,
but holding them responsible for the truth of what they publish." Notwithstanding the d~plorable consequences here predicted from too great license to the
press, it is matter of daily observation that the press, in its comments upon public
events and public men, proceeds in all respects as though it were privileged; public opinion would not sanction prosecutions by candidates for offiee for publications amounting to technical libels, but which were nevertheless published without malice in fact ; and the man who has a " character to lose" presents himself
for the suffrages of his fellow-citizens in the full reliance that detraction by the
public press will be corrected through the same instrumentality, and that unmerited abuse will react on the public opinion in his favor. Meantime the press
is gradually becoming more just, liberal, and dignified in its dealings with political opponents, and vitu~eration is much less common, re(•kless, and bitter now
than it was at the beginning of the century, when repression was more often
resorted to as a remedy.
1 Dawson v. Duncan, 7 El. & Bl. 229.
2 Sanford v. Bennett, 24 N. Y. 20.
Bennett was sued for publishing in the
"New York Herald " the 8peech of a person convicted of mnrder, mntle upon the
scaffold as he was about to be executed, and reflecting upon the counsel who had
defended him. The principal question in the case was, whether a statute of the
State, passed after the publication but before the trial, was applicable. The
statute privileged any fair. and true report in a newspaper, of a judicial, .legislative, or other public official proceeding, or statement, speech, argument, or
debate in the course of the same. The court held the statute not applicable,
both because it was not retrospective in its provisions, and therefore could not
apply to publieations previously made, and also because this was not any such
proceeding as the statute contemplated. Upon the question whether the publication was not privileged, independent of the statute, Dtmio, J., says: "The
want of legal connection between the words spoken and the proceeding which
was going forward at the same time and place, which has led me to the conclusion
that the statute does not apply, shows that it is not within the reason upon which
the common-law rule is based. That rule assumes that tbe public may have a
legitimate interest in being made acquainted with the proceedings of courts of
justice and of legislative bodies. The free circulation of such intelligence is of
vast advantage in every country, and particularly here, where all reforms in
legal or administrative polity must proceed from the people at large. But neither
the reason of the rule, nor, as I belie~e, the rule itself, has any application to a
proceeding in which neither forensic debate nor legiMlative or administrative deliberations or determinations have any place. 'Vhere the proceeding is a mere
act, with which neither oral nor written communications have any thing more than
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literary productions are allowable, if fair, reasonable, and tem-

perate; but the artist or author is not to be criticised through

his works, and his personal character is not made the property of

the public by his publications.1 For further privilege it would seem

that publishers of news must appeal to the protection of public

opinion, or they must call upon the legislature for such modiﬁca-

tion of the law as may seem important to their just protection.

The publisher of a newspaper, however, though responsible for

all the actual damage which a party may suffer in consequence of

injurious publications in his paper, cannot properly be made liable

for exemplary or vindictive damages, where the article complained

of was inserted in his paper without his personal knowledge, and

he has been guilty of no negligence in the selection of agents, or of

personal misconduct, and is not shown habitually to make his paper

the vehicle of detraction and malice.”

an accidental or fortuitous connection, there is no room for the application of the

doctrine of privilege to whatever may be spoken or written at the time and place

where and when it is transpiring. Such transactions are subject to be reported,

described, and published in newspapers or otherwise, like other affairs in which

individuals and communities feel a curiosity, and with the same liability attaching

to the publisher to answer for any injury which may happen to the character of

literary productions are allowable, if fair, reasonable, and temperate; but the artist or author is not to be criticised through
his works, and his personal character is not made the property of
the public by his publications. 1 For further privilege it would seem
that publishers of news must appeal to the protection of public
opinion, or they must call upon the legislatu.re for such modification of the law as may seem important to their just protection.
The publisher of a newspaper, however, though responsible for
all the actual damage which a party may suffer in consequence of
injurious publications in his paper, cannot properly be made liable
for exemplary or vindictive damages, where the article complained
of was inserted in his paper without his personal knowledge, and
he has been guilty of no negligence in the selection of agents, or of
personal misconduct, and is not shown habitually to make his paper
the vehicle of detraction and malice. 2
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individuals if, in the course of such publications, libcllous imputations are applied

to any one. It is of course perfectly lawful to publish all the circumstances

attending a public execution, including the dying speech of the male-factor; but

it is a necessary condition of that right, that if scandalous imputations are used

by the culprit or anyone else which are untrue, he who publishes them afterwards

must be responsible for the wrong and injury thereby occasioned to the person

attacked.” Mason, J ., in the same case gives a reason for concurring in the

conclusion of the court, which seems to us to possess some force, intlepcndcnt of

the question of privilege. It is that the provisions of law then in force, re-

quiring capital executions to be within the walls of the prison, or in an adjoining

inclosure, and excluding all spectators with limited exceptions, must be regarded

as indicating a legislative policy adverse to the publicity of what passes on such

occasions.

‘ The libel suits brought by J . Fennimore Cooper may be usefully consulted in

this connection. Cooper v. Stone, 24 Wend. 434; Cooper v. Barber, 24 Wen'd.

105; Cooper v. Greeley, 1 Denio, 347; Stone v. Cooper, 2 Denio, 293. As to

criticisms on public entertainments, see Fry v. Bennett, 5 Sandf. 54, and :28

N. Y. 324; Dibdin v. Swan, 1 Esp. 28; Green v. Chapman, 4 Bing. (N. C.) 92.

As to how far sermons, preached, but not otherwise published, form a proper

subject for comment and criticism by the public press, see Gathercole 0. Miall,

15 M. & IV. 3l8.

' Daily Post Co. v. McArthur, and Detroit Free Press v. Same, 16 Mich.

447.
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an accidental or fortuitous connection, there is no room for the application of the
doctrine of privilege to whatever may be spoken or written at the time and place
where and when it is transpiring. Such transactions are subject to be reported,
described, and published in newspapers or otherwise, like other affairs in which
individuals and communities feel a curiosity, and with the same liability attaching
to the publisher to answer for any injury which may happt>n to the character of
individuals if, in the course of such publications, libellous imputations are applied
to any one. It is of course perfectly lawful to publish all the cireumstances
attending a public execution, including the dying speech of the mah:factor; but
it is a necessary condition of that right, that if scandalous imputations are used
by the culprit or any one else which are untrue, he who publishes them afterwards
must be responsible for the wrong and injury thereby oc<·asioned to the person
attacked." .Mll8on, J., in the same case gives a reason for concurring in the
('Onclusion of the court, which setJms to us to possess some force, indept-ndent of
the question of privilege. It is that the provisions of law then in force, requiring capital executions to be within the walls of the pris:.m, or in an adjoining
inclosure, and excluding all spectators with limited exceptions, must be regaracd
as indicating a legislative policy adverse to the publicity of what passes on such
occasions.
1 The libel suits brought by J. }'ennimore Cooper may be usefully consulted in
this connection. Cooper v. Stone, 24 Wend. 434; Cooper"· Barber, 2~ Wend.
105; Cooper v. Grellley, 1 Denio, 347; Stone "· Cooper, 2 Denio, 293. As to
criticisms on publie entertainments, see Fry v. Bennett, 5 Sandf. 54, and 28
N.Y. 324; Dibdin v. Swan, 1 Esp. 28; Green v. Chapman, 4 Bing. (N.C.) 92.
As to how far sermons, preached, but not otherwise published, form a proper
subject for comment and criticism by the public press, see Gatbercole v• .Miall,
15M. & W. 318.
1 Daily Post Co. v. McArthur, and Detroit Free Preu "· Same, 16 Mich.
447.
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Publication of Legislative Proceedings.

LIBERTY OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS.

CH. XII.]

• 457

Although debates, reports, and other proceedings in legislative

bodies are privileged, it does not seem to follow that the publication

of them is always equally privileged. The English decisions do

Publication of Legislative Proceedings.

not place such publications on any higher ground of right than any

other communication through the public press. A member of

Parliament, it is said, has a right to publish his speech,but it must

not be made the vehicle of slander against any individual, and if it

is, it is a libel.‘ And in another case: “A member of

[* the House of Commons] has spoken what he thought [* 458]

material, and what he was at liberty to speak, in his char-

acter as a member of that house. So far he is privileged ; but he

has not stopped there, but, unauthorized by the house, has chosen

to publish an account of that speech, in what he has pleased to call

a corrected form, and in that publication has thrown out reflections

injurious to the character of an individual.” And he was convicted

and fined for the libel.“ 5

Thecircumstance that the publication was unauthorized by the

house was alluded to in this opinion, but the rule of law would

seem to be unaffected by it, since it was afterwards held that an

order of the house directing a report made to it to be published did

not constitute any protection to the official printer, who had
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published it in the regular course of his duty, in compliance with

such order. All the power of the house was not suﬁicient to

protect its printer in obeying the order tounake this publication;

and a statute was therefore passed to protect in the future persons

publishing parliamentary reports, votes, or other proceedings by

order of either house.”

‘ Rex v. Lord Abington, 1 Esp. 226. In this case the defendant was ﬁned,

imprisoned, and required to ﬁnd security for his good behavior, for a libel con-

tained in a speech made by him in Parliament, and afterwards published.

’ Rex v. Creevey, 1 M. & S. 278.

3 Stat. 3 and 4 Victoria, c. 9. The case was that of Stockdale v. Hansard,

very fully reported in 9 Al. & El. 1. Sec also ll Al. & El. 253. The Messrs.

Hansard were printers to the House of Commons, and had printed by order of

that house the report of the inspectors of prisons, in which a book, published by

Stockdale, and found among the prisoners in Newgate, was described as obscene

and indecent. Stockdale brought an action against the printers for libel, and

recovered judgment. Lord Denman, presiding on the trial, said that “ the fact
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Although debates, reports, and other proceedings in legislatiye
bodies are privileged, it does not seem to follow that the publication
of them is always equally privileged. The English decisions do
not place such publications on any higher ground of right than any
other communication through the public press. A member of
Parliament, it is said, has a right to publish his speech, but it must
not be made the vehicle of slander against any individual, and if it
is, it is a libel. 1 And in another case: "A member of
[* the House of Commons] has spoken what he thought [* 458]
material, and what he was at liberty to speak, in his character as a member of that house. So far he is privileged ; but he
has not stopped there, but, unauthorized by the house, has chosen
to publish an account of that speech, in what he has pleased to call
a corrected form, and in that publication has thrown out reflections
injurious to the character of an iridividual." And he was convicted
and fined for the libel.2
The circumstance that the publication was unauthorized by the
house was alluded to in this opinion, but the rule of law would
seem to be unaffected by it, since it was afterwards held that an
order of the house directing a report made to it to be published did
not constitute any p•·otection to the official printer, who had
published it in the regular course of his duty, in compliance with
such order. All the power of the house was not sufficient to
protect its printer in obeying the order to'make this publication;
and a statute was therefore passed to protect in the future persons
publishing parliamentary reports, votes, or other proceedings by
order of either house.s
Rex v. Lord Abington, 1 Esp. 226. In this case the defendant was fined,
imprisoned, and required to find security for his good behavior, for a libel contained in a speech made by him in Parliament, and afterwards published.
1 Rex v. Creevey, 1 M. & S. 278.
3 Stat. 3 and 4 Victoria, c. 9.
The case was that of Stockdale v. Hansard,
very fully reported in 9 AI. & EJ. 1. Sec also 11 AI. & EJ. ~.)3. The Messrs.
Hansard were printers to the House of Commons, and had printed by order of
that house the report of the inspectors of prisons, in which a book, published by
Stockdale, and found among the prisoners in Newgate, was described as obscene
and indecent. Stockdale brought an action against the printers for libel, and
recovered judgment. Lord Denman, presiding on the trial, said that " the fact
1

'
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[“ 459] * It has been intimated, however, that what a representa-

• 459

CONSTITUTIONAL LIIIITATIONS.

(CH.

m.

tive is privileged to address to the house of which he is a

of the House of Commons having directed Messrs. Hansard to publish all their

parliamentary reports is no justiﬁcation for them, or for any bookseller who

publishes any parliamentary report containing a libel against any man." The

[• 459]

• It has been intimated, however, that what a representative is privileged to address to the house of which he is a

house resented this opinion and resolved, " that the power of publishing such of

its reports, votes, and proceedings as it shall deem necessary or conducive to the

public interests is an essential incident to the constitutional functions of Parlia-

ment, more especially of this house as the representative portion of it.” They

also resolved that for any person to institute a suit in order to call its privileges

in question, or for any court to decide upon matters of privilege inconsistent

with the determination of either house, was a breach of privilege. "Stockdale,

however, brought other actions, and again recovered. When he sought to

enforce these judgments by executions, his solicitor and himself were proceeded

against for contempt of the house, and imprisoned. While in prison. Stockdale

commenced a further suit. The sheriffs, who had been ordered by the House of

Commons to restore the money which they had collected, were, on the other

hand, compelled by attachments from the Queen's Bench to pay it over to Stock-

dale. In this complicated state of affairs, the proper and digniﬁed mode of

relieving the difﬁculty by the passage of a statute making such publications privi-

leged for the future was adopted. For an account of this controversy, in addition

to what appears in the law reports, see May, Law and Practice of Parliament,
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156-1-59, 2d ed.; May, Constitutional History, c. 7. A case in some respects

similar to that of Stockdale v‘. Hansard is that of Popham v. Pickburn, 7 Hurl.

& Nor. 891. The defendant, the proprietor of a newspaper, was sued for

publishing a report made by a medical ofiicer of health to a vestry board, in

pursuance of the statute, and which reﬂected severely upon the conduct of the

plaintiff. The publication was made without any comment, and as a part of

the proceedings of the vestry board. It was held not to be privileged, notwith-

standing the statute provided for the publication of the report by the vestry

board, —which, however, had not yet been made. Wilde, B., delivering the

opinion of the court, said: “ The defendant has published that of the plaintiff

which is undoubtedly a libel, and which is untrue. He seeks to protect himself

on the ground that the publication is a correct report of a document read at a

meeting of the Clerkenwell vestry, which document must have been published

and sold at a small price by the vestry in a short time. But we are of opinion

this furnishes no defence. Undoubtedly the report ofa trial in a court ofjustice

in which this document had been read would not make the publisher thereof

liable to an action for libel. and reasonably, for such reports only extend that

publicity which is so important a feature of the administration of the law in

England, and thus enable to be witnesses of it not merely the few whom the

court can hold, but the thousands who can read the reports. But no case has

decided that the reports of what takes place at the meeting of such a body as

this vestry are so privileged; indeed the case cited in the argument [Rex v.

Wright, 8 T. R. 293] is an authority that they are not. Then, is the publication

justified by the statute? It is true that the document would have been accessible

to the public in a short time, though not published by the defendant; but this
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of the House of Commons ·having directed Messrs. Hansard to publish all their
parliamentary reports is no justification for them, or for any bookseller who
publishes any parliamentary report containing a libel against any man." The
hou~e resented this opinion and resolved, " that the power of publishing such of
ita reports, votes, and proceedings as it shall deem necessary or conducive to the
public interests is an essential incident to the constitutional functions of Parliament, more especially of this bouse as th,e representative portion of it." They
also rt-solved that for any person to institute a suit in order to call its privileges
in question, or for any court to decide upon matters of privilege in<..-onsistent
with the determination of either house, was a breach of privilege. ·Stockdale,
however, brought other actions, and again recovered. When be sought to
enforce these judgments by executions, his solicitor and himself were proceeded
against for contempt of the house, and imprisoned. While in prison, Stockdale
commenced a furt.her suit. The sheriffs, who had been ordered by the House of
Commons to restore the money which they had collected, were, on the other
band, compelled by attachments from the Queen's Bench to pay it over to Stockdale. In this complicated state of affairs, the proper and dignified mode of
relieving the difficulty by the passage of a statute making such publications privileged for the future was adopted. For an account of this controversy, in addition
to what appears in the law reports, see May, Law and Practice of Parliament,
166-159, 2d ed.; May; Conbtitutional History, c. 7. A case in some respects
similar to that of Stockdale v·. Hansard is that of Popham v. Pickburn, 7 Hurl.
& Nor. 891. The defendant, the proprietor of a newspaper, was sued for
publishing a report made by a medical officer of health to a vestry board, in
pursuance of the statute, and which reflected severely upon the conduct of the
plaintiff. The publication was made without any comment, and as a part of
the proceedings of the vestry board. It was held not to be privileged, notwithstanding the ~t:tute provided f'Gr the publication of the report by the vestry
board,- which, however, had not yet been made. Wilde, B., delivering the
opinion of the court, said: " The defendant has published that of the plaintiff
which is undoubtedly a libel, and which is untrue. He seeks to protect hitnself
on the ground that the publication is a correct report of a document read at a
meeting of the Clerkenwell vestry, which document must have been published
and sold at a small price by the vestry in a short time. But we are of opinion
this furnishes no defence. Undoubtedly the report of a trial in a court of justice
in which this document had been read would not make the publisher thereof
liable to an action for libel, and reasonably, for such reports only extend that
publicity which is so important a feature of the administration of the law in
England, and thus enable to be witnesses of it not merely the few whom the
court can hold, but the thousands who can read the reports. But no case baa
decided that the reports of what takes place at the meeting of such a body as
this vestry are so privileged ; indeed the case cited in the argument [Rex "·
Wright, 8 T. R. 29~] is an authority that they are not. Then, is the publi('ation
justified by the statute? It is true that the document would have been accessible
to the public in a short time, though not published by the defendant; but this
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member, he is also privileged to address to his constituents; and

ca. xn.J

LIBERTY OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS.

that the bona ﬁde publication for that purpose of his speech in the

house is protected.‘ And the practice in this country

appears to proceed on * this idea; the speeches and [* 460]

proceedings in Congress being fully reported by the press,

and the exemption of the member from being called to account for

his speech being apparently supposed to extend to its publication

also. When complete publicity is thus practised, perhaps every

speech published should be regarded as addressed bone ﬁde by the

representative, not only to the house, but also to his constituents.

But whether that view be taken or not, if publication is provided

for by law, as in the case of Congressional debates, the publishing

must be considered as privileged.

The Jury as Judges of the Law.

In a considerable number of the State constitutions it provided

that, in prosecutions for libel, the jury shall have a right to deter-

mine the law and the fact. In some it is added, “as in other

cases;” in others, “under the direction of the court.” For the

necessity of these provisions we must' recur to the rulings of

the English judges in the latter half of the last century, and the

member, he is also privileged to address to his constituents; and
that the bona fide publication for that purpose of his speech in the
house is protected. 1 And the practice in this country
appears to proceed on • this idea; the speeches and [* 460]
proceedings in Congress being fully reported by the press,
and the exemption of the member from being called to account for
his speech heing apparently supposed to extend to its publication
also. When complete publicity is thus practised, perhaps every
speech published should be regarded as addressed bona fide by the
representative, not only to the house, but also to h;s constituents.
But whether that view be taken or not, if publication is provided
for by law, as in the case of Congressional debates, the publishing
must be considet·ed as privileged.

memorable contest in the courts and in Parliament, resulting at

last in the passage of Mr. Fox’s Libel Act, declaratory of the rights

T!te Jury as Judges of the Law.
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of juries in prosecutions for libel. ’ .

In the year 1770, Woodfall, the printer of the “ Morning Adver-

cannot justify his anticipating the publication, and giving it a wider circulation,

and possibly without an answer which the vestry might have received in some

subsequent report or otherwise, and which would then have been circulated with

the libel. This defence therefore fails.

“ It was further contended that this libel might be justified as a matter of

public discussion on a subject of public interest. The answer is: This is not a

discussion or comment. It is the statement of a fact. To charge a man incor-

rectly with a disgraceful act is very different from commenting on a fact relating

to him truly stated; there the writer may, by his opinion, libel himself rather

than the subject of his remarks.

“ It is to be further observed that this decision does not determine or affect

the question whether, after the statutory publication, it might or might not be

competent to others to republish these reports, with or without reasonable com-

ments.”

In a considerable number of the State constitutions it provided
that, in prosecutions for libel, the jury shall have a right to determine the law and the fact. In some it is added, "as in other
cases;" in others, "under. the direction of the court." For the
necessity of these provisions we must· recur to the rulings of
the English judges in tho latter half of the last century, -and the
memorable contest in the courts and in Pat·liament, resulting at
last in the passage of Mr. Fox's Libel Act, declaratory of the rights
of juries in prosecutions for libel.
In the year 1770, Woodfall, the printer of the " Morning Adver-

' Lives of Chief Justices, by Lord Campbell, Vol. III. p. 167; Davison v.

Duncan, 7 El. & Bl. 229, 233.
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cannot justify his antieipating the publication, and giving it a wider circulation,
and pos8ibly without an answer which the vestry might have received in ~ome
subst·quent rt>port or otherwise, and whieh would then have been circulated with
the libel. This defence therefore fails.
" It was further contended that this libel might be justified as a matter of
public diseus~ion on a subject of public interest. The answer is: This is not a
discussion or comment. It is the statement of a fact. To charge a man incorrectly with a disgraceful act is very different from commenting' on a fact relating
to him truly stated; there the writer may, by his opinion, libel himself rather
than the subject of his remarks.
"It is to be further observed that this decision does not determine or affect
the IJUestion whether, after the statutory publication, it might or might not be
compelent to others to republish these reports, with or without reasonable comments."
1 Lh·es of Chief Justices, by Lord Campbell, Vol. Ill. p. 167; Davison "·
Duncan, 7 El. & Bl. 229, 233.
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tiser,” was tried before Lord Mansﬁeld for having published in his

paper what was alleged to be a libel on the king; and his lordship

told the jury that all they had to consider was, whether the

defendant had published the paper set out in the information, and

whether the innuendoes, imputing a particular meaning to particu-

lar words were true, as that “the K-—” meant his Majesty

King George III. ; but that they were not to consider whether the

publication was, as alleged in the information, false and malicious,

those being mere formal words; and that whether the letter was

libellous or innocent was a pure question of law, upon which the

opinion of the court might be taken by a demurrer or a motion in

arrest of judgment. His charge obviously required the jury, if

satisﬁed the publication was made, and had the meaning attributed

to it, to render a verdict of guilty, whether they believed the pub-

lication false and malicious or not; in other words, to convict the

party of guilt, notwithstanding they might believe the essential

element of criminality to be wanting. The jury, dissatisﬁed with

these instructions, and unwilling to make their verdict

[" 461] cover ‘matters upon which they were not at liberty to

exercise their judgment, returned a verdict of “guilty

of printing and publishing only,” but this the court afterwards

rejected as ambiguous, and ordered a new trial} '
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In Miller’s case, which was tried the same year, Lord Zlfansﬁeld

instructed the jury as follows: “ The direction I am going to give

you is with a full conviction and conﬁdence that it is the language

of the law. If you by your verdict ﬁnd the defendant not guilty,

the fact established by that verdict is, he did not publish a paper

of that meaning; that fact is established, and there is an end of the

prosecution. You are to try the fact, because your verdict estab-

lishes that fact, that he did not publish it. If you ﬁnd that,

according to your judgment, your verdict is ﬁnal, and if you ﬁnd

it otherwise, it is between God and your consciences, for that is the

basis upon which all verdicts ought to be founded; then the fact

ﬁnally established by your verdict, ifyou ﬁnd him guilty, is, that he

printed and published a paper of the tenor and of the meaning set

forth in the information ; that is the only fact ﬁnally established by

your verdict; and whatever fact is ﬁnally established never can be

controvertcd in any shape whatever. But you do not by that

‘ 20 State Trials, 895.
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tiser," was tried before Lord Mansfield for having published in his .
paper what was alleged to be a libel on the king; and his lordship
told the jury that all they had to consider waR, whether the
defendant had published the paper set out in the information, and
whether the innuendoes, imputing a particular meaning to particular words were true, as that " the K - - " meant his Majeaty
King George III. ; but that they were not to consider whether the
publication was, as alleged in the information, false and malicious,
those being mere formal words; and that whether the letter was
libellous or innocent was a pure question of law, upon which the
opinion of the court might be taken by a demurrer or a motion in
arrest of judgment. His charge obYiously required the jury, if
satisfied the publication was made, and had the meaning attributed
to it, to render a verdict of guilty, whether they belieYed the publication false and malicious or not ; in other words, to convict the
party of guilt, notwithstanding they might believe the eRsential
element of criminality to be wantiug. The jury, dissatisfied with
these instructions, a.nd unwilling to make their verdict
[• 461] cover • matters upon which they were not at liberty to
exercise their judgment, returned a Yerdict of "guilty
of printing and publishing only," but this the court afterwards
rejectca as amhiguons, and ordet·ed a new tt-ial.1
In Miller's case, which was tried the same year, Lord "jfansfield
instructed the jury as follows: "The direction I am going to giYe
you is with a full conviction and confidence that it is the language
of the law. If you by your verdict find the defendant not guilty,
the fact established by that verdict is, he did not publish a paper
of that meaning; that fact is established, and there is an end of the
. prosecution. You are to try the fact, because your verdict estaOlishes that fact, that he did not publish it. If you find that,
according to your judgment, your verdict is final, and if you find
it otherwise, it is between God and your consciences, for that is the
basis upon which all verdicts ought to be founded; then the fact
finally established by your verdict, if you find him guilty, is, that he
printed and published a paper of the tenor and of the meaning set
forth in the information; that is the only fact finally established by
your verdict; and whatever fact is finally established never can be
controver·ted in any shape whatever. But you do not by that
1
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20 State Trials, 895.
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verdict give an opinion, or establish whether it is or not lawful to

LIBERTY OF SPEECH .AND OF THE PRESS.

print or publish a paper of the tenor and meaning in the informa-

tion; for, supposing the defendant is found guilty, and the paper

is such a paper as by the law of the land may be printed and

published, the defendant has a right to have judgment respited, and

to have it carried to the highest court of judicature.” 1

Whether these instructions were really in accordance with the

law of England, it would be of little importance now to inquire.

They were assailed as not only destructive to the liberty of the

press, but as taking from the jury that right to cover by their verdict

all the matter charged and constituting the alleged offence, as it

was conceded was their right in all other cases. In no other case

could the jury be required to ﬁnd a criminal intent which they did

not believe to exist. In the House of Lords they were assailed by

Lord Chatham ; and Lord Camden, the Chief Justice of the Common

Pleas, in direct contradiction to Lord Mansﬁeld, declared

his instructions not to be the law ‘of England. "‘Never- [' 462]

theless, with the judges generally the view of Lord Mans-

ﬁeld prevailed, and it continued to be enforced for more thap

twenty years, so far as juries would suffer themselves to be

controlled by the directions of the courts.

The act known as Mr. Fox’s Libel Act was passed in 1792
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against the protest of Lord Thurlow and ﬁve other lords. who pre-

dicted from it “the confusion and destruction of the law of England.”

It was entitled “ An act to remove doubts respecting the functions

of juries in cases of libel,” and it declared and enacted that the

jury might give a general verdict of guilty or not guilty, upon the

whole matter put in issue upon the indictment or information, and

should not be required or directed by the court or judge before

whom it should be tried to ﬁnd the defendant guilty, merely on

the proof of the publication of the paper charged to be a libel, and

of the sense ascribed to the same in the indictment or information:

Provided, that on every such trial the court or judge before whom

it should be tried should, according to their discretion, give their

opinion and direction to the jury on the matter in issue, in like

manner as in other criminal cases: Provided also, that nothing

therein contained should prevent the jury from ﬁnding a special

‘ 20 State Trials, 870. For an ‘account of the raising of the same question

in Pennsylvania, so early as 1692, see The Forum, by David Paul Brown, Vol. I.

p. 280.
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verdict give an opinion, or establish whether it is or not lawful to
print or publish a. paper of the tenor and meaning in the information ; for, supposing the defendant is found guilty, and the paper
is such a paper as by the law of the land may be printed and
published, the defendant has a. right to have judgment respited, and
to have it carried to the highest court of judicature." 1
Whether these instructions were really in accordance with the
law of England, it would be of little importance now to inquire.
They were assailed as not only destructive to the liberty of the
press, but as taking from the jury that right to cover by their verdict
all the matter charged and constituting the alleged offence, as it
was conceded was their right in all other cases. In uo other case
could the jury be requi1·ed to find a criminal intent which they did
not believe to exist. In the House of Lords they were assailed by
Lord Gltatham; and Lord Camden, the Chief Justice of the Common
Pleas, in direct contradiction to Lord Mansfield, declared
his instructions not to be the law -of England. • Never- [• 462]
theless, with the judges generally the view of Lord Mansfield prevailed, and it continued to be euforced for more tba!l
twenty years, so far as juries would suffer themselves to be
controlled by the directions of the courts.
The act known as Mr. Fox's Libel Act was passed in 1792
agaiust the protest of Lord Thurlow and five other lords. who predicted from it" the confusion and destruction of the law of England."
It was entitled "An act to remove doubts respecting the functions
of juries in cases of libel," and it declared and enacted that the
jury might give a general verdict of guilty or not guilty, upon the
whole matter put in issue upon the indictment or information, and
should not be required or directed by the court or judge before
whom it should be tried to find the defendant guilty, merely on
the proof of the publication of the paper charged to be a libel, and
of the sense ascribed to the same in the indictment or information:
Provided, that on every such trial the court or judge before whom
it should be tried should, according to their discretion, give their
opinion and direction to the jury on the matter in issue. in like
manner as in other criminal cases: Provided also, that nothing
therein contained should prevent the jnry from finding a special
1 20 State Trials, 870.
For an ·account of the raising of the same question
in Pennsylvania, so early as 1G9:?, see The Forum, by Da\'id Paul Brown, Vol. I.
p. 280.

[ 507]

"‘ 462 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [cr1. xn.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

verdict in their discretion, as in other criminal cases: Provided

[CH. XII.

also, that in case the jury should ﬁnd the defendant guilty, he

might move in arrest of judgment on such ground and in such

manner as by law he might have done before the passing of the

act. _

Whether this statute made the jury the rightful judges of the

law as well as of the facts in libel cases, or whether, on the other

hand, it only placed these cases on the same footing as other crim-

inal prosecutions, leaving it the duty of the jury to accept and

follow the instructions of the judge upon the criminal character of

the publication, are questions upon which there are still differ-

ences of opinion. Its friends have placed the former construction

upon it, while others adopt the opposite view}

In the United States the disposition of the early judges was to

adopt the view of Lord llfunsﬁeld as a correct exposition of the

respective functions of court and jury in cases of libel; and on the

memorable trial of Callendar, which led to the impeachment of

Judge Chase of the United States Supreme Court, the

[* 463] right of the "*jury to judge of the law was the point in

dispute upon which that judge ﬁrst delivered his opinion,

and afterwards invited argument. The charge there was of libel

upon President Adams, and was prosecuted under the Sedition
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Law so called, which expressly provided that the jury should have

the right to determine the law and the fact, under the direction of

the court, as in other cases. The defence insisted that the Sedi-

tion Law was unconstitutional and void, and proposed to argue that

question to the jury, but were stopped by the court. The question

of the constitutionality of a statute, it was said by Judge Chase,

was a judicial question, and could only be passed upon by the

court; the jury might determine the law applicable to the case

under the statute, but they could not inquire into the validity of

the statute by which that right was given?

Whatever may be the true import of Mr. Fox’s Libel Act, it

would seem clear that a constitutional provision which allows the

jury to determine the law refers the questions of law to them for

their rightful decision. Wherever such provisions exist, the jury,

we think, are the judges of the law ; and the argument of counsel

‘ Compare Forsyth on Trial by Jury, c. 12, with l\Iay’s Constitutional History

of England, c. 9.

_ ’ Wharton’s State Trials, 688.
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verdict in their discretion, as in other criminal cases : Prov£ded
also, that in case the jury should find the defendant guilty, he
might move in arrest of judgment on such ground and in such
manner as by law he- might have done before the passing of the
act.
Whether this statute made the jury the rightful jud!!es of the
law as well as of the facts in libel cases, or whether, on the other
hand, it only placed these cases on the same footing as other criminal prosecutions, leaving it the duty of the jury to accept and
follow the instructions of the judge upon the criminal character of
the publication, are questions upon which there are still differences of opinion. Its friends have placed the former construction
upon it, while others adopt the opposite view.l
In the United States the disposition of the early judges was to
adopt the view of Lord Jl:fanBjield as a correct exposition of the
respective functions of court and jury in cases of libel ; and on the
memorable trial of Callendar, which led to the impeachment of
Judge Chase of the United States Supreme Court, the
[* 463] right of the • jury to judge of the law was the point in
dispute upon which that judge first delivered his opinion,
and afterwards invited argument. The charge there was of libel
upon President Adams, and was prosecuted under the Sedition
Law so called, which expressly provided that the jury shonld have
the right to determine the law and the fact, under the direction of
the court, as in other cases. The defence insisted that the Sedition Law was unconstitutional and void, and proposed to argue that
question to the jury, but were stopped by the court. The question
of the constitutionality of a statute, it was said by Judge Ollase,
was a judicial question, and could only be passed upon by the
court; the jury might determine the law applicable to the case
under the statute, but they could not inquire into the validity of
the statute by which that right was given. 2
Whatever may be the true import of Mr. Fox's Libel Act, it
would seem clear that a constitutional provision which allows the
jury to determine the law refers the questions of law to them for
their rig~1tful decision. Wherever such provisions exist, the jury,
we thiuk, are the judges of the law; and the argument of counsel
1 Compare Forsyth on T1ial by Jury, c. 12, with May's Constitutional History
of England, c. 9.
• Wharton's State Trials, 688.
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Nor can the distinction be maintained which was taken by Judge

Chase, and which forbids the jury considering questions affecting

the constitutional validity of statutes. When the question before

them is, what is the law of the case, the highest and paramount

law of the case cannot be shut from view. Nevertheless, we con-

ceive it to be proper and indeed the duty of the judge to instruct

the jury upon the law in these cases, and it is to be expected that

they will generally adopt and follow his opinion.

Where, however, the constitution provides that they shall be

judges of the law “as in other cases,” or may determine the law

and the fact “ under the direction of the court,” we must perhaps

conclude that the intention has been simply to put libel cases on

the same footing with any other criminal prosecutions} and that

the jury will be expected to receive the law from the court.

"' “Good Motives and Justtﬁable Ends.” ["‘ 464]

In civil suits to recover damages for slander or libel, the truth

is generally a complete defence, if pleaded and established.” In

criminal prosecutions it was formerly ‘not so. The basis of‘ the

prosecution being that the libel was likely to disturb the peace

and order of society, that liability was supposed to be all the

greater if the injurious charges were true, as a man would be
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more likely to commit a breach of the peace when the matters

upon it is rightfully addressed to both the court and the jury.
Nor can the distinction be maintained which was taken by Judge
Cltase, and which forbids the jury considering questions affecting
the constitutional validity of statutes. When the question before
them is, what is the law of the case, the highest and paramount
law of the case cannot be shut from view. Nevertheless, we conceive it to be proper and indeed the duty of the judge to instruct
the jury upon the law in these cases, and it is to be expected that
they will generally adopt and follow his opinion.
Where, however, the constitution provides that they shall be
judges of the law "as in other cases," or may determine the law
and the fact " under the direction of the court," we must perhaps
couclude that the intention has been simply to put libel cases on
the same footing with any other criminal prosecutions,1 and that
the jury will be expected to receive the law from the court.

alleged against him were true than if they were false, in which

latter case he might, perhaps, afford to treat them with contempt.

Hence arose the common maxim, “The greater the truth the

1 “ By the last clause of the sixth section of the eighth article of the Consti-

• "Good Motives and Justifiable Ends."

[* 464]

tution of this State, it is declared that, in all indictments for libel, the jury shall

have the right to determine the law and the facts iinder the direction of the court

as in other cases. It would seem from this that the framers of our Bill of Rights

did not imagine that juries were rightfully judges of the law and fact in criminal

cases, independently of the directions of courts. Their right to judge of the

law is a right to be exercised only under the direction of the courts; and if they

go aside from that direction and determine the law incorrectly, they depart from

their duty, and commit a public wrong; and this in criminal as well as in civil

cases.” Montgomery 0. State, 11 Ohio, 427. See also State o. Allen, 1 McCord,

525.

' Foss v. Hildreth, 10 Allen, 76. See ante, 455.
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In civil suits to recover damages for slander or libel, the truth
is generally a complete defence, if pleaded and established.2 In
criminal prosecutions it was formerly ·not so. The basis of the
prosecution being that the libel was likely to disturb the peace
and order of society, that liability was supposed to be all the
greater if the injurious charges were true, as a man would be
more likely to commit a breach of the peace when the matters_
alleged against him wm·e true than if they were false, in which
latter case he might, perhaps, afford to treat them with contempt.
Hence arose the common maxim, "The greater the truth the
1 " By the last clause of the sixth section of the eighth article of the Constitution of this State, it is deelared that, in all indictments for libel, the jury shall
have the right to determine the law and the facts under the direction of the court
as in other cases. It would seem from this that the framers of our Bill of Rights
did not imagine that juries were rightfully judges of the law and fact in criminal
cases, independently of the directions of courts. Their right to judge of the
law is a right to be exercised only under the direction of the courts ; and if they
go aside from that diredion and determine the law incorrectly, they depart from
their duty, and commit a public wrong; and this in criminal as well as in civil
cases.'' Montgomery v. State, 11 Ohio, 427. See also State v. Allen, 1 McCord,
625.
1 Foss v. l:lild;eth, 10 Allen, 76.
See ante, 455.

[ 509]

* 464 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.‘ [can xn.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.•

greater the libel,” which subjected the law on this subject to a

[cH. :xn.

great deal of ridicule and contempt. The constitutional provisions

we have quoted generally make the truth a defence if published

with good motives and for justifiable ends. Precisely what showing

shall establish good motives and justiﬁable occasion must be settled

by future decisions. In one case the suggestion was thrown out

that proof of the truth of the charge alone might be suﬁicient) but

this was not an authoritative decision, and it could not be true in

any case where the matter published was not ﬁt to be spread before

the public, whether true or false. It must be held. we think, that

where the defendant justifies in a criminal prosecution, the burden

is upon him to prove, not only the truth of the charge, but also

the “ good motives and justifiable ends ” of the publication.

These might appear from the very character of the publication

itself, if it was true; as where it exhibited the misconduct or unﬁt»

ness of a candidate for public oﬁice; but where it related

["‘ 465] to a *‘ person in private life, and who was himself taking

no such action as should put his character in issue before

the public, some further showing would generally be requisite after

the truth had been proved? ‘ ,

' Charge of Judge Belts to the jury in King v. Root, 4 \Vcnd. 121 : “ Should

the scope of proofs and circumstances lead you to suppose the defendants had
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no good end in contemplation, that they were instigated to these charges solely to

avenge personal and political rcsentments against the plaintitf, still, if they have

satisfactorily shown the charges to be true, they must he acquitted of all liability

to damage in a private action on account of the publication. Indeed, if good

motives and justifiable ends must be shown, they might well be implied from the

establishment of the truth of a charge, for the like reason that malice is inferred

ﬁ'om its falsity.” V

greater the libel," which subjected the law on this suhject to a
great deal of ridicule and contempt. The constitutional provisions
we have quoted generally make the truth a defence if ·published
with good motives and for justifiable ends. Precisely what showing
shall establish good motives and justifiable occasion must be settled
by future decisions. In one case the suggestion was thrown out
that proof of the truth of the charge alone might be sufficient/ but
this was not an authoritative decision, and it could not be true in
any case where the matter published was not fit to be spread before
the public, whether true or false. It must be held, we think, that
where the defendant justifies in a criminal prosecution, the burden
is upon him to prove, not only the truth of the charge, but also
the "good motives and justifiable ends" or the publication.
These might appear from the very character of the publication
itself, if it was true; as where it exhibited the misconduct or wlfituess of a candidate for public office; but where it related
[* 465) to a • person in private life, and who was himself taking
no such action as should put his character in issue before
the public, some further showing would generally be requisite after
'
the truth had been proved.2

..

' In Commonwealth v. Bonner, 9 Met. 410, the defendant was indicted for a

libel on one Oliver Brown, in the following words: “ However, there were few

who, according to the old toper’s dictionary, were drunk; yea, in all conscience,

drunk as a drunken man; and_who and which of you desperadoes of the town

got them so? Was it you whose groggery was open, and the rat soup measured

out at your bar to drunkards, while a daughter lay a corpse in your house, and even

on the day she was laid in her cold and silent grave, :1 victim of Go(l‘s chastening

rod upon your guilty drunkard-manufacturing head? Was it you who refused to

close your drunkery on the day that your aged father was laid in the narrow house

appointed for all the living, and which must ere long receive your recreant

carcass P We ask again, Was it you? Was it you P ” On the trial the defend-

ant introduced evidence to prove, and contended that he did prove, all the facts

alleged in his publication. The court charged the jury that the burden was

upon the defendant to show that the matter charged to be libellous was published

i “:5 _ __ g _ g _
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Charge of Judge Betts to the jury in King v. Root, 4 Wend. 121: "Should
the scope of proofs and circumstances lead you to suppose the defendants had
no good end in contemplation, that they were instigated to these charges solely to
avenge per11onal and political resentments against the plaintiff, still, if they have
satisfactorily shown the charges to be true, they must be acquitted of allliahility
to damage in a private action on account of the publication. Indeed, if good
motives and justifiable ends must be shown, they might well be implied from the
establishment of the truth of a charge, for the like reason that malice is inferred
from its falsity."
·
1 In Commonwealth v. Bonner, 9 Met. 410, the defendant was indicted for a
libel on one Oliver Brown, in tbe following words: "However, there were few
who, according to the old toper's dictionary, were drunk; yea, in all conscience,
drunk as a drunken man ; and. who and which of you desperadoes of the town
got them so ? Was it you who11e groggery was open, and the rat ~>oup measured
out at your bar to drunkards, while a daughter lay a corpse in your house, and even
... on the day she was laid in her cold and silent tr,rave, a victim of God's chastening
rod upon your guilty drunkard-manufacturing head? Was it you who refused to
close your drunkery on the day that your aged father was laid in the narrow house
appointed for all the living, and which must ere long receive your recreant
carcass? We ask again, Was it you? Was it you?" On the trial the defendant introduced evidence to prove, and contended that he did prove, all the facts
alleged in his publication. The court charged the jury that the burden was
upon the defendant to show that the matter charged to be libeliQus was published
1
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with good motives and for justiﬁable ends; that malice is the wilful doing of an
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unlawful act, and does not necessarily imply personal ill-will towards the person

libelled. The defendant excepted to the ruling of the court as applied to the

facts proved, contending that, having proved the truth of all the facts alleged in

the libel, and the publication being in reference to an illegal traffic, a public

nuisance, the jury should have been instructed that it was incumbent on the

government to show that defendant’s motives were malicious, in the popular sense

of the word, as respects said Brown. By the court, Shaw, Ch. J . : “ The court

are of opinion that the charge of the judge of the Common Pleas was strictly

correct. If the publication be libcllous, that is, be such as to bring the person

libelled into hatred, contempt, and ridicule amongst the people, malice is pre-

sumed from the injurious act. But by Rev. Stat. c. 133, § 6, ‘in every prosecution

for writing or publishing a libel, the defendant may give in evidence, in his

defence upon the trial, the truth of the matter contained in the publication

charged as libellous: provided, that such evidence shall not be deemed a suﬁicient

justiﬁeation, unless it shall be further made to appear, on the trial, that the matter

charged to be libcllous was published with good'motives and for justiﬁable ends.’

Nothing can be more explicit. The judge therefore was right in directing the

jury that, after the publication had been shown to have been made by the defend-

ant, and to be libellous and malicious, the burden was on the defendant, not only

to prove the truth of the matter charged as libellous, but likewise that it was

published with good motives and for justiﬁable ends. We are also satisﬁed that
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the judge was right in his description or deﬁnition of legal malice, that it is not

malice in its popular sense; viz., that of hatred and ill-will to the party libelled,

but an act done wilfully, unlawfully, and in violation of the just rights of another.”

And yet it would seem as if, conceding the facts published to be true, the jury

ought to have found the occasion a proper one for correcting such indecent eon-

duct by public exposure. See further on this subject, Regina v. Newman,

"‘ 1 El. & Bl. 268 and 558; Same Case, 18 Eng. L. & Eq. 113; Bar- [* 466]

thelemy v. People, 2 Hill, 2-18; State v. White, 7 Ired. 180; Common-

wealth v. Snelling, 15 Pick. 337. The fact that the publication is copied from

another source is clearly no protection, if it is not true in fact. Regina v. New-

man, ub. sup. Neither are the motives or good character of the defendant,

if he has published libellous matter which is false. Barthelemy v. People,

2 Hill, 248; Commonwealth v. Snelling, 15 Pick. 337.
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with good motives and for justifiable t>nda; that malice is the wilful doing of an
unlawful act, and does not necessarily imply personal ill-will towards the person
libelled. The defendant excepted to the ruling of the court as applied to the
facts proved, contending that, having proved the truth of all the facts alleged in
the libel, and the publication being in reference to an illegal traffic, a public
nuisance, the j.ury should have been instructed that it was incumbent on the
government to show that defendant's motives were malicious, in the popular sense
of the word, as respects said Brown. By the court, Shaw, Cb. J. : "The court
are of opinion that the charge of the judge of tbe Common Pleas was strictly
correct. If the publication be libellous, that is, be such as to bring the person
libelled into hatred, contempt, and ridicule amongst the people, malice is presumed from the injuriouot act. But by Rev. Stat. c. 133, § 6, 'in every prosecution
for writing or publishing a libel, the defendant may give in evidence, in his
defence upon the trial, the truth of the matter contained in the publication
charged as libellous: provided, that such evidence shall not be deemed a sufficient
justification, unless it shall be further made to appea~, on the trial, that the matter
charged to be libellous was published with good' motives and for ju~tifiable ends.'
Nothing can be more explicit. The judge therefore was right in directing the
jury that, after the publication had been shown to have been made by the defen<Jaut, and to be libellous and malicious, the burden was on the defendant, not only
to prove the truth of the matter charged as libellous, but likewise that it was
publi~bed with good motives and for justifiable end.,. We are also satisfied that
the judge was right in his description or definition of legal malice, that it is not
malice in its popular sense; viz., that of hatred and ill-will to the party libelled,
but an act done wilfully, unlawfully, and in violation of the just rights of another."
And yet it would seem as if, conceding the facts published to be true, the jury
ought to have found the occasion a proper one for correcting sut~h indecent conduct by public exposure. See further on thi11 subject, Regina"· Newman,
• 1 El. & BJ. 268 and 568; Same Case, 18 :Eng. L. & Eq. 113; Bar- [• 466]
thelemy 11. People, 2 Hill, 248; State v. White, 7 Ired. 180; Commonwealth o. Snelling, 15 Pick. 337. The fact that the publication is copied from
another source is clearly no protection, if it is not true in fact. Regina v. New- •
man, ub. sup. Neit.ber are the motives or good charal'ter of the defendant,
if be has published libellous matter whil'h is false. Barthelemy v. People,
2 Hill, 248; Commonwealth o. Snelling, 15 Pick. 837.
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[cu. xm.

or RELIGIOUS LIBERTY.

HE who shall examine with care the American constitutions

will ﬁnd nothing more fully stated or more plainly expressed than

the desire of their authors to preserve and perpetuate religious

liberty, and to guard against the slightest approach towards the

establishment of inequality in the civil or political rights of citizens,

based upon differences of religious belief. The American people

[* 467]

*CHAPTER XIII.

came to the work of framing their fundamental laws after centuries

OF RELIGIOUA LIBERTY.

of religious oppression and persecution, sometimes by one party or

sect and sometimes by another, had taught them the utter futility

of all attempts to propagate religious opinions by the rewards,

penalties, or terrors of human laws. They could not fail to per-

ceive, also, that a union of Church and State, like that which

existed in England, if not wholly impracticable in America, was

certainly opposed to the spirit of our institutions, and that any

domineering of one sect over another was repressing to the ener-

gies of the people, and must necessarily tend to discontent and

disorder. _ Whatever, therefore, may have been their individual

sentiments upon religious questions, or upon the propriety of the

State assuming supervision and control of religious aﬁfairs under

other circumstances, the general voice has been, that persons of
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every religious persuasion should be made equal before the law, and

that questions of religious belief and religious worship should be

questions between each individual man and his Maker, of which

human tribunals are not to take cognizance, so long as the public

order is not disturbed, except as the individual, by his voluntary

action in associating himself with a religious organization, may have

conferred upon such organization a jurisdiction over him in eccle-

siastical matters.1 These constitutions, therefore, have not estab-

‘ The religious societies which exist in America are mere voluntary societies,

having little resemblance to those which constitute a part of the machinery of

government in England. They are for the most part formed under general

laws, which permit the voluntary incorporation of attendants upon religious

worship, with power in the corporation to hold real and personal estate for the

[.512] -

HE who shall examine with care the American constitutions
will find nothing more fully stated or more plainly expressed than
the desire of their authors to preserve and perpetuate religious
liberty, and to guard against the slightest approach towards the
establishment of inequality in the civil or political rights of citizens,
based upon differences of religious belief. The American people
came to the work of framing their fundall?-entallaws after centuries
of religious oppression and persecution, sometimes by one party or
sect and sometimes by another, had taught them the utter futility
of all attempts to propagate religious opinions by the rewards,
penalties, or terrors of human laws. They could not fail to perceive, also, that a union of Church and State, like that which
existed in England, if not wholly impracticable in America, was
certainly opposed to the spirit of our institutions, and that any
domineering of one sect over another was repressing to the energies of the people, and must necessarily tend to discontent and
disorder. . Whatever, therefore, may have been their iudividual
sentiments upon religious questious, or upon the propriety of the
State assuming supe~vision and control of religious affairs under
other circumstances, the general voice has been, that persons of
every religious persuasion should be made equal before the law, and
that questions of religious belief and religious worship should be
questions between each individual man and his :Maker, of which
human tribunals are. not to take cognizance_, so long as the public
order is not disturbed, except as the indiYidual, by his voluntary
action in associating himself with a religious organization, may have
conferred upon such organizativn a jurisdiction oYer him in ecclesiastical matters. 1 These constitutions, therefore, have not estab1 The religiou~ societies which exist in America are mere voluntary societies,
having little resemblance to those which constitute a part of .the ma<'hinery of
government in England. They are for the most part formed under general
laws, which permit the voluntary incorporation of attendants upon religious
worship, with power in the corporation to hold real and personal estate for the
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lished religious toleration merely, but religious equality; in that

particular being far in advance not only of the mother country,

lished religious toleration merely, but religious equality; in that
particular being far iu ad vance not ouly of the mothet· country,

purposes of their organization, but not for other purposes. Such a society is

" a voluntary association of individuals or families, united for the purpose of

having a common place of worship, and to provide a proper teacher to instruct

them in religious doctrines and duties, and to administer the ordinances of bap-

tism, &c. Although a church or body of professing Christians is almost uniformly

connected with such a society or congregation, the members of the church have

no other or greater rights than any other members of the society who statedly

attend with them for the purposes of divine worship. Over the church, as such,

the legal or temporal tribunals of the State do not profess to haveany jurisdic-

tion whatever, except so far as is necessary to protect the civil rights of others,

and to preserve the public peace. All questions relating to the faith and prac-

tice of the church and its members belong to the church judicatories, to which

they have voluntarily subjected themselves. But, as a general principle, those

ecclesiastical judicatories cannot interfere with the temporal concerns of the

congregation or society with which the church or the members thereof are con-

nected.” lValw0rlh, Chancellor, in Baptist Church v. \Vethcrell, 3 Paige, 301.

See Ferraria v. Vasconcellos. 31 Ill. 25; Lawyer v. Clipperly, 7 Paige, 281;

Shannon v. Frost, 3 B. Mom-. 258; German, &c., Cong. v. Pressler, 17 La. An.

127; Such a corporation is not an ecclesiastical, but merely a private civil cor-
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poration, the members of the society being the corporators, and the trustees the

managing oﬁicers, with such powers as the statute confers, and the ordinary

discretionary powers of ollicers in civil corporations. Robertson v. Bullions,

11 N. Y. 249; Miller v. Gable, 2 Denio, 492. The church connected with the

society, if any there he, is not recognized in the law as a distinct entity; the

corporators in the society are not necessarily members thereof, and the society

may change its government, faith, form of worship, discipline, and ecclesiastical

relations at will, subject only to the restraints imposed by their articles of asso-

ciation, and to the general laws of the State. Keyser v. Stansifer, 6 Ohio, 363;

Robertson v. Bullions. ll N. Y. 249; Parish of Bellport v. Tooker, 29 Barb.

256; Same Case, 21 N. Y. 267; Burrel v. Associated Reform Church, 44 Barb.

282. The courts of the State have no general jurisdiction and control over the

oﬁicers of such corporations in respect to the performance of their oﬂicial duties;

but as in respect to the property which they hold for the corporation they stand

in position of trustees, the courts may exercise the same supervision as in other

cases of trust. Fcrraria v. Vasconcellos, 31 Ill. 25. But the courts will inter-

fere where abuse of trust is alleged only in clear cases, especially if the abuse

alleged be a departure from the tenets of the founders of a charity. Happy v.

Morton, 33 Ill. 398. The articles of association will determine who may vote

when the State law does not prescribe qualiﬁcations. State v. Crowell, 4 Halst.

390. Should there be a disruption of the society, the title to the property will

remain with that part ofit which is acting in harmony with its own law; seceders

will be entitled to no part of it. McGinnis v. \Vatson, 41 Penn. St. 9; M. E.

Church v. Wood, 5 Ohio, 286; Keyser v. Stansifer, 6 Ohio, 863; Shannon 0.

Frost, 3 B. Mon‘r. 253; Gibson v. Armstrong, 7 B. Monr. 281; Haddcn v.

as [ 513 ]
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purposes of their organization, but not for other purposes. Such a society is
" a volunta1·y association of individuals or families, united for the purpose of
havirig a common place of worship, and to provide a proper teacher to instruct
them in religioull doctrines and duties, and to administer the ordinances of baptism, &c. Although a chureh or body of professing Christians is almost uniformly
connected with such a society or congregation, the members of the church haYe
no other or greater rights than any other members of the society who statedly
attt>nd with them for the purposes of divine wor~hip. Over the church, as such,
the legal or temporal tribun1ds of the Sta.te do not profess to have any jurisdiction whatever, except so far as is necessary to protect the civil rights of others,
and to preserve the public peace. All questions relating to the faith and prac·
tice of the church and its memberR belong to the church judicatories, to which
they have voluntarily subjected themseh·es. But, as a general principle, those
ecclesiastieal judicatories cannot interfere with the temporal concerns of the
congregation or society with which tho church or the members thereof are connected." Walwol"ih, Chancellor, in Baptist Church t•. Wetherell, 3 Paige, 301.
Sec Ferraris "·Vasconcellos. 31 111. 25; Lawy~r "· Clipperly, 7 Paige, 281;
Shannon v. Frost, 3 B. 1\lonr. 258; German, &c., Cong. "· Pressler, 17 La. An.
127; Such a corporation is not an ecclesi&lltical, but merely a private ciYil corporation, the members of the society being the corporators, and the trustees the
managing officers, with such powers as the statute confers, and the ordinary
discretionary powers of officers in civil corporations. Robertson 11. Bullions,
11 N.Y. :249; l\liller v. Gable, 2 Denio, 492. The church connected with the
soeiety, if any there he, is not recognized in the law as a disrin(,'t entity; the
corporators in the society are not necessarily members thereof, and the soeiety
may change its government, faith, form of worship, discipline, and ecclesiastical
relations at will, subject only to the restraints imposed by their articles of association, and to the general laws of the State. Keyser v. Stansifer, 6 Ohio, 363;
Robertson "· Bullions, 11 N.Y. 249; Parish of Bellport v. Tooker, 29 Barb.
256; Same Case, 21 N.Y. 267; Burrel v. Associated Reform Church, 44 Barb.
282. The courts of the State have no general jurisdiction and control over the
officers of such corporations in respect to the performance of their official duties ;
but as in respect to the property which they hold for the corporation they stand
in position of trustees, the courts may exercise the same supervision as in other
cases of trust. Ferraria v. Vasconcellos, 31 Ill. 2~. But the courts will interfere where abuse of trust is alleged only in clear cases, especially if the abuse
alleged be a departure from the tenets of the founders of a charity. Happy v.
Morton, 33 Ill. 398. The articles of assoeiation will determine who may vote
when the State law does not prescribe qualifications. State "· Crowell, 4 Haist.
390. Should there be a disruption of the society, the title to the property will
remain with that part of it which is acting in harmony with its own law; seccders
will be entitled to no part of it. McGinnis"· Watson, 41 }>enn. St. 9; M. E.
Church v. Wood, 5 Ohio, ,286 ; Keyser "· Stansifer, 6 Ohio, 36!~; Shannon "·
Frost, 3 B. Monr. 253; Gibson v. Armstrong, 7 B. 1\Ionr. :281; Hadden "·
-
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but also of much of the colonial legislation, which, though more

liberal than that of other civilized countries, nevertheless exhib-

ited features of discrimination based upon religious beliefs or pro-

fessions}

[“' 468] * Considerable differences will appear in the provisions

in the State constitutions on the general subject of the

present chapter ; some of them being conﬁned to declarations and

prohibitions whose purpose is to secure the most perfect equality

before the law of all shades of religious belief, while some exhibit a

jealousy of ecclesiastical authority by making persons who exercise

the functions of clergyman, priest, or teacher of any religious

Chorn, 8 B. Monr. 70; Ferraria '0. Vasconcellos, 23 Ill. 456. And this even

though there may have been a change in doctrine on the part of the controlling

majority. Keyser v. Stansifer, 6 Ohio, 363. The administration of church

rules or discipline the courts of the State do not interfere with, unless civil rights

become involved, and then only for the protection of such rights. Hendrickson

but also of much of the colonial legislation, which, though more
liberal than that of other civilized countries, nevertheless exhibited features of discrimination based upon religious beliefs or professions.1
[* 468] • Considerable differences will appear in the provisions
in the State constitutions on the general subject of the
present chapter ; some of them being confined to declarations and
prohibitions whose purpose is to secure the most perfect equality
before the law of all shades of religious belief, while some exhibit a
jealousy of ec-clesiastical authority by making persons who exercise
the functions of clergyman, priest, or teacher of any religious

v. Decow, Sax. Ch. 577; Baptist Church v. Wetherell, 3 Paige, 301; German

Reformed Church v. Seither, 3 Penn. St. 291. And see the recent case of Chase

v. Cheney in the Supreme Court of Illinois.

‘ For the distinction between religious toleration and religious equality, see

Bloom v. Richards, 2 Ohio St. 390. It was not easy, two centuries ago, to make
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men educated in the ideas of those days understand how there could be com-

plete religious liberty, and at the same time ordcr and due subordination to

authority in the State. Roger \Villiams explained and defended his own views,

and illustrated the subject thus: “There goes many a ship to sea, with many

hundred souls in one ship, whose weal and woe is common, and is a true picture

of a commonwealth, or human combination or society. It hath fallen out some-

times that both Papists and Protestants, Jews and Turks, may be embarked in

one ship; upon which supposal I aﬁirm that all the liberty of conscience I ever

pleaded for turns upon these two hinges: that none of the Papists, Protestants,

Jews, or Turks be forced to come to the ship’s prayers or worship if they prac-

tise any. I further add that I never denied that, notwithstanding this liberty,

the commander of this ship ought to command the ship’s course, yea, and also

command that justice, peace, and sobriety be kept and practised, both among the

seamen and all the passengers. If any of the seamen refuse to perform their ser-

vice, or passengers to pay their freight; if any refuse to help, in person or purse,

towards the common charges or defence; if any refuse to obey the common laws

and orders of the ship, concerning their common peace and preservation; if any

shall mutiny and rise up against their commanders and officers; if any should

preach or write that there ought to be no commanders or officers, because all are

equal in Christ, therefore no masters nor oﬂicers, no laws nor orders, no correc-

tions nor punishments; I say I never denied but in such cases, whatever is

pretended, the commander or commanders may judge, resist, compel, and punish

such transgressors according to their deserts and merits.” Arnold’s History of

Rhode Island, Vol. I. p. 254, citing Knowles, 279, 280.
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Chorn, 8 B. Monr. 70 i Ferraria v. Vasconcellos, 28 TIL 456. And this even
though there may have been a change in doctrine on the part of the controlling
majority. Keyser v. Stansifer, 6 Ohio, 868. The administration of church
rules or discipline the courts of the State do not interfere with, unless civil rigbt8
become involved, and then only for the protection of such rights. Hendrickson
v. Decow, Sax. Ch. 577 i Baptist Church "· Wetherell, 8 Paige, 801 ; German
Reformed Church "· Seither, ~ Penn. St. 291. And see the recent case of Chase
v. Cheney in the Supreme Court of Illinois.
1 For tbe distinction between religious toleration and religious equality, ·see
Bloom "· Richards, 2 Ohio St. 890. It was not easy, two centuries ago, to make
men educated in the ideas of those days understand how there could be complete religious liberty, and at the same time order and due subordination to
authority in the State. Roger Williams explained and defended his own views,
and illustrated the subject thus: " There goes many a ship to sea, with many
hundred souls in one ship, whose weal and woe i11 common, and is a true picture
of a commonwealth, or human combination or society. It hath fallen out sometimes that both Papists and Protestants, Jews and Turks, may be embarked in
one ship; upon which supposal I affirm that all the liberty of conscience I ever
pleaded for turns upon these two hinges : that none of the Papists, Protestants,
Jews, or Turks be forced to come to the ship's prayers or wort~hip if they practise any. I further add that I never denied that, notwithstanding this liberty,
the commandt!r of this ship ought to command the ship's course, yea, and also
command that justice, peace, and sobriety be kept and practised, both among the
seamen and all the passengers. If any of the seamen refuse to perform their service, or passengers to pay their freight; if any refuse to help, in person or purse,
towards the common charges or defence ; if any refuse to obey the common laws
and orders of the ship, concerning their common peace and preservation; if any
shall mutiny and rise up against their commanders and officers; if any should
preach or write that there ought to be no commanders or officers, because all are
equal in Christ, therefore no master!! nor officers, no laws nor orders, no corrections nor punishments ; I say I never denied but in such cases, whatever is
pretended, the commander or commandP.rs may judge, resist, compel, and punish
such transgressors aceording to their deberts and merits." Arnold's History of
Rhode Island, Vol. I. p. 254, citing Knowles, 279, 280.
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persuasion, society, or sect, ineligible to civil office ;1 and still others

show some traces of the old notion, that truth and a sense of duty are

inconsistent with scepticism in religion.” There are ex-

ceptional "clauses, however, not. many in number; and [* 469]

it is believed that, where they exist, they are not often

made use of, to deprive any person of the civil or political rights or

privileges which are placed by law within the reach of his fellows.

Those things which are not lawful under any of the American

constitutions may be stated thus :—-

' There are provisions to this effect, more or less broad, in the Constitutions

of Tennessee, Louisiana, Virginia, Texas, Delaware, and Kentucky.

' The Constitution of Pennsylvania provides “ that no person who acknowl-

edges the being of God, and a future state of rewards and punishments, shall, on

account of his religious sentiments, be disqualiﬁed to hold any office or place of

persuasion, society, or sect, ineligible to civil office ; 1 and still others
show some traces of the old notion, that truth and a sense of duty are
inconsistent with scepticism in religion.2 There are exceptional • clauses, however, not many in number; and [* 469]
it is believed that, where they exist, they are not often
made use of, to deprive any person of the civil or political rights or
privileges which are placed by law within the reach of his fellows.
Those things which are not lawful under any of the American
constitutions may be stated thus : -

trust or proﬁt under this commonwealth.” Art. 9, § 4. — The Constitution of North

Carolina: " The following classes of persons shall be disqualiﬁed for office :

First. All persons who shall deny the existence of Almighty God," &c. Art.

6, § 5. —The Constitution of Arkansas: “ No person who denies the being of a

God shall hold any oﬁice in the civil department of this State, nor be allowed

his oath in any court.” Art. 8, § 3. —The Constitutions of Mississippi and Ten-

nessee: “ No person who denies the being of a God, or of a future state of rewards
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and punishments, shall hold any oﬁice in the civil department of this State.”

On the other hand the Constitutions of Georgia, Kansas, Virginia, \Vest Vir-

ginia, Maine, Delaware, Indiana, Iowa, Oregon, Ohio, New Jersey, Nebraska,

Texas, and \Visconsin expressly forbid religious tests as a qualiﬁcation for otﬁce

or public trust. The Constitution of Maryland provides “ that no religious test

ought ever to be required as a qualiﬁcation for any oﬁice of trust or proﬁt in this

State, other than a declaration of belief in the existence of God; nor shall the

legislature prescribe any other oath of ofﬁce than the oath prescribed by this

constitution.” Declaration of Rights, Art. 87.--The Constitution of Illinois pro-

vides that “ the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship

without discrimination shall forever be guaranteed; and no person shall be denied

any civil or political right, privilege, or capacity, on account of his religious

opinions ; but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be construed to

dispense with oaths or aﬁirmations, excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify

practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of the State. No person shall be

required to attend or support any ministry or place ofiworship against his con-

sent, nor shall any preference be given by law to any religious denomination or

mode of worship.” Art. 2, § 3. Some other constitutions contain provisions that

liberty of conscience is not to justify licentiousness or practices inconsistent with

the peace and moral safety of. society. The Constitution of Tennessee declares

that “ no political or religious test, other than an oath to support the Constitu-

tion of the United States, and of this State, shall ever be required as a qualiﬁ-

cation to any oﬂice or public trust llniler the State ;” but afterwards, with singu-

lar inconsistency, proceeds to disqualify certain classes as above stated.

~
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1 There are provisions to this effect, more or less broad, in the Constitutions
of Tennessee, Louisiana, Virginia, Texas, Delaware, and Kentucky.
1 The Constitution of Pennsylvania provides "that no person who al·knowledges the being of God, a~d a future state of rewards and punishments, shall, on
account of his religious sentiments, be disqualified to hold any office or place of
trust or profit under this eommomvealth." Art. 9, § 4.- The Constitution ofNorth
Carolina: "The following classes of persons shall be disqualified for office :
First. All persons who shall deny the existence of Almighty God," &c. Art.
6, § 6. -The Constitution of Arkansas: '' No person who denies the being of a
God shall hold any office in the civil department of this State, nor be aJio,ved
his oath in any court." Art. 8, § 3.- The Constitutions of Mississippi and Tennessee : " No person who denies the being of a God, or of a future state of rewards
and punishment!!, shall hold any office in the civil department of this State."
On the other hand the Constitutions of Georgia, Kansas, Virginia, \Vest Virginia, Maine, Delaware, Indiana, Iowa, Oregon, Ohio, New Jersey, Nebraska,
Texas, and Wisconsin expressly forbid religious tests as a qualification for office
or public trust. The Constitution of Maryland provides "that no religious test
ought ever to be rec1uired as a qualification for any office of trust or profit in this
State, other than a declaration of belief in the existence of God; nor shall the
legislature prescribe any other oath of office than the oath prescribed by this
comtitution." Declaration of Rights, Art. 37.- The Constitution of Illinois provides that " the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship
without discrimination shall forever be guaranteed; and no person shall be denied
any civil or political right, privilege, or capacity, on account of his religious
opinions; but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be construed to
dispense with oaths or affirmations, excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify
practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of the State. No person shall be
required to attenrl or support any ministry or place of worship against his con~
sent, nor shall any preferenee be given by law to any religious denomination or
morle of worship." Art. 2, § S. Some other constitutions contain provisions that
liberty of conscience is not to justify licentiousness or practices inconsistent !ith
the peace and moral safety of. society. The Constitution of Tennessee declares
that " no political or religious test, other than an oath to support the Constitution of t.he United States, and of this State, shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or puhlic trust unrler the State;" but afterwards, with singular inconsistency, prucccrls to rlisqualify certain classes as above stated.
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1. Any law respecting an establishment of religion. The legis-

latures have not been left at liberty to effect a union of Church

and State, or to establish preferences by law in favor of any one

religious persuasion or mode of worship. There is not complete

religious liberty where any one sect is favored by the State and

given an advantage by law over other sects. Whatever establishes

a distinction against one class or sect is, to the extent to which

the distinction operates unfavorably, a persecution; and if based

on religious grounds, a religions persecution. It is not mere

toleration which is established in our system, but religious

equality.

2. Compulsory support, by taxation or otherwise, of religious

instruction. Not only is no one denomination to be favored at the

expense of the rest, but all support of religious instruction must

be entirely voluntary. It is not within the sphere of government

to coerce it.

3. Compulsory attendance upon religious worship. Whoever is

not led by choice or a sense of duty to attend upon the ordinances

of religion is not to be compelled to do so by the State. It is the

province of the State to enforce, so far as it may be found practi-

cable, the obligations and duties which the citizen may be under
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or may owe to his fellow-citizen or to society; but those which

spring from the relations between himself and his Maker are to be

enforced by the admonitions of the conscience, and not by the

penalties of human laws. Indeed, as all real worship must

essentially and necessarily consist in the free-will offering of ado-

ration and gratitude by the creature to the Creator, human laws

are obviously inadequate to incite or compel those internal and

voluntary emotions which shall induce it, and human penalties at

most could only enforce the observance of idle ceremonies, which,

when unwillingly performed, are alike valueless to the participants

and devoid of all the elements of true worship.

4. Restraints upon the free exercise of religion according to the

dictates of the conscience. No external authority is to

[‘470] place itself ‘between the ﬁnite being and the Infinite

when the former is seeking to render the homage that is

due, and in a mode which commends itself to his conscience and

judgment as being suitable for him to render and acceptable to its

object.

5. Restraints upon the expression of religious belief. An

r

[ 516 ]

1. Any law respecting an establishment of religion. The legislatures have not been left at liberty to effect a union of Church
and State, or to establish preferences by law in favor of any one
religious persuasion or mode of worship. There is not complete
religious liberty where any one sect is favored by the State and
given an advantage by law over other sects. Whatever establishes ·
a distinction against one class or Rect is, to the extent to which
the distinction operates unfavorably, a. persecution ; and if based
on religious grounds, a religious persecution. It is not mere
toleration which is established in our system, but religious
equality.
2. Compulsory support, by taxation or otherwise, of religious
instruction. Not only is no one denomination to be favored at the
expense of the rest, but all support of religious instruction must
be entirely voluntary. It is not within the sphere of government
to coerce it.
3. Compulsory attendance upon religious worship. Whoever is
not led by choice or a sense of duty to attend upon the ordinances
of religion is not to be compelled to do so by the State. It is the
province of the State to enforce, so far as it may be found practicable, the obligations and duties whkh the citizen may be under
or may owe to his fellow-citizen or to society; but those which
spring from the relations between himself and his Maker are to be
enforced by the admonitions of the conscience, and not by the
penalties of human laws. Indeed, as all real worship must
essentially and necessarily consist in the free-will offering of adoration and gratitude by the creature to the Creator, human laws
are obviously inadequate to incite or compel those internal and
voluntary emotions which shall induce it, and human penalties at
most could only enforce the observance of idle ceremonies, which,
when unwillingly performed, are alike valueless to the participants
and devoid of all the elements of true worship.
4. Restraints upon the free exercise of religion according to the
dictates of the conscience. No external authority is to
[* 4 70] place itself • between the finite being and the Infinite
when the former is seeking to render the homage that is
due, and in a mode which commends itself to his conscience and
judgment as being suitable for him to render and acceptable to its
ohjcct.
5. Restraints upon the expression of religious belief. An
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earnest believer usually regards it as his duty to propagate his

opinions, and to bring others to his views. To deprive him of this

right is to take from him the power to perform what he considers

a most sacred obligation. ,

These are the prohibitions which in some form of words are to be

found in the American constitutions, and which secure freedom of

conscience and of religious w0rship.1 No man in religious matters

is to be subjected to the'censorship of the State or of any public

authority; and the State is not to inquire into or take notice of

religious belief, when the citizen performs his duty to the State and

to his fellows, and is guilty of no breach of public morals or public

decorum.”

But while thus careful to establish, protect, and defend religious

freedom and equality, the American constitutions contain no pro-

visions which prohibit the authorities from such solemn recog-

nition of a superintending Providence in public transactions and

' This whole subject is considered very largely in _a case in the Superior Court

of Cincinnati, involving the right of the school board of that city to exclude the

reading of the Bible from the public schools. The case is reported and pub-

lished by Robert Clarke and Co., Cincinnati, under the title, “ The Bible in
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the Public Schools,” 1870. ‘

' Congress is forbidden, by the ﬁrst amendment to the Constitution of the

earnest believer usually regards it as his duty to propagate his
opinions, and to bring others to his views. To deprive him of this
right is to take from him the power to perform what he considers
a most sacred obligation.
These are the prohibitions which in some form of words are to be
found in the American constitutions, and which secure freedom of
conscience and of religious worship. 1 No man in religious matters
is to be subjected to the' censorship of the State or of any public
authority ; and the State is not to inquire into or take notice of
religions belief, when the citizen performs his duty to the State and
to his fellows, and is guilty of no breach of public morals or public
decorum. 2
But while thus careful to establish, protect, and defend religious
freedom and equality, the American constitutions contain no provisions which prohibit the authorities from such solemn recognition of a superintending Providence in public transactions and

United States, from making any law respecting an establishment of religion, or

prohibiting the free exercise thereof. Mr. Story says of this provision : " It was

under a solemn consciousness of the dangers from ecclesiastical ambition, the

bigotry of spiritual pride, and the intolerance of sects, exempliﬁed in our do-

mestic, as well as in foreign annals, that it was deemed advisable to exclude

from the national government all power to act upon the subject. The situation,

too, of the different States equally proclaimed the policy as well as the necessity

of such an exclusion. In some of the States, Episcopalians constituted the pre-

dominant ‘sect; in others, Presbytcrians; in others, Congregationalists; in

others, Quakers; and in others again, there was a close numerical rivalry among

contending sects. It was impossible that there should not arise perpetual strife

and perpetual jealousy on the subject of ecclesiastical ascendency, if the national

government were left free to create a religious establishment. The only security

was in extirpating the power. But this alone would have been an imperfect

security, if it had not been followed up by a declaration of the right of the free

exercise of religion, and a prohibition (as we have seen) of all religious tests.

Thus, the whole power over the subject of religion is left exclusively to the State

governments, to be acted upon according to their own sense of justice and the

State constitutions; and the Catholic and the Protestant, the Calvinist and the

Arminian, the Jew and the Inﬁdel, may sit down at the common table of

the national councils, without any inquisition into their faith or mode of wor-

ship.” Story on the Constitution, § 1879.
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1 This whole subject is considered very largely in .a case in the Superior Court
of Cincinnati, involving the right of the school board of that city to exclude the
reading of the Bible from the public schools. The case is reported and published by Robert Clarke and Co., Cincinnati, under the title, "The Bible in
the Public Schools," 1870.
1 Congress is forbidden, by the first amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, from making any law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. Mr. Story says of this provision : " It was
under a solemn consciousness of the dangers from ecclesiastical ambition, the
bigotry of spiritual pride, and the intolerance of sects, exemplified in our domestic, as well as in foreign annals, that it was deemed advisable to exclude
from the national government all power to act upon the subject. The situation,
too, of the different States equally proclaimed the policy as well as the necessity
of such an t'xclusion. In some of the States, Episcopalians constituted the predominant ·sect; in others, Presbyterians; in others, Congregationalist~; in
others, Quakers; and in others again, there was a close numerical rivalry among
conttmding sects. It was impossible that there should not arise. perpetual strife
and perpetual jealousy on the subject of ecclesiastical ascendency, if the national
government were left free to create a religious establishment. The only security
was in extirpating the power. But this alone would have been an imperfect
security, if it had not been followed up by a declaration of the right of the free
exercise of religion, and a prohibition (as we have seen) of all religious tests.
Thus, the whole power over the subject of religion is left exclusively to the State
governments, to be acted upon according to their own sense of justice and the
State constitutions ; and the Catholic and the Protestant, the Calvinist and the
Arminian, the Jew and the Infidel, may sit down at the common table of
the national councils, without any inquisition into their faith or mode of worship." Story on the Constitution, § 1879.
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exercises as the general religious sentiment of mankind inspires,

A - and as ‘seems meet and proper in ﬁnite and dependent

[* 471] beings. Whatever may be the shades *‘ of religious belief,

' ‘all must acknowledge _the ﬁtness‘ of recognizing in im-

portant human aﬂairs the superintending care and control of the

great Governor of the Universe, and of acknowledging with

thanksgiving his boundless favors, or bowing in contrition when

visited with the penalties of his broken laws. No principle of con-

stitutional law is violated when thanksgiving or fast days are

appointed ; when chaplains are designated for the army and navy ;

when legislative sessions are opened with prayer or the reading of

the Scriptures, or when religious teaching is encouraged by a

general exemption of the houses of religious worship from taxation

for the support of State government. Undoubtedly the spirit of

the constitution will require, in all these cases, that care» be taken

to avoid discrimination in favor of or against any one religious

denomination or sect; but the power to do any of these things

does not become unconstitutional simply because of. its suscepti-

bility to abuse. This public recognition of religious worship,
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however, is not based entirely, perhaps not even mainly, upon a

sense of what is due to the Supreme‘ Being himself as the author

of all good and of all law; but the same -reasons of State policy

which induce the government to aid institutions of charity and

seminaries of instruction will incline it also to foster religious

worship and religious institutions, as conservators of the public

morals, and valuable, if not indispensable, assistants to the preser-

vation of the public order.

Nor, while recognizing a superintending Providence, are we

always precluded from recognizing also, in the rules prescribed

for the conduct of the citizen, the notorious fact that the pre-

vailing religion in the States is Christian. Some acts would be

oﬁ'ensive to public sentiment in a. Christian community, and would

tend to public disorder, which in a Mahometan or Pagan country

might be passed by without notice, or even be regarded as meritori-

ous ; just as some things would be considered indecent, and worthy

of reprobation and punishment as such, in one state of society

which in another would be in accord with the prevailing customs,

and therefore defended and protected by the laws. The criminal

laws of every country are shaped in greater or less degree by the

prevailing public sentiment as to what is right, proper, and deco-
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exercises ~s the general religious sentiment of mankind inspires,
and as ·seems meet and proper in finite and dependent
[• 471] beings. ·Whatever may be the shades • of religious belief,
· · all must acknowledge . the fitness~ of recognizing in important human affairs the superintending care and control of the
great Governor of the Universe, and of acknowledging with
thanksgiving his boundless favors, or bowing in contrition when
visited with the penalties of his broken laws. No principle of constitutional law is violated when thanksgiving or fast days are
appointed; when chrwlains are designated for the army and naYy;
when legislative sessions are opened with prayer or the reading of
the Scriptures, or when religious teaching is encouraged by a
general exemption of the houses of religious worship from taxation
for the support of State government. Undoubtedly the spir·it of
the constitution will require, in all these cases, that care be taken
to avoid discrimination in favor of or ~gainst any one religious
denomination or sect ; but the power to do any of these things
docs not become unconstitutional simply because of. its susceptibility to abuse. This public recognition of religious worship,
however, is not based entirely, perhaps not even mainly, upon a
sense of what is due to the Supreme· Being himself as the author
of all good .and of all law; but the same reasons of State policy
which induce the government to aid institutions of charity and
seminaries of instruction will incline it also to foster religious
worship and religious institutions, as conservators of the public
morals, and valuable, if not indispensable, assistants to the preservation of the public order.
Nor, while recognizing a superintending Providence, are we
always precluded from recognizing also, in the rules prescri~d
for the conduct of the citizen, the notorious fact that the prevailing religion in the States is Christian. Some acts would be
offensive to public sentiment in a Christian community, and would
tend to public disorder, which in a Mahometan or Pagan countr·y
might be passed by without notice, or even be regarded as meritorious ; just as some things would be considered indecent, and worthy
of reprobation and punishment as such, in one state of society
which in another would be in accord with the prevailing customs,
and therefore defended and protected by the laws. The criminal
laws of every country are shaped in greater or less degree by the
prevailing public sentiment as to what is right, proper, and deco[ 518]
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rous, or the reverse; and they punish those acts as crimes which

disturb the peace and order, or tend to shock the‘moral sense or

sense of propriety and decency, of the community. The moral

sense is largely regulated and controlled by the religious "belief ;

and therefore it is that those things which, estimated by a.

Christian standard, are profane and blasphemous, are properly

punished as crimes against society, since they are offensive in the

highest degree to the general public sense, and have a direct

tendency to undermine the moral support of the laws, and to

corrupt the community. _

" It is frequently said that Christianity is a. part of the [‘ 472]

law of the laud. In a certain sense and for certain purposes

this is true. The best features of the common law, and especially

those which regard the family and social relations; which compel

the parent to support the child, the husband to support the wife;

which make the marriage ‘tie permanent and forbid polygamy,—if

not derived from, have at least been improved and strengthened

by the prevailing religion and the teachings of its sacred Book.
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But the law does not attempt to enforce the precepts of Christianity

on the ground of their sacred character or divine origin. Some of

those precepts, though we may admit their continual and univer-

sal obligation, we must nevertheless recognize as being incapable

of enforcement by human laws. That standard of morality which

requires one to love his neighbor as himself we must admit is too

elevated to be accepted by human tribunals as the proper test by

which to judge the conduct of the citizen; and one could hardly be

held responsible to the criminal laws if in goodness of heart and

spontaneous charity he fell something short of the Good Samaritan.

The precepts of Christianity, moreover, affect the heart and address

themselves to the conscience, while the laws of the State can regard

the outward conduct only ; and for these several reasons Christianity

is not a part of the law of the land in any sense which entitles the

courts to take notice of and base their judgments upon it, except

so far as they can ﬁnd that its precepts and principles have been

incorporated in and made a component part of the positive law of

the State}

Mr. Justice Story has said in the Girard Will case that, al-

‘ Andrew v. Bible Society, 4 Sandf. 182; Ayres v. Methodist Church, 3 Sandf.

377; State v. Chandler, 2 Harr. 555; Bloom v. Richards, 2 Ohio, N. s. 387.
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rous, or the reverse; and they punish those acts as crimes which
disturb the peace and order, or tend to shock the ' x:norai sense or
sense of propriety and decency, of the community. The moral
sense is largely regulated and controlled by the religious belief ;
and therefore it is that those things which, estimated by a
Christian standard, are profane and blasphemous, are properly
punished as crimes against society, since they are offensive fn the
highest degree to the general public sense, and have a direct
tendency to undermine the moral support of the laws, and to
corrupt the community.
• It is frequently said that Christianity is a part of the [• 472]
law of the land. In a certain sense and for certain purposes
this is true. The best features of the common law, and especially
those which regard the family and social relations ; which compel
the parent to support the child, the husband to support the wife;
which make the marriage,tie permanent and forbid polygamy,- if
not derived from, have at least been improved and strengthened
by the prevailing religion and the teachings of its sacred Book.
But the law does not attempt to enforce the pt·ecepts of Christianity
on the ground of their sacred character or divine origin. Some of
those precepts, though we may admit their continual and universal obligation, we must nevertheless recognize as being incapable
of enforcement by human laws. That standard of morality which
requires one to love his neighbor as himself we must admit is too
elevated to be accepted by human tribunals as the proper test by
which to judge the conduct of the citizen ; and one could hardly be
held responsible to the criminal laws if in goodness of heart and
spontaneous charity he fell something short of the Good Samaritan.
The precepts of Christianity, moreover, affect the heart and address
themselves to the conscience, while the laws of the State can regard
the outward conduct only; and fot· these several reasons Christianity
is not a part of the law of the land in any sense which entitles the .
courts to take uotice of and base their judgments upon it, except
so far as they can find that its precepts and principles have been
incorporated in and made a component part of the positive law of
the State.1
Mr. Justice Story has said in the Girard Will case that, al1 Andrew v. Bible Society, 4 Sandf. 182 ; Ayres v. Methodist Church, 3 Sandf.
377; State v. Chandler, 2 Harr. 555; Bloom"· Richards, 2 Ohio, N. s. 387.
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though Christianity is a part of the common law of the State, it is

only so in this qualiﬁed sense, that its divine or-{gin and truth are

admittecl, and therefore it is not to be maliciously and openly

reviled and blasphemed against, to the annoyance of believers or to

the injury of the plll)ll0.1 It may be doubted, however, if the pun-

ishment of blasphemy is based necessarily upon an admission of

the divine origin or truth of the Christian religion, or incapable of

being otherwise justiﬁed.

Blasphemy has been deﬁned as consisting in speaking evil of the

Deity, with an impious purpose to derogate from the divine

majesty, and to alienate the minds of others from the love and

reverence of God. It is purposely using words concerning the

Supreme Being calculated and designed to impair and destroy the

reverence, respect, and conﬁdence due to him, as the intelligent

Creator, Governor, and Judge of the world. It embraces the idea

of detraction as regards the character and attributes of God, as

calumny usually carries the same idea when applied to an individ-

ual. It is a wilful and malicious attempt to lessen" men’s reverence

of God, by denying his existence or his attributes as an intelligent

Creator, Governor, and Judge of men, and to prevent their
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[" 473] having conﬁdence in him as such? 'Contumelious re-

proaches and profane ridicule of Christ or of the Holy

Scriptures have the same evil effect in sapping the foundations of

society and of public order, and are classed under the same

headﬁ '

In an early case where a prosecution for blasphemy came before

Lord Hale, he is reported to have said: “ Such kind of wicked,

blasphemous words are not only an offence to God and religion, but

a crime against the laws, State, and government, and therefore

punishable in the Court of King’s Bench. For to say religion is a

cheat, is to subvert all those obligations whereby civil society is

preserved; that Christianity is a part of the laws of England, and

‘ Vidal v. Girard’s Ex’rs, 2 How. 198. Mr. Webster‘s argument that Chris-

tianity is a part of the law of Pennsylvania, is given in 6 WVebster‘s VVorks,

. 175. ,

P ’ Shaw, Ch. J., in Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 20 Pick. 213.

‘ People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290; Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 20 Pick.

213; Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 S. & R. 394; State v. Chandler, 2 Harr.

553; Rex v. Waddington, 1 B. & C. 26; Rex v. Carlile, 3 B. &' Ald. 161;

Cowan v. Milboum, Law R. 2 Exch. 230.
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though Christianity is a part of the common law of the State, it is
only so in this qualified sense, that its divine origin and troth are
admitted, and therefore it is not to be maliciously and openly
reviled and blasphemed against, to the annoyance of believers or to
the iujury of the public,! It may be doubted, however, if the pun1sluuent of blasphemy is based necessarily upon an admission of
the divine origin or truth of the Christian religion, or incapable of
being otherwise justified.
Blasphemy has been defined as consisting in speaking evil of the
Deity, with an impious purpose to derogate from the divine
majesty, and to alienate the minds of others from the love and
reverence of God. It is purposely using words concerning the
Supreme Being calculated and designed to impair and destroy the
reverence, respect, and confidence due to him, as the intelligent
Creator, Governor, and Judge of the world. It embraces the idea
of detraction as regards the character and attributes of God, as
calumny usually carries the same idea when applied to au individual. It is a wilful and malicious attempt to lessen· men's reverence
of God, by denying his existence or his attributes as an intelligent
Creator, Governor, and Judge of men, and to prevent their
[• 473] having confidence in him as snch. 2 • Contumelious reproaches and profane ridicule of Christ or of the Holy
Scriptures have the same evil effect in sapping the foundations of
society and of public ~rder, and are classed under the same
head.8
In an early case where a prosecution for blasphemy came before
Lord Hale, he is reported to have said: " Such kind of wicked,
blasphemous words are not only an offence to God and religion, but
a crime against the laws, State, and government, and therefore
punishable in the Court of King's Bench. For to say religion is a
cheat, is to subvert all those obligations whereby civil society is
preserved; that Christianity is a part of the laws of England, aml
1 Vidal v. Girard's Ex'rs, 2 How. 198.
Mr. Web~ter's argument that Christianity is a part of the law of Pennsylvania, is gi\'en in 6 'Vebster's Worb,
p. 175.
1 Sllaw, Ch. J., in Commonwealth t1. Kneeland, 20 Pick. 218.
3 People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290; Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 20 Pick.
218; Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 S. & R. 394; State v. Chandler, 2 Harr.
558; Rex v. Waddington, 1 B. & C. 26 ; Rex v. Carlile, 3 B. & Ald. 161 ;
Cowan v. Milbourn, Law R. 2 Exl·h. 280.
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to reproach the Christian religion is to speak in subversion of the

law.”1 Eminent judges in this country have adopted this

language, and applied it to prosecutions for blasphemy, where the

charge consisted in malicious ridicule of the Author and Founder

of the Christian religion. The early cases in New York and Mas-

sachusetts? are particularly marked by clearness and precision on

this point, and Mr. Justice Clayton of Delaware has also adopted

and followed the ruling of Lord Chief Justice Hale, with such

explanations of the true basis and justification of these prosecutions

as to give us a clear understanding of the maxim that Christianity

is a part of the law of the land, as understood and applied by

the courts in these cases.“ Taken with the explanation

"given, there is nothing in the maxim of which the [* 474]

believer in any creed or the disbeliever of all can justly

complain. The language which the Christian regards as blas-

phemous no man in sound mind can feel under a sense of duty to

make use of under any circumstances, and no person is" therefore

1 The King v. Taylor, 3 Keb. 607, Vent. 293. See also The King v. Wool-

aston, 2 Stra. 844, Fitzg. 64, Raym. 162, in which the defendant was convicted

of publishing libels, ridiculing the miracles of Christ, his life and conversation.
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Lord Ch. J. Raymond in that case says: “ I would have it taken notice of. that

we do not meddle with the difference of opinion, and that we interfere only where

the root of Christianity is struck at."

to reproach the Cluistian religion is to speak in subversion of the
law." 1 Eminent judges in this country have adopted this
' language, and applied it to prosecutions for blasphemy, where the
charge consisted in malicious ridicule of the Author and Founder
of the Christian religion. The early cases in New York and Massachusetts 2 are particularly marked by clearness and precision on
this point, and Mr. Justice Clayton of Delaware has also adopted
and followed the ruling of Lord Chief Justice Hale, with such
explanations of the true basis and justification of these prosecutions
as to give us a clear understanding of the maxim that Christianity
is a part of the law of the laud, as understood and applied by
the courts in these cases.8 Taken with the explanation
• given, there is nothing in the maxim of which the [* 474]
believer in any creed or the disbeliever of all can justly
complain. The language which the Christian regards as blasphemous no man in sound mind can feel under a sense of duty to
make use of under any circumstances, and no person is· therefore

’ People v. Ruggles, '8 Johns. 291; Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 20 Pick.

203.

° State v. Chandler, 2 Harr. 555. The case is very full, clear, and instruc-

tive, and cites all the English and American authorities. The conclusion at

which it arrives is, that “ Christianity was never considered a. part of the com-

mon law, so far as that for a violation of its injunctions, independent of the

established laws of man, and without the sanction of any positive act of Parlia-

ment made to enforce those injunctions, any man could be drawn to answer in a

common-law court. It was a part of the common law, ‘ so far that any person

reviling, subverting. or ridiculing it might be prosecuted at common law’ as

Lord Mamgﬁcld has declared ; because, in the judgment of our English ancestors

and their judicial tribunals, he who reviled, subverted, or ridiculed Christianity,

did an act which struck at the foundation of our civil society, and tended by its

necessary consequences to disturb that common peace of the land of which (as

Lord Coke had reported), the common law was the preserver. The common law

. . . adapted itself to the religion of the country just so far as was necessary for

the peace and safety of civil institutions; but it took cognizance of offences against

God only when, by their inevitable effects, they became oﬂ‘ences against man

and his temporal security.” See, also, what is said on this subject by Duer, J .,

in Andrew v. Bible Society, 4 Sandf. 182.
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The King"· Taylor, 8 Keb. 607, Vent. 298. See also The King"· Woolaston, 2 Stra. 844, Fitzg. 64, Raym. 162, iu which the defendant was convicted
of publishing libels, ridiculing the miracles of Christ, his life and conversation.
Lord Ch. J. Raymond in that case says: "I would have it taken notice of, that
we do not meddle with the difference of opinion, and that we interfere only where
the root of Christianity is stru<'k at."
1 People " · Ruggles, 's Johns. 291; Commonwealth "· Kneeland, 20 Pick.
203.
3 State "· Chandler, 2 Harr. 655.
The case is very full, clear, and instructive, and cites all the Engli~h and American authorities. The conclusion at
which it arrives is, that " Christianity was never considered a part of the common law, so far as that for R violation of its injunctio~s. independent of the
established laws of man, and without the sanction of any posit-ive act of Parliament made to enforce those injunctions, any man could be drawn to answer in a
common-law court. It WA!l a part of the common law, 'so far that any person
reviling, subverting, or ridiculing it might be prosecuted at common law' as
J,ord Mansfield has declared; because, in the judgment of our Englilih ancestors
and their judicial tribunals, he who reviled, subverted, or ridiculed Christianity,
did an act which struck at the foundation of our civil society, and tended by its
necessary consequence!! to disturb that common peace of the land of which (as
Lord Coke had reported), the common law was the preserver. The common law
. . • adapted itself to the religion of the country just so far as was necessary for
the peace and safety of civil institutions ; but it took cognizance of offenc~s against
God only when, by their inevitable effe<'ts, they became offences against man
and his temporal security." See, also, '"hat is said on this subject by Duer, J .,
in Andrew"· Bible Society, 4: Sandf. 182.
1
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deprived of a right when he is prohibited, under penalties, from

[cH. XIII.

uttering it. _

But it does not follow, because blasphemy is punishable as a

crime, that therefore one is not at liberty to dispute and argue

against the truth of the Christian religion, or of any accepted

dogma. Its “ divine origin and truth ” are not so far admitted in

the law as to preclude their being controverted. To forbid discus-

sion on this subject, except by the various sects of believers,

would be to abridge the liberty of speech and of the press in a

point which, with many, would be regarded as most important of

all. Blasphemy implies something more than a denial of any of

the truths of religion, even of the highest and most vital. A bad

motive must exist; there must be a wilful and malicious attempt

to lessen men’s reverence for the Deity, or for the accepted

religion. But outside of such wilful and malicious attempt, there

is a broad ﬁeld for candid investigation and discussion, which is as

much open to the Jew and the Mahometan as to the professors of

the Christiantfaith. “ No author or printer who fairly and conscien-

tiously promulgates the opinions with whose truths he is impressed,

for the beneﬁt of others, is answerable as a criminal. A malicious

and mischievous intention is, in such a case, the broad boundary

between right and wrong; it is to be collected from the offen-
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sive levity, scurillous and opprobrious language, and other circum-

stances, whether the act of the party was malicions.”1 Legal

blasphemy implies that the words were uttered in a wanton

manner,“ with a wicked and malicious disposition, and not in a

serious discussion upon any controverted point in religion.” 2 The

courts have always been careful, in administering the law, to say

that they did not intend to include in blasphemy disputes between

' Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 S. & R. 394. In Ayres v. Methodist

Church, 3 Sandf. 377, Duer, J., in speaking of “ pious uses,” says: “ If the

Presbyterian and the Baptist, the Methodist and the Protestant Episcopalian must

each be allowed to devote the entire income of his real and personal estate, for-

ever, to the support of missions, or the spreading of the Bible, so must the

Roman Catholic his to the endowment of a monastery, or the founding of a per-

petual mass for the safety of his soul; the Jew his to the translation and publi-

cation of the Mishna or the Talmud, and the Mahometan (if in that collm.-{es

gentium to which this city [New York], like ancient Rome, seems to be doomed,

such shall be among us), the Mahometan his to the assistance or relief of the

annual pilgrims to Mecca.”

' People v. Ruggles, B Johns. ‘.293, per Kent, Ch. J.

1I

deprived of a right when he is prohibited, under penalties, from
uttering it.
.
But it does not follow, because blasphemy is punishable as a
crime, that therefore one is not at liberty to dispute and argue
against the truth of the Christian religion, or of any accepted
dogma. Its " divine origin and truth" are not so far admitted in
the law as to preclude their being controverted. To forbid discussion on this subject, except by the various sects of believers,
would be to abridge the liberty of speech and of the press in a
point which, with many, would be regarded as most important of
all. Blasphemy implies something more than a denial of any of
the truths of religion, even of the highest and most vital. A. bad
motive must exist ; there must be a wilful and malicious attempt
to lessen men's reverence for the Deity, or for the accepted
religion. But outside of such wilful and malicious attempt, there
is a broad field for candid investigation and discussion, which is as
much open to the Jew and the Mahometau ns to tho professors of
the Christian..faith. "No author or printer who fairly and conscientiously promulgates the opinions with whose truths he is impressed,
for the benefit of others, is answerable as a criminal. A malicious
and mischievous intention is, in such a case, the broad boundary
between right and wrong ; it is to· be collected from the offensive levity, scurillous and opprobrious language, and other circumstances, whether the act of the party was malicious." 1 Legal
blasphemy implies that the words were uttered in a wanton
manner, "with a wicked and malicious disposition, and not in a
serious discussion upon any controverted point in religion." 2 The
courts have always been careful, in administering the law, to say
that they did not intend to include in blasphemy disputes between

[522 ]

Updegraph "· Commonwealth, 11 S. & R. 39!. In Ayres "· Methodist
Church, 3 Sandf. 377, Duer, J., in speaking of "pious uses,'' says: "If the
Presbyterian and the Baptist, the Methodist and the Prott>stant Episcopalian must
each be allowed to devote the entire income of his real and personal estate, forever, to the support of missions, or the spreading of the Bible, so must the
Roman Catholic his to the endowment of a monastery, or the founding of a perpetual mass for the safety of his soul; the Jew his to the translation and publication of the Mishna or the Talmud, and the Mabomctan (if in that colluviu
gentium to which this city [New York], like ancient Rome, seems to be doomed,
such shall be among us), the Mahometan his to the assistance or relief of the
annual pilgrims to Mecca."
1 People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 293, per Kent, Ch. J.
1
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learned men upon particular controverted points} The

constitutional *provisions for the protection of religious [* 475]

liberty not only include within their protecting power all

sentiments and professions concerning or upon the subject of

religion, but they guarantee to every one a perfect right to form

and to promulgate such opinions and doctrines upon religious

matters, and in relation to the existence, power, attributes, and

providence of a Supreme Being as to himself shall seem reasonable

and correct. In doing this he acts under an awful responsibility,

but it is not to any human tribunal.”

' Rex v. Woolaston, Stra. 834, Fitzg. 64; People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 293,

per Kent, Ch. J.

' Per Shaw, Ch. J., in Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 20 Pick. 234. The lan-

guage of the courts has perhaps not always been as guarded as it should have

learned men upon particular controverted points.! The
constitutional • pro'Visions for the protection of religious [• 475]
liberty not only include within their protecting power all
sentiments and professions concerning or upon t11e subject of
religion, but they guarantee to every one a perfect right to form
and to promulgate such opinions and doctrines upon religious
matters, and in relation to the existence, power, attributes, and
providence of a Supreme Being as to himself shall seem reasonable
and correct. In doing this be acts under an awful responsibility,
but it is not to any human tribuua1. 2

been on this subject. In the King v. \Vaddington, 1 B. & C. 26, the defendant

was on trial for blasphemous libel, in saying that Jesus Christ was an impostor,

and a murderer in principle. One of the jurors asked the Lord Chief Justice

(Abbott), whether a work which denied the divinity of the Saviour was a libel.

The Lord Chief Justice replied that “ a work speaking of Jesus Christ in the

language used in the publication in question was a libel, Christianity being a
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part of the law of the land.” This was doubtless true, as the wrong motive was

apparent; but it did not answer the juror’s question. On motion for a new trial,

the remarks of Best, J ., are open to a construction which answers the question

in the atlirmative: “ My Lord Chief Justice reports to us that he told the jury

that it was an indictable oﬂ'ence to speak of Jesus Christ in the manner in which

he is spoken ofin the publication for which this defendant is indicted. It cannot

admit of the least doubt that this direction was correct. The 53 Geo. III. c. 160,

has made no alteration in the common law relative to libel. If, previous to the

passing of that statute, it would have been a libel to deny, in any printed book,

the divinity of the second person in the Trinity, the same publication would be

a libel now. The 53 Geo. III. c. 160, as its title expresses, is an act to relieve

persons who impugn the doctrine of the Trinity from certain penalties. If we

look at the body of the act to see from what penalties such parties are relieved,

we ﬁnd that they are the penalties from which the 1 \V. & M. Sess. 1, c. 18,

exempted all Protestant dissenters, except such as denied the Trinity, and the

penalties or disabilities which the 9 & 10 \V. III. imposed on those who denied

the Trinity. The 1 lV. & M. Sess. 1, c. 18, is, as it has been usually called, an

act of toleration, or one which allows dissenters to worship God in the mode that

is agreeable to their religious opinions, and exempts them from punishment for

non-attendance at the Established Church and non-conformity to its rights. The

legislature, in passing that act, only thought of easing the conscience of dis-

senters, ancl not of allowing them to attempt to weaken the faith of the members

of the church. The 9 & 10 W. III. was to give security to the government, by

rendering men incapable of otiice, who entertained opinions hostile to the estab-

lished religion. The only penalty imposed by that statute is exclusion from
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Rex 11. Woolaston, Stra. 834, Fitzg. 64; People"· Ruggles, 8 Johns. 293,
per Kmt, Ch. J.
1 Per ShauJ, Ch. J., in Commonwealth"· Kneeland, 20 Pick. 234.
The language of the courts bas perhaps not always been as guarded as it should have
been on this subject. In the King 11. Waddington, 1 B. & C. 26, the defendant
was on trial for blasphemous libel, in saying that Jesus Christ was an impostor,
and a murderer in principle. One of the jurors asked the Lord Chief Justice
(Abbott), whether a work which denied the divinity of the Saviour was a libel.
The Lord Chief Justice replied that " a work speaking of Jesus Christ in the
language used in the publication in question was a libel, Christianity being a
part of the law of the land." This was doubtless true, as the wrong motive was
apparent; but it did not answer the juror's question. On motion for a new trial,
the remarks of Best, J ., are open to a construction which answers the question
jn the affirmative: "My Lord Chief Justice reports to us that he told the jury
that it was an indictable offence to speak of Jesus Christ in the manner in which
be is Rpoken of in the publication for which this def~ndant is indicted. It cannot
admit of the least doubt that this direction was correct. The o3 Geo. III. c. 160,
has made no alteration in the common law relative to libel. If, previous to th~
passing of that statute, it would ha,·e been a libel to deny, in any printed book,
the divinity of the second person in the Trinity, the same publication would be
a libel now. The .')3 Geo. III. c. 160, as its title expresses, is an act to relieve
persons who impugn the doctrine of the Trinity from certain penalties. If we
look at the body of the act to see from what penalties such parlies are relieved,
we fintl that tht>y are the penalties from which the 1 ,V. & .M. Seas. 1, c. 18,
exempted all Protestant dissenters, except such as denied the Trinity, and the
pem~lties or disabilities which the 9 & 10 W. III. imposed on those who denied
the Trinity. The 1 W. & M. Sess. 1, c. 18, is, as it bas been usually called, an
act of toleration, or one which allows dissenters to worship God in the mode that
is agreeable to their religious opinions, and exempts them from punishment for
non-attendance at the E!>tahli~hed Church and non-conformity to its rights. The
legislature, in passing that act, only thought of easing the conscience of dissenters, and not of allowing them to attempt to weaken the faith of the members
of the .:burch. The 9 & 10 ,V. III. was to give security to the government, by
rendering men incapable of office, who entertained opiniona hostile to the established religion. The only penalty imposed by that statute is exclusion from
1
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are also made punishable by statutes in the several States.

The cases these statutes take notice of are of a character no one

can justify, and their punishment involves no question of religious

liberty. The right to use profane and indecent language is recog-

nized by no religious creed, and the practice is reprobated by right

thinking men of every nation and every religious belief. The

statutes for the punishment of public profanity require no further

justiﬁcation than the natural impulses of every man who believes

in a Supreme Being and recognizes his right to the reverence of his

creatures.

The laws against the desecration of the Christian Sabbath, by

labor or sports, are not so readily defensible by arguments the force

of which will be felt and admitted by all. It is no hardship to any

one to compel him to abstain from public blasphemy or other

profanity, and none can complain that his rights of conscience are

invaded by this enforced respect to a prevailing religious sentiment.

But the Jew who is forced to respect the ﬁrst day of the week,

oﬁice, and that penalty is incurred by any manifestation of the dangerous opinion,

without proof of intention in the person entertaining it, either to induce others

to be of that opinion, or in any manner to disturb persons of a diﬂerent per-

suasion. This statute rested on the principle of the tcst laws, and did not
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interfere with the common law relative to hlasphemous libels. It is not necessary

for me to say whether it be libellous to argue from the Scriptures against the

divinity of Christ; that is not what the defendant professes to do; he argues

against the divinity of Christ by denying the truth of the Scriptures. A work

containing such arguments, published maliciously (which the jury in this case

[ *476]

• Other forms of profanity, besides that of blasphemy,
are also made punishable by statutes in the several States.
The cases these statutes take notice of are of a character no one
cnu justify, and their punishment involves no question of religious
liberty. The right to use profane and indecent language is recognized by no religious creed, and the practice is reprobated by right
thinking men of every nation and every religious belief. The
statutes for the punishment of public profanity require no further
justification than the natural impulses of every man who believes
in a Supreme Being and recognizes his right to the reverence of his
creatures.
The laws against the desecration of the Christian Sabbath, by
labor or sports, are not so readily defensible by arguments the force
of which will be felt and admitted by all. It is no hardship to any
one to compel him to abstain from public blasphemy or other
profanity, and no~1e cn.n complain that his rights of conscience are
invaded by this enforced respect to a prevailing religious sentiment.
But the Jew who is forced to respect the first day of the week,

have found), is by the common law a libel, and the legislature has never altered

this law, nor can it ever do so while the Christian religion is considered the

basis of that law.” It is a little ditﬁcult, perhaps, to determine precisely how

far this opinion was designed to go in holding that the law forbids the public

denial of the truth of the Scriptures. That arguments against it, made in good

faith by those who do not accept it, are legitimate and rightful. we think there

is no doubt; and the learned judge doubtless meant to admit as much when

he required a malicious publication as an ingredient in the offence. However,

when we are considering what is the common law of England and of this country

as regards offences against God and religion, the existence of a State church in

that country, and the effect of its recognition upon the law, are circumstances to

be kept constantly in view.

In People v. Porter, 2 Park. Cr. R. 14, the defence of drunkenness was made

to a prosecution for a blasphemous libel. Walworth, Circuit Judge, presiding at

the trial, declared the intoxication of defendant, at the time of uttering the

words, to be an aggravation of the offence rather than an excuse.
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office, and that penalty is incurred by any manifestation of the dangerous opinion,
without proof of intention in the person entertaining it, either to induce othcH
to be of that opinion, or in any manner to disturb persons of a diffcn-nt persuasion. This statute rested on the prim·iple of the test laws, and did not
interfere with the t•ommon law relative to blasphemous libels. It is not necessary
for me to ~ay whether it be libellous to argue from the Scriptures against the
divinity of Christ; that is not what the defendant professes to do; he argues
against the divinity of Christ by d.cnying the truth of the Scriptures. A work
containing such arguments, published maliciously (which the jury in this case
ha\'e found), is by the common law a libel, and the legislature has never altered
this law, nor can it ever do so while the Christian religion is considered the
basis of that law,, It is a little difficult, perhap~. to determine precisely how
far this opinion was designed to go in holding that the law forbids the public
denial of the truth of the Scriptures. That arguments against it, made in good
f.1ith by those who do not accept it, are legitimate and rightful, we think there
is no doubt; and the learned judge doubtless meant to admit as much when
be required a malicious publication as an ingredient in the offence. However,
when we are considering what is the common law of England and of this country
as regards offences against God and religion, the existence of a State church in
that country, and the effect of its recognition upon the law, are circumstances to
be kept constantly in view.
In People v. Porter, 2 Park. Cr. R . 14, the defence of dmnkenness was made
to a proset·ution for a blasphemous libel. Walworth, Circuit Judge, presiding at
the trial, declared the intoxication of defendant, at the time of uttering the
words, to be an aggravation of the offence rather than an excuse.
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when his conscience requires of him the observance of the seventh

also, may plausibly urge that the law discriminates against his

religion, and by forcing him to keep a second Sabbath in each

week, unjustly, though by indirection, punishes him for his belief.

The laws which prohibit ordinary employments on Sunday are

to be defended either on the same grounds which justify the

punishment of profanity, or as establishing sanitary regulations

based upon the demonstration of experience that one day’s rest in

seven is needful to recuperate the exhausted energies of

body and mind. If ‘sustained on the ﬁrst ground, the ["‘ -177]

View must be that such laws only require the proper defer-

ence and regard which those not accepting the common belief may

justly be required to pay to the public conscience. The Supreme

Court of Pennsylvania have preferred to defend such legislation on

the second ground rather than the ﬁrst ; 1 but it appears to us that

if the beneﬁt to the individual is alone to be considered, the argu-

ment against the law which he may make who has already observed

the seventh day of the week is unanswerable. But on the other

ground it is clear that these laws are supportable on authority,

' “It intermeddles not with the natural and indefeasible right of all men to

worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences; it
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compels none to attend, erect, or support any place of worship, or to maintain

any ministry against his consent; it pretends not to control or to interfere with

the rights of conscience, and it establishes no preference for any religious estab-

lishment or mode of worship. It treats no religious doctrine as paramount in

the State; it enforces no unwilling attendance upon the celebration of divine

worship. It says not to the Jew or Sabbatarian, ‘ You shall dcsecrate the day

when his conscience requires of him the observance of the seventh
also, may plausibly urge that the law discriminates against his
religion, and by forcing him to keep a second Sabbath in each
week, unjustly, though by indirection, punishes him for his beliof.
The laws which prohibit ordinary employments on Sunday are
to be defended either on the same grounds which justify the
punishment of profanity, or as establishing sanitary regulations
based upon the demonstration of experience that one day's rest in
seven is needful to recuperate the exhausted energies of
body and mind. If • sustained on the first ground, the [• 477]
view must be that such laws only require the proper deference and regard which those not accepting the common belief may
justly be required to pay to the public conscience. The Su1weme
Court of Pennsylvania have preferred to defend such legislation on
the second ground rather than the first; 1 but it appears to us that
if the benefit to the individual is alone to be considered, the argument against the law which he may make who has already observed
the seventh day of the week is unanswerable. But on the other
ground it is clear that these laws are supportable on authority,

you esteem as holy, and keep sacred to religion that we deem to be so.’ It

enters upon no discussion of rival claims of the ﬁrst and seventh (lays of the

week, nor pretends to bind upon the conscience of any man any conclusion upon

a subject which each must decide for himself. It intrudes not into the domestic

circle to dictate when, where, or to what god its inmates shall address their

orisons; nor does it presume to enter the synagogue of the Israelite, or the

church of the seventh-day Christian, to command or even persuade their attend-

ance in the temples of those who especially approach the altar on Sunday. It

does not in the slightest degree infringe upon the Sabbath of any sect, or curtail

their freedom of worship. It detracts not one hour from any period of time

they may feel bound to devote to this object, nor does it add a moment beyond

what they may choose to employ. Its sole mission is to inculcate a temporary

weekly cessation from labor, but it adds not to this requirement any religious

obligation." Specht v..Commonwcalth, 8 Penn. St. 312. See also Charleston

v. Benjamin, 2 Strob. 508; Bloom v. Richards, 2 Ohio St. 387; McGatrick v.

\Vason, 3 Ohio St. 566.
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1 "It intermeddlt•s not with the natural and indefeasible right of all men to
wo1·ship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences; it
compels none to attend, erect, or support any place of worship, or to maintain
an~· ministry against his consent; it pretends not to control or to intt·rfere with
tht- rights of cons<·ience, and it establishes no preferenee for any religious establishment or mode of worship. It treats no religious doctrine as paramount in
the State; it enforces no unwilling attendance upon the celebration of divine
wor~hip. It ~ays not to the Jew or Sabbatarian, • You shall desecrate the day
you esteem as holy, and keep saered to religion that we deem to be so.' It
entt•!"l! upon no discussion of rival claims of the first and seventh days of tho
w<•ck. nor pretends to bind upon the conscience of any man any conclusion upon
a suhjed which each must deeide for himself. It intrudes not into the domestic
circle to dictate when, where, or to what god its inmates shall address their
orisons; nor does it presume to enter the synagogue of the Israelite, or the
chtm·h of the scventh-tlay Christian, to command or even persuade their attendance in the temples of those who especially approach the altar on Sunday. It
does not in the slightt-st degree infringe upon the Sabbath of any sect, or curtail
their freedom of worship. It detracts not one hour from any period of time
they may feel bound to devote to this object, nor does it add a moment beyond
what they may choose to employ. Its sole mission is to inculcate a temporary
weekly cessation from labor, but it adds not to this requirement any religious
obligation." Specht v•. Commonwealth, 8 Penn. St. 312. See also Charleston
r. Benjamin, 2 Stroh. 508; Bloom v. Richards, 2 Ohio St. 387 ; 1\IcGatrick o.
Wason, 3 Ohio St. 566.
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notwithstanding the inconvenience which they occasion to those

whose religious sentiments do not recognize the sacred character

of the ﬁrst day of the week.1 .

Whatever deference the constitution or the laws may require to

be paid in some eases to the conscientious scruples or religious

convictions of the majority, the general policy always is,

[" 478] to ‘avoid with care any compulsion which infringes on

the religious scruples of any, however little reason may

seem to others to underlie them. Even in the important matter

of bearing arms for the public defence, those who cannot in

conscience take part are excused, and their proportion of this

great and sometimes imperative burden is borne by the rest of the

community.”

Some-of the State constitutions have also done away with the

distinction which existed at the common law regarding the admis-

sibility of testimony in some cases. All religions were recognized

by the law to the extent of allowing all persons to be sworn and to

give evidence who believed in a superintending Providence who

rewards and punishes, and that an oath was binding on their

conscience.“ But the want of such belief rendered the person

‘ Commonwealth v. Wolf, 8 S. & R. 50; Commonwealth v. Fisher, 17 S. &

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:22 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105011581
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

R. 160; Shover v. State, 5 Eng. 529, Voglesong v. State, 9 Ind. 112; State 1:.

Ambs, 20 Mo. 214; Cincinnati v. Rice, 15 Ohio, 225. In Simonds‘s Ex‘rs Gratz, 2 Pen. & Watts, 416, it was held that the conscientious scruples of a Jew

to appear and attend a trial of his cause on Saturday were not sutﬁcient cause

for a continuance. But quccre of this. In Frolickstein v. Mayor of Mobile,

40 Ala. 725, it was held that a statute or municipal ordinance prohibiting the

sale ofgoods by merchants on Sunday, in its application to religious Jews “ who

believe that it is their religious duty to abstain from work on Saturdays, and to

notwithstanding the inconvenience which they occasion to those
whose religious sentiments do not recognize the sacred character
of the first day of the week.l
Whatever deference the constitution or the laws may require to
be paid in some cases to the conscientious scruples or religious
convictions of the majority, the general policy always is,
[• 4 78] to • avoid with care any compulsion which infringes on
the religious scruples of any, however little reason may
seem to others to underlie them. Even iu the important matter
of bearing arms for the public defence, those who cannot in
conscience take part are excused, and their proportion of this
great and sometimes imperative burden is borne by the rest of the
community.2
Some -of the State constitutions have also done away with the
distinction which existed at the common law regarding the admissibility of testimony in some cases. All religions were recognized
by the law to the extent of allowing all persons to be sworn and to
give evidence who believed in a superintending Providence who
rewards and punishes, and that an oath was binding on their
conscience.8 But the want of such belief rendered the person

work on all the other six days of the week,” was not violative of the article

in the State constitution which declares that no person shall, “ upon any pretence

whatsoever, be hurt, molested, or restrained in his religious sentiments or per-

suasions."

' There are constitutional provisions to this eﬁ'ect in New Hampshire, Ala-

bama, Texas, Illinois, Indiana, Vermont, and Tennessee, and statutory provis-

ions in other States.

' See upon this point the leading case of Omiichund v. Barker, \Villes. 538,

and 1 Smith’s Leading Cases, 535, where will be found a full discussion of this

subject. Some of the earlier American cases required of a witness that he should

believe in the existence of God. and of a state of rewards and punishments after

the present life. See especially Atwood v. Welton, 7 Conn. 66. But this rule

did not generally obtain; belief in a Supreme Being who would punish false

swearing, whether in this world or in the world to come, being regarded suﬂicient.
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1 Commonwealth"· Wolf, 8 S. & R. 50; Commonwealth"· Fisher, 17 S. &
R . 160; Shover v. State, 5 Eng. 529; Voglesong "· State, 9 Ind. 112; State "·
Ambs, 20 Mo. 214; Cincinnati "· Rice, 15 Ohio, 225. In Simonds'11 Ex'rs v.
Gratz, 2 Pen. & Watts, 416, it was held that the consdentious scruples of a Jew
to appear and attend a trial of his cawe on Saturday were not sufficient cause
for a continuance. But qurere of this. In Frolickstein "· Mayor of 1\Iobile,
40 Ala. 725, it was held that a statute or municipal ordinance prohibiting the
sale of goods by merchants on Sunday, in its application to religious Jews "who
believe that it is their religious duty to abstain from work on Saturdays, and to
work on all the other six days of the week," was not violative of the article
in the State constitution whil·h declares that no person shall, "upon any preten<-'e
whatsoever, be hurt, molested, or restrained in his religious sentiments or persuasions."
1 There are constitutional provisions to this effect in New Hampshire, Alabama, Texas, Illinois, Indiana, Vermont, and Tennessee, and statutory provisions in other States.
1 See upon this point the leading case of Ormichund t1. Barker, Willes, 5S8,
and 1 Smith's Leading Cases, 535, where will be found a fuU discussion of this
subject. !3ome of the earlier American cases required of a witness that he should
believe in the existence of God, and of a state of rewards and punishmenl!l after
the present life. See especially Atwood v. Welton, 7 Conn. 66. But this rule
did not generally obtain ; belief in a Supreme Being who woulrl punish false
swearing, whether in this world or in the world to come, ht!ing regarded sufficient.

[ 526]

v.·~·
•..

* " W”

ca. xu1.] or RELIGIOUS LIBERTY. "‘ 478

CH. XIII.]

• 478

OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY.

incompetent. Wherever the common law remains unchanged, it

must, we suppose, be held no violation of religions liberty to

recognize and enforce its distinctions ; but the tendency is to do away

with them entirely, or to allow one’s unbelief to go to his credi-

bility only, if taken into account at all.‘

Cnbbison v. McCreary, 7 W. & S. 262; Blocker v. Burness, 2 Ala. 854; Jones

v. Harris, 1 Strob. 160; Shaw v. Moore. 4 Jones, 25; Hunscum v. Hunscum, 15

Mass. 184; Brock v. Milligan, 10 Ohio, 121; Bennett v. State, 1 Swan, 411;

incompetent. Wherever the common law remains unchanged, it
must, we suppose, be held no violation of . religious liberty to
recognize and enforce its distinctions ; but the tendency is to do away
with them entirely, or to allow one's unbelief to go to his credibility only, if taken into account at ali.l

Central R.R. Co. v. Rockafellow, 17 Ill. 541; Arnold v. Arnold, 13 Vt. 362.

But one who lacked this belief was not sworn, because there was no mode known

to the law by which it was supposed an oath could be made binding upon his

conscience. Arnold v. Arnold, 13 Vt. 362.

' The States of Iowa, Minnesota, Michigan, Oregon, ‘Vise-onsin, and New

York have constitutional provisions expressly doing away with incompeteney

from want of religious belief. Perhaps the general provisions in some of the

other constitutions declaring complete equality of civil rights, privileges, and

capacities are sufficiently broad to accomplish the same purpose. Perry’s Case,

3 Grat. 632. In Michigan a witness is not to be questioned concerning his

religious belief. People v. Jenness, 5 Mich. 305.
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Cubbison v. l\lcCreary, 7 W. & S. 262; Blocker v. Burness, 2 Ala. 854; Jones
v. Harris, 1 Stroh. 160; Shaw v. Moore. 4 Jones, 25; Hunscum v. Hunscum, 15
:Mass. 184; Brock v. Milligan, 10 Ohio, 121; Bennett v. State, 1 Swan, 411;
Central R.R. Co. v. Rockafellow, 17 111. 541; Arnold v. Arnold, 13 Vt. 362.
But one who lacked this belief was not sworn, because there was no mode known
to the law by which it was supposed an oath could be made binding upon his
conscience. Arnold v. Arnold, 13 Vt. 362.
1 The States of Iowa, Minnesota, Michigan, Oregon, \Visconsin, and New
York have constitutional provisions expressly doing away with incompetency
from want of religious belief. Perhaps the general provisions in some of the
other constitutions declaring complete equality of civil rights, privileges, and
capacities are sufficiently broad to accomplish the same purpose. Perry's Case,
3 Grat. 632. In Michigan a witness is not to be questioned concerning his
religious belief. People v. Jenness, 5 Mich. 305.
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THE POWER or TAXATION. '

THE power to impose taxes is one so unlimited in force and

so searching in extent, that the courts scarcely venture to de-

clare that it is subject to any restrictions whatever, except such

as rest in the discretion of the authority which exercises it.

It reaches to every trade or occupation ; to every object of indus-

try, use, or enjoyment; to every species of possession; and it

*CHAPTER XIV.

[* 479]

imposes a burden which, in case of failure to discharge it, may

be followed by seizure and sale or conﬁscation of property. N0

THE POWER

attribute of sovereignty is more pervading, and at no point

OF TAXATION.

•

does the power of the government affect more constantly and inti-

mately all the relations of life than through the exactions made

under it.

Taxes are deﬁned to be burdens or charges imposed by the

legislative power upon persons or property, to raise money for

public purposes} The power to tax rests upon necessity, and is

inherent in every sovereignty. The legislature of every free State

will possess it under the general grant of legislative power,

whether particularly specified in the constitution among the

powers to be exercised by it or not. No constitutional govern-

ment can exist without it, and no arbitrary government without
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regular and steady taxation could be any thing but an oppressive

and vexatious despotism, since the only alternative to taxation

would be a forced extortion for the needs of government from such

persons or objects as the men in power might select as victims.

Chief Justice Marshall has said of this power: “The power of

taxing the people and their property is essential to the very

‘ Blackwell on Tax Titles, 1. A tax is a contribution imposed by govern-

ment on individuals for the service of the State. It is distinguished from a

subsidy as being certain and orderly, which is shown in its derivation from

Greek, 1-6.51;, 01-do, order or arrangement. Jacob, Law Die. ; Bouvier Law Dic.

“ The revenues ofa State are a portion that each subject gives of his property

in order to secure, or to have, the agreeable enjoyment of the remainder.”

Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, B. 12, c. 30.

i— ~.
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THE power to impose taxes is one so unlimited in force and
so searching in extent, that the courts scarcely venture to declare that it is subject to any restrictions whatever, except such
as rest in the discretion of the authority which exercises it.
It reaches to every trade or occupation ; to every object of industry, use, or enjoyment ; to every species of possession ; and it
imposes a burden which, in case of failure to discharge it, may
be followed by seizure and sale or confiscation of property. No
attribute of sovereignty is more pervading, and at no point
does the power of the government affect more constantly and intimately all the relations of life than through the exactions made
under it.
Taxes are defined to be burdens or charges imposed by the
legislative power upon persons or property, to raise money for
public purposes.1 The power to tax rests upon necessity, and is
inherent in every sovereignty. The legislature of every free State
will possess it under the general grant of legislative power,
whether particularly specified in the constitution among the
powers to be exercised by it or not. No constitutional government can exist without it, and no arbitrary government without
regular and steady taxation could be any thing but an oppressive
and vexatious despotism, since the only alternative to taxation
would be a forced extortion for the needs of government from such
persons or objects as the men in power might select as victims.
Chief Justice Marshall has said of this power: " The power of
taxing the people and their property is essential to the very
1 Blackwell on Tax Titles, 1.
A tax is a contribution imposed by government on individuals for the service of the State. It is distinguished from a
subsidy as being certain and orderly, which is shown in its derivation from
Greek, r~tr, ordo, order or arrangement. Jacob, Law Die.; Bouvier Law Die.
"The revenues of a State are a portion that each subject gives of his property
in order to secure, or to have, the agreeable enjoyment of the remainder."
Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, B. 12, c. 30.
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the objects to which it is applicable to the utmost extent to which

the government may choose to carry it. The only security against

the abuse of this power is found in the structure of the

government itself. In imposing a ‘tax, the legislature ["480]

acts upon its constituents. This is, in general, a suf-

ﬁcient security against-erroneous and oppressive taxation. The

people of a State, therefore. give to their government a right

of taxing themselves and their property ; and as the exigencies of

the government cannot be limited, they prescribe no limits to the

exercise of this right, resting conﬁdently on the interest of the

legislator, and on the inﬂuence of the constituents over their

representative, to guard them against its abuse/’1

And the same high authority has said in another case: “The

power of legislation, and consequently of taxation, operates on all

persons and property belonging to the body politic. This is an

original principle, which has its foundation in society itself. It is

granted by all for the beneﬁt of all. It resides in the government

as part of itself, and need not be reserved where property of any

description, or the right to use it in any manner, is granted to in-

dividuals or corporate bodies. However absolute the right of any

individual may be, it is still in the nature of that right that it
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must bear a portion of the public burdens, and that portion must

be determined by the legislature. This vital power may be abused ;

but the interest, wisdom, and justice of the representative body,

and its relations with its constituents, furnish the only security

against unjust and excessive taxation, as well as against unwise

taxation.”2 And again, the same judge says it is “ unﬁt for the

judicial department to inquire what degree of taxation is the

legitimate use, and what degree may amount to the abuse, of

the power.”8 And the same general views have been frequently

expressed in other cases.‘

Notwithstanding the pervading nature of this power, there are

.-

McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 428.

Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 561.

McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 ¥Vheat. 430.

‘ Kirby v. Shaw, 19 Penn. St. 260; Sharpless v. Mayor, &c. 21 Penn. St.

168; \Veister v. Hade, 52 Penn. St. 478; \Vingate v. Sluder, 6 Jones, Law, 552;

Herrick v. Randolph, 13 Vt. 529; Armington v. Barnet, 15 Vt. 745; Thomas v.

Leland, 24 \Vend. 65; People v. Mayor, &c., of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 425; Portland

Bank v. Apthorp, 12 Mass. 252.
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existence of government, and may be legitimately exercised on
the objects to which it is applicable to the utmost extent to which
the government may choose to carry it. The only security against
the abuse of this power is found in the structure of the
government itself. In imposing a • tax, the legislature [* 480]
acts upon its constituents. This is, in general, a sufficient security against •erroneous and oppressive taxation. The
people of a State, therefore. gi~e to their government a right
of taxing themselves and their property ; and as the exigencies of
t.he government cannot be limited, they prescribe no limits to the
exercise of this right, resting confidently on the interest of the
legislator, and on the influence of the constituents over their
representative, to guard them against its abuse." 1
And the same high authority has said in another case : " The
power of legislation, and consequently of taxation, operates on all
persons and property belonging to the body politic. This is an
original principle, which has its foundation in society itself. It is
granted by all for the benefit of all. It resides in the govemment
as part of itself, and need not be reserved where property of any
description, or the right to uso it in any manner, is granted to individuals or corporate bodies. However absolute the right of any
individual may be, it is still in the nature of that right that it
must bear a portion of the public burdens, and that portion must
be determined by the legislature. This vital powct· may be abused ;
but the interest, wisdom, and justice of the representative body,
and its relations with its constituents, furnish the only security
against unjust and excessive taxation, as well as against unwise
taxation." 2 And again, the same judge says it is " unfit for the
judicial department to inquire what degree of taxation is the
legitimate use, and what degree may amount to the abuse, of
the power." 3 And the same general views have been frequently
expressed in other cases. 4
Notwithstanding the permding nature of this power, thet·e are
McCulloch "· Maryland, 4 Wheat. 428.
Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 l 1et. 561.
3 McCulloch.,. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 430.
4 Kirby v. Shaw, 19 Penn. St. 260; Sharpless v. Mayor, &c. 21 Penn. St.
168; Weister v. Hade, 52 Penn. St. 478; 'Vingate v. Sluder, 6 Jones, Law, 552;
Herrick v. Randolph, 13 Vt. 529; Armington v. Barnet, Hi Vt. 745; Thomas v.
Leland, 2-! Wend. 65; People v. Mayor, &c., of Brooklyn, 4 N.Y. 425; Portland
Bank v. Apthorp, 12 Mass. 252.
34
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sary implication, are exempted from its exercise. Thus, the States

cannot tax the agencies of the general government; for, if they

could, it would be within their power to impose taxation

[" 481] to an extent that might cripple, if not wholly defeat, ' the

operations of the nationalauthorities within their proper

sphere of action. “That the power to tax,” says Chief Justice

Marshall, involves the power to destroy; that the power to de-

stroy may defeat and render useless the power to create; that

there is a plain repugnance in conferring on one government a

power to control the constitutional measures of another, which

other, with respect to those very measures, is declared to be su-

preme over that which exerts the control,— are propositions not to

be denied.” And referring to the argument that conﬁdence in

the good faith of the State governments must forbid our indulging

the anticipation of such consequences, he adds: “But all inconsis-

tencies are to be reconciled by the magic word,—conﬁdence. Tax-

ation, it is said, does not necessarily and unavoidably destroy. To

carry it to the excess of destruction would be an abuse, to pre-

sume which would banish that conﬁdence which is essential to all

government. But is this a case of conﬁdence ? Would the people

of any one State trust those of another with a power to control the
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most insigniﬁcant operations of their State government? We know

they would not. Why then should we suppose that the people of

any one State would be willing to trust those of another with a

power to control the operations of a government to which they

have conﬁded their most important and most valuable interests?

In the legislature of the Union alone are all represented. The

legislature of the Union alone, therefore, can be trusted by the

people with the power of controlling measures which concern all,

in the conﬁdence that it will not be abused. This, then, is not a

case of conﬁdence.“ _

‘ MeCulloch o. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 431. The case involved the right of the

State of Maryland to impose taxes upon the operations, within its limits, of the

Bank of the United States, created by authority of Congress. “ If,“ continues

the ChiefJustiee, “ we apply the principle for which the State of Maryland con-

tends to the Constitution generally, we shall ﬁnd it capable of changing totally

the character of that instrument. We shall ﬁnd it capable of arresting all the

measures of the government, and of prostrating it at the foot of the States. The

American people have declared their Constitution, and the laws made in pursu-
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some things under our system of government which, by necessary implication, are exempted from its ~xercise. Thus, the States
cannot tax the agencies of the general government; for, if they
could, it would be within their power to impose taxation
481] to an extent that might cripple, if not wholly defeat, • the
operations of the national. authorities within their proper
sphere of action. " That the power to tax," says Chief Justice
Marshall, involves the power to destroy; that the power to destroy may defeat and render useless the power to create ; that
there is a plain repugnance in couferring ou one government a
power to control the constitutional measures of another, which
other, with respect to those very measures, is declared to be supreme over that which exerts the control,- are propositions not to
be denied." And referring to the argument that confidence in
the good faith of the State governments must forbid our indulging
the anticipation of such consequences, he adds : "But all inconsistencies are to be reconciled by the magic word,- confidence. Taxation, it is said, does not necessarily and unavoidably destroy. To
carry it to the excess of destruction would be au abuse, to presume which would banish that confidence which is essential to all
government. But is this a case of confidence ? Would the people
of any one State trust those of another with a power to control the
most insignificant operations of their State go\'ernment? We know
they would not. Why then should we suppose that the people of
any one State would be willing to trust those of another with a
power to control the operations of a government to which they
have confided their most important and most valuable interests?
In the legislature of the Union alone are all represented. The
legislature of the Union alone, therefore, can be trusted by the
people with the power of controlling measures which contern all,
in the coufidence that it will not be abused. This, then, is not a
case of confidence." 1

r·

McCulloch o. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 431. The case involved the right of the
State of Maryland to impose taxes upon the operations, within its limits, of the
Bank of the United States, created by authority of Congress. "If," continues
the Chief Justice, "we apply the principle (or which the State of Maryland contends to the Constitution generally, we shall find it capable of changing totally
the character of that instrument. We shall find it capable of arresting all the
measures of the government, and of prostrating it at the foot of the States. The
American people have declared their Constitution, and the laws made in pursu1
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if the Congress of the Union may constitutionally create

a Bank of the United-States, as an agency of the national govern-

ment in the accomplishment of its constitutional purposes, the

power of the States to tax such bank, or its property, or the means

of performing its functions, is prohibited by necessary implication}

For the like reasons a State is prohibited from taxing an oﬂicer of

the general government for his ofﬁce or its emoluments, since such

a tax, having the etfect to reduce the compensation for the services

provided by the act of Congress, would to that extent conﬂict

with such act, and tend to neutralize its purpose? So the States

may not impose taxes upon the obligations or evidences of debt

issued by the general government upon the loans made to it, un-

less such taxation is permitted by law of Congress, and then only

in the manner such law shall prescribe,—any such tax being an

impediment to the operations of the government in negotiating

loans, and in greater or less degree, in proportion to its magnitude,

tending to cripple and embarrass the national power.3 The tax

ance thereof, to be supreme; but this principle would transfer the supremacy in

fact to the States. If the States may tax one instrument employed by the gov-

ernment in the execution of its powers, they may tax any and every other instru-

ment. They may tax the mail; they may tax the mint; they may tax patent
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rights; they may tax the papers of the custom-house; they may tax judicial

process; they may tax all the means employed by the government to an excess

which would defeat all the ends of government. This was not intended by the

American people. They did not design to make their government dependent on

the States.” In Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wal. 5253, it was held competent for

• Accepting this doctrine as sound, it would follow that [• 482]
if the Congress of the Union may constitutionally create
a Bank of the United States, as an agency of the national government in the accomplishment of its constitutional purposes, the
power of the States to tax such bank, or its property, or the means
of performing its functions, is prohibited by necessary implication.1
For th~ like reasons a State is prohibited from taxing an officer of
the general government for his office or its emoluments, since such
a tax, having the effect to reduce the compensation for the services
provided by the act of Congress, would to that extent conflict
with such act, and tend to neutralize its purpose.2 So the States
may not impose taxes upon the obligations or evidences of debt
issued by the general government upon the loans made to it, unless such taxation is permitted by law of Congress, and then only
in the manner such law shall prescribe,- any such tax being an
impediment to the operations of the government in negotiating
loans, and in greater or less degree, in proportion to its magnitude,
tending to cripple and embarrass the national power.3 The tax

Congress, in aid of the circulation of the national banks, to impose restraints

upon the circulation of the State banks in the form of taxation. Perhaps no

other case goes so far as this, in holding that taxation may be imposed for other

purposes than the raising of revenue, though the levy of duties upon imports

wit.h a view to incidental protection to domestic manufactures is upon a similar

principle.

1 1\IcCulloch v. Maryland‘. 4 \Vheat. 316; Osborn v. United States Bank, 9

Wheat. 738; Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie Co. 16 Pet. 435. But the doc-

trine which exempts the instrumentalities of the general government from the

inﬂuence of State taxation, being founded on the implied necessity for the use

of such instruments by the government, such legislation as does not impair the

usefulness or capability of such instruments to serve the government, is not

within the rule of prohibition. National Bank v. Commonwealth, 9 Wal. 353;

Thompson v. Paciﬁc R.R. Co. ib. 579.

’ Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie Co. 16 Pet. 435.

’, Weston v. Charleston, 2 Pet. 449; Bank of Commerce v. New York City, 2
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ance thereof, to be supreme; but this principle would transfer the supremacy in
fact to the States. If the States may tax one instrument employed by the government in the execution of its powers, they may tax any and· l'Vcry other instrument. They may tax the mail ; they may tax the mint; they may tax patent
rights; they may tax the papers of the custom-house; they may tax judi rial
process; they may tax all the means employed by the government to an excess
which would defeat all the ends of government. This was not intended by the
American people. They did not design to make their government dependent on
the States." In Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wal. 5:13, it was held competent for
Congress, in aid of the circulation of the national banks, to impose restraints
upon the circulation of the State banks in the form of taxation. Perhap~ no
other case goes so far as this, in holding that taxation may he imposed for other
purposes than the raising of revenue, though the levy of dutit•s upon imports
with a view to incidental protection to domestic manufactures is upon a similar
principle.
1 McCulloch v. Maryland·, 4 Wheat. 316; Osborn tl. United States Bank, 9
Wheat. 738; Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie Co. 16 Pet . .t3.'i. But the doctrine which exempts the instrumentalities of the general government from the
influence of State taxation, being founded on the implied necessity for the use
of such instruments by the govel'llment, suC'h legislation as does not impair the
usefulness or capability of such instruments to serve the government, is not
within the rule of prohibition. National Bank v. Commonwealth, 9 Wal. 353;
Thompson v. Pacific R .R. Co. ib. 579.
1 Dobbins tl. Commissioners of Eric Co. 16 Pet. 43.'i.
3 • Weston v. Charleston, 2 Pet. 449; Bank of Commerce"· New York City, 2
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upon the national securities is a. tax upon the exercise of the

(CH. XIV.

power of Congress “ to borrow money on the credit of the United

States.” The exercise of this power is interfered with to the

extent of the tax imposed under State authority, and the liability

of the certiﬁcates of stock or other securities to taxation by a

State, in the hands of individuals, would necessarily aﬁ"ect their

value in market, and therefore affect the free and unrestrained

exercise of the power. “ If the right to impose a tax exists, it is

a right which, in its nature, acknowledges no limits. It may be

carried to any extent within the jurisdiction of the State or corpo-

ration which imposes it, which the will of such State or cor-

poration may prescribe.”1

[*483] *‘If the States cannot tax the means by which the

national government performs its functions, neither, on

the other hand, and for the same reasons, can the latter tax the

agencies of the State governments. “The same supreme power

which established the departments of the general government

determined that the local governments should also exist for their

own purposes, and made it impossible to protect the people in

their common interests without them. Each of these several

agencies is conﬁned to its own sphere, and all are strictly subordi-

nate to the Constitution which limits them, and independent of
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other agencies, except as thereby made dependent. There is

nothing in the Constitution [of the United States] which can be

made to admit of any interference by Congress with the secure

existence of any State authority within its lawful bounds. And

Black, 620; Bank Tax Case, 2 Wal. 200; Van Allen v. Assessors, 3 Wal. 573;

People v. Commissioners, 4 W'al. 244; Bradley v. People, il». 459; The Banks v.

The Mayor, 7 Wal. 16; Bank v. Supervisors, ib. 26. For a kindred doctrine,

see State v. Jackson. 33 N. J . 450.

' \Veston v. Charleston, 4 Pet. 449; Bank of Commerce v. New York City, 2

Black, 631. This principle is unquestionably sound, but a great deal of diﬂiculty

has been experienced in consequence of it, under the law of Congress establishing

the National Banking System, which undertakes to subject the National Banks

to State taxation, but at the same time to guard those institutions against unjust

discriminations, by providing that their shares shall only be taxed at the place

where the bank is located, and in the same manner as shares in the State banks

are taxed. The diﬂiculty is in harmonizing the State and national laws on the

upon 'the national securities is a tax upon the exercise of the
power of Congress " to borrow money on the credit of the United
States." The exercise of this power is interfered with to the
extent of the tax imposed under State authority, and the liability
of the certificates of stock or other securities to taxation by a
State, iu the hands of individuals, would necessarily affect their
value in market, and therefore affect the free and unrestrained
·exercise of the power. "If the right to impose a tax exists, it is
a right which, in its nature, acknowledges no ·limits. It may be
carried to any extent within the jurisdiction of the State or corporation which imposes it, which the will of such State or corporation may prescribe." I
[• 483]
• If the States cannot tax the means by which the
national government performs its functions, neither, on
the other hand, and for the same reasons, can the latter tax the
agencies of the State governments. "The same supreme power
which established the departments of the general government
determined that the local governments should also exist for their
own purposes, and made it impossible to protect the people in
their common interests without them. Each of these several
agencies is confined to its own sphere, and all are strictly subordinate to the Constitution which limits them, and independent of
other agencies, except as thereby made dependent. There is
nothing in the Constitution [of the United States] which can be
made to admit of any interference by Congress with the secure
e:listence of any State authority within its lawful bounds. And

subject, and it will be illustrated in a measure by some of the cases above cited;

though the full extent of the ditﬁculty is only perceived in other cases where the

taxation of State banks is ﬁxed by constitutional provisions, which provide modes

that cannot be harmonized at all with the law of Congress.
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Black, 620; Bank Tax Case, 2 \Val. 200; Van Allen v. Assessors, 3 W al. 573;
People v. Commissioners, 4 Wal. 244; Bradley v. People, ib. 459; The Banks v.
The Mayor, 7 WaL 16; Bank v. Supervisors, ib. 26. For a kindred doctrine,
see State"· Jackson, SS N.J. 450.
1 Weston v. Charleston, 4 Pet. 449; Bank of Commeroo " · New York City, 2
Black, 631. This principle is unquestionably sound, but a great deal of difficulty
bas been experienced in consequence of it, under the law of Congress establishing
the National Banking System, which undertakes to subject the National Banks
to State taxation, but at the same time to guard those institutions against unjust
discriminations, by providing that their shares shall only be taxed at the place
where the bank is located, and in the same manner as shares in the State banks
are taxed. The difficulty is in harmonizing the State and national laws on the
subject, and it will be illustrated in a measure by some of the cases above cited;
though the full extent of the difficulty is only perceived in other cases where the
taxation of State banks is fixed by constitutional provisions, which provide modes
that cannot be hannonized at all with the law of Congress.

[ 532 J

cu. x1v.] run POWER or TAXATION. * 483

any such interference by the indirect means of taxation is quite
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as much beyond the power of the national legislature as if the

interference were direct and extreme”! It has therefore been

held that the law of Congress requiring judicial process to be

stamped could not constitutionally be applied to the process of

the State courts; since otherwise Congress might impose such

restrictions upon the State courts as would put an end to their

effective action, and be equivalent practically to abolishing them

altogether.” And a similar ruling has been made in other cases.

‘ Fiﬁeld v. Close, 15 Mich. 509. “ In respect to the reserved powers. the

State is as sovereign and independent as the general government. And if the

means and instrumentalities employed by that government to carry into operation

the powers granted to it, are necessarily, and for the sake of self-preservation,

exempt from taxation by the States, why are not those of the States depending

upon their reserved powers, for like reasons, equally exempt from Federal tax-

any such int~rference by the indirect means of taxation is quite
as much beyond the power of the national legislature as if the
interference were direct and extreme." 1 It has therefore been
held that the law of Congress requiring judicial process to be
stamped could not constitutionally be applied to the process of
the State courts ; since otherwise Congress might impose such
restrictions upon the State courts as would put an end to their
effective action, and be equivalent practically to abolishing them
altogether. 2 .And a similar ruling has been made in other cases.

ation? Their unimpaircd existence in the one case is as essential as in the other.

It is admitted that there is no express provision in the Constitution that prohibits

the general government from taxing the means and instrumentalities of the States,

nor is there any prohibiting the States from taxing the means and instrumentalities

of that government. In both cases the exemption rests upon necessary implication,

and is upheld by the great law of self-preservation; as any government, whose

means employed in conducting its operations, if subject to the control of another
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and distinct government, can only exist at the mercy of that government. Of what

avail are these means if another power may tax them at discretion? ” Per Nelson,

J., in Buflington v. Day, Supreme Court of United St-ates, December term, 1870.

’ Warren v. Paul, 22 Ind. 279; Jones v. Estate of Keep, 19 Wis. 369; Fi-

ﬁeld v. Close, 15 Mich. 505; Union Bank v. Hill, 3 Cold. (Tenn.) 325; Smith

v. Short, ~10 Ala. 796. “State governments,” it is said in the Indiana case,

“ are to exist with judicial tribunals of their own. This is manifest all the way

through the Constitution. This being so, these tribunals must not be subject to be

encroached upon or controlled by Congress. This would be incompatible with

their free existence. It was held, when Congress created a United States Bank,

and is now decided, when the United States has given bonds for borrowed money,

that as Congress had rights to create such ﬁscal agents, and issue such bonds, it

would be incompatible with the full and free enjoyment of those rights to allow

that the States might tax the bank or bonds; because, if the right to so tax

them was conceded, the States might exercise the right to the destruction of

congressional power. The argument applies with full force to the exemption

of State governments from Federal legislative interference.

“There must be some limit to the power of Congress to lay stamp taxes.

Suppose a State to form a new, or to amend her existing constitution; could

Congress declare that it should be void, unless stamped with a Federal stamp?

Can Congress require State legislatures to stamp their bills, journals, laws, &c.,

in order that they shall be valid? Can it require the executive to stamp all

commissions? If so, where is he to get the money? Can Congress compel the

[ 533 ]

Fifield"· Close, 15 :Mich. 509. "In respect to the reserved powers, the
State is as sovereign and independent as the general government. And if the
means and instrumentalities employed by that government to carry into operation
the powers granted to it, are necessarily, and for the sake of self-preservation,
exempt from taxation by the States, why are not those of the States depending
upon their reserved powers, for like reasons, equally exempt fro!p Federal taxation? Their unimpaired existence in the one case is as essential as in the other.
It is admitted that there is no express provision in the Constitution that prohibits
the general government from taxing the means anrl instrumentalities of the States,
nor is there any prohibit.ing the States from taxing the means and instrumentalities
of that government. In both cases the exemption rests upon necessary implication,
and is upheld by the great law of self-preservation ; as any government, whose
means employed in conducting its operations, if subject to the control of another
and distinct government, ean only exist at the mercy of that government. Of what
avail are these means if another power may tax them at discretion?" Per Nelson,
J., in Buffington v. Day, Supreme Court of United St-1\tes, December term, 1870.
t Warren 1:1. Paul, 22 Ind. 279; Jones v. Estate of Keep, 19 Wis. 369; Fi·
field v. Close, 15 .Mich. 505; Union Bank v. Hill, 3 Cold. (Tenn.) 825; Smith
1:1. Short, 40 Ala. 796. "State governments," it is said in the Indiana case,
" are to exist with judicial tribunals of their own. Thh! i~ manifest all the way
through the Constitution. This being so, these tribunal!.' must not be subject to be
encroached upon or controlled by Congress. This would be incompatible with
their free existence. It was held, when Congress created a United States Bank,
and is now decided, when the United States has given bonds for borrowed money,
that as Congress had rights to create such fiscal agents, and issue such bonds, it
would be incompatible with the full and free enjoyment of those rights to allow
that the States might tax the bank or bonds; because, if the right to !!O tax
them was conceded, the States might exercise the right to the destruction of
congressional power. The argument applies with full force to the exemption
of State governments from Federal legislative interference.
''There must be some limit to the power of Congress to lay stamp taxes.
Suppose a State to form a new, or to amend her existing constitution ; could
Congress declare that it should be void, unless stamped with a Federal stamp?
• require State legislatures to stamp their bills, journals, laws, &c.,
Can Congress
in order that they shall be valid? Can it require the executive to stamp all
commissions? If so, where is he to get the money? Can Congress compel the
1
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taxing power in some of the cases which have considered

State legislatures to appropriate it? Can Congress thus subjugate a State by

legislation? We think this will scarcely be pretended. \Vhere, then, is the line

of dividing power in this particular? Could Congress require voters in State

[• 484]

• Strong as is the language employed to characterize tl1e
taxing power in some of the cases which have considered

and corporation elections to stamp their tickets to render them valid? Under

the old Confederation, Congress legislated upon States, not upon the citizens

of the State. The most. important change wrought in the government by the

Constitution was that legislation operated upon the citizens directly, enforced by

Federal tribunals and agencies, not upon the States. Another established con-

stitutional principle is, that the government of the United States, while sovereign

within its sphere, is still limited in jurisdiction and power to certain speciﬁed

subjects. Taking these three propositions then as true, -— 1. States are to exist

with independent powers and institutions within their spheres; 2. The Federal

government is to exist with independent powers and institutions within its sphere;

3. The Federal government operates within its sphere upon the people in their

individual capacities, as citizens and subjects of that government, within its

sphere of power, and upon its own officers and institutions as a part of itself, —-

taking these propositions as true, we say, it seems to result as necessary to har-

mony of operation between the Federal and State governments, that the Federal

government must be limited, in its right to lay and collect stamp taxes, to the

citizens and their transactions as such, or as acting in the Federal government,
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officially or otherwise; and cannot be laid upon and collected from individuals

or their proceedings when acting, not as citizens transacting business with each

other as such, but oﬁicially or in the pursuit of rights and duties in and through

State oﬂicial agencies and institutions. When thus acting, they are not acting

under the jurisdiction nor within the power of the United States; not acting as

subjects of that government, not within its sphere of power over them; and

neither they nor their proceedings are subject to interference from the United

States. Can Congress regulate or prescribe the taxation of costs in a State court?

The Federal government may tax the governor of a State, or the clerk of a State

court, and his transactions as an individual, but not as a State otlicer. This

must be so, or the State may be annihilated at the pleasure of the Federal gov-

ernment. The Federal government may perhaps take by taxation most of the

property in a State, if exigencies require; but it has not a right, by direct or

indirect means, to annihilate the functions of the State government.”

In Carpenter v..Snelling, 97 Mass. 452, it was held that the act of Congress

of 1866, c. 184, § 9, which provided that certain papers not stamped should not

be received in evidence, was applicable only to the national courts, and the doubt

was expressed whether Congress has the constitutional power to establish rules

of evltlt-ncc for the State courts. To the same etfect are Clemens v. Conrad,

19 Mich. 170; Haight v. Grist, 64 N. C. 739; Griﬂin v. Ranncy, 35 Conn. 239;

Green v. Holway, 101 Mass. 250; and People v. Gates, Court of Appeals

of New York, October term, 1870. In Sammons v. Holloway, £20 Mich. ;

Sporrer v. Eiﬂer, 1 Heiskell; Hunter v. Cobb, 1 Bush,' 239; and Craig v.

Dimock, 47 Ill. 300, the courts have gone still further, and decided that Congress

cannot preclude parties from entering into contracts permitted by the State laws,
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State legislatures to appropriate it? Can Congress thus subjugate a State by
legislation? We think this will scarcely be pretended. Where, then, is the line
of dividing power in this particular ? Could Congress l"t'quire voters in State
and corporation elections to stamp their tickets to render them valid? Gnder
the old Confederation, Congress lt>gislated upon States, not upon the citizens
of the State. The most important change wrought in the goVl'rnment by the
Con~titution was that lPgislation operated upon the citizens directly, enforced by
Federal tribunals and agencies, not upon the States. Another t>stablished constitutional principle is, that the government of the United State~, while sovereign
within its sphere, is still limited in jurisdiction and power to certain specified
subjects. Taking these three propositions then as true, - 1. States are to exist
with indept>ndent powers and institutions within their spheres; 2. The Federal
government is to exist with independent powers and institutions within its sphere ;
8. The Feueral goYernment operates within its sphere upon the people in their
individual capacities, as citizens and subjects of that government, within its
sphere of power, and upon its own officers and institutions as a part of itself,taking these propositions as true, we say, it seems to result as nece11sary to harmony of operation between the Federal and State governments, that the Federal
government must be limited, in its right to lay and collect stamp taxes, to the
citizens and their transactions as such, or as acting in the Federal government.
officially or otherwise ; and cannot be laid upon and collected from individuals
or their proceedings when acting, not as citizens transacting business with each
other as such, but officially or in the pursuit of rights and duties in and through
State official agencies and institutions. When thus acting, they are not acting
under the jurisdiction nor within the power of the United States; not acting as
subjects of that government, not within its sphere of power over them; and
neither they nor their proceedings are subject to interference from the United
States. Can Congress regulate or prescribe the taxation of costs in a State court?
The Federal government may tax the governor of a State, or the clerk of a State
court, and hi11 transactions as an individual, but not as a State officer. This
must bu so, or the State may be annihilated at the pleasure of the Federal government. Tho Federal government may perhaps take by taxation most of the
property in a State, if exigenl'ies require; but it bas not a right, by direct or
indirect means, to annihilate the functions of the State government."
In Carpenter v . .Snelling, 97 Mass. 452, it was held that the act of Congress
of 1866, c. 184, § 9, which provided that certain papers not stamped should not
be received in evidence, was applicable only to the national courts, and the doubt
was expressed whether Congress has the constitutional power to establish rules
of evidence for the State courts. To the same effect are Clemens v. Conrad,
19 Mich. 170; Haight"· Grist, 64 N. C. 738; Griffin v. Ranney, 85 Conn. 239;
Green "· Holway, 101 Mass. 250; and People "· Gates, Court of Appeals
of New York, October term, 18i0. In Sammons v. Holloway, ~ Mich.;
Sporrer "· Eifler, 1 Heiskell; Hunter v. Cobb, 1 Buslt,' 289; and Craig v.
Dimock, 47 Ill. 300, the courts have gone still further, and decided that Congress
cannot preclude parties from entering into contracts permitted by the State laws,
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this subject, subsequent events have demonstrated that it was by

no means extravagant. An enormous national debt has

not only made *‘imposts necessary which in some cases [* 485]

reach several hundred per cent of the original cost of the

articles upon which they are imposed, but the systems of State

banking which were in force when the necessity for contracting

that debt ﬁrst arose have been literally taxed out of existence by

burdens avowedly imposed for that very purpose} If taxation is

thus unlimited in its operation upon the objects within its reach, it

cannot be extravagant to say that the agencies of government are

necessarily excepted from it, since otherwise its exercise might

altogether destroy the government through the destruction of its

agencies. That which was predicted as a possible event has been

demonstrated by actual facts to-be within the compass of the

power; and if considerations of policy were important, it might

be added that, if the States possessed the authority to tax the agen-

cies of the national government, they would hold within their

hands a constitutional weapon which factious and disappointed

parties would be able to wield with terrible effect when the policy

of the national government did not accord with their views; while,

on the other hand, if the national government possessed a corre-
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sponding power over the agencies of the State governments, there

would not be wanting men who, in times of strong party excite-

ment, would be willing and eager to resort to this power as a

means of coercing the States in their legislation upon the subjects

remaining under their control.

There are other subjects which are or may be removed from the

sphere of State taxation by force of the Constitution of the United

States, or of ‘the legislation of Congress under it. That instru-

ment declares that “no State shall, without the consent of Con-

gress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what

may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws.”

This prohibition has led to some diﬂiculty in its practical applica-

and that to declare them void was not a. proper penalty for the enforcement of

tax laws. Congress cannot make void a tax deed issued by a State. Sayles v.

Davis, 2'2 \Vis. 225. Nor require a stamp upon the oﬂicial bonds of State oﬂi-

cers. State v. Green, 32 Ind. Nor tax the salary of a State oﬂicer. Per

Clz§ﬂ"or(l,J., in Day v. Bufﬁngton, Am. Law Rev. for Oct. 1870, p. 176. This

case has recently been affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States.

' The constitutionality of this taxation was sustained by a. divided court in

Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 lrVal. -533.
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this subject, subsequent events have demonstrated that it was by
no means extravagant. An enormous national debt has
not only made *imposts necessary which in some cases [* 485]
reach several hundred per cent of the originQ.l cost of the
articles upon which they are imposed, but the systems of State
banking which were in force when the necessity for contracting
that debt first arose have been literally taxed out of existence by
burdens avowedly imposed for that very purpose.1 If taxation is
thus unlimited in its operation upon the objects within its reach, it
cannot be extravagant to say that the agencies of government are
necessarily excepted from it, since otherwise its exercise might
altogether destroy the government through the destruction of its
agencies. That which was predicted as a possible event has been
demonstrated by actual facts to • be within the compass of the
power; and if considerations of policy were important, it might
be added that, if the States possessed the authority to tax the agencies of the national government, they would hold within their
hands a constitutional weapon which factious and disappointed
parties would be able to wield with terrible effect when the policy
of the national government did not accord with their views; while,
on the other hand, if the national government possessed a corresponding power over the agencies of the State governments, there
would not be wanting men who, in times of strong party excitement, would be willing and eager to resort to this power as a
means of coercing the States in their legislation upon the subjects
remaining under their control.
There are other subjects which are or may be removed from the
sphere of State taxation by force of the Constitution of the United
States, or of' the legislation of Congress under it. That instrument declares that "no State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what
may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws."
This prohibition has led to some difficulty in its practical applicaand that to declare them void was not a proper penalty for the enforcement of
tax laws: Congress cannot make void a tax deed issued by a State. Sayles " ·
Davis, 22 Wis. 225. Nor require a stamp upon the official bonds of State officers. State "· Green, 32 Ind. Nor tax the salary of a State officer. Per
Clifford, .J., in Day"· Buffington, Am. Law Rev. for Oct. 1870, p. 176. This
case has recently been affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States.
1 The constitutionality or this taxation was sustained by a divided court in
Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wal. 533.
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tion. Imports, as such, are not to be taxed generally, but it was

not the purpose of the Constitution to exclude permanently from

the sphere of State taxation all property brought into the country

from abroad; and the diﬂiculty met with has been in indicating

with suﬁicient accuracy for practical purposes the point of time at

which articles imported cease to be regarded as imports within the

meaning of the prohibition. In general terms it has been said

that when the importer has so acted upon the thing imported

that it has become incorporated and mixed up with the mass of

property in the country, it has perhaps lost its distinctive charac-

ter as an import, and has become subject to the taxing power of

the State; but that while remaining the property of the importer,

in his warehouse, in the original form or package in which

[* 486] it was * imported, a tax‘ upon it is too plainly a duty on

imports to escape the prohibition in the Constitution} And

in the application of this rule it was declared that a State law

which, for revenue purposes, required an importer to take a license

and pay ﬁfty dollars before he should be permitted to sell a pack-

age of imported goods, was equivalent to laying a duty upon

imports. It has also been held in another case, that a stamp duty
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imposed by the legislature of California upon bills of lading for

gold or silver, transported from that State to any port or place out

of the State, was in etfect a tax upon exports, and the law was con-

sequently void?

Congress also is vested with power to regulate commerce; but

this power is not so far exclusive as to prevent regulations by the

States also, when they do not conﬂict with those established by

Congress? The States may unquestionably tax the subjects of

commerce; and no necessary conﬂict with that complete control

which is vested in Congress appears until the power is so exercised

as to defeat or embarrass the congressional legislation. Where

Congress has not acted at all upon the subject, the State taxation

cannot be invalid on this ground; but when national regulations

exist, under which rights are established or privileges given, the

State can impose no burdens which shall "in effect make the enjoy-

‘ Brown v. Maryland, 12 \Vheat. 441, per Marshall, Ch. J. -

’ Ahny v. People, 2~L How. 169. See also Brumagim v. Tillinghast, 18 Cal.

265; Garrison v. Tillinghast, ib. 404.

“ Cooley v. Board of \Vardens, 12 How. 299. See also Wilson v. Blackbird

Creek Marsh Co. 2 Pet. 245.
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tion. Imports, as such, are not to be taxed generally, but it was
not the purpose of the Constitution to exclude permanently from
the sphere of State taxation all property brought into the country
from abroad ; and the difficulty met with has been in indicating
with sufficient accuracy for practical purposes the point of time at
which articles imported cease to be regarded as imports within the
meaning of the prohibition. In general terms it has been said
that when the importer has so acted upon the thing imported
that it has become incorporated and mixed up with the mass of
property in the country, it has perhaps lost its distinctive character as an import, and has become subject to the taxing power of
the State; but that while remaining the property of the importer,
in his warehouse, in the original form or package in which
[* 486] it was *imported, a tar upon it is too plainly a duty on
imports to escape the prohibition in the Constitution.1 And
in the application of this rule it was declared that a State law
which, for revenue purposes, required an importer to take a license
and pay fifty dollars before he should be permitted to sell a package of imported goods, was equivalent to laying a duty upon
imports. It has also been held in another case, that a stamp duty
imposed by the legislature of California upon bills of lading for
gold or silver, transported from that State to any port or place out
of the State, was in effect a tax upon exports, and the law was consequently void.2
Congress also is vested with power to regulate commerce; but
this power is not so far exclusive as to prevent regulations by the
States also, when they do not conflict with those established by
Congress.8 The States may unquestionably tax the subjects of
commerce; and no necessary conflict with that complete control
which is vested in Congress appears until the power is so exercised
as to defeat or embarrass the congressional legislation. Where
Congress has not acted at all upon the subject, the State taxation
cannot be invalid on this ground ; but when national regulations
exist, under which rights are established or privileges given, the
State can impose no burdens which shall ·in effect make the enjoyBrown v. :Maryland, 12 Wheat. 441, per Marshall, Ch. J.
Almy v. People, 2-1 How. 169. See also Brumagim v. Tillinghast, 18 Cal.
265; Garrison v. Tillinghast, ib. 40-1.
3 Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299.
See also Wilson v. Blackbird
Creek Marsh Co. 2 Pet. 245.
1

1
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CH. XIV.]

• 486

THE POWER OF TAXATION.

of tribute to the State}

It is also believed that that provision in the Constitu-

tion of the *United States, which declares that “the [* 487]

citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privi-

leges and immunities of the citizens of the several States,”§will

preclude any State from imposing upon the property within its

limits belonging to citizens of other States any higher burdens by

way of taxation than are imposed upon the like property of its own

citizens. This is the express decision of the Supreme Court of

Alabama} following in this particular the dictum of an eminent

Federal judge at an early day.‘ I

Having thus indicated the extent of the taxing power, it is

necessary to add that certain elements are essential in all taxation,

and that it will not necessarily follow because the power is so vast,

that every thing which may be done under pretence of its exer-

cise will leave the citizen without redress, even though there be no

conflict with express constitutional inhibitions. Every thing that

may be done under the name of taxation is not necessarily a tax;

and it may happen that an oppressive burden imposed by the gov-

ernment, when it comes to be carefully scrutinized, will prove,

instead of a tax, to be an unlawful conﬁscation of property, unwar-
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ranted by any principle of constitutional government.

‘ In Brown v. Maryland, it was held that a license fee of ﬁfty dollars; required

by the State of an importer before he should be permitted to sell imported goods,

was unconstitutional, as coming directly in conﬂict with the regulations of Con-

gress over commerce. For further discussion of this subject in the United States

courts, see New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 102; License Cases, 5 How. 504. See

also Lin Sing v. Washburn, 20 Cal. 53-L; Erie Railway Co. v. New Jersey,

2 Vroom, 531, reversing same case in 1 Vroom; Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Com-

monwealth, 3 Grant, 128; Hinsen v. Lott, 40 Vt. 1§3; Commonwealth v. Erie

R.R. 62 Penn. St. 286; and the full discussion of the subject in the two opinions

in Wolcott v. People, 17 Mich. 68. In the recent case of Crandall v. Nevada,

6 Wal. 35, it was held that a State law imposing a tax of one dollar on each

moot of those rights and privileges contingent upon the payment
of tribute to the State. 1
It is also believed that that provision in the Constitution of the • United States, which declares that "the [• 487]
citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the several States,"~ will
preclude any State from imposing upon the property within its
limits belonging to citizens of other States any higher burdens by
way of taxation than are imposed upon the like property of its own
citizens. This is the express decision of the Supreme Court of
Alabama,3 following in this particular the dictum of an eminent
"
Federal judge at an early day. 4
Having thus indicated the extent of the taxing power, it is
necessary to add that certain elements are essential in o.ll taxation,
and that it will not necessarily follow because the power is so vast,
that every thing which may be done under pretence of its exercise will leave the citizen without redress, even though there be no
conflict with express constitutional inhibitions. Every thing that
may be done under the name of taxation is not necessarily a tax ;
and it may happen that an oppressive burden imposed by the government, when it comes to be carefully scrutinized, will prove,
instead of a tax, to be an unlawful confiscation of property, unwarranted by any principle of constitutional government.

person leaving the State by public conveyance was not void as coming in conﬂict

with the control of Congress over commerce.

' Art. 4, § 2.

‘ Wiley v. Parmer, 14 Ala. 627.

‘ Washington, J ., in C01-ﬁeld v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 380. And see Camp-

bell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 554; VVard v. Morris, 4 H. & McH. 340; and other

eases cited, ante, p. 16, note. See also Oliver v. Washington Mills, 11 Allen,

268.

[ 5:-17 ]

In Brown "· Maryland, it was held that a license fee of fifty dollars; required
by the State of an importer before he should be permitted to sell imported goods,
was unconstitutional, as coming directly in conflict with the regulations of Congress over commerce. For further discussion of this subject in the United States
courts, see New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 102; License Cases, 5 How. 504. See
also Lin Sing v. Washburn, 20 Cal. 534; Erie Railway Co. v. New Jersey,
2 Vroom, 531, reversing same case in 1 Vroom; Pennsylvania R.R. Co."· Commonwealth, 3 Grant, 128; Hinsen v. Lott, 40 Vt. 1~3; Commonwealth v. Erie
R.R. 62 Penn. St. 286; and the full discussion of the subject in the two opinions
in Wolcott v. People, 17 :Mich. 68. In the recent case of Crandall v. Nevada,
6 W al. 35, it was held that a State law imposing a tax of one dollar on each
person leaving the State by public conveyance was not void as coming in conflict
with the control of Congress over commerce.
I Art. 4, § 2.
' Wiley v. Parmer, 14 Ala. 627.
• Washington, J., in Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 380. And see Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 554; Ward v.Morris, 4 H. & McH. 340; and other
cases cited, ante, p. 16, note. See also Oliver v. Washington Mills, 11 Allen,
1

268.
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CONSTITUI'IONAL LIMITATIONS.

In the ﬁrst place, taxation having for its only legitimate object

[cu. .nv.

the raising of money for public purposes and the proper needs

of government, the exaction of moneys from the citizens for

other purposes is not a proper exercise of this power, and

must therefore be unauthorized. In this place, however, we do

not use the word public in any narrow and restricted sense, nor

do we mean to be understood that whenever the legislature shall

overstep the legitimate bounds of their authority, the case will be

such that the courts can interfere to arrest their action. There

are many cases of unconstitutional action by the representatives

of the people which can be reached only through the ballot-box;

and there are other cases where the line of distinction between that

which is allowable and that which is not is so faint and shadowy

that the decision of the legislature must be accepted as ﬁnal, even

though the judicial opinion might be different. But there

[* 488] are still other cases where '* it is entirely possible for the

legislature so clearly to exceed the bounds of due au-

thority that we cannot doubt the right of the courts to interfere

to check what can only be looked upon as ruthless extortion,

provided the nature of the case is such that judicial process

can aﬂ'ord relief. An unlimited power to make any and every

thing lawful which the legislature might see ﬁt to call taxation,
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would be, when plainly stated, an unlimited power to plunder the

citizen}

It must always be conceded that the proper authority to deter-

mine what should and what should not properly constitute a public

burden is the legislative department of the State. This is not

only true for the State at large, but it is true also in respect to

each municipality or political division of the State; these inferior

corporate existences having only such authority in this regard as

the legislature shall confer upon them." And in determining this

question, the legislature cannot be held to any narrow or technical

1 Tyson v. School Directors, 51 Penn. St. 9; Morford u. Unger, S Iowa, 92.

“ It is the clear right of every citizen to insist that no unlawful or unauthorized

exaction shall be made upon him under the guise of taxation. If any such illegal

encroachment is attempted, he can always invoke the aid of the judicial tribunals

for his protection, and prevent his money or other property from being taken and

appropriated for a purpose and in a manner not authorized by the Constitution

and laws." Per Bigelow, Ch. J ., in Freeland v. Hastings, 10 Allen, 575.

‘ Litchﬁeld v. Vernon, 41 N. Y. 123. See ante, p. 230, and cases cited in

note to p. 489.
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In the first place, taxation having for its only legitimate object
the raising of money for public purposes and the proper needs
of government, the exaction of moneys from the citizens for
other purposes is not a proper exercise of this power, and
must therefore be unauthorized. In this place, however, we do
not use the word public in any narrow and restricted sense, nor
do we 1t1ean to be understood that whenever the legislature lfitall
overstep the legitimate bounds of their authority, the case will be
such that the courts can interfere to arrest their action. There
are many cases of unconstitutional action by the representatives
of the people which can be reached only through the ballot-box ;
and there are other cases where the line of distinction between that
which is allowable and that which is not is so faint and shadowy
that the decision of the legislature must be accepted as final, even
though the judicial opinion might be different. But there
[• 488] are still other cases where • it is entirely possible for the
legislature so clearly to exceed the bounds of due authority that we cannot doubt the right of the courts to interfere
to check what can only be looked upon as ruthless extortion,
provided the nature of the case is such that judicial process
can afford relief. An unlimited power to make any and every
thing lawful which the legislature might see fit to call taxation,
would be, when plain~ stated, an unlimited power to plunder the
citizen.1
It must always be conceded that the proper authority to determine what should and what should not properly constitute a public
burden is the legislative department of the State. This is not
only true for the State at large, but it is true also in respect to
each municipality or political division of the State; these inferior
corporate existences having only such authority in this regard as
the legislature shall confer upon them.2 And in determining this
question, the legislature cannot be held to any narrow or technical
Tyson v. School Directors, 51 Penn. St. 9; Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa, 92.
" It is the clear right of every citizen to insist that no unlawful or unauthorized
exaction shall be made upon him under the guise of taxation. If any such illegal
encroachment is attempted, he can always invoke the aid of the judicial tribunals
for his protection, and prevent his money or other property from being taken and
appropriated for a purpose and in a manner not authorized by the Constitution
and laws." Per Bigeloto, Ch. J., in Freeland v. Hastings, 10 Allen, 575.
1 Litchfield v. Vernon, 41 N.Y. 123.
See ante, p. 230, and cases cited in
note top. 489.
1
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rule. Certain expenditures are not only absolutely necessary to
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the continued existence of the government, but as a matter of

policy it may sometimes be proper and wise to assume other bur-

dens which rest entirely on considerations of honor, gratitude, or

charity. The oﬁicers of government must be paid, the laws

printed, roads constructed, and public buildings erected; but with

a. view to the general well-being of society, it may also be impor-

tant that the children of the !State should be educated, the poor

kept from starvation, losses in the public service indemniﬁed, and

incentives held out to faithful and fearless discharge of duty in the

future, by the payment of pensions to those who have been faithful

public servants in the past. There will therefore be necessary

expenditures, and expenditures which rest upon considerations of

policy alone; and in regard to the one as much as to the other,

the decision of that department to which alone questions of State

policy are addressed must be accepted as conclusive.

Very strong-language has been used by the courts, in some of

the cases on this subject. In a case where was questioned

the *‘ validity of the State law conﬁrming township action [* 489]

which granted gratuities to persons enlisting in the mili-

tary service of the United States, the Supreme Court of Connec-

ticut assigned the following reasons in its favor : —
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“ In the ﬁrst place, if it be conceded that it is not competent for

the legislative power to make a gift of the common property, or of

a sum of money to be raised by taxation, where no possible public

beneﬁt, direct or indirect, can be derived therefrom, such exercise

of the legislative power must be of an extraordinary character

to justify the interference of the judiciary; and this is not that

case.

“ Second. If there be the least possibility that making the gift

will be promotive in any degree of the public welfare, it becomes a

question of policy, and not of natural justice, and the determination

of the legislature is conclusive. And such is this case. Such gifts

to unfortunate classes of society, as the indigent blind, the deaf

and dumb, or insane, or grants to particular colleges or schools, or

grants of pensions, swords, or other mementoes for past services,

involving the general good indirectly and in slight degree, are fre-

quently made and never questioned.

“ Third. The government of the United States was constituted

by the people of the State, although acting in concert with the

' [ 539 ]

rule. Certain expenditures are not only absolutely necessary to
the continued existence of the government, but as a matter of
policy it may sometimes be proper and wise to assume other burdens which rest entirely on considerations of honor, gratitude, or
charity. The officers of government must be paid, the laws
printed, roads constructed, and public buildings erected; but with
a view to the general well-being of society, it may also be important that the children of the rState should be educated, the poor
kept from starvation, losses in the public service indemnified, and
incentives held out to faithful and fearless discharge of duty in the
future, by the payment of pensions to those who have been faithful
public servants in the past. There will therefore be necessary
expenditures, and expenditures which rest upon considerations of
policy alone ; and in regard to the one as much as to the other,
the decision of that department to which alone questions of State
policy are addressed must be accepted as conclusive.
Very strong.language has been used by the courts, in some of
the cases on this subject. In a case where was questioned
the *validity of the State law confirming township action [* 489]
which granted gratuities to persons enlisting in the military service of the United States, the Supreme Court of Connecticut assigned the following reasons in its favor:" In the first place, if it be conceded that it is not competent for
the legislative power to make a gift of the common property, or of
a sum of money to be raised by taxation, where no possible public
benefit, direct or indirect, can bo derived therefrom, such exercise
of the legislative power must be of an extraordinary character
to justify the interference of the judiciary ; and this is not that
case.
" Second. If there be the least possibility that making the gift
will be promotive in any degree of the public welfare, it becomes a
question of policy, and not of natural justice, and the determination
of the legislature is conclusive. And such is this case. Such gifts
to unfortunate classes of society, as the indigent blind, the deaf
and dumb, or insane, or grants to particular colleges or schools, or
grants of pensions, swords, or other mementoes for past services,
involving the general good indirectly and in slight degree, arc frequently made and never questioned.
" Third. The government of the U ni~ed States was constituted
by the people of the State, although acting in concert with the
[ 539]
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people of the other States, and the general good of the people of
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this State is involved in the maintenance of that general govern-

ment. In many conceivable ways the action of the town might

not only mitigate the burdens imposed upon a class, but render the

service of that class more efficient to the general government, and

therefore it must be presumed that the legislature found that the

public good would be thereby promoted.

“ And fourth. It is obviously possible, and therefore to be

intended, that the General Assembly found a clear equity to justify

their action.”1

And the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has ‘said : “ To justify the

court in arresting the proceedings and in declaring the tax void,

the absence of all possible public interest in the purposes for which

the funds are raised must be clear and palpable ; so clear and pal-

pable as to be perceptible by every mind at the ﬁrst blush. . . .

It is not denied that claims founded in equity and justice,

[" 490] in the ‘largest sense of those terms, or in gratitude or

charity, will support a tax. Such is the language of the

authorities.” 2

But we think it clear in the words of the Supreme Court of

Wisconsin, that “the legislature cannot . . . in the form of a tax

take the money of the citizen and give to an individual, the public
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interest or welfare being in no way connected with the transaction.

The objects for which money is raised by taxation must be public,

and such as subserve the common interest and well-being of the

community required to contribute.” 3 Or, as stated by the Supreme

Court of Pennsylvania, “ the legislature has no constitutional right

to . . . levy a tax, or to authorize any municipal corporation to

do it, in order to raise funds for a mere private purpose. No such

authority passed to the assembly by the general grant of the legis-

lative power. This would not be legislation. Taxation is a mode

of raising revenue for public purposes. When it is prostituted to

‘ Booth v. Woodbury, 32 Conn. 128. See to the same effect Speer v. School

Directors of Blairville, 50 Penn. St. 150. The legislature is not obliged to

consult the will of the people concerned in ordering the levy of local assess-_

ments. Cheaney v. Hooser, 9 B. Monr. 350; Slack v. Maysville, &c., R.R. Co.

13 B. Monr. 26; Cypress Pond Draining Co. v. Hooper, 2 Met. (Ky.) 353 ; ante,

pp. 230-235.

' Brodhead v. City of Milwaukee, 19 \Vis. 652.

‘ Per Dixon, Ch. J., in Brodhead v. Milwaukee, 19 Wis. 652. See also

Lumsden v. Cross, 10 ‘Via. 282.

-— ~i
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people of the other States, and the general good of the people of
this State is involved in the maintenance of that general government: In many conceivable ways the action of the town might
not only mitigate the burdens imposed upon a class, but render the
service of that class more efficient to the general go>ernment, and
therefore it must be presumed that the legislature found that the
public good would be thereby promoted.
" And fourth. It is obviously possible, and therefore to be
intended, that the General Assembly found a clear equity to justify
their action." 1
And the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has "said : " To justify the
court in arresting the proceedings and in declari.n g the tax void,
the absence of all possible public interest in the purposes for which
the funds are raised must be clear and palpable; so clear and palpable as to be perceptible by every mind at the first blush....
It is not denied that claims founded in equity and justice,
[• 490] in the *largest sense of those terms, or in gratitude or
charity, will support a tax. Such is the language of the
authorities." 2
But we think it clear in the words of the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin, that "the legislature cannot ... in the form of a tax
. take tho money of the citizen and give to an individual, the public
interest or welfare being in no way connected with the transaction.
The objects for which money is raised by taxation must be public,
and such as subserve the common interest and well-being of the
community required to contribute." 8 Or, as stated by the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, " the legislature has no constitutional right
to •.. levy a tax, or to authorize any municipal corporation to
do it, in order to raise funds for a mere private purpose. No such
authority passed to the assembly by the general grant of the legislative power. This would not be legislation. Taxation is a mode
of raising revenue for public purposes. When it is prostituted to
1 Booth v. Woodbury, 32 Conn. 128.
See to the same effect Speer v. School
Directors of Blairville, 50 Penn. St. 150. The legislature is not obliged to
consult the will of the people concerned in ordering the levy of local assess-;
ments. Cheaney v. Hooser, 9 B. Monr. 350; Slack v. Maysville, &c., R.R. Co.
13 B. Monr. 26; Cypress Pond Draining Co. v. Hooper, 2 Met. (Ky.) 353; ante,
pp. 230-235.
1 Brodhead"· City of Milwaukee, 19 Wis. 652.
3 Per Dixon, Ch. J., in Brodhead "· Milwaukee, 19 Wis. 652.
See also
Lumsden v. Cross, 10 Wis. 282.

[ 540]

en. xiv.] "ms rowan or raxarron. * 490
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ceases to be taxation and becomes plunder. Transferring money

from the owners of it into the possession of those who have no title

to it, though it be done under the name and form of a tax, is

unconstitutional for all the reasons which forbid the legislature to

usurp any other power not granted to them.” 1 And by the same

court, in a still later case, where the question was whether the

legislature could lawfully require a municipality to refund to a

bounty association the sums which they had advanced to relieve

themselves from an impending military conscription, “such an

enactment would not be legislation at all. It would be in the

nature of judicial action, it is true, but wanting the justice of notice

to parties to be affected by the hearing, trial, and all that gives

sanction and force to regular judicial proceedings; it would much

more resemble an imperial rescript than constitutional legisla-

tion: ﬁrst, in declaring an obligation where none was created or

previously existed ; and next, in decreeing payment, by directing

the money or property of the people to be sequestered to make

the payment. The legislature can exercise no such despotic

functions.” 2

‘ Per Black, Ch. J ., in Sharpless v. Mayor, &c. 21 Penn. St. 168.

’ Tyson v. School Directors of Halifax, 51 Penn. St. 9. See also Grim v.
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Weisenburg School District, 57 Penn. St. 433. The decisions in Miller

v. Grandy, 13 Mich. 540, Crowell v. Hopkinton, 45 N. H. 9, and Shackford v.

Newington, 46 N. H. 415, so far as they hold that a bounty law is not to be

held to cover moneys before advanced by an individual without any pledge of

the public credit, must be held referable, we think, to the same principle. \Ve

are aware that there are some cases, the doctrine of which seems opposed to

those we have cited, but perhaps a careful examination will enable us to harmo-

nize them all. One of these is Guilford v. Supervisors of Chenango, 18 Barb.

objects in no way connected with the public interest or welfare, it
ceases to be taxation and becomes plunder. Transferring money
from the ow.11ers of it into the possession of those who have no title
to it, though it be done under the name and form of a tax, is
unconstitutional for all the reasons which forbid the legislature to
usurp any other power not granted to them." 1 And by the same
court, in a still later case, where the question was whether the
legislature could lawfully require a municipality to refund to a
bounty association the sums which they had advanced to relie>e
themselves from an impending military conscription, " such an
enactment would not be legislation at all. It would be in the
nature of judicial action, it is true, but wanting the justice of notice
to parties to be affected by the hearing, trial, and all that gives
sanction and force to regular judicial proceedings ; it would much
more resemble an imperial rescript than constitutional legislation : first, in declaring an obligation where none was created or
previously existed ; and next, in decreeing payment, by directing
the money or property of the people to be sequestered to make
the payment. The legislature can exercise no such despotic
functions." 2

615, and 13 N. Y. 143. The facts in that case were as follows: Cornell and

Clark were formerly commissioners of highways of the town of Guilford, and as

such, by direction of the voters of the town, had sued the Butternut and Oxford

Turnpike Road Company. They were unsuccessful in the action, and were,

after a long litigation, obliged to pay costs. The town then refused to reimburse

them these costs. Cornell and Clark sued the town, and, after prosecuting the

action to the court of last resort, ascertained that they had no legal remedy.

They then applied to the legislature, and procured an act authorizing the ques-

tion of payment or not by the town to be submitted to the voters at the succeed-

ing town meeting. The voters decided that they would not tax themselves for

any such purpose. Another application was then made to the legislature, which

resulted in a law authorizing the county judge of Chenango County to appoint

three commissioners, whose duty it should be to hear and determine the amount

[541]

Per Black, Ch. J., in Sharpless v. Mayor, &c. 21 Penn. St. 168.
Tyson v. School Directors of Halifax, 51 Penn. St. 9. See also Grim v.
W eisenburg School District, 57 Penn. St. 433. The decisions in Miller
"· Grandy, 13 Mich. 540, Crowell v. Hopkinton, 45 N. H. 9, and Shackford "·
Newington, 46 N. H. 415, so far as they hold that a bounty law is not to be
held to cover moneys before advanced by an individual without any pledge of
the public credit, must be held referable, we think, to the same principle. 'Ve
are aware that there are s~me cases, the doctrine of which seems opposed to
those we have cited, but perhaps a careful examination will enable us to harmonize them all. One of these is Guilford v. Supervisors of Chenango, 18 Barb.
615, and 13 N.Y. 143. The facta in that case were as follows: Cornell and
Clark were fonnerly commissioners of highway~ of the town of Guilford, and as
such, by direction of the voters of the town, had sued the Butternut and Oxford
Turnpike Road Company. They were unsuccessful in the action, and were,
after a long litigation, obliged to pay costs. The town then refused to reimburse
them these costs. Cornell and Clark sued the town, and, after prosecuting the
action to the court of last resort, ascertained that they had no legal remedy.
They then applied to the legislature, and procured an act authorizing the question of payment ot- not by the town to be submitted to the voters at the succeeding town meeting. The voters decided that they would not tax themselves for
any such purpose. Another application was then made to the legislature, which
resulted in a law authorizing the county judge of Chenango County to appoint
three commissioners, whose duty it should be to hear and determine the amount
1

1
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[“ 491] "‘ The Supreme Court of Michigan has proceeded upon

the same principle in a recent case. The State is forbid-

of costs and expenses incurred by Cornell and Clark in the piosecution and

defence of the suits mentioned. It authorized the commissioners to make an

[* 491]

*The Supreme Court of Michigan bas proceeded upon
the same principle in a recent case. The State is forbid-

award, which was to be ﬁled with the county clerk, and the board of supervisors

were then required, at their next annual meeting, to apportion the amount of

the award upon the taxable property of the town of Guilford, and provide for

its collection in the same manner as other taxes are collected. The validity

of this act was aflirmed. It was regarded as one of those of which Denio, J .,

says “the statute book is full, perhaps too full, of laws awarding damages and

compensation of various kinds to be paid by the public to individuals, who had

failed to obtain what they considered equitably due to them by the decision of

administrative ofﬁcers acting under the provisions of former laws. The courts

have no power to supervise or review the doings of the legislature in such cases.”

It is apparent that there was a strong equitable claim upon the township in this

case for the reimbursement of moneys expended by public oﬁicers under the direc-

tion of their constituents, and perhaps no principle of constitutional law was

violated by the legislature thus changing it into a legal demand, and compelling

its satisfaction. Mr. Sedgwick criticises this act, and says of it that it “ may be

called taxation, but in truth it is the reversal of a judicial decision.” Sedg. on

Stat. & Const. Law, 414. There are very many claims, however, resting in
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equity, which the courts would be compelled to reject, but which it would be

very proper for the legislature to recognize, and provide for by taxation. Brew-

ster v. City of Syracuse, 19 N. Y. 116. Another case, perhaps still stronger

than that of Guilford v. The Supervisors, is Thomas v. Leland, 24 Wend. 65.

Persons at Utica had given bond to pay the extraordinary expense that would

be caused to the State by changing the junction of the Chenango Canal from

Whitesborough to Utica, and the legislature afterwards passed an act requiring

the amount to be levied by a tax on the real property of the city of Utica.

The theory of this act may be stated thus: The canal was a public way. The

expense of constructing all public ways may be properly charged on the commu-

nity specially or peculiarly beneﬁted by it. The city of Utica was specially and

peculiarly beneﬁted by having the canal terminate there; and as the expense of

construction was thereby increased, it was proper and equitable that the property

to be beneﬁted should pay this difference, instead of the State at large. The

act was sustained by the courts, and it was well remarked that the fact that a

bond had been before given securing the same money could not detract from its

validity. See on this point, Shaw v. Dennis, 5 Gilm. 416. Whether this case

is reconcilable with some others, and especially with that of Hampshire v.

Franklin, 16 Mass. 83, we have elsewhere expressed a doubt; but as an exercise

of the power of taxation, it does not conﬂict with the principles stated in the

text. Nevertheless, for the legislature in any case to compel a municipality to

assume a burden, on the ground of local beneﬁt or local obligation, against the

will of the citizens, is the exercise of nu arbitrary power little in harmony with

the general features of our republican system, and only to be justiﬁed in extreme

cases. The general idea of our tax system is, that those shall vote the burdens

who are to pay them; and it would be intolerable that a central authority should

[542] . , .

of costs and expenses incurred by Cornell and Clark in the prosecution and
defence of the suits mentioned. It authorized the commissioners to make an
award, which was to be filed with the county clerk, and the board of supervisors
were then required, at their next annual meeting, to apportion the amount of
the award upon the taxable property of the town of Guilford, and provide for
its collection in the same manner as other taxes are collected. The validity
of this act was affirmed. It was regarded as one of those of which De71io, J.,
says " the statute book is full, perhaps too full, of laws awa,rding damages and
compensation of various kinds to be paid by the public to individuals, who had
failed to obtain what they considered equitably due to them by the decision of
administrativ& officers acting under the provisions of former laws. The conrts
have no power to supervise or review the doings of the legislature in such cases."
It is apparent that there lvas a strong equitable claim upon the township in this
case for the reimbursement of moneys expended by public officers under the direction of their constituents, and perhaps no principle of constitutional law was
violated by the legislature thus changing it into a legal demand, and compelling
its satisfaction. Mr. Sedgwick criticises this act, and says of it that it "may be
called taxation, but in truth it is the reversal of a judicial decision." Sedg. on
Stat. & Const. Law, 414. There are very many claims, however, resting in
equity, which the courts would be compelled to reject, but which it would be
very proper for the legislature to recognize, and provide for by taxation. Brewster v. City of Syracuse, 19 N. Y. 116. Another case, perhaps still stronger
than that of Guilford v. The Supervisors, is Thomas v. Leland, 24 Wend. 65.
Persons at Utica had given bond to pay the e~traordinary expense that would
be caused to the State by changing the junction of the Chenango Canal from
Whitesborough to Utica, and the legislature afterwards passed an act requiring
the amount to be levied by a tax on the real property of the city of Utica.
The theory of this act may be stated thus: The canal was a public way. The
expense of constructing all public ways may be properly charged on the community specially or peculiarly benefited by it. The city of Utica was specially and
peculiarly benefited by having the canal terminate there; and as the expense of
construction was thereby increased, it \Vas proper and equitsble that the property
to be benefited should pay this difference, instead of the State at large. The
act was sustained by the courts, and it was well remarked that the fact that a
bond had been before given securing the same money could not detract from ita
validity. See on this point, Shaw v. Dennis, 5 Gilm. 416. Whether this case
is reconcilable with some others, and especially with that of Hampshire v.
Franklin, 16 Mass. 83, we have elsewhere expressed a doubt; but as an exercise
of the power of taxation, it does not conflict with the principles stated in the
text. Nevertheless, for the legislature in any case to compel a municipality to
assume a burden, on the ground of local benefit or local obligation, against the
will of the citizens, is the exercise of an arbitrary power little in harmony with
the general features of our republican system, and only to be justified in extreme
cases. The general idea of our tax system is, that those shall vote the burdens
who are to pay them; and it would be intolerable that a central authority should
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den by the ‘constitution to engage in works of public [* 492]

improvement, except in the expenditure of grants or other

property made to it for this purpose. The State, with this prohibi-

tion in force, entered into a contract with a private party for the

construction by such party of an improvement in the ~

Muskegon River, for which the State was to pay ‘the [* 493]

contractor ﬁfty thousand dollars, from the Internal Im-

provement Fund. The improvement was made, but the State

officers declined to draw warrants for the amount, on the ground

that the fund from which payment was to have been made was

exhausted. The State then passed an act for the levying of tolls

upon the property passing through the improvement suﬁicient to

pay the contract price within ﬁve years. The court held this act

void. As the State had no power to construct or pay for such a

work from its general fund, and could not constitutionally have

agreed to pay the contractors from tolls, there was no theory on

which the act could be supported, except it was that the State had

misappropriated the Internal Improvement Fund, and therefore

ought to provide payment from some other source. But if the

State had misappropriated the fund, the burden of reimbursement

have power, not only to tax localities, for local purposes of a public character
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which they did not approve, but also, if it so pleased, to compel them to assume

and discharge private claims not equitably chargeable upon them. The eases of

Chcaney v. Hooser, 9 B. Monr. 330; Sl1arp’s Ex. v. Dunavan, 17 B. Monr. 223;

Maltus v. Shields, 2 Met. (Ky.) 553, will throw some light on this general sub-

ject. The case of Cypress Pond Draining Co. v. Hooper, 2 Met. (Ky.) 350, is

also instructive. The Cypress -Pond Draining Company was incorporated to

drain and keep drained the lands within a speciﬁed boundary, at the cost of the

owners, and was authorized by the act to collect a tax on each acre, not exceed-

den by the • constitution to engage in works of public [* 492]
improvement, except in the expenditure of grants or other
property made to it for this purpose. The State, with this prohibition in force, entered into a contract with a private party for the
construction by such party of an improvement in the
Muskegon River, for which the State was to pay • the [* 493]
contractor fifty thousand dollars, from the Internal Improvement Fund. The improvement was made, but the State
officers declined to draw warrants for the amount, on the ground
that the fund from which payment was to have been made was
exhaustc;d. The State then passed an act for the levying of tolls
upon the property passing through the improvement sufficient to
pay the contract price within five years. The court held this act
void. As the State had no power to construct or pay for such a
work from its general fund, and could not constitutionally have
agreed to pay the contractors from tolls, there was no theory on
which the act could be supported, except it was that the State had
misappropriated the Internal Improvement Fund, and therefore
ought to provide payment from some other source. But if the
State had misappropriated the fund, the burden of reimbursement

ing twenty-ﬁvc cents per acre, for that purpose, for ten years, to be collected by

the sheriff. With the money thus collected, the board of managers, six in num-

ber, named in the act, was required to drain certain creeks and ponds within

said boundary. The members of the board owned in the aggregate 3,840 acres,

the larger portion of which was low land, subject to inundation, and of little or

no value in its then condition, but which would be rendered very valuable by

the contemplated draining. The corporate boundary contained 14,621 acres,

owned by sixty-eight persons. Thirty-four of these, owning 5,975 acres, had

no agency in the passage of the act, and no notice of the application therefor,

gave no assent to its provisions, and a very small portion of their land, if any,

would be beneﬁted or improved in value by the proposed draining; and they

resisted the collection of the tax. As to these owners the act of incorporation

was held unconstitutional and inoperative. See also The City of Covington v.

Southgate, 15 B. Monr. 491.

. [543]

have power, not only to tax localities, for local purposes of a public character
which they did not approve, but also, if it so pleased, to compel them to assume
and discharge private claims not equitably chargeable upon them. The cases of
Cheaney v. Hooser, 9 B. Monr. 330; Sharp's Ex. v. Dunavan, 17 B. Monr. 223;
Maltus v. Shields, 2 Met. (Ky.) 553, will throw some light on this general subject. The case of Cypress Pond Draining Co. v. Hooper, 2 Met. (Ky.) 350, is
also instructive. The Cypress Pond Draining Company was incorporated to
drain and keep drained the lands within a specified boundary, at the cost of the
owners, and was authorized by the act to collect a tax on each acre, not exceeding twenty-five cents per acre, for that purpose, for t.en years, to be collected by
the sheriff. With the money thus collected, the board of managers, six in number, named in the act, was required to drain certain creeks and ponds within
said boundary. The members of the board owned in the aggregate 8,840 acres,
the larger portion of which was low land, subject to inundation, and of little or
no nlue in its then condition, but which would be rendered very valuable by
the contemplated draining. The corporate boundary contained 14,621 acres,
owned by sixty-eight persons. Thirty-four of these, owning 5,975 acres, had
no agency in the passage of the act, and no notice of the application therefor,
gave no assent to its provisions, and a very small portion of their land, if any,
would be benefited or improved in value by the proposed draining ; and they
resisted the collection of the tax. As to these owners the act of incorporation
was held unconstitutional and inoperative. Sec also The City of Covington v.
Southgate, 15 B. Monr. 491.
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would fall upon the State at large ; it could not lawfully be imposed

upon a single town or district, or upon the commerce of a single

town or district. The burden must be borne by those upon whom

it justly rests, and to recognize in the State a power to compel

some single district to assume and discharge a State debt would be

to recognize its power to make an obnoxious district or an

obnoxious elass- bear the whole burden of the State government.

An act to that eﬂ'ect would not be taxation, nor would it be the

exercise of any legitimate legislative authority} And it may be

said of such an act, that, so far as it would operate to make those

who would pay the tolls pay more than their propprtion of

["194] the State obligation, it * was in effect taking their property

for the private beneﬁt of other citizens of the State, and

was obnoxious to all the objections against the appropriation of

private property for private purposes which could exist in any other

case. '

And the Supreme Court of Iowa has said: “ If there be such a

ﬂagrant and palpable departure from equity in the burden imposed ;

if it be imposed for the beneﬁt of others, or for purposes in which

those objecting have no interest, and are therefore not bound to

contribute, it is no matter in what form the power is exercised, —
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whether in the unequal levy of a tax, or in the regulation of the

boundaries of the local government, which results in subjecting the

' Ryerson v. Utley, 16 Mich. 269. “ Uniformity in taxation implies equality

in the burden of taxation.” Bank v. Hines, 3 Ohio, N. s. 15. " This equality in

the burden constitutes the very substance designed to be secured by the rule.”

Weeks v. City of Milwaukee, 10 \Vis. 258. See also Sanborn v. Rice, 9 Minn.

273; State v. Haben, 22 \Vis. 660. “ There can be no doubt that, as a general

rule, where an expenditure is to be made for a public object, the execution of

which will be substantially beneﬁcial to every portion of the Commonwealth

alike, and in the beneﬁts and advantages of which all the people will equally

participate, if the money is to be raised by taxation, the assessment would

be deemed to come within that class which was laid to defray one of the

would fall upon the State at large; it could not lawfully be imposed
upon a single town or district, or upon the commerce of a single
town or district. The burden must be borne by those upon whom
it justly rests, and to recognize in the State a power to compel
some single district to assume and discharge a State debt would be
to recognize its power to make an obnoxious district or au
obnoxious class bear the whole burden of tho State government.
An act to that effect would not be taxation, nor would it be the
exercise of any legitimate legislative authority. 1 And it may be
said of such an act, that, so far as it would operate to make those
who would pay the tolls pay more than their prop_ortion of
[• 494] the State obligation, it • was in effect taking their property
for the private benefit of other citizens of the State, and
was obnoxious to all the objection~ against the appropriation of
private property for private purposes which could exist in any other

case.
And the Supreme Court of Iowa has said: " If there be such a
flagrant and palpable departure from equity in the burden imposed ;
if it be imposed for the benefit of others, or for purposes in which
those objecting have no interest, and are therefore not bound to
contribute, it is no mattez: in what form the power is exercised,whether in the unequal levy of a tax, or in the regulation of the
boundaries of the local government, which results in subjecting the

general charges of government, and ought therefore to be imposed as nearly

as possible with equality upon all persons resident and estates lying within

the Commonwealth. . . . An assessment for such a purpose, if laid in any

other manner, could not in any just or proper sense be regarded as ‘ propor-

tional’ within the meaning of the Constitution.” Merrick v. Inhabitants of Am-

herst, 12 Allen, 504, per Bigelow, Ch. J. Taxation not levied according to the

principles upon which the right to tax is based, is an unlawful appropriation of

private property to public uses. City of Covington v. Southgate, 15 B. Monr.

498.
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1 Ryerson v. Utley, 16 1\Iich. 269.
"Uniformity in taxation implies equality
in the burden of taxation." Bank v. Hines, 3 Ohio, N. s. 15. "This equality in
the burden constitutes the very substance designed to be secured by the rule."
Weeks v. City of 1\Iilwaukee, 10 \Vis. 258. Sec also Sanborn v. Rice, 9 Minn.
273; State v. IIaben, 22 Wis. 660. " There can be no doubt that, as a general
rule, where an expenditure is to be made for a public object, the execution of
which will be substantially beneficial to every portion of the Commonwealth
alike, and in the benefits and advantages of which all the people will equally
participate, if the money is to be raised by taxation, the assessment would
be deemed to come ,~·ithin that class which was laid to defray one of the
general charges of government, and ought therefore to be imposed as nearly
as possible with equality upon all persons resident and estates lying within
the Commonwealth. • . • An assessment for such a purpose, if laid in any
other manner, could not in any just or proper sense be regarded as ' proportional' within the II\eaning of the Constitution." Merrick v. Inhabitants of .Amherst, 12 Allen, 50!, per Bioelow, Ch. J. Taxation not levied according to the
principles upon which the right to tax is based, is an unlawful appropriation of
private property to public uses. City of Covington v. Southgate, 15 B. 1\Ionr.

498.
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party unjustly to local taxes,—it must be regarded as coming
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within the prohibition of the constitution designed to protect private

rights against oppression however made, and whether under color

of recognized power or not.” 1

When, therefore, the legislature assumes to impose a pecuniary

burden upon the citizen in the form of a tax, two questions may

always be raised: First, whether the purpose of such burden may

properly be considered public on any of the grounds above indi-

eated ; and second, if public, then whether the burden is one which

should properly be borne by the district upon which it is imposed.

If either of these questions is answered in the negative, the legis-

lature must be adjudged to have assumed an authority not con-

ferred in the general grant of legislative power, and which is

therefore unconstitutional and void. “The power of taxation,”

says an eminent writer, “is a great governmental attribute, with

which the courts have very wisely shown extreme unwillingness to

interfere; but if abused, the abuse should share the fate of all

other usurpations.” 2 In the case of burdens thus assumed by the

legislature on behalf of the State, it is not always that a speedy

and safe remedy can be properly afforded in the courts. It would

certainly be a very dangerous exercise of power for a court to

attempt to stay the collection of State taxes because an illegal
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demand was included in the levy; and indeed, as State taxes are

not usually levied for the purpose of satisfying speciﬁc demands,

but a gross sum is raised which it is calculated will be suﬁicient

for the wants of the year, the question is not one usually of the

unconstitutionality of taxation, but of the misappropriation of

moneys which have been raised by taxation. But if the State

should order a city, township, or village to raise money by taxa-

tion to establish one of its citizens in business, or for any other

object equally removed from the proper sphere of government, or

should undertake to impose the whole burden of the government

upon a fraction of the State, the usurpation of authority

would not only be *plain and palpable, but the proper ["‘ 495]

remedy would also be plain, and -no ‘court of competent

jurisdiction could feel at liberty to decline to enforce the paramount

law. -

In the second place, it is of the very essence of taxation that it

' Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa, 92.

’ Sedgwick on Const. and Stat. Law, 414.
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party unjustly to local taxes,- it must be regarded as coming
within the prohibition of the constitution designed to protect private
rights against oppression however made, and whether under color
of recognized power or not." 1
When, therefore, the legislature assumes to impose a pecuniary
burden upon the citizen in the form of a tax, two questions may
always be raised: First, whether the purpose of such burden may
properly be considered public on any of the grounds above indicated ; and second, if public, then whether the burden is one which
should properly be borne by the district upon which it is imposed.
If either of these questions is answ~red in the negative, the legislature must be adjudged to have assumed an authority not conferred in the general grant of legislative power, and which is ,.
therefore unconstitutional and void. "The power of taxation,"
says an eminent writer," is a great governmental attribute, with
which the courts have very wisely shown extreme unwillingness to
interfere ; but if abused, the abuse should share the fate of all
other usurpations." 2 In the case of burdens thus assumed by the
legislature on behalf of the State, it is not always that a speedy
and safe remedy can be properly afforded in the courts. It would
certainly be a very dangerous exercise of power for a court to
attempt to stay the collection of State taxes because an illegal
demand was included in the levy ; and indeed, as State taxes are
not usually levied for the purpose of satisfying specific demands,
but a gross sum is raised which it is calculated will be sufficient
for the wants of the year, the question is not one usually of the
unconstitutionality of taxation, but of the misappropriation of
money& which have been raised by taxation. But if the State
should order a city, township, or village to raise money by taxation to establish one of its citizens in business, or for any other
object equally removed from the proper sphere of government, or
should undertake to impose the whole burden of the government
upon a fraction of the State, the usurpation of authority
would not only be *plain and palpable, but the proper (* 495]
remedy would also be plain, and .no 'court of competent
jurisdiction could feel at liberty to decline to enforce the paramount
law.
In the second place, it is of the very essence of taxation that it
1
1

Morford"· Unger, 8 Iowa, 92.
Sedgwick on Const. and Stat. Law, 414:.
85
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be levied with equality and uniformity, and to this end, that there
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should be some system of apportionment. Where the burden is

common, there should be common contribution to discharge it.1

Taxation is the equivalent for the protection which the government

affords to the persons and property of its citizens; and as all are

alike protected, so all alike should bear the burden, in proportion

to the interests secured. Taxes by the poll are justly regarded as

odious, and are seldom resorted to for the collection of revenue;

and when levied upon property there must be an apportionment

with reference to a uniform standard, or they degenerate into mere

arbitrary exaetions. In this particular the State constitutions

have been very speciﬁc, though in providing for equality and uni-

formity they have done little more than to state in concise language

a principle ,of constitutional law which, whether declared or not,

would inhere in the power to tax.

Taxes may assume the form of duties, imposts, and excises;

and those collected by the national government are very largely of

this character. They may also assume the form of license fees, for

permission to carry on particular occupations, or to enjoy special

franchises. They may be speciﬁc; such as are often levied upon

corporations, in reference to the amount of capital stock. or to the

business done, or proﬁts earned by them. Or they may be direct,
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upon property, in proportion to its value, or upon some other basis

of apportionment, which the legislature shall regard as just, and

which shall keep in view the general idea of uniformity. The taxes

collected by the States are mostly of the latter class, and it is to

them that the constitutional principles we shall have occasion to

discuss will more particularly apply. -

As to all taxation apportioned upon property, there must be

taxing districts, and within these districts the rule of absolute uni-

formity must be applicable. A State tax is to be apportioned

through the State, a county tax through the county, a city tax

through the city ; while in the case of local improvements, beneﬁt-

ing in a special and peculiar manner some portion of the State or

of a county or city, it is competent to arrange a special taxing

district, within which the expense shall be apportioned.

["-196] School districts and road districts are "‘also taxing dis-

tricts for the peculiar purposes for which they exist, and

‘ 2 Kent, 231; Sanborn v. Rice, 9 Minn. 273; Ryerson v. Utlcy, 16 Mich.

269; Oliver v. \Vashington Mills, 11 Allen, 268.
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be levied with equality and uniformity, and to this end, that there
should be some system of apportionment. Where the burden is
common, there should be common contribution to discharge it.l
Taxation is the equivalent for the protection which the government
affords to the persons and property of its citizens ; and as all are
alike protected, so all alike should bear the burden, in proportion
to the interests secured. Taxes by the poll are justly regarded as
odious, and are seldom resorted to for the collection of revenue ;
and when levied upon property there must be an apportionment
with reference to a uniform standard, or they degenerate into mere
arbitrary exactions. In this particular the State constitutions
have been very specific, though in providing for equality and uni._ formity they have done little more than to state in concise language
a principle ,of constitutional law which, whether declared or not,
would inhere in the power to tax.
Taxes may assume the form of duties, imposts, and excises ;
and those collected by the national government are very largely of
this character. They may also assume the form of license fees, for
permission to carry on particular occupations~ or to enjoy special
franchises. They may be specific; such as are often levied upon
corporations, in reference to the amount of capital stock, or to the
business done, or profits earned by them. Or they may be direct,
upon property, in proportion to its value, or upon some other basis
of apportionment, which the legislature shall regard as just, and
which shall keep in view the general idea of uniformity. The taxes
• collected by the States are mostly of the latter class, and it is to
them that the constitutional principles we shall have occasion to
discuss will more particularly apply.
As to all taxation apportioned upon property, there must be
taxing districts, and within these districts the rule of absolute uniformity must be applicable. A State tax is to be apportioned
through the State, a county tax through the county, a city tax
through the city ; while in the case of local improvements, benefiting in a special and peculiar manner some portion of the State or
of o. county or city, it is competent to arrange a special taxing
district, within which the expense shall be apportioned.
[* 496] School districts and road districts are • also taxing districts for the peculiar purposes for which they exist, and
1 2 Kent, 231; Sanborn t'. Rice, 9 Minn. 273; Ryerson
269; Oliver v. Washington Mills, 11 Allen, 268.
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Utley, 16 Mich.
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villages may have special powers of taxation distinct from the

CH. XIV.)
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townships of which they form a part. Whenever it is made a

requirement of the State constitution that taxation shall be upon

property according to value, such a requirement implies an assess-

ment of valuation by public ofﬁcers at such regular periods as

shall be provided by law, and a taxation upon the basis of such

assessment until the period arrives for making it anew. Thus, the

Constitutions of Maine and Massachusetts require that there should

be a valuation of estates within the Commonwealth to _be made

at least every ten years ;1 the Constitution of Michigan requires

the annual assessments which are made by township oﬂicers to be

equalized by a State board, which reviews them for that purpose

every ﬁve years;2 and the Constitution of Rhode Island requires

the legislature “ from time to time ” to provide for new valuations

of property for the assessment of taxes in such manner as they

may deem best.” Some other constitutions contain no provisions

upon this subject; but the necessity for valuation is nevertheless

implied, though the mode of making it, and the periods at which it

shall be made, are left to the legislative discretion.

There are some kinds of taxes, however, that are not usually

assessed according to the value of property, and some which could

not be thus assessed. And there is probably no State which does
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not levy other taxes than those which are imposed upon property.‘

Every burden which the State imposes upon its citizens with a view

to a revenue, either for itself or for any of the municipal govern-

ments, or for the support of the governmental machinery in any of

the political divisions, is levied under the power of taxation,

whether imposed under the name of tax, or under some other

designation. The license fees which are sometimes required to be

paid by those who follow particular employments are, when

imposed for purposes of revenue, taxes ; the tolls upon the persons

or property making use of the works of public improvement

owned and controlled by the State, are a species of tax; stamp

duties when imposed are taxes, and it is not uncommon, as we

have already stated, to require that corporations shall pay a

‘ Constitution of Maine, art. 9, § 7; Constitution of Mass. Part 2, c. 1, § 1,

art. 4.

’ Constitution of Mich. art. 14, § 13.

" Constitution of Rhode Island, art.‘ 4, § 15.

‘ See Bright v. McCulloch, 27 Ind._223.

[5-17]

villages may have special powers of taxation distinct from the
townships of which they form a part. Whenever it is made a
requirement of the State constitution that taxation shall be upon
property according to value, such a requirement implies an assessment of valuation by public officers at such regular periods as
shall be provided by law, and a taxation upon the basis of such
assessment until the period arrives for making it anew. Thus, the
Constitutions of :Maine and :Massachusetts require that there should
be a valuation of estates within the Commonwealth to .be made
at least every ten years ; 1 the Constitution of Michigan requires
the annual assessments which are made by township officers to be
equalized by a State board, which reviews them for that purpose
every five years; 2 and the Constitution of Rhode Island requires
the legislature " from time to time " to provide for new valuations
of property for the assessment of taxes in such manner as they
may deem best.3 Some other constitutions contain no provisions
upon this subject; but the necessity for valuation is nevertheless
implied, though the mode of making it, and the periods at which it
shall be made, are left to the legislative discretion.
There are some kinds of taxes, however, that are not usually
assessed according to the value of property, and some which could
not be thus assessed. And there is probably no State which does
not levy other taxes than those which are imposed upon property.4
Every burden which the State imp'Jses upon its citizens with a view
to a revenue, either for itself or for any of the municipal governments, or for the support of the governmental machinery in any of
the political divisions, is levied under the power of taxation,
whether imposed under the name of tax, or under some other
designation. The license fees which are sometimes required to be
paid by those who follow particular employments are, when
imposed for purposes of revenue, taxes; the tolls upon the persons
or property making usc of the works of public improvement
owned and controlled by the State, are a species of tax ; stamp
duties when imposed are taxes, and it is not uncommon, as we
have already stated, to require that corporations shall pay a
1 Constitution of Main?, art. 9, § 7; Constitution of Mass. Part 2, c. 1, § 1,
art. 4.
1 Constitution of Mich. art. 14, § 13.
3 Constitution of Rhode Isla.nu, art.- 4, § 15.
4 Sec Bright v. McCulloch, 27 Ind. _223.
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[*‘ 497] certain sum annually, in proportion to their * capital

(CH. XIV.

stock, or by some other standard, and which is the mode

regarded by the State as most convenient and suitable for the

taxation of such organizations. It is evident, therefore, that the

constitutional requirements sometimes met with, that taxation

upon property shall be according to value, do not include every

species of taxation; but all special cases like those we have here

referred to are, by implication, excepted.

But in addition to these cases, there are others where taxes are

levied directly upon property, which are nevertheless held not to

be within the constitutional provisions. Assessments for the open-

ing, making, improving, or repairing of streets, the draining of

swamps, and the like local works, have been generally made upon

property, with some reference to the supposed beneﬁts which the

property would receive therefrom. Instead, therefore, of making

the assessment include all the property of the municipal organiza-

tion in which the improvement is made, a new and special taxing

district is created, whose bounds are conﬁned to the limits within

which property receives a special and peculiar beneﬁt, in conse-

quence of the improvement. Even within this district the assess-

ment is sometimes made by some other standard than that of

value; and it is evident that if it be just to create the taxing

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:22 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105011581
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

district with reference to special beneﬁts, it would be equally just

and proper to make the taxation within the district have reference

to the beneﬁt each parcel of property receives, rather than to its

relative value. The opening or paving of a street may increase

the value of all property upon or near it; and it may be just that

all such property should contribute to the expense of the improve-

ment: but it by no means follows that each parcel of the property

will receive from the improvement a beneﬁt in proportion to the

previous value. One lot upon the street may be greatly increased

in value, another at a little distance may be but slightly beneﬁted;

and if no constitutional provision interferes, there is consequently

abundant reason why the tax levied within the taxing district

should have reference, not to value, but to beneﬁt.

It has been objected, however, to taxation upon this basis, that

inasmuch as the district upon which the burden is imposed is com-

pelled to make the improvement for the beneﬁt of the general

public, it is, to the extent of the tax levied, an appropriation of

private property for the public use; and as the persons taxed, as a

[548 ]

[* 497] certain sum annually, in proportion to their • capital
stock, or by some other standard, and which is the mode
regarded by the State as most convenient and suitable for the
taxation of such organizations. It is evident, therefore, that the
constitutional requirements sometimes met with, that taxation
upon property shall be according to value, do not include every
species of taxation; but all special cases like those we have here
referred to are, by implication, excepted.
But in addition to these cases, there are others where taxes are
levied directly upon property, which are nevertheless held not to
be within the constitutional provisions. Assessments for the opening, making, improving, or repairing of streets, the draining of
swamps, and the like local works, have been generally made upon
property, with some reference to the supposed benefits which the
property would receive therefrom. Instead, therefore, of making
the assessment include all the property of the municipal organization in which the improvement is made, a new and special taxing
district is created, whose bounds are confined to the limits within
which property receives a special and peculiar benefit, in consequence of the improvement. Even within this district the assessment is sometimes made by some other standara than that of
value; and it is evident that if it be just to create the taxing
, district with reference to special benefits, it would be equally just
and proper to make the taxation within the district have reference
to the benefit each parcel of property receives, rather than to its
relative value. The opening or paving of a street may increase
the value of all property upon or near it; and it may be just that
all such property should contribute to the expense of the improvement: but it by no means follows that each parcel of the property
will receive from the improvement a benefit in proportion to the
previous value. One lot upon the street may be greatly increased
in value, another at a little distance may be but slightly benefited;
and if no constitutional provision interferes, there is consequently
abundant reason why the tax levied within the taxing district
should have reference, not to value, but to benefit.
It has been objected, however, to taxation upon this basis, that
inasmuch as the district upon which the burden is imposed is compelled to make the improvement for the benefit of the general
public, it is, to the extent of the tax levied, an appropriation of
private property for the public use; and as the persons taxed, ns a
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part of the public, would be entitled of right to the enjoyment of
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the improvement when made, such right of enjoyment could not

be treated as compensation for the exaction made, and such exac-

tion would therefore be opposed to those constitutional principles

which declare the inviolability of private property. But those

principles have no reference to the taking of property under the

right of taxation. When the constitution provides that private

property shall not be taken for public use without just

compensation made therefor, it has reference to *an [* 498]

appropriation thereof under the right of eminent domain.

Taxation and eminent domain indeed rest substantially on the

same foundation, as each implies the taking of private property for

the public use 011 compensation made; but the compensation is

different in the two cases. When taxation takes money for the

public use, the tax-payer receives, or is supposed to receive, his

just compensation in the protection which government affords to

his life, liberty, and property, and in the increase in the value of

his possessions by the use to which the government applies the

money raised by the tax,‘ and either of these beneﬁts will support

the burden.

But if these special local levies are taxation, do they come under

the general provisions on the subject of taxation to be found in
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our State constitutions? The Constitution of Michigan provides

that “the legislature shall provide an uniform rule of taxation,

except on property paying speciﬁc taxes; and taxes shall be levied

upon such property as shall be prescribed by law;”2 and again:

“All assessments hereafter autlioriied shall be on property at its

cash value.”3 The ﬁrst of these provisions has been regarded as

conﬁding to the discretion of the legislature the establishment of

the rule of uniformity by which taxation was to be imposed; and

the second as having reference to the annual valuation of property

for the purposes of taxation, which it is customary to make in that

State, and not to the actual levy of a tax. And a local tax, there-

fore, levied in the city of Detroit, to meet the expense of paving a

public street, and which was levied, not in proportion to the value

" People v. Mayor, &c., of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 422; lVilliams v. Mayor, &c.,

of Detroit, 2 Mich. 565; Scovills v. Cleveland, 1 Ohio, N. s. 126; Northern In-

diana R.R. Co. v. Connelly, 10 Ohio, N. s. 165.

7 Art. 14, § 11.

i‘ Art. 14, § 12.
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part of the public, would be entitled of right to the enjoyment of
the improvement when made, such right of enjoyment could not
be treated as compensation for the exaction made, and such exaction would therefore be opposed to those constitutional principles
which declare the inviolability of private property. But those
principles have no reference to the taking of property under the
right of taxation. When tlie constitution provides that private
property shall not bo taken for public use without just
compensation made therefor, it has reference to • an [• 498]
appropriation thereof under the right of eminent domain.
Taxation and eminent domain indeed rest substantially on the
same foundation, as each implies the taking of private property for
the public use on compensation made ; but the compensation is
different in the two cases. When taxation takes money for the
public use, the tax-payer receives, or is supposed to receive, his
just compensation in the protection which government affords to
his life, liberty, and property, and in the increase in the value of
his possessions by the use to which the government applies the
money raised by the tax, 1 and either of these benefits will support
the burden.
But if these special local levies are taxation, do they come under
the general provisions on the subject of taxation to be found in
our State constitutions? Tho Constitution of Michigan provides
that " the legislature shall provide an uniform rule of taxation,
except on property paying specific taxes; and taxes shall be levied
upon such property as shall be prescribed by law;" 2 and again:
"All assessments hereafter authori:ed shall be on property at its
cash value." 8 The first of these provisions has been regarded as
confiding to the discretion of the legislature the establishment of
the rule of uniformity by which taxation was to be imposed ; and
the second as having reference to the annual valuation of property
for the purposes of taxation, which it is customary to make in that
State, and not to the actual levy of a tax. And a local tax, therefore, levied in the city of Detroit, to meet the expense of paving a
public street, and which was levied, not in proportion to the value
1 People v. Mayor, &c., of Brooklyn, 4 N.Y. 422; Williams v. Mayor, &c.,
of Detroit, 2 Mich. 565; Scovills v. Cleveland, 1 Ohio, N. s. 126; Northern Indiana R.R. Co. v. Connelly, 10 Ohio, x. a. 165.
' Art. 14, § 11.
3 Art. 14, § 12.
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of property, but according to an arbitrary scale of supposed beneﬁt,
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was held not invalid under the constitutional provision}

So the Constitution of Illinois provides that “the General As-

sembly shall provide for levying a tax by valuation, so that every

person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value

of his or her property ; such value to be ascertained by some person

or persons to be elected or appointed in such manner as the Gen-

eral Assembly shall direct, and not otherwise,” &c. The charter

of the city of Peoria provided that, when a public street

[* 499] "‘ was opened or improved, commissioners should be

appointed by the county court to assess upon the property

beneﬁted the expense of the improvement in proportion to the

beneﬁt. These provisions were held to be constitutional, on the

ground that assessments of this character were not such taxation

as was contemplated by the general terms which the constitution

employed.“ And a similar view of these local assessments has

been taken in other cases.‘

' \Villiams v. Mayor, &c., of Detroit, 2 Mich. 560. And see \Voodbridge v.

Detroit, 8 Mich. 274.

' Art. 9, § 2.

" City of Peoria v. Kidder, 26 Ill. 357. See also Canal Trustees v. Chicago,

12 Ill. 406. In the subsequent case of Chicago v. Larned, 34 Ill. 203, it was
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decided, after very full argument and consideration, that, while taxation for these

local assessments might constitutionally be made in proportion and to the extent

of the beneﬁts received, it could not be made on the basis of frontage. This case

of property, but according to an arbitrary scale of supposed benefit,
was held not invalid under the constitutional provision. 1
So the Constitution of Tilinois provides that " the General Assembly shall provide for levying a tax by valuation, so that every
person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value
of his or her property; such value to be ascertained by some person
or persons to be elected or appointed in such manner as the General Assembly shall direct, and not otherwise," 2 &c. The charter
of the city of Peoria provided that, when a public street
[• 499] • was opened or improved, commissioners should be
appointed by the county court to assess upon the property
benefited the expense of the improvement in proportion to the
benefit. These provisions were held to be constitutional, on the
ground that assessments of this character were not such taxation
as was contemplated by the general terms which the constitution
employed.8 And a similar view of these local assessments bas
been taken in other cases.4

was followed in Wright v. Chicago, 46 Ill. 44.

‘ People v. Mayor, &c., of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419; Matter of Mayor, &c., of

New York, 11 Johns. 77; Sharp v. Spier, 4-Hill, 76; Livingston v. Mayor, &c.,

of New York, S Wend. 85; Matter of Furman St., 17 Wend. 649; Nichols v.

Bridgeport, 23 Conn. 189; Schenleyv. City of Allegheny, 25 Penn. St. 128;

Wray v. Pittsburg, 46 Penn. St. 365; McBride v. Chicago, 22111. 574; Chicago

v. Larned, 34 Ill. 203; City of Lexington v. McQuillan‘s Heirs, 9 Dana, 513;

Barnes v. Atchison, 2 Kansas, 4-54; Hines v. Leavenworth, 3 Kansas, 186; St.

Joseph v. O’Donoghue, 31 Mo. 345; Egyptian Levee Co. v. Hardin, 27 Mo.

495; St. Joseph v. Anthony, 30 Mo. 537; Burnet v. Sacramento, 12 Cal. 76;

Yeatman v. Crandell, 11 La. An. 220; \Vallace v. Shelton, 14 La. An. 498;

Richardson v. Morgan, 16 La. An. 429; Hill v. Higdon, 5 Ohio, N. S. 243;

Marion v. Epler, ib. 250; Reeves v. Treasurer of Wood Co. 8 Ohio, N. s. 333;

Northern Ind. R.R. Co. v. Connelly, 10 Ohio, N. s. 159; Baker v. Cincinnati,

11 Ohio, N. s. 534; Maloy v. Marietta, 11 Ohio, N. s. 636; State v. Dean, 3

Zab. 335; State v. Mayor, &c., of Jersey City, 4 Zab. 662; Bond v. Kenosha,

17 Wis. 289; City of Fairﬁeld v. Ratcliff, 20 Iowa, 396; Municipality No. 2 v.

White, 9 La. An. 447; Cumming v. Police Jury, ib. 503; Northern Liberties v.

St. John’s Church, 13 Penn. St. 107; McGee v. Mathis, 21 Ark. 40; Goodrich

[ 550 ] _

1 Williams"· Mayor, &c., of Detroit, 2 Mich. 560.
.And see Woodbridge"·
Detroit, 8 Mich. 274.
'Art. 9, § 2.
~ City of Peoria"· Kidder, 26 Til. 857. See also Canal Trustees"· Chicago,
12 Ill. 406. In the subsequent ease of Chicago "· Larned, 34 TIL 203, it was
decided, after very full argument and consideration, that, while taxation for theae
local assessments might constitutionally be made in proportion and to the extent
of the benefits received, it could not be made on the basis of frontage. This caae
was followed in Wright v. Chicago, 46 Ill. 44.
4 People"· Mayor, &c., of Brooklyn, 4 N.Y. 419; Matter of Mayor, &e., of
New York, 11 Johns. 77; Sharp"· ~pier, 4-Hill, 76; Livingston"· Mayor, &e.,
of New York, 8 Wend. 85; Matter of Funnan St., 17 Wend. 64:9; Nichola "·
Bridgeport, 23 Conn. 189; Schenley"· City of Alleghany, 25 Penn. St. 128;
Wray v. Pittsburg, 46 Penn. St. 365; McBride"· Chicago, 22 Ill. 574; Chicago
t). Larned. 34 m. 203; City of Lexington II. McQuillan's Heirs, 9 Dana, 518 ;
Barnes "· A-tchison, 2 Kansas, 454; Hines v. Leavenworth, 8 Kansas, 186; St.
Joseph v. O'Donoghue, 31 Mo. 845; Egyptian Levee Co. "· Hardin, 27 Mo.
495; St. Joseph "· Anthony, 80 Mo. 637; Burnet "· Sacramento, 12 Cal. 76;
Yeatman "· Crandell, 11 La. An. 220; Wallace "· Shelton, 14 La. An. 498;
Richardson "·Morgan, 16 La. An. 429; Hill v. Higdon, 5 Ohi~t, N. s. 248;
Marion v. Epler, ib. 250; Reeves "· Treasurer of Wood Co. 8 Ohio, N. s. 838;
Northern Ind. R.R. Co. "· Connelly, 10 Ohio, N. 8. 159; Baker "·Cincinnati,
11 Ohio, N. s. 584; 1\faloy "· Marietta, 11 Ohio, N . 8 . 686; State "· Dean, 8
Zab. 335; State "· Mayor, &c., of Jersey City, 4 Zab. 662; Bond"· Kenosha,
17 Wis. 289; City of Fairfield v. Ratcliff, 20 Iowa, 396; Municipality No. 2 "·
White, 9 La. An. 447; Cumming"· Police Jury, ib. 503; Northern Liberties"·
St. John's Church, 18 Penn. St. 107; McGee v. Mathis, 21 Ark. 40; Goodrich
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But whatever may be the basis of the taxation, the requirement

CH. XIV.]

THE POWER OF TAXATION.

that it shall be uniform is universal. It applies as much to these

local assessments as to any other species of taxes. The difference

is only in the character of the uniformity, and in the basis on which

it is established. But to render taxation uniform in any case, two

things are essential. The ﬁrst of these is that each taxing district

should conﬁne itself to the objects of taxation within its limits.

Otherwise there is or may be duplicate taxation, and of course

inequality. Assessments upon real estate not lying within the

taxing districts would be void,‘ and assessments for per-

sonal property * made against persons not residing in the [* 500]

district would also be void, unless made with reference to

the actual presence of the property in such district?

In Wells 0. City of Weston? the Supreme Court of Missouri

deny the right of the legislature to subject property located in one

taxing district to taxation in another, upon the express ground

that it is in substance the arbitrary taxation of the property of one

class of citizens for the beneﬁt of another class. The case was

one where the legislature sought to subject real estate lying out-

side the limits of a city to taxation for city purposes, on the theory

that it received some beneﬁt from the city government, and ought

to contribute to its support. In Kentucky‘ and Iowa5 decisions
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have been made which, while aﬁirming the same principle as the

v. Winchester, &c., Turnpike Co. 26 Ind. 119; Emery 0. Gas Co. 28 Cal. 345;

Palmer v. Stumph, 29 Ind. 329; Dergan v. Boston, 12 Allen, 223. The cases of

lVeeks v. Milwaukee, 10 \Vis. 242, and Lumsden v. Cross, ib. 282, recognize

the fact that these local burdens are generally imposed under the name of assess-

ments instead of taxes, and that therefore they are not covered by the general

provisions in the constitution of the State on the subject of taxation. And see

Bond u. Kenosha, 17 Wis. 28-1. An exemption of church property from taxation

will not preclude its being assessed for improving streets in front of it. Le Fever

v. Detroit, 2 Mich. 586; Lockwood v. St. Louis, 24 Mo. 20.

‘ But sometimes, when a parcel of real estate lies partly in two districts,

authority is given by law to assess the whole in one of these districts, and the

But whatever may be the basis of the taxation, the requirel\).ent
that it shall be uniform is universal. It applies as much to these
local assessments as to any other species of taxes. The difference
is only in the character of the uniformity, and in the basis on which
it is established. But to render taxation uniform in any case, two
things are essential. The first of these is that each taxing district
should confine itself to the objects of taxation within its limits.
Otherwise there is or may be duplicate taxation, and of course
inequality. Assessments upon real estate not lying within the
taxing districts would be void,1 and assessments for personal property • made against persons not residing in the [* 500]
district would also bo void, unless made with reference to
the actual presence of the property in such district.2
In Wells v. City of Weston,3 the Supreme Court of Missouri
deny the right of the legislature to subject property located in one
taxing district to taxation in another, upon the express ground
that it is in substance the arbitrary taxation of the property of one
class of citizens for the benefit of another class. The case was
one where the legislature sought to subject real estate lying outside the limits of a city to taxation for city purposes, on the theory
that it received some benefit from the city government, and ought
to contribute to its support. In Kentucky 4 and Iowa 5 decisions
have been made which, while affirming the same principle as the

whole parcel may then be considered as having been embraced within the district

where taxed, by an enlargement of the district bounds to include it. Saunders

-v. Springstein, 4 \Vend. 429.

1 People v. Supervisors of Chenango, 11 N. Y. 563; Mygatt v. Washburii,

15 N. Y. 316; Brown v. Smith, 24 Barb. 419; Hartland v. Church, -£7 Me. 169;

Lessee of Hughey v. Horrell, 2 Ohio, 231.

3 22 M0. 385.

‘ City of Covington v. Southgate, 15 B. Monr. 491; Arbegust v. Louisville,

3 Bush, 271. ’ Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa, 82.
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"· Winchester, &c., Turnpike Co. 26 Ind. 119; Emery"· Gas Co. 28 Cal. 345;
Palmer o. Stumph, 29 Ind. 329; Dergan v. Boston, 12 Allen, 223. The cases of
Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 'Vis. 242, and Lumsden v. Cross, ib. 282, recognize
the fact that these local burdens are generally imposed under the name of asseJJsments instead of taze8, and that therefore they are not covered by the general
provisions in the constitution of the State on the subject of taxation. And see
Bond v. Kenosha, 17 Wis. 28!. An exemption of church property from taxation
will not preclude its being assessed for improving streets in front of it. Le Fever
"· Detroit, 2 Mich. 1586; Lockwood v. St. Louis, 24 Mo. 20.
1 But sometimes, when a parcel of real estate lies partly in two districts,
authority is given by law to assess the whole in one of these districts, and the
whole parcel may then be considered as having been embraced within the district
where taxed, by an enlargement of the district bounds to include it. Saunders
"· Springstein, 4 "\Vend. 429.
1 People v. Supervisors of Chenango, 11 N.Y. 1563; Mygatt v. Washburri,
15 N. Y. 316; Brown v. Smith, 24 Barb. 419; Hartland o. Churl'h, 47 Me. 169;
Lessee of Hughey v. Horrell, 2 Ohio, 231.
3 22 Mo. 3815.
c City of Covington v. Southgate, 115 B. Moor. 491; Arbegust v. Louisville,
3 Bush, 271.
a Morford o. Unger, 8 Iowa, 82.
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case, above cited, go still further, and declare that it is not

• 500
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competent for the legislature to increase the limits of a city, in

order to include therein farming lands, occupied by the owner for

agricultural purposes, and not required for either streets or houses,

or other purposes of a town, and solely for the purpose of increas-

ing the city revenue by taxation. The courts admit that the

extension of the limits of a city or town, so as to include its actual

enlargement, as manifested by houses and population, is to be

deemed a legitimate exercise of the taxing power, but they declare

that an indeﬁnite or unreasonable extension, so as to embrace

lands or farms at a distance from the local government, does not

rest upon the same authority. And although it may be a delicate

as well as a difficult duty for the judiciary to interpose, the court

had no doubt but strictly there are limits beyond which the legis-

lative discretion cannot go. “ It is not every case of injustice or

oppression which may be reached; and it is not every case which

will authorize a judicial tribunal to inquire into the minute opera-

tion of laws imposing taxes, or deﬁning the boundaries of local

jurisdictions. The extension of the limits of the local authority

may in some cases be greater than is necessary to include the

adjacent population, or territory laid out into city lots,

[* 501] without a *case being presented in which the courts
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would be called upon to apply a nice and exact scrutiny as

to its practical operation. It must be a case of ﬂagrant injustice

and palpable wrong, amounting to the taking of private property

without such compensation in return as the tax-payer is at liberty

to consider a fair equivalent for the tax.” This decision has been

subsequently recognized and followed as authority, in the last-

named State}

‘ Langworthy v. Dubuque, 13 Iowa, 86; Fulton v. Davenport, 17 Iowa, 40-1;

Buell v. Ball, 20 Iowa, 282. These cases, however, do not hold the legislative

act which enlarges the city limits to be absolutely void, but only hold that they

will limit the exercise of the taxing power as nearly as practicable to the line

where the extension of the boundaries ceases to be beneﬁcial to the proprietor

in a municipal point of view. For this purpose they enter into an inquiry of

fact, whether the lands in question, in view of their relative position to the grow-

ing and improved parts of the town, and partaking more or less of the beneﬁts

of municipal government, are proper subjects of municipal taxation; and if not,

they enjoin the collection of such taxes. It would seem as if there must be

great practical diﬁiculties — if not some of principle — in making this disposition

of such a case.

1

case. above cited, go still further, and declare that it is not
competent for the legislature to increase the limits of a city, in
order to include therein farming lands, occupied by the owner for
agricultural purposes, and not required for either streets or houses,
or other purposes of a town, and solely for the purpose of increasing the city revenue by taxation. The courts admit that the
extension of the limits of a city or town, ~o as to include its actual
enlargement, as manifested by houses and population, is to be
deemed a legitimate exercise of the taxing power, but they declare
that an indefinite or unreasonable extension, so as to embrace
lands or farms at a distance from the local government, does not
rest upon the same authority. And although it may be a delicate
as well as a difficult duty for the judiciary to interpose, the court
had no doubt but strictly there are limits beyond which the legislative discretion cannot go. " It- is not every case of injustice or
oppression which may be reached; and it is not every case which
will authorize a judicial tribunal to inquire into the minute operation of laws imposing taxes, or defining the boundaries of local
jurisdictions. The extension of the limits of the local authority
may in some cases be greater than is necessary to include the
adjacent population, or territory laid out int<> city lots,
[* 501] without a • case being presented in which the courts
would be called upon to apply a nice and exact scrutiny as
to its practical operation. It must be a case of flagrant injustice
and palpable wrong, amounting to the taking of private property
without such compensation in return as the tax-payer is at liberty
to consider a fair equivalent for the tax." This decision has been
subsequently recognized and followed as authority, in the lastnamed State.I
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1 Langworthy v. Dubuque, 13 Iowa, 86; Fulton v. Davenport, 17 Iowa, 404;
Buell v. Ball, 20 Iowa, 282. These cases, however, do not hold the legislative
act which enlarges the city limits to be absolutely void, but only hold that they
will limit the exercise of the taxing power as nearly as practicable to the line
where the extension of the boundaries ceases to be beneficial to the proprietor
in a municipal point of view. For this purpose they enter into an inquiry of
fact, whether the lands in question, in view of their relative position to the growing and improved parts of the town, and partaking more or less of the benefits
of municipal government, are proper subjects of municipal taxation; and if not,
they enjoin the collection of such taxes. It would seem as if there must be
great practical difficulties- if not some of principle- in making this disposition
of such a case.
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The second essential is that the apportionment of taxes should
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reach all the objects of taxation within the district. Of the correct-

ness of this as a principle, there can be little doubt, though there

may sometimes be difficulty in determining whether in practice it

has been applied or not.

“ With the single exception of speciﬁc taxes,” says Oliristianqy,

J ., in Woodbridge 11. Detroit,‘ “the terms ‘ tax ’ and ‘ assessment ’

both, I think, when applied to property, and especially to lands,

always include the idea of some ratio or.rule of apportionment, so

that of the whole sum to be raised, the part paid by one piece of

property shall bear some known relation to, or be affected by, that

paid by another. Thus, if one hundred dollars are to be raised

from tracts A, B, and G, the 3Il10lI1lJ paid by A will reduce by so

much that to be paid by B and G, and so of the others. In the case

of speciﬁc taxes, as well as duties and imposts, though the amount

paid by one is not aﬂected by that paid by another, yet there is a

known and ﬁxed relation of one to the other, a uniform rate by

which it is imposed upon the whole species or class of property or

persons to which the speciﬁc tax applies; and this is so of duties

and imposts, whether speciﬁc or ad valorem. To compel individuals

to contribute money or property to the use of the public, without

reference to any common ratio, and without requiring the
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sum ‘paid by one piece or kind of property or by one [* 502]

person to bear any relation whatever to that paid by

another is, it seems to me, to lay a forced contribution, not a tax,

duty, or impost, within the sense of these terms as applied to the

exercise of powers by any enlightened or responsible govern-

ment.”

In the case of Knowlton 1:. Supervisors of Rock County,” an

important and interesting question arose, involving the very point

now under discussion. The Constitution of Wisconsin provides

that “the rule of taxation shall be uniform,” which, if we are

correct in what we have already stated, is no more than an afﬁrm-

ance of a. settled principle of constitutional law. The city of

Janesville included within its territorial limits, not only the land

embraced within the recorded plat of the village of J anesville and

its additions, but also a large quantity of the adjacent farming or

' 8 Mich. 301. See also Chicago v. Larned, 34 Ill. 203.

' 9 Wis. 410.

V [ 553 ]

The second essential is that the apportionment of taxes should
reach all the objects of taxation within the district. Of the correctness of this as a principle, there can be little doubt, though there
may sometimes be difficulty in determining whether in practice it
has been applied or not.
" With tho single exception of specific taxes," says Oltristiancy,
J ., in Woodbridge v. Detroit,1 "the terms' tax' and' assessment'
both, 1 think, when applied to property, and especially to lands,
always include the idea of some ratio or.rule of apportionment, so
that of the whole sum to be raised, the part paid by one piece of
property shall bear some known relation to, or be affected by, that
paid by another. Thus, if one lmndred dollars are to be raised
from tracts A, B, and C, tho amotlllt paid by A will reduce by so
much that to be paid by B and C, and so of the others. In the case
of specific taxes, as well as duties and imposts, though the amount
paid by one is not affected by that paid by another, yet there is a.
known and fixed relation of one to the other, a uniform rate by
which it is imposed upon the whole species or class of property or
persons to which the specific tax applies; and this is so of duties
and imposts, whether specific or ad valorem. To compel individuals
to contribute money or property to the use of the public, without
reference to any common ratio, and without requiring the
sum • paid by one piece or kind of property or by one [* 502]
person to bear any relation whatever to that paid by
another is, it seems to me, to lay a forced contribution, not a tax,
duty, or impost, within the sense of these terms as applied to the
exercise of powers by any enlightened or responsible government."
In the case of Knowlton v. Supervisors of Rock County,2 an
important and interesting question arose, involving the very point
now under discussion. The Constitution of Wisconsin provides
that " the rule of taxation shall be uniform," which, if we are
correct in what we have already stated, is no more than an affirmance of a settled principle of constitutional law. The city of
Janesville included within its territorial limits, not only the land
embraced within the recorded plat of the village of Janesville and
its additions, but also a large quantity of the adjacent farming or
1
1

8 Mich. 801. See also Chicago
9 Wis. 410.

11.

Larned, 84 111. 203.
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agricultural lands. Conceiving the owners of these lands too
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greatly and unequally burdened by taxation for the support of the

city government, the legislature passed an act declaring that “in

no case shall the real and personal property within the territorial

limits of said city, and not included within the territorial limits of

"the recorded plat of the village of J anesville, or of any additions to

said village, which may be used, occupied, or reserved for agricul-

tural or horticultural purposes, be subject to an annual tax to

defray the current expenses of said city exceeding one-half of one

per cent, nor for the repair and building of roads and bridges, and

the support of the poor, more than one-half as much on each

dollar’s valuation shall be levied for such purposes as on the prop-

erty within such recorded plats,,nor shall the same be subject to

any tax for any of the purposes mentioned in § 3 of c. 5 of [the city

charter], nor shall the said farming or gardening lands be subject

to any tax other than before mentioned for any city purpose what-

ever.” Under the charter the property of the city was liable to an

annual taxof one per cent to defray the current expenses of the

city; and also an additional tax of such sum as the common

council might deem necessary for the repair and building of roads

and bridges, and for the support of the poor. Thus it will be

perceived that the legislature, within the same taxing district,
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undertook to provide that a portion of the property should be

taxed at one rate in proportion to value, and another portion at a.

much lower rate ; while from taxation for certain proper local pur-

poses the latter class was exempted altogether.

[" 503] * “ It was contended in argument,” say the court, “ that

as those provisions ﬁxed one uniform rate without the

recorded plats, and another within them, thus taxing all the prop-

erty without alike, and all within alike, they do not infringe the

Constitution. In other words, that for the purpose of taxation,

the legislature have the right arbitrarily to divide up and classify

the property of the citizens, and, having done so, they do not

violate the constitutional rule of uniformity, provided all the

property within a given class is rated alike.

“ The answer to this argument is, that it creates different rules

of taxation to the number of which there is no limit, except that

ﬁxed by legislative discretion, while the constitution establishes

but one ﬁxed, unbending, uniform rule on the subject. It is

believed that if the legislature can by classiﬁcation thus arbitrarily

[ 554 ]

agricultural lands. Conceiving the owners of these lands too
greatly and unequally burdened by taxation for the support of the
city government, the legislature passed an act declaring that " in
no case shall the real and personal property within the territorial
limits of said city, and not included within the territorial limits of
l.he recol'ded plat of the village of Janesville, or of any additions to
said village, which may be used, occupied, or reserved for agricultural or horticultural purposes, be subject to an annual tax to
defray the current expenses of said city exceeding one-half of one
per cent, nor for the repair and building of roads and bridges, and
the support of the poor, more than one-half as much on each
dollar's valuation shall be levied for such purposes as on the property within such recorded plats~nor shall the same be subject to
any tax for any of the purposes mentioned in§ 3 of c. 5 of [the city
charter], nor shall the said farming or gardening lands be subject
to any tax other than before mentioned for any city purpose whatever." Under the charter the property of the city was liable to an
annual tax -of one per cent to defray the current expenses of the
city ; and also an additional tax of such sum as the common
council might deem necessary for the repair and building of roads
and bridges, and for the support of the poor. Thus it will be
perceived that the legislature, within the same taxing district,
undertook to provide that a portion of the property should be
taxed at one rate in proportion to value, and another portion at a
much lower rate ; while from taxation for certain proper local purposes the latter class was exempted altogether.
[• 503]
• " It was contended in argument," say the court, " that
as those provisions fixed one uniform rate without the
recorded plats, and another within them, thus taxing all the property without alike, and all within alike, they do not infringe the
Constitution. In other words, that for the purpose of taxation,
the legislature have the right arbitrarily to divide up and classify
the property of the citizens, and, having done so, they do not
violate the constitutional rule of uniformity, provided all the
property within a given class is rated alike.
" The answer to this argument is, that it creates different Niles
of taxation to the number of which there is no limit, except that
fixed by legislative discretion, while the constitution establishes
but one fixed, unbending, uniform rule on the subject. It is
believed that if the legislature can by classification thus arbitrarily
[ 554]
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and without regard to value discriminate in the same municipal
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corporation between personal and real property within, and per-

sonal and real property without, a recorded plat, they can also by

the same means discriminate between lands used for one purpose

and those used for another, such as lands used for growing wheat

and those used for growing corn, or any other crop; meadow-lands

and pasture-lands, cultivated and uncultivated lands; or they can

classify by the description, such as odd-numbered lots and blocks

and even-numbered ones, or odd and even numbered sections.

Personal property can be classiﬁed by its character, use, or descrip-

tion, or, as in the present case, by its location, and thus the rules

of taxation may be multiplied to an extent equal in number to the

different kinds, uses, descriptions, and locations of real and per-

sonal property. We do not see why the system may not be carried

further, and the classiﬁcation be made by the character, trade,

profession, or business of the owners. For certainly this rule of

uniformity can as well be applied to such a classiﬁcation as any

other, and thus the constitutional provision be saved intact. Such

a construction would make the constitution operative only to the

extent of prohibiting the legislature from discriminating in favor of

particular individuals, and would reduce the people, while consid-

ering so grave and important a proposition, to the ridiculous
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attitude of saying to the legislature, ‘ You shall not discriminate

between single individuals or corporations; but you may divide

the citizens up into diﬂerent classes, as the followers of different

trades, professions, or kinds of business, or as the owners

of "‘ different species or descriptions of property, and legis- ["'504]

late for one class, and against another, as much as you

please, provided you serve all of the favored or unfavored classes

alike: ’ thus affording a direct and solemn sanction to a system of

taxation so manifestly and grossly unjust that it will not ﬁnd an

apologist anywhere, at least outside of those who are the recipients

of its favor. We do not believe the framers of that instrument

intended such a construction, and therefore cannot adopt it.” 1

‘ Per Dixon, Ch. J ., 9 Wis. 421. Besides the other cases referred to, see,

on this same general subject, Lin Sing v. \Vashburn, 20 Cal. 534; State v. Mer-

chants Ins. Co. 12 La. An. 802; Adams v. Somerville, 2 Head, 363; McComb

v. Bell, 2 Minn. 295; Attorney-General v. Winnebago Lake ,and Fox River

P. R. Co. 11 'Wis. 35; Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 ‘Vie. 242; O‘Kane v. Treat, 25

Ill. 5.57; Philadelphia Association, &c. v. Wood, 39 Penn. 73; Sacramento v.

Crocker, 16 Cal. 119.
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and without regard to value discriminate in the ·same municipal
corporation between personal and real property within, and personal and real property without, a recorded plat, they can also by
the same means discriminate between lands used for one purpose
and those used for another, such as lands used for growing wheat
and those used for growing corn, or any other crop; meadow-lands
and pasture-lands, cultivated and uncultivated lands; or they can
classify by the description, such as odd-numbered lots and blocks
and even-numbered ones, or odd and even numbered sections.
Personal property can be classified by its character, use, or description, or, as in the present case, by its location, and thus the rules
of taxation may be multiplied to an extent equal in number to the
different kinds, uses, descriptions, and locations of real and personal property. We do not see why the system may not be carried
further, and the classification be made by the character, trade,
profession, or business of the owners. For certainly this rule of
uniformity can as well be applied to such a classification as any
other, and thus the constitutional provision be saved intact. Such
a construction would make the constitution operative only to the
extent of prohibiting the legislature from discriminating in favor of
particular individuals, and would reduce the people, while considering so grave and important a proposition, to the ridiculous
attitude of saying to the legislature, ' You shall not discriminate
between single individuals or corporations; but you may divide
the citizens up into different classes, as the followers of different
trades, professions, or kinds of business, or as the owners
of • different species or descriptions of property, and legis- [• 504]
late for one class, and against another, as much as you
please, provided you serve all of the favored or unfavored classes
alike: ' thus affording a direct and solemn sanction to a system of
taxation so manifestly and grossly unjust that it will not find an
apologist anywhere, at least outside of those who are the recipients
of its favor. We do not believe the framers of that iustrument
intended such a construction, and therefore cannot adopt it." 1
1 Per Dizon, Ch. J., 9 Wis. 421.
Besides the other cases referred to, see,
on this same general subject, Lin Sing t1. Washburn, 20 Cal. 634; State t~. :Merchants Ins. Co. 12 La. An. 802; Adams t1. Somerville, 2 Head, 363; McComb
v. Bell, 2 1\finn. 295; Attorney-General v. Winnebago Lake ,and Fox River
P.R. Co. 11 Wis. 35; Weeks v. Milwaukee; 10 Wis. 242; O'Kane v. Treat, 25
Dl. 557; Philadelphia Association, &c. v. Wood, 39 Penn. 73; Sacramento v.
Crocker, 16 Cal. 119.
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"' 504 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [cn. XIV.

The principle to be deduced from the Iowa and Wisconsin cases,

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

(CH.

XIV.

assuming that they do not in any degree conﬂict, seems to be this :

The legislature cannot arbitrarily include within the limits of a

village, borough, or city, property and persons not properly charge-

able with its burdens, and for the sole purpose of increasing the

corporate revenues by the exaction of the taxes. But whenever

the corporate boundaries are established, it is to be understood

that whatever property is included within those limits has been

thus included by the legislature, because it justly belongs there as

being within the circuit which is beneﬁted by the local government,

and which ought consequently to contribute to its burdens. The

legislature cannot, therefore, after having already, by including the

property within the corporation, declared its opinion that such prop-

erty should contribute to the local government, immediately turn

about and establish a basis of taxation which assumes that the

property is not in fact urban property at all, but is agricultural

lands, and should be assessed accordingly. The rule of apportion-

ment must be uniform throughout the taxing district, applicable to

all alike; but the legislature have no power to arrange the taxing

districts arbitrarily, and without reference to the great fundamental

principle of taxation, that the burden must be borne by those upon

whom it justly rests. The Kentucky and Iowa decisions hold that,
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in a case where they have manifestly and unmistakably done so,

the courts may interfere and restrain the imposition of municipal

burdens on property which does not properly belong within the

municipal taxing district at all.

[* 505] ‘This rule of uniformity has perhaps been found most

difficult of application in regard to those cases of taxation

which are commonly known under the head of assessments, and

which are made either for local improvement and repair, or to

prevent local causes resulting in the destruction of health or prop-

erty. In those cases where it has been held that_such assessments

were not covered by the constitutional provision that taxation

should be laid upon property in proportion to value, it has neverthe-

less been decided that the authority to make them must be referred

to the taxing power, and not to the police power of the State,

under which sidewalks have sometimes been ordered to be con-

structed. Apportionment of the burden was therefore essential,

though it need not be made upon property in proportion to its

value. But the question then arises: What shall be the rule of

[ 556 ]

The principle to be deduced from the Iowa and Wisconsin cases,
assuming that they do not in any degree conflict, seems to be this :
The legislature cannot arbitrarily include within the limits of a
village, borough, or city, property and persons not properly chargeable with its burdens, and for the sole purpose of increasing the
corporate revenues by the exaction of the taxes. But whenever
the corporate boundaries are established, it is to be understood
that whatever property is included within those limits has been
thus included by the legislature, because itjustly belongs there as
being within the circuit which is benefited by the local government,
and which ought consequently to contribute to its burdens. The
legislature cannot, therefore, after having already, by including theproperty within the corporation, declared its opinion that such property should contribute to the local government, immediately turn
about and establish a basis of taxation which assumes that the
property is not in fact urban property at all, but is agricultural
lands, and should be assessed accordingly. The rule of apportionment must be uniform throughout the taxing district, applicable to
all alike ; but the legislature have no power to arrange the taxing
districts arbitrarily, and without reference to the great fundamental
principle of taxation, that the burden must be borne by those upon
whom it justly rests. The Kentucky and Iowa decisions hold that,
in a case where they have manifest.ly and unmistakably done so,
the courts may interfere and restrain the imposition of municipal
burdens on property which does not properly belong within the
municipal taxing district at all.
[• 505]
• This rule of uniformity has perhaps been found most
difficult of application in regard to those cases of taxation
which are commonly known under the head of assessments, and
which arc made either for local improvement and repair, or ro
prevent local causes resulting in the destruction of health or property. In those cases where it has been held that.such assessments
were not covered by the constitutional provision that taxation
should be laid upon property in proportion to value, it has neverthe·less been decided that the authority to make them must be referred
to the taxing power, and not to the police power of the State,
under which sidewalks have sometimes been ordered to be constructed. Apportionment of the burden was therefore essential,
though it need not be made upon property in proportion to its
value. But the question then arises: What shall be the rule of
[ 556]
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apportionment? Can a street be ordered graded and paved, and

CH. XIV.]

• 505

THE POWER OF TAXATION.

the expense assessed exclusively upon the property which, in the

opinion of the assessors, shall be peculiarly beneﬁted thereby in

proportion to such beneﬁt? Or may a taxing district be created

for the purpose, and the expense assessed in proportion to the area

of the lots? Or may the street be made a taxing district, and the

cost levied in proportion to the frontage? Or may each lot owner

be required to grade and pave in front of his lot? These are grave

questions, and they have not been found of easy solution.

The case of The People v. The Mayor, &c., of Brooklyn} is a

leading case, holding that a statute authorizing a municipal corpora-

tion to grade and improve streets, and to assess the expense among

the owners and occupants of lands beneﬁted by the improvement, in

proportion to the amount of such beneﬁt, is a constitutional and

valid law. The court in that case concede that taxation cannot

be laid without apportionment, but hold that the basis of apportion-

ment in these cases is left by the constitution with the legislature.

The application of any one rule or principle of apportionment to

all cases would be manifestly oppressive and unjust. Taxation is

sometimes regulated by one principle and sometimes by another;

and very often it has been apportioned without reference to local-

ity, or to the tax-payer’s ability to contribute, or to any proportion
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between the burden and the beneﬁt. “The excise laws, and taxes

on carriages and watches, are among the many examples

of "‘ this description of taxation. Some taxes affect classes [* 506]

of inhabitants only. All duties on imported goods are

taxes on the class of consumers. The tax on one imported article

falls on a large class of consumers, while the tax on another affects

comparatively a few individuals. The duty on one article con-

sumed by one class of inhabitants is twenty per cent of its value,

while on another, consumed by a different class, it is forty per cent.

The duty on one foreign commodity is laid for the purpose of

revenue mainly, without reference to the ability of its consumers

to pay, as in the case of the duty on salt. The duty on another is

laid for the purpose of encouraging domestic manufacture of the

same article, thus compelling the consumer to pay a higher price

to one man than he could otherwise have bought the article for

from another. These discriminations may be impolitic, and in

some cases unjust; but if the power of taxation upon importations

‘ 4 N. Y. 419; overruling same case, 6 Barb. 209.
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apportionment? Can a street be ordered graded and paved, and
the expense assessed exclusively upon the property which, in the
opinion of the assessors, shall be peculiarly benefited thereby in
proportion to such benefit? Or may a taxing district be created
for the purpose, and the expense assessed in proportion to the area
of the lots ? Or may the street be made a taxing district, and the
cost levied in proportion to the frontage? Or may each lot owner
be required to grade and pave in front of his lot? These are grave
questions, and they have not been found of easy solution.
The case of The People v. The Mayor, &c., of Brooklyn,1 is a
leading case, holding that a statute authorizing a municipal corporation to grade and improve streets, and to assess the expens8 among
the owners and occupants of lands benefited by the improvement, in
proportion to the amount of such benefit, is a constitutional and
valid law. The court in that case concede that taxation cannot
be laid without apportionment, but hold that the basis of apportionment in these cases is left by the constitution with the legislature.
The application of any one rule or principle of apportionment to
all cases would be manifestly oppressive and unjust. Taxation is
sometimes regulated by one principle and sometimes by another;
and very often it has been apportioned without reference to locality, or to the tax-payer's ability to contribute, or to any proportion
between the burden and the benefit. "The excise laws, and taxes
on carriages and watches, are among the many examples
of • this description of taxation. Some taxes affect classes [* 506]
of inhabitants only. All duties on imported goods are
taxes on the class of consumers. The tax on one imported article
falls on a large class of consumers, while the tax on another affects
comparatively a few individuals. The duty on one article consumed by one class of inhabitants is twenty per cent of its value,
while on another, consumed by a different class, it is forty per cent.
Tho duty on one foreign commodity is laid for the purpose of
revenue mainly, without reference to the ability of its consumers
to pay, as in the case of the duty on salt. The duty on another is
laid for the purpose of encouraging domestic manufacture of the
same article, thus compelling the consumer to pay a higher price
to one man than he could otherwise have bought the article for
from another. These discriminations may be impolitic, and in
some cases unjust ; but if the power of taxation upon importations
1

4 N.Y. 419; overruling same case, 6 Barb. 209.

[ 557]
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STATUTE OF LUIJTATIONS.

had not been transferred by the people of this State to the Federal

[CH. XIV.

government, there could have been no pretence for declaring them

to be unconstitutional in State legislation.

“A property tax for the general purposes of the government,

either of the State at large or of a county, city, or other district, is

regarded as a just and equitable tax. The reason is obvious. It

apportions the burden according to the beneﬁt more nearly than

any other inﬂexible rule of general taxation. A rich man derives

more beneﬁt from taxation, in the protection and improvement of his

property, than a poor man, and ought therefore to pay more. But

the amount of each man’s beneﬁt in general taxation cannot be

ascertained and estimated with any degree of certainty; and for

that reason a property tax is adopted, instead of an estimate of

beneﬁts. In local taxation, however, for special purposes, the

local beneﬁts may in many cases be seen, traced, and estimated to

a reasonable certainty. At least this has been supposed and

assumed to be true by the legislature, whose duty it is to prescribe

the rules on which taxation is to be apportioned, and whose deter-

mination of this matter, being within the scope of its lawful power,

is conclusive.”

The reasoning of this case has been generally accepted as satis-

factory, and followed in subsequent cases}
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1 Scoville v. Cleveland, 1 Ohio, N. s. 126; Hill v. Higdon, 5 Ohio, N. s. 243;

Marion v. Epler, ib. 250; Maloy v. Marietta, 11 Ohio, N. s. 636; City of Peoria

u. Kidder, 26 Ill. 351; Reeves v. Treasurer of Wood Co. 8 Ohio, 1~:.s. 333;

Garrett v. St. Louis, 25 Mo. 505; Ubrig v. St. Louis, 44 Mo. 463. The legis-

lation in Ohio on the subject has authorized the cities and villages, in opening

and improving streets, to assess the expense either upon the lots abutting on

the street in proportion to the street front, or upon the lands in proportion to

their assessed value. In a case where the former mode was resorted to, and an

assessment made upon property owned by the Northern Indiana Railroad Com-

pany for its corporate purposes, Peck, J ., thus states and answers an objection

had not been transferred by the people of this State to the Federal
government, there could have been no pretence for declaring them
to be unconstitutional in State legislation.
" A property tax for the general purposes of the government,
either of the State at large or of a county, city, or other district, is
regarded as a just and equitable tax. The reason is obvious. It
apportions the burden according to the benefit more nearly than
any other inflexible rule of general taxation. A rich man derives
more benefit from taxation, in the protection and improvement of his
pr~perty, than a poor man, and ought therefore to pay more. But
the amount of each man's benefit in general taxation cannot be
ascertat'lled and estimated with any degree of certainty ; and for
that reason a property tax is adopted, inst~ad of an estimate of
benefits. In local taxation, however, for special purposes, the
local benefits may in many cases be seen, traced, and estimated to
a reasonable certainty. At least this has been supposed and
assumed to be true by the legislature, whose duty it is to prescribe
the rules on which taxation is to be apportioned, and whose determination of this matter, being within the scope of its lawful power,
is conclusive."
The reasoning of this case has been generally accepted as satisfactory, and followed in subsequent cases.1

to the validity of the tax: " But it is said that assessments, as distinguished from

general taxation, rest solely upon the idea of equivalents; a compensation pro-

portioned to the special beneﬁts derived from the improvement, and that, in the

case at bar, the railroad company is not, and in the nature of things cannot be,

in any dcgee beneﬁted by the improvement. It is quite true that the right. to

impose such special taxes is based upon a presumed equivalent; but it by no

means follows that there must be in fact such full equivalent in every instance,

or that its absence will render the assessment invalid. The rule of apportion-

ment, whether by the front foot or a percentage upon the assessed valuation, must

be uniform, affecting all the owners and all the property abutting on the street

l
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1 Scoville v. Cleveland, 1 Ohio, N. 8. 126; Hill v. Higdon, 5 Ohio, Y. s. 243 ;
Marion v. Epler, ib. 250; Maloy v. Marietta, 11 Ohio, N. e. 636; City of Peoria
v. Kidder, 26 Ill. 351; Reeves v. Treasurer of Wood Co. 8 Ohio, N. 8. 333;
Garrett v. St. Louis, 25 1\Io. 505; Uhrig v. St. Louis, 44 :Mo. 463. The legislation in Ohio on the subject has authorized the cities and villages, in opening
and improving streets, to assess the expense either upon the lots abutting on
the street in proportion to the street front, or upon the lands in proportion to
their assessed value. In a case where the former mode wa.s resorted to, and an
assessment made upon property owned by the Northern Indiana Railroad Company for its corporate purposes, Peck, J., thus states and answers an objection
to the validity of the tax: "But it is said that assessments, as distinguished from
general taxation, rest solely upon the idea of equivalents; a compensation proportioned to the special benefits derived from the improvement, and that, in the
case at bar, the railroad company is not, and in the nature of things cannot be,
in any degree benefited by the improvement. It is quite true that the right to
impose such special taxes is based upon a presumed equivalent; but it by no
means follows that there must be in fact such full equivalent in every instance,
or that its absence will render the assessment invalid. The rule of apportionment, whether by the front foot or a percentage upon the assessed valuation, must
be uniform, affecting all the owners and all the property abutting on the street

[ 558]
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" On the other hand, and on the like reasoning, it has been [" 507]

CH. XIV.)

THE POWER OF TAXATION.

held equally competent to make the street a taxing district,

and assess the expense of the improvement upon the lots in pro-

portion to the frontage} Here also is apportionment by a rule

which approximates to what is just, but which, like any other rule

that can be applied, is only an approximation to absolute equality.

But if, in the opinion of the legislature, it is the proper rule to

apply to any particular case, the courts must enforce it.

* But a very different case is presented when the legis- [* 508]

lature undertakes to provide that each lot upon a street .

shall pay the whole expense of grading and paving the street along

its front. For while in such a case there would be something

having the outward appearance of apportionment, it requires but

slight examination to discover that it is a deceptive semblance

only, and that the measure of equality which the constitution

requires is entirely wanting. If every lot owner is compelled to

construct the street in front of his lot, his tax is neither increa_sed

nor diminished by the assessment upon his neighbors; nothing is

divided or apportioned between him and them; and each particu-

lar lot is in fact arbitrarily made a taxing district, and charged

with the whole expenditure therein, and thus apportionment

avoided. If the tax were for grading the street simply, those lots
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alike. One rule cannot be applied to one owner, and a different rule to another

owner. One could not be assessed ten per cent, another ﬁve, another three,

and another left altogether unassessed because he was not in fact beneﬁted. It

is manifest that the actual beneﬁts resulting from the improvement maybe as

various almost as the number of the owners and the uses to which the property

may be applied. No general rule, therefore, could be laid down which would

do equal and exact justice to all. The lemslature have not attempted so vain a

thing, but have prescribed two different modes in which the assessment may be

made, and left the city authorities free to adopt either. The mode adopted by

the council becomes the statutory equivalent for the beneﬁts conferred, although

• On the other hand, and on the like reasoning, it has been [* 507]
held equally competent to make the street a taxing district,
and assess the expense of the improvement upon .the lots in proportion to the frontage. 1 Here also is apportionment by a rule
which approximates to what is just, but which, like any other rule
that can be applied, is only an approximation to absolute equality.
But if, in the opinion of the legislature, it is the proper rule to
apply to any particular case, the courts must enforce it.
* But a very different case is presented when the legis- [* 508]
lature undertakes to provide that each lot upon a street
shall pay the whole expense of grading and paving the street along
its front. For while in such a case there w<>uld be something
having the outward appearance of apportionment, it requires but
slight examination to discover that it is a deceptive semblance
only, and that the measure of equ~lity which tho constitution
requires is entirely wanting. If every lot owner is compelled to
construct the street in front of his lot, his tax is neither incre~~:sed
nor diminished by the assessment upon his neighbors ; nothing is
divided or apportioned between him and them; and each particular lot is in fact arbitrarily made a taxing district, and charged
with the whole expenditure therein, and thus apportionment
avoided. If the tax were for grading the street simply, those lots

in fact the burden imposed may greatly preponderate. In such case, if no fraud

intervene, and the assessment does not substantially exhaust the owner"s interest

in the land, his remedy would seem to be to procure, by a timely appeal to the

city authorities, a reduction of the special assessment, and its imposition, in

whole or in part, upon the public at large.” 10 Ohio, xv. s. 165.

‘ \Villiams v. Detroit, 2 Mich. 560; Northern Ind. R.R. Co. v. Connelly,

10 Ohio, 1\‘.s. 159; Lumsden v. Cross, 10 Wis. 282. And see St. Joseph v.

O’Donoghue, 31 Mo. 145; Burnet v. Sacramento, 12 Cal. 76; Scoville v. Cleve-

land, 1 Ohio, N. s. 133; Hill v. Higdon, 5 Ohio, N. s. 2-16; Ernst v. Kunkle, ib.

5'20; Hines v. Leavenworth, 3 Kansas, 186; Magee v. Commonwealth, 46 Penn.

St. 388; Wray v. Pittsburg, ib. 365; Palmer v. Stumph, 29 Ind. 3:29.
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alike. One rule cannot be applied to one owner, and a different rule to another
ownt>r. One could not be assessed ten per cent, another five, another three,
and another left altogether unassessed because he was not in fact benefited. It
is manifest that the actual benefits resulting fr()m the improvement may be as
various almost as the number of the owners and the uses to which the property
may be applied. No general rule, therefore, could be laid down which would
do equal and exact justice to all. The legislature have not attempted so vain a
thing, but have prescribed two different modes in which the assessment may be
made, and left the city authorities free to adopt either. The mode adopted by
the council becomes the statutory equivalent for the benefits conferred, although
in fact the burden imposed may greatly preponderate. In such case, if no fraud
intervene, and the asses!!ment does not substantially exhaust the owner's interest
in the land, his remedy would seem to be to procure, by a timely appeal to the
city authorities, a reduction of the special assessment, and its imposition, in
whole or in part, upon the public at large." 10 Ohio, N. s. 165.
1 Williams v. Detroit, 2 1\lich. 560; Northern Ind. R .R. Co. v. Connelly,
10 Ohio, N . 8 . 1W; Lumsden v. Cross, 10 Wis. 282. And see St. Joseph v.
O'Donoghue, 311\Io. 145; Burnet v. Sacramento, 12 Cal. 76 ; Scoville v. Cleveland, 1 Ohio, N. s. 133; Hill v. Higdon, 5 Ohio, N. 8. 2!6; Ernst v. Kunkle, ib.
520; Hines v. Leavenworth, 3 Kansas, 186 ; :Magee v. Commonwealth, 46 Penn.
St. 388; Wray t•. Pittsburg, ib. 365; Palmer v. Stumph, 29 Ind. 329.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

(CH. XIV.

which were already at the established grade would escape alto-

gether, while those on either side, which chanced to be above and

below, must bear the whole burden, though no more beneﬁted by

the improvement than the others} It is evident, therefore, that a

law for making assessments on this basis could not have in view

such distribution of burdens in proportion to benefits as ought to

be a. cardinal idea in every tax law. It would be nakedly an arbi-

trary command of the law to each lot owner to construct the street

in front of his lot at his own expense, according to a prescribed

standard; and a power to issue such command could never be

exercised by a constitutional government, unless we are at liberty

to treat it as a police regulation, and place the duty to make the

streets upon the same footing as that to keep the sidewalks free

from obstruction and ﬁt for passage. But any such idea is clearly

inadmissible.”

‘ In fact, lots above and below an established grade are usually less beneﬁted

by the grading than the others; because the improvement subjects them to new

burdens, in order to bring the general surface to the grade of the street, which

the others escape.

' See City of Lexington v. McQuillan‘s Heirs, 9 Dana,-513, and opinions of

Campbell and Christianc_z/, JJ., in \Voodbridge v. Detroit, 8 Mich. 274. The

case of \Veeks zi. Milwaukee, 10 VVis. 258, seems to be contra. lVe quote from

which were already at the established grade would escape altogether, while those on either side, which chanced to be above and
below, must bear the whole burden, though no more benefited by
the improvement than the others.1 It is evident, therefore, that a
law for making assessments on this basis could not have in view
such distribution of burdens in proportion to benefits as ought to
be a cardinal idea in every tax law. It would be nakedly an arbitrary command of the law to each lot owner to construct the street
in front of his lot at his own expense, according to a prescribed
standard ; and a power to issue such command could never be
exercised by a constitutional government, unless we are at liberty
to treat it as a police regulation, and place the duty to make the
streets upon the same footing as that to keep the sidewalks free
from obstruction and fit for passage. But any such idea is clearly
inadmissible.2
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the opinion of the court by Paine, J . After stating the rule that uniformity in

taxation implies equality in the burden, he proceeds: “ The principle upon which

these assessments rests is clearly destructive of this equality. It requires every

lot owner to build whatever improvements the public may require on the street:

in front of his lot, without reference to inequalities in the value of the lots, in the

expense of constructing the improvements, or to the question whether the lot is

injured or beneﬁted by their construction. Corner lots are required to construct

and keep in repair three times as much as other lots; and yet it is well known

that the difference in value bears no proportion to this difference in burden. In

front of one lot the expense of building the street may exceed the value of the

lot; and its construction may impose on the owner additional expense, to render

his lot accessible. In front of another lot, of even much greater value, the ex-

pense is comparatively slight. Thcse inequalities are obvious; a.nd.I have always

thought the principle of such assessments was radically wrong. They have been

very extensively discussed, and sustained upon the ground that the lot should

pay because it receives the beneﬁt. But if this be true, that the improvements

in front of a lot are made for the beneﬁt of the lot only, then the right of the

public to tax the owner at all for that purpose fails; because the public has no

right to tax the citizen to make him build improvements for his own beneﬁt

merely. It must be for a public purpose; and it being once established that the

construction of streets is a public purpose that will justify taxation, I think it

follows, if the matter is to be settled on principle, that the taxation should be

[560]

1 In fact, lots above and below an established grade are usually less benefited
by the grading than the others; because the improvement subjects them to new
burdens, in order to bring the general surface to the grade of the street, which
the others escape.
' See City of Lexington v. McQuillan's Heirs, 9 Dana, ·513, and opinions of
Campbell and Christiancy, JJ., in Woodbridge v. Detroit, 8 Mich. 274. The
case ofWeeks v. Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 258, seems to be contra. We quo~e from
the opinion of the court by Paine, J. After stating the rule that uniformity in
taxation implies equality in the burden, he proceeds: "The principle upon which
these assessments rests is clearly destructive of this equality. It requires every
Jot owner to build whatever improvements the public may require on the street
in front of his lot, without reference to inequalities in the value of the lots, in the
expense of constructing the improvements, or to the question whether the lot is
injured or benefited by their construction. Corner lots arc required to construct
and keep in repair three times as much as other lots ; and yet it is well known
that the difference in value bears no proportion to this difference in burden. In
front of one lot the expense of building the street may exceed the value of the
lot ; and its construction may impose on the owner additional expense, to render
his lot accessible. In front of another lot, of even much greater value, the expense is comparatively slight. These inequlilities are obvious; and I have always
thought the principle of such assessments was radically wrong. They have been
very extensively discussed, and sustained upon the ground that the lot should
pay because it receives the benefit. But if this be true, that the improvements
in front of a lot are made for the benefit of the lot only, then the right of the
public to tax the owner at all for that purpose fails ; because the public has no
right to tax the citizen to make him build improvements for his own benefit
merely. It must be for a public purpose; and it being once established that the
construction of streets is a public purpose that will justify taxation, I think it
follows, if the matter is to be settled on principle, that the taxation should be
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provement, and repair of streets, may special taxing

equal and uniform, and that to make it so the whole taxable property of the polit-

ical division in which the improvement is made should be taxed by auniform

rule for the purpose of its construction.

• In many other cases, besides the construction, im- [• 509]
provement, and repair of streets, may special taxing

'\But in sustaining these assessments when private property was wanted for a

street, it has been said that the State could take it, because the use of a street

was a public use; in ordcr to justify a resort to the power of taxation, it is said

the building of a street is a public purpose. But then, having got the land to

build it on, and the power to tax by holding it a public purpose, they immediately

abandon that idea; and say that it is a private beneﬁt, and make the owner of the

lot build the whole of it. I think this‘ is the same in principle as it would be to

say that the town, in which the county seat is located, should build the county

buildings, or that the county where the capital is should construct the public

ediﬁces of the State, upon the ground that, by being located nearer, they derived

a greater beneﬁt than others. If the question, therefore, was, whether the sys-

tem of assessment could be sustained upon principle, I should have no hesitation

in deciding it in the negative. I fully agree with the reasoning of the Supreme

Court of Louisiana in the case of Municipality No. 2 u. \Vhite, 9 La. An. 447,

upon_this point.

“ But the question is not whether this system is established upon sound prin-

ciples, but whether the legislature has power, under the constitution, to establish
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such a system. As already stated, if the provision requiring the rule of taxation

to be uniform was the only one bearing upon the question, I should answer this

also in the negative. But there is another provision which seems to me so im-

portant, that it has changed the result to which I should otherwise have arrived.

That provision is § 3 of art. 11, and is as follows: ‘ It shall be the duty of the

legislature, and they are hereby empowered, to provide for the organization of

cities and incorporated villages, and to restrict their power of taxation, assess-

ment, borrowing money, contracting debts, and loaning their ‘credit, so as to

prevent abuses in assessments and taxation, and in contracting debts by such

municipal corporations.’

“ It cannot well be denied that if the word ‘assessment,’ as used in this sec-

tion, had reference to this established system of special taxation for municipal

improvements, that then it is a clear recognition of the existence and legality of

the power.” And the court, having reached the conclusion that the word did

have reference to such an established system, sustain the assessment, adding:

"The same effect was given to the same clause in the Constitution of Ohio, by

the Supreme Court of that State, in a recent decision in the case of Hill v. Higdon,

5 Ohio, 2;. s. 243. And the reasoning of Chief Justice Ranney on the question

I think it impossible to answer.”

If the State of \Visconsiu had any settled and known practice, designated as

assessments, under which each lot owner was compelled to construct the streets

in front of his lot, then the constitution as quoted may well be held to recognize

such practice. In this view, however, it is still diﬂicult to discover any “ restric-

tion " in a law which perpetuates the arbitrary and unjust custom, and which still

permits the whole expense of making the street in front of each lot to be imposed
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equal and uniform, and that to make it so the whole taxable property of the political division in which the improvement is made should be taxed by a. uniform
rule for the purpose of its .construction.
'\.But in sustaining these assessments when private property was wanted for a
street, it has been said that the State could take it, because the use of a street
was a public use; in order to justify a. resort to the power of taxation, it is said
the building of a street is a public purpose. But then, having got the land to
build it on, and the power to tax by holding it a public purpose, they immediately
abandon that idea; and say that it is a private benefit, and make the owner of the
lot build the whole of it. I think tbis · is the same in principle as it would be to
say that the town, in which the county seat is located, should build the county
buildings, or that the county where the capital is should construct the public
edifices of the State, upon the ground that, by being located nearer, they derived
a greater benefit than others. If the question, therefore, was, whether the system of assessment could be sustained upon principle, I should have no hesitation
in deciding it in the negative. I fully agree with the reasoning of the Supreme
Court of Louisiana in the case of Municipality No.2 v. White, 9 J.a. An. 447,
upon.tbis point.
" But the question is not whether this system is established upon sound principles, but whether tb.e legislature has power, under the constitution, to establish
such a system. As already stated, if the provision requiring the rule of taxation
to be uniform was the only one bearing upon the question, I should answer this
also in the negative. But there is another provision which seems to me so important, that it has changed the result to which I should otherwise have arrived.
That provision is § 3 of art. 11, and is as follows : ' It shall be the duty of the
legislature, and they are hereby empowered, to provide for the organization of
cities and incorporated villages, and to restrict their power of taxation, assessment, borrowing money, contracting debts, and loaning their ,credit, so as to
prevent abuses in assessments and taxation, and in contracting debts by such
municipal corporations.'
" It cannot well be denied that if the word 'assessment,' as used in this section, had reference to this established system of special taxation for municipal
improvements, that then it is a clear recognition of the existence and legality of
the power." And the court, having reached the conclusion that the word did
have reference to such an established system, sustain the assessment, adding:
•• The same effect was given to the same clause in the Constitution of Ohio, by
the Supreme Court of that State, in a recent decision in the case of Hill"· Higdon,
5 Ohio, N. s. 243. And the reasoning of Chief Justice Ranne!J on the question
I think it impossible to answer."
If the State of Wisconsin had any settled and known practice, designated as
assessments, under which each lot owner was compelled to construct the streets
in front of his lot, then the constitution as quoted may well be held to recognize
such practice. In this view, however, it is still difficult to discover any "restriction '' in a law which perpetuates the arbitrary and unjust custom, and which still
permits the whole expense of making the street in front of each lot to be imposed
86
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[*510] districts be created, with a *view to local improvements.

(CH. XIV.

t The cases of drains to relieve swamps, marshes, and

other low lands of their stagnant water, and of levees to prevent

lands being overﬁowed by rivers, will at once suggest themselves.

In providing for such cases, however, the legislature exercises

another power besides the power of taxation. On the theory that

the drainage is for the sole purpose of beneﬁting the lands of

individuals, it would be diﬂicult to defend such legislation. But

if the stagnant water causes sickness, it may be a nuisance,

which, under its power of police, the State would have authority

to-abate. The laws for this purpose, so far as they have fallen

under our observation, have proceeded upon this theory.

[*511] Nevertheless, when the State incurs "expense in the

exercise of its police power for this purpose, it is proper to

assess that expense upon the portion of the community specially

and peculiarly beneﬁted. The assessment is usually made with

reference to the beneﬁt to property ; and it is difficult to frame or

to conceive of any other rule of apportionment that would operate

so justly and so equally in these cases. There may be diﬂiculty

in the detail ; diﬁiculty in securing just and impartial assessments ;

upon it. The only restriction which the law imposes is, that its terms exclude

uniformity, equality, and justice, which surely could not be the restriction the
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constitution designed. Certainly the learned judge shows very clearly that such

a law is unwarranted as a legitimate exercise of the taxing power; and as it

cannot be warranted under any other power known to constitutional government,-

tlie authority to adopt it should not be found in doubtful words. The case of

Hill v. Higdon, referred to, is different. There the expense .of improving the

street was assessed upon the property abutting on the street, in proportion to the

foot front. The decision there was, that the constitutional provision that “ laws

(* 510] districts be created, with a • view to local improvements.
The cases of drains b> relieve swamps, marshes, an'd
other low lands of their stagnant water, and of levees to prevent
lands being overflowed by rivers, will at once suggest themselves.
In providing for such cases, however, the legislature exercises
another power besides the power of taxation. On the theory that
the drainage is for the sole purpose of benefiting the lands of
individuals, it would be difficult to defend such legislation. But
if the stagnant water causes sickness, it may be a nuisance,
which, under its power of police, the State would have authority
t<5·abate. The laws for this purpose, so far as they have fallen
under our observation, have proceeded upon this theory.
[* 511] Nevertheless, when the State incurs • expense in the
exercise of its police power for this purpose, it is proper to
assess that expense upon the portion of the community specially
and peculiarly benefited. The assessment is usually made with
reference to the benefit to property ; and it is difficult to frame or
to conceive of any other rule of apportionment that would operate
so justly and so equally in these cases. There may be difficulty
iu the detail ; difficulty in securing just and impartial assessments ;

shall be passed taxing by a uniform rule all moneys, &c., and also all real and

personal property, according to its true value in money,” had no reference to

these local assessments, which might still be made, as they were before the con-

stitution was adopted, with reference to the beneﬁts conferred. The case. there-

fore, showed a rule of apportionment which was made applicable throughout the

taxing district, to wit, along the street so far as the improvement extended.

The case of State v. City of Portage, 12 Wis. 562, holds that a law authorizing

- the expense of an improvement to be assessed upon the abutting lots, in pl‘OpOl‘-

tion to their front or size, would not justify and sustain city action which

required the owner of each lot to bear the expense of the improvement in front

of it. '

The recent case of Warren v. Henley in the Supreme Court of Iowa—see

Westem Jurist, Vol. V. p. 101 —is in accord with Weeks v. Milwaukee, supra,

and opposed to the doctrine stated in the text.
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upon it. The only restriction which the law imposes is, that its terms exclude
uniformity, equality, and justice, which surely could not be the re11triction the
constitution designed. Certainly the learned judge shows very clearly that such
a law is unwarranted as a legitimate exercise of the taxing power; and as it
cannot be warranted 40der any other power known to constitutional government, ·
the authority to adopt it should not be found in doubtful words. The case of
Hill v. Higdon, referred to, is different. There the expense .of improving the
street was assessed upon the property abutting on the street, in proportion to the
foot front. The decision there was, that the constitutional provision that " laws
shall be passed taxing by a uniform rule all moneys, &c., and also all real and
personal property, according to its true value in money," had no reference to
these local assessments, which might atill be made, as they were before the conatitution was adopted, with reference to the benefits conferred. The case. therefore, showed a rule of apportionment which was made applicable throughout the
taxing district, to wit, along the street so far as the improvement extended.
The case of State o. City of Portage, 12 Wis. 562, holds that a law authorizing
• the expense of an improvement to be assessed upon the abutting lots, in proportion to their front or size, would not justify and sustain city action which
required the owner of each lot to bear the expense of the improvement in front
of it.
·
The recent case of Warren o. Henley in the Supreme Court of Iowa -see
Western Jurist, Vol. V. p. 101-is in accord with Weeks o. Milwaukee, :rupra,
and opposed to the doctrine stated in the text.

[ 562]
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ness upon such considerations}

‘ See Reeves v. Treasurer of Wood Co. 8 Ohio, N. s. 333; French v.

Kirkland, 1 Paige, 117; Philips v. Wickham, ib. 590. In Woodrutf v. Fisher,

17 Barb. 224, Hand, J ., speaking of one of these drainage laws, says: “ If the

'

but the principle of such a law would not depend for its soundness upon such considerations.1

object to be accomplished by this statute may be considered a public improve-

ment, the power of taxation seems to have been sustained upon analogous prin-

ciples. [Citing People v. Mayor, &c., of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419; Thomas v.

Leland, 24 Wend. 65; and Livingston v. Mayor, &c., gf New York, 8 VVend.

101.] But if the object was merely to improve the property of individuals, I

think the statute would be void, although it provided for compensation. The

water privileges on Indian River cannot be taken or affected in any way

solely for the private advantage of others, however numerous the beneﬁciaries.

Several statutes have been passed for draining swamps, but it seems to me that

the principle above advanced rests upon natural and constitutional law. The

professed object of this statute is to promote public health. And one question

that arises is, whether the owners of large tracts of land in a state of nature can

be taxed to pay the expense of draining them, by destroying the dams, &c., of

other persons away from the drowned lands, and for the purposes of public

health. This law proposes to destroy the water power of certain persons against

their will, to drain the lands of others, also, for all that appears, against their

will; and all at the expense of the latter, for this public good. If this taxation is
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illegal, no mode of compensation is provided, and all is illegal.” “ The owners

of these lands could not be convicted of maintaining a public nuisance because

they did not drain them; even though they were the owners of the lands upon

which the obstructions are situated. It does not appear by the act or the com-

plaint that the sickness to be prevented prevails among inhabitants on the wet

lands, nor whether these lands will be beneﬁted or injured by draining; and cer-

tainly, unless they will be beneﬁted, it would seem to be partial legislation to tax

a certain tract of land, for the expense of doing to it what did not improve it,

merely because, in a state of nature, it may be productive of sickness. Street

assessments are put upon the ground that the land assessed is improved, and its

value greatly enhanced.” The remarks of Green, J., in Williams v. Mayor, &c.,

of Detroit, 2 Mich. 567, may be here quoted: “Every species of taxation, in

every mode, is in theory and principle based upon an idea of compensation,

beneﬁt, or advantage to the person or property taxed, either directly or indi-

rectly. If the tax is levied for the support of the government and general police

of the State, for the education and moral instruction of the citizens, or the con-

struction of works of internal improvement, he is supposed to receive a just com-

pensation in the security which the government affords to his person and property,

the means of enjoying his possessions, and their enhanced capacity to contribute

to his comfort and gratiﬁcation, which constitute their value.”

It has been held incompetent, however, for a city which has itself created a

nuisance on the property of a citizen, to tax him for the expense of removing or

abating it. Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 258.

In Egyptian Levee Co. v. Hardin, 27 Mo. 495, it was held that a special

assessment for the purpose of reclaiming a district from inundation might prop-
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1 See Reeves 11. Treasurer of Wood Co. 8 Ohio, N. s. 833; French "·
Kirkland, 1 Paige, 117; Philips v. Wickham, ib. li90. In Woodruff 11. Fisher,
17 Barb. 224, Hand, J., speaking of one of these drainage laws, says: "If the
object to be accomplished by this statute may be considered a public improvement, the power of taxation seems to have been sustained upon analogous principles. [Citing People v. Mayor, &c., of Brooklyn, 4 N.Y. 419; Thomas v.
Leland, 24 Wend. 65; and Livingston v.l\fayor, &c., 2f New York, 8 'Vend.
101.] But if the objeet was merely to improve the property of individuals, I
think the statute would be void, although it provided for compensation. The
water privileges on Indian River cannot be taken or affected in any way
solely for the private advantage of others, however numerous the beneficiaries.
Several statutes have been pa8sed for draining swamps, but it seems to me that
the principle above advanced rests upon natural and constitutional law. The
professed object of this statute is to promote public health. And one question
that arises is, whether the owners of large tracts of land in a state of nature can
be taxed to pay the expense of draining them, by destroying the dams, &c., of
other persons away from the drowned lands, and for the purposes of public
health. This law proposes to destroy the water power of certain persons against
their will, to drain the lands of others, also, for all that appears, against their
will; and all at the expense of the latter, for this public good. If this taxation is
illegal, no mode of compemation is provided, and all is illegal." ''The owners
of these lands could not be convicted of maintaining a public nuisance because
they did not drain them ; even though they were the owners of the lands upon
which the obstructions are situated. It does not appear by the act or the complaint that the sickness to be prevented prevails among inhabitants on the wet
lands, nor whether these lands will be benefited or injured by draining ; and certainly, unless they will be benefited, it would seem to be partial legislation to tax
a certain tract of land, for the expense of doing to it what did not improve it,
merely because, in a state of nature, it may be productive of sickness. Street
assessments are put upon the ground that the land assessed is improved, and its
value greatly enhanced." The remarks of Grem, J., in Williams "· Mayor, &c.,
of Detroit, 2 Mich. 067, may be here quoted: "Every species of taxation, in
every mode, is in theory and principle bii.Sed upon an idea of compensation,
benefit, or advantage to the person or property taxed, either directly or indirectly. If the tax is levied for the su.rport of the government and general police
of the State, for the education and moral instruction of the citizens, or the construction of works of internal improvement, he is supposed to receive a just compensation in the security which the government affords to his person and property,
the means of enjoying his possessiow, and their enhanced capacity to contribute
to his comfort and gratification, which constitute their value."
It has been held incompetent, however, for a city which has itself created a
nuisance on tho property of a citizen, to tax him for the expense of removing or
abating it. Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 258.
In Egyptian Levee Co. 11. Hardin, 27 Mo. 495, it w~ held that a special
assQssment for the purpose of reclaiming a district from inundation might prop-
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call upon the citizen to appear in person and perform

service for the State, in the nature of police duties. The burden

of improving and repairing the common highways of the country,

except in the urban districts, is generally laid upon the people

in the form of an assessment of labor. The assessment may be

upon each citizen, in proportion to his property; or, in addition

to the property assessment, there may be one also by the poll. But

though the public burden assumes the form of labor, it is still tax-

ation, and must therefore be levied on some principle of uniform-

ity. But it is a peculiar species of taxation ; and the general

terms “tax,” or “taxation,” as employed in the State consti-

tutions, would not generally be understood to include it. It has

been decided that the clause in the Constitution of Illinois, that

“the mode of levying a tax shall be by valuation, so that every

person shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of the property

he or she has in his or her possession,” did not prevent the levy

of poll-taxes in highway labor. “The framers of the constitution

intended to direct a uniform mode of taxation on property, and

not to prohibit any other species of taxation, but to leave the legis-

lature the power to impose such other taxes as would be consonant

to public justice, and as the circumstances of the country might
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require. They probably intended to prevent the imposition of an

arbitrary tax on property, according to kind and quantity, and

without reference to value. The inequality of the mode of tax-

ation was the object to be avoided. We cannot believe that they

intended that all the public burdens should be borne by those

having property in possession, wholly exempting the rest

[* 513] of the community, who, by the "‘same constitution were

made secure in the exercise of the rights of suffrage, and

all the immunities of the citizen.” 1 And in another case, where an

assessment of highway labor is compared with one upon adjacent

property for widening a street,—which had been held not to be

erly be laid upon land in proportion to its area, and that the constitutional

provision that taxation should be levied on property in proportion to its valu-

ation did not preclude this mode of assessment. The same ruling was made in

Louisiana cases. Crowley v. Copley, 2 La. An. 329; Ycatman v. Crandall, 11

La. An. 220; Wallace v. Shelton, 14 La. An. 498; Bishop v. Marks, 15 La.

An. 147 ; Richardson v. Morgan, 16 La. An. 429; McGchcc v. Mathis, 21 Ark. 40.

' Sawyer v. City oi.Alt0n, 3 Scam. 130.

ii — l — ? __ m
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[* 512]

• In certain classes of cases, it has been customary to
call upon the citizen to appear in person and perform
service for the State, in the nature of police duties. The burden
of improving and repairing the common highways of the country,
except in the urban districts, is generally laid upon the people
in the form of an assessment of labor. The assessment may be
upon each citizen, in proportion to his property ; or, in addition
to the property assessment, there may be one also by the poll. But
though the public burden assumes the form of. labor, it is still taxation, and must therefore be levied on some principle of uniformity. But it is a peculiar species of taxation; and the general
terms " tax," or "taxation," as employed in the State constitutions, would not generally be understood to include it. It has
been decided that the clause in the Constitution of Illinois, that
"the mode of levying a tax shall be by valuation, so that every
person shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of the property
he or she has in his or her possession," did not prevent the levy
of poll-taxes in highway labor. "The framet·s of the constitution
intended to direct a uniform mode of taxation on property, and
not to prohibit any other species of taxation, but to leave the legislature the power to impose such other taxes as would be consonant
.to public justice, and as the circumstances of the country might
require. They probably intended to pre¥ent the imposition of an
arbitrary tax on property, according to kind and quantity, and
without reference to value. The inequality of the mode of taxation was the object to be avoided. We cannot belieYe that they
intended that all the public burdens should be borne by those
having property in possession, wholly exempting the rest
(* 513] of the community, who, by the • same constitution were
made secure in the exercise of the rights of suffrage, and
all the immunities of the citizen." 1 And in another case, where an
assessment of highway labor is compared with one upon adjacent
pt·operty for widening a street,- which had been held not to be
erly be laid upon land in proportion to ita area, and that the constitutional
provision that taxation should be levied on property in proportion to its valuation did not preclude this mode of assessment. The same ruling was made in
Louisiana cases. Crowley v. Copley, 2 La. An. 829; Yeatman t'. Crandall, 11
La. An. 2:20; Wallace v. Shelton, 14 La. An. 498; Bishop v. Marks, 15 La.
An. 147; l~chardson v. Morgan, 16 La. An. 429; McGehee v. Mathis, 21 Ark. 40.
1 Sawyer v. City o~Alton, 3 Scam. 130.

[ 564]

en. x1v.] rna rowan or TAXATION. * 513

taxation, as that term was understood in the Oonstitution,—-it is
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said : “ An assessment of labor for the repair of roads and- streets

is less like a tax than is such an assessment. The former is not

based upon, nor has it any reference to, property or values owned

by the person of whom it is required, whilst the latter is based

alone upon the property designated by the law imposing it. Nor

is an assessment a capitation tax, as that is a sum of money levied

upon each poll. This rate, on the contrary, is a requisition for so

many days’ labor, which may be commuted in money. No doubt,

the number of days levied, and the sum which may be received by

commutation, must be uniform within the limits of the district or

body imposing the same. This requisition for labor to repair roads

is not a tax, and hence this exemption is not repugnant to the con-

stitution.” 1

It will be apparent from what has already been said, that it is

not essential to the validity of taxation that it be levied according

to rules of abstract justice. It is only essential that the legis-

lature keep within its proper sphere of action, and not impose

burdens under the name of taxation which are not taxes in fact;

and its decision as to what is proper, just, and politic, must then

be ﬁnal and conclusive. Absolute equality and strict justice are

unattainable in tax proceedings. The legislature must be left to
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decide for itself how nearly it is possible to approximate so desir-

able a result. It "must happen under any tax law that some prop-

erty will be taxed twice, while other property will escape taxation

altogether. Instances will also occur where persons will be taxed

as owners of property which has ceased to exist. The system in

vogue for taking valuations of property ﬁxes upon a certain time

for that purpose, and a party becomes liable to be taxed upon

what he possesses at the time the valuing oﬂicer calls upon him.

Yet changes of property from person to person are occurring while

the valuation is going on, and the same parcel of property is found

by the assessor in the hands of two different persons, and is twice

assessed, while another parcel for similar reasons is not assessed

at all. Then the man who owns property when the as-

sessment is * taken may have been deprived of it by acci- [* 514]

dent or other misfortune before the tax becomes payable ;

but the tax is nevertheless a charge against him. And when the

valuation is only made once in a series of years, the occasional

‘ Town of Pleasant v. Kost, 29 Ill. 494. i

\
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taxation, as that term was understood in the Constitution,- it is
said : " An assessment of labor for the repair of roads and· streets
is less like a tax than is such an assessment. The former is not
based upon, nor has it any reference to, property or values owned
by the person of whom it is required, whilst the latter is based
alone upon the property designated by the law imposing it. Nor
is an assessment a capitation tax, as that is a sum of money levied
upon each poll. This rate, on the contrary, is a requisition for so
many days' labor, which may be commuted in money. No doubt,
the number of days levied, and the sum wl~ich may be received by
commutation, must be uniform within the limits of the district or
body imposing the same. This requisition for labor to repair roads
is not a tax, and hence this exemption is not repugnant to the constitution." 1
It will be apparent from what has already been said, that it is
not essential to the validity of taxation that it be levied according
to rules of abstract justice. It is only essential that the legislature keep within its proper sphere of action, and not impose
burdens under the name of taxation which are not taxes in fact ;
and its decision as to what is proper, just, and politic, must then
be final and conclusive. Absolute equality and strict justice nre
unattainable in tax proceedings. The legislature must be left to
decide for itself how nearly it is possible to approximate so desirable a result. It must happen under any tax law that some property will be taxed twice, while other property will escape taxation
altogether. Inslances will also occur where persons will be taxed
as owners of property which has ceased to exist. The system in
vogue for taking valuations of property fixes upon a certain time
for that purpose, and a party becomes liable to be taxed upon
what he possesses at the time the valuing officer calls upon him.
Yet changes of property from person to person are occurring while
the valuation is going on, and the same parcel of property is found
by the assessor in the hands of two diffet·ent persons, and is twice
assessed, while another parcel for similar reasons is not assessed
at all. Then the man who owns property when the assessment is • taken may have been deprived of it by acci- [• 514]
dent or other misfortune before the tax becomes payable ;
but the tax is nevertheless a charge against him. And when the
valuation is only made once in a series of years, the occasional
1

Town of Pleasant v. Kost, 29 Ill. 49!.

[ 565]
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hardships and inequalities in consequence of relative changes in

(CH. XIV.

the value of property from various causes become sometimes very

glaring. Nevertheless, no question of constitutional law is in-

volved in these cases, and the legislative control is complete}

The legislature must also, except when an unbending rule has

been prescribed for it by the constitution, have power to select in

its discretion the subjects of taxation. The rule of uniformity re-

quires an apportionment among all the subjects of taxation within

the districts; but it does not require that every thing which the

legislature might make taxable shall be made so in fact. Many

exemptions are usually made from taxation from reasons the

cogency of which is at once apparent. The agencies of the na-

tional government, we have seen, are not taxable by the States;

and the agencies and property of States, counties, cities, boroughs,

towns, and villages are also exempted by law, because, if any por-

tion of the public expenses was imposed upon them, it must in

some form be collected from the citizens before it can be paid. N o

beneﬁcial object could therefore be accomplished by any such

assessment. The property of educational and religious institutions

is also generally exempted from taxation by law upon very similar

considerations, and from a prevailing belief that it is the policy

and the interest of the State to encourage them. If the
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[* 515] State '* may cause taxes to be levied from motives of char-

ity or gratitude, so for the like reasons it may exempt the

objects of charity and gratitude from taxation. Property is some-

times released from taxation by contract with the State and corpo-

‘ In Shaw v. Dennis, 5 Gilm. 418, objection was taken to an assessment made

for a local improvement under a special statute, that the commissioners, in deter-

mining who should be liable to pay the tax, and the amount each should pay,

were to be governed by the last assessment of taxable property in the county.

It was insisted that this was an unjust criterion, for a man might have disposed

of all the taxable property assessed to him in the last assessment before this tax

was actually declared by the commissioners. The court, however, regarded the

objection as more reﬁned than practical, and one that, if allowed, would at once

annihilate the power of taxation. “ In the imposition of taxes, exact and critical

justice and equality are absolutely unattainable. If we attempt it, we might

have to divide a single yea:-‘s tax upon a given article of property among a dozen

different individuals who owned it at different times during the year, and then

hardships and inequalities in consequence of relative changes in
the value of property from various causes become sometimes very
glaring. Nevertheless, no question of constitutional law is involved in these cases, and the legislative control is complete.!
The legislature must also, except when an unbending rule has
been prescribed for it by the constitution, have power to select in
its discretion the subjects of taxation. The rule of uniformity requires an apportionment among all the subjects of taxation within
the districts ; but it does not require that every thing which tbe
legislature might make taxable shall be made so in fact. Many
exemptions are usually made from taxation from reasons the
cogency of which is at once apparent. The agencies of the national government, we have seen, are not taxable by the States ;
and the agencies and property of States, counties, cities, boroughs,
tQwns, and villages are also exempted by law, because, if any portion of the public expenses was imposed upon them, it must in
some form be collected from the citizens before it can be paid. No
beneficial object could therefore be accomplished by any such
assessment. The property of educational and religious institutions
is also generally exempted from taxation by law upon very similar
considerations, and from a prevailing belief that it is the policy
and the interest of the State to encourage them. If the
[• 515] State • may cause taxes to be levied from motives of charity or gratitude, so for the like reasons it may exempt tbe
objects of charity and gratitude from taxation. Property is sometimes released from taxation by contract with the State and corpo-

be almost as far from the desired end as when we started. The proposition is

Utopian. The legislature must adopt some practicable system; and there is no

more danger of oppression or injustice in taking a former valuation than in rely-

ing upon one to be made subsequently.”

[ 566 ]

1 In Shaw v. Dennis, 5 Gilm. 418, objection was taken to an assessment made
for a local improvement under a special statute, that the commissioners, in determining who should be liable to pay the tax, and the amount each should pay,
were to be governed by the last assessment of taxable property in the county.
It wail insisted that this was an unjust criterion, for a man might have disposed
of all the taxable property assessed to him in the last assessment before this tax
was actually declared by the commissioners. The court, however, regarded the
objection as more refined than practical, and one that, if allowed, would at once
annihilate the power of taxation. '' In the imposition of taxes, exact and critical
justice and equality are absolutely unattainable. If we attempt it, we might
have to divide a single year's tax upon a given article of property among a dozen
different individuals who owned it at different times during the year, and then
be almost as far from the desired end as when we started. The proposition is
Utopian. The legislature must adopt some practicable system; and there is no
more danger of oppression or injustice in taking a former valuation than in relying upon one to be made subsequently."

[ 566]

on. x1v.] was rowan or TAXATION. * 515

rations, and speciﬁed occupations are sometimes charged with
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speciﬁc taxes in lieu of all taxation of their property. A broad

ﬁeld is here opened to legislative discretion. As matter of State

policy it might also be deemed proper to make general exemption

of suﬂicient of the tools of trade or other means of support to

enable the poor man, not yet a pauper, to escape becoming a

public burden. There is still ample room for apportionment after

all such exemptions have been made. The constitutional re-

quirement of equality and uniformity only extends to such objects

of taxation as the legislature shall determine to be properly subject

to the burden.‘ The power to determine the persons and the

objects to be taxed is trusted exclusively to the legislative de-

partment ;2 but over all those the burden must be spread, or it

will be unequal and unlawful as to those who are selected to make

the payment.“

' State v. North, 27 Mo. 464; People v. Colman, 3 Cal. 46.

" Wilson v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 4 E. D. Smith, 675; Hill 0. Higdon,

5 Ohio, N. s. 245; State v. Parker, 33 N. J . 313. Notwithstanding a require-

ment that “the rule of taxation shall he uniform," the legislature may levy

speciﬁc State taxes on corporations, and exempt them from municipal taxation.

So held on the ground of stare decisis. Kneeland v. Milwaukee, 15 Wis. 454.

° In the case of Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 242, s. somewhat peculiar ex-
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emption was made. It appears that several lots in the city upon which a new

rations, and specified occupations are sometimes charged with
specific taxes in lieu of all taxation of their property. A broad
field is here opened to legislative discretion. As matter of State
policy it might also be deemed proper to make general exemption
of sufficient of the tools of trade or other means of support to
enable the poor man, not yet a pauper, to escape becoming a
public burden. There is still ample room for apportionment after
all such exemptions have been made. The constitutional requirement of equality and uniformity only extends to such objects
of taxation as the legislature shall determine to be properly subject
to the burden.1 The power to determine the persons and the
objects to be taxed is trusted exclusively to the legislative department ; 2 but over all those the burden must be spread, or it
will be unequal and unlawful as to those who are selected to make
the payment. 8

hotel was being constructed, of the value of from $150,000 to $200,000, were

purposely omitted to be taxed, under_the direction of the Common Council, “ in

view of the great public beneﬁt which the construction of the hotel would be to

the city.” Paine, J ., in delivering the opinion of the com't, says: “ I have no

doubt this exemption originated in motives of generosity and public spirit. And

perhaps the same motives should induce the tax-payers of the city to submit to

the slight increase of the tax thereby imposed on each, without questioning its

strict legality. But they cannot be compelled to. No man is obliged to be

more generous than the law requires, but each may stand strictly upon his legal

rights. That this exemption was illegal, was scarcely contested. I shall, there-

fore, make no effort to show that the Common Council had no authority to

suspend or repeal the general law of the State, declaring what property shall be

taxable and what exempt. But the important question presented is, whether,

conceding it to have been entirely unauthorized, it vitiates the tax assessed upon

other property. And upon this question I think the following rule is established,

both by reason and authority. Omissions of this character, arising from mistakes

of fact, erroneous computations, or errors of judgment on the part of those to

whom the execution of the taxing laws is intrusted, do not necessarily vitiate

the whole tax. But intentional disregard of those laws, in such manner as to

impose illegal taxes on those who are assessed, does. The ﬁrst part of the rule

is necessary to enable taxes to be collected at all. ,The execution of these laws is

[567]

State"· North, 27 Mo. 464; People"· Colman, S Cal. 46.
Wilson"· Mayor, &c., of New York, 4 E. D. Smith, 675; Hill v. Higdon,
5 Ohio, N. s. 245; State "· Parker, 83 N.J. 318. Notwithstanding a requirement that " the rule of taxation shall be uniform," the legislature may levy
specific State taxes on corporations, and exempt them from municipal taxation.
So held on the ground of stare decisis. Kneeland v. Milwaukee, 15 Wis. 454.
3 In the case of Weeks "· Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 242, a somewhat peculiar exemption was made. It appears that several lots in the city upon which a new
hotel was being constructed, of the value of from $150,000 to $200,000, were
purposely omitted to be taxed, under .the direction of the Common Council, " in
view of the great public benefit which the construction of the hotel would be to
the city." Paine, J., in delivering the opinion of the court, says: "I have no
doubt this exemption originated in motives of generosity and public spirit. And
perhaps the same motivea should induce the tax-payers of the city to submit to
the slight increase of the tax thereby imposed on each, without questioning its
strict legality. But they cannot be compelled to. No man is obliged to be
more generous than the law requires, but each may stand strictly upon his legal
rights. That this exemption was illegal, was scarcely contested. I shall, therefore, make no effort to show that the Common Council had no authority to
suspend or repeal the general law of the State, declaring wh~t property shall be
taxable and what exempt. But the important question presented is, whether,
conceding it to have been entirely unauthorized, it vitiatea the tax assessed upon
other property. And upon this queation I think the following rule is established,
both by reason and authority. Omissions of this character, arising from mistakes
of fact, erroneous computations, or errors of judgment on the part of those to
whom the execution of the taxing laws is intrusted, do not necessarily vitiate
the whole tax. But intentional disregard of those laws, in such manner as to
impose illegal taxes on those who are asseased, does. The first part of the rule
is necessary to enable taxes to be collected at all. ,The execution of these laws is
1

~
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In some of the States it has been decided that the
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[*516] particular ’*provisions inserted in their constitutions to

insure uniformity are so worded as to forbid exemptions.

Thus the Constitution of Illinois provided that “the General

Assembly shall provide for levying a tax by valuation, so that

every person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the

value of his or her proper-tyyw 1 Under this it has been held that

exemption by the legislature of persons residing in a city from a

tax levied to repair roads beyond the city limits, by township

authority,—the city being embraced within the township which,

for that purpose, was the taxing district, — was void.“ It is to be

observed of these cases, however, that they would have fallen

within the general principle laid down in Knowlton v.

["* 517] Supervisors of Rock Co.,” and the legislative acts * under

consideration might perhaps have been declared void on

general principles, irrespective of the peculiar wording of the con-

necessarily intrusted to men, and men are fallible, liable to frequent mistakes

of fact and errors of judgment. If such errors, on the part of those who are

attempting in good faith to perform their duties, should vitiate the whole tax, no

tax could ever be collected. And, therefore, though they sometimes increase

improperly the burdens of those paying taxes, that part of the rule which holds

the tax not thereby avoided is absolutely essential to a continuance of govern-

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:22 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105011581
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

ment. But it seems to me clear that the other part is equally essential to the

just protection of the citizen. If those executing these laws may deliberately

In some of the States it has been decided tha.t the
[• 516] particula.r • provisions inserted in their constitutions to
insure uniformity are so worded as to forbid exemptions.
Thus the Constitution of Illinois provided that "the General
Assembly shall provide for levying a tax by valuation, so that
every person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the
value of his or her property." 1 Under this it has been held that
exemption by the legislature of persons residing in a city from a
tax levied to repair roads beyond the city limits, by township
authority,- the city being embraced within the township which,
for that purpose, was the taxing district,- was void.2 It is to be
observed of these cnses, however, that they would have fallen
within the general principle la.id down in Knowlton v.
[• 517] Supervisors of Rock Co.,8 and the legislative acts • under
consideration might perhaps have been declared void on
general principles, irrespective of the peculiar wording of the con-

disregard them, and assess the whole tax upon a part only of those who are

liable to pay it, and have it still a legal tax, then the laws afford no protection.

and the citizen is at the mercy of those oﬂicers, who, by being appointed to

execute the laws, would seem to be thereby placed beyond legal control. I know

of no considerations of public policy or necessity that can justify carrying the

rule to that extent. And the fact that in this instance the disregard of the law

proceeded from good motives ought not to affect the decision of the question.

It is a rule of law that is to be established; and, if established here because the

motives were good, it would serve as a precedent where the motives were bad,

and the power usurped for purposes of oppression." pp. 263-265. See also

Henry v. Chester, f5 Vt. 460; State v. Collector of Jersey City, 4 Zab. 108;

Insurance Co. v. Yard, 17 Penn. St. 331; \Villia1ns v. School District, 21 Pick.

75; Hersey v. Supervisors of Milwaukee, 16 Wis. 185; Crosby c. Lyon, 37 Cal.

242. But it seems that an omission of property from the tax-roll by the assessor,

unintentionally, through want of judgment and lack of diligence and business

habits, will not invalidate the roll. Dean v. Gleason, 16 \Vis. 1.

' Art. 9, § 2, of the old Constitution.

’ O’Kane v. Treat, 25 Ill. -561; Hunsaker v. Wright, 30 Ill. 146. See also

Trustees v. McConnell, 12 Ill. 138.

"' 9 Wis. 410.

[ see ]

necessarily intrusted to men, and men are fallible, liable to frequent mistakes
of fact and errors of judgment. If such errors, on the part of those who are
attempting in good faith to perform their duties, should vitiate the whole tax, no
tax could ever be collected. And, therefore, though they sometimes increase
improperly the burdens of those paying taxes, that part of the rule which holds
the tax not thereby avoided is absolutely essential to a continuance of government. But it seems to me clear that the other part is equally essential to the
just protection of the citizen. If those executing these laws may deliberately
disregard them, and assess the whole tax upon a part only of those who are
liabl~ to pay it, and have it still a legal tax, then the laws afford no protection.
and the citizen is at the mercy of those officers, who, by being appointed to
execute the laws, would seem to be thereby placed beyond legal control. I know
of no considerations of public policy or necessity that can justify carrying the
rule to that extent. And the fact that in this instance the disregard of the law
proceeded from good motives ought not to affect the decision of the question.
It is a rule of law that is to be established; and, if established here because the
motives were good, it would serve as a precedent where the motives were bad,
and the power usurped for purposes of oppression." pp. ~63-265. See also
Henry v. Chester, !5 Vt. 460; State v. Collector of Jersey City, 4 Zab. 108;
Insurance Co. v. Yard, 17 Penn. St. 331; Williams v. School District, 21 Pick.
75; Hersey v. Supervisors of Milwaukee, 16 Wis. 185; Crosby t:. Lyon, 37 Cal.
242. But it seems that an omission of property from the tax-roll by the assessor,
unintentionally, through want of judgment and lack of diligence and business
habits, will not invalidate the roll. Dean v. Gleason, 16 Wis. 1.
1 Art. 9, § 2, of the old Constitution.
2 O'Kane v. Treat, 25 Ill. 561; Hunsaker v. Wright, SO Ill. 146.
See also
Trustees v. McConnell, 12 Ill. 138.
s 9 Wis. 410.
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nois, recognize the power in the legislature to commute for a tax,

or to contract for its release for aconsideration. The Constitution

of Ohio provides 1 that “laws shall be passed taxing by a uniform

rule all moneys, credits, investments in bonds, stocks, joint-stock

companies, or otherwise ; and also all real and personal property,

according to its true value in money.” Under this section it was

held not competent for the legislature to provide that lands within

the limits of a city should not be taxed for any city purpose,

except roads, unless the same were laid off into town lots and

recorded as such, or into outlots not exceeding ﬁve acres each?

Upon this case we should make the same remark as upon the

Illinois cases above referred to.

It is, moreover, essential to valid taxation that the taxing oﬂi-

cers be able to show legislative authority for the burden they

assume to impose in every instance. Taxes can only be voted by

the people’s representatives. They are in every instance an appro-

priation by the people to the government, which the latter is to ex-

pend in furnishing the people protection, security, and such facilities

for enjoyment as it properly pertains to government to provide.

This principle is a chief corner-stone of Anglo-Saxon liberty ; and

it has operated not only as an important check on government, in
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preventing extravagant expenditures, as well as unjust and tyran-

nical action, but it has been an important guaranty of the right of

private property. Property is secure from the lawless grasp of the

government, if the means of existence of the government depend

upon the voluntary grants of those who own the property. Our

ancestors coupled their grants with demands for the redress of

grievances ; but in modern times the surest protection against

grievances has been found to be to vote speciﬁc taxes for the spe-

ciﬁc purposes to which the people’s representatives are willing

they shall be devoted ;3 and the persons exercising the functions

of government must then become petitioners if they desire money

for other objects. And then these grants are only made periodi-

eally. Only a few things, such as the salaries of oﬁicers,

the interest upon the public debt, the support "‘ of schools, [* 518]

and the like, are provided for by permanent laws; and

‘ Art. 12, § 2.

’ Zanesville v. Auditor of Muskingum County, 5 Ohio, N. s. 589.

' Hoboken v. Phinney, 5 Dutch. 65.

[ 569 ]

stitution. These cases, notwithstanding, as well as others in Illinois, recognize the power in the legislature to commute for a tax,
or to contract for its release for a consideration. The Constitution
of Ohio provides 1 that "laws shall be passed taxing by a uniform
rule all moneys, credits, investments in bonds, stocks, joint-stock
companies, or otherwise ; and also all real and personal property,
accerding to its true value in money." Under this section it was
held not competent for the legislature to provide that lands within
the limits of a city should not be taxed for any city purpose,
except roads, unless the same were laid off into town lots and
recorded as such, or into out-lots not exceeding five acres each. 2
Upon this case we should make the same remark as upon the
Illinois cases above referred to.
It is, moreover, essential to valid taxation that the taxing officers be able to show legislative authority for the burden they
assume to impose in every instance. Taxes can only be voted by
the people's representatives. They are in every instance an appropriation by the people to the government, which the latter is to expend in furnishing the people protection, security, and such facilities
for enjoyment as it properly pertains to government to provide.
This principle is a chief corner-stone of Anglo-Saxon liberty ; and
it has operated not only as an important check on government, in
preventing extravagant expenditures, as well as unjust and tyrannical action, but it has been an important guaranty of the right of
private property. Property is secure from the lawless grasp of the
government, if the means of existence of the government depend
upon the voluntary grants of those who own the property. Our
ancestors coupled their grants with demands for the redress of
grievances; but in modern times the surest protection against
grievances has been found to be to vote specific taxes for the specific purposes to which the people's representatives are willing
they shall be devoted ; 8 and the persons exercising the functions
of government must then become petitioners if they desire money
for other objects. And then these grants are only made periodically. Only a few things, such as the salaries of officers,
the interest upon the public debt, the support • of schools, [• 618]
and the like, are provided for by permanent laws; and
Art. 12, § 2.
Zanesville"· Auditor of Muskingum County, 5 Ohio,
a Hoboken"· Phinney, 5 Dutch. 65.

I

1

N.

s. 589.

[ 569]
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not always is this done. The government is dependent from year

(CH. XIV.

to year on the periodical vote of supplies. And this vote will

come from representatives who are newly chosen by the people,

and who will be expected to reﬂect their views regarding the pub-

lic expenditures. State taxation, therefore, is not likely to be

excessive or onerous, except when the people, in times of ﬁnancial

ease, excitement, and inﬂation, have allowed the incurring of ex-

travagant debts, the burden of which remains after the excitement

has passed away.

But it is as true of the political divisions of the State as it is of

the State at large, that legislative authority must he shown for

every levy of taxes} The power to levy taxes by these divisions

comes from the State. The State confers it, and at the same time

exercises a parental supervision by circumscribing it. Indeed, on

general principles, the power is circumscribed by the rule that the

taxation by the local authorities can only be for local purposes.’

Neither the State nor the local body can authorize the imposition

of a tax on the people of a county or town for an object in which

the people of the county or town are not concerned. And by

some of the State constitutions it is expressly required that the

State, in creating municipal corporations, shall restrict their power

of taxation over the subjects within their control. These re-
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quirements, however, impose an obligation upon the legislature

which only its sense of duty can compel it to perform.“ It is evi-

dent that if the legislature fail to enact the restrictive legislation,

the courts have no power to compel such action. Whether in any

case a charter of incorporation could be held void on the ground

that it conferred unlimited powers of taxation, is a question that

could not well arise, as a. charter is probably never granted which

does not impose some restrictions ; and where that is the case, it

must be inferred that those were all the restrictions the legislature

deemed important, and that therefore the constitutional duty of

the legislature has been performed.‘

' Clark v. Davenport, 14 Iowa, 494; Burlington v. Kcllar, 18 Iowa, 59;

Mays v. Cincinnati, 1 Ohio, N. s. 273.

' Foster v. Kenosha, 12 Wis. 616. See ante, p. 213.

3 In Ilill v. Higdon, 5 Ohio, N. s. 248, Ranney, J., says of this provision:

“ A failure to perform this duty may be of very serious import, but lays no

foundation for judicial correction.” And see Maloy v. Marietta, 11 Ohio, N. s.

638.

‘ The Constitution of Ohio requires the legislature to provide by general laws

[570]

not always is this done. The government is dependent from year
to year on the periodical vote of supplies. And this vote will
come from representatives who are newly chosen by the people,
and who will be expected to reflect their views regarding the public expenditures. State taxation, therefore, is not likely to be
excessive or onerous, except when the people, in times of financial
ease, excitement, and inflation, have allowed the incurring of extravagant debts, the burden of which remains after the excitement
has passed away.
But it is as true of the political divisions of the State as it is of
the State at large, that legislative authority must be shown for
every levy of taxes.! The power to levy taxes by these divisions
comes from the State. The State confers it, and at the same time
exercises a parental supervision by circumscribing it. Indeed, on
general principles, the power is circumscribed by the rule that the
taxation by the local authorities can only be for local purposes.2
Neither the State nor the local body can authorize the imposition
of a tax on the people of a county or town for an object in which
the people .of the county or town are not concerned. And by
some of the State constitutions it is expressly required that the
State, in creating municipal corporations, shall restrict their power
of taxation over the subjects within their control. These requirements, however, impose an obligation upon the legislature
which only its sense of duty can compel it to perform. 8 It is evident that if the legislature fail to enact the restrictive legislation,
the courts have no power to compel such action. Whether in any
case a charter of incorporation could be held void on the ground
that it conferred unlimited powers of taxation, is a question that
could not well arise, as a charter is probably never granted which
does not impose some restrictions; and where that is the case, it
must be inferred that those were all the restrictions the legislature
deemed important, and that therefore the constitutional duty of
the legislature has been performed.4
1 Clark v. Davenport, 14 Iowa, 494; Burlington v. Kellar, 18 Iowa, l>9;
Mays v. Cincinnati, 1 Ohio, N. s. 273.
1 Foster v. Kenosha, 12 Wis. 616.
See ante, p. 213.
3 In Hill 11. Higdon, 5 Ohio, N. s. 248, Ramuy, J., says of this provision :
" A failure to perform this duty may be of very serious import, but lays no
foundation for judicial correction." And see 1\.Ialoy v. Marietta, 11 Ohio, N. s.
638.
' The Constitution of Ohio requires the legislature to provide by general laws

[ 570]
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‘*When, however, it is said to be essential to valid [* 519]
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taxation that there be legislative authority for every tax

that is laid, it is not meant that the legislative department of the

for the organization of cities and incorporated villages, and to restrict their

power of taxation, assessment, &c. The general law authorizing the expense of

grading and paving streets to be assessed on the grounds bounding and abutting

on the street, in proportion to the street-front, was regarded as being passed in

• When, however, it is sai"d to be essential to valid [• 519)
taxation that there be legislative authority for every tax
that is laid, it is not meant that the legislative department of the

attempted fulﬁlment of the constitutional duty, and therefore valid. The chief

restriction in the case was, that it did not authorize assessment in any other or

different mode from what had been customary. Northern Indiana R.R. Co. _v.

Connelly, 10 Ohio, N.S. 165. The statute also provided that no improvement

or repair of a street or highway, the cost of which was to be assessed upon the

owners, should be directed without the concurrence of two-thirds of the members

elected to the municipal council, or unless two-thirds of the owners to be charged

should petition in writing therefor. In Maloy v. Marietta, 11 Ohio, N. s. 639,

Peck, J ., says: “ This may be said to be a very imperfect protection; and in

some cases will doubtless prove to be so; but it is calculated and designed, by

the unanimity or the publicity it requires, to prevent any ﬂagrant abuses of the

power. Such is plainly its object; and we know of no rights conferred upon

courts to interfere with the exercise of a legislative discretion which the consti-

tution has delegated to the law-making power.” And see Weeks v. Milwaukee,

10 Wis. 242. The Constitution of Michigan requires the legislature, in providing
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for the incorporation of cities and villages, to “ restrict their power of taxation,”

&c. The Detroit Metropolitan Police Law made it the duty of the Board of

Police to prepare and submit to the city controller, on or before the ﬁrst day of

May in each year, an estimate in detail of the cost and expense of maintaining

the police department, and the Common Council was required to raise the same

by general tax. These provisions, it was claimed, were in conﬂict with the

constitution, because_no limit was ﬁxed by them to the estimates that might be

made. In People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 498, the court say: “ Whether this

provision of the constitution can be regarded as mandatory in a sense that would

make all charters of municipal corporations and acts relating thereto which are

wanting in this limitation invalid, we do not feel called upon to decide in this

case, since it is clear that a limitation upon taxation is ﬁxed by the act before us.

The constitution has not prescribed the character of the restriction which shall

be imposed, and from the nature of the case it was impossible to do more than

to make it the duty of the legislature to set some bounds to a power so liable to

abuse. A provision which, like the one complained of, limits the power of tax-

ation to the actual expenses as estimated by the governing board, after ﬁrst

limiting the power of the board to incur expense within narrow limits, is as much

a restriction as if it conﬁned the power to a certain percentage upon taxable

property, or to a sum proportioned to the number of inhabitants in the city.

\Vhether the restriction ﬁxed upon would as effectually guard the citizen against

abuse as any other which might have been established was a question for the

legislative department of the government, and does not concern us on this

inquiry.”
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for the organization of cities and incorporated villages, and to restrict their
power of taxation, assessment., &c. The general law authorizing the expense of
grading and paving streets to be assessed on the grounds bounding and abutting
on the street, in proportion to the strE>et front, was regarded as being passed in
attempted fulfilment of the constitutional duty, and therefore valid. The chief
restriction in the case was, that it did not authorize assessment in any other or
different mode from what had been customary. Northern Indiana R.R. Co."·
Connelly, 10 Ohio, N. s. 165. The statute also provided that no improvement
or r~pair of a street or highway, the cost of which was to be assessed upon the
ownera, should be directed without the concurrence of two-thirds of the members
elected to the municipal council, or unless two-thirds of the owners to be charged
should petition in writing therefor. In Maloy "· Marietta, 11 Ohio, N. s. 639,
Peck, J ., says: " This may be said to be a very imperfect protection; and in
some cases will doubtless prove to be so; but it is calculated and designed, by
the unanimity or the publicity it requires, to prevent any flagrant abuses of the
power. Such is plainly its object; and we know of no rights conferred upon
courts to interfere with the exercise of a legislative discretion which the constitution has delegated to the law-making power." And see Weeks"· Milwaukee,
10 Wis. 242. The Constitution of Michigan requires the legislature, in providing
for the incorporation of cities and Tillages, to "restrict their power of taxation,"
&c. The Detroit Metropolitan Police Law made it the duty of the Board of
Police to prepare and submit to the city controller, on or before the first day of
l\fay in each year, an estimate in detail of the cost and expense of maintaining
the police department, and the Common Council was required to raise the same
by general tax. These provisions, it was claimed, were in conflict with the
constitution, because no limit was bed by them to the estimates that might be
made. In People ,;, Mahaney, 13 Mich. 498, the court any: "Whether this
proYision of the constitution can be regarded as mandatory in a sense that would
make all charters of municipal corporations and acts relating thereto whith are
wanting in this limitation invalid, we do not feel called upon to decide in this
calie, sinte it is clear that a limitation upon taxation is fixed by the act before us.
The constitution has not prescribed the character of the restriction which shall
be imposed, and from the nature of the case it was impossible to do more than
to make it the duty of the legislature to set some bounds to a power so liable to
abuse. A provision which, like the one complained of, limits the power of taxation to the actual expenses as estimated by the governing board, after first
limiting the power of the board to incur expense within narrow limits, is as much
a 1·estriction as if it confined the power to a certain percentage upon taxable
property, or to a sum proportioned to the number of inhabitants in the city.
Whether the restriction fixed upon would as effectually guar!l the citizen against
abuse as any other which might have been established was a question for the
legislative department of the government, and does not concern us on this
inquiry."

[ 571]
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' State must have passed upon the necessity and propriety

(cH. XIV.

[* 520] of every particular tax; ‘* but those who assume to seize

the property of the citizen for the satisfaction of the tax

must be able to show that that particular tax is authorized, either

by general or special law. The power inherent in the government

to tax lies dormant until a constitutional law has been passed call-

ing it into action, and is then vitalized only to the extent provided

by the law. Those, therefore, who act under such law should be

careful to keep within its limits, lest they remove from their acts

the shield of its protection.‘ While we do not propose to enter

upon any attempt to point out the various cases in which a failure

to obey strictly the requirements of the law will render the pro-

ceedings void, and in regard to which a diversity of decision would

be met with, we think we shall be safe in saying that, in eases of

this description, which propose to dispossess the citizen of his

property against his will, not only will any excess of taxation

beyond what the law allows render the proceedings void, but any

failure to comply with such requirements of the laws as are made

for the protection of the owner’s interest will also render them

void. .

There are several cases in which taxes have been levied but

slightly in excess of legislative power, in which it has been urged
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in defence of the proceedings that the law ought not to take notice

of such unimportant matters ; but an excess of jurisdiction is never

unimportant. In one case in Maine the excess was eighty-seven

cents only in a tax of $225.75, but it was held sufficient to render

the proceedings void. We quote from Mellen-, Ch. J ., delivering

the opinion of the court : “ It is contended that the sum of eighty-

seven cents is such a triﬂe as to fall within the range of the maxim

dc mim'mis,&c.; but if not, that still this small excess does not

vitiate the assessment. The maxim is so vague in itself as to

form a very unsafe ground of proceeding or judging; and it may

be almost as difﬁcult to apply it as a rule in pecuniary concerns as

to the interest which a witness has in the event of a cause ; and in

such case it cannot apply. Any interest excludes him. The

assessment was therefore unauthorized and void. If the line

which the legislature has established be once passed, we know of

no boundary to the discretion of the assessors.” 1 The same view

‘ Huse v. Merriam, 2 Greenl. 375. See Joyner v. School District, 3 Cush.

567 ; Kemper v. McClelland, 19 Ohio, 324; School District v. Merrills, 12 Conn.

1
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State must have passed up<)n the necessity and propriety
of every particular tax; • but those who assume to seize
the property of the citizen for the satisfaction of the tax
must be able to show that that particular tax is authorized, either
by general or special law. The power inherent in the government
to tax lies dormant until a constitutional law has been passed calling it into action, and is then vitalized only to the extent provided
by the law. Those, therefore, who act under such law should be
careful to keep within its limits, lest they remove from their acts
the shield of its protection. While we do not propose to enter
upon any attempt to point out the various cases in which a failure
to obey strictly the requirements of the law will render the proceedings void, and in regard to which a diversity of decision would
be met with, we think we shall be safe in saying that, in cases of
this description, which propose to dispossess the citizen of his
property against his will, not only will any excess of taxation
beyond what the law allows render the proceedings void, but any
failure to comply with such requirements of the laws as are made
for the protection of the owner's interest will also render them
void.
There are several cases in which taxes have been levied but
slightly in excess of legislative power, in which it has been urged
in defence of the proceedings that the law ought not to take notice
of such unimportant matters ; but an excess of jurisdiction is never
unimportant. In one case in Maine the excess was eighty-seven
cents only in a tax of $225.75, but it was held sufficient to render
the proceedings void. We quote from Mellen, Ch. J., delivering
the opinion of the court : " It is contended that the sum of eightyseven cents is such a trifle as to fall within the range of the maxim
de minimiiJ, &c. ; but if not, that still this small excess does not
vitiate the assessment. The maxim is so vague in itself as to
form a very unsafe ground of proceeding or judging; and it may
be almost as difficult to apply it as a rule in pecuniary concerns as
to the interest which a witness has in the event of a cause ; and in
such case it cannot apply. Any interest excludes him. The
assessment was therefore unauthorized and void. If the line
which the legislature has established be once passed, we know of
no boundary to the discretion of the assessors." 1 The same view

r· 520]

1 Huse t~. Merriam, 2 Greenl. 375.
See Joyner v. School District, S Cosh.
567; Kemper t~. McClelland, 19 Ohio, 824; School District t~. Merrills, 12 Conn.
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cu. x1v.] ma rowan or mxsrron. " 520

has been taken by the Supreme Court of Michigan, by

CH. XIV.]

THE POWER OF TAXATION.

which the "opinion is expressed that the maxim de [* 521]

mz'm'm.is Zex non curat should be applied with great caution

to proceedings of this character, and that the excess could not be

held unimportant and overlooked where, as in that case, each

dollar of legal tax was perceptibly increased thereby.‘ Perhaps,

however, a slight excess, not the result of intention, but of

erroneous calculations, may be overlooked, in vie_w of the great

difficulty in making all such calculations mathematically correct,

and the consequent impolicy of requiring entire freedom from all

errors?

Wherever a. tax is invalid because of excess of authority, or

because the requisites in tax proceedings which the law has pro-

vided for the protection of the tax-payer are not complied with,

any sale of property based upon it will be void also. The owner is

not deprived of his property by “ the law of the land,” if it is taken

to satisfy an illegal tax. And if property is sold for the satis-

faction of several taxes, any one of which is unauthorized, or for

any reason illegal, the sale is altogether void.3

437; Elwell v. Shaw, 1 Greenl. 335; Wells v. Burbank, 17 N. H. 393; Kins-

worthy v. Mitchell, 21 Ark. 145.

' Case v. Dean, 16 Mich. 12.
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’ This was the view taken by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Kelley v.

Corson, 8 \Vis. 182, where an excess of $8.61 in a tax of $6,654.57 was held not

to be fatal; it appearing not to be the result of intention, and the court thinking

that an accidental error no greater than this ought to be disregarded.

’ This has been repeatedly held. Elwell v. Shaw, 1 Greenl. 335; Lacy v.

Davis, 4 Mich. 140; Bangs v. Snow, 1 Mass. 188; Thurston 1:. Little, 3 Mass.

has been taken by the Supreme Court of :Michigan, by
which the • opinion is expressed that the maxim de [• 521]
minimi1 lex non curat should be applied with great caution
to proceedings of this character, and that the excess could not be
held unimportant and overlooked where, as in that case, each
dollar of legal tax was perceptibly increased thereby. 1 Perhaps,
however, a slight excess, not the result of intention, but of
erroneous calculations, may be overlooked, in vie.w of the great
difficulty in making all such calculations mathematically correct,
and the consequent impolicy of requiring entire freedom from all
errors.2
Wherever a tax is invalid because of excess of authority, or
because the requisites in tax proceedings which the law has provided for the protection of the tax-payer are uot complied with,
any sale of property based upon it will be void also. The owner is
not deprived of his property by " the law of the land," if it is taken
to satisfy an illegal tax. And if property is sold for the satisfaction of several taxes, any one of which is unauthorized, or for
any reason illegal, the sale is altogether void.8

429; Dillingham v. Snow, 5 Mass. 547; Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass. 283;

Libby v. Burnham, 15 Mass. 144; Hayden v. Foster, 13 Pick. 492; Torrey v.

Millbury, 21 Pick. 70; Alvord v. Collin, 20 Pick. 418; Drew v. Davis, 10 Vt.

506; Doe v. McQuilkin, 8 Blackf. 335; Kemper v. l\IcClelland, 19 Ohio, 324.

This is upon the ground that the sale being based upon both the legal and the

illegal tax, it is manifestly impossible afterwards to make the distinction, so that

the act shall be partly a trespass and partly innocent. But when a party asks

relief in equity before a sale against the collection of taxes, a part of which are

legal, he will be required ﬁrst to pay that part, or at least to so distinguish them

from the others that process of injunction can be so framed as to leave the legal

taxes to be enforced; and failing in this, his bill will be dismissed. Conway v.

\Vaverley, 15 Mich. 257; Palmer v. Napoleon, 16 Mich. 176; Hersey v. Super

visors of Milwaukee, 16 1/Vis. 182; Bond v. Kenosha, 17 Wis. 288; Myrick v.

La Crosse, ib. 442.

As to the character and extent of the irregularities which should defeat the
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437; Elwell v. Shaw, 1 Greenl. 335; Wells v. Burbank, 17 N. H. 393; Kineworthy v. Mitchell, 21 Ark. 145.
1 Case v. Dean, 16 Mich. 12.
' This was the view taken by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Kelley "·
Corson, 8 "ris. 182, where an excess of $8.61 in a tax of $6,654.57 was held not
to be fatal; it appearing not to be the result of intention, and the court thinking
that an accidental error no greater than thi!! ought to be disregarded.
, This has been repeatedly held. Elwell v. Shaw, 1 Greeol. 335; Lacy v.
Da,·is, 4 Mich. 140; Bangs v. Snow, 1 Mass. 188; Thurston v. Little, 3 Mass.
429; Dillingham v. Snow, 5 Mass. M7; Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass. 28:J;
Libby "· Burnham, 15 Mass. 144; Hayden v. Foster, 13 Pick. 492; Torrey v.
Millbury, 21 Pick. 70; Alvord "· Collin, 20 Pick. 418; Dre'v v. Davis, 10 Vt.
506; Doe v. McQuilkin, 8 Blackf. 835; Kemper "· McClelland, 19 Ohio, 324.
This is upou the ground that the sale being based upon both the legal and the
illegal tax, it is manifestly impossible afterwards to make the distinction, so that
the act shall be partly a trespass and partly innocent. But when a party asks
relief in equity before a sale against the collection of taxes, a part of which are
legal, he will be required first to pay that part, or at least to so distinguish them
from the others that process of injunction can be so framed as to leave the legal
taxes to be enforced ; and failing in this, his bill will be dismissed. Conway v.
Waverley, 15 Mich. 257; Palmer v. Napoleon, 161\Iich. 176; Her~ey v. Super,·isors of Milwaukee, 16 Wis. 182; Bond v. Kenosha, 17 Wis. 288; Myrick "·
La Crosse, ib. 442.
As to the character and extent of the irregularities which should defeat the
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS,

proceedings for the collection of taxes, we could not undertake to speak here.

[CB. XIV.

We think the statement in the text, that a failure to comply with any such re-

quirements of the law as are made for the protection of the owner‘s interest will

prove fatal to a tax sale, will be found abundantly sustained by the authorities,

while many of the cases go still further in making irregularities fatal. It appears

to us that where the requirement of the law which has failed of observance was

one which had regard simply to the due and orderly conduct of the proceedings,

or to the protection of the public interest, as against the ofﬁcer, so that to the tax-

payer it is immaterial whether it was complied with or not, a failure to comply

ought not to be recognized as a foundation for complaint by him. But those safe-

guards which the legislature has thrown around the estates of citizens, to protect

them against unequal, unjust, and extortionate taxation, the courts are not at

liberty to do away with by declaring them non-essential. To hold the require-

ment of the law in regard to them directory only, and not mandatory, is in effect

to exercise a dispensing power over the laws. Mr. Blackwell, in his treatise on

tax titles, has collected the cases on this subject industriously, and perhaps we

shall be pardoned for saying also with a perceptible leaning against that species

of conveyance. As illustrations how far the courts will go, in some cases, to sus-

tain irregular taxation, where oﬂicers have act/ed in good faith, reference is made

to Kelley v. Corson, 11 Wis. 1; Hersey v. Supervisors of Milwaukee, 16 Wis.

185. See also Mills v. Gleason, 11 Wis. 497, where the court endeavors to lay

down a general rule as to the illegalities which should render a tax roll invalid.

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:22 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105011581
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

A party bound to pay a tax, or any portion thereof, cannot get title to the land

by neglecting payment and allowing a sale to be made at which he becomes the

purchaser. McMinn v. Whelan, 27 Cal. 300. See Butler v. Porter, 13 Mich.

292. _
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I

proceedings for the collection of taxes, we could not undertake to speak here.
We think the statement in the text, that a failure to comply with any such requirements of the law as are made for the protection of the owner's interest will
prove fatal to a tax sale, will be found abundantly sustained by the authorities,
while many of the cases go still further in making irregularities fatal. It appears
to us that where the requirement of the law which has failed of observance was
one which bad regard simply to the due and orderly conduct of the proceedings,
or to the protection of the public interest, as a,aainst the officer, 110 that to the taxpayer it is immaterial whether it was complied with or not, a failure to comply
ought not to be recognized as a foundation for complaint by him. But those safeguards which the legislature has thrown around the estates of citizens, to protect
them against unequal, unjust, and extortionate taxation, the courts are not at
liberty to do away with by declaring them non-essential. To hold the requirement of the law in regard to them directory only, and not mandatory, is in effect
to exercise a dispensing power over the laws. Mr. Blackwell, in his treatise on
tax titles, has collected the cases on this subject industriously, and perhaps we
shall be pardoned for saying also with a perceptible leaning against that species
of conveyance. As illustrations how far the courts will go, in some cases, to sustain irregular taxation, where officers have acted in good faith, reference is made
to Kelley"· Corson, 11 Wis. 1; Hersey v. Supervisors of Milwaukee, 16 Wis.
185. See also Mills "· Gleason, 11 Wis. 497, where the court endeavors to lay
down a general rule as to the illegalities which should render a tax roll invalid.
A party bound to pay a tax, or any portion thereof, cannot get title to the land
by neglecting payment and allowing a sale to be made at which be becomes the
purchaser. McMinn "· Whelan, 27 Cal. 300. See Butler"· Porter, 13 Mich.
292.

[ 574]

ca. .xv.] run EMINENT nomam. * 523

‘CHAPTER XV. ,[“‘523]

cH. I xv.]

THE EMINENT DOMAIN.

TEE EMINENT DOMAIN.

Evssv sovereignty possesses buildings, lands, and other property,

which it holds for the use of its oﬂ_Eicers and agents, to enable them

to perform their public functions. It may also have property from

the rents, issues, and proﬁts, or perhaps the sale, of which

it is expected the State will derive a revenue. Such property

*CHAPTER XV.

. [* 523]

constitutes the ordinary domain of the State. In respect to its

use, enjoyment, and alienation, the same principles apply which

govern the management and control of like property of individuals ;

THE

EMINENT

DOMAIN.

and the State is in fact but an individual proprietor, whose title

and rights are to be tested, regulated, and governed by the same

rules that would have pertained to the ownership of the same

property by any of its citizens. There are also cases in which

property is peculiarly devoted to the general use and enjoyment of

the individual citizens who compose the organized society, but the

regulation and control of which are vested in the State by virtue of

its sovereignty. The State may be the proprietor of this property,

and retain it for the common use, as a means of contributing to

the general health, comfort, or happiness of the people; but gener-

ally it is not strictly the owner, but rather the governing and

supervisory trustee of the public rights in such property, vested
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with the power and charged with the duty of so regulating, pro-

tecting, and controlling them, as to secure to each citizen the

privilege to make them available for his purposes, so far as may

be consistent with an equal enjoyment by every other citizen

of the same privilege} In some instances these rights are of such

a nature, or the circumstances are such, that the most feasible

mode of enabling every citizen to participate therein, may seem to

In The Company of Free Fishers, &c. v. Gann, 20 C. B., N. s. 1, it was

held that the ownership of the crown in the bed of navigable waters is for the

beneﬁt of the subject, and cannot be used in any such manner as to derogate

from or interfere with the right of navigation, which belongs by law to all the

subjects of the realm. And that consequently the grantees of a particular por-

tion, who occupied it for a ﬁshery, could not be lawfully authorized to charge

and collect anchorage dues from vessels anchoring therein.

[575]

EvERY sovereignty possesses buildings, lands, and other property,
which it holds for the use of its o~cers and agents, to enable them
to perform their public functions. It may also have property from
the rents, issues, and· profits, or perhaps the sale, of which
it is expected the State will derive a revenue. Such property
constitutes the ordinary domain of the State. In respect to its
use, enjoyment, and alienation, the same principles apply which
govern the management and control of like property of individuals;
and the State is in fact but an individual proprietor, whose title
and rights are to be tested, regulated, and governed by the same
rules that would have pertained to the ownership of the same
property by any of its citizens. There are also cases in which
property is peculiarly devoted to the general use and enjoyment of
the individual citizens who compose the organized society, but the
regulation and contrql of which are vested in the State by virtue of
its sovereignty. The State may be the proprietor of this property,
and retain it for the common use, as a means of contributing to
the general health, comfort, or happiness of the people; but generally it is not strictly the owner, but rather the governing and
supervisory trustee of the public rights in such property, vested
with the power and charged with the duty of so regulating, protecting, and controlling them, as to secure to each citizen the
privilege to make them available for his purposes, so far as may
be consistent with an equal enjoyment by eve1·y other citizen
of the same privilege.1 In some instances these rights are of such
a nature, or the circumstances are such, that the most feasible
mode of enabling every citizen to participate therein, may seem to
1 In The Company of Free Fisbe1'8, &c. "· Gann, 20 C. B., N. s. 1, it was
held that the ownership of the crown in the bed of navigable waters is for the
benefit of the subj~ct, and cannot be used in any such manner as to derogate
from or interfere with the right of navigation, which belongs by law to all the
subjects of the realm. And that consequently the grantees of a particular portion, who occupied it for a fishery, could not be lawfully authorized to charge
and collect anchorage dues from vessels anchoring therein.
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be, for the State to transfer its control, wholly or partially, to

[en. xv.

individuals, either receiving by way of augmentation of the pub-

lic revenues a compensation therefor, or securing in return a.

release to the citizens generally from some tax or charge

[* 524] which would have rested upon them in ‘respect to such

rights, had the State retained the usual control in its

own hands, and borne the incidental burdens. '

The rights of which we here speak are considered as pertaining

to the State by virtue of an authority existing in every sovereignty,

and which is called the eminent domain. Some of these are com-

plete without any action on the part of the State; as is the case

with the rights of navigation in its seas, lakes, and public rivers,

the rights of ﬁshery in public waters, and the right of the State to

the precious metals which may he mined within its limits} Others

only become complete and are rendered effectual through the State

displacing, either partially or wholly, the rights of private owner-

ship and control; and this it accomplishes either by contract with

the owner, by accepting his gift, or by appropriating his property

against his will through an exercise of its superior authority. Of

these, the common highway furnishes an example; the public

rights therein being acquired either by the grant or dedication of

the owner of the land over which they run, or by a species of
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forcible dispossession when the public necessity demands the way,

and the private owner will neither give nor sell it. All these

rights rest upon a principle which in every sovereignty is essential

to its existence and perpetuity, and which, so far as when called

into action it excludes pre-existing individual rights, is sometimes

spoken of as being based upon an implied reservation by the

government when its citizens acquire property from it or under its

protection. And as there is not often occasion to speak of the

eminent domain except in reference to those cases in which the

government is called upon to appropriate property against the will

of the owners, the right itself is generally deﬁned as if it were

restricted to such cases, and is said to be that superior right of

property pertaining to the sovereignty by which the private prop-

erty acquired by its citizens under its protection may be taken or

‘ 1 Bl. Com. 294; 3 Kent, 378, note. In California it has been decided that

a grant of public lands by the government carries with it to the grantee the title

to all mines. Boggs v. Merced, &c., Co. 14 Cal. 279; Moore v. Smaw, 17 Cal.

199.
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be, for the State to transfer its control, wholly or partially, to
individuals, either receiving by way of augmentation of the pu~
lie revenues a compensation therefor, or securing in return a
release to the citizens generally from some tax or charge
(* 524] which would have rested upon them in • respect to such
rights, had the State retained the usual control in its
own hands, and borne the incidental burdens.
The rights of which we here speak are considered as pertaining
to the State by virtue of an authority existing in every sovereignty,
and which is called the eminent domain. Some of these are complete without any action on the part of the State; as is the case
with the rights of navigation in its seas, lakes, and public rivers,
the rights of fishery in public waters, and the right of the State to
the precious metals which may he mined within its limits.1 Others
only become complete and are rendered effectual through the State
displacing, either partially or wholly, the rights of private ownership and control; and this it accomplishes either by contract with
the owner, by accepting his gift, or by appropriating his property
agaiust his will through an exercise of its superior authority. Of
these, the common highway furnishes an example; the public
rights therein being acquired either by the grant or dedication ?f
the owner o( the land over which they run, or by a species of
forcible dispossession when the public necessity demands the way,
and the private owner will neither give nor sell it. All these
rights rest upon a principle which in every sovereignty is essential
to its existence and perpetuity, and which, so far as when called
into action it excludes pre-existing individual rights, is sometimes
spoken of as being based upon an implied reservation by the
government when its citizens acquire property from it or under its
protection. And ns there is not often occasion to speak of the
eminent domain except in reference to those cases in which the
government is called upon to appropriate property against the will
of the owners, the right itself is generally defined as if it were
restricted to such cases, and is said to be that superior right of
property pertaining to the sovereignty by which the private property acquired by its citizens under its protection may be taken or
1 1 Bl. Com. 29! ; 3 Kent, 378, note.
In California it has been decided that
a grant of public Janda by the government carriH!l with it to the grantee the title
to all mines. Boggs"· Merced, &c., Co. 14 Cal. 279; 1\Ioore v. Smaw, 1i Cal.
199.
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wishes of its owners. More accurately, it is the rightful authority,

which exists in every sovereignty, to control and regulate those

rights of a public nature which pertain to its citizens in common,

and to appropriate and control individual property for the public

beneﬁt, as the public safety, necessity, convenience, or welfare

may demand}

*When the existence of a particular power in the gov- ["' 525]

ernment is recognized on the ground of necessity, no

delegation of the legislative power by the people can be held to

vest authority in the department which holds it in trust, to bargain

away such power, or to so tie up the hands of the government as

to preclude its repeated exercise, as often and under such circum-

stances as the needs of the government may require. For if this

were otherwise, the authority to make laws for the government and

welfare of the State might be so exercised, in strict conformity

with its constitution, as at length to preclude the State performing

its ordinary and essential functions, and the agent chosen to

govern the State might put an end to the State itself. It must

follow that any legislative bargain in restraint of the complete,

continuous, and repeated exercise of the right of eminent domain is

unwarranted and void; and that provision of the Constitution of

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:22 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105011581
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

the United States which forbids the States violating the obligation

of contracts could not be so construed as to render valid and

‘ “ The right which belongs to the society or to the sovereign of disposing,

in case of necessity, and for the public safety, of all the wealth contained in the

State, is called the eminent domain.” il[cKinle_z/, J., in Pollard‘s Lessee v. H0-

gan, 3 How. 223. “ Notwithstanding the grant to individuals, the highest and

most exact idea of property remains in the government, or in the aggregate body

of the people in their sovereign’ capacity; and they have a right to resume the

possession of the property, in the manner directed by the constitution and laws

of the State, whenever the public interest requires it. This right of resumption

may be exercised, not only where the safety, but also where the interest or even

the expediency of the State is concerned; as where the land of the individual is

wanted for a road, canal, or other public improvement.” Walworlh, Chancellor,

its use controlled for the public benefit without regard to the
wishes of its owners. More accurately, it is the rightful authority,
which exists in every sovereignty, to control and regulate those
rights of a public nature which pertain to its citizens in common,
and to appropriate and control individual property for the public
benefit, as the public safety, necessity, convenience, or welfare
may demand.l
• When the existence of a particular power in the gov- [• 525]
ernment is recognized on the ground of necessity, no
delegation of the legislative power by the people can be held to
vest authority in the department which holds it in trust, to bargain
away such power, or to so tie up the hands of the government as
to preclude its repeated exercise, as often and under such circumstances as the needs of the government may require. For if this
were otherwise, the authority to make laws for the government and
welfare of the State might be so exercised, in strict conformity
with its constitution, as at length to preclude the State performing
its ordinary and essential functions, and the agent chosen to
govern the State might put au end to the State itself. It must
follow that any legislative bargain in restraint of the complete,
continuous, and repeated exercise of the right of eminent domain is
unwarranted and vo.id ; and that provision of the Constitution of
the United States which forbids the States violating the obligation
of contracts could not be so construed as to render valid and

in Beekman v. Saratoga and Schenectady R.R. Co. 3 Paige, 73. The right is

inherent in all governments, and requires no constitutional provision to give it

force. -Brown v. Beatty, 34 Miss. 227; Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill, 143. “ Title

to property is always held upon the implied condition that it must be surren~

dered to the government, either in whole or in part, when the public necessities,

evidenced according to the established forms of law, demand.” Hogeboom, J .,

in People v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 32 Barb. 112.

31 [.577 ]

1 " The right which belongs to the society or to the sovereign of disposing,
in case of necessity, and for the public safety, of all the wealth contained in the
State, is called the eminent domain." McKinley, J., in Pollard's Lessee v. Hogan, 8 How. 223. "Notwithstanding the grant to individuals, the highest and
most exact idea of property remains in the government, or in the aggregate body
of the people in their sovereign' capacity ; and they have a. right to resume the
po118ession of the property, in the manner directed by the constitution and laws
of the State, whenever the public interest requires it. This right of resumption
may be exercised, not only where the safety, but also where the interest or even
the expediency of the State is concerned; as where the land of the individual is
wanted for a road, canal, or other public improvement." Walwortlt, Chancellor,
in Beekman "· Saratoga and Schenectady R.R. Co. 3 Paige, 73. The right is
inherent in a.ll governments, and requires no constitutional provision to gi\'e it
force .• Brown v. Beatty, 84 Miss. 227; Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill, 14S. "Title
to property is always held upon the implied condition that it must be surrt'ndered to the government, either in whole or in part, when the public necessities,
evidenced according to the established forms of law, demand." Ilugeboom, J.,
in People v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 32 Ba.rb. 112.
37
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effectual such a bargain, which originally was in excess of -proper

[cH. xv.

authority. Upon this subject we shall content ourselves with

referring in this place to what has been said in another connec-

tion.‘

As under the peculiar American system the protection and

regulation of private rights, privileges, and immunities in general

properly pertain to the State governments, and those governments

are expected to make provision for those conveniences and neces-

sities which are usually provided for their citizens through the

exercise of the right of eminent domain, the right itself, it would

seem, must pertain to those governments also, rather than to the

government of the nation; and such has been the conclusion of

the authorities. In the new territories, however, where the gov-

ernment of the United States exercises sovereign author-

["‘ 526] ity, it possesses, * as incident thereto, the right of eminent

domain, which it may exercise directly or through the

territorial governments; but this right passes from the nation to

the newly formed State whenever the latter is admitted into the

Union.“ So far, however, as the general government may deem it

important to appropriate lands or other property for its own

purposes, and to enable it to performiits functions,—as must some-

times be necessary in the case of forts, light-houses, military posts
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or roads, and other conveniences and necessities of government,—

the general government may still exercise the authority, as well

within the States as within the territory under its exclusive

jurisdiction, and its right to do so may be supported by the same

reasons which support the right in any case; that is to say, the

absolute necessity that the means in the government for perform-

ing its functions and perpetuating its existence should not be

' See ante, p. 281.

‘ Pollard‘s Lessee v. Hogan, 3 How. 212; Goodtitle v. Kibbee, 9 How. 471;

Doe v. Beebe, 13 How. 25; United States v. The Railroad Bridge Co. 6 McLean,

517; Gilmer v. Lime Point, 18 Cal. 2'29. The States have sometimes assumed

authority, under the eminent domain, to appropriate the property of individuals

in order to donate it to the general government for national purposes; but the

right to do this must be exceedingly doubtful. The authority of the general

government to appropriate private property for its needs is unquestionable, but

every sovereignty must judge of its needs for itself, and the right to decide upon

and supply them by dispossessing private rights cannot be assumed by any other

authority without the incorporation of some new principle into the law of emi-

neut domain.

~i _ _

effectual such a bargain, which originally was in excess of proper
authority. Upon this subject we shall content ourselves with
referring in this place to what has been saiQ. in another conneotion.1
As under the peculiar American system the protection and
regulation of private rights, privileges, and immunities in general
properly pertain to the State governments, and those governments
are expected to make provision for those conveniences and necessities which are usually provided for their citizens through the
exercise of the right of eminent domain, the right itself, it would
seem, must pertain to those governments also, rather than to the
government of the nation; and such has been the conclusion of
the authorities. In the new territories, however, where the government of the United States exercises sovereign author[• 526] ity, it possesses, • as incident thereto, the right of eminent
domain, which it may exercise directly or through the
territorial governments ; but this right passes from the nation to
the newly formed State whenever the latter is admitted into the
Union.2 So far, however, as the general government may deem it
·important to appropriate lands or other property for its own
purposes, and to enable it to perform its functions,- as must sometimes be necessary in the case of forts, light-houses, military posts
or roads, and other conveniences and necessities of government,the general government may still exercise the authority, as well
within the States as within the territory under its exclusive
jurisdiction, and its right to do so may be supported by the same
reasons which support the right in any case; that is to say, the
absolute necessity that the means in the government for performing its functions and perpetuating its existence should not be
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See ante, p. 281.
' Pollard's Lessee !1. Hogan, 3 How. 212; Goodtitle v. Kibbee, 9 How. 471;
Doe t'. Beebe, 13 How. 25; United States v. The Railroad Bridge Co. 6 McLean,
lil7; Gilmer v. Lime Point, 18 Cal. 229. The States have sometimes assumed
authority, under the eminent domain, to appropriate the property of individuals
in order to donate it to the general government for national purposes ; but the
right to do this must be exceedingly doubtful. The authority of the general
government to appropriate private property for its needs is unquestionable, but
e¥Cry sovereignty must judge of its needs for itself, and the right to decide upon
and supply them by dispossessing private rights cannot be assumed by any other
authority without the incorporation of some new principle into the law of eminent domain.
1
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private parties, or of any other authority.

What Property is subject to the Right.

Every species of property which the public needs may require,

and which government cannot lawfully appropriate under any

liable to be controlled or defeated by the want of consent of
private parties, or of any other authority.

other right, is subject to be seized and appropriated under the

right of eminent domain! Lands for the public ways; timber,

stone, and gravel with which to make or improve the public

What Property is 8Ubject to the Rigltt.

ways;2 buildings standing in the way of contemplated improve-

ments, or which for any other reason it becomes necessary to take,

remove, or destroy for the public good;3 streams of water;4

corporate franchises;5 and generally, it may be said, legal and

' People 0. Mayor, &c., of New York, 32 Barb. 102; Bailey v. Miltenbcrger,

31 Penn. St. 37.

‘ Wheelock v. Young, 4 Wend. 647; Lyon v. Jerome, 15 Wend. 569; Je-

rome v. Ross, 7 Johns. Ch. 315; Bliss v. Hosmer, 15 Ohio, 44; Watkins v.

VValker Co. 18 Texas, 585. In Eldridge v. Smith, 34 Vt. 484, it was held com-

petent for a railroad company to appropriate lands for piling the wood and

lumber used on the road, and brought to it to be transported thereon.

3 Wells v. Somerset, &c., R.R. Co. 47 Me. 345. But the destruction of a private

house during a ﬁre to prevent the spreading of a conﬂagration has been held not

Every species of property which the public needs may require,
and which government cannot lawfully appropriate under any
other right, is subject to be seized and appropriated under the
right of eminent domain. 1 Lands for the public ways; timber,
stone, and gravel with which to make or improve the public
ways ; 2 buildings standing in the way of contemplated improvements, or which for any other reason it becomes necessary to take,
remove, or destroy for the public good; 8 streams of water; 4
corporate franchises; 6 and generally, it may be said, legal and

to be an appropriation under the right of eminent domain, but an exercise of
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the police power. Sorocco v. Geary, 3 Cal. 69. “ The destruction was author-

ized liy the law of overruling necessity; it was the exercise of a natural right

belonging to every individual, not conferred by law, but tacitly excepted from

all human codes.” Per Sherman, Senator, in Russell 12. Mayor, &c., of New

York, 2 Denio, 473. See also McDonald 12. Redwing, 13 Minn. 38. But see

Hale v. Lawrence, 1 Zab. 714; Same v. Same, 3 Zab. 590.

‘ Gardner v. Newburg, 2 Johns. Ch. 162.

° Piscataqua Bridge v. New Hampshire Bridge, 7 N. H. 35; Crosby v. Han-

over, 36 N. H. 420; Boston Water Power Co. v. Boston and Vi'orcester B..R.

Co. 23 Pick. 360; Central Bridge Corporation v. Lowell, 4 Gray, 474; VVest

River Bridge c. Dix, 6 How. 507; Richmond R.R. Co. v. Louisa RR. Co. 13

How. 81, per Girer, J .; Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Co. v. Baltimore and Ohio

R.R. Co. 4 Gill & J. 1; State v. Noyes, 47 Me. 189; Red River Bridge Co. v.

Clarksville, 1 Sneed, 176; Armington v. Barnet, 15 Vt. 745; White River Turn-

pike Co. v. Vermont Central R.R. Co. 21 Vt. 594; Newcastle, &c., R.R. Co. v.

Peru and Indiana R.R. Co. 3 Ind. 464; Springﬁeld v. Connecticut River R.R. Co.

4 Cush. 63; Forward v. Hampshire, &c., Canal Co. 22 Pick; 462. “The only

true rule of policy as well as of law is, that a grant for one public purpose must

yield to another more urgent and important, and this can be effected without any

infringement on the constitutional rights of the subject. If in such cases suitable
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1 People"· Mayor, &c., of New York, 32 Barb. 102; Bailey"· Miltenberger,
31 Penn. St. 37.
' Wheelock "· Young, 4 Wend. 647; Lyon "· Jerome, 16 Wend. 669; Jerome v. Ross, 7 Johns. Ch. 315; Bliss "· Hosmer, 15 Ohio, 44; Watkins "·
Walker Co. 18 Texas, 685. In Eldridge o. Smith, 34 Vt. 484, it was held competent for a railroad company to appropriate Ianda for piling the wood and
lumber used on the road, and brought to it to be transported thereon.
3 Wells v. Somerset, &c., R.R. Co. 47 Me. 346. But the destruction of a private
house during a fire to prevent the spreading of a contlagration has been held not
to be an appropriation under the right of eminent domain, but an exercise of
the police power. Sorocco 11. Geary, 3 Cal. 69. "The destruction was authorized ~ the law of overruling necessity ; it was the exercise of a natural right
belonging to every individual, not conferred by law, but tacitly excepted from
all human codes." Per Sherman, Senator, in Russell v. Mayor, &c., of New
York, 2 Denio, 473. See abo McDona1d v. Redwing, 13 Minn. 38. But see
Hale v. Lawrence, 1 Zab. 714; Same"· Same, 3 Zab. 690.
4 Gardner v. Newburg, 2 Johns. Ch. 162.
6 Piscataqua Bridge "·New Hampshire Bridge, 7 N.H. 36; Crosby"· Hanover, 36 N.H. 420; Boston Water Power Co. 11. Boston and Worcester R.R.
Co. 23 Pick. 360; Central Bridge Corporation v. Lowell, 4 Gray, 474; West
River Bridge v. Dix, 6 How. 507; Richmond R.R. Co. 11. Louisa R.R. Co. 13
How. 81, per Girer, J.; Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Co. v. Baltimore and Ohio
R.R. Co. 4 Gill & J. 1; State v. Noyes, 47 Me. 189; Red River Bridge Co."·
Clarks\·ille, 1 Sneed, 176; Armington"· Barnet, 15 Vt. 745; White River Turnpike Co. v. Vermont Central R.R. Co. 21 Vt. 59-!; Newcastle, &c., R.R. Co."·
Peru and Indiana R.R. Co. 3 Ind. 464; Springfield v. Connecticut River R.R. Co.
4 Cush. 63; Forward v. Hampshire, &c., Canal Co. 22 Pick: 462. "The only
true rule of poli<.-y as well as of law is, that a grant for oae public purpose must
yield to another more urgent and importa1!t, and this can be effected without any
infringement on the constitutional rights of the subject. If in such cases suitable
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[* 527] equitable rights of ’*every description are liable to be

(CH. XV.

thus appropriated. From this statement, however, must

be excepted money, or that which in ordinary use passes as

such, and which the government may reach by taxation, and also

rights in action, which can only be available when made to produce

money ; neither of which can it be necdful to take under this power}

Legislative Authority requisite.

The right to appropriate private property to public uses

[‘ 528] lies *dormant in the State, until legislative action is had,

pointing out the occasions, the modes, conditions, and

[* 527] equitable rights of . *every description are liable

to be

thus appropriated. From this statement, however, must
be excepted money, or that which in ordinary use passes as
such, and which the government may reach by taxation, and also
rights in action, which can only be available when made to produce
money; neither of which can it be needful to take under this power.1

agencies for its appropriation.’ Private property can only be

and adequate provision is made by the legislature for the compensation of those

whose property or franchise is injured or taken away, there is no violation of

Legislative Authority requU1ite.

public faith or private right. The obligation of the contract created by the

original charter is thereby recognized." Per Bigelow, J., in Central Bridge

_Corporation 1:. Lowell, 4 Gray, 482.

‘ Property of‘ individuals cannot be appropriated by the State under this

The right to appropriate private property to public uses

[* 528] lies *dormant in the State, until legislative action is had,

power for the mere purpose of adding to the revenues of the State. Thus it has

been held in Ohio, that in appropriating the water of streams for the purposes

of a canal, more could not be taken than was needed for that object, with a view

pointing out the occasions, the modes, conditions, and
agencies for its appropriation.2 Private property can only be

to raising a revenue by selling or leasing it. “ The State, notwithstanding the

sovereignty of her character, can take only suiﬁcient water from private streams
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for the purposes of the canal. So far the law authorizes the commissioners to

invade private right as to take what may be necessary for canal navigation, and

to this extent authority is conferred by the constitution, provided a compensa-

tion be paid to the owner. Tbe,principle is founded on the superior claims of

a whole community over an individual citizen; but then in those cases only

where private property is wanted for public use, or demanded by the public

welfare. \Ve know of no instances in which it has or can be taken, even by State

authority, for the mere purpose of raising a revenue by sale or otherwise; and

the exercise of such a power would be utterly destructive of individual right,

and break down all the distinctions between meant and tuum, and annihilate them

forever at the pleasure of theoState." Wood, J ., in Buckingham v. Smith, 10

Ohio, 296. To the same effect is Cooper v. \Villia.ms, 5 Ohio, 392.

Taking money under the right of eminent domain, when it must be compen-

sated iu money afterwards, could be nothing more nor less than a forced loan,

only to be justiﬁed as a last resort in a time of extreme peril, whcre neither the

credit of the government nor the power of taxation could be made available.

It is impossible to lay down rules for such a case, except such as the law of over-

ruling nccessily, whit-h,for the time being sets aside all the rules and protections

of private right, shall then prescribe. - See post, p. 530, note.

’ Barrow v. Page, 5 Hayw. 97.

-_ __ __ _
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and adequate provision is made by the legislature for the compensation of those
whose property or franchise is injured or taken away, there is no violation of
public faith or private right. The obligation of the contract created by the
original charter is thereby recognized." Per Bigelow, J., in Central Bridge
Porporation v. Lowell, 4 Gray, 482.
1 Property of individuals cannot be appropriated by the State under this
power for the mere purpose of adding to the revenues of the State. Thus it has
been held in Ohio, that in appropriating the water of streams for the purposes
of a canal, more could not be taken than was needed for that object, with a view
to raising a revenue by selling or leasing it. '' The State, notwithstanding the
sovereignty of her character, can take only sufficient water from private streams
for the purposes of the canal. So far the law authorizes the commissioners to
invade private right as to take what may be necessary for canal Il\Vigation, and
to this extent authority is conferred by the constitution, provided a compensation be paid to the owner. The. principle is founded on the superior claims of
a whole community over an individual citizen ; but then in those cases only
where private property is wanted for puhlic use, or demanded by the puhlic
welfare. We know of no instances in which it has or can be taken, even by Stat.e
authority, for the mere purpose of raising a revenue by sale or otherwise; and
the exercise of such a power would be utterly destructive of individual right,
and break down all the distinctions between meunl and t1tum, and annihilate them
forever at the pleasure of the•State." Wood, J., in But:kingbam v. Slllith, 10
Ohio, 296. To the same effect is Cooper v. Williams, 5 Ohio, 392.
Taking money under the right of eminent domain, when it must be compensated in money afterwards, could be nothing more nor !CIIs than a forced loan,
only to be justified as a last resort in a time of extreme peril, where neither the
credit of the government nor the power of taxation could be made available.
It is impossible to lay down rules for such a case, except such as the law of overruling necessity, whic:h,for the time being sets aside all the rules and protections
of private right, shall then prescribe. · See post, p. 630, no«-.
1 Barrow v. Page, 5 Hayw. 97.
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sity, being the customary mode in which that fact is determined,

must be held to be for this purpose “ the law of the land,” and no

further ﬁnding or adjudication can be essential, unless the consti-

tution of the State has expressly required it.1 When, however,

action is had for this purpose, there must be kept in view that

general as well as reasonable and just rule, that, whenever in

pursuance of law the property of an individual is to be devested

by proceedings against his will, a strict compliance must be had

with all the provisions of law which are made for his protection

and beneﬁt, or the proceeding will be lll6iT8Ctll&l.2 Those pro-

visions must be regarded as in the nature of conditions precedent,

which are not only to be observed and complied with before the

right of the property owner is disturbed, but the party claiming

authority under the adverse proceeding must show afﬁrmatively

such compliance. For example, if by a statute prescribing the

mode of exercising the right of eminent domain, the damages to

be assessed in favor of the property owner for the taking of his

land are to be so assessed by disinterested freeholders of the mu-

nicipality, the proceedings will be ineffectual unless they show on

their face that the appraisers were such freeholders and inhabi-

tants.3 So if a statute only authorizes proceedings in invitum
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after an effort shall have been made to agree with the owner on

the compensation to be paid, the fact of such effort and its fail-

ure must appear.‘ So if the statute vests the title to lands

1 “\Vhatever may be the theoretical foundation for the right of eminent

domain, it is certain that it attaches as an incident to every sovereignty, and

constitutes a condition upon which all property is holden. VVhcn the public

necessity requires it, private rights to property must yield to the paramount

right of the sovereign power. We have repeatedly held that the character of the

work for which the property is taken, and not the means or agencies employed

for its construction, determines the question of power in the exercise of this right.

It requires no judicial condemnation to subject private property to public uses.

Like the power to tax, it resides in the legislative department to whom the dele-

gation is made. It may be exercised directly or indirectly by that body; and it

can only be restrained by the judiciary when its limits have been exceeded, or its

authority has been abused or perverted.” Kramer v. Cleveland and Pittsburg

R.R. Co. 5 Ohio, N. s. 146.

* Gillinwater v. Mississippi, &c., R.R. Co. 13 Ill. 1; Stanford v. \Vorn, 27

Cal. 171.

' Nichols v. Bridgeport, 23 Conn. 189; Judson v. Bridgeport, 25 Conn. 428;

People v. Brighton, 20 Mich. 57.

‘ Reitenbaugh v. Chester Valley R.R. Co. 21 Penn. St. 100. But it was

[ 581 ]

taken pursuant to law ; but a legislative act declaring the necessity, being the customary mode in which that fact is determined,
must be held to be for this purpose" the law of tho land," and no
further finding or adjudication can be essential, unless the constitution of the State has expressly required it.1 When, however,
action is had for this purpose, there must be kept in view that
general as well as reasonable and just rule, that, whenever in
pursuance of law the property of an individual is to be devested
by proceedings against his will, a strict compliance must be had
with all the provisions of law which are made for his protection
and benefit, or the proceeding will be ineffectual.2 Those provisions must be regarded as in the nature of conditions precedent, .
which are not only to be observed and complied with before the
right of the property owner is disturbed, but the party claiming
authority under the adverse proceeding must show affirmatively
such compliance. For example, if by a statute prescribing the
mode of exercising the right of eminent domain, the damages to
be assessed in favor of the property owner for the taking of his
land are to be so assessed by disinterested freeholders of the municipality, the proceedings will be ineffectual unless they show on
their face that the appraisers wero such freeholders and inhabitants.3 So if a statute only authorizes proceedings in invitum
after an effort shall have been made to agree with the owner on
the compensation to be paid, the fact of such effort and its failure must appear}' So if the statute vests the title to lands
1 " 'Vhatever may be the theoretical foundation for the right of eminent
domain, it is certain that it attaches as an incident to every sovereignty, and
constitutes a condition upon which all property is holden. When the public
necessity requires it, private rights to property must yield to the paramount
right of the sovereign power. 'Ve have repeatedly held that the character of the
work for which the property is taken, and not the means or agencie~ employed
for its construction, determines the question of power in the exercise of this right.
It requires no judicial condemnation to subject private property to public uses.
Like the power to tax, it resides in the legislative department to whom the delegation is made. It may be exercised directly or indirectly by that body ; and it
can only be restrained by the judiciary when its limits have been exceeded, or its
authority has been abused or perverted." Kramer v. Cleveland and Pittsburg
R.R. Co. 5 Ohio, N. s. 146.
' Gillinwater v. Mississippi, &c., R .R. Co. 13 Ill. 1; Stanford v. Worn, 27
Cal. 171.
1 :Nichols 11. Bridgeport, 23 Conn. U!9; Judson 11. Bridgeport, 2.'> Conn. 428;
People v. Brighton, 20 Mich. 57.
4 Reitenbaugh v. Chester Valley R.R. Co. 21 Penn. St. 100.
But it was
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therefor being made, it is evident that, under the rule

stated, the payment is a condition precedent to the passing of the

title} And where a general railroad law authorized routes to be

surveyed by associated persons desirous of constructing roads, and

provided that if the legislature, on being petitioned for the purpose,

should decide by law that a proposed road would be of sufficient

utility to justify its construction, then the company, when organ-

ized, might proceed to take land for the way, it was held that,

until the route was approved by the legislature, no authority could

be claimed under the law to appropriate land for the purpose.”

held in this case that if the owner appears in proceedings taken for the assess-

ment of damages, and contests the amount without objecting the want of any

such attempt, the court must presume it to have been made.

‘ Stacy v. Vermont Central R..R. Co. 27 Vt. 44. By the section of the statute

under which the land was appropriated, it was provided that when land or other

real estate was taken by the corporation, for the use of their road, and the parties

were unable to agree upon the price of the land, the same should be ascertained

[• 529] appropriated in the State or in • a corporation on payment
therefor being made, it is evident that, under the rule
stated, the payment is a condition precedent to the passing of the
title. 1 .And where a general railroad law authorized routes to be
surveyed by associated persons desirous of constructing roads, and
provided that if the legislature, on being petitioned for the purpose,
should decide by law that a proposed road would be of sufficient
utility to justify its construction, then the company, when organized, might proceed to take land for the way, it was hehl that,
until the route was approved by the legislature, no authority could
be claimed under the law to appropriate land for the purpose.2

and determined by the commissioners, together with the costs and charges ac-

cruing thereon, and upon the payment of the same, or by depositing the amount

in a bank, as should be ordered by the commissioners, the corporation should be

deemed to be seised and possessed of the lands. Held, that, until the payment
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was made, the company had no right to enter upon the land to construct the

road, or to exercise any act of ownership over it; and that a court of equity

would enjoin them from exercising any such right, or they might be prosecuted

in trespass at law. This case follows Baltimore and Susquehanna R.R. Co. v.

Nesbit, 10 How. 395, and Bloodgood v. Mohawk and Hudson R.R. Co. 18 \Vend.

10, where the statutory provisions were similar. In the case in Howard it is

said: “ It can hardly be questioned that without acceptance in the mode pre-

scribed [i. e., by payment of the damages assessed], the company were not bound;

that if they had been dissatisﬁed with the estimate placed on the land, or could

have procured a more eligible site for the location of their road, they would have

been at liberty, before such acceptance, wholly to renounce the inquisition. The

proprietors of the land could have no authority to coerce the company into its

adoption.” Daniel, J., 10 How. 399.

' Gillinwater v. Mississippi, &c., R.R. Co. 13 Ill. 1. “ The statute says

that, after a certain other act shall have been passed, the company may then

proceed to take private property for the use of their road; that is equivalent to

saying that that right shall not be exercised without such subsequent act. The

right to take private property for public use is one of the highest prerogatives of

the sovereign power; and here the legislature has, in language not to be mis-

taken, expressed its intention to reserve that power until it could judge for itself

whether the proposed road would be of sufficient public utility to justify the use

of this high prerogative. It did not intend to cast this power away, to be gath-

ered up and used by any who might choose to exercise it.” Ibid. p. 4.
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held in this case that if the owner appears in proceedings taken for the assessment of damages, and contests the amount without objecting the want of any
such attempt, the court must presume it to have been made.
1 Stacy v. Vermont Central R.R. Co. 27 Vt. 44.
By the section of the statute
under which the land was appropriated, it was provided that when land or other
real estate was taken by the corporation, for the use of their road, and the parties
were unable to agree upon the price of the land, the same should be ascertained
and determined by the commissioners, together with the costs and charges accruing thereon, and upon the payment of the same, or by depositing tlte amount
in a bank, as sltould be ordered by the commissioners, tlte co-r7Joration sltould be
deemed to be seised and possessed of the lands. Held, that, until the pa~·ment
was made, the company had no right to enter upon the land to construct the
road, or to exereise any act of ownership over it; and that a court of equity
would enjoin them from exercising any such right, or they might be prosecuted
in trespass at law. This case follows Baltimore and Sl}squehanna R.R. Co. tt.
Nesbit, 10 How. 395, and Bloodgood tt. Mohawk and Hudson R.R. Co. 18 Wend.
10, where the statutory provisions were similar. In the case in Howard it is
said: " It can hardly be questioned that without acceptance in the mode prescribed [i.e., by payment of the damages assessed], the company were not bound;
that if they had been dissatisfied with the estimate placed on the land, or could
have procured a more eligible site for the location of their road, they would have
been at liberty, before such acceptance, wholly to renounce the inquisition. Tbe
proprietors of the land could have no authority to coerce the company into its
adoption." Daniel, J., 10 How. 399.
1 Gillinwater tt. Mississippi, &c., R.R. Co. 13 Ill. 1.
"The statute says
that, after a certain other act shall have been passed, the company may then
proceed to take private property for the use of their road; that is equivalent to
saying that that right shall not be exercised without such subsequent act. The
right to take private property for public use is one of the highest prerogatives of
the sovereign power ; and here the legislature has, in language not to be mistaken, expressed its intention to reserve that power until it could judge for itself
whether the proposed road would be of sufficient public utility to justify the use
of this high prerogative. It did not intend to cast this power away, to be gathered up and used by any who might choose to exercise it." ibid. p. 4.
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indeed would seem to be too plain and obvious to require either

illustration or discussion}

* So the powers granted by such statutes are not to be“ [’* 530]

enlarged by intendment, especially where they are being

exercised by a corporation by way of appropriation of land for its

corporate purposes. “ There is no rule more familiar or better set-

tled than this: that grants of corporate power, being in derogation

of common right, are to be strictly construed ; and this is especially

the case where the power claimed is a delegation of the right of

eminent domain, one of the highest powers of sovereignty per-

taining to the State itself, and interfering most seriously and often

vexatiously with the ordinary rights of property.” 2 It has accord-

ingly been held that where a railroad company was authorized by

law to “ enter upon any land to survey, lay down, and construct its

road,” “ to locate and construct branch roads,” &c., to appropriate

land “for necessary side tracks,” and “a right of way over ad-

jacent lands sufﬁcient to enable such company to construct and

repair its road,” and the company had located, and was engaged

in the construction of its main road along the north side of a town,

it was not authorized under this grant of power to appropriate a

temporary right of way for a term of years along the south side of
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the town, to be used as a substitute for the main track whilst the

latter was in process of construction.” And substantially the same

strict rule is applied when the State itself seeks to appropriate

private property; for it is not unreasonable that the property

owner should have the right to insist that the State, which selects

the occasion and prescribes the conditions for the appropriation of

his property, should conﬁne its action strictly within the limits

which it has marked out as suﬂicient. So high a prerogative

as that of devesting one’s estate against his will should only be

' See further, the cases of Atlantic and Ohio R.R. Co. v. Sullivant, 5 Ohio,

N. s. 277; Parsons v. Howe, 41 Me. 218; Atkinson v. Marietta and Cincinnati

R.R. Co. 15 Ohio, N. s. 21.

' Currier v. Marietta and Cincinnati R.R. Co. 11 Ohio, N. s. 231. See ante,

pp. 39-1-396.

' Currier v. Marietta and Cincinnati R..R. Co. 11 Ohio, N. 5. ‘.228. And see

Gilmer v. Lime Point, 19 Cal. 47; Bensley v. Mountain Lake, &c., C0. 13 Cal.

306; Brunnig v. N. O. Canal and Banking Co. 12 La. An. 541.

‘.
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These cases must suffice as illustrations of a general rule, which
indeed would seem to be too plain and obvious to require either
illustration or discussion. 1
• So the powers granted by such statutes are not to be,,[* 530]
enlarged by intendment, especially where they are being
exercised by a corporation by way of appropriation of land for its
corporate purposes. " There is no rule more familiar or better settled than this: that grants of corporate power, being in derogation
of common right, are to be strictly construed ; and this is especially
the case where the power claimed is a delegation of the right of
eminent domain, one of the highest powers of sovereignty pertaining to the State itself, and interfering most seriously and often
vexatiously with the ordinary rights of property." 2 It has accordingly been held that where a railroad company was authorized by
law to " enter upon any land to survey, lay down, and construct its
road," "to locate and construct branch roads," &c., to appropriate
land " for necessary side tracks," and "a right of way over adjacent lands sufficient to enable such company to construct and
repair its road," and the company had located, and was engaged
in the construction of its main road along the north side of a town,
it was not authorized under this grant of power to appropriate a
temporary right of way for a term of years along the south side of
the town, to be used as a substitute for the main track whilst the
latter was in process of construction.8 And substantially the same
strict rule is applied when the State itself seeks to appropriate
private property ; for it is not unreasonable that the property
owner should have the right to insist that the State, which selects
the occasion and prescribes the conditions for the appropriation of
his property, should confine its action strictly within the limits
which it has marked out as sufficient. So high a prerogative
as that of devesting one's estate against his will should only be
See further, the cases of Atlantic and Ohio R.R. Co. "· Sullivant, 5 Ohio,
277; Parsons v. Howe, 41 Me. 218; Atkinson "· Marietta and Cincinnati
R.R. Co. 15 Ohio, N. 8. 21.
1 Currier v. Marietta and Cincinnati R.R. Co. 11 Ohio, N. 8. 231.
See ante,
pp. 394-396.
J Currier "· Marietta and Cincinnati R.R. Co. 11 Ohio, N. s. 228.
And see
Gilmer "· Lime Point, 19 Cal. 47; Bensley"· Mountain Lake, &c., Co. 13 Cal.
306; Brunnig "· N. 0. Canal and Banking Co. 12 La. An. 541.
1

N. 8.

[ 583]

•

‘ 530 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [cn. xv.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

exercised where the plain letter of the law permits it, and under

[cH. XV.

a careful observance of the formalities prescribed for the owner’s

protection.

The Purpose.

The deﬁnition given of the eright of eminent domain implies

that the purpose for which it may be exercised must not be a mere

exercised where the plain letter of the law permits it, and under
a careful observance of the formalities prescribed for the owner's
protection.

private purpose; and it is conceded on all hands that the legis-

The Purpose.

lature has no power, in any case, to take the property of one indi-

vidual and pass it over to another without reference to some use

to which it is to be applied for the public beneﬁt} “ The right of

eminent domain,” it has been said, “ does not imply a right in the

sovereign power to take the property of one citizen and transfer it

to another, even for a full compensation, where the public interest

will be in no way promoted by such transfer.2 It seems

[*‘ 531] not to be allowable, theiefore, to authorize * private roads

to be laid out across the lands of unwilling parties by an

exercise of this right. The easement in such a case would be the

property of him for whom it was established ; and although the

owner would not be deprived of the fee in the land, the beneﬁcial

use and exclusive enjoyment of his property would in greater or

less degree be interfered with. Nor would it be material to inquire

1 In a work of this character, we have no occasion to consider the right of
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the government to seiie and appropriate to its ownkuse the property of individuals

in time of war, through its military authorities. That is a right which depends

on the existence of hostilities, and the suspension, partially or wholly, of the

civil laws. For recent cases in which it has been considered, see Mitchell o.

Harmony, 13 How. 128; VVilson v. Crockett, 43 Mo. 216; Williams v. Wicker-

man, 44 Mo. 484; Yost v. Stout, 4 Cold. 205; Sutton v. Tiller, 6 Cold. 593;

Taylor v. Nashville, &c., R.R. Co.1'b. 646; Coolidge v. Guthrie, 8 Am. Law

Beg. (N. s.) 22; Ecbols v. Staunton, 3 W. Va. 574; VVilson v. Franklin, 63 N. C.

259; Ferguson '0. Loar, 5 Bush, 689.

’ Beekman v. Saratoga and Schenectady R.R. Co. 3 Paige, 73; Hepburn‘s

The definition gi-ven of the -right of eminent domain implies
that the purpose for which it may be exercised must no.t be a mere
private purpose ; and it is conceded on all· hands that the legislature has no power, in any case, to take the property of one individual and pass it over to another without refet·ence to some use
to which it is to be applied for the public benefi.t. 1 "The right of
eminent domain," it has been said, " does not imply a right in the
sovereign power to take the property of one citizen and transfer it
to another, even for a full compensation, where the public interest
will be in no way promoted by such transfer.2 It seems
[• 531] not to be allowable, t~efore, to authorize • private roads
to be laid out across the lands of unwilling parties by an
exercise of this right. The easement in such a case would be the
property of him for whom it was established ; and although the
owner would not be deprived of the fee in the land, the beneficial
usc and exclusive enjoyment of his property would in greater or
less degree be interfered with. Nor would it be material to inquire

Case, 3 Bland, 95; Sadler v. Langham, 34 Ala. 311 ; Pittsburg v. Scott, 1 Penn.

St. 139; Matter of Albany Street, 11 \V end. 149; Matter of John and Cherry

Streets, 19 \Vend. 659; Cooper v. \Villiams, 5 Ohio, 393; Buckingham v. Smith,

10 Ohio, 296; Reeves v. Treasurer of Wood Co. 8 Ohio, N. s. 333. See this

subject considered on principle and authority by Senator Tracy in Bloodgood v.

Mohawk and Hudson R.R. Co. 18 Wend. 55 et seq. See also Embury 0. Conner,

3 N.Y. 511; Kramer v. Cleveland and Pittsburgh R.R. Co. 5 Ohio, N. s. 146;

Pratt Brown, 3 Wis. 603; Concord R.R. v. Greeley, 17 N. H. 47.
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In a work of this character, we have no occasion to consider the right of
the government to sei.ie anti appropriate to its own 'use the property of indi,·idual.s
in time of war~ through its military authorities. That is a right which depends
on the existence of hostilities, and the suspension, partially or wholly, of the
civil laws. For recent cases in which it bas been considered, see Mitchell "·
Harmony, 18 How. 128; Wilson "· Crockett, 43 Mo. 216; Williams"· Wickerman, 44 Mo. 484; Yost "· Stout, 4 Cold. 205; Sutton "· Tiller, 6 Cold. 693;
Taylor "· Nashville, &c., R.R. Co. ib. 646; Coolidge "· Guthrie, 8 Am. Law
Reg. (N. s.) 22; Echols"· Staunton, 8 W . Va. 674; Wilson"· Franklin, 68 N.C.
269; Ferguson 11. Loar, [)Bush, 689.
1 Beekman v. Saratoga and Schenectady R.R. Co. 8 Paige, 73; Hepburn's
Case, 3 Bland, 95; Sadler"· Langham, 3i Ala. 31l; Pittsburg"· Scott, 1 Penn.
St. 139; Matter of Albany Street, 11 Wend. 149; Matter of John and Cherry
Streets, 19 Wend. 6[)9; Cooper "·Williams, 6 Ohio, 398; Buckingham "· Smith,
10 Oliio, 296; Reeves "· Treasurer of Wood Co. 8 Ohio, N. s. 888. See this
subject considered on principle and authority by Senator Tracy in Bloodgood "·
Mohawk and Hudson R.R. Co. 18 Wend. 55 et seq. See also Embury"· Conner,
3 N.Y. 511; Kramer v. Cleveland and Pittsburgh R.R. Co. 5 Ohio, N. s. 146;
Pratt"· Brown, 3 Wis. 603; Concord R.R. "·Greeley, 17 N.H. 47.
1
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what quantum of interest would pass from him : it would be suffi-
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cient that some interest, the appropriation of which detracted from

his right and authority, and interfered with his exclusive possession

as owner, had been taken against his will ; and if taken for a

purely private purpose, it would be unlawful.‘ Nor could it be of

importance that the public would receive incidental beneﬁts, such

as usually spring from the improvement of lands or the establish-

ment of prosperous private enterprises: the public use implies a

‘ Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill, 142, per Bronson, J .; White v. \Vhite, 5 Barb.

474; Sadler v. Langham, 34 Ala. 311; Pittsburg v. Scott, 1 Penn. St. 139;

Bankhead v. Brown, 25 Iowa, 5-L0. A neighborhood road is onlya private road,

and taking land for it would not be for a public use. Dickey v. Tennison, 27

Mo. 373. To avoid this diﬂiculty, it is provided by the constitutions of some of

what quantum of interest would pass from him : it would be sufficient that some interest, the appropriation of which detracted from
his right and authority, and interfered with his exclusive possession
as owner, bad been taken against his will ; and if taken for a
purely private purpose, it would be unlawful. 1 Nor could it be of
importance that the public would receive incidental benefits, such
as usually spring from the improvement of lands or the establishment of prosperous private enterprises : the public use implies a

the States that private roads may be laid out under proceedings corresponding

to those for the establishment of highways. There are provisions to that effect

in the Constitutions of New York, Georgia. and Michigan. But in Harvey v.

Thomas, 10 Watts, 65, it was held that the right might be exercised in order to

the establishment of private ways from coal ﬁelds to connect them with the public

improvements, there being nothing in the constitution forbidding it. See also

the Pocopson Road, 16 Penn. St. 15. But this doctrine is directly opposed to

Young v. McKenzie, 3 Georgia, 44; Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill, 146; Buffalo and

N. Y. R.R. Co.v. Brainerd, 9 N. Y. 108; Bradley v. N. Y. and N. H. R.R. C0.
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21 Conn. 305; Reeves v. Treasurer of “food Co. 8 Ohio, N. s. 344, and many

other cases: though possibly convenient access to the great coal ﬁelds of the

State might be held to be so far a matter of general concern as to support an

exercise of the power on the ground of the public beneﬁt. In Eldridge v. Smith,

34 Vt. 484, it was held that the manufacture of railroad cars was not so legit-

imately and necessarily connected with the management of a railroad that the

company would be authorized to appropriate lands therefor. So, also, of land

for the erection of dwelling-houses to rent by railroad companies to their em-

ployés.

In the text we have stated what is unquestionably the result of the authorities;

though if the question were an open one, it might well be debated whether the

right to authorize the appropriation of the property of individuals did not rest

rather upon grounds of general public policy than upon the public purpose to

which it was proposed to devote it. There are many cases in which individuals

or private corporations have been empowered to appropriate the property of

others when the general good demanded it, though the purpose was no more

public than it is in any case where beneﬁts are to flow to the community generally

from a private enterprise. The case of appropriations for mill-dams, railroads,

and drains to improve lands are familiar examples. These appropriations have

been sanctioned under an application of the term “ public purpose," which might

also justify the laying out of private roads, when private property could not

otherwise be made available. Upon this general subject, the reader is referred

to an article by Hon. J . V. Campbell in the Bench and Bar for July, 1871.

[ass]

1 Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill, 142, per Bronson, J.; White v. White, 5 Barb.
474; Sadler v. Langham, 84 Ala. 311; Pittsburg v. Scott, 1 Penn. St. 139;
Bankhead v. Brown, 25 Iowa, 540. A neighborhood road is only a private road,
and taldng land for it would not be for a public use. Dickey v. Tennison, 27
:Mo. 373. To avoid this difficulty, it is provided by the constitutions of some of
the States that private roads may be laid out under proceedings corresponding
to those for the establishment of highways. There are provisions to that effect
in the Constitutions of New York, Georgia, and Michigan. But in Harvey v.
Thomas, 10 Watts, 65, it was held that the right might be exercised in order to
the establishment of private ways from coal fields to connect them with the public
improvements, there being nothing in the constitution forbidding it. See also
the Pocopson Road, 16 Penn. St. 15. But this doctrine is directly opposed to
Young v. McKenzie, 3 Georgia, 44; Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill, 146; Buffalo and
N.Y. R.R. Co. v. Brainerd, 9 N.Y. 108; Bradley v. N.Y. and N.H. R.R. Co.
21 Conn. 305; Reeves v. Treasurer of Wood Co. 8 Ohio, N. s . 344, and many
other ca5es: though po~sibly convenient access to the great coal fields of the
State might be held to be so far a matter of general concern as to support an
exercise of the power on the ground of the public benefit. In Eldridge v. Smith,
34 Vt. 484, it was held that the manufacture of railroad cars was not so legitimately ami necessarily connected with the management of a railroad that the
company would be nuthorized to appropriate lands therefor. So, also, of land
for the erection of dwelling· houses to rent by railroad companies to their employes.
In the text we have stated what is unquestionably the result of the authorities;
though if the question were an open one, it might wen be debated whether the
right to authorize the appropriation of the property of individuals did not rest
rather upon grounds of general public policy than upon the public purpose to
which it was proposed to devote it. There are many cases in which individuals
or private corporations have been empowered to appropriate the property of
others when the general good demanded it, though the purpose was no more
public than it is in any case where benefits are to flow to the community generally
from a private enterprise. The case of appropriations for mill-dams, railroads,
and drains to improve lands are familiar examples. These appropriations have
been sanctioned under an application of the term "public purpo~e," which might
also justify the laying out of private roads, when private property could not
otherwise be made available. Upon this general subject, the reader is referred
to an article by Hon. J. V. Campbell in the Bench and Bar for July, 1871.
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possession, occupation, and enjoyment of the land by the public at

(CH. XV.

large, or by public agencies ;1 and a due protection to the rights of

private property will preclude the government from seizing it in

the hands of the owner, and turning it over to another on vague

grounds of public beneﬁt to spring from the more proﬁtable use to

which the latter may devote it.

/We ﬁnd ourselves somewhat at sea, however, when we

[* 532] undertake to deﬁne,‘ in the light of the judicial decisions,

what constitutes a public use. It has been said by a.

learned jurist that, “ if the public interest can be in any way pro-

moted by the taking of private property, it must rest in the wis-

dom of the legislature to determine whether the beneﬁt to the

public will be of suﬁicient importance to render it expedient for

them to exercise the right of eminent domain, and to authorize an

interference with the private rights of individuals for that purpose.“

It is upon this principle that the legislatures of several of the

States have authorized the condemnation of the lands of indi-

viduals for mill sites, when from the nature of the country such

mill sites could not be obtained for the accommodation of the in-

habitants without overﬂowing the lands thus condemned. Upon

the same principle of public beneﬁt, not only the agents of the

government, but also individuals and corporate bodies have been
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authorized to take private property for the purpose of making pub-

lie highways, turnpike roads, and clanals; of erecting and con-

structing wharves and basins ; of establishing ferries ; of draining

swamps and marshes, and of bringing water to cities and villages.

In all such cases the object of the legislative grant of power is the

public advantage expected from the contemplated improvement,

whether such improvement is to be effected directly by the agents

of the government, or through the medium of corporate bodies, or

of individual enterprise.” 3

It would not be entirely safe, however, to apply with much lib-

erality the language above quoted, that, “ where the public interest

can be in any way promoted by the taking of private property,”

the taking can be considered for a public use. It is certain that

' Per Tracy, Senator. in Bloodgood v. Mohawk and Hudson R.R. Co. 18

Wend. 60.

’ 2 Kent Com. 340.

' Walworth, Chancellor, in Beekman v. Saratoga and Schenectady R.R.. Co. 3

Paige, 73. And see Wilson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co. 2 Pet. 251.

[ see ]

possession, occupation, and enjoyment of the land by the public at
large, or by public agencies ; I and a. due protection to the rights of
private property will preclude the government from seizing it in
the hands of the owner, and turning it over to another on vague
grounds of public benefit to spring from the more profitable use to
which the latter may devote it.
.We find ourselves somewhat at sea, however, when we
[* 532] undertake to define,• in the light of the judicial decisions,
what constitutes a public use. It has been said by a
learned jurist that, " if the public interest can be in any way promoted by the taking of private property, it must rest in the wisdom of the legislature to determine whether the benefit to the
public will be of sufficient importance to render it expedient for
them to exercise the right of eminent domain, and to authorize an
interference with the private rights of individuals for that purpose)1
It is upon this principle that the legislatures of several of the
States have authorized the condemnation of the lands of individuals for mill sites, when from the nature of the country such
mill sites could not be obtained for the accommodation of the inhabitants without overflowing the lands thus condemned. Upon
the same principle of public benefit, not only the agents of the
government, but also individuals and corporate bodies have been
authorized to take private property for the purpose of making public highways, turnpike roads, and canals ; of erecting and con'
structing wharves and basins ; of establishing
ferries; of draining
swamps and marshes, and of bringing water to cities and villages.
In all such cases the object of the legislative grant of power is the
public advantage expected from the contemplated improvement,
whether such improvement is to be effected directly by the agents
of the government, or through the medium of corporate bodies, or
of individual enterprise." 8
It would not be entirely safe, however, to apply with much liberality the language above quoted, that," where the public interest
can be in any way promoted by the taking of private property,"
the taking can be considered for a public use. It is certain that
Per Tracy, Senator, in Bloodgood "· Mohawk and Hudson R.R. Co. 18
Wend. 60.
1 2 Kent Com. 340.
1 Walworth, Chancellor, in Beekman "· Saratoga and Schenectady R.R. Co. 3
Paige, 73. And see Wilson "· Blackbird Creek Marsh Co. 2 Pet. 251.
1
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there are very many cases in which the property of some individual

owners would be likely to be better employed or occupied to the

advancement of the public interest in other hands than in their

own ; but it does not follow from this circumstance alone that they

may rightfully be dispossessed. It may be for the public beneﬁt

that all the wild lands of the State be improved and cultivated, all

the low lands drained, all the unsightly places beautiﬁed, all di-

lapidated buildings replaced by new ; because all these things tend

to give an aspect of beauty, thrift, and comfort to the country, and

thereby to invite settlement, increase the value of lands, and gratify

the public taste; but the common law has never sanctioned an

appropriation of property based upon these considerations alone;

and some further element must therefore be involved be-

fore the appropriation can be regarded as sanctioned * by [" 533]

our constitutions. The reason of the case and thesettled

practice of free governments must be our guides in determining

what is or is not to be regarded a public use ; and that only can

be considered such where the government is supplying its own

needs, or is furnishing facilities for its citizens in regard to those

matters of public necessity, convenience, or welfare, which, on

account of their peculiar character, and the difﬁculty—perhaps
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impossibility — of making provision for them otherwise, it is alike

proper, useful, and necdful for the government to provide.

Every government is expected to make provision for the public

ways, and for this purpose it may seize and appropriate lands.

And as the wants of traffic and travel require facilities beyond

those afforded by the common highway, over which any one may

pass with his own vehicles, the government may establish the

higher grade of highways, upon some of which only its own vehi-

cles can be allowed to run, while others, differently constructed,

shall be open to use by all on payment of toll. The common

highway is kept in repair by assessments of labor and money ; the

tolls paid upon turnpikes, or the fares on railways, are the equiva-

lents to these assessments; and when these improved ways are

required by law to be kept open for use by the public impartially,

they also may properly be called highways, and the use to which

land for their construction is put be denominated a public use.

The government also provides court-houses for the administration

of justice ; buildings for its seminaries of instruction ;1 aqueducts

‘ Williams v. School District, 33 Vt. 271.
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there are very many cases in which the property of some individual
owners would be likely to be better employed or occupied to the
advancement of the public interest in other hands than in their
own; but it does not follow from this circumstance alone that they
may rightfully be dispossessed. It may be for the public benefit
that all the wild lands of the State be improved and cultivated, all
the low lan~s drained, all the unsightly places beautified, all dilapidated buildings replaced by new ; because all these things tend
to give an aspect of beauty, thrift, and comfort to the country, and
thereby to invite settlement, increase the value of lands, and gratify
the public taste; but the common law has never sanctioned an
appropriation of property based upon these considerations alone ;
and some further element must therefore be involved be
fore the appropriati~n can be regarded as sanctioned • by [* 533]
our constitutions. The reason of the case and the settled
practice of free governments must be our guides in determining
what is or is not to be regarded a public use ; and that only can
be considered such where the government is supplying its own
needs, or is furnishing facilities for its citizens in regard to those
matters of public necessity, convenience, or welfare, which, on
account of their peculiar character, and the difficulty- perhaps
impossibility- of making provision for them otherwise, it is alike
proper, useful, and needful for the government to provide.
Every government is expected to make provision for the public
ways, and for this purpose it may seize and appropriate lands.
And as the wants of traffic and travel require facilities beyond
those afforded by the common highway, over which any one may
pass with his own vehicles, the government may establish the
higher grade of highways, upon some of which only its own vehi
cles can be allowed to run, while others, differently constructed,
shall be open to use by all on payment of toll. The common
highway is kept in repair by assessments of labor and money; the
tolls paid upon turnpikes, or the fares on railways, are the equiva
lents to these assessments ; and when these improved ways are
required by law to be kept open for use by the public impartially,
they also may properly be called highways, and the use to which
land for their construction is put be denominated a public use.
The government also provides cour~houses for the administration
of justice ; buildings for its seminaries of instruction ; 1 aqueducts
4

4

4

1

Williams !'. School District, 33 Vt. 271.
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levees to prevent the country being overﬂowed by the rising

streams ; 2 it may cause drains to be constructed to relieve swamps

and marshes of their stagnant water ; 3 and other measures of gen-

eral utility, in which the public at large are interested, and which

require the appropriation of private property, are also within the

power, where they fall within the reasons underlying the cases

mentioned.‘

[* 534] * Whether the power of eminent domain can rightfully

be exercised in the condemnation of lands for manufac-

turing purposes, where the manufactories are to be owned and

occupied by individuals, is a question upon which the authorities

are at variance. Saw-mills, grist-mills, and various other manu-

factories, are certainly a public necessity; and while,the country

is new, and capital not easily attainable for their erection, it some-

times seems to be essential that government should oﬂ'er large

inducements to parties who will supply this necessity. Before

steam came into use, water was almost the sole reliance for motive

power ; and as reservoirs were generally necessary for this purpose,

it would sometimes happen that the owner of a valuable mill site

was unable to render it available. because the owners of lands which

must be ﬂowed to obtain a reservoir would neither consent to the
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1 Reddall v. Bryan, 14 Md. 444; Kane v. Baltimore, 15 Md. 240; Gardner

v. Newburg, 2 Johns. Ch. 16:2; Ham v. Salem, 10 Mass. 350.

’ Mithot1' v. Carrollton, 12 La. An. 185; Cash v. Whitworth, 13 La. An. 401 ;

Inge v. Police Jury, 14 La. An. 117.

3 Anderson v. Kerns Draining Co. 14 Ind.199; Reeves v. Treasurer of Wood

County, 8 Ohio, N. s. 344. See a clear statement of the general principle and

its necessity in the last-mentioned case. The drains, however, which can be

authorized to be cut across the land of unwilling parties, or for which individuals

can be taxed, must not be mere private drains, but must have reference to the

public health, convenience, or welfare. Reeves 1:. Treasurer, &c. supra. ' And

to convey pure and wholesome water into large towns ; 1 it builds
levees tp prevent the country being overflowed by the rising
streams ; 2 it may cause drains to be constructed to relieve swamps
and marshes of their stagnant water ; 8 and other measures of general utility, in which the public at large are interested, and which
require the appropriation of private property, are also within the
power, where they fall within the reasons underlying the cases
mentioned.f
·
[• 534]
• Whether the power of eminent domain can rightfully
be exercised in the condemnation of lands for manufacturing purposes, where the manufactories are to be owned and
occupied by individuals, is a question upon which the authorities
are at variance. Saw-mills, grist-mills, and various other manufactories, are certainly a public necessity ; and while. the country
is new, and capital not easily attainable for their erection, it sometimes seems to be essential that government should offer large
inducements to parties who will supply this necessity. Before
steam came into use, water was almost the sole reliance for motive
power ; and as reservoirs were generally necessary for this purpose,
it would sometimes happen that the owner of a valuable mill site
was unable to render it available. because the owners of lands which
must be flowed to obtain a reservoir would neither consent to the

see People v. Nearing, 27 N. Y. 306. It is competent under the eminent domain

to appropriate and remove a dam owned by private parties, in order to reclaim

a considerable body of lands ﬂowed by means of it, paying the owner of the

dam its value. Talbot v. Hudson, 16 Gray, 417.

‘ Such, for instance, as the construction of a public park, which, in large

cities, is as much a matter of public utility as a railway or a supply of pure

water. See Matter of Central Park Extension, 16 Abb. Pr. Rep. 56; Owners

of Ground v. Mayor, &c., of Albany, 15 \Vend. 374. Or sewers in cities. Hil-

dreth v. Lowell, 11 Gray, 345. A city may be authorized to appropriate lands

in order to ﬁll them up, and thereby abate a nuisance upon them. Dingley v.

Boston, 100 Mass. 544.

[ass] -

1 Reddall v. Bryan, 14 Md. 444; Kane v. Baltimore, 15 Md. 2!0; Gardner
v. Newburg, 2 Johns. Ch. 162; Ham v. Salem, 10 1\fa.ss. 350.
1 1\fithoft' "· Carrollton, 12 La. An. 185; Cash v. Whitworth, 18 La. An. 401 ;

lngP v. Police Jury, 14 La. An. 117.
~Anderson v.Kems Draining Co. 14 Ind.199; Reeves"· Treasurer of Wood
County, 8 Ohio, N. s. 34:4. See a clear statement of the general principle and
its necessity in the last-mentioned case. The drains, however, which can be
authorized to be cut acr.oss the land of unwilling parties, or for which individuals
can be taxed, must not be mere private drains, but must have reference to the
public health, convenience, or welfare. Reeves "· Treasurer, &c. :mpra. ' And
see People v. Nearing, 27 N.Y. 306. It is competent under the eminent domain
to appropriate and remove a Jam owned by private parties, in order to reclaim
a con~iderable body of lands flowed by means of it, paying the owner of the
dam its value. Talbot v. Hudson, 16 Gray, 417.
4 Such, for instance, as the construction of a public park, which, in large
cities, is as much a matter of public utility as a railway or a supply of pure
water. See Matter of Central Park Extension, 16 Abb. Pr. Rep. 56; Owners
of Ground v. Mayor, &e., of Albany, 15 Wend. 374. Or sewers in cities. Hildreth v. Lowell, 11 Gray, 345. A city may be authorized to appropriate lands
in order to fill them up, and thereby abate a nuisance upon them. Dingley "·
Boston, 100 Mass. 644.
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and inadmissible prices. The legislatures in some of the States

have taken the matter in hand, and have surmounted the diﬁiculty,

sometimes by authorizing the land to be appropriated, and at

other times by permitting the erection of the dam, but requiring

the mill owner to pay annually to the proprietor of the land the

damages caused by the ﬂowing, to be assessed in some impartial

mode} The reasons for such statutes have been growing weaker

with the introduction of steam power and the progress of improve-

ment, but their validity has repeatedly been recognized in some of

the States, and probably the same courts would continue still to

recognize it, notwithstanding the public necessity may no longer

appear to demand such laws? The rights granted by these laws

to mill owners are said by Chief Justice Shaw, of Massachusetts,

to be “ granted for the better use of the water power, upon consid-

erations of general policy and the general good ” ;3 and in this view,

and in order to render available a valuable property which might

otherwise be made of little use by narrow, selﬁsh, and

'* unfriendly conduct on the part of individuals, such laws [*535]

may perhaps be sustained on the same grounds which sup-

port an exercise of the right of eminent domain to protect, drain,

a11d render valuable the lands which, by the overﬂow of a river,
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might otherwise be an extensive and worthless swamp.‘

‘ See Angeli on Watercourses, c. 12, for references to the statutes on this

subject.

’ “The encouragement of mills has always been a favorite object with the

legislature; and though the reasons for it may have ceased, the favor of the

legislature continues.” \Volcott Vi/oollen Manufacturing Co- v. Upham, 5 Pick.

294.

' French v. Braintree Manufacturing Co. 23 Pick. 220.

‘ Action on the case for raising a dam across the Merrimac River, by which a

mill stream emptying into that river, above the site of said dam, was set hack

and overﬂowed, and a mill of the plaintiff situated thereon, and the mill privi-

construction of a damt nor sell their lands except at extravagant
and inadmissible prices. The legislatures in some of the States
have taken the matter in handt and have surmatmted the difficulty,
sometimes by authorizing the land to be appropriated, and at
other times by permitting the erection of the dam, but requiring
the mill owner to pay annually to the proprietor of the land the
damages caused by the flowing, to be assessed in some impartial
mode.l The reasons for such statutes have been growing weaker
with the introduction of steam power and the progress of improvement, but their validity has repeatedly been recognized in some of
the States, and probably the same courts would continue still to
recognize it, notwithstanding the public necessity may no longer
appear to demand such laws.2 The rights granted by these laws
to mill owners are said by Chief Justice Sltaw, of Massachusetts,
to be " granted for the better use of the water power, upon considerations of general policy and the general good " ; 3 and in this view,
and in order to render available a valuable property which might
otherwise be made of little use by narrow, selfish, and
• unfriendly conduct on the part of individuals, such laws [* 535]
may perhaps be sustained on the same grounds which support an exercise of the right of eminent domain to protect, drain,
and render valuable the lands which, by the overflow of a river,
might otherwise be an extensive and worthless swamp:'

lege, were damaged and destroyed. Demurrer to the declaration. The defend-

ant company were chartered for the purpose of constructing a dam across the

Merrimac River, and constructing one or more locks and canals, in connection

with said dam, to remove obstructions in said river by falls and rapids, and to

create a water power to be used for mechanical and manufacturing purposes.

The defendants claimed that they were justiﬁed in what they had done, by an

act of the legislature exercising the sovereign power of the State, in the right of

eminent domain; that the plaintitI"s property in the mill and mill privilege was

taken and appropriated under this right; and that his remedy was by a claim of

[ 589 ]

1 See Angell on Watercourses, c. 12, for references to the statutes on this
subject.
1 "The encouragement of mills has always been a favorite object with the
legislature ; and though the reasons for it may have ceased, the favor of the
legislature continues." Wolcott 'Woollen Manufacturing Co. v. Upham, 5 Pick.
294.
1 French v. Braintree Manufacturing Co. 23 Pick. 220.
4 Action on the case for raising a dam across the Merrimac River, by which a
mill stream emptying into that river, above the site of said dam, was set back
and overflowed, and a mill of the plaintiff situated thereon, and the mill privilege, ~re damaged and destroyed. Demurrer to the declaration. The defendant company were chartered for the purpose of constructing a dam across the
Merrimac River, and constructing one or more locks and canals, in connection
with said dam, to remove obstructions in said river by falls and rapids, and to
create a water power to be used for mechanical and manufacturing purposes.
The defendants claimed that they were justified in what they had done, by an
act of the legislature exercising the sovereign power of the State, in the right of
eminent domain; that the plaintiff's property in the mill and mill privilege was
taken and appropriated under this right; and that his remedy was by a claim of
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[‘* 536] * On the other hand, it is said that the legislature of New

[CH. XV.

York has never exercised the right of eminent domain in

favor of mills of any kind, and that “ sites for steam engines, hotels,

damages under the act, and not by action at common law as for a wrongful and

unwarrantable encroachment upon his right of property. Shaw, Ch. J . : “ It is

contended that if this act was intended to authorize the defendant company to

take the mill power and mill of the plaintiff, it was void because it was not taken

for public use, and it was not within the power of the government in the exercise

of the right of eminent domain. This is the main question. In determining it,

we must look to the declared purposes of the act; and if a public use is declared,

it will be so held, unless it manifestly appears by the provisions of the act that

they can have no tendency to advance and promote such public use. The de-

clared purposes are to improve the navigation of the Merrimac River, and to

create a large mill power for mechanical and manufacturing purposes. In general,

whether a particular structure, as a bridge, or a lock, or canal, or road, is for

the public use, is a question for the legislature, and which may be presumed to

have been correctly decided by them. Commonwealth v. Breed, 4 Pick. 463.

That the improvement of the navigation of a river is done for the public use

has been too frequently decided and acted upon to require authorities. And so

to create a wholly artiﬁcial navigation by canals. The establishment of a great

mill power for manufacturing purposes, as an object of great public interest,

especially since manufacturing has come to be one of the great industrial pur-
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suits of the Commonwealth, seems to have been regarded by the legislature, and

sanctioned by the jurisprudence of the Commonwealth, and in our judgment

rightly so, in determining what is a public use, justifying the exercise of right of

eminent domain. See St. 1825, c. 148, incorporating the Salem Mill Dam Cor-

poration; Boston and Roxbury Mill Dam Corporation v. Newman, 12 Pick. 467.

The acts since passed, and the cases since decided on this ground, are very

numerous. That the erection of this dam would have a strong and direct ten-

dency to advance both these public objects, there is no doubt. \Ve are therefore

of opinion that the powers conferred on the corporation by this act were so done

within the scope of the authority of the legislature, and were not a violation of

the Constitution of the Commonwealth.” Hazen v. Essex Company, 12 Cush.

477. See also Boston and Roxbury Mill Corporation v. Newman, 12 Pick. 467 ;

Fiske v. Framingham Manufacturing Co. ib. 67; Harding v. Goodlett, 3 Yerg.

41. The courts of VVisconsin have sustained such laws. Newcomb v. Smith,

1 Chand. 71; Thien v. Voegtlander, 3 \Vis. 465; Pratt v. Brown, ib. 603. And

those of Connecticut. Olmstead v. Camp, 33 Conn. 532. And of Maine. Jor-

dan v. Woodward, -10 Me. 317. And of Minnesota. Miller v. Troost, 1! Minn.

365. And they have been enforced elsewhere without question. Burgess v.

Clark, 13 Ired. 109; McAfee’s Heirs v. Kennedy, 1 Lit. 92; Smith v. Connelly,

1 T. B. Monr. 58; Shackleford v. Coffey, 4 J. J. Marsh. 40; Crenshaw 1:. Slate

River Co. 6 Rand. 245. The whole subject was very fully considered and the

validity of such legislation alﬁrmed in Great Falls Manuf. Co. v. Fernald, 37

N. H. 444. In Newell v. Smith, 1.5 \Vis. 101, it was held not constitutional to

authorize the appropriation of the property, and leave the owner no remedy

except to subsequently recover its value in an action of trespass.

[590] _

[* 536]

*On the other hand, it is said that the legislature of New
York has never exercised the right of eminent domain in
favor of mills of any kind, and that " sites for steam engines, hotels,
damages under the act, and not by action at common law as for a wrongful and
unwarrantable encroachmP-nt upon his right of property. Bhaw, Ch. J.: " It ia
contended that if this act was intended to authorize the defendant company to
take the mill power and mill of the plaintiff, it was void because it was not taken
for public use, and it wa.~ not within the power of the goveMlment in the exercise
of the right of eminent domain. This is the main question. In determining it,
we must look to the declared purposes of the act; and if a public use is declared,
it will be so held, unless it manifestly appears by the provisions of the act that
they can have no tendency to advance and promote such public use. The declared purposes are to improve the navigation of tho Merrimac H.iver, and to
create a large mill power for mechanical and manufacturing purposes. In general,
whether a particular structure, as a bridge, or a lock, or canal, or road, is for
the public use, is a question for the legislature, and which may pe presumed to
have been correctly decided by them. Commonwealth v. Breed, 4 Pick. 463.
That the improvement of the navigation of a river is done for the public use
has been too frequently decided and acted upon to require authorities. And so
to create a wholly artificial navigation by canals. The establishment of a great
mill power for manufacturing purposes, as an object of great public interest,
especially since manufacturing has come to bo one of the great industrial pursuits of the Commonwealth, seems to have been regarded by the legi1dature, and
sanctioned by the jurisprudence of the Commonwealth, and in our judgment
rightly so, in determining what is a public use, justifying the exercise of right of
eminent domain. See St. 182.), c. 148, incorporating the Salem Mill Dam Corporation ; Boston and Roxbury Mill Dam Corporation v. Newman, 12 Pick. 467.
The acts since passed, and the cases since decided on this ground, are very
numerout~. That the erection of this dam would have a strong and direct tendency to advance both these public objects, there is no doubt. We are therefore
of opinion that the powers conferred on the corporation by this act were so done
within the scope of the authority of the legislature, and were not a violation of
the Con~titution of the Commonwealth." Hazen v. Essex Company, 12 Cush.
477. See also Boston and Roxbury Mill Corporation v. Newman, 12 Pick. 467;
Fi::~ke v. Framingham Manufacturing Co. ib. 67; H:~.rding v. Goodlett, 3 Yerg.
41. The courts of Wisconsin have sustained such laws. Newcomb "· Smith,
1 Chand. 71; Thien v. Voegtlander, 3 Wis. 465; Pratt v. Brown, ib. 603. And
those of Connecticut. Olmstead v. Camp, 33 Conn. 532. And of Maine. Jordan v. ·woodward, 40 Me. 317. And of Minnesota. Miller v. Troost, 14l\linn.
365. And they have been enforced elsewhere without question. Burgess "·
Clark, 13 Ired. 109; McAfee's Heirs v. Kennedy, 1 Lit. 92; Smith v. Connelly,
1 T. B. l\Ionr. 58; Shaekleford "· Coffey, 4 J. J. Marsh. 40; Crenshaw r. Slate
River Co. 6 Rand. 245. The whole subject was very fully considered and the
validity of such legislation affirmed in Great Falls Manuf. Co. v . .Fcrn:Ud, 37
N.H. 444. In Newell v. Smith, 15 Wis. 101, it was held not constitutional to
authorize the appropriation of the property, and lea\'e the owner no rcm_e dy
except to subsequently recover its value in an action of trespass.
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the exercise of this extraordinary power.” 1 A somewhat similar

view has been taken by the Supreme Court of Alabama.’ It is quite

possible that, in any State in which this question would be entirely a

new one, and where it would not be embarrassed by long acquies-

cence, or by either judicial or legislative precedents, it might be

held that these laws are not sound in principle, and that there is

no such necessity, and consequently no such imperative reasons

of public policy, as would be essential to support an exercise of the

right of eminent domain.” But accepting as correct the decisions

which. have been made, it must be conceded that the term “ public

use,” as employed in the law of eminent domain, has a meaning

much controlled by the necessity, and somewhat different from

that which it bears generally.‘

‘ Hay v. Cohoes Company, 3 Barb. 47.

' Sadler v. Langham, 34 Ala. 311. In this case, however, it was assumed

that lands for the purposes of grist-mills which grind for toll, and were required

to serve the public impartially, might, under proper legislation, be taken under

the right of eminent domain. .

i’ See this subject in general discussed in a review of Angeli on Watercourses,

2 Am. Jurist, p. 25.

churches, and other public conveniences, might as well be taken by
the exercise of this extraordinary power." 1. A somewhat similar
view has been taken by the Supreme Court of Alabama.2 It is quite
possible that, in any State in which this question would be entirely a
new one, and where it would not be embarrassed by long acquiescence, or by either judicial or legislative precedents, it might be
held that these laws are not sound in principle, and that there is
no such necessity, and consequently no such imperative reasons
of public policy, as would be essential to support an exercise of the
right of eminent domain.a But accepting as correct the decisions
which. have been made, it must be conceded that the term " public
use," as employed in the law of eminent domain, has a meaning
much controlled by the necessity, and somewhat different from
that which it bears generally.•

4 In People v. Township Board of Salem, 20 Mich., the court consider

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:22 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105011581
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

the question whether a use which is regarded as public for the purposes of an

exercise of the right of eminent domain, is necessarily so for the purposes of

taxation. They say: “ Reasoning by analogy from one of the sovereign pow-

ers of government to another is exceedingly liable to deceive and mislead. An

object may be public in one sense and for one purpose, when in a general sense

and for other purposes it would be idle or misleading to applythe same term.

All governmental powers exist for public purposes, but they are not necessarily

to be exercised under the same conditions of public interest. The sovereign

police power which the State possesses is to be exercised only for the general

public welfare, but it reaches to every person, to every kind of business, to

every species of property within the Commonwealth. The conduct of every

individual, and the use of all property and of all rights is regulated by it, to

any extent found necessary for the preservation of the public order, and also

for the protection of the private rights of one individual against encroachment

by'others. The sovereign power of taxation is employed in a great many cases

where the power of eminent domain might be made more immediately efficient

and available, if constitutional principles could suffer it to be resorted to; but

each of these has its own peculiar and appropriate sphere, and the object which

is public for the demands of the one is not necessarily of a character to permit

the exercise of the other.

b“ If we examine the subject critically, we shall ﬁnd that the most important

consideration in the case of eminent domain is the necessity of accomplishing

[591]

Hay v. Cohoes Company, 3 Barb. 47.
Sadler v. Langham, 34 Ala. 811. In this case, however, it was assumed
that lands for the purposes of grist-mills which grind for toU, and were required
to serve the public impartially, might, under proper legislation, be taken under
the right of eminent domain.
•
3 See this subject in general discussed i~ a reTiew of Angell on Watercourses,
2 Am. Jurist, p. 25.
6 In People v. Township Board of Salem, 20 Mich., the court consider
the question whether a use which is regarded as public for the purposes of an
exercise of the right of eminent domain, is necessarily so for the purposes of
taxation. They say: " Reasoning by analogy from one of the sovereign powers of government to another is exceedingly liable to deceive and mislead. An
object may be public in one sense and for one purpose, when in a general sense
and for other purposes it would be idle or misleading to apply.the same term.
All governmental powers exi~t for public purposes, but they are not necessarily
to be exercised under the same conditions of public interest. The sovereign
police power which the State possesses is to be exercised only for the general
public welfare, but it reaches to every person, to every kind of business, to
every species of property within the Commonwealth. The conduct of every
individual, and the use of all property and of all rights is regulated by it, to
any extent found necessary for the preservation of the public order, and also
for the proteetion of the private rights of one individual against encroachment
by· others. The sovereign power of taxation is employed in a great many cases
where the power of eminent domain might be made more immediately efficient
and available, if constitutional principles could suffer it to be resorted to; but
each of these bas its own peculiar and appropriate sphere, and the object which
is public for the demands of the one is not necessarily of a character to permit
the exercise of the other.
. "If we examine the subject critically, we shall find that the most important
consideration in the case of eminent domain is the necessity of accomplishing
1

1

[ 591]

* 536 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [cn. xv.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

[CH. XV.

D

The Taking of Property.

Although property can only be taken for a public use, and the

legislature must determine in what cases, it has been long settled

The Taking of Property.

some public good which is otherwise impracticable; and we shall also ﬁnd that

the law does not so much regard the means as the need. The power is much

nearer akin to that of the public police than to that of taxation; it goes but a

step farther, and that step is in the same direction. Every man has an abstract

Although property can only be taken for a public use, and .the
legislature must determine in what cases, it has been long settled

right to the exclusive use of his own property for his own enjoyment in such

manner as he shall choose; but if he should choose to create a nuisance upon it,

or to do any thing which would preclude a reasonable enjoyment of adjacent

property, the law would interfere to impose restraints. He is said to own his

private lot to the centre of the earth, but he would not be allowed to excavate

it indeﬁnitely, lest his neighbor‘s lot should disappear in the excavation. The

abstract right to make use of his own property in his own way is compelled to

yield to the general comfort and protection of the community, and to a proper

regard to relative rights in others. The situation of his property may even be

such that he is compelled to dispose of it because the law will not suffer his

regular business to be carried on upon it. A needful and lawful species of

manufacture may so injuriously affect the health and comfort of the vicinity that

it cannot be tolerated in a densely settled neighborhood, and therefore the owner

of a lot in that neighborhood will not be allowed to engage in that manufacture
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upon it, even though it be his regular and legitimate business. The butcher in

the vicinity of whose premises a village has grown up, ﬁnds himself compelled

to remove his business elsewhere, because his right to make use of his lot as a

place for the slaughter of cattle has become inconsistent with the superior right

of community to the enjoyment of pure air and the accompanying blessings

and comforts. The owner of a lot within the ﬁre limits of a city may be com-

pelled to part with the property, because he is unable to erect a brick or stone

structure upon it, and the local regulations will not permit one of wood. Eminent

domain only recognizes and enforces the superior right of the community against

the selﬁshness of individuals in a similar way. Every branch of needful industry

has a right to exist, and community has s right to demand that it be permit-

ted to exist; and if for that purpose a peculiar locality already in possession

of an individual is essential, the owner's right to undisturbed occupancy must

yield to the superior interest of the public. A railroad cannot go around the

farm of every unwilling person, and the business of transporting persons and

property for long distances by rail, which has been found so essential to the

general enjoyment and welfare, could never have existed if it were in the power

of any unwilling person to stop the road at his boundary, or to demand uproa-

sonable terms as a condition of passing him. The law interferes in these cases,

and regulates the relative rights of the owner and of the community with as

strict regard to justice and equity as the circumstances will permit. It does not

deprive the owner of his property, but it compels him to dispose of so much of

it as is essential on equitable terms. While, therefore, eminent domain estab-

;_4.
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some public good which is otherwise impracticable; and we shall also find that
the law does not so much regard the means as the n~Jed. The power is mu<·h
nearer akin to that of the public police than to that of taxation; it goes but a
step farther, and that step is in the same direction. Every man has an abstract
right to the exclusive use of his own property for his own enjoyment in such
manner as he shall choose ; but if he should choose to create a nuisance upon it,
or to do any thing which would preclude a reasonable enjoyment of adjacent
property, the law would interfere to impose restraints. He is said to own his
private lot to the centre of the earth, but he would not be allowed to excavate
it indefinitely, lest his neighbor's lot should disappear in the excavation. The
abstract right to make use of his own property in his own way is compelled to
yield to the general comfort and protection of tae community, and to a proper
regard to relative rights in others. The situation of his property may even be
such that he is compelled to dispose of it because the law will not suffer his
regular business to be carried on upon it. A needful and lawful species of
manufacture may so injuriously affect the health and comfort of the vicinity that
it cannot be tolerated in a densely settled neighborhood, and therefore the owner
of a lot in that neighborhood will not be allowed to engage in that manufacture
upon it, even though it be his regular and legitimate bu11iness. The butcher in
the vicinity of whose premi~es a village has grown up, finds himself compelled
to ·remove his business elsewhere, because his right to make use of his lot aa a
place for the slaughter of cattle has become inconsistent with the superior right
of community to the enjoyment of pure air and the accompanying bles~ings
and comforts. The owner of a lot within the fire limits of a city may be compelled to part with the property, because he is unable to erect a brick or stone
structure upon it, and the local regulations will not permit one of wood. Eminent
domain only recognizes and enforces the superior right of the community against
the selfishness of individuals in a similar way. Every branch of needful industry
has a right to exist, and community bas a right to demand that it be permitted to exist ; and if for that purpose a peculiar locality already in possCIIIIion
of an individual is essential, the owner's right to undisturbed occupancy must
yield to the superior interest of the public. A railroad cannot go around the
farm of every unwilling person, and the business of transporting persons and
property for long distances by rail, which has J>een found so essential to the
general enjoyment and welfare, could never have existed if it were in the power
of any unwilling person to stop the road at his boundary, or to demand unrea•
sonable terms as a condition of passing him. The law interferes in these cases,
and regulates the relative rights of the owner and of the community with as
strict rt·gard to justice and equity as the circumstances will permit. It docs not
deprive the owner of his property, but it compels him to dispose of so much of
it as is essential on equitable terms. While, therefore, eminent domain estab-
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that it is not essential the taking should be to or by the State
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itself, if by any other agency, in the opinion of the legislature, the

use can be made equally effectual for the public beneﬁt. There

are many cases in which the appropriation consists simply in

throwing the property open to use by such persons as may see ﬁt

to avail themselves of it ; as in the case of common highways and

public parks. In these cases the title of the owner is not dis-

turbed, except as it is charged with this burden; and the State

defends the easement, not by virtue of any title in the property,

but by means of criminal proceedings when the general

right is disturbed.* But in other cases it seems impor- [* 537]

tant to take the title; and in many of these it is conven-

ient, if not necessary, that the taking be, not by the State, but by

the municipality for which the use is specially designed, and to

whose care and government it will be conﬁded. When property is

needed for a district school-house, it is proper that the district ap-

propriate it; and it is strictly in accordance with the general

theory as well as with the practice of our government for the State

to delegate to the district the exercise of the power of eminent

domain for this special purpose. So a county may be authorized

to take lands for its courthouse or jail; a city, for its town hall, its

reservoirs of water, its sewers, and other public works of like im-
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portance. In these cases no question of power arises; the taking

is by the public ; the use is by the public; and the beneﬁt to ac-

crue therefrom is shared in greater or less degree by the whole

public.

If, however, it be constitutional to appropriate lands for mill

dams or mill sites, it ought also to be constitutional that the tak-

ing be by individuals instead of by the State or any of its organized

political divisions; since it is no part of the business of the gov-

ernment to engage in manufacturing operations which come in

competition with private enterprise; and the cases must be very

peculiar and very rare where a State or municipal corporation

lishes no industry, it so regulates the relative rights of all that no individual

shall have it in his power to preclude its establishment." On this general subject

see Olmstead v. Camp, 33 Conn. 532, in which it was very fully and carefully

considered.

\Vhat is a public use is a question for the courts; though where a use has

been declared public by the legislature, the co_urts will hold it to be such unless

the contrary clearly appears. Bankhead v. Brown, 25 Ill. 540. See Olmstead v.

Camp, 33 Conn. 551.

38 [ 593 ]

that it is not essential the taking should be to or by the State
itself, if by any other agency, in the opinion of the legislature, the
use can be made equally effectual for the public benefit. There
are many cases in which the appropriation consists simply in
throwing the property open to use uy such persons a.a may see fit
to avail thewelves of it ; as in the case of common highways and
public parks. In these cases the title of the owner is not dis- .
turbed, except as it is charged with this burden ; and the State
defends the easement, not by virtue of any title in the property,
but by means of criminal proceedings when the general
right is disturbed. • But in other cases it seems impor- [* 537]
tant to take the title ; and in many of these it is convenient, if not necessary, that the taking be, not by the State, but by
the municipality for which the use is specially designed, and to
whose care and government it will be confided. When property is
needed for a district school-house, it is proper that the district appropriate it ; and it is strictly in accordance with the general
theory as well as with the practice of our government for the State
to delegate to the district the exercise of the power of eminent
domain for this special purpose. So a county may be authorized
to take lands for its court-house or jail; a city, for its town hall, its
reservoirs of water_, its sewers, and other public works of like im, portance. In these cases no question of power arises ; the taking
is by the public ; the use is by the public; and the benefit to accrue therefrom is shared in greater or less degree by the whole
public.
If, however, it be constitutional to appropriate lands for mill
dams or mill sites, it ought also to be constitutional that the taking he hy individuals instead of by the State or any of its organized
political divisions; since it is no part of the business of the government to engage in manufacturing operations which come in
competition with private enterprise ; and the cases must be very
peculiar and very rare where a State or municipal corporation
lishes no industry, it so regulates the relative rights of all that no individual
shall have it in his power to preclude its establishment." On this general subject
see Olmstead v. Camp, 83 Conn. 532, in which it was very fully and carefully
considered.
What is a public use is a question for the courts; though where a use has
been declared public by the legislature, the co.urts will hold it to be such unless
the contrary clearly appears. Bankhead o. Brown, 25 Ill. 540. See Olmstead v.
Camp, 33 Conn. 651.
88
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could be justiﬁed in any such undertaking. And although the

[ca. xv.

practice is not entirely uniform on the subject, the general senti-

ment is adverse to the construction of railways by the State, and

the opinion is quite prevalent, if not general, that they can be

better managed, controlled, and operated for the publjc beneﬁ_t in

the hands of individuals than by State or municipal oﬁicers or

agencies.

And while there are unquestionably some objections to compel-

ling a citizen to surrender his property to a corporation, whose cor-

porators, in receiving it, are inﬂuenced by motives of private gain

and emolument, so that to them the purpose of the appropriation

is altogether private, yet conceding it to be settled that these facil-

ities for travel and commerce are a public necessity, if the legisla-

ture, reflecting the public sentiment, decide that the general beneﬁt

is -better promoted by their construction through individuals or

corporations than by the State itself, it would clearly he pressing a

constitutional maxim to an absurd extreme if it were to be held that

the public necessity should only be provided for in the way

[*538] which is least consistent with the public *interest. Ac-

cordingly, on the principle of public beneﬁt, not only the

State and its political divisions, but also individuals and corporate

bodies, have been authorized to take private property for the con-
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struction of works of public utility, and when duly empowered by

the legislature so to do, their private pecuniary interest does not

preclude their being regarded as public agencies in respect to the

public good which is sought to be accomplished}

The Necessity for the Taking.

The authority to determine in any case whether it is needful to

exercise this power must rest with the State itself; and the ques-

' Beekman v. Saratoga and Schenectady R.R. Co. 3 Paige, 73; \Vilson 0.

Blackbird Creek Marsh Co. 2 Pet. 251 ; Buonaparte v. Camden and AmboyR.R.

Co. 1 Bald. 205; Bloodgood v. Mohawk and Hudson R.R. Co. 18 \Vend. 1;

Lebanon v. Olcott, 1 N. H. 339; Petition of Mount lVashington Road Co. 35

N. H. 141; Pratt v. Brown, 3 VVis. 603; Swan v. Williams, 2 Mich. 427; Ste-

vens v. Middlesex Canal, 12 Ma.ss. 466; Boston Mill Dam v. Newman, 12 Pick.

467; Gilmer v. Lime Point, 18 Cal. 229; Armington v. Barnet, 15 Vt. 750;

White River Turnpike v. Central Railroad, 21 Vt. 590; Raleigh, &c., R.R. Co.

could be justified in any such undertaking. And although tl1c
practice is not entirely unifot·m on the subject, the general sentiment is adverse to the construction of railways by the State, and
the opinion is quite prevalent, if not general, that they can be
better managed, controlled, and operated for the publjc benefi,t in
the hands ·of individuals than by State or municipal officers or
agencies.
And while there are unquestionably some objections to compelling a citizen to surrender bis property to a corporation, whose corporators, in receiving it, aro influenced by motives of private gain
and emolument, so that to them the purpose of the appropriation
is altogether private, yet conceding it to be settled that these facilities for travel and commerce are a public necessity, if the legislature, reflecting the public sentiment, decide that the general benefit
is ·better promoted by their construction through individuals or
.corporations than by the State itself, it would clearly be pressing a
constitutional maxim to an absurd extreme if it were to be held that
the public necessity should only be provided for in the way
[• 538] which is least consistent with the public • int_erest. Accordingly, on the principle of public benefit, not only the
8tate and its political divisions, but also individuals and corporate
bodies, have been authorized to take private property for the construction of works of public utility, and when duly empowered by
the legislature so to do, their private pecuniary interest does not
p~eclude their being regarded as public agencies in respect to the
public good which is sought to be accomplished.l

v. Davis, 2 Dev. & Bat. 451; Whiteman's Ex‘r v. Wilmington, &c., R.R. Co.

2 Harr. 514; Bradley v. N. Y. and N. H. R.R. Co. 21 Conn. 294; Olmstead v.

The Necessity for the Taking.

Camp, 33 Conn. 532.

[594]

The authority to determine in any case whether it is needful to
exercise this power must rest with the State itself; and the ques1 Beekman v. Saratoga and Schenectady R.R. Co. 3 Paige, 73; Wilson "·
Blackbird Creek Marsh Co. 2 Pet. 251 ; Buonaparte v. Camden and Amboy R.R.
Co. 1 Bald. 205; Bloodgood v. Mohawk and Hudson R.R. Co. 18 Wend. 1;
Lebanon v. Olcott, 1 N. H. 339; Petition of Mount Washington Road Co. 35
N.H. 141; Pratt v. Brown, 3 Wis. 603; Swan v. Williams, 2 Mich. 427; Stevens v. Middlesex Canal, 12 Mass. 466; Boston Mill Dam v. Newman, 12 Pick.
467; Gilmer v. Lime Point, 18 Cal 229; Armington "· Barnet, 15 Vt. 750;
White Ri,·er Turnpike v. Central Railroad, 21 Vt. 590; Raleigh, &c., H..R. Co.
v. Davis, 2 Dev. & Bat. 451; Whiteman'!! Ex'r "·Wilmington, &c., R.R. Co.
N.H. R.R. Co. 21 Conn. 294; Olmstead"·
2 Harr. 514; Bradley v. N.Y.
Camp, 38 Conn. 582.

and
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tion is always one of strictly political character, not requiring any
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hearing upon the facts or any judicial determination. Neverthe-

less, when a work or improvement of local importance only is con-

templated, the need of which must be determined upon a view of

the facts which the people of the vicinity may be supposed best to

understand, the question of necessity is generally referred to some

local tribunal, and it may even be submitted to a jury to decide

upon evidence. But parties interested have no constitutional right

to be heard upon the question, unless the State constitution clearly

and expressly recognizes and provides for it. On general princi-

ples, the ﬁnal decision rests with the legislative department of the

State; and if the question is referred to any tribunal for trial, the

reference and the opportunity for being heard are matters of favor

and not of right. The State is not under any obligation to make

provision for a judicial contest upon that question. And where

the’ case is such that it is proper to delegate to individuals or to a

corporation the power to appropriate property, it is also competent

to delegate the authority to decide upon the necessity for the

taking} '

' People v. Smith, 21 N. Y. 597; Ford v. Chicago and N. VV. R.R. Co. 14

Vllis. 617; Matter of Albany St. 11 Wend. 152; Lyon v. Jerome, 26 Wend.

48l; Hays v. Risher, 32 Penn. St. 169; North Missouri R.lt. Co. 2:. Lackland,
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25 Mo. 515; Same v. Gott, ib. 540; Bankliead v. Brown, 25 Iowa, 540. In the

case ﬁrst cited, Denio, J., says: “The question is, whether the State, in the

exercise of the power to appropriate the property of individuals to a public use,

where the dutyof judging of the expediency of making the appropriation, in a

class of cases, is committed to public oilicers, is obliged to aﬂbrd to the owners

of the property an opportunity to be heard before those oﬂicers when they sit for

tion is always one of strictly political character, not requiring any
hearing upon the facts or any judicial determination. Nevertheless, when a work or improvement of local importance only is contemplated, the need of which must be determined upon a view of
the facts which the people of the vicinity may be supposed best to
understand, the question of necessity is generally referred to some
local tribunal, and it may even be submitted to a jury to decide
upon evidence. But parties interested have no constitutional rigllt
to be heard upon the question, unless the State constitution clearly
and expressly recognizes and provides for it. On general principles, the final decision rests with the legislative department of the
State ; and if the question is referred to any tribunal for trial, the
reference and the opportunity for being heard are matters of favor
and not of right. The State is not under any obligation to make
provision for a judicial contest upon that question. And where
the' case is such that it is proper to delegate to individuals or to a
corporation the power to appropriate property, it is also competent
to delegate the authority to decide upon the necessity for the
taking. 1

the purpose of making the determination. I do not speak now of the process for

arriving at the amount of compensation to be paid to the owners, but of the

determination whether, under the circumstances of a particular case, the prop-

erty required for the purpose shall be taken or not; and I am of opinion that the

State is not under any obligation. to make provision for a judicial contest upon

that question. The only pant of the Constitution which refers to the subject is

that which forbids private property to be taken for public use without compen-

sation, and that which prescribes the manner in which the compensation shall be

ascertained. It is not pretended that the statute under consideration violates

either of those provisions. There is, therefore, no constitutional injunction on

the point under consideration. The necessity for appropriating private property

for the use of the public or of the government is not a judicial question. The

power resides in the legislature. It may be exercised by means of a statute

which shall at once designate the property to be appropriated and the purpose of

the appropriation; or it may be delegated to public oliicers, or, as it has been

[595]

1 People v. Smith, 21 N. Y. 597; Ford v. Chicago and N. W. R.R. Co. 14
\Vis. 617; Matter of Albany St. 11 Wend. 152; Lyon v. Jerome, 26 Wend.
48-l; Hays v. Risher, 32 Penn. St. 169; North :Missouri R.l{.. Co. v. Lat·kland,
25 Mo. 515; Same v. Gott, ib. 540; Bankhead v. Brown, 25 Iowa, 5!0. In the
case first citell, Deuio, J., says: "The question is, wht·ther the State, in the
exercise of the power to appropriate the property of indi\·iduals to a public use,
where the duty,of judging of the expedieney of making the appropriation, in a
class of cases, is committed to public officers, is obliged to afford to the owners
of the property an opportunity to be heard before those officers when they sit fur
the purpose of making the determination. I do not speak now of the proe\!ss for
arriving at the amount of compensation to be paid to the owners, but of the
determination whether, under the circumstances of a particular case, the property required for the purpose shall be taken or not; and I am of opinion that the
State is not under any obligation· to make provision for a judicial ccntest upon
that question. The only paJt of the Constitution which refers to the subject is
that which forbids private property to be taken for public use without compensation, and that which prescribes the manner in which the compensation shall be
ascertaiued. It is not pretended that the statute under consideration Yiolates
either of those provisions. There is, therefore, no constitutional injunction on
the point under consideration. Tbe necessity for appropriating private property
for the use of the public or of the government is not a jullicial question. The
power resides in the legislature. It may be exercised by means of a statute
which shall at once designate the property to be appropriated and the purpose of
the appropriation; or it may be delegated to public officers, or, as it bas been
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The taking of property must always be limited to the

necessity of the case, and consequently no more can be

[*540] appropriated in any “‘instancc than the proper tribunal

shall adjudge to be needed for the particular use for which

• How much Property may be taken.

[• 539]

the appropriation is made. When a part only of a man’s premises

is needed by the public, the necessity for the appropriation of

that part will not justify the taking of the whole, even though

compensation be made therefor. The moment the appropriation

goes beyond the necessity of the case, it ceases to be justiﬁed

on the principles which underlie the right of eminent domain.‘

repeatedly held, to private corporations established to carry on enterprises in

which the public are interested. There is no restraint upon the power, except

that requiring compensation to be made. And where the power is committed to

public oﬁicers, it is a subject of legislative discretion to determine what pruden-

tial regulations shall be established to secure a discreet and judicious exercise of

the authority. The constitutional provision securing p. trial by jury in certain

cases, and that which declares that no citizen shall be deprived of his property

without due process of law, have no application to the case. The jury trial can

The taking of property must always be limited to the
necessity of the case, and consequently no more can be
[* 540] appropriated in any *instance than the proper tribunal
shall adjudge to be needed for the particular use for which
the appropriation is made. When a part only of a man's premises
is needed by the public, the necessity for the appropriation of
that part will not justify the taking of the whole, even though
compensation be made therefor. The moment the appropriation
goes beyond the necessity of the case, it ceases to be justified
on the principles which underlie the right of eminent domain. 1

only be claimed as a constitutional right where the subject is judicial in its char-

acter. The exercise of the right of eminent domain stands on the same ground

with the power of taxation. Both are emanations from the law-making power.
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They are attributes of political sovereignty, for the exercise of which the legis-

lature is under no necessity to address itself to the courts. In imposing a tax,

or in appropriating the property of a citizen, or of a class of citizens, for a public

purpose, with a proper provision for compensation, the legislative act is itself

due process of law; though it would not be if it should undertake to appropriate

the property of one citizen for the use of another, or to conﬁscate the property

of one person or class of persons, or a particular description of property upon

some view of public policy, where it could not be said to be taken for a public

use. It follows from these views that it is not necessary for the legislature, in

the exercise of the right of eminent domain, either directly, or indirectly through

public oflicers or agents, to invest the proceedings with the forms or substance

of judicial process. It may allow the owner to intervene and participate in the

tliscusslon before the ofﬁcer or board to whom the power is given of determining

whether the appropriation shall be made in a particular case, or it may provide

that the oﬂicers shall act upon their own views of propriety and duty, without the

aid of a forensic contest. The appropriation of the propriety is an act of public

administration, and the form and manner of its performance is such as the legis-

lature in its discretion shall prescribe."

1 By a statute of New York it was enacted that whenever a part only of a lot

or parcel of land should be required for the purposes of a city street, if the com-

missioners for assessing compensation should deem it expedient to include the
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repeatedly held, to private corporations established to carry on enterprises in
which the public are interested. There is no restraint upon the power, except
that requiring compensation to be made. And where the power is committed to
public officers, it is a subject of legislative discretion to determine what prudential regulations shall be established to secure a discreet an(l judicious exercise of
the authority. The constitutional provision securing 1- trial b)· jury in certain
eases, ami that which declares that no citizen shall be deprived of his property
without due process of law, have no application to the case. The jury trial ean
only be claimed as a eonstitutional right where the subject is judicilll in its character. The exercise of the right of eminent domain stands on the same ground
with the power of taxation. Both are emanations from the law-making power.
They are attributes of political sovereignty, for the exercise of which the legis·
Iaturc is under no necessity to ~ddress itself to the courts. In impo~ing a tax,
or in appropriating the property of a citizen, or of a class of citizens, for a public
purpose, with a proper provision for compensation, the legislative act is itself
due process of law; though it would not be if it shoutd undertake to appropriate
the property of one citizen for the use of anot.her, or to confiscate the property
of one perso~ or class of persons, or a particular description of property upon
some view of public policy, where it could not be said to be taken for a public
use. It follows from these views that it is not necessary for the legislature, in
the exercise of the right of eminent domain, either directly, or indirectly through
public officers or agents, to invest the proceedings with the forms or substance
of judicial process. It may allow the owner to intervene and participate in the
uiscussion before the officer Or board to whom the power is giYen of determining
whether the appropriation shall be made in a particular case, or it may provide
that the officers shall act upon their own views of propriety and duty, wit bout the
aid of a forensic contest. The appropriation of the propriety is an act of public
administration, and the form and mann£>r of its performance is such 1\8 the legislature in its discretion shall prescribe.''
1 By a statute of New York it was enacted that whenever a part only of a lot
or parcel of land should be required for the purposes of a city street, if the commissioners for assessing compensation should deem it expedient to include the
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is acted upon, and the property owner accepts the compen-

sation awarded to him under it, he will be precluded by this

implied assent from afterwards objecting to the excessive appro-

priation.1 And where land is taken for a public work, there is

nothing in the principle we have stated which will preclude the

appropriation of whatever might be necessary for incidental con-

veniences; such as the workshops or depot buildings of a railway

company,’ or materials to be used in the construction of their road,

whole lot in the assessment, they should have power so to do; and the part not

wanted for the particular street or improvement should, upon the continuation of

the report, become vested in the corporation, and might be appropriated to pub-

lic uses, or sold in case of no such appropriation. Of this statute it was said by

the Supreme Court of New York: “ If this provision was intended merely to

give to the corporation capacity to take property under such circumstances with

the consent of the owner, and then to dispose of the same, there can be no objec-

tion to it; but if it is to be taken literally, that the commissioners may, against

the consent of the owner, take the whole lot, when only a part is required for

public use, and the residue to be applied to private use, it assumes a power

which, with all respect, the legislature did not possess. The constitution, by

authorizing the appropriation of property to public use, impliedly declares that

for any other use private property shall not be taken from one and applied to the
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private use of another. It is in violation of natural right; and if it is not in

violation of the letter of the constitution, it is of its spirit, and cannot be sup-

ported. This power has been supposed to be convenient when the greater part

of a lot is taken, and only a small part left, not required for public/use, and that

small part of but little value in the hands of the owner. In such case the cor-

poration has been supposed best qualiﬁed -to take and dispose of such parcels, or

gores, as they have sometimes been called; and probably this assumption of

power has been acquiesced in by the proprietors. I know of no case where the

power has been questioned, and where it has received the deliberate sanction of

this court. Suppose a case where only a few feet, or even inches, are wanted,

from one end ofla lot to widen a street, and a valuable building stands upon the

other end of such lot; would the power be conceded to exist to take the whole

lot, whether the owner consented or not? The quantity of the residue of any

lot cannot vary the principle. The owner may be very uuwillihg to part with

only a few feet; and I hold it equally incompetent for the legislature to dispose

of private property, whether feet or acres are the subject of this assumed power."

Matter of Albany St. 11 Wend. 151, per Savage, Ch. J .

1 Embury v. Conner, 3 N. Y. 511. There is clearly nothing in constitutional

principles which would preclude the legislature from providing that a man’s prop-

erty might be taken with his assent, whether the assent was evidenced by deed or

not; and if he accepts payment, he must be deemed to assent. The more recent

case of House v. Rochester, 15 Barb. 517, is not, we think, opposed to Embury

v. Conner, of which it makes no mention.

' Chicago B. and Q. B..R. Co. v. Wilson-, 17 Ill. 123 ; Low v. Galena and C. U.
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If, *however, the statute providing for such appropriation [* 541]
is acted upon, and the property owner accepts the compensation awarded to him under it, he will be precluded by this
implied assent from afterwards objecting to the excessive appropriation.1 And where land is taken for a public work, there is
nothing in the principle we have stated which will preclude the
appropriation of whatever might be necessary for incidental conveniences; such as the workshops or depot buildings of a railway
company,2 or materials to be used in the construction of their roaJ,
whole lot in the assessment, they should have power so to do; and the part not
wanted for the particular street or improvement should, upon the confirmation of
the report, become vested in the corporation, and might be appropriated to public uses, or sold in case of no such appropriation. Of this statute it was said by
the Supreme Court of New York: "If this provision was intended merely to
give to the corporation capacity to take property untler such circumstances with
the consent of the owner, and then to dispose of the same, there can be no objection to it; but if it is to be taken literally, that the commissioners may, against
the consent of the owner, take the whole lot, when only a part is required for
public use, and the residue to be applied to private use, it assumes a pow£>r
which, with all respect, the legislature did not possess. The constitution, by
authorizing the appropriation of property to public use, impliedly declares that
for any other use private property shall not be taken from one and applied to the
private use of another. It is in violation of natural nght; and if it is not in
Yiolation of the letter of the constitution, it is of its spirit, antl cannot he supported. This power has been supposed to be convenient when the greater part
of a lot is taken, and only a small part left, not required for public 'use, and that
small part of but little value in the hands of the owner. In such ease the corporation has been supposed best qualified ·to take and dispose of such parcel~, or
gores, as they have sometimes been called; and prob:tbly this assumption of
power has been acquiesced in by the proprietors. I know of no c~se where the
power has been questioned, and where it has received the deliberate sanction of
this court. Suppose a case where only a few feet, or even inches, are wanted,
from one end of-a lot to widen a street, and a valuable building stands upon the
other end of such lot ; would the power be conceded to exist to take the whole
lot, whether the owner consented or not? The quantity of the residue of any
lot cannot vary the principle. The owner may be very unwill~g to part with
only a few feet; and I hold it equally incompetent for the legislature to dispose
or private property, whether feet or acres are the subject of this assumed power."
Matter of Albany St. 11 Wend. 1.">1, per Savage, Cb. J.
1 Embury v. Conner, 3 N.Y. 611.
There is clearly nothing in constitutional
principles which would preclude the legislature from providing that a man's prop·
crty might be taken with his assent, whether the assent was evidenced by deed or
not; and if he accepts payment, he must be deemed to assent. The more recent
case of House v. Rochester, 15 Bar.b. 517, is not, we think, opposed to Embury
o. Conner, ofwhich it makes no mention.
1 Chicago B. and Q. R.R. Co. v. Wilson-, 17lll. 123; Lowv. Galena and C. U.
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and so on. Express legislative power, however, is needed for

[CH. XV.

these purposes; it will not follow that, because such things are

convenient to the accomplishment of the general object, the public

may appropriate them without express authority of law; but the

power to appropriate must be expressly conferred, and the public

agencies seeking to exercise this high prerogative must be careful

to keep within the authority delegated, since the public necessity

cannot be held to extend beyond what has been plainly declared

on the face of the legislative enactment.

What constitutes a Taking of Property.

Any proper exercise of the powers of government, which does

not directly encroach upon the property of an individual, or dis-

turb him in its possession or enjoyment, will not entitle him to

, compensation, or give him a right of action.‘ If, for in-

and so on. Express legislative power, however, is needed for
these purposes ; it will not follow that, because such things are
convenient to the accomplishment of the general object, the public
may appropriate them without express authority of law; but the
power to appropriate must be expressly conferred, and the public
agencies seeking to exercise this high prerogative must be careful
to keep within the authority delegated, since the public necessity
cannot be held to extend beyond what has been plainly declared
on the face of the legislative enactment.

[* 542] stance, the * State, under its power to provide and regulate

the public highways, should authorize the construction of

a bridge across a navigable river, it is quite possible that all pro-

prietary interests in land upon the river might be injuriously

What constitutes a Taking of Property.

affected ; but such injury could no more give a valid claim against

the State for damages, than could any change in the general laws

of the State, which, while keeping in view the general good, might

injuriously affect particular interests.’ So if, by the erection of a
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dam in order to improve navigation, the owner of a ﬁshery ﬁnds it

diminished in value,3 or if by deepening the channel of a river to

B..R. Co. 18 Ill. 324; Giesy v. Cincinnati, W. and Z. R.R. Co. 4 Ohio, N. 5.

308.

‘ Zimmerman v. Union Canal Co. 1 VV. & S. 346; Shrunk v. Schuylkill Nav-

igation Co. 14 S. & R. 71; Monongahela Navigation Co. v. Coons, 6 W. & S.

101; Davidson v. Boston and Maine R.R. Co. 3 Cush. 9] ;- Gould v. Hudson

River R.R. Co. 12 Barb. 616, and 6 N. Y. 522; Radclilf v. Mayor, &c.,

of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 195; Murray v. Menifce, 20 Ark. 561; Hooker v. New

Haven and Northampton Co. 14 Conn. 146; People v. Kerr, 27 N. Y. 193; Fuller

v. Eddings, 11 Rich. Law, 239; Eddings v. Seabrook, 12 Rich. Law, 504;

Richardson v. Vermont Central R.R. Co. 25 Vt. 465; Kennett’s Petition, 4

Fost. 139; Alexander v. Milwaukee, 16 Wis. 247; Richmond, &c., Co. v. Rogers,

1 Duvall, 135; Harvey v. Lackawana, &c., R.R. Co. 47 Penn. St. 428; Tinicum

Fishing Co. v. Carter, 61 Penn. St. 21. V

’ Davidson v. Boston and Maine l{.R. Co. 3 Cush. 91.

Any proper exercise of the powers of government, which does
not directly encroach upon the property of an individual, or disturb him in its possession or enjoyment, will not entitle him to
,
compensation, or give him a right of action.1 If, for in[* 542] stance, the *State, under its power to provide and regulate
the public highways, should authorize the construction of
a bridge across a navigable river, it is quite possible that all proprietary interests in land ':lpon the river might be injuriously
affected; but such injury could no more give a valid claim against
the State for damages, than could any change in the general laws
of the State, which, while keeping in view the general good, might
injuriously affect particular interests.2 So if, by the erection of a
dam in order to improve navigation, the owner of a fishery finds it
diminished in value,a or if by deepening the channel of a river to

" Shrunk v. Schuylkill Navigation Co. 14 S. & R. 71.,
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R.R. Co. 18 Til. 824; Giesy v. Cincinnati, W. and Z. R.R. Co. 4 Ohio, N. s.
808.
1 Zimmerman v. Union Canal Co. 1 W. & S. 846; Shrunk v. Schuylkill Navigation Co. 14 S. & R. 71; Monongahela Navigation Co. v. Coons, 6 W. & S.
101; Davidson v. Boston and Maine R.R. Co. 3 Cush. 91 ;·Gould v. Hudson
River R.R. Co. 12 Barb. 616, and 6 N. Y. 522; Radcliff v. Mayor, &c.,
ofBrooklyn,4N. Y.195; Murrayv. Menifee, 20 Ark. 561; Hooker v. New
Haven and Northampton Co. 14 Conn. 146; People v. Kerr, 27 N.Y. 193; Fuller
v. Eddings, 11 Rich. Law, 289; Eddings v. Seabrook, 12 Rich. Law, 504;
Richardson v. Vermont Central R.R. Co. 25 Vt. 465; Kennett's Petition, 4
Fost. 139; Alexander v. Milwaukee, 16 Wis. 247; Richmond, &c., Co. v. Rogers,
1 Duvall, 185; Harvey v. Lackawana, &c., R.R. Co. 47 Penn. St. 428; Tinicum
Fishing Co. v. Carter, 61 Penn. St. 21.
' Davidson t•. Boston and ~Iaine R.R. Co. 8 Cush. 91.
3 Shrunk "· Schuylkill Navigation Co. 14 S. & R. 7l..
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the grade of a city street the value of adjacent lots is diminished,”

—in these and similar cases the law affords no redress‘ for the

injury. So if, in consequence of the construction of a public

work, an injury occurs, but the work was constructed on proper

plan and without negligence, and the injury is caused by acci-

dental and extraordinary circumstances, the injured party cannot

demand compensation.”

‘This principle is peculiarly applicable to those cases [*543]

where property is appropriated under the right of eminent

domain. It must frequently occur that a party will ﬁnd his rights

seriously affected without any property to which he has lawful

claim being appropriated. As where a road is laid out along the

line of a man’s land without appropriating any portion of it, so

that in consequence he is compelled to keep up the whole of a fence

where before was a partition fence, one-half of which his neighbor

was required to Sllpp0rt.4 No property being taken in this case,

the party has no relief, unless the statute shall give it. The loss

is damnum absque irqjuria. So a turnpike company, whose proﬁts

1 Commonwealth v. Richter, 1 Penn. St. 467. '

2 British Plate Manufacturing Co. v. Meredith, 4 T. R. 794; Matter of Fur-

man Street, 17 Wend. 649; Radcliff’s Ex‘rs v. Mayor, &c., of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y.
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195; Graves v. Otis, 2 Hill, 466; VVilson v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 1 Denio,

595; Murphy v. Chicago, 29 Ill. 279; Roberts v. Chicago, 26 Ill. 249; Charlton

v. Alleghany City, 1 Grant, 208; La Fayette v. Bush, 19 Ind. 326; Macy v.

Indianapolis, 17 Ind. 267; Vincennes v. Richards, 23 Ind. 381; Green v.

Reading, 9 Watts, 382; O‘Conner v. Pittsburg, 18 Penn. St. 187; In re Ridge

Street, 29 Penn. St. 391; Callendar 0. Marsh, 1 Pick. 417; Creal v. Keokuk, 4

improve the navigation a spring is destroyed,1 or by a change in
the grade of a city street the value of adjacent lots is diminished,2
-in these and similar cases the law affords no redress for the
InJury. So if, in consequence of the construction of a public
work, an injury occurs, but the work was constructed on proper
plan and without negligence. and the injury is caused by accidental and extraordinary circumstances, the injured party cannot
demand compeusation.s
• This principle is peculiarly applicable to those cases [* 543]
where property is appropriated under the right of eminent
domain. It must frequently occur that a party will find his rights
seriously affected without any property to which he has lawful
claim being appropriated. As where a road is laid out along the
line of a man's land without appropriating any portion of it, so
that in consequence he is compelled to keep up the whole of a fence
where before was a partition fence, one-half of which his neighbor
was required to support.4 No property being taken in this case,
the party has no relief, unless the statute shall give it. The loss
is damnum absque injuria. So a turnpike company, whose profits

Greene (Iowa), 47; Smith v. VVashington, 20 How. 135; Skinner v. Hartford

Bridge Co. 29 Conn. 523; Benden 0. Nashua, 17 N. H1 477 ; Goszler v. George-

town, 6 Wheat. 703. The cases of McComb v. Akron, 15 Ohio, 474, and 18

Ohio, 229; and Crawford v. Delaware, 7 Ohio, N. s. 459, are contra. Those

cases, however, admit that a party whose interests are injured by the orig-

inal establishment of a street grade can have no claim to compensation; but

they hold that when the grade is once established, and lots are improved in

reference to it, the corporation has no right to change the grade afterwards,

except on payment of the damages.

3 As in Sprague v. Worcester, 13 Gray, 193, where, in consequence of the

erection of a bridge over a stream on which a mill was situated, the mill was

injured by an extraordinary rise in the stream; the bridge, however, being in all

respects properly constructed.

‘ Kc-nnett’s Petition, 4 Fost. 139. And Eddings v. Seabrook, 12 Rich. Law,

50L.
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Commonwealth v. Richter, 1 Penn. St. 467.
British Plate Manufacturing Co. v. Meredith, 4 T. R. 794; Matter of Furman Street, 17 Wend. 649; Radcliff's Ex'rs v. Mayor, &c., of Brooklyn, 4 N.Y.
195; Graves v. Otis, 2 Hill, 466; Wilson v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 1 Denio,
595; Murphy v. Chicago, 29 Ill. 279; Roberts v. Chicago, 26 Ill. 249; Charlton
v. Alleghany City, 1 Grant, 208; La Fayette v. Bush, 19 Ind. 326; Macy v.
Indianapolis, 17 Ind. 267; Vincennes v. Richards, 23 Ind. 381; Green v.
Reading, 9 Watts, 382; O'Conner v. Pittsburg, 18 Penn. St. 187; In re Ridge
Street, 29 Penn. St. 391; Callendar v. Marsh, 1 Pick. 417; Creal v. Keokuk, 4
Greene (Iowa), 47; Smith v. Washington, 20 How. 135; Skinner v. Hartford
Bridge Co. 29 Conn. 523; Benden v. Nashua, 17 N.H. 477; Goszler v. Georgetown, 6 Wheat. 703. The cases of McComb v. Akron, 15 Ohio, 474, and 18
Ohio, 229; and Crawford v. Delaware, 7 Ohio, N. s. 459, are contra. Those
cases, however, admit that a party whose interests are injured by the original establishment of a street grade can have no claim to compensation ; but
they hold that when the grade is once established, and lots are improved in
reference to it, the corporation has no right to change the grade afterwards,
except on payment of the damages.
3 As in Sprague v. Worcester, 13 Gray, 193, where, in consequence of the
erection of a bridge over a stream on which a mill was situated, the mill was
injured by an extraordinary rise in the stream; the bridge, however, being in all
respects properly consiructed.
4 Kennett's Petition, 4 Fost. 139.
And Eddings v. Seabrook, 12 Rich. Law,
50!.
1

l
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will be diminished by the construction of a railroad along the same
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general line of travel, is not entitled to compensation.‘ So where

a railroad company, in constructing their road in a proper manner

on their own land, raised a high embankment near to and in front

of the plaintiﬂ"s house, so as to prevent his passing to and from

the same with the same convenience as before, this consequential

injury was held to give no claim to compensation.” So the owner

of dams erected by legislative authority is without remedy, if they

are afterwards rendered valueless by the construction of a

["‘ 544] canal.“ " And in New York it has been held that, as the

' Troy and Boston R.R. C0. v. Northern Turnpike Co. 16 Barb. 100. See

La Fayette Plank Road Co. v. New Albany and Salem R.R.. Co. 13 Ind. 90;

Richmond, &c., Co. v. Rogers, 1 Duvall, 135. So an increased competition with

a party‘s business caused by the construction or extension of a road is not a

ground of claim. Harvey v. Lackawana, &c., R.R. Co. 47 Penn. St. 428.

“Every great public improvement must, almost of necessity, more or less

will be diminished by the construction of a railroad along the same
general line of travel, is not entitled to compensation.1 So where
a railroad company, in constructing their road in a proper manner
on their own land, raised a high embankment near to and in front
of the plaintiff's house, so as to prevent his passing to and from
the same with the same convenience as before, this consequential
injury was held to give no claim to compensation.2 So the owner
of dams erected by legitdative authority is without remedy, if they
are afterwards rendered valueless by the construction of a
[• 544] canal.8 • And in New York it has been held that, as the

aﬂ'ect individual convenience and property; and when the injury sustained is

remote and consequential, it is damnum absque injuria, and is to be borne as a

part of the price to be paid for the advantages of the social condition. This is

founded upon the principle that the general good is to prevail over partial

individual convenience.” Lansing v. Smith, 8 Cow. 149.

' Richardson v. Vermont Central R.R. Co. 25 Vt. 465. But quwrc if this
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could be so, if the effect were to prevent access from the lot to the highway. In

certain Indiana cases it is‘said that the right of the owner of adjoining land to

the use of the highway is as much property as the land itself; that it is appurte-

nant to the land, and is protected by the constitution. Haynes v. Thomas, 7 Ind.

38; Protzman v. Indianapolis, &c., R.R. Co. 9 Ind. 469; New Albany and

Salem R.R. Co. v. O’Dailey, 13 Ind. 463. The same doctrine is recognized in

Crawford v. Delaware, 7 Ohio, N. s. 459, and Street Railway v. Cummins-

ville, 14 Ohio, N. s. 523. In the Vermont case above cited it was_ held that an

excavation by the company on their own land, so near the line of the plaintiﬁ"s

that his land, without any artiﬁcial weight thereon, slid into the excavation,

would render the company liable for the injury; the plaintitf being entitled to the

lateral support for his land. _

’ Susquehanna Canal Co. v. \Vright, 9 W. & S. 9; Monongahela Navigation

Co. v. Coons, 6 W. & S. 101. In any case, if parties exercising the right of

eminent domain shall cause injury to others by a negligent or improper construc-

tion of their work, they may be liable in damages. Rowe v. Granite Bridge

Corporation, 21 Pick. 348; Sprague v. \Vorcester, 13 Gray, 193. And if a

public work is of a character to necessarily disturb the occupation and enjoyment

of his estate by one whose land is not taken, he may have an action on the case

for the injury, notwithstanding the statute makes no provision for compensation.

As where the necessary, and not simply the accidental, consequence was, to ﬂood

a man’s premises with water, thereby greatly diminishing their value. Hooker

v. New Haven and Northampton Co. 14 Conn. 146; Same Case, 15 Conn. 312;

[coo]

1 Troy and Boston R.R. Co. v. Northern Turnpike Co. 16 Barb. 100.
See
La Fayette Plank Road Co. 11. New Albany and Salem R.R. Co. 13 Ind. 90;
Richmond, &c., Co. v. Rogers, 1 Duvall, 135. So an increased competition with
a party's business caused by the construction or extension of a road is not a
ground of claim. Harvey v. Lackawana, &c., R.R. Co. 47 Penn. St. 428.
"Every great public improvement must, almost of necessity, more or less
affect individual convenience and property ; and when the injury sustained is
remote and consequential, it is damnum absque injuria, and is to be borne as a
part of the price to be paid for the advantages of the social condition. This is
founded upon the principle that the general good is to prevail over partial
individual convenience." Lansing v. Smith, 8 Cow. 149.
1 Richardson v. Vermon"t Central R.R. Co. 25 Vt. 465. But qua:rc if this
could be so, if the effect were to prevent access from the lot to the highway. In
certain Indiana cases it is"sai<l that the right of the owner of adjoining land to
the use of the highway is as much property as the land itself; that it is appurtenant to the land, and is protected by the constitution. Haynes v. Thomas, 7 Ind.
88; Protzman v. Indianapolis, &c., R.R. Co. 9 Ind. 469; New Albany and
Salem R.R. Co. 11. O'Dailey, 13 Ind. 468. The same doctrine is recognized in
Crawford v. Delaware, 7 Ohio, N. s. 459, and Street Railway v. Cumminsville, 14 Ohio, N. s. 523. In the Vermont case above cited it was held that an
excavation by the company on their own land, so near the line of.the plaintiff's
that his land, without aay artificial weight thereon, slid into the excavation,
would render the company liable for the injury ; the plaintiff being entitled to the
•
lateral support for his land.
1 Susquehanna Canal Co."· Wright, 9 W. & S. 9; Monongahela Navigation
Co. "· Coons, 6 W. & S. 101. In any case, if parties exercising the right of
eminent domain shall cause injury to others by a negligent or improper construction of their work, they may be liable in damages. Rowe"· Granite Bridge
Corporation, 21 Pick. 848; Sprague "· Worcester, 18 Gray, 198. Anti if a
public work is of a character to necessarily disturb the occupation and enjoyment
of his estate by one whose land is not tllken, he may have an action on the case
for the injury, notwithstanding the statute makes no provision for compensation.
As where the necessary, and not simply the accidental, consequence was, to flood
a man's premises with water, thereby greatly diminishing their value. Hooker
11. New Haven and Northampton Co. 14 Conn. 146; Same Case, 15 Conn. 312;
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water mark, belongs to the public, the State may lawfully authorize

a railroad company to construct their road along the water front

below high-water mark, and that the owner of the adjacent bank

could claim no compensation for the consequential injury to his

interests.‘ So the granting of a ferry right with a landing on

private property within a highway terminating on a private stream

is not an appropriation of property,” the ferry being a mere

continuation of the highway, and the landing-place upon the

private property having previously been appropriated. to public

uses.

These cases must suﬂice as illustrations of the principle stated,

though many others might be referred to. On the other hand, any

injury to the property of an individual which deprives the owner of

the ordinary use of it is equivalent to a taking, and entitles him to

compensation.“ Water front on a stream where the tide does not

ebb and ﬂow is property, and if taken must be paid for as such.‘

So with an exclusive right of wharfage upon tide water.“ So with

the right of the owner of land to use an adjoining street,

whether he is owner of the land over which the " street is [* 545]

laid out or not.‘ So with the right of pasturage in streets,

which belongs to the owners of the soil? So a partial destruction
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Evansville, &c., R.R. Co. v. Dick, 9 Ind. 433; Robinson v. N.Y. and Erie R.R.

Co. 27 Barb. 512; Trustees of Wabash and Erie Canal v. Spears. 16 Ind. 441.

So where, by blasting rock in making an excavation, the fragments are thrown

upon adjacent buildings so as to render their occupation unsafe. Hay v. Cohoes

Co. 2 N. Y. 159: Tremain v. Same, ib. 163; Carman v. Steubenville and

Indiana R.R. Co. 4 Ohio, N_. s. 399; Sunbury and Erie R.R. Co. v. Hummel, 27

Penn. St. 99. There has been some disposition to hold private corporations

liable for all incidental damages caused by their exercise of the right of eminent

domain. See Tinsman v. Belvidere and Delaware R.R. Co. 2 Dutch. 148;

Alexander v. Milwaukee, 16 W'is. 255.

laud where the tide ebbs and flows, between high and low
water mark, belougs to the public, the State may lawfully authorize
a railroad compauy to construct their road along the water frout.
below high-water mark, and that the owner of the adjacent bank
could claim no compensation for the consequential injury to his
interests.1 So tho granting of a ferry right with a landing on
private property within a highway terminating on a private stream
is not an appropriation of property,2 the ferry being a mere
continuation of the highway, and the landing-place upon the
private property having previously been appropriated. to p~blic
uses.
These cases must suffice as illustrations of the principle stated,
though many others might be referred to. On the other hand, any
injury to the property of an individual which deprives the owner of
the ordinary use of it is equivalent to a taking, and entitles him to
compensation.3 Water front on a stream where the tide does not
ebb and flow is property, and if taken must be paid for as such.~
So with an exclusive right of wharfage upon tide water. 6 So with
the right of the owner of land to use an adjoining street,
whether he is owner of the land over which the • street is [• 545]
laid on t or not.a· So with the right of pasturage in streets,
which belongs to the owners of the soil.7 So a partial destruction

_' Gould v. Hudson River R.R. Co. 6 N. Y. 522. But see the dissenting

opinion of Edmonds, J ., in this case.

’ Murray v. Menifee, 20 Ark. 561.

‘ Hooker v. New Haven and Northampton Co. 14 Conn. 146.

‘ Varick v. Smith, 9 Paige, 547.

‘ Murray v. Sharp, 1 Bosw. 539.

“ Laekland v. North Missouri R.R. Co. 31 Mo. 180. See supra, p. 543,

note.

" Tonawanda R.R. Co. v. Munger, 5 Denio, 255; Woodruffv. Neal, 28 Conn.

165. In this case it was held that a by-law of a town giving liberty to the inhab-

itants to depasture their cows in the public highways under certain regulations,
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Evansville, &c., R.R. Co. v. Dick, 9 Ind. 433; Robinson v. N . Y. and Erie R.R.
Co. 27 Barb. 512; Trustees of Wahash and Erie Canal"· Speal'fl, 16 Ind. 441.
So where, by blasting rock in making an exeavation, the fragments are thrown
upon adjacent buildings so as to render their occupation unsafe. Hay v. Cohoes
Co. 2 N. Y. 159: Tremain v. Same, ib. 163; Carman v. Steubenville and
Indiana R.R. Co. 4 Ohio, N:. s. 899; Sunbury and Erie R.R. Co. v. Hummel, 2i
Penn. St. 99. There bas been some di~position to hold private corporations
liable for all incidental damages caused by their exercise of the right of eminent
domain. See Tinsman " · Belvidere and Delaware R.R. Co. 2 Dutch. 148;
Alexander ''· Milwaukee, 16 'Vis. 255.
1 Gould v. Hudson River R.R. Co. 6 N.Y. 522.
But see the dissenting
opinion of Edmonds, J., in this case.
1 Murray v. Menifee, 20 Ark. 561.
3 Hooker v. New Haven and Northampton Co. 14 Conn. 146.
~ Varick v. Smith, 9 Paige, 547.
6 Morray v. Sharp, 1 Bosw. 539.
v Lack land "· North Missouri R.R. Co. Sl Mo. 180. See supra, p. 543,
note.
7 Tonawanda R.R. Co. v.Munger, 5 Denio, 255; Woodrufl'v. Neal, 28 Conn.
165. In this case it was held that a by-law of a town giving liberty to the inhabitants to depasture their cows in the public highways under certain regulations,
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

or diminution of value of property by an act of the government

[cH. xv.

which directly and not merely incidentally aﬂects it, is to that

extent an appropriation}

It sometimes becomes important, where a highway has been

laid out and opened, to establish a diﬂerent and higher grade of

way upon the same line, with a view to accommodate an increased

public demand. The State may be willing to surrender the control

of the streets in these cases, and authorize turnpike, plank-road, or

railroad corporations to occupy them for their purposes; and if it

shall give.such consent, the control, so far as is necessary to the

purposes of the turnpike, plank-road or railway, is thereby passed

over to the corporation, and their structure i11 what was before a

common highway cannot be regarded as a public nuisance. But

the municipal organizations in the State have no power to give

such consent, without express_ legislative permission; the general

control of their streets which is commonly given by munic-

ipal charters not being sufficient authority for this purpose?

passed under the authority of a general statute empowering towns to pass such

by-laws. was of no validity, because it appropriated the pasturage,‘which was

private property, to the public use, without making compensation. The contrary

has been held in New York as to all highways laid out while such a statute was

in existence; the owner being held to be compensated for the pasturage as well
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as for the use of the land for other purposes, at the time the highway was laid

out. Griﬁin v. Martin, 7 Barb. 297; Hardenburgh v. Lockwood, 25 Barb. 9.

See also Kerwhacker v. Cleveland C. and C. R.R. Co. 3 Ohio, N.S. 177, where

or diminution of value of property by an act of the government
which directly and not merely incidentally affects it, is to that
extent an appropriation. 1
It sometimes becomes important, where a highway has been
laid out and opened, to establish a different and higher grade of
way upon the same line, with a view to accommodate an increased
public demand. The State may be willing to surrender the control
of the streets in these cases, and authorize turnpike, plank-road, or
railroad corporations to occupy them for their purposes ; and if it
shalJ give. such consent, the control, so far as is necessary to the
purposes of the turnpike, plank-road or railway, is thereby passed
over to the corporation, and their structure in what was before a
common highway cannot be regarded as a public nuisance. But
the municipal organizations in the State have no power to give
such consent, without express legislative permission; the general
control of their streets which is commonly given by municipal charters not being sufficient authority for this pnrpose.2

it was held that by ancient custom in that State there was a right of pasturage by

the public in the highways.

' See Glover v. Powell, 2 Stockt. 211.

’ Lackland v. North Missouri R.R. Co. 31 Mo, 180; New York and Harlem

R.R. Co. v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 1 Hilt. 562; Milhau v. Sharp, 27 N. Y.

611. In Inhabitants of Springﬁeld v. Connecticut River R.R. Co. 4 Cush. '71, it

was held that legislative authority to construct arailroad between certain termini,

without prescribing its precise course and direction, would not prima-facie confer

power to lay out the road on and along an existing public highway. Per Shaw,

Ch. J . : “ The whole course of legislation on the subject of railroads is opposed

to such a construction. The crossing of public highways by railroads is obviously

necessary, and of course warranted; and numerous provisions are industriously

made to regulate such crossings, by determining when they shall be on the same

and when on different levels, in order to avoid collision, and when on the

same level what gates, fences, and barriers shall be made, and what guards shall

be kept to insure safety. Had it been intended that railroad companies, under a

general grant, should have power to lay a railroad over a highway longitudinally.

which ordinarily is not necessary, we think that would have been done in express

terms, accompanied with full legislative provisions for maintaining such barriers

[ 602 ]

passed under the authority of a general statute empowering towns to pass such
by-laws, was of no validity, because it appropriated the pasturage, 'which was
private property, to the public use, without making compensation. The contrary
has been held in New York as to all highways laid out while such a statute was
in existence ; the owner being held to be compensated for the pasturage as well
. as for the use of the land for other purposes, at the time the highway was laid
out. Griffin v. Martin, 7 Barb. 297; Hardenburgh v. I~ockwood, 25 Barb. 9.
See also Kerwhacker v. Cleveland C. and C. R.R. Co. 3 Ohio, N.S. 177, where
it was held that by ancient custom in that State there was a right of pasturage by
the public in the highways.
1 See Glover v. Powell, 2 Stockt. 211.
1 Lackland v. North Missouri R.R. Co. 31 Mo~ 180; New York and Harlem
R.R. Co. v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 1 Hilt. 562; :Milhau v. Sharp, 27 N. Y.
611. In Inhabitants of Springfield v. Connecticut River R.R. Co. 4 Cush. 71, it
was held that legislative authority to construct a railroad between certain termini,
without prescribing its precise coune and direction, would not prima facie confer
power to lay out the road on and along an existing public highway. Per Shaw,
Ch. J.: "The whole course of legislation on the subject of railroads is opposed
to such a construction. The crossing of public highways by railroads is obviously
necessary, and of course warranted; and numerous provisions are industriously
made to regulate such crossings, by determining when they shall be on the same
and when on different levels, in order to avoid collision, and when on the
same level what gates, fences, and barriers shall be made, and what guards shall
be kept to insure safety. Had it been intended that railroad companies, under a
general grant, should have power to lay a railroad over a highway longitudinall~··
which ordinarily is not ncce~sary, we think that would han~ been done in exprl'S.:!
term~. aceomp:mit•d with full legislative provisions for maintaining such barriers
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When, however, the * public authorities have thus assented, ["‘ 546]

CH.

xv.]
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it may be found that the owners of the adjacent lots, who

are also owners of the fee in the highway subject to the public

easement, may be unwilling to assent to the change, and may ﬁnd

or believe their interests seriously and injuriously affected thereby.

The question may then arise, Is the owner of the land, who has

been once compensated for the injury he has sustained in the

appropriation of his land as a highway, entitled to a new assess-

ment for any further injury he may sustain in consequence of A the

street being subjected to a change in the use not contemplated at

the time of the original taking, but nevertheless in furtherance of

the same general purpose?

When a common highway is made a turnpike or a plank-road,

upon which tolls are collected, there is much reason for holding

that the owner of the soil is not entitled to any further compensa-

tion. The turnpike or the plank-road is still an avenue for public

travel, subject to be used in the same manner as the ordinary

highway was before, and if properly constructed is generally

expected to increase rather than diminish the value of property

along its line; and though the adjoining proprietors are required

to pay toll, they are supposed to be, and generally are, fully com-

pensated for this burden by the increased excellence of the road,
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and by their exemption from highway labor upon it.1 But it is

different when a highway is appropriated for the purposes of a

railroad. “ It is quite apparent that the use by the public

of a highway, and the use thereof by a * railroad company, [" 547]

is essentially different. In the one case every person is at

liberty to travel over the highway in any place or part thereof, but

and modes of separation as would tend to make the use of the same road, for

both modes of travel, consistent with the safety of travellers on both. The

absence of any such provision aﬁbrds a strong inference that, under general

terms, it was not intended that such a power should be given.” See also Com-

monwealth v. Erie and N. E. R.R. Co. 27 Penn. St. 339; Attorney-General v.

Morris and Essex R.R. Co. 4 C. E. Green, 586.

' See Commonwealth v. Wilkinson, 16 Pick. 175; Benedict v. Goit, 3 Barb.

459; Wright v. Carter, 3 Dutch. 76_; Chagrin Falls and Cleveland Plank Road

Co. v. Cane, 2 Ohio, N. s. 419; Douglass v. Turnpike Co. 22 Md. 219. But see

\Villiams v. Natural Bridge Plank Road Co. 21 Mo. 580. In Murray v. County

Commissioners of Berkshire, 12 Met. 455, it was held that owners of lands

adjoining n. turnpike were not entitled to compensation when the turnpike was

When, however, the • public authorities have thus assented, [* 546]
it may be found that the owners of the adjacent lots, who
are also owners of the fee in the highway subject to the public
easement, may be unwilling to assent to the change, and may find
or believe their interests seriously and injuriously affected thereby.
The question may then arise, Is the owner of the land, who has
been once compensated for the injury he has sustained in the
appropriation of his land as a highway, entitled to a new assessment for any further injury he may sustain in consequence of the
street being subjected to a change in the use not contemplated at
the time of the original taking, but nevertheless in furtherance of
the same general purpose ?
When a common highway is made a turnpike or a plank-road,
upon which tolls are collected, there is much reason for holding
that the owner of the soil is not entitled to any further compensation. The turnpike or the plank-road is still an avenue for public
travel, subject to be used in the same manner as the ordinary
highway was before, and if properly constructed is generally
expected to increase rather than diminish the value of property
along its line; and though the adjoining proprietors are required
to pay toll, they are supposed to be, and generally are, fully compensated for this burden by the increased excellence of the road,
and by their exemption from highway labor upon it. 1 But it is
different when a highway is appropriated for the purposes of a
railroad. "It is quite apparent that the use by the public
of a highway, and the use thereof by a • railroad company, [* 547]
is essentially different. In the one case every person is at
liberty to travel over the highway in any place or part thereof, but

changed to a common highway.

[602]

and modes of separation as would tend to make the use of the same road, for
both modes of travel, consistent with the safety of travellers on both. The
absence of any such provision affords a strong inference that, under general
terms, it was not intended that such a power should be given." See also Commonwealth v. Erie and N. E. R.R. Co. 27 Penn. St. 339; Attorney-General "·
Morris and Essex R.R. Co. 4 C. E. Green, 586.
1 See Commonwealth v. Wilkinson, 16 Pick. 175; Benedict v. Goit, 3 Barb.
459; Wright v. Carter, 3 Dutch. 76; Chagrin Falls and Cleveland Plank Road
Co. v. Cane, 2 Ohio, N. s. 419; Douglass v. Turnpike Co. 22 Md. 219. But see
Williams"· Natural Bridge Plank Road Co. 21 Mo. 580. In Murray v. County
Commissioners of Berkshire, 12 Met. 455, it was held that owners of lands
adjoining n turnpike were not entitled to compensation when the turnpike wns
clumgcd to n common highway.
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he has no exclusive right of occupation of any part thereof except

*547

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITA TlONS.

[CH. XV.

while he is temporarily passing over it. It would be trespass for

him to occupy any part of the highway exclusively for any longer

period of time than was necessary for that purpose, and the

stoppages incident thereto. But a railroad company takes ex-

clusive and permanent possession of a portion of the street or

highway. It lays down its rails upon, or imbeds them in, the soil,

and thus appropriates a portion of the street to its exclusive use,

and for its own particular mode of conveyance. In the one case,

all persons may travel on the street or highway in their own com-

mon modes of conveyance. In the other, no one can travel on or

over the rails laid down, except the railroad company and with

their cars specially adapted to the tracks. In one case the use is

general and open alike to all. In the other, it is peculiar and

exclusive.

“ It is true that the actual use of the street by the railroad may

not be so absolute and constant as to exclude the public also from

its use. With a single track, and particularly if the ears used

upon it were propelled by horse-power, the interruption of the public

easement in the street might be very triﬂing and of no practical

consequence to the public at large. But this consideration

cannot affect the question of the right of property, or of the in-
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crease of the burden upon the. soil. It would present simply

a question of degree in respect to the enlargement of the ease-

ment, and would not affect the principle, that the use of a

street for the purposes of a railroad imposed upon it a new

burden.” 1

‘ Wager v. Troy Union R.R. Co. 25 N. Y. 532, approving Williams v. New

York Central R.R. Co. 16 N. Y. 97; Carpenter v. Oswego and Syracuse R.R.

Co. 24 N. Y. 655; Mahon v. New York Central R.R. Co. ib. 658. In Inhab-

itants of Springﬁeld v. Connecticut River R.R. Co. 4 Cush. 71, where, however,

the precise question here discussed was not involved, Chief Justice Shaw, in

comparing railroads with common highways, says: “ The two uses are almost, if

not wholly, inconsistent with each other, so that taking the highway for a railroad

will nearly supersede the former use to which it had been legally appropriated.”

See also Presbyterian Society of Waterloo v. Auburn and Rochester R..R. Co.

3 Hill, 567 ; Craig u. Rochester, &c., R.R. Co. 39 Barb. 494; Schurmeier v.

St. Paul, &c., R.R. Co. 10 Minn. 82; Gray v. First Division, &c. 13 Minn. 365.

The cases of Philadelphia and Trenton R.R. Co. 6 Whart. 25, and Morris and

he has no exclusive right of occupation of an,r part thereof except
while he is temporarily passing over it. It would be trespass for
him to occupy any part of the highway exclusively for any longer
period of time than was necessary for that purpose, and the
stoppages incident thereto. But a railroad company takes ex. elusive and permanent possession of a portion of the street or
highway. It lays down its rails upon, or imbeds them in, the soil,
and thus appropriates a portion of the street to its exclusive use,
and for its own particular mode of conveyance. In the one case,
all persons may travel on the street or highway in their own common modes of conveyance. In the other, no one can travel on or
over the rails laid down, except the railroad company and with
their cars specially adapted to the tracks. In one case the use is
general and open alike to all. lu the other, it is peculiar and
exclusive.
" It is true that the actual use of the street by the railroad may·
not be so absolute and constant as to exclude the public also from
its use. With a single track, and particularly if the cars used
upon it were propelled by horse-power, the interruption of the public
easement in the street might be very trifling and of no practical
consequence to the public at large. But this consideration
cannot affect the question of the right of property, or of the increase of the burden upon the soil. It would present simply
a question of degree in respect to the enlargement of the easement, and would not affect the principle, that the use of a
street for the purposes of a railroad imposed upon it a new
burden." 1

Essex R.R. Co. v. Newark, 2 Stockt. 352. are opposed to the New York cases.

And see Wolfe v. Covington and Lexington R.R. Co. 15_ B. Monr. 40-L; Com-

[604]

1 Wager v. Troy Union R.R. Co. 25 N.Y. 532, approving Williams o. New
York Central R.R. Co. 16 N.Y. 97; Carpenter "· Oswego and Syracuse R.R.
Co. 24 N.Y. 655; :Mahon "· New York Central R.R. Co. ib. 658. In Inhabitants of Springfield v. Conne<:ticut Rive1· R.R. Co. 4 Cush. 71, where, however,
the precise question here discussed was not involved, Chief Justice Shaw, in
comparing railroads with common highways, says: " The two uses are almost, if
not wholly, inconsistent with each other, so that taking the highway for a railroad
will nearly supersede the former use to which it had been legally appropriated."
See also Presbyterian Society of Waterloo "· Auburn and Rochester R.R. Co.
8 Hill, 567; Craig v. Rochester, &c., R.R. Co. 89 Barb. 494; Schurmeier "·
St. Paul, &c., R.R. Co. 10 Minn. 82; Gray "· First Division, &c. 13 Minn. 865.
The cases of Philadelphia and Trenton R.R. Co. 6 Whart. 25, and Morris and
Essex R.R. Co."· Newark, 2 Stockt. 352, are opposed to the New York cases.
And see Wolfe"· Covington and Lexington R.R. Co. 15.B. Monr. 404; Com-
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* The case from which we here quote is approved in [* 548]

cu. xv.]

• 548

THE EMINENT DOMAIN.

recent cases in Wisconsin, where importance is attached

to the different effect the common highway and the railroad will

have upon the value of adjacent property. “ The dedication to the

public as a highway,” it is said, “ enhances the value of the lot,

and renders it more convenient and useful to the owner. The use

by the railroad company diminishes its value, and renders it

inconvenient and comparatively useless. It would be a most

unjust and oppressive rule which would deny the owner compensa-

tion under such circumstances.” 1

It is not always the case, however, that the value of a lot of "land

will be enhanced by the laying out of a. common highway across it,

or diminished by the construction of a railway over the same line

afterwards. The constitutional question cannot depend upon the

accidental circumstance that the new road will or will not have

an injurious effect; though that circumstance is’ properly referred

to, since it is difficult to perceive how a change of use which may

possibly have an injurious effect not contemplated in the original

appropriation can be considered any thing else than the imposition

of a new burden upon the owner’s estate. In Connecticut, where

the authority of the legislature to authorize a railroad to be

constructed in a common highway without compensation to land
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owners is also denied, importance is attached to the terms of the

statute under which the original appropriation was made, and

which are regarded as permitting the taking for the purposes of a

common highway, and for no other. The reasoning of the court

appears to us sound ; and it is applicable to the statutes of the States

generally.“

monwealth v. Erie and N. E. R.R. C0. 27 Penn. St. 339; Snyder v. Pennsyl-

vania R.R. Co. 55 Penn. St. 344.

‘ Ford v. Chicago and Northwestern R.R. Co. 14 Wis. 616; followed in

Pomeroy v. Chicago and M. R.R. Co. 16 Wis. 640.

' Imlay v. Union Branch R R. Co. 26 Conn. 255. “ When land is condemned

for a special purpose,” say the court, “ on the score of public utility, the seques-

tration is limited to that particular use. Land taken for a highway is not thereby

converted into a common. As the property is not taken, but the use only, the

right of the public is limited to the use, the speciﬁc use, for which the proprietor

has been devested of a. complete dominion over his own estate. These are propo-

sitions which are no longer open to discussion. But it is contended that land

once taken and still held for highway purposes may be used for a railway without

• The case from which we here quote is approved in [• 548]
recent cases in Wisconsin, where importance is attached
to the different effect the common highway and the railroad will
have upon the value of adjacent property. "The dedication to the
public as a highway," it is said, " enhances the value of the lot,
and renders it more convenient and useful to the owner. The use
by the railroad co_mpany diminishes its value, and renders it
inconvenient and comparatively useless. It would be a most
unjust and oppressive rule which would deny the owner compensation under such circumstances." 1
It is not always the case, however, that the value of a lot of-land
will be enhanced by the laying out of a common highway across it,
or diminished by the construction of a railway over the same line
afterwards. The constitutional question cannot depend upon the
accidental circumstance that the new road will or will not have
an injurious effect ; though that circumstance is• properly referred
to, since it is difficult to perceive how a change of use which may
possibly have an injurious effect not contemplated in the original
appropriation can be considered any thing else than the imposition
of a new burden upon the owner's estate. In Connecticut, where
the authority of the legislature to authorize a railroad to be
constructed in a common highway without compensation to land
owners is also denied, importance is attached to tho terms of the
statute under which the original appropriation was made, and
which are regarded as permitting the taking for the purposes of a
common highway, and for no other. The reasoning of the court
appears to us sound ; and it is applicable to the statutes of the States
generally .2

exceeding the limits of the easement already acquired by the public. If this is

true, if the new use of the land is within the scope of the original sequestration

[605]

monwealth t~. Erie and N. E. R.R. Co. 27 Penn. St. 339; Snyder t~. Pennsylvania R.R. Co. 55 Penn. St. 344.
1 Ford t~. Chicago and Northwestern R.R. Co. 14 Wis. 616; followed in
Pomeroy t~. Chicago and l\1. R.R. Co. 16 Wis. 640.
1 Imlay t~. Union Branch R R. Co. 26 Conn. 255.
"When land is condemned
for a special purpose," say the court, '' on the score of public utility, the sequestration is limited to that particular use. Land taken for a highway is not thereby
converted into a common. As the property is not taken, but the use only, the
right of the public is limited to the use, the specific use, for which the proprietor
has been devested of a complete dominion over his own estate. These arc propositions which are no longer open to discussion. But it is contended that land
once taken and still held for highway purposes may be used for a railway without
exceeding the limits of the easement already acquired by the public. If this is
true, if the new use of the land is within the scope of the original sequestration

[ 605]

* 549 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [cm xv.

[* 549] ‘It would appear from the cases cited that the weight

* 549

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

[cu. xv.

of judicial authority is against the power of the legisla-

or dedication, it would follow that the railway privileges are not an encroach-

ment on the estate remaining in the owner of the soil, and that the new mode of

enjoying the public easement will not enable him rightfully to assert a claim

[* 549]

• It would appear from the cases cited that the weight
of judicial authority is against the power of the legisla-

to damages therefor. On the contrary, if the true intent and eﬁieacy of the

original condemnation was not to subject the land to such a burden as will be

imposed upon it when it is conﬁscated to the uses and control of a railroad cor-

poration, it cannot be denied that in such a case the estate of the owner of the

soil is injuriously affected by the supervening servitude; that his rights are

abridged, and that in a legal sense his land is again taken for public uses. Thus

it appears that the court have simply to decide whether there is such an identity

between a highway and a railway, that statutes conferring a right to establish the

former include an authority to construct the latter.

“ The term ‘ public highway,’ as employed in such of our statutes as convey

the right of eminent domain, has certainly a limited import. Although, as sug-

gested at the bar, a navigable river or a canal is, in some sense, a public highway,

yet an easement assumed under the name of a highway would not enable the

public to convert~a street into a canal. The highway, in the true meaning of

the word, would be destroyed. But as no such destruction of the highway is

necessarily involved in the location of a railroad track upon it, we are pressed

to establish the legal proposition that a highway, such as is referred to in
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these statutes, means or at least comprehends a railroad. Such a construction

is possible only when it is made to appear that there is a substantial practical

or technical identity between the uses of land for highway and for railway pur-

poses.

“ No one can fail to see that the terms ‘ railway’ and ‘ highway’ are not con-

vertible, or that the two uses, practically considered, although analogous, are not

identical. Land as ordinarily appropriated by a railroad company is incon-

venient, and even impassable, to those who would use it as a common highway.

Such a corporation does not hold itself bound to make or to keep its embankments

and bridges in a condition which will facilitate the trzmsitus of such vehicles as

ply over an ordinary road. A practical dissimilarity obviously exists between a.

railway and a common highway, and is recognized as the basis of a legal distinc-

tion between them. It is so recognized on a large scale when railway privileges

are sought from legislative bodies, and granted by them. Ifthc terms ‘ highway ’

and ‘railway’ are synonymous, or if one of them includes the other by legal

implication, no act could be more superﬂuous than to require or to grant author-

ity to construct railways over localities already occupied as highways.

“ If a legal identity does not subsist between a highway and a railway, it is

illogical to argue that, because a railway may be so constructed as not to inter-

fere with the ordinary uses of a highway, and so as to be consistent with the

highway right already existing, therefore such a new use is included within

the old use. It might as well be urged, that if a common, or a canal, laid out

over the route of a public road, could be so arranged as to leave an ample

roadway for vehicles and passengers on foot, the land should be held to be
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or dedication, it would follow that the railway privileges are not an encroachment on the estate remaining in the owner of the soil, and that the new mode of
enjoying the public easement will not enable him rightfully to assert a daim
to damages therefor. On the contrary, if the true intent and efficacy of the
original condemnation was not to subject the land to such a burden as will be
imposed upon it when it is confiscated to the uses and control of a railroad corporation, it cannot be denied that in such a case the estate of the owner of the
soil is injuriously affected by the supervening servitude; that his rights are
abridged, and that in a legal sense his land is again taken for public uses. Thus
it appears that the court have simply to decide whether there is such an identity
between a highway and a railway, that statutes conferring a right to establish the
former include an authority to construct the latter.
"The term' public highway,' as employed in such of our statutes as convey
the right of eminent domain, has certainly a limited import. Although, as suggested at the bar, a navigable river or a canal i~, in some sense, a public highway,
yet an easement assumed under the name of a highway would not enable the
public to convert·& street into a canal. The highway, in the true meaning of
the word, would be destroyed. But as no such destruction of the highway is
necessarily involved in the location of a railroad track upon it, we are pressed
to establish the legal proposition that a highway, such as is referred to in
these statutes, means or at least comprehends a railroad. Such a construction
is possible only when it is Rl&de to appear that there is a substantial practical
or technical identity between the uses of land for highway and for railway purposes.
" No one can fail to see that the terms ' railway' and 'highway' are not convertible, or that the two uses, practically considered, although analogous, are not
identical. Land as ordinarily appropriated by a railroad company is inconvenient, and even impassable, to those who would use it as a common highway.
Such a corporation does not hold itself bound to make or to keep its embankments
and bridges in a condition which will facilitate the transitus of such vehicles as
ply over an ordinary road. A practical dissimilarity obviously exists between a
railway and a common highway, and is recognized as the basis of a legal distinction between them. It is so recognized on a large scale when railway privileges
are sought from legislative bodies, and granted by them. If the terms ' highway '
and 'railway' are synonymous, or if one of them includes the other by legal
implication, no act could be more superfluous than to require or to grant authority to construct railways over localities already occupied as highways.
"If a legal identity does not subsist between a highway and a railway, it is
illogical to argue that, because a railway may be so constructed as not to interfere with the ordinary uses of a highway, and so as to be consistent with the
highway right already existing, therefore such a new use is included within
the old use. It might as well be urged, that if a common, or a canal, laid out
over the route of a public road, could be so arranged as to leave an ample
roadway for vehicles and passengers on foot, the land should be held to be
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ture to appropriate a * common highway to the purposes [" 550]
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of a railroad, unless at the same time provision is made

originally condemned for a canal or a common, as properly incident to the high-

way use.

“ There is an important practical reason why courts should be slow to recog-

ture to appropriate a • common highway to the purposes [• 550]
of a railroad, unless at the same time provision is made

nize a legal identity between the two uses referred to. They are by no means

the same thing to the proprietor whose land is taken ; on the contrary, they sug-

gest widely different standards of compensation. One can readily conceive of

cases where the value of real estate would be directly enhanced by the opening

of a highway through it; while its conﬁscation for a railway at the same or a sub-

sequent time would be a gross injury to the estate, and a total subversion of the

mode of enjoyment expected by the owner when he yielded his private rights to

the public exigency.

“ But essential distinctions also exist between highway and railway powers, as

conferred by statute, — distinctions which are founded in the very nature of the

powers themselves. In the vase of the highway, the statute provides that, after

the observance of certain legal forms, the locality in question shall be forever

subservient to the right of every individual in the community to pass over the

thoroughfare so created at all times. This right involves the important implica-

tion that he shall so use the. privilege as to leave the privilege of all others as

unobstructed as his own, and that he is therefore to use the road in the manner

in which such roads are ordinarily used. with such vehicles as will not obstruct,
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or require the destruction of the ordinary modes of travel thereon. He is not

authorized to lay down a railway track, and run his own locomotive and car upon

it. N 0 one ever thought of regarding highway acts as conferring railway privi-

leges, involving a right in every individual, not only to break up ordinary travel,

but also to exact tolls from the public for the privilege of using the peculiar con-

veyances adapted to a railroad. If a right of this description is not conferred

when a highway is authorized by law, it is idle to pretend that any proprietor is

devested of such a right. It would seem that, under such circumstances, the

true construction of highway laws could hardly be debatable, and that the ab-

sence of legal identity between the two uses of which we speak was patent and

entire.

“ Again, no argument or illustration can strengthen the self-evident proposi-

tion that, when a railway is authorized over a public highway, a right is created

against the proprietor of the fee, in favor of a person, an artiﬁcial person, to

whom he before bore no legal relation whatever. It is understood that when

such an easement is sought or bestowed, a new and independent right will accrue

to the railroad corporation as against the owner of the soil, and that, without any

reference to the existence of the highway, his land will forever stand charged

with the accruing servitude. Accordingly, if such a highway were to be discon-

tinued according to the legal forms prescribed for that purpose, the railroad

corporation would still insist upon the express and independent grant of an case-

ment to itself, enabling it to maintain its own road on the site of the abandoned

roadway. We are of opinion, therefore, as was distinctly intimated by this court

in a former case (see opinion of Hinman, J ., in Nicholson v. N. Y. and N. H.
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originally condemned for a canal or a common, as properly incident to the highway us~.
" There is an important practical reason why courts should be slow to recognize a legal identity be~ween the two uses referred to. They are by no means
the same thing to the proprietor whose land is taken ; on the contrary, they suggest widely different standards of compensation. One can readily conceive of
cases where the value of real estate would be directly enhanced by the opening
of a highway through it; while its confiscation for a railway at the same or a sub~equent time would be a gross injury to the estate, and a total subversion of the
mode of enjoyment expected by the owner wht>n he yielded his private ri~hts to
the public exigenry.
" But essential distinctions also exist between highway and railway powers, as
conferred by statute, -distinctions which are founded in the very nature of the
powers themselves. In the cnse of the highway, the statute provides that, after
the obMervance of certain legal forms, the locality in question shall be forever
subservient to the right of every individual in the community to pass over the
thoroughfare so created at all times. This right involves the important implication that he shall so us~ the privilege as to leave the privilege of all others as
unobstructed as his own, and that he is therefore to use the road in the manner
in which such roads are ordinarily used, with such vehicles as will not obstruct,
or require the destruction of the ordinary modes of travel thereon. He is not
authorized to lay down a railway track, and run his own locomotive and car upon
it. No one ever thought of regarding highway acts as conferring railway privileges, involving a right in every individual, not only to break up ordinary travel,
but also to exact tolls from the public for the privilege of using the peculiar conveyances adapted to a railroad. If a right of this description is not conferred
when a highway is authorized hy law, it is idle to pretend that any proprietor is
de vested of such a right. It would seem that, under su1·h circumstances, the
true construction of highway laws could hardly be debatable, and that the absence of legal identity between the two uses of which we speak was patent and
entire .
.. Again, no argument or illustration can strengthen the self-evident proposition that, when a railway is authorized over a public highway, a right is created
against the proprietor of the fee, in favor of a person, an artificial person, to
whom he before bore no legal relation whatever. It is understood that when
such an easement is sought or bestowed, a new and independent right will accrue
to the railroad corporation as against the owner of the soil, and that, without any
reference to the existence of the highway, his land will forever stand charged
with the accruing servitude. Accordingly, if such a highway were to be discontinued according to the legal forms prescribed for that purpose, the railroad
corporation would still insist upon the express and independent grant of an easement to itself, enabling it to maintain its own road on the site of the abandoned
roadway. We are of opinion, therefore, as was distinctly intimated by this court
in a former case (see opinion of Hinman, J ., in Nicholson v. N. Y. and N. H.

'
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[* 551] for compensation to the owners of the fee. * These cases,

however, have had reference to the common railroad, oper-

ated by steam. In one of the New York casesl it is intimated,

and in another case in the same State it was directly decided, that

the ruling should be the same in the ease of the street railway oper-

ated by horse-power.” There is generally, howeyer, a very great

diﬁerence in the two cases, and some of the considerations to which

the courts have attached importance could have no application in

many eases of common horse railways. A horse railway, as a general

thing, will interfere very little with the ordinary use of the way by

the public, even upon the very line of the road; and in many

cases’ it would be a relief to an overburdened way, rather than an

impediment to the previous use. In Connecticut, after it had been

decided, as above shown, that the owner of the fee subject to a

perpetual highway was entitled to compensation when the highway

was appropriated for an ordinary railroad, it was also held that

the authority to lay and use a horse-railway track in a public street

was not a new servitude imposed upon the land for which the

owner of the fee would be entitled to damages, but that it was a

part of the public use to which the land was originally subjected

when taken for a street? The same distinction between horse

railways and those operated by steam is also taken in recent New
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York cases.‘ But whether the mere difference in the motive-

power will make different principles applicable, is a question which

the courts will probably have occasion to consider further. Cou-

ceding that the interests of individual owners will not generally

suffer, or their use of the highway be incommoded by the laying

down and use of the track of a horse railway upon it, there are

nevertheless cases where it might seriously impede, if not alto-

gether exclude, the general travel and use by the ordinary modes,

and very greatly reduce the value of all the property along the

line. Suppose, for instance, a narrow street in a city, occupied

R.R. Co. 22 Conn. 85), that to subject the owner of the soil of a highway to a

further appropriation of his land to railway uses is the imposition of a new ser-

vitude upon his estate, and is an act demanding the compensation which the law

awards when land is taken for public purposes."

' Wager v. Troy Union R.R. Co. 25 N. Y. 532.

' Craig v. Rochester City and Brighton R.B.. Co. 39 Barb. 449.

3 Elliott v. Fair Haven and VVestville R.R. Co. 32 Conn. 586.

‘ Brooklyn Central, &c., R.R. Co. v. Brooklyn City R.R. Co. 33 Barb. 422;

People v. Kerr, 37 Barb. 357; Same Case, 27 N. Y. 188.
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[* 551] for compensation to the owners of the fee. • These cases,
however, have had reference to the common railroad, oper·
ated by steam. In one of the New York cases 1 it is intimated,
and in another case in the same State it was directly decided, that
the ruling should be the same in the case of the street rail way operated by horse-power.2 There is generally, howeyer, a ""ery great
difference in the two cases, and some oi the considerations to which
the courts have attached importance could have no application in
many cases of common horse railways. A horse railway, as a general
thing, will interfere very little with the ordinary usfl of the way by
the public, even upon the very line of the road ; and in many
caseS' it would be a relief to an overburdened way, rather than an
impediment to the previous use. In Connecticut, after it had been
decided, as above shown, that the owner of the fee subject to a
perpetual highway was entitled to compensation when the highway
was appropriated for an ordinary railroad, it was also held that
the authority to lay and use a horse-railway track in a public street
was not a new servitude imposed upon the land for which the
owner of the fee would be entitled to damages, but that it was a
part of the public use to which the land was originally subjected
when taken for a street.3 The same distinction between horse
railways and those operated by steam is also taken in recent New
York cases.4 But whether the mere difference in the moth·epower will make different principles applicable, is a question which
the courts will probably have occasion to consider further. Conceding that the interests of individual owners will not generally
suffer, or their use of the highway be incommoded by the laying
down and use of the track of a horse railway upon it, there are
nevertheless cases where it might seriously impede, if not altogether exclude, the general travel aud use by the ordinary modes,
and very greatly reduce the Yalue of all the property along the
line. Suppose, for instance, a na1-row street in a city, occupied
R.R. Co. 22 Conn. 85), that to subject the owner of the soil of a highway to a
further appropriation of his land to railway uses is the imposition of a new servitude upon his estate, and is an act demanding the compensation which the law
awards when land is taken for public purposes."
1 Wager v. Troy Union R.R. Co. 25 N. Y. 532.
1 Craig v. Rochester City and Brighton R.R. Co. 39 Barb. 449.
3 Elliott v. Fair Haven and W estYille R.R. Co. 32 Conn. 586.
4 Brooklyn Central, &c., R.R. Co. v. Brooklyn City R.R. Co. 33 Barb. 422;
People v. Kerr, 87 Barb. 35i; Same Case, 27 N.Y. 188.
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altogether by wholesale houses, which require constantly the use
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of the whole street in connection with their business, and suppose

this to be turned over to a street-railway company, whose line is

such as to make the road a principal avenue of travel, and

to require such * constant passage of cars as to drive all [* 552]

drayage from the street.- The corporation, under these

circumstances, will substantially have a monopoly in the use of the

street; their vehicles will drive the business from it, and the

business property will become comparatively worthless. And if

property owners are without remedy in such case, it is certainly a

very great hardship upon them, and a very striking and forcible

instance and illustration of damage without legal injury.

When property is appropriated for a public way, and the pro-

prietor is paid for the public easement, the compensation is gener-

ally estimated, in practice, at the value of the land itself.‘ If,

therefore, no other circumstances were to be taken into the

account in these cases, the owner, who has been paid the value of

his land, could not reasonably complain of any use to which it

might afterwards be put by the public. But, as pointed out in the

Connecticut case,” the compensation is always liable either to

exceed or to fall below the value of the land taken, in consequence

of incidental injuries or beneﬁts to the owner as proprietor of the
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land which remains. These injuries or beneﬁts will be estimated

with reference to the identical use to which the property is appro-

priated; and if it is afterwards put to another use, which causes

greater incidental injury, and the owner is not entitled to further

compensation, it is very evident that he has suffered a wrong by

the change which could not have been foreseen and provided

against. And if, on the other hand, he is entitled in any case to

an assessment of damages in consequence of such an appropriation

of the street affecting his rights injuriously, then he must be enti-

tled to such an assessment in every case, and the question involved

will be, not as to the right, but only of the quantum of damages.

The horse railway either is or is not the imposition of a new

burden upon the estate. If it is not, the owner of the fee is

entitled to compensation in no case; if it is, he is entitled to have

an assessment of damages in every casel

' Murray v. County Commissioners, 12 Met. 457, per Shaw, Ch. J.

" Imlay v. Union Branch R.R. Co. 26 Conn. 257.

39 [ 609 ]

altogether by wholesale houses, which require constantly the use
of the whole street in connection with their business, and suppose
this to be turned over to a street-rail way company, whose line is
such as to make the road a principal avenue of travel, and
to require such • constant passage of cars as to drive all [• 552]
drayage from the street. · The corporation, under these
circumstances, will substantially have a monopoly in the use of the
street; their vehicles will drive the business from it, and the
business property will become comparatively worthless. And if
property owners are without remedy in such case, it is certainly a
Tery great hardship upon them, and a very striking and forcible
instance and illustration of damage without legal injury.
When property is appropriated for a public way, and th~ proprietor is paid for the public easement, the compensation is generally estimated, in practice, at the value of the land itself.l If,
therefore, no other circumstances were to be taken into the
account in these cases, the owner, who has been paid the value of
his land, could not reasonably complain of any use to which it
might afterwards be put by the public. But, as pointed out in the
Connecticut case,2 the compensation is always liable either to
exceed or to fall below the value of the land taken, in consequence
of incidental injuries or benefits to the owner as proprietor of the
land which remains. These injuries or benefits will be estimated
with reference to the identical use to which the property is appropriated ; and if it is afterwards put to another use, which causes
greater incidental injury, and the owner is not entitled to further
compensation, it is very evident that he has suffered a wrong by
the change which could not have been foreseen and provided
against. And if, on the other ha.nd, he is entitled in any case to
an assessment of damages in consequence of such an appropriation
of the street affecting his rights i11t}uriously, then he must be entitled to such an assessment in every case, and the question involved
will be, not as to the right, but only of the quantum of damages.
The horse railway either is or is not the imposition of a new
burden upon the estate. If it is not, the owner of the fee is
entitled to compensation in no case; if it is, he is entitled to have
an assessment of damages in every case:
1
1

Murray v. County Commissioners, 12 Met. 457, per Sltaw, Ch. J.
Imlay v. Union Branch R.R. Co. 26 Conn. 257.
39
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In New York, where, by law, when a public street is laid out or
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dedicated, the fee in the soil becomes vested in the city, it has been

held that the legislature might authorize the construction of a.

horse railway in a street, and that neither the city nor the owners

of lots were entitled to compensation, notwithstanding it

[* 553] was *found as a fact that the lot owners would suﬂer

injury from the construction of the road. The city was

not entitled, because, though it held the fee, it held it in trust for the

use of all the people of the State, and not as corporate or munici-

pal property; and the land having been originally acquired under

the right of eminent domain, and the trust being publici juria, it

was under the unqualiﬁed control of the legislature, and any

appropriation of it to public use by legislative authority could not

be regarded as an appropriation of the private property of the city.

And so far as the adjacent lot owners were concerned, their

interest in the streets, as distinct from that of other citizens, was

only as having a possibility of reverter after the public use of the

land should cease; and the value of this, if any thing, was inap-

preciable, and could not entitle them to compensation}

So in Indiana, where the title in fee to streets in cities and

villages is vested in the public, it is held that the adjacent land

owners are not entitled to the statutory remedy for an assessment
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of damages in consequence of the street being appropriated to the

use of a railroad; and this without regard to the motive-power by

which the road is operated. ~. At the same time it is also held that

the lot owners may maintain an action at law if, in consequence of

the railroad, they are cut off from the ordinary use of the street.“

So in Iowa it is held that where the title to city streets is in the

corporation in trust for the public, the legislature may authorize

‘ People v. Kerr, 37 Barb. 357; Same Case, 27 N. Y. 188. And see Brook-

lyn Central, &c., R.R. Co. v. Brooklyn City R.R. Co. 33 Barb. 420; Brooklyn

and Newtown R.R. Co. v. Couey Island R.R. Co. 35 Barb. 364; New York v.

Kerr, 38 Barb. 369; Chapman v. Albany and Schenectady R.R. Co. 10 Barb.

360. Although, in the case of People v. Kerr, the several judges seem gener-

ally to have agreed on the principle as stated in the text, it is not very clear

how much importance was attached to the fact that the fee to the street was in

the city, nor that the decision would have been different if that had not been the

case.

‘ Protzman v. Indianapolis and Cincinnati R.R. Co. 9 Ind. 467; New Albany

and Salem R.R. Co. v. 0‘Daily, 13 Ind. 353; Same v. Same, 12 Ind. 551. See

also Street Railway v. Cumminsville, 14 Ohio, N. s. 523.

~_ - s _

In New York, where, by law, when a public street is laid out or
dedicated, the fee in the soil becomes vested in the city, it has been
held that the legislature might authorize the construction of a
horse railway in a street, and that neither the city nor the owners
of lots were entitled to compensation, notwithstanding it
553] was • found as a fact that the lot owners would suffer
injury from the construction of the road. The city was
not entitled, because, though it held the fee, it held it in trust for the
use of all the people of the State, and not as corporate or municipal property; and the land having been originally acquired under
the right of eminent domain, and the trust being publici juris, it
was under the unqualified control of the legislature, and any
appropriation of it to public use by legislative authority could not
be regarded as an appropriation of the private property of the city.
And so far as the adjacent lot owners were concerned, their
interest in the streets, as distinct from that of other citizens, was
only as having a possibility of reverter after the public u~m of the
land should cease; and the value of this, if any thing, was inappreciable, and could not entitle them to compensation.1
So in Indiana, where the title in fee to streets in cities and
villages is vested in the public, it is held that the adjacent land
owners are not entitled to the statutory remedy for an assessment
of damages in consequence of the street being appropriated to the
use of a railroad; and this without regard to the motive-power by
which the road is operated. ; At the same time it is also held that
the lot owners may maintain an action at law if, in consequence of
the railroad, they are cut off from the ordinary use of the street.3
So in Iowa it is held that where the title to city streets is in the
corporation in trust for the public, the legislature may authorize

r·
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1 People o. Kerr, 37 Barb. 857; Same Case, 27 N.Y. 188.
And see Brooklyn Central, &c., R.R. Co. o. Brooklyn City R.R. Co. 33 Barb. 420; Brooklyn
and Newtown R.R. Co. o. Coney Island R.R. Co. 35 Barb. 364; New York o.
Kerr, 38 Barb. 869; Chapman v. Albany and Schenectady R.R. Co. 10 Barb.
360. Although, in the case of People o. Kerr, the several judges seem generally to have agreed on the principle as stated in the text, it ia not nry clear
how much importance was attached to the fact that the fee to the street was in
the city, nor that the decision would have been different if that had not been the
case.
' Protzman v. Indianapolis and Cincinnati R.R. Co. 9 Ind. 467; New Albany
and Salem R.R. Co. 17. O'Daily, 13 Ind. 853; Same v. Same, 12 Ind. bbl. See
also Street Railway v. Cumminsville, 14 Ohio, N. s. 523.
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the construction of an ordinary railroad through the same, with the

consent of the city, and without awarding compensation to lot
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owners ;1 or even without the consent of the municipal authorities,

and without entitling the city to compensation.” . So in Illinois, in

a case where a lot owner had ﬁled a bill in equity to restrain the

laying down of the track of a railroad, by consent of the common

council, to be operated by steam in one of the streets of Chicago, it

was held that the bill could not be maintained; the title to the

street being in the city, which might appropriate it to any proper

city purpose.“

' Millburn v. Cedar Rapids, &c., R.R. Co. 12 Iowa, 246.

' Clinton v. Cedar Rapids, &c., R.R. Co. 24 Iowa, 455.

3 Moses v. Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne, and Chicago R.R. Co. 21 Ill. 522. We

quote from the opinion of Oaton, Ch. J .: “By the city charter, the common

council is vested with the exclusive control and regulation of the streets of the

city, the fee-simple title to which we have already decided is vested in the munic-

the construction of an ordinary railroad through the same, with the
consent of the city, and without awarding compensation to lot
owners ; 1 or even without the consent of the municipal authorities,
and without entitling the city to compensation.2 . So in Illinois, in
a case where a lot owner had filed a bill in equity to restrain the
laying down of the track of a railroad, by consent of the common
council, to be operated by steam in one of the streets of Chicago, it
was hold that the bill could not be maintained ; the title to the
street being in the city, which might appropriate it to any proper
city purpose.a

ipal corporation. The city charter also empowers the common council to direct

and control the location of railroad tracks within the city. In granting this

l\fillburn v. Cedar Rapids, &c., R.R. Co. 12 Iowa, 246.
Clinton v. Cedar Rapids, &c., R.R. Co. 24 Iowa, 455.
3 Moses"· Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne, and Chicago R.R. Co. 21 Til. 522.
We
quote from the opinion of Caton, Ch. J.: "By the city charter, the common
council is vested with the exclusive control and regulation of the streets of the
city, the fee-simple title to which we have already decided is Tested in the municipal corporation The city charter also empowers the common council to direct
and control the location of railroad tracks within the city. In granting this
pennission to locate the track in Beach Street, the common council acted under
an express power granted by the legislature. So that the defendant has all the
right which both the legislature and the common council could give it, to occupy
the street with its track. But the complainant assumes higher ground, and
claims that any use of the street, even under the authority of the legislature
and the common council, which tends to deteriorate the value of his property on
the street, is a violation of that fundamental law which forbids private property
to be taken for public use without just compensation. This is manifestly an
erroneous view of the constitutional guaranty thus invoked. It must necessarily
happen that streets will be used for various legitimate purposes, which will, to a
greater or less extent, incommode persons residing or doing business upon them,
and just to that extent damage their property ; and yet such damage is incident
to all city property, and for it a party can claim no remedy. The common
council may appoint certain localities where backs and drays shall stand waiting
for employment, or where wagons loaded with ba:r or wood, or other commodities, shall stand waiting for purchasers. This may drive customers away from
shops or stores in the vicinity, and yet there is no remedy for the damage. A
street is made for the passage of persons and property ; and the law cannot
define what exclusive means of transportation and passage shall be used. Universal experience shows that this can best be left to the determination of' the
municipal authorities, who are supposed to be best acquainted with the wants
and necessities of the citizens generally. To say that a new mode of passage
shall be banished from the streets, no matter how much the general good may
require it, simply because streets were not so used in tht' days of Blackstone,
would hardly comport with the advancement and enligbwnmcnt of the present
age. Steam has but lately taken the place, to any extent, of animal power for
land transportation, and for that reason alone shall it be expelJed the streets P
1

permission to locate the track in Beach Street, the common council acted under

1

an express power granted by the legislature. So that the defendant has all the

right which both the legislature and the common council could give it, to occupy

the street with its track. But the complainant assumes higher ground, and
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claims that any use of the street, even under the authority of the legislature

and the common council, which tends to deteriorate the value of his property on

the street, is a violation of that fundamental law which forbids private property

to be taken for public use without just compensation. This is manifestly an

erroneous view of the constitutional guaranty thus invoked. It must necessarily

happen that streets will be used for various legitimate purposes, which will, to a

greater or less extent, incommode persons residing or doing business upon them,

and just to that extent damage their property; and yet such damage is incident

to all city property, and for it a party can claim no remedy. The common

council may appoint certain localities where hacks and drays shall stand waiting

for employment, or where wagons loaded with hay or wood, or other commodi-

tics, shall stand waiting for purchasers. This may drive customers away from

shops or stores in the vicinity, and yet there is no remedy for the damage. A

street is made for the passage of persons and property; and the law cannot

deﬁne what exclusive means of transportation and passage shall be used. Uni-

versal experience shows that this can best be left to the determination of the

municipal authorities, who are supposed to be best acquainted with the wants

and necessities of the citizens generally. To say that a new mode of passage

shall be banished from the streets, no matter how much the general good may

require it, simply because streets were not so used in the days of Blackstone,

would hardly comport with the advancement and enlightenment of the present

age. Steam has but lately taken the place, to any extent, of animal power for

land transportation, and for that reason alone shall it be expelled the streets?

[611]
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[’* 554] * It is not easy, as is very evident, to trace a clear line

• 554

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.
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of authority running through the various decisions bearing

[* 555] upon the ’ appropriation of the ordinary highways and

streets to the use of railroads of any grade or species;

but a strong inclination is apparent to hold that, when the fee in

the public way is taken from the former owner, it is taken for any

public use whatever to which the public authorities, with the legis-

lative assent, may see ﬁt afterwards to devote it, in furtherance

of the general purpose of the original appropriation ;1 and if this

For the same reason camels must be kept out, though they might be profitably

employed. Some fancy horse or timid lady might be frightened by such uncouth

objects. Or is the objection not in the motive-power, but because the carriages

are larger than were formerly used, and run upon iron, and are conﬁned to a

given track in the street? Then street railroads must not be admitted; they

have large carriages which run on iron rails, and are conﬁned to a given track.

[* 554]

• It is not easy, as is very evident, to trace a clear line
of authority running through the various decisions bearing
[* 555] upon the • appropriation of the ordinary highways and
streets to the use of railroads of any grade or species ;
but a strong inclination is apparent to hold that, when the fee in
the public way is taken from the former owner, it is taken for any
public use whatever to which the public authotities, with the legislative assent, may see fit afterwards to devote it, in furtherance
of the general purpose of the original appropriation ; 1 and if this

Their momentum is great, and may do damage to ordinary vehicles or foot pas-

sengers. Indeed we may suppose or assume that streets occupied by them are

not so pleasant for other carriages or so desirable for residences or business

stands, as if not thus occupied. But for this reason the property owners along

the street cannot expect to stop such improvements. The convenience of those

who live at a greater distance from the centre of a city requires the use of such

improvements, and for their beneﬁt the owners of property upon the street must
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submit to the burden, when the common council determine that the public good

requires it. Cars upon street railroads are now generally if not universally pro-

pelled by horses, but who can say how long it will be before it will be found safe

and proﬁtable to propel them with steam, or some other power besides horses?

Should we say that this road should be enjoined, we could advance no reason for

it which would not apply with equal force to street railroads ; so that consistency

would require that we should stop all. Nor would the evil which would result

from the rule we must lay down stop here. \Ve must prohibit every use of a

street which discommodes those who reside or do business upon it, because their

property will else be damaged. This question has been presented in other

States, and in some instances, where the public have only an easement in the

street, and the owner of the adjoining property still holds the fee in the street,

it has been sustained; but the weight of authority, and certainly, in our appre-

hension, all sound reasoning, is the other way.”

All the cases from which we have quoted assume that the use of the street by

the railroad company is still a public use; and probably it would not be held that

an appropriation of a street, or of any part of it, by an individual or company,

for his or their own private use, unconnected with any accommodation of the

public, was consistent with the purpose for which it was originally acquired. See

Brown v. Duplessis, 14 La. An. 842; Green v. Portland, 32 Me. 431.

' On this subject see, in addition to the other cases cited, \Vcst v. Bancroft,

32 Vt. 367; Kelsey v. King, 32 Barb. 410; Ohio and Lexington R.R. Co. v.

Applegatc, 8 Dana, 289. When, however, land is taken or dedicated speciﬁ-

\
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For the same reason camels must be kept out, though they might be profitably
employed. Some fancy horse or timid lady might be frightened by such uncouth
objects. Or is the objection not in the motive-power, but because the carriages
are larger than were formerly used, and run upon iron, and are confined to a
given track in the street P Then street railroads must not be admitted ; they
have large carriages which run on iron rails, and are confined to a given track.
Their momentum is great, and may do damage to ordinary Vt!hicles or foot passengers. Indeed we may suppose or ast~ume that streets occupied by them are
not so pleasant for other carriages or so desirable for residences or business
stands, as if not thus occupied. But for this reason the property owners along
the street cannot expect to stop such improvements. The convenience of those
who live at a greater distance from the centre of a city requires the use of such
improvements, and for their benefit the owners of property upon the street must
submit to the burden, when the <:ommon council determine that the public good
requires it. Cars upon street railroadl! arc now generally if not universally propelled by horses, but who can say how long it will be before it will be found safe
and profitable to propel them with steam, or some other power besides horses P
Should we say that this road should be enjoined, we could advance no reason for
it which wouhl not apply with equal force to street railroads; so that consi!i'tency
would require that we should stop all. Nor would the evil which would result
from the rule we must lay down stop here. We must prohibit every use of a
street which discommodes those who reside or do busineSB upon it, because their
property will else be damaged. This question bas been presented in other
States, and in some instance~!, where the public have only an easement in the
street, and the owner of the adjoining property still holds the fee in the street,
it has been sustained; but the weight of authority, and certainly, in our apprehension, all sound reasoning, is the other way."
All the cases from which we have quoted assume that the use of the street by
the railroad company is still a public use; and probably it would not be held that
an appropriation of a street, or of any part of it, by an individual or company,
for his or their own private use, unconnected with any accommodation of the
public, was consistent with the purpose for which it was originally acquired. See
Brown v. Duplessis, U La. An. 842 ; Green v. Portla11d, 32 Me. 431.
1 On this subject see, in addition to the other cases cited, 'West"· Bancroft,
S2 Vt. S67 ; Kelsey v. King, 32 Barb. 410; Ohio and Lexington R.R. Co. v.
Applegate, 8 Dana, 289. When, however, land is taken or dedicated specifi-
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is so, the owner must be held to be compensated at the time of the
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original taking for any such possible use ; and he takes his chances

of that use, or any change in it, proving beneﬁcial or deleterious

to any remaining property he may own, or business he may be

engaged in ; and it must also be held that the possibility that the

laud may, at some future time, revert to him, by the public use

ceasing, is too remote and contingent to be considered as property

at all.1 At the same time it must be confessed that it is diﬂicult

to determine precisely how far some of the decisions made have

been governed by the circumstance that the fee was or was not in

the public, or, on the other hand, have proceeded on the theory

that a railway was only in furtherance of the original

purpose of the appropriation, and not ‘to be regarded as [*556]

the imposition of any new burden, even where an easement

only was originally taken?

cally for a street, it would seem, although the fee is taken, it is taken for the

restricted use only; that is to say, for such uses as streets in cities are commonly

put to.

‘ As to whether there is such possibility of reverter, see Heyward v. Mayor,

&c., ofNew York, 7 N. Y. 314; People v. Kerr, 27 N. Y. 211, per Wright, J.;

Plitt v. Cox, 43 Penn. St. 486.

' There is great ditﬁculty, as it seems to us, in supporting important
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distinctions upon the fact that the fee was originally taken for the use of the

is so, the owner must be held to be compensated at the time of the
original taking for any such possible use ; and he takes his chances
of that use, or any change in it, proving beneficial or deleterious
to any remaining property he may own, or business he may be
engaged in ; and it must also be held that the possibility that the
land may, at some future time, revert to him, by the public use
ceasing, is too remote and contingent to be considered as property
at all.l At the same time it must be confessed that it is difficult
to determine prec_isely how far some of the decisions made have
been governed by the circumstance that the fee was or was not in
the public, or, on the other band, have proceeded on the theory
that a rail way was only in furtherance of the original
purpose of the appropriation, and not • to be regarded as [• 556]
the imposition of any new burden, even where an easement
only was originally taken.2

public instead of a mere easement. If the fee is appropriated or dedicated, it is

for a particular use only; and it is a conditional fee, -- a fee on condition that

the land continue to be occupied for that use. The practical dilference in the

cases is, that when the fee is taken, the possession of the original owner is

excluded; and in the case of city streets where there is occasion to devote them

to many other purposes besides those of passage, but nevertheless not incon-

sistent, such as for the laying of water and gas pipes, and the construction of

sewers, this exclusion of any private right of occupation is important, and will

sometimes save controversies and litigation. But to say that when a man has

declared a dedication for a particular use, under a statute which makes a dedi-

cation the gift of a fee, he thereby makes it liable to be appropriated to other

purposes, when the same could not be done if a perpetual easement had been

dedicated, seems to be basing important distinctions upon a difference which

alter all is more technical than real, and which in any view does not affect the

distinction made. The same reasoning which has sustained the legislature in

authorizing a railroad track to be laid down in a city street would support its

action in authorizing it to be made into a canal; and the purpose of the original

dedication or appropriation would thereby be entirely defeated. Is it not more

consistent with established rules to hold that a dedication or appropriation to one

purpose conﬁnes the use to that purpose; and when it is taken for any other, the

original owner has not been compensated for the injury he may sustain in conse-

[613]

cally for a street, it would seem, although the fee is taken, it is taken for the
restrided use only; that is to say, for such uses as streets in citiel.' are commonly
put to.
1 As to whether there is such poasibility of reverter, see Heyward "· :Mayor,
&c., of New York, 7 N.Y. 314; People"· Kerr, 27 N.Y. 211, per Wright, J.;
Plitt"· Cox, 43 Penn. St. 486.
1 There is great difficulty, as it seems to us, in supporting important
distinctions upon the fact that the fee was originally taken for the use of the
public instead of a mere easement. If the fee is appropriated or dedicated, it is
for a particular use only; and it is a conditional fee, - a fee on condition that
the land continue to be occupied for that use. The practical difference in the
cases is, that when the fp,e is taken, the possession of the original owner is
excluded ; and in the case of city streets where there is occasion to devote them
to many other purpo11es besides those of passage, but nevertheless not inconsistent, such as for the laying of water and gas pipes, and the eonstruction of
sewers, this exclusion of any private right of occupation is important, and will
sometimes save controversies and litigation. But to say that 'vhen a man has
declared a dedication for a particular use, under a statute which makes a dedication the gift of a fee, be thereby makes it liable to be appropriated to other
purposes, when the same could not be done if a perpetual easement had been
dedicated, seems to be basing important distinctions upon a difference which
after all is more technical than real, and which in any view doe~ not affect the
distinction made. The same reasoning which has sustained the legislature in
authorizing a railroad track to be laid down in a city street would support ita
action in authorizing it to be made into a canal; and the purpose of the original
dedication or appropriation would thereby be entirely defeated. Is it not more
consistent with established rules to hold that a dedication or appropriation to one
purpose confines the use to that purpose; and when it is taken for any other, the
original owner has not been compensated for the injury be may sustain in conse-
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Perhaps the true distinction in these cases relates, not to the

(CH. :XV.

motive~power of the railway, or to the question whether the fee

simple or a mere easement was taken in the original appropriation,

but depends upon the question whether the railway constitutes a

thoroughfare, or on the other hand is a more local convenience.

When land is taken or dedicated for a town street, it is unques-

tionably appropriated for all the ordinary purposes of a town

street ; not merely the purposes to which such streets were formerly

applied, but those demanded by new improvements and new wants.

Among these purposes is the use for carriages which run upon a

grooved track; and the preparation of important streets in large

cities for their use is not only a frequent necessity, which must

be supposed to have been contemplated, but it is almost as much a

matter of course as the grading and paving. The appropriation

of a country highway for the purposes of a railway, on the other

hand, is neither usual nor often important; and it cannot with

any justice be regarded as Within the contemplation of the

[*557] parties when ‘the highway is ﬁrst established. And if

this is so, it is clear that the owner cannot be considered

as compensated for the new use at the time of the original appro-

priation. '

Although the regulation of a navigable stream will give to the
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persons incidentally affected no right to compensation, yet if the

stream is diverted from its natural course, so that those entitled to

its beneﬁts are prevented from making use of it as before, the

deprivation of this right is a taking which entitles them to compen-

sation, notwithstanding the taking may be for the purpose of

creating another and more valuable channel of navigation.1 The

quence, and is therefore entitled to it now? Notwithstanding a dedication

which vests the title in the public, it must be conceded that the interest of the

adjacent lot owners is still property. "They have a peculiar interest in the

street, which neither the local nor the general public can pretend to claim; a

private right of the nature of an incorporeal hereditarnent, legally attached to

their contiguous grounds and the erections thereon; an incidental title to certain

facilities and franchises assured to them by contracts and by law, and without

which their property would be comparatively of little value. This easement,

appurtenant to the lots, unlike any right of one lot owner in the lot of another, is

as much property as the lot itself.” Crawford 0. Delaware, 7 Ohio, N. s. 459.

See some very pertinent and sensible remarks on the same subject by Rmmey, J .,

in Street Railway u. Cumminsville, 14 Ohio, N. s. 5-11.

' People v. Canal Appraisers, 13 Wend. 355. And see Hatch v. Vermont

Perhaps the true distinction in these cases relates, not to the
motive-power of the railway, or to the question whether the fee
simple or a mere easement was taken in the original appropriation,
but depends upon the question whether the railway constitutes a
thoroughfare, or on the other hand is a mere local convenience.
When land is taken or dedicated for a town street, it is unquestionably appropriated for all the ordinary purpos_e s of a town
street ; not merely the purposes to which such streets were formerly
applied, but those demanded by new improvements and new wants.
Among these purposes is the use for carriages which run upon a
grooved track ; and the preparation of important streets in large
cities for their use is not only a frequent necessity, which must
be supposed to have been contemplated, but it is almost as much a
matter of course as the grading and paving. The appropriation
of a country highway for the purposes of a railway, on the other
hand, is neither usual nor often important ; and it cannot with
any justice be regarded as within the contemplation of the
[* 557] parties when • the highway is first established. And if
this is so, it is clear that the owner cannot be considered
as compensated for the new use at the time of the original appropriation.
Although the regulation of a navigable stream will give to the
persons incidentally affected no right to compensation, yet if the
stream is diverted from its natural course, so that those entitled to
its benefits are prevented from making usc of it as before, the
deprivation of this right is a taking which entitles them to compensation, notwithstanding the taking may be for the purpose of
creating another and more valuable channel 9f navigation. 1 The
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quence, and is therefore entitled to it now? Notwithstanding a dedication
which vests the title in the public, it must be conceded that the interest of the
adjacent lot owners is still property. "They have a peculiar interest in the
street, which neither the local nor the general public can pretend to claim; a
private right of t.he nature of an incorporeal hereditament, legally attached to
their contiguous grounds and the erections thereon; an incidental title to certain
facilities and franchises assured to them by contracts and by law, and without
which their property would be comparatively of little value. This easement,
appurtenant to the lots, unlike any right of one lot owner in tbe lot of another, is
as much property as the lot itself." Crawford v. Delaware, 7 Ohio, N. lil. 459.
See some very pertinent and sensible remarks on the same subject by Ranney, J.,
in Street Railway v. Cumminsville, 14 Ohio, N. s. Ml.
1 People v. Canal Appraisers, 13 Wend. 355.
And see Hatch v. Vermont
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owners of land over which such a stream ﬂows, although they do
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not own the ﬂowing water itself, yet have a property in the use of

that water as it ﬂows past them, for the purpose of producing

mechanical power, or for any of the other purposes for which

they can make it available, without depriving those below them

of the like use, or encroaching upon the rights of those above;

and this property is equally protected with any of a more tangible

character.‘

What Interest in Land can be taken under the Right of Eminent

Domain.

Where land is appropriated to the public use under the right of

eminent domain, and against the will of the owner, we have seen

how careful the law is to limit the public authorities to their pre-

owners of land over which such a stream flows, although they do
not own the flowing water itself, yet have a property in the use of
that water as it flows past them, for the purpose of producing
mechanical power, or for any of the other purposes for which
they can make it available, without depriving those below them
of the like use, or encroaching upon tbe .rights of those above;
and this property is equally protected with any of a more tangible
character.1

cise needs, and not to allow the dispossession of the owner from

any portion of his freehold which the public use does not require.

This must be so on the general principle that the right being based

on necessity cannot be any broader than the necessity which ' sup-

What Interest in Land can be talcen under the Right of Eminent
Domain.

ports it. For the same reason, it would seem that, in respect to

the land actually taken, if there can be any conjoint occupation of

the owner and the public, the former should not be altogether ex-

cluded, but should be allowed to occupy for his private purposes

to any extent not inconsistent with the public use. As a general
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rule, the laws for the exercise of the right of eminent domain do

not assume to go further than to appropriate the use, and

the title "‘in fee still remains in the original owner. In [* 558]

the common highways, the public have a perpetual

easement, but the soil is the property of the adjacent o_wner,iand

he may make any use of it which does not interfere with the public

right of passage, and the public can use it only for the purposes

usual with such ways? And when the land ceases to be used by

the public as a way, the owner will again become restored to his

Central R.R. Co. 25 Vt. 49; Bellinger 17. New York Central R.R. Co. 23

N. Y. 42; Gardner v. Newburg, 2 Johns. Ch. 162.

‘ Morgan v. King, 18 Barb. 284; Same Case, 35 N. Y. 454; Gardner v.

Newburg, 2 Johns. Ch. 162.

’ In Adams v. Rivers, 11 Barb. 390, a person who stood in the public way and

abused the occupant of an adjoining lot was held liable in trespass as being

unlawfully there, because not using the highway for the purpose to which it was

appropriated.

! [ 615 ]

Where land is appropriated to the public use under tbe right of
eminent domain, and against the will of the owner, we have seen
how careful the law is to limit the public authorities to their precise needs, and not to allow the dispossession of the owner from
any portion of his freehold which the public use does not require.
This must be so on the general principle that the right being based
on necessity cannot be any broader than the necessity which' supports it. For the same reason, it would seem that, in respect to
th~ land actually taken, if there can be any conjoint occupation of
the owner and the public, the former should not be altogether excluded, but should be allowed to occupy for hts private purposes
to any extent not inconsistent with the public use. As a general
rule, the laws for the exercise of the right of eminent domain do
not assume to go further than to appropriate the use, and
the title *in fee still remains in the original owner. In [* 558]
the common highways, the public have a perpetual
easeme~t, but the soil is the property of the adjacent owner,' and
he may make any use of it which does not interfere with the public
right of passage, and the public can use it only for the purposes
usual with such ways.2 And when the land ceases to be used by
the public as a way, the owner will again become restored to his
Central R.R. Co. 25 Vt. 49; Bellinger "· New York Central R.R. Co. 23
N.Y. 42; Gardner v. Newburg, 2 Johns. Ch. 162.
1
Morgan v. King, 18 Barb. 284; Same Case, 85 N. Y. 404; Gardner v.
Newburg, 2 Johns. Ch. 162.
1 In Adams v. Rivers, 11 Barb. 390, a person who stood in the public way and
abused the occupant of an adjoining lot was held liable in trespass as being
unlawfully there, because not using the highway for the purpose to which it was
appropriated.
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complete and exclusive possession, and the fee will cease to be

[ca. xv.

encumbered with the easement.‘

It seems, however, to be competent for the State to appropriate

the title to the land in fee, and so to altogether exclude any use by

the former owner, except that which every individual citizen is en-

titled to make, if in the opinion of the legislature it is needful that

the fee be taken? The judicial decisions to this effect proceed

upon the idea that, in some cases, the public purposes cannot be

fully accomplished without appropriating the complete title; and

where this is so in the opinion of the legislature, the same reasons

which support the legislature in their right to decide absolutely

and ﬁnally upon the necessity of the taking will also support their

decision as to the estate to be taken. The power, it is said in one

ease, “ must of necessity rest in the legislature, in order to secure

the useful exercise and enjoyment of the right in question. A

case might arise where a temporary use would be all that the public

interest required._ Another case might require the permanent and

apparently the perpetual occupation and enjoyment of the property

by the public; and the right to take it must be coextensive with

the necessity of the case, and the measure of compensation should

of course be graduated by the nature and the duration of the

estate or interest of which the owner is deprived.”3 And it was
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therefore held, where the statute provided that lands might be

compulsorily taken in fee-simple for the purposes of an almshouse

extension, and they were taken accordingly, that the title of the

original owner was thereby entirely devested, so that when

["‘559] the land ceased to ‘be used for the public purpose, the

title remained in the municipality which had appropriated

it, and did not revert to the former owner or his heirs.‘ And it

1 Dean v. Sullivan R.R. Co. 2 Fost. 321; Blake v. Rich, 34 N. H. 282;

Henry v. Dubuque and Paciﬁc R.R. Co. 2 Iowa, 288; Weston v. Foster, 7 Met.

299; Quimby v. Vermont Central R.R. Co. 23 Vt. 387; Giesy u. Cincinnati,

&c., RR. Co. 4 Ohio, N. 5. 3'27.

' This, however, is forbidden by the Constitution of Illinois of 1870, in the

case of land taken for railroad tracks. Art. 2, § 13. And we think it would be

ditlicult to demonstrate the necessity for appropriating the fee in case of any

thorouglifare ; and if never 'needful, it ought to be held incompetent.

3 Heyward 1:. Mayor, &c., of New York, 7 N. Y. 314. See also Dingley v.

Boston, 100 Mass. 544.

‘ Heyward v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 7 N. Y. 314. And see Baker u.

Johnson, 2 Hill, 348; Wheeler v. Rochester, &c., R.R. Co. 12 Barb. 227;
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complete and exclusive possession, and the fee will cease to be
encumbered with the easement.1
It ~eems, however, to be competent for the State to appropriate
the title to the land in fee, and so to altogether exclude any use by
the former owner, except that which every individual citizen is entitled to make, if in the opinion of the legislature it is needful that
the fee be taken. 2 The judicial decisions to this effect proceed
upon the idea that, in some cases, the public purposes cannot be
fully accomplished without appropriating the complete title ; and
where this is so in the opinion of the legislature, the same reasons
which support the legislature in their right to decide absolutely
and finally upon the necessity of the taking will also support their
decision as to the estate to be taken. The power, it is said in one
case, " must of necessity rest in the legislature, in order to secure
the useful exercise and enjoyment of the right in question. .A
case might arise where a temporary use would be all that the public
interest required .. Another case might require the permanent and
apparently the perpetual occupation and enjoyment of the property
by the public ; and the right to take it must be coextensive with
the necessity of the case, and the measure of compensation should
of cou.1·se be graduated by the nature and the duration of the
estate or interest of which the owner is deprived." 3 And it was
therefore held, where the statute provided that lands might be
compulsorily taken in fee-simple for the purposes of an almshouse
extension, and they were taken accordingly, that the title of the
original owner was thereby entirely devested, so that when
[* 559] the land ceased to • be used for the public purpose, the
title remained in the municipality which
had appropriated
\
it, and did not revert to the former owner or his heirs.t And it
Dean v. Sullivan R.R. Co. 2 Fost. 321 ; Blake v. Rich, 34 N . H. 282;
Henry v. Dubuque and Pacific R.R. Co. 2 Iowa, 288; Weston v. Foster, 7 Met.
299; Quimby t•. Vermont Central R.R. Co. 23 Vt. 387; Giesy v. Cincinnati,
&c., R.R. Co. 4 Ohio, N. s. 327.
1 This, however, is forbidden by the Constitution of Illinois of 1870, in the
case of land taken for railroad tracks. Art. 2, § 18. And we think it would be
difficult to demonstrate the necessity for appropriat.ing the fee in case of any
thoroughfare ; and if never ·needful, it ought to be held incompetent.
3 Heyward v.l\Iayor, &c., of New York, 7 N.Y. 314.
See also Dingley v.
Boston, 100 l\:lass. 544.
4 Heyward v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 7 N.Y. 314.
And see Baker "·
Johnson, 2 Hill, 848; Wheeler "· Rochester, &c., R.R. Co. 12 Barb. 227;
1
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does not seem to be uncommon to provide that, in the case of
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some classes of public ways, and especially of city and village

streets, the dedication or appropriation to the public use shall vest

the title to the land in the State, county, or city; the purposes for

which the land may be required by the public being so numerous

and varied, and so impossible of complete speciﬁcation in advance,

that nothing short of a complete ownership in the public is deemed

suﬁicient to provide for them. In any case, however, an easement

only would be taken, unless the statute plainly contemplated and

provided for the appropriation of a larger interest}

Compensation for Property taken.

It is a primary requisite, in the appropriation of lands for public

purposes, that compensation shall be made therefor. Eminent

domain differs from taxation in that, in the former case, the citizen

is compelled to surrender to the public something beyond his due

proportion for the public beneﬁt. The public seize and appropriate

does not seem to be uncommon to provide that, in the case of
some classes of public ways, and especially of city and village
streets, the dedication or appropriation to the public use shall vest
the title to the land in the State, county, or city; the purposes for
which the land may be required by the public being so numerous
and varied, and so impossible of complete specification in advance,
that nothing short of a complete ownership in the public is deemed
sufficient to provide for them. In any case, however, an easement
only would be taken, unless the statute plainly contemplated and
provided for the appropriation of a larger interest. 1

his particular estate, because it has special need for it, and not

because it is right, as between _him and the government, that he

should surrender it.” To him, therefore, the beneﬁt and protection

he receives from the government are not sufﬁcient compensation ;

Oompensation for Property taken.

for those beneﬁts are the equivalent for the taxes he pays, and the

other public burdens he assumes in common with the community
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at large. And this compensation must be pecuniary in its charac-

ter, because it is in the nature of a payment for a compulsory

purchase?

Munger v. Tonawanda R.R. Co. 4 N. Y. 349; Rexford v. Knight, 11 N. Y. 308;

Commonwealth -v. Fisher, 1 Pen. & Watts, 462; De Varaigne v. Fox, 2 Blatch.

95; Coster v. N. J. R.R. Co. 3 Zab. 227; Plitt v. Cox, 43 Penn. St. 486.

' Barclay v. Howe1l’s Lessee, 6 Pet. 498; Rust v. Lowe, 6 Mass. 90; Jackson

v. Rutland and B. R.R. Co. 25 Vt. 151; Jackson v. Hathaway, 15 Johns. 447.

’ People v. Mayor, &c., of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419; Woodbridge v. Detroit,

8 Mich. 278; Booth v. \Voodbury, 32 Conn. 130.

" The eifect of the right of eminent domain against the individual “ amounts

to nothing more than a power to oblige him to sell and convey when the public

necessities require it.” Johnson, J ., in Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 145. And

see Bradshaw v. Rogers, 20 Johns. 103, per Spencer, Ch. J .; People v. Mayor,

&c., of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419; Carson v. Coleman, 3 Stockt. 106; United States

v. Minnesota, &c., R.R. Co. 1 Minn. 127 ; Railroad Co. v. Ferris, 26 Texas,

603; Curran u. Shattuck, 24 Cal. 427; State v. Graves, 19 Md. 351.
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It is a primary requisite, in the appropriation of lands for public
purposes, that compensation shall be made therefor. Eminent
domain differs from taxation in that, in the former case, the citizen
is compelled to surrender to the public something beyond his due
proportion for the public benefit. The public seize and appropriate
his particular estate, because it has special need for it, and not
because it is right, as between .him and the government, that he
should surrender it. 2 To him, therefore, the benefit and protection
he recei\'es from the government are not sufficient compensation;
for those benefits are the equivalent for the taxes he pays, and the
other public burdens he assumes in common with the community
at large. And this compensation must be pecuniary in its character, because it is in the nature of a payment for a compulsory
purchase.8
Munger v. Tonawanda R.R. Co. 4 N.Y. 349; Rexford v. Knight, 11 N.Y. 308;
Commonwe11lth v. Fisher, 1 Pen. & Watts, 462; De Varaiglle v. Fox, 2 Blatch.
95; Coster v. N. J. R.R. Co. 8 Zab. 227; Plitt v. Cox, 43 Penn. St. 486.
1 Barclay tl. Howell's Lessee, 6 Pet. 498; Rust"· Lowe, 6 Mass. 90; Jackson
v. Rutland and B. R.R. Co. 25 Vt. 151; Jackson v. Hathaway, 15 Johns. 447.
1 People v. Mayor, &c., of Brooklyn, 4 N.Y. 419; Woodbridge v. Detroit,
8 Mich. 278; Booth v. Woodbury, 32 Conn. 130.
• The effect of the right of eminent domain against the individual " amounts
to nothing more than a power to oblige him to ~ell and convey when the public
necessities require it." Johnson, J., in Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 145. And
see Bradshaw v. Rogers, 20 Johns. 103, per Spenct:r, Ch. J.; People "·Mayor,
&c., of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419 ; Carson "· Coleman, 3 Stockt. 106 ; United States
"· Minnesota, &c., R.R. Co. 1 1\Iinn. 127; Railroad Co."· Ferris, 26 Texas.
603; Curran v. Shattuck, 24 Cal. 427; State t1. Graves. 19 Md. 351.
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State. In some of the States, by express constitutional direction,

compensation must be made before the property is taken. No

constitutional principle, however, is violated by a statute which

allows private property to be entered upon and temporarily occu-

pied for the purpose of a survey and other incipient proceedings,

with a view to judging and determining whether the public needs

require the appropriation or not, and, if so, what the proper loca-

tion shall be; and the party acting under this statutory author-

ity would neither be bound to make compensation for the temporary

possession, nor be liable to action of trespass} When, however,

the land has been viewed, and a determination arrived at to ap-

propriate it, the question of compensation is to be considered ; and

in the absence of any express constitutional provision ﬁxing the

time and the manner of making it, the question who is to take the

property—whether the State, or one of its political divisions or

municipalities, or, on the other hand, some private corporation—

may be an important consideration.

When the property is taken directly by the State, or by any

municipal corporation by State authority, it has been repeatedly
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held not to be essential to the validity of a law for the exercise of

the right of eminent domain, that it should provide for making

compensation before the actual appropriation. It is suﬂicient if

provision is made by the law by which the party can obtain com-

pensation, and that an impartial tribunal is provided for assessing

it? The decisions upon this point assume that, when the

["‘ 561] State "* has provided a remedy by resort to which the party

can have his compensation assessed, adequate means are

afforded for its satisfaction ; since the property of the municipality,

or of the State, is a fund to which he can resort without risk of

' Bloodgood v. Mohawk and Hudson R.R. Co. 14 Wend. 51, and 18 \Vend.

9; Cushman v. Smith, S4 Me. 247; Nichols v. Somerset, &c., R.R. C0. 43 Me.

356; Mercer v. McWilliams, Wright (Ohio), 132; Walther 0. lVarner, 25 M0.

277; Fox v. W. P. R R. Co. 31 Cal. 538.

' Bloodgood v. Mohawk and Hudson R.R. Co. 18 VVend. 9; Rogers v. Brad-

shaw, 20 Johns. 744; Calking v. Baldwin, 4 \Vend. 667; Case v. Thompson, 6

Wend. 634; Fletcher v. Auburn and Syracuse R.R. Co. 25 Wend. 462; Rexford

v. Knight, 11 N. Y. 308; Taylor v. Marcy, 25 Ill. 518; Callison v. Hedrick, 15

Lyon v. Jerome, 26 Wend. 497, per Verplanck, Senator; Gardner v. Newhurg,
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• The time when the compensation must be made may
depend upon the peculiar constitutional provisions of the
State. In some of the States, by express constitutional direction,
compensation must be made before the property is taken. No
constitutional principle, however, is violated by a statute which
allows private property to be entered upon and temporarily occupied for the purpose of a survey and other incipient proceedings,
with a view to judging and determining whether the public needs
require the appropriation or not, and, if so, what the proper location shall be ; and the party acting under this statutory authority would neither be bound to make compensation for the temporary
possession, nor be liable to action of trespass. 1 When, however,
the lalld has been viewed, and a determination arrived at to appropriate it, the question of compensation is to be considered ; and
in the absence of any express constitutional provision fixing the
time and the manner of making it, the question who is to take the
property- whether the State, or one of its political divisions or
municipalities, or, on the other hand, some private corporationmay be an important consideration.
When the property is taken directly by the State, or by any
municipal corporation by State authority, it has been repeatedly
held not to be essential to the validity of a law for the exercise of
the right of eminent domain, that it should
provide for making
I
compensation before the actual appropriation. It is sufficient if
provision is made by the law by which the party can obtain compensation, and that an impartial tribunal is provided for assessing
it.2 The decisions upon this point assume that, when the
[• 561] State • has provided a remedy by resort to which the party
can have his compensation assessed, adequate means are
afforded for its satisfaction ; since the property of the municipality,
or of the State, is a fund to which he can resort without risk of
[• 560]

depend upon the peculiar constitutional provisions of the

Grat. 244; Jackson v. \Vinn’s Heirs, 4 Lit. 323; People v. Green, 3 Mich. 496;

[en. xv.

•

[* 560] ‘The time when the compensation must be made may

•

1 Bloodgood"· Mohawk and Hudson R .R. Co. 14 Wend. 51, and 18 Wend.
9; Cushman 11. Smith, 34 Me. 247 ; Nichols "· Somerset, &c., R.R. Co. 43 Me.
856; Mercer"· McWilliams, Wright (Ohio), 182; Walther"· Warne~, 25 Mo.
277; Fox "· W. P. R R. Co. 81 Cal. 588.
1 Bloodgood "· Mohawk and Hudson R.R. Co. 18 Wend. 9; Rogers tt. Bradshaw, 20 Johns. 744; Calking "· Baldwin, 4 Wend. 667; Case"· Thompson, 6
Wend. 634; Fletcher "· Auburn and Syracuse R.R. Co. 25 Wend. 462; Rexford
"· Knight, 11 N. Y. 308; Taylor"· Marcy, 25 Ill. 518; Callison "· Hedrick, 15
Grat. 244; Jackson"· Winn's Heirs, 4 Lit. 323; People"· Green, 8 Mich. 496;
Lyon"· Jerome, 26 Wend. 497, per Verpla11ck, Senator; Gardner"· Newburg,
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loss} It is essential, however, that the remedy be one to which
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the party can resort on his own motion ; if the provision be such

that only the public authorities appropriating the land are author-

ized to take proceedings for the assessment, it must be held to be

void? But if the remedy is adequate, and the party is allowed to

pursue it, it is not unconstitutional to limit the period in which he

shall resort to it, and to provide that, unless he shall take pro-

ceedings for the assessment of damages within a speciﬁed time, all

right thereto shall be barred.“ The right to compensation, when

property is appropriated by the public, may always be

waived ;4 and a failure to apply for and ‘have the com- [* 562]

2 Johns. Ch. 162; Charlestown Branch R.R. Co. v. Middlesex, 7 Met. 78;

Harper v. Richardson, 22 Cal. 251 ; Baker v. Johnson, 2 Hill, 342; People v.

Hayden, 6 Hill, 359. “ Although it may not be necessary, within the constitu-

tional provision, that the amount of compensation should be actually ascertained

and paid before property is thus taken, it is, I apprehend, the settled doctrine,

even as against the State itself, that at least certain and adequate provision must

loss. 1 It is essential, however, that the remedy be one to which
the party can resort on his own motion ; if the provision be such
that only the public authorities appropriating the land are authol'ized to take proceedings for the assessment, it must be held to be
void. 2 But if the remedy is adequate, and the party is allowed to
pursue it, it is not unconstitutional to limit the period in which he
shall resort to it, and to provide that, unless he shall take proceedings for the assessment of damages within a specified time, all
right thereto shall be barred.8 The right to compensation, when
property is appropriated by the public, may always be
waived ; 4 and a failure to apply for and • have the com- [* 562]

ﬁrst be made by law (except in cases of public emergency), so that the owner can

coerce payment through the judicial tribunals or otherwise, without any unrea-

sonable or unnecessary delay; otherwise the law making the appropriation is no

better than blank paper. Bloodgood v. Mohawk and Hudson R.R. Co. 18 \Vend.

9. The provisions of the statute prescribing the mode of compensation in cases
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like the present, when properly understood and administered, come fully up to

this great fundamental principle; and even if any doubt could be entertained

about the true construction, it should be made to lean in favor of the one that is

found to be most in conformity with the constitutional requisite.” People v. Hay-

den, 6 Hill, 359. “ A provision for compensation is an indispensable attendant

upon the due and constitutional exercise of the power of depriving an individual

of his property.” Gardner v. N ewburg, 2 Johns. Ch. 168; Bulfalo, &c., R.R.

Co. v. Ferris, 26 Texas, 588.

‘ In Commissioners, &c., v. Bowie, 34 Ala. 461, it was held that a provision

by law that compensation when assessed should be paid to the owner by the

county treasurer suﬂiciently secured its payment. And see Talbot v. Hudson,

16 Gray, 417.

' Shepardson v. Milwaukee and Beloit R.R. Co. 6 Wis. 605; Powers v. Bears,

12 Wis. 220. See McCann v. Sierra Co. 7 Cal. 121; Colton v. Rossi, 9 Cal. 595;

Ragatz v. Dubuque, 4 Iowa, 343. But in People v. Hayden, 6 Hill, 359, where

the statute provided for appraisers who were to proceed to appraise the land as

soon as it was appropriated, the proper remedy of the owner, if they failed to

perform this duty, was held to be to apply for a mandamus.

3 People v. Green, 3 Mich. 496; Charlestown Branch R.R. Co. v. Middlesex,

7 Met. 78; Rexford v. Knight, 11 N. Y. 308; Taylor v. Marcy, 25 Ill. 518; Cal-

lison v. Hedrick, 15 Grat. 244; Gilmer v. Lime Point, 18 Cal. 229; Harper v.

Richardson, 22 Cal. 251.

‘ Matter of Albany St. 11 Wend. 149; Brown v. Worcester, 13 Gray, 31.

[ 619 ]

2 Johns. Ch. 162; Charlestown Branch R.R. Co. v. Middlesex, 7 Met. 78;
Harper v. Richardson, 22 Cal. 251; Baker v. Johnson, 2 Hill, 342; People "·
Hayden, 6 Hill, 359. ".Although it may not be necessary, within the constitutional provision, that the amount of compensation should be actually ascertained
and paid before property is thus taken, it is, I apprehend, the settled doctrine,
even as against the State itself, that at least certain and adequate provision must
first be made by law (except in cases of public emergency), so that the owner can
coerce payment through the judicial tribunals or otherwise, without any unreasonable or unnecessary delay; otherwise the law making the appropriation is no
better than blank paper. :Pioodgoodo. Mohawk and HudsonR.R. Co.18Wend.
9. The provisions of the statute prescribing the mode of compensation in cases
like the present, when properly understood and administered, come fully up to
this great fundamental principle; and even if any doubt could be entertained
about the true construction, it should be made to lean in favor of the one that is
found to be most in conformity with the constitutional requisite." People v. Hayden, 6 Hill, 359. " A provision for compensation is an indispensable attendant
upon the due and constitutional exercise of the power of depriving an individual
of his property." Gardner v. Newburg, 2 Johns. Ch. 168; Buffalo, &c., R.R.
Co. v. Ferris, 26 Texas, 588.
1 In Commissioners, &c., v. Bowie, 34 Ala. 461, it was held that a provision
by law that compensation when assessed should be paid to the owner by the
county treasurer sufficiently secured its payment. And see Talbot "· Hudson,
16 Gray, 417.
1 Shepardson"· Milwaukee and Beloit R.R. Co. 6 Wis. 605; Powers v. Bears,
12 Wis. 220. See McCann v. Sierra Co. 7 Cal. 121; Colton 11. Rossi, 9 Cal. 595;
Ragatz "· Dubuque, 4 Iowa, 343. But in People "· Hayden, 6 Hill, 359, where
the statute provided for appraisers who were to proceed to appraise the land as
soon as it was appropriated, the proper remedy of the owner, if they failed to
perform this duty, was held to be to apply for a mandamus.
a People v. Green, 3 Mich. 496; Charlestown Branch R.R. Co. "· Middlesex,
7 Met. 78; Rexford v. Knight, 11 N. Y. 308; Taylor v. Marcy, 25 ill. 51-8; Callison v. Hedrick, 15 Grat. 244; Gilmer"· Lime Point, 18 Cal. 229; Harper v.
Richardson, 22 Cal. 251.
4 Matter of Albany St. 11 Wend. 149; Brown v. Worcester, 13 Gray, 31.
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pensation assessed, when reasonable time and opportunity and _a
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proper tribunal are aﬁbrded for the purpose, may well be con-

sidered a waiver.

Where, however, the property is not taken by the State, or by a

municipality, but by a private corporation which, though for this

purpose to be regarded as a public agent, appropriates it for the

beneﬁt and proﬁt of its members, and which may or may not be

sufficiently responsible to make secure and certain the payment, in

all cases, of the compensation which shall be assessed, it is cer-

tainly proper, and it has sometimes been questioned whether it

was not absolutely essential, that payment be actually made before

the owner could be devested of his freehold} Chancellor Kent has

expressed the opinion, that compensation and appropriation should

be concurrent. “ The settled and fundamental doctrine is, that

government has no right to take private property for public pur-

poses, without giving just compensation ; and it seems to be neces-

sarily implied that the indemnity should,in cases which will admit

of it, be previously and equitably ascertained, and be ready for

reception, concurrently in point of time with the actual exercise of

the right of eminent domain.” 2 And while this is not an inﬂex-

ible rule unless in terms established by the constitution, it is so

just and reasonable that statutory provisions for taking private
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property very generally make payment precede or accompany the

appropriation, and by several of the State constitutions this is

expressly required.” And on general principles, it is essential

that an adequate fund be provided from which the owner of the

property can certainly obtain compensation ; it is not competent to

deprive him of his property, and turn him over to an action at law

\I

' This is the intimation in Shepardson v. Milwaukee and Beloit R.R. Co. 6

Wis. 605; Powers v. Bears, 12 Wis. 220; State 1:. Graves, 19 Md. 351; Dron-

berger v. Reed, 11 Ind. 420. But see Calking v. Baldwin, 4 Wend. 667.

* 2 Kent, 339, note.

5 The Constitution of Florida provides “ that private property shall not be

taken or applied to public use, unless just compensation be ﬁrst made therefor.”

Art. 1, § 14. See also, to the same ctfect, Constitution of Georgia, art. 1, § 17;

Constitution of Iowa, art. 1, § 18; Constitution of Kansas, art. 1'2, § 4; Consti-

tution of Kentucky, art. 13, § 14; Constitution of Minnesota, art. 1, § 13; Con-

stitution of Mississippi, art. 1, § 13; Constitution of Nevada, art. 1, § 8; Consti-

tution of Ohio, art. 1, § 19. The Constitution of Indiana, art. 1, § 21, and that

pensation assessed, when reasonable time and opportunity and .a
proper tribunal are afforded for the purpose, m11y well be considered a waiver.
Where, however, the property is not taken by the State, or by a
municipality, but by a private corporation which, though for this
purpose to be regarded as a public agent, appropriates it for the
benefit and profit of its members, and which may or may not be
sufficiently responsible to make secure and certain the payment, in
all cases, of the compensation which shall be assessed, it is certainly proper, and it has sometimes been questioned whether it
was not absolutely essential, that payment be actually made before
the owner could be devested of his freehold. 1 Chancellor Kent has
expressed the opinion, that compensation and appropriation should
be concurrent. " The settled and fundamental doctrine is, that
government has no right to take private property for public purposes, without giving just compensation ; and it seems to be necessarily implied that the indemnity should, in cases which will admit
of it, be previously and equitably ascertained, and be ready for
reception, concurrently in point of time with the actual exercise of
the right of eminent domain." 2 And while. this is not an inflexible rule unless in terms established by the constitution, it is so
just and reasonable that statutory provisions for taking private
property very generally make payment precede or accompany the
appropriation, and by several of the State constitutions this is
expressly required.s And on general principles, it is essential
that an adequate fund be provided from which the owner of the
property can certainly obtain compensation ; it is not competent to
deprive him of his property, and turn him over to an action at law

of Oregon, art. 1, § 19, require compensation to be ﬁrst made, except when the

I

property is appropriated by the State.
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This is the intimation in Shepardson "· Milwaukee and Beloit R:R. Co. 6
Wis. 605; Powers tl. Bears, 12 Wis. 220; State t'. Graves, 19 Md. :351; Dronberger tl. Reed, 11 Ind. 420. But see Calking v. Baldwin, 4 Wend. 667.
1 2 Kent, 339, note.
3 The Constitution of Florida provides " that private property shall not be
taken or applied to public use, unless just compensation be first made therefor."
Art. 1, § 14. See also, to the same effect, Constitution of Georgia, art. 1, § 17;
Constitution of Iowa, art. 1, § 18; Constitution of Kansas, art. 12, § 4; Constitution of Kentucky, art. 13, § 14; Constitution of Minnesota, art. 1, § 13; Constitution of Mississippi; art. 1, § 13; Constitution of Nevada, art. l, § 8; Constitution of Ohio, art. 1, § 19. The Constitution of Indiana, art. 1, § 21, and that
of Oregon, art. 1, § 19, require compensation to be first made, except when the
property is appropriated by the State.
1
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against a corporation which may or may not prove respon-

CH.

xv.]
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sible, * and to a judgment of uncertain efficacy} For [* 563]

the consequence would be, in some cases, that the party

might lose his estate without redress, in violation of the inﬂexible

maxim upon which the right is based.

What the tribunal shall be which is to assess the compensation

must be determined either by the constitution or by the statute

which provides for the appropriation. The case is not one where,

as a matter of right, the party is entitled to a trial by jury, unless

the constitution has provided that tribunal for the purpose?

Nevertheless, the proceeding is judicial in its character, and the

party in interest is entitled to have an impartial tribunal, and the

usual rights and privileges which attend judicial investigations.

It is not competent for the State itself to ﬁx the compensation

through the legislature, for this would make it the judge in its

own cause.” And, if a. jury is provided, the party must have the

ordinary opportunity to appear when it is to be impanelled, that

he may make any legal objections.‘ And he has the same right to

notice of the time and place of assessment that he would have in

any other case of judicial proceedings, and the assessment will be

invalid if no such notice is given.“ These are just as well as famil-

iar rules, and they are perhaps invariably recognized in legislation.
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It is not our purpose to follow these proceedings, and to attempt

to point out the course of practice to be observed, and which is so

different under the statutes of different States. An inﬂexible rule

should govern them all, that the interest and exclusive right of the

owner is to be regarded and protected so far as may be consistent

with a recognition of the public necessity. While the owner is not

to be disseised until compensation is provided, neither, on the

other hand, when the public authorities have taken such steps as

‘ Shepardson v. Milwaukee and Beloit R.R. Co. 6 Wis. 605; VValther v.

Wamer, 25 Mo. 277; Gilmer v. Lime Point, 18 Cal. 229; Curran v. Shattuck,

24 Cal. 427; Memphis and Charleston R.R. Co. v. Payne, 37 Miss. 700; Henry

v. Dubuque and Paciﬁc R.R. Co. 10 Iowa, 540.

’ Petition of Mount Washington Co. 35 N. H. 134.

‘ Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 7 Pick. 344; Same Case, 11 Pet.

571, per McLean, J.

‘ People v. Tallmau, 36 Barb. 222; Booneville v. Ormrod, 26 Miss. 193. A

jury, without further explanation in the law, must be understood as one of twelve

persons. Lamb v. Lane, 4 Ohio, 1~:. s. 167.

‘ Hood v. Finch, 8 Wis. 381; Dickey v. Tennison, 27 Mo. 373.
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against a corporat~on which ~ay or may not prove responsible, • and to a judgment of uncertain efficacy .1 For [* 563]
the consequence would be, in some cases, that the party
might lose his estate ~ithout redress, in violation of the inflexible
maxim upon which the right is based.
What the tribunal shall be which is to assess the compensation
must be determined either by the constitution or by the statute
which provides for the appropriation. The case is not one where,
as a matter of right, the party is entitled to a trial by jury, unless
the constitution has provided that tribunal for the purpose.2
Nevertheless, the proceeding is judicial in its character, and the
party in interest is entitled to have an impartial tribunal, and the
usual rights and privileges which attend judicial investigations.
It is not competent for the State itself to fix the compensation
through the legislature, for this would make it the judge in its
own cause. 3 And, if a jury is provided, the party must have the
ordinary opportunity to appear when it is to be impanelled, that
he may make any legal objections.~ A.nd he has the same right to
notice of the time and place of assessment that he would have in
any other case of judicial proceedings, and the assessment will be
invalid if no such notice is given.6 These are just as well as familiar rules, and they are perhaps invariably recognized in legislation.
It is not our purpose to follow these proceedings, and to attempt
to point out the course of practice to be observed, and which is so
different under the statutes of different States. An inflexible rule
should govern them all, that the interest and exclusive right of the
owner is to be regarded and protected so far as may be consistent
with a recognition of the public necessity. While the owner is not
to be disseised until compensation is provided, neither, on the
other hand, when the public authorities have taken such steps as
1 Shepardson "· Milwaukee and Beloit RR. Co. 6 Wis. 605; Walther "·
Warner, 25 Mo. 277; Gilmer"· Lime Poiut, 18 Cal. 229; Curran v. Shattuck,
24 Cal. 427; Memphis and Charleston R.R. Co. "· Payne, 37 Miss. 700; Henry
2'. Dubuque and Pacific R.R. Co. 10 Iowa, 540.
~ Petition of Mount Washington Co. 35 N. H. 184.
1 Charles Ri\'er Bridge"· Warren Bridge, 7 Pick. 344; Same Case, 11 Pet.
571, per McLean, J.
4 People v. Tallman, 86 Barb. 222; Booneviile v. Onnrod, 26 Miss. 198.
A
jury, without further explanation in the law, must be understood as one of twelve
persons. Lamb"· Lane, 4 Ohio, N. s. 167.
~ Hood v. Finch, 8 Wis. 881 ; Dickey "· Tennison, 27 Mo. 373.
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to ﬁnally settle upon the appropriation, ought he to be left

(cH. XV.

["‘ 564] in a * state of uncertainty, and compelled to wait for com-

pensation until some future time, when they may see ﬁt

to occupy it. The land should either be his or he should be paid

for it. Whenever, therefore, the necessary steps have been taken

on the part of the public to select the property to be taken, locate

the public work, and declare the appropriation, the owner becomes

absolutely entitled to the compensation, whether the public pro-

eeed at once to occupy the property or not. If a street is legally

established over the land of an individual, he is entitled to de-

mand payment of his damages, without waiting for the street to be

opened} And if a railway line is located across his land, and the

damages are appraised, his right to payment is complete, and he

cannot be required to wait until the railway company shall actu-

ally occupy his premises, or enter upon the construction of the

road at that point. It is not to be forgotten, however, that the

proceedings for the assessment and collection of damages are stat-

utory, and displace the usual remedies ; that the public agents who

keep within the statute are not liable to common-law action ; 2 that

it is only where they fail to follow the statute that they render

themselves liable as trespassers ;3 though if they construct their

work in a careless, negligent, and improper manner, by means of
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which carelessness, negligence, or improper construction a party is

injured in his rights, he may have an action at the common law as

in other cases of injurious negligence.‘

‘ Philadelphia v. Dickson, 38 Penn. St. 247; Philadelphia v. Dyer, 41 Penn.

St. 463; Hallock v. Franklin County, 2 Met. 559; Harrington v. County Com-

missioners, 22 Pick. 268; Blake 0. Dubuque, 13 Iowa, 66; Higgins v. Chicago,

18 Ill. 276; County of Peoria v. Harvey, ib. 364; Shaw v. Charlestown, 3

Allen, 538; Hampton v. Coffin, 4 N. H. 517; Clough c. Unity, 18 N. H. 77.

And where a city thus appropriates land for a street, it would not be allowed to

set up in defence to a demand for compensation its own irregularities in the pro-

ceedings taken to condemn the land. Higgins v. Chicago, 18 Ill. 276; Chicago

v. Wheeler, 25 Ill. 478.

* East and \Vcst India Dock, &c., Co. v. Gattke, 15 Jur. 61 ; Kimble v. White

Water Valley Canal, 1 Ind. 285; Mason v. Kennebec, &c., R.R. Co. 31 Me.

to finally settle upon the appropriation, ought be to be left;
[• 564] in a • state of uncertainty, and compelled to wait for compensation until some future time, when they may see fit
to occnpy it. The land should either be his or he should be paid
for it. Whenever, therefore, the necessary steps have been taken
on the part of the public to select the pr.operty to be taken, locate
the public work, and declare the appropriation, the owner becomes
absolutely entitled to the compensation, whether the public proceed at once to occupy the property or not. If a street is legally
established over the land of an individual, he is entitled to demand payment of his damages, without waiting for the street to be
opened.1 And if a railway line is located across his land, and the
damages are appraised, his right to payment is complete, and he
cannot be required to wait until the railway company shall actually occupy his premises, or enter upon the construction of the
road at that point. It is not to be forgotten, however, that the
proceedings for the assessment and collection of damages are statutory, and displace the usual remedies; that the public agents who
keep within the statute are not liable to common-law action ; 2 that
it is only where they fail to follow the statute that they render
themselves liable as trespassers ; 8 though if they construct their
work in a careless, negligent, and improper manner, by means of
which carelessness, negligence, or improper construction a party is
injured in his rights, he may have an action at the common law as
in other cases of injurious negligence.•

215; Aldrich v. Cheshire R.R. Co. 1 Fost. 359; Brown v. Beatty, 34 Miss.

227; Pettibone v. La Crosse and Milwaukee R.R. Co. 14 \Vis. 4-13; Vilas v.

Milwaukee and Mississippi R.R. Co. 15 \Vis. 233.

3 Dean v. Sullivan R.R. Co. 2 Fost. 316; Furniss v. Hudson River R.R. Co.

5 Sandfl 551.

‘ Lawrence v. Great Northern R. Co. 20 L. J. Rep. Q. B. 293; Bagnall v.

[622]

1 Philadelphia o. Dickson, 38 Penn. St. 247; Philadelphia o. Dyer, 41 Penn.
St. 463; Hallock v. Franklin County, 2 ~let. 559; Harrington v. County Commissioners, 22 Pick. 268; Blake v. Dubuque, 13 Iowa, 66; Higgins v. Chicago,
18 Til. 276; County of Peoria v. Harvey, ib. 364; Shaw v. Charlestown, 8
Allen, 538; Hampton v. Coffin, 4 N. H. 517; Clough v. Unity, 18 N. H. 77.
And where a city thus appropriates land for a street, it would not be allowed to
set up in defence to a demand for compensation its own irregularities in the proceedings taken to condemn the land. Higgins v. Chicago, 18 Ill. 276; Chicago
v. Wheeler, 25 Ill. 478.
1 East and W(8t India Dock, &c., Co. o. Gattke, 15 Jur. 61; Kimble t'. White
Water Valley Canal, 1 Ind. 285; Mason"· Kenntlbec, &c., R.R. Co. 31 Me.
215; Aldrich "· Cheshire R.R. Co. 1 Fost. 359; Brown o. Beatty, 34 Miss.
227 ; Pettibone v. La Crosse and Milwaukee R.R. Co. 14 Wis. 443; Vilas v.
Milwaukee and Mississippi R.R. Co. 15 Wis. 233.
3 Dean v. Sullivan R.R. Co. 2 Fost. 316; Furniss v. Hudson River R.R. Co.
{) Sand f. 551.
' Lawrence v. Great Northern R. Co. 20 L. J. Rep. Q. B. 293; Bagnall "·
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"' The principle upon which the damages are to be [" 565]
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assessed is always an important consideration in these

cases; and the circumstances of different appropriations are some-

times so peculiar that it has been found somewhat diﬁicult to

establish a rule that shall always be just and equitable. If the

whole of a man’s estate is taken, there can generally be little diﬂi-

culty in ﬁxing upon the measure of compensation ; for it is appar-

ent that, in such a case, he ought to have the whole market value

of his premises, and he cannot reasonably demand more. The

question is reduced to one of market value, to be determined upon

the testimony of those who have knowledge upon that subject, or

whose business or experience entitles their opinions to weight.

It may be that, in such a case, the market value may not seem to

the owner an adequate compensation; for he may have reasons

peculiar to himself, springing from association, or other cause,

which make him unwilling to part with the property on the esti-

mate of his neighbors; but such reasons are incapable of being

taken into account in legal proceedings, where the question is one

of compensation in money, inasmuch as it is manifestly impossible

to measure them by any standard of pecuniary value. Concede

to the government a right to appropriate the property on paying

for it, and we are at once remitted to the same standards for esti-
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mating values which are applied in other cases, and which neces-

sarily measure the worth of property by its value as an article of

sale, or as a means of producing pecuniary returns.

When, however, only a portion of a parcel of land is appropri-

ated, just compensation may perhaps depend upon the effect which

the appropriation may have on the owner’s interest in the remain-

der, to increase or diminish its value, in consequence of the use to

which that taken is to be devoted, or in consequence of the con-

dition in which it may leave the remainder in respect to conven-

ience of use. If, for instance, a public way is laid out through a

tract of land which before was not accessible, and if in conse-

quence it is given a front, or two fronts, upon the street, which

furnish valuable and marketable sites for building lots, it may be

that the value of that which remains is made, in consequence of

taking a part, vastly greater than the whole was before, and that

London and N. W. R. 7 H. & N. 423; Brown v. Cayuga and Susquehanna R.R.

Co. 12 N. Y. -187.

[ 623 ]

• The principle upon which the damages are to be [• 565]
assessed is always an important consideration in these
cases ; and the circumstances of different appropriations are sometimes so peculiar that it has been found somewhat difficult to
establish a rule that shall always be just and equitable. If the
whole of a man's estate is taken, there can generally be little difficulty in fixing upon the measure of compensation ; for it is apparent that, in such a case, he ought to have the whole market value
of his premises, and he cannot reaaonably demand more. The
question is reduced to one of market value, to be determined upon
the testimony of those who have knowledge upon that subject, or
whose business or experience entitles their opinions to weight.
It may be that, in such a case, the market value may not seem to
the owner an adequate compensation ; for he may have reasons
peculiar to himself, springing from association, or other cause,
which make him unwilling to part with the property on the estimate of his neighbors; but such reasons are incapable of being
taken into account in legal proceedings, where the question is one
of compensation in money, inasmuch as it is manifestly impossible
to measure them by any standard of pecuniary value. Concede
to tho government a right to appropriate the property on paying
for it, and we are at once remitted to the same standards for estimating values which are applied in other cases, and which necessarily measure the worth of property by its value as an article of
sale, or as a means of producing pecuniary returns.
When, however, only a portion of a parcel of land is appropriated, just compensation may perhaps depend upon the effect which
the appropriation may have on the owner's interest in the remainder, to increase or diminish its value, in consequence of the use to
which that taken is to be devot~d, or in consequence of the condition in which it may leave the remainder in respect to convenience of use. If, for instance, a public way is laid out through a
tract of land which before was not accessible, and if in consequence it is given a front, or two fronts, upon the street, which
furnish valuable and marketable sites for building lots, it may be
that the value of that which remains is made, in consequence of
taking a part, vastly greater than the whole was before, and that
London and N. W. R. 7 H. & N. 423; Brown!'. Cayuga and Susquehanna R.R.
Co. 12 N.Y. 487.
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the owner is beneﬁted instead of damniﬁed by the appropriation.

(CH. XV.

Indeed, the great majority of streets in cities and villages are

dedicated to the public use by the owners of lands, with-

[’* 566] out any other " compensation or expectation of compensa-

tion than the increase in market value which is expected

to be given to such lands thereby; and this is very often the case

with land for other public improvements,which are supposed to be

of peculiar value to the locality in which they are made. But

where, on the other hand, a railroad is laid out across a man’s

premises, running between his house and his outbuildings, neces-

sitating, perhaps, the removal of some of them, or upon such a

grade as to render deep cuttings or high embankments necessary,

and thereby greatly increasing the inconveniences attending the

management and use of the land, as well as the risks of accidental

injuries, it will often happen that the pecuniary loss which he

would suffer by the appropriation of the right of way would greatly

exceed the value of the land taken, and to pay him that value only

would be to make very inadequate compensation.

It seems clear that, in these cases, it is proper and just that the

injuries suffered and the beneﬁts received, by the proprietor, as

owner of the remaining portion of the land, should be taken into

account in measuring the compensation. This, indeed, is generally
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conceded; but what injuries shall be allowed for, or what beneﬁts

estimated, is not always so apparent. The question, as we ﬁnd it

considered by the authorities, seems to be, not so much what the

value is of that which is taken, but whether what remains is

reduced in value by the appropriation, and, if so, to what extent;

in other words, what pecuniary injury the owner sustains by a part

of his land being appropriated. But, in estimating either the

injuries or the beneﬁts, those which the owner sustains or receives

in common with the community generally, and which are not

peculiar to him and connected with his ownership, use, and enjoy-

ment of the particular parcel of land, should be altogether

excluded, as it would be unjust to compensate him for the one, or

to charge him with the other, when no account is taken of such

incidental beneﬁts and injuries with other citizens who receive or

feel them equally with himself, but whose lands do not chance to

be taken}

‘ In Somerville and Easton R.R. Co. ads. Doughty, 2 Zab. 495, a motion was

made for a new trial on an assessment of compensation for land taken by a rail-

[624]

the owner is benefited instead of damnified by the appropriation.
Indeed, the great majority of streets in cities and villages are
dedicated to the public use by the owners of lands, with[• 566] out any other • compensation or expectation of compensation than the increase in market value which is expected
to be given to such lands thereby ; and this is very often the case
with land for other public improvements, which are supposed to be
of peculiar value to the locality in which they are made. But
where, on the other hand, a railroad is laid out across a man's
premises, running between his house and his outbuildings, necessitating, perhaps, the removal of some of them, or upon _such a
grade as to render deep cuttings or high embankments necessary,
and thereby greatly increasing the inconveniences attending the
management and use of the land, as well as the risks of accidental
injuries, it will often happen thA.t the pecuniary loss which he
would suffer by the appropriation of the right of way would greatly
exceed the value of the land taken, and to pay him that value only
would be tq make very inadequate compensation.
It seems clear that, in these cases, it is proper and just that the
injuries suffered and the benefits received, by the proprietor, as
owner of the remaining portion of the land, should be taken into
acqount in measuring the compensation. This, indeed, is generally
conceded; but what injuries shall be allowed for, or what benefits
estimated, is not always so apparent. The question, as we find it
considered by the authorities, seems to be, not so much what the
value is of that which is taken, but whether what remains is
reduced in value by the appropriation, and, if so, to what extent;
in other words, what pecuniary injury the owner sustains by a part
of his laud being appropriated. But, in estimating either the
injuries or the benefits, those which the owner sustains or receives
in common with the community •generally, and which are not
peculiar to him and connected with his ownership, use, and enjoyment of the particular parcel of land, should be altogether
excluded, as it would be unjust to compensate him for the one, or
to charge him with the other, when no account is taken of such
incidental benefits and injuries with other citizens who receive or
feel 'them equally with him8elf, but whose lands do uot chance to
be taken. 1
1 In Somerville and Easton R.R. Co. a.M. Doughty, 2 Zab. 495, a motion was
made for a new trial on an assessment of compensation for land taken by a rail-
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*‘ The question, then, in these cases, relates ﬁrst to the [* 567]
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value of the land appropriated; which is to be assessed

road company, on the ground that the juzlge in his charge to the jury informed

them “ that they were authorized by law to ascertain and assess the damages sus-

tained by the plaintiff to his other lands not taken and occupied by the defend-

• The question, then, in these cases, relates first to the [• 567]
value of the land appropriated; which is to be assessed

ants; to his dwelling-house, and other buildings and improvements, by reducing

their value, changing their character, obstructing their free use, by subjecting his

buildings to the hazards of ﬁre, his family and stock to injury and obstruction in

their necessary passage across the road, the inconvenience caused by embank-

ments or excavations, and, in general, the effect of the railroad upon his adjacent

lands, in deteriorating their value, in the condition they were found, whether

adapted for agricultural purposes only, or for dwellings, stores, shops, or other

like purposes." Y

“ On a careful review of this charge,” says the judge, delivering the opinion

of the court, “ I cannot see that any legal principle was violated, or any unsound

doctrine advanced. The charter provides _that the jury shall assess the value of

the land and materials taken by the company, and the -damages. The damages

here contemplated are not damages to the land actually occupied or covered by

the road, but such damages as the owner may sustain in his other and adjacent

lands not occupied by the company’s road. His buildings may be reduced in

value by the contiguity of the road, and the use of engines upon it. His lands

and buildings, before adapted and used for particular purposes, may, from the
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same cause, become utterly unﬁtted for such purposes. The owner may be in-

commoded by high embankments or deep excavations on the line of the road, his

buildings subjected to greater hazard from ﬁre, his household and stock to injury

or destruction, unless guarded with more than ordinary care. It requires no

special experience or sagaeity to perceive that such are the usual and natural

effects of railroads upon the adjoining lands, and which necessarily deteriorate

not only their marketable but their intrinsic value. The judge, therefore, did

not exceed his duty in instructing the jury that these were proper subjects for

their consideration in estimating the damages which the plaintiff might sustain by

reason of the location of this road upon and across his lands.” And in the same

case it was held that the jury, in assessing compensation, were to adopt as the

standard of value for the lands taken, not such a price as they would bring at a

forced sale in the market for money, but such a price as they could be purchased

at, provided they were for sale, and the owner asked such prices as, in the opinion

of the community, they were reasonably worth; that it was matter of universal

experience that land would not always bring at a forced sale what it was reason-

ably worth, and the owner, not desiring to sell, could not reasonably be required

to take less. In Sater v. Burlington and Mount Pleasant Plank Road Co. 1 Iowa,

393, Isbell, J ., says: “ The terms used in the constitution, ‘just compensation,’

are not ambiguous. They undoubtedly mean a fair equivalent; that the person

whose property is taken shall be made whole. But while the end to be attained

is plain, the mode of arriving at it is not without its ditliculty. On due consid-

oration, we see no more practical rule than to ﬁrst ascertain the fair marketable

value of the premises over which the proposed improvement is to pass, irrespective

§

40 £625. 1

road company, on the ground that the jt~ge in his charge to the jury informed
them " that they were authorized by law to ascertain and assess the damages sustained by the plaintiff to his other lands not taken and occupied by the defendants; to his dwelling-house, nnd other buildings and impro,·ements, by reducing
their value, changing their character, obstructing their free usc, by subjecting his
buildings to the hazards of fire, his family and stock to injury and obstruction in
their necessary passage across the road, the incon\'euience caused by embankments or excavations, and, in general, the effect of the railroad upon his adjac1·nt .
lands, in deteriorating their value, in the condition they were found, whether
adapted for agricultural purposes only, or for dwellings, stores, shops, or other
like purposes."
"On a careful review of this charge," says the judge, delivering the opinion
of the court, " I cannot see that any legal principle was violated, or any unsound
doctrine advanced. The charter provides .that the jury shall assess the value of
the land and materials taken by the company, and the ·damages. The damages
here contemplated are not damages to the land actually occupied or covered by
the road, but such damages as the owner may sustain in his other and adjacent
lands not occupied by the company's road. His buildings may be reduced in
value by the contiguity of the road, and the use of engines upon it. Hi~ lands
and buildings, before adapted and used for particular purposes, may, from the
same cause, become utterly unfitted for such purposes. The owner may be incommoded by high embankments or deep excavations on the line of the road, his
buildings subjected to greater hazar•! from fire, his household and stoek to injury
or destruction, unless guarded with more than ordinary care. It requires no
special experience or sagacity to pt•rcE'ive that such are the usual and natural
effec-t.~ of railroads upon the adjoining lands, and which necessarily deteriorate
not only their marketable but their intrin11ic value. The judge, therefore, did
not exceed his duty in instructing the jury that these were proper :subjects for
their consideration in estimating the damages which the plaintiff might sustain by
reason of the location of this road upon and across his lands." And in the same
case it was held that the jury, in assessing compen~ation,' were to adopt as the
standard of value for the lands taken, not such a price as they woul•l bring at a
forced sale in the market for money, but such a price as they could be purchased
at, provided they were for sale, and the owner asked such prices as, in the opinion
of the community, they were reasonably worth; that it was matter of universal
experience that land would not always bring at a forced sale what it was reasonably worth, and the owner, not desiring to sell, could not reasonably be required
to takl! less_ In Sater v. Burlington and Mount Pleasant Plank Road Co. 1 Iowa,
393, liibell, J., says: "The terms used in the constitution, • just compensation.'
are not ambiguous. They undoubtedly mean a fair equivalent; that the P•~rson
whose property is taken shall be made whole. But while the end to be attained
is plain, the mode of arriving at it is not. without its difficulty. On due consideration, we see no more practical rule than to first ascertain the fair marketable
value of the premises over which the proposl'd improvement is to pass, irrespective
40
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[* 568] with reference to what * it is worth for sale, in view of the
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uses to which it may be applied, and not simply in refer-

ence to its productiveness to the owner in the condition in which

he has seen ﬁt to leave it.1 Second, if less than the whole estate

is taken, then there is further to be considered how much the por-

tion not taken is increased or diminished in value in consequence

of the appropriation.”

of such improvement, and also a like value of the same, in the condition in which

they will be immediately after the land for the improvement has been taken,

irrespective of the beneﬁt which will result from the improvement, and the dif-

ference in value to constitute the measure of compensation. But in ascertaining

[* 568] with reference to what • it is worth for sale, in view of the
uses to which it may be applied, and not simply in reference to its productiveness to the owner in the condition in which
he has seen fit to leave it.l S~ond, if less than the whole estate
is taken, then there is further to be considered how much the portion not taken is increased or diminished in value in consequence
of the appropriation.2

the depreciated value of the premises after that part which has been taken for

public use has been appropriated, regard must be had only to the immediate, and

not remote, consequence of the appropriation; that is to say, the value of the

remaining premises is not to be depreciated by heaping consequence on conse-

quence. While we see no more practical mode of ascertainment than this, yet

it must still be borne in mind that this is but a mode of ascertainment; that,

after all, the true criterion is the one provided by the constitution, namely, just

comp'ensation for the property taken.” See this rule illustrated and applied in

Henry v. Dubuqne and Paciﬁc R.R. Co. 2 Iowa, 300, where it is said: " That

the language of the constitution means that the person whose property is taken

for public use shall have a fair equivalent in money for the injury done him by
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such taking; in other words, that he shall be made whole so far as money is a

measure of compensation, we are equally clear. This just compensation should

be precisely commensurate with the injury sustained by having the property

taken; neither more nor less.” And see the recent Kentucky cases of Richmond,

&c., C0. v. Rogers, 1 Duvall, 135; Robinson v. Robinson, -ib. 162.

‘ Matter of Furman Street, 17 \Vend. 669 ; Tide-\Vater Canal Co. v. Archer,

9 Gill & J. 480; State v. Burlington, &c., R.R. Co. 1 Iowa, 386; Parks v.

Boston, 15 Pick. 206; First Parish, &c. v. Middlesex, 7 Gray, 106; Dickenson

0. Inhabitants of Fitchburg, 13 Gray, 546; Lexington v. Long, 31 Mo. 369.

’ Denton v. Polk, 9 Iowa, 594; Parks 0. Boston, 15 Pick. 198; Dickenson v.

Fitchburg, 13 Gray, 546; N ewby v. Platte County, 25 Mo. 258; Paciﬁc R.R.

Co. v. Chrystal, ib. 544; Somerville and Easton R.R. Co. ads. Doughty, 2 Zab.

495; Carpenter v. Landaﬁ‘, 42 N. H. 218; Troy and Boston R.R. Co. v. Lee,

13 Barb. 169; Tide-Water Canal Co. v. Archer, 9 Gill and J. 480; \Vinona and

St. Paul R.R. Co. v. \Valdron, 11 Minn. 515; Nicholson v. N. Y. and N. H.

R.R. Co. 22 Conn. 7-1; Nichols v. Bridgeport, 28 Conn. 189. “ Compensation

is an equivalent for property taken, or for an injury. It must be ascertained by

estimating the actual damage the party has sustained. That damage is the sum

of the actual value of the property taken, and of the injury done to the residue

of the property by the use of that part which is taken. The beneﬁt is, in part,

an equivalent to the loss and damage. The loss and damage of the defendant is

the value of the land the company has taken, and the injury which the location

and use of the road through his tract may cause to the remainder. The amount

[626]

of such improvement, and also a like value of the same, in the condition in which
they will be immediately after the land for the improvement bas been taken,
irrespective of the benefit which will result from the improvement, and the difference in value to constitute the measure of compensation. But in ascertaining
the depreciated value of the premises after that part which has been taken for
public use has been appropriated, regard must be bad only to the immediat~. and
not remote, consequence of the appropriation; that is to say, the value of the
remaining premises is not to be depreciated by heaping consequen~.;e on consequence. While we see no more practical mode of ascertainment than this, yet
it must still be borne in mind that this is but a mode of ascertainment; that,
after all, the true criterion is the one provided by the constitution, namely, just
compensation for the property taken." See this rule illustrated and applied in
Henry "· Dubuque and Pacific R.R. Co. 2 Iowa, 300, where it is said: "That
the language of the constitution means that the person whose property is taken
for public use shall have a fair equivalent in money for the injury done him by
such taking; in other words, that he shall be made whole so far as money is a
measure of compensation, we are equally clear. This just compensation should
be precisely commensurate with the injury sustained by having the property
taken; neither more nor less." And see the recent Kentucky cases of Richmond,
&c., Co. "· Rogers, 1 Duvall, 135; Robinson "· Robinson, ib. 162.
1 Matter of Furman Street, 17 Wend. 669; Tide-Water Canal Co."· Archer,
9 Gill & J. 480; State "· Burlington, &c., R.R. Co. 1 Iowa, 386; Parks "·
Boston, 15 Pick. 206; Fin~t Parish, &c. "· :Middlesex, 7 Gray, 106; Dickenson
"· Inhabitants of Fitchburg, 13 Gray, 546; Lexington"· Long, 31 Mo. S69.
1 Denton "· Polk, 9 Iowa, 594; Parks "· Boston, 15 Pick. 198; Dickenson "·
Fitchburg, 13 Gray, 546; Newby"· Platte County, 25 Mo. 25~; Pacific R.R.
Co. "· Chrystal, ib. M4; Somerville and Easton R.R. Co. ad8. Doughty, 2 Zab.
495; Carpenter "· Landaft'. 42 N.H. 218; Troy and Boston R.R. Co. "·Lee,
IS Barb. 169; Tide-Water Canal Co. "· Archer, 9 Gill and J. ~0; Winona and
St. Paul R.R. Co."· Waldron, 11 Minn. 515; Nicholson v. N.Y. and N.H.
R.R. Co. 22 Conn. 74; Nichols "·Bridgeport, 23 Conn. 189. "Compensation
is an equivalent for property taken, or for an injury. It must be ascertained by
e~;t.imating the actual damage the party bas sustained. That damage is the sum
of the actual value of the property taken, and of the injury done to the residue
of the property by the use of that part which is taken. The benefit is, in part,
an equivalent to the loss and damage. The loss and damage of the defendant is
the value of the land the company bas taken, and the injury which the location
and use of the road through his tract may cause to the remainder. The amount
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' But, in making this estimate, there must be excluded [* 569]
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from consideration those beneﬁts which the owner receives .

only in common with the community at large in conse-

quence of his ownership of other property) ‘and also those [* 570]

which may be assessed for these particulars the company admits that it is bound to

pay. But as a set-oil‘, it claims credit for the beneﬁt the defendant has received

from the construction of the road. That beneﬁt may consist in the enhanced

value of the residue of his tract. When the company has paid the defendant the

• But, in making this estimate, there must be excluded [* 569]
from consideration those benefits which the owner receives
only in common with the community at large in consequence of his ownership of other property,1 *and also those [* 570]

excess of his loss or damage over and above the beneﬁt and advantage he has

derived from the road, he will have received a just compensation. It is objected

that the enhanced salable value of the land should not be assessed as a beneﬁt to

the defendant, because it is precarious and uncertain. The argument admits

that the enhanced value, if permanent, should be assessed. But whether the

appreciation is permanent and substantial, or transient and illusory, is a subject

about which the court is not competent to determine. It must be submitted to a

jury, who will give credit to the company according to the circumstances. The

argument is not tenable, that an increased salable value is no beneﬁt to the owner

of land unless he sells it. This is true if it be assumed that the price will de-

cline. The chance of this is estimated by the jury, in the amount which they

may assess for that beneﬁt. The sum assessed is therefore (so far as human

foresight can anticipate the future) the exponent of the substantial increase of

the value of the land. This is a beneﬁt to the owner, by enlarging his credit
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and his ability to pay his debts or provide for his family, in the same manner and

to the same extent as if his fortune was increased by an acquisition of property."

Greenville and Columbia R.R.. Co. v. Partlow, 5 Rich. 437. And see Pennsyl-

vania R.R. Co. v. Reiley, 8 Penn. St. 445; Matter of Albany Street, 11 Wend.

153; Upton v. South Reading Branch R.R. 8 Cush. 600; Proprietors, &c. v.

Nashua and Lowell R.R. Co. 10 Cush. 385; Mayor, &c., of Lexington v. Long,

31 Mo. 369; St. Louis, &c., R.R. Co. v. Richardson, 45 Mo. 468; Little Miami

R.R. Co. v. Collett, 6 Ohio, N. S. 182. In Newby v. Platte County, 25 Mo. 358,

the right to assess beneﬁts was referred to the taxing power; but this seems not

necessary, and indeed somewhat dilﬁcult on principle. See Sutton’s Heirs v.

Louisville, 5 Dana, 30-34.

‘ Dickenson v. Inhabitants of Fitchburg, 13 Gray, 546; Newby v. Platte

County, 25 Mo. 258; Paciﬁc R.R. Co. v. Chrystal, ib. 544; Carpenter v. Lan-

daH', 42 N. H. 218; Mount VVashington Co.’s Petition, 35 N. H. 134; Penrice

v. \Vallis, 37 Miss. 172; Palmer Co. 1.1. Ferrill, 17 Pick. 58; Meacham v. Fitch-

burg R..R. C0. 4 Cush. 291, where the jury were instructed that, if they were

satisﬁed that the laying out and constructing of the railroad had occasioned any

beneﬁt or advantage to the lands of the petitioner through which the road passed,

or lauds immediately adjoining or connected therewith, rendering the part not

taken for the railroad more convenient or useful to the petitioner, or giving it

some peculiar increase in value compared with other lands generally in the

vicinity, it would be the duty of the jury to allow for such beneﬁt, or increase of

value, by way of set-off, in favor of the railroad company; but, on the other

hand, if the construction of the railroad, by increasing the convenience of the

[627]

which may be assessed for these particulars the company admits that it is bound to
pay. But as a set-off, it claims credit for the benefit the defendant has received
from the construction of the road. That benefit may consist in the enhanced
value_ of the residue of his tract. When the company has paid the defendant the
excess of his loss or damage over and above the benefit and advantage he has
derived from the road, he will have received a just compensation. It is objected
that the enhanced salable value of the land should not be assessed as a benefit to
the defendant, because it is precarious and uncertain. The a~gument admits
that the enhanced value, if permanent, should be asses~ed. But whether the
appreciation is permanent and substantial, or transient and illusory, is a subject
about which the court is not competent to determine. It must be submitted to a
jury, who will give credit to the company according to the circumstances. The
argument is not tenable, that an increased salable value is no benefit to the owner
of land unless he sells it. This is true if it be assumed that the price will decline. The chance of this is estimated by the jury, in the amount \Vhich they
may assess for that benefit. The sum assessed is therefore (so far as human
foresight can anticipate the future) the exponent of the substantial increase of
the value of the land. This is a benefit to the owner, by enlarging his credit
and his ability to pay his debts or provide for his family, in the same manner and
to the same extent as if his fortune was increased by an acquisition of property."
Greenville and Columbia R. R. Co. v. Partlow, 6 Rich. 437. And see Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Reiley, 8 Penn. St. 445; Matter of Albany Street, 11 Wend.
153; Upton v. South Reading Branch R.R. 8 Cush. 600; Proprietors, &c. v.
Nashua and Lowell R.R. Co. 10 Cush. 385; Mayot:, &c., of Lexington v. Long,
Sl Mo. 369; St. Louis, &c., R.R. Co. v. Richardson, 45 Mo. 468; Little Miami
R.R. Co. v. Collett, 6 Ohio, N. s. 182. In Newbyv. Platte County, 25 Mo. 358,
the right to assess benefits was referred to the taxing power; but this seems not
necessary, and indeed somewhat difficult on principle. See Sutton's Heirs v.
Louisville, 5 Dana, S0-34.
1 Dickenson v. Inhabitants of Fitchburg, 13 Gray, 646; Newby "· Platte
County, 25 Mo. 258; Pacific R.R. Co. v. Chrystal, ib. 644; Carpenter v. Landaff, 42 ~-H. 218; Mount Washington Co.'s Petition, 35 N.H. 134; Penrice
"·)Vallis, 37 Miss. 172; Palmer Co. v. Ferrill, 17 Pick. 68; Meacham v. Fitchburg R.R. Co. 4 Cush. 291, where the jury were instructed that, if they were
satisfied that the laying out and constructing of the railroad had occasioned any
benefit or advantage to the lands of the petitioner through which the road passed,
or lands immediately adjoining or connected therewith, rendering the part not
taken for the railroad more convenient or useful to the petitioner, or giving it
some peculiar increase in value compared with other lands generally in the
vicinity, it would be the duty of the jury to allow for such benefit, or increase of
value, by way of set-off, in favor of the railroad company; but, on the other
hand, if the construction of the railroad, by increasing the convenience of the

[ 627]
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incidental injuries to other property, such as would not give to

(cH. XV•

other persons a right to compensation,‘ while allowing those

which directly aﬂ'ect the value of the remainder of the land not

taken; such as the necessity for increased fencing, and the like?

And if an assessment on these principles makes the beneﬁts equal

the damages, and awards the owner nothing, he is nevertheless to

be considered as having received full compensation, and conse-

quently as not being in position to complain.“ '

people of the town generally as a place for residence, and by its anticipated and

probable eﬂ'ect in increasing the population, business, and general prosperity of

the place, had been the occasion of an increase in the salable value of real estate

generally near the station, including the petitioner’s land, and thereby occasion-

ing a beneﬁt or advantage to him, in common with other owners of real estate in

the vicinity, this beneﬁt was too contingent, indirect, and remote to be brought

into consideration in settling the question of damages to the petitioner for taking

his particular parcel of land. Upton v. South Reading Branch R.lt. Co. 8 Cush.

600. It has sometimes been objected, with great force, that it was unjust and

oppressive to set oﬂ‘ beneﬁts against the loss and damage which the owner of the

property sustains, because thereby he is taxed for such beneﬁts, while his neigh-

bors, no part of whose land is taken, enjoy the same beneﬁts without the loss;

and the courts of Kentucky have held it to be unconstitutional, and that full com-

pensation for the land taken must be made in money. Sutton v. Louisville, 5
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Dana, 28; Rice v. Turnpike Co. 7 Dana, 81 ; Jacob v. Louisville, 9 Dana, 114

And some other States have established, by their constitutions, the rule that bene-

ﬁts shall not be deducted. See Deaton v. County of Polk, 9 Iowa, 596; Giesy

v. Cincinnati, W. and Z. R.R. Co. 4 Ohio, N. s. 308; W'oodfolk v. Nashville

R.R. Co. 2 Swan, 422. But the cases generally adopt the doctrine stated in

the text; and if the owner is paid his actual damages, he has no occasion to com-

plain because his neighbors are fortunate cnongh’to receive a beneﬁt. Green-

ville and Columbia R.R. Co. v. Partlow, 5 Rich. 438; Mayor, &c., of Lexington

v. Long, 31 Mo. 369.

‘ Somerville, &c., R.R. Co. ads. Doughty, 2 Zab. 495; Dorlan 1'. East Bran-

d_\-winc, &c., R.R. Co. 46 Penn. St. 520; Proprietors, &c. v. Nashua and Lowell

R.R. Co. 10 Cush. 385; Louisville and Nashville R.R. Co. v. Thompson, 18 B.

Monr. 785; Winona and St. Peter’s R.R. Co. v. Denman, 10 Minn. 267.

’ Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Reiley, 8 Penn. St. 445; Greenville and Columbia

R.R. Co. v. Partlow, 5 Rich. 439; Dearborn v. Railroad Co. 4 Fost. 179; Car-

penter v. Landatf, 42 N. H. 220; Dorlan v. East Brandywine, &c., R.R. Co.

46 Penn. St. 520; \Vinona and St. Peter‘s R.R. Co. v. Dcnman, 10 Minn. 267;

Mount \Vashington Co.’s Petition, 35 N. H. 134. lvherc a part of a meeting-

house lot was taken for a highway, it was held that the anticipated annoyance to

worshippers by the use of the way by noisy and dissolute persons on the Sabbath

could form no basis for any assessment of damages. First Parish in \Voburn v.

Middlesex County, 7 Gray, 106.

" \Vhite v. County Commissioners of Norfolk, 2 Cush. 361; \Vhitman v. Bos-

ton and Maine R.R. Co. 3 Allen, 138; Nichols v. Bridgeport, 23 Conn. 189.

[628] V

incidental lllJUries to other property, such as would not give to
Qther persons a right to compensation,1 while allowing those
which directly affect th~ value of the remainder of the land not
taken ; such as the necessity for increased fencing, and the like.2
And if an assessment on these principles makes the benefits equal
the damages, and awards the owner nothing, he is nevertheless to
be considered as having received full compensation, and consequently as not being in position to complain.a
people of the town generally as a place for residence, and by its anticipated and
probable effect in increasing the p.opulation, business, and general prosperity of
the place, had been the occasion of an increase in the salable value of real estate
generally near ~c station, including the petitioner's land, and thereby occasioning a benefit or advantage to him, in common with other owners of real estate in
the vicinity, this benefit was too contingent, indirect, and remote to be brought
into consideration in settling the question of damages to the petitioner for taking
his particular parcel ofland. Upton!'. South Reading Branch R.R. Co. 8 Cush.
600. It has sometimes been objected, with great force, that it was unjust and
oppressive to set off benefits against the loss and damage which the owner of the
property sustains, because thereby he is taxed for such benefits, while his neighbors, no part of whose land is taken, enjoy the same benefits without the loss;
and the courts of Kentucky have held it to be unconstitutional, and that full compensation for the land taken mu>t be made in money. Sutton v. Louin·ille, 5
Dana, 28; Rice v. Turnpike Co. 7 Dana, 81; Jacob"· Louisville, 9 Dana, 114
And some other States have established, by their constitutions, the rule that bene·
fits shall not be deducted. See Deaton!'. County of Polk, 9 Iowa, 596; Giesy
v. Cincinnati, W. and Z. R.R. Co. 4 Ohio, N. s. 808; W oodfolk v. Nashville
R.R. Co. 2 Swan, 422. But the cases generally adopt the dodrine stated in
the text; and if the owner is paid his actual damages, he has no occasion to com·
plain because his neighbors are fortunate enough' to receive a benefit. Greenville and Columbia R.R. Co. v. Partlow, 5 Rich. 488; Mayor, &c., of Lexington
v. Long, 81 Mo. 869.
1 Somerville, &c., R.R. Co. ad8. Doughty, 2 Zab. 495; Dorian v. East Brandywine, &c., R.R. Co. 46 Penn. St. 520; Proprietors, &c. v. Nashua and Lowdl
R.R. Co. 10 Cush. 385; Louisville and Nashville R.R. Co. v. Thompson, 18 B.
Monr. 785; Winona and St. Peter's R.R. Co. v. Denman, 10 Minn. 267.
1 Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Reiley, 8 Penn. St. 445; Greenville and Columbia
R.R. Co. !'. Partlow, f> Rich. 489; Dearborn v. Railroad Co. 4 Fost. 179; Carpenter "· Landaff, 42 N. H. 220; Dorian v. East Brandywine, &c., R.R. Co.
46 Penn. St. 520; Winona and St. Peter's R.R. Co. !'. Denman, 10 Minn. 267;
Mount W asbington Co.'s Petition, 85 N. H. 184. Where a part of a meetinghouse lot was taken for a highway, it was held that the anticipated annoyance to
worshippers by the use of the way by noisy and dissolute persons on the Sabbath
could form no basis for any assessment of damages. First Parish in Woburn !'.
Middlesex County, 7 Gray, 106.
3 White "· County Commissioners of Norfolk, 2 Cush. 861 ; Whitman v. Boston and Maine R.R. Co. S Allen, 188; Nichols !'. Bridgeport, 23 Conn. 189.
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The statutory assessment of compensation will cover all conse-
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quential damages which the owner of the land sustains by means

of the construction of the work, except such as may result‘

from * negligence or improper construction} and for which ["‘ 571]

an action at the common law will lie, as already stated.

But it is not competent for the commissioners who assess the compensation to

require that which is to be made to be in whole or in part in any thing else than

money. An award of “ one hundred and ﬁfty dollars, with a wagon-way and

stop for cattle,” is void, as undertaking to pay the owner in part in conveniences

The statutory assessment of compensation will cover all consequential damages which the owner of the land sustains by means
of the construction of the work, except such as may result·
from • negligence or improper construction,1 and for which [* 571]
an action at the common law will lie, as already stated.

to be furnished him, and which he may not want, and certainly cannot be com-

pelled to take instead of money. Central Ohio R.R. Co. v. Holler, 7 Ohio,

N. s. 225.

‘ Philadelphia and Reading R.R. Co. v. Yeiser, 8 Penn. St. 866; Aldrich v.

Cheshire R.R. Co. 1 Fost. 359; Dearhorn v. Boston, Concord, and Montreal

R.R. Co. 4 Fost. 179; Dodge v. County Commissioners, 3 Mot. 380; Brown v.

Providence, VV. and B. R. R. Co. 5 Gray, 35; Mason v. Kennebec and Portland

RR. C0. 31 Me. 215.

[629]
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But it is not competent for the commissioners who assess the compensation to
require that which is to be made to be in whole or in part in any thing else than
money. An award of " one hundred and fifty dollars, with a wagon-way and
stop for cattle," is void, as undertaking to pay the owner in part in conveniences
to be furnished him, and which he may not want, and certainly cannot be compelled to take instead of money. Central Ohio R.R. Co. v. Holler, 7 Ohio,
N. S . 225.
1 Philadelphia and Reading R.R. Co."· Yeiser, 8 Penn. St. 866; Aldrich "·
Cheshire R.U. Co. 1 Fost. 859; Dearborn v. Boston, Concord, and Montreal
R.R. Co. 4 Fost. 179; Dodge v. County Commissioners, 8 Met. 380; Brown v.
Providence, W. and B. R. R. Co. 5 Gray, 35; Mason v. Kennebec and Portland
R.R. Co. 81 Me. 215.
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[“‘572] *CHAPTER XVI.

(CH. XVI.

ran POLICE rowan or was sures.

ON questions of conﬂict between national and State authority,

and on questions whether the State exceeds its just powers in deal-

ing with the property and restraining the actions of individuals, it

often becomes necessary to consider the extent and proper bounds

of a power in the States, which, like that of taxation, pervades

every department of business and reaches to every interest and

*CHAPTER XVI.

[*572]

every subject of proﬁt or enjoyment.‘ We refer to what is known

as the police power.

THE POLICE POWER OF THE STATES.

The police of a State, in a comprehensive sense, embraces its

system of internal regulation, by which it is sought not only to

preserve the public order and to prevent oﬂ'ences against the State,

but also to establish for the intercourse of citizen with citizen

those rules of good manners and good neighborhood which are

calculated to prevent a conﬂict of rights, and to insure to each the

uninterrupted enjoyment of his own, so far as is reasonably con-

sistent with a like enjoyment of rights by others}

In the present chapter we shall take occasion to speak of the

police power principally as it aﬂ'ects the use and enjoyment of

property ; the object being to show the universality of its presence,

and to indicate, so far as may be practicable, the limits which set-
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tled principles of constitutional law assign to its interference.

‘ Blackstone deﬁnes the public police and economy as “ the due regulation

and domestic order of the kingdom, whereby the inhabitants of a State, like

members of a well-governed family, are bound to conform their general behavior

to the rules of propriety, good neighborhood, and good manners, and to be

decent, industrious, and inoffensive in their respective stations.” 4 Bl. Com.

162. Jeremy Bentham, in his General View of Public Offences, has this deﬁni-

tion: “ Police is in general a system of precaution, either for the prevention of

crimes or of calamities. Its business may be distributed into eight distinct

branches: 1. Police for the prevention of offences; 2. Police for the prevention

of calamities; 3. Police for the prevention of endemic diseases; 4. Police of

charity; 5. Police of interior communications; 6. Police of public amusements;

7. Police for recent intelligence; 8. Police for registration." Edinburgh Ed. of

Works, Part IX. p. 157. -

[630] ’

ON questions of conflict between national and State authority,
and on questions whether the State exceeds its just powers in dealing with the property and restraining the actions of individuals, it
often becomes necessary to consider the extent and proper bounds
of a power in the States, which, like that of taxation, pervades
every department of business and reaches to every interest and
every su~ject of profit or enjoyment.· We refer to what is kuown
as the police power.
The police of a State, in a comprehensive sense, embraces its
system of internal regulation, by which it is sought not only to
preserve the public order and to prevent offences against the State,
but also to establish for the intercourse of citizen with citizen
those rules of good manners and good neighborhood which are
calculated to prevent a conflict of rights, and to insure to each the
uninterrupted enjoyment of his own, so far as is reasonably consistent with a like enjoyment of rights by others. 1
In the present chapter we shall take occasion to speak of the
police power principally as it affects the use and enjoyment of
property ; the object being to show the universality of its presence,
and to indicate, so far as may be practicable, the limits which settled principles of constitutional law assign to its interference.
Blackstone defines the public police and economy as "the due regulation
and domestic order of the kingdom, whereby the inhabitants of a State, like
members of a well-governed family, are bound to conform their general behavior
to the rules of propriety, good neighborhood, and good manners, and to be
decent, industrious, and inoffensive in their respective stations." 4 Bl. Com.
162. Jeremy Benthll.ID, in his General View of Public Offences, has this definition : " Police is in general a system of precaution, either for the prevention of
crimes or of calamities. Its business may be distributed into eight distinct
branches: 1. Police for the prevention of offences; 2. Police for the prevention
of calamities; 3. Police for the prevention of endemic diseases; 4. Police of
charity; 5. Police of interior communications; 6. Police of public amusements;
7. Police for recent intelligence; 8. Police for registration." Edinburgh Ed. of
Works, Part IX. p. 157.
1

[ 630]
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“ We think it is a settled principle,” says Chief Justice
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Shaw, *‘“ growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil [“‘ 573]

society, that every holder of property, however absolute

and unqualiﬁed may be his title, holds it under the implied liability

that his use of it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of

others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property,

nor injurious to the rights of the community. All property in this

Commonwealth is . . . held subject to those general regulations

which are necessary to the common good and general welfare.

Rights of property, like all other social and conventional rights,

are subject to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as

shall prevent them from being injurious, and to such reasonable

restraints and regulations established by law as the legislature,

under the governing and controlling power vested in them by the

constitution may think necessary and expedient. This is very dif-

ferent from the right of eminent domain, — the right of a govern-

ment to take and appropriate private property whenever the public

exigency requires it, which can be done only on condition of pro-

viding a reasonable compensation therefor. The power we allude

to is rather the police power; the power vested in the legislature

by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of

wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either
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with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as

they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the Commoti-

wealth, and of the subjects of the same. It is knuch easier to per-

ceive and realize the existence and sources of this power than to

mark its boundaries, or prescribe limits to its exercise.” 1

“ This police power of the State,” says another eminent judge,

“ extends to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and

quiet of all persons, and the protection of all property within the

State. According to the maxim, Sic utere tuo ut alienum non

lwdas, which being of universal application, it must, of course, be

within the range of legislative action to deﬁne the mode and man-

ner in which every one may so use his own as not to injure

‘ Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 84. See also Commonwealth v. Tewks-

bury, 11 Met. 57; Hart v. Mayor, &c., of Albany, 9 Wend, 571; New Albany

and Salem R.R. Co. 1:. Tilton, 12 Ind. 3 ; Indianapolis and Cincinnati R.R.. C0. v.

Kercheval, 16 Ind.84; Ohio and Misissippi R.R.. Co. 1:. McClelland, 25 Ill. 140;

People v. Draper, 25 Barb. 374; Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 390; Police Com-

missioners v. Louisville, 3.Bush, 597.

\ [631]

"We think it is a settled principle," says Chief Justice
S!Jaw, •" growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil [• 573]
society, that every holder of propet·ty, however absolute
and unqualified may be his title, holds it under the implied liability
that his use of it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of
others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property,
nor injurious to the rights of the community. All property in this
Commonwealth is . . . held subject to those general regulations
which are necessary to the common good and general welfare.
Rights of property, like all other social and conventional rights,
are subject to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as
shall prevent them from being injurious, and to such reasonable
restraints and regulations established by law as the legislature,
under the governing and controlling power vested in them by the
constitution may think necessary aud expedient. This is very different from tho right of eminent domain,- the right of a government to take and appropriate private property whene\·er the public
exigency requires it, which can be done only on condition of pt·oviding a reasonable compensation therefor. The power we allude
to is rather the police power ; the power vested in the legislature
by the constitution to mllke, ordain, and establish all manner of
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either
with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as
they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the Commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same. It is 'much easier to perceive auu realize the existence and sources of this power than to
mark itR boundaries, or prescribe limits to its exercise." 1
" This police power of the State," says another eminent judge,
" extends to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and
quiet of all persons, and the protection of all property within the
State. According to the maxim, Sic utere tuo ut alienum non
lcedas, which being of universal application, it must, of course, be
within the range of legislative action to define the mode and manner in which every one may so use his own as not to injure
1 Commonwealth"· Alger, 7 Cush. 8!.
See also Commonwealth v. Tewksbury, 11 Met. 57; Hart v. Mayor, &c., of Albany, 9 Wend, 571; New Albany
and Salem R.R. Co. v. Tilton, 12 Ind. S; Indianapolis and Cincinnati R.R. Co. v.
Kerche,·al, 16 Ind. 84 ; Ohio and Misissippi R.R. Co. v. McClelland, 25 Ill. 140;
People v. Draper, 25 Barb. 374; Baltimore "· State, 15 Md. 390; Police Commissioners v. Louisville, 3 Bush, 597.
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others.” And again: [By this] “general police power of the

State, persons and property are subjected toall kinds of restraints

and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort,

[* 574] health, and prosperity of the * State ; of the perfect right

in the legislature to do which, no question ever was, or,

upon acknowledged general principles, ever can be made, so far

as natural persons are eoncerned.”1

In the American constitutional system, the power to establish

the ordinary regulations of police has been left with the individual

States, and cannot be assumed by the national government.2

Neither can the national government through any of its depart-

ments or officers assume any supervision of the police regulations

of the States, so long as they do not invade the sphere of national

sovereignty, and obstruct or impede the exercise of any authority

which the Constitution has conﬁded to the nation? But on the

' Redﬁeld, Ch. J., in Thorpe v. Rutland and Burlington R.R. Co. 27 Vt. 149.

See the maxim, Sic utere, &c., -—“ Enjoy your own property in such manner

as not to injure that of another,“-—in Broom, Legal Maxims, 5th Am. ed. p.

327. See also Turbeville v. Stampe, 1 Ld. Raym. 264, and 1 Salk. 13; Jelfries v.

“Williams, 5 Exch. 792; Humphries v. Brogden, 12 Q. B. 739; Pixley v. Clark,

35 N. Y. 520.
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' So decided in United States v. DeWitt, 9Wal. 41, in which a section of the

others.'' And again: [By this] " general police power of the
State, persons and property are subjected to aU kinds of restraints
and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort,
[*57 4] health, and prosperity of the * State ; of the perfect right
in the legislature to do which, no question ever was, or,
upon acknowledged general principles, ever can be made, so far
as natural persons are concerned." 1
In the American constitutional system, the power to establish
the ordinary regulations of police has been left with the individual
States, and cannot be assumed by the national government.2
Neither can the national government _through any of its departments or officers assume any supervision of the police regulations
of the States, so long as they do not invade the sphere of national
sovereignty, and obstruct or impede the exercise of any authority
which the Constitution has confided to the nation.s But on the

Internal Revenue Act of 1867 — which undertook to make it a misdemeanor to

mix for sale naphtha and illuminating oils, or to sell oil of petroleum inﬂammable

at a less temperature than 110° Fahrenheit.—was held to be a mere police regu-

lation, and as such void within the States.

' Sec this subject considered at large in the License Cases, 5 How. 504, and

the Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283. Congress has no power to authorize a busi-

ness within a State which is prohibited by the State. License Tax Cases, 5 \Val.

471, per Chase, Ch. J. A claim has recently been advanced at New Orleans,

that the Civil Rights Bill, in connection with the fourteenth amendment to the

national Constitution, has so far enlarged the jurisdiction of the Federal Courts,

as to authorize them, at the suit of citizens of a State, to review one of its stat-

utes purporting to establish a police regulation, and to adjudge it void ifin their

opinion it wrongfully abridged the right of citizens to follow a lawful employment;

and this claim has been sustained by Mr. Justice Bradley, of the United States

Supreme Court, in the case of The Live Stock, &c., Association v. The Crescent

City, &c., Company, decided by him at the Circuit. The case is now pending in

the United States Supreme Court, to which it has been removed; and it may not

be proper now to comment upon it: but it is safe to say — as indeed is virtually

conceded by the learned judge who made the deeision—that no such conse-

quence was contemplated when the Civil Rights Bill was passed. State legislation

in violation of the fourteenth amendment, or of any other provision of the Con-

stitution, if sustained by the State Court of last resort, may be set aside by the

[ 632 ]

Red.fidd, Ch. J., in Thorpe 11. Rutland and Burlington R.R. Co. 27 Vt. 149.
See the maxim, Sic tllere, &c.,-" Enjoy your own property in such manner
as not to injure that of another,"- in Broom, Legal Maxims, 5th Am. ed. p.
827. See also Turbeville.,. Stampe, 1 I~d. Raym. 264, and 1 Salk. 18; Jetfriesv.
Williams, 5 E:r.ch. 792; Humphries "· Brogden, 12 Q. B. 789; Pixley 11. Clark,
85 N.Y. 520.
1 So decided in United States v; Dt:Witt, 9Wal. 41, in which a section of the
Internal Revenue Act of 1867 - which undertook to make it a misdemeanor to
mix for sale naphtha and illuminating oils, or to sell oil of petroleum inflammable
at a less temperature than 110° Fahrenheit- was held to be a mere police regulation, and as such void within the States.
1 See this subject considered at l!lrge in the License Cases, 5 How. 50!, and
tht> Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283. Congress has no power to authorize a business within a State which is prohibited by the State. License Tax Cases, 5 Wal.
471, per Chcue, Ch. J. A claim has recently been advanced at New Orleans,
that the Civil Rights Bill, in connection with the fourteenth amendment to the
national Constitution, has so far enlarged the jurisdiction of the Federal Courts,
as to authorize them, at the suit of citizens of a State, to review one of its statutes purporting to establish a police regulation, ~Lnd to adjudge it void if in their
opinion it wrongfully abridged the right of citizens to follow a lawful employment;
and this claim has been sustained by :Mr. Justice Bradley, of the United Statea
Supreme Court, in the case of The Live Stock, &c., Association 11. The Crescent
City, &c., Company, decided by him a£ the Circuit. The case is now pending in
the United States Supreme Court, to which it has been removed; and it may not
be proper now to comment upon it: but it is nfe to say- as indeed is virtually
conl't!tlcd by the learned judge who made the decision -that no such consequence was contemplated when the Civil Rights Bill was passed. State legislation
in violation of the fourteenth amendment, or of any other provision of the Constitution, if sustained by the State Court of last resort, may be set aaide by the
1
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other hand it is easy to see that the power in the States might be
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THE POLICE POWER OF THE STATES.

so employed as to interfere with the jurisdiction of the general

government ; and some of the most serious questions regarding the

police of the States concerns the cases in which authority has been

conferred upon Congress. In those cases it has sometimes been

claimed that the ordinary police jurisdiction is by necessary impli-

cation excluded, and that, if it were not so, the State would be

found operating within the sphere of the national powers, and

establishing regulations which would either abridge the rights

which the national Constitution undertakes to render absolute, or

burden the privileges which, being conferred by law of Congress,

cannot properly be subject to control by any other authority.

But any accurate statement of the theory upon which the police

power rests, will render it apparent that a proper exercise of it by

the State cannot come in conﬂict with the provisions of the'C0nsti-

tution of the United States. If the power only extends to a just

regulation of rights with a view to the due protection and enjoy-

ment of all, and does not deprive any one of that which is justly

and properly his own, it is obvious that its possession by the State,

and its exercise for the regulation of the property and actions of

its citizens, cannot well constitute an invasion of national juris-

diction, or afford a basis for an appeal to the protection of the
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national authorities.

This subject has often been considered in its bearings upon the

clause of the Constitution of the United States which forbids the

States passing any laws violating the obligation of contracts; and

invariably it has been held that this clause does not so far remove

from State control the rights and properties which depend for their

existence or enforcement upon contracts, as to relieve them from

the operation of such general regulations for the good government

of the State and the protection of the rights of individuals as may

be deemed important. All contracts and all rights, it is held, are

subject to this power ; and regulations which affect them may not

Federal Supreme Court on appeal, as provided by the J udiciary»Act of 1793 ; but

when general original jurisdiction to supervise or review State legislation shall be

conferred upon the federal judiciary, an innovation will be made in our system

which ought not to be made without careful consideration and deliberate intention.

In State v. Hairston, 63 N. C. 451, it was decided that the recent amendments

to the national Constitution had not had the effect to repeal a State law forbid-

ding marriages between white persons and negroes.

[ass]

other hand it is easy to see that the power in the States might be
so employed as to interfere with the jurisdiction of the general
government ; and some of the most serious questions regarding the
police of the St~tes concerns the cases in which authority has been
conferred upon Congress. In those cases it has sometimes been
claimed that the ordinary police jurisdiction is by necessary implication excluded, and that, if it were not so, the State would be
found operating within the sphere of the national powers, and
establishing regulations which would either abridge the rights
which the national Constitution undertakes to render absolute, or
burden the privileges which, being conferred by law of Congress,
cannot properly be subject to control by any other authority.
But any accurate statement of the theory upon which the police
power rests, will render it apparent that a proper exercise of it by
the State cannot come in conflict with the provisions of the Constitution of the United States. If the power only extend-s to a just
regulation of rights with a view to the due protection and enjoyment of all, and does not deprive any one of that which is justly
and properly his own, it is obvious that its possession by the State,
and its exercise for tho regulation of the property and actions of
its citizens, cannot well constitute an invasion of national jurisdiction, or afford a basis for an appeal to the protection of the
national authorities.
This subject has often been considered in its bearings upon the
clause of the Constitution of the United States which forbids the
States passing any laws violating the obligation of contracts; and
invariably it has been held that this clause does not so far remove
from State control the rights and properties which depend for their
existence or enforcement upon contracts, as to relieve them from
the operation of such general regulations for the good government
of the State and the protection of the rights of individuals as may
be deemed important. .A.ll contracts and all rights, it is held, are
subject to this power ; and regulations which affect them may not
Federal Supreme Court on appeal, as provided by the Judiciary·Act of 1793; but
when general original jurisdiction to supervise or review St.atc legislation shall be
conferred upon the federal judiciary, an innovation will be made in our system
which ought not to be made without careful consideration and deliberate intention.
In State v. Hairston, 63 N. C. 4lil, it was decided that the recent amendments
to the natio~al Constitution had not had the effect to repeal a State law forbidding marriages between white persons and negroes.
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only be established by the State, but must also be subject to change
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from time to time, with reference to the general well-being of the

community, as circumstances change, or as experience demon-

strates the necessity}

‘ In the case of Thorpe v. Rutland and Burlington R.R. Co. 27 Vt. 140, a

question arose under a provision in the Vermont General Railroad Law of 1849,

which required each railroad corporation to erect and maintain fences on the line

of their road, and also cattle guards at all farm and road crossings, suitable and

only be established by the State, but must also be subject to change
from time to time, with reference to the general well-being of the
community, as circumstances change, or as experience demonstrates the necessity. 1

suﬁicient to prevent cattle and other animals from getting upon the railroad, and

which made the corporation and its agents liable for all damages which should be

done by their agents or engines to cattle, horses, or other animals thereon, if

occasioned by the want of such fences and cattle guards. It was not disputed

that this provision would be valid as to such corporations as might be afterwards

created within the State; but in respect to those previously in existence, and

whose charters contained no such provision, it was claimed that this legislation

was inoperative, since otherwise its offect would be to modify, and to that extent

to violate, the obligation of the charter-contract. “ The case,” say the court,

“ resolves itself into the narrow question of the right of the legislature, by gen-

eral statute, to require all railways, whether now in operation or hereafter to be

chartered or built, to fence their roads upon both sides, and provide sufficient

cattle guards at all farm and road crossings, under penalty of paying all damages

caused by their neglect to comply'with such requirements. . . . We think the
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power of the legislature to control existing railways in this respect may be found

in the general control over the police of the country, which resides in the law-

making power in all free States, and which is, by the ﬁfth article of the bill of

rights of this State, expressly declared to reside perpetually and inalicnably in

the legislature; which is, perhaps, no more than the enunciation of a geneqal

principle applicable to all free States, and which cannot therefore be violated so

as to deprive the legislature of the power, even by express grant to any mere

public or private corporation. And when the regulation of the police of a city or

town, by general ordinances, is given to such towns and cities, and the regulation

of their own internal police is given to railroads to be carried into effect by their

by-laws and other regulations, it is of course always, in all such cases, subject to

the superior control of the legislature. That is a responsibility which legislatures

cannot devest themselves of if they would.

“ So far as railroads are concerned, this police power which resides primarily

and ultimately in the legislature is twofold: 1. The police of the roads, which,

in the absence of legislative control, the corporations themselves exercise over

their operatives, and to some extent over all who do business with them, or come

upon their grounds, through their general statutes, and by their oﬂicers. We

apprehend there can be no manner of doubt that the legislature may, if they

deem the public good requires it, of which they are to judge, and in all doubtful

cases their judgment is ﬁnal, require the several railroads in the State to establish

and maintain the same kind of police which is now observed upon some of the

more important roads in the country for their own security, or oven such a police

as is found upon the English railways, and those upon the Continent of Europe.

[634]

1 In the case of Thorpe v. Rutland and Burlington R .R. Co. 27 Vt. 140, a
question arose under a provision in the Vennont General Railroad Law of 1849,
which required each railroad corporation to erect and maintain fences on the line
of their road, and also cattle guards at all farm and road crossings, suitable and
sufficient to prevent cattle and other animals from getting upon the railroad, and
which made the corporation and its agents liable for all damages which should be
done by their agents or engines to cattle, horses, or other animals thereon, if
occasioned by the want of such fences and cattle guards. It was not disputed
that this provision would be valid as to such corporations as might be afterwards
created within the State; but in respect to those previously in existence, and
whose charters contained no such provision, it was claimed that this legislation
was inoperative, since otherwise its offect would be to modify, and to that extent
to violate, the obligation of the charter-contract. " The case," say the court,
" resolves itself into the narrow question of the right of the legislature, by general statute, to require all railways, whether now in operation or hereafter to be
chartered or built, to fence their roads upon both sides, and provide sufficient
cattle guards at all fann and road crossings, under penalty of paying all damages
caused by their neglect to comply 'with such requirements. . • • We think the
power of the legislature to control existing railways in this respect may be found
in the general control over the police of the country, which resides in the lawmaking power in all free States, and which is, by the fifth article of the bill of
rights of this State, expressly declared to reside perpetually and inalil•nably in
the legislature; which i5, perhaps, no more than the enunciation of a genex:al
principle applicable to all free States, and which cannot therefore be violated so
as to deprive the legislature of the power, even by express grant to any mere
public or private corporation. And when the regulation of the police of a city or
town, by general ordinances, is given to such towns and cities, and the regulation
of their own internal police is given to railroads to be carried into effect by their
by-laws and other regulations, it is of course always, in all such cases, subject to
the superior control of the legislature. That is a responsibility which legislatures
cannot devest themselves of if they would.
" So far as railroads are concerned, this police power which resides primarily
and ultimately in the legislature is twofold: 1. The police of the roads, whieh,
in the absence of legislative control, the corporations themselves exercise over
their operatives, and to some extent over all who do business with them, or come
upon their grounds, through their general statutes, and by their officers. We
apprehend there can be no manner of doubt that the legislature may, if they
deem the public good requires it, of which they are to judge, and in all doubtful
cases their judgment is final, require the several railroads in the State to establish
and maintain the same kind of police which is now observed upon some of the
more important roads in the country for their own security, or even such a police
as is found upon the English railways, and those upon the C-ontinent of Europe.
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here stated will be found among the judicial decisions

which have held *‘that the rights insured to private cor- [" 576]

porations by their charters, and the manner of their exer-

cise, are subject to such new regulations as from time to time may

N o one cver questioned the right of the Connecticut legislature to require trains

upon all of their railroads to come to a stand before passing draws in bridges; or

of the Massachusetts legislature to require the same thing before passing another

railroad. And by parity of reasoning may all railways be required so to conduct

• Perhaps the most strikinJl; illustrations of the principle [* 575]
here stated will be found among the judicial decisions
which have held • that the rights insured to private cor- [• 576]
porations by their charters, and the manner of their exercise, are subject to such new regulations as from time to time may

themselves as to other persons, natural or corporate, as not unreasonably to in-

jure them or their property. And if the business of railways is specially danger-

ous, they may be required to bear the expense of erecting such safeguards as

will render it ordinarily safe to others, as is often required of natural persons

under such circumstances.

"There would be no end of illustrations upon this subject. . . . It may be

extended to the supervision of the track, tending switches, running upon the

time of other trains, running a road with a single track, using improper rails, not

using proper precaution by way of safety-beams in case of the breaking of

axletrees, the number of brakemen upon a train with reference to the number of

cars, employing intemperate or incompetent engineers and servants, running

beyond a given rate of speed, and a thousand similar things, most of which have

been made the subject of legislation or judicial determination, and all of which
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may be. Hegeman v. Western R. Co. 16 Barb. 353.

“ 2. There is also the general police power of the State, by which persons and

property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure

the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State; of the perfect right in

the legislature to do which no question ever was, or, upon acknowledged general

principles, ever can be made, so far as natural persons are concerned. And it is

certainly calculated to excite surprise and alarm that the right to do the same in

regard to railways should be made a serious question.” And the court proceed

to consider the various cases in which the right of the legislature to regulate mat-

ters of private concern with reference to the general public good has been acted

upon as unquestioned, or sustained by judicial decisions, and quote, as pertinent

to the general question of what laws are prohibited on the ground of impairing

the obligation of contracts, the language of Chief Justice zlfarshall in Dartmouth

College v. Woodward, 4 \Vheat. 518, 629, that “ the framers of the Constitution

did not intend to restrain the States in the regulation of their civil institutions,

adopted for internal government, and that the instrument they have given us is

not to be so construed.” See, to the same effect, Suydam v. Moore, 8 Barb.

358; \Valdron v. Rensselaer and Saratoga R.R. Co. 8 Barb. 390; Galena and

Chicago U. R.R. Co. v. Loomis, 13 Ill. 548; Fitchburg R.R. v. Grand Junction

R.R. Co. 1 Allen, 552; Veazie v. Mayo, 45 Me. 560; Peters v. Iron Mountain

R.R. Co. 28 Mo. 107; Grannahan v. Hannibal, &c., R.R. Co. 30 Mo. 546; In-

dianapolis and Cincinnati R.R. Co. v. Kercheval, 16 Ind. 84; Galena and Chi-

cago U. R.R. Co. o. Appleby, 28 Ill. 283; Blair v. Milwaukee, &c., R.R. Co.

20 Wis. 254; State v. Mathews, 44 Mo. 523.

[ 635 ]

No one ever questioned the right of the Connecticut legislature to require trains
upon all of their railroads to come to a stand before passing draws in bridges ; or
of the Massachusetts legislature to require the same thing before pasMing another
railroad. And by parity of reasoning may aU railways be required so to condu<:t
themselves as to other persons, natural or corporate, as not unreasonably to injure them or thair property. And if the business of railways is specially dangerous, they may be required to bear the expense of erecting such safeguards as
will render it ordinarily safe to others, as is often required of natural persons
under such circumstances •
.. There would be no end of illustrations upon this subject. • • . It may be
extended to the supervision of the track, tending switches, running upon the
time of other trains, running a road with a single track, using improper rails, not
using proper precaution by way of safety-beams in case of the breaking of
axletrees, the number of brakemen upon a train with reference to the number of
cars, employing intemperate or incompetent engineers and servants, running
beyond a given rate of speed, and a thousand similar things, most of which have
been made the subject of legislation or judicial determination, and all of which
may be. Hegeman "· Western R. Co. 16 Barb. 353.
"2. There is also the general police power of the State, by which persons and
property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure
the general comfort. health, and prosperity of the State; of the perfect right in
t~e legislature to do which no question ever was, or, upon acknowledged general
principles, ever can be made, so far as natural persons are concerned. And it is
certainly calculated to excite surprise and alarm that the right to do the same in
regard to railways should be made a serious question." And the court proceed
to consider the various cases in which the right of the legislature to regulate matters of private concern with reference to the general public good has been acted
upon as unquestioned, or sustained by judicial decisions, and quote, as pertinent
to the general question of what laws are prohibited on the ground of impairing
the obligation of contracts, the language of Chief Justice .Marshall in Dartmouth
College "· Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 629, that " the framers of the Constitution
did not intend to restrain the States in the regulation of their civil institutions,
adopted for internal government, and that the instrument they have given us is
not to be so construed." See, to the same effect, Suydam "· Moore, 8 Barb.
35~; Waldron "·Rensselaer and Saratoga R.R. Co. 8 Barb. 890; Galena and
Chicago U. R.R. Co. v. Loomis, 13 Ill. M8; Fitchburg R.R. v. Grand Junction
R.R. Co. 1 Allen, 552; Veazie "· :Mayo, 4b Me. 560; Peter:~ v. Iron Mountain
R.R. Co. 28 Mo. 107; Grannahan v. Hannibal, &c., R.R. Co. 30 Mo. 546; Indianapolis and Cincinnati R.R. Co. "· Kercheval, 16 Ind. 84; Galena and Chicago U. R.R. Co. v. Appleby, 28 Ill. 283; Blair "· Milwaukee, &c., R.R. Co.
20 Wis. 25!; State "· Mathews, 44 Mo. 523.
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be made by the State with a view to the public protection, health,
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and safety, and to properly guard the rights of other individuals

and corporations. Although these charters are to be regarded as

contracts, and the rights assured by them are inviolable, it does

not follow that these rights are at once, by force of the charter-

contract, removed from the sphere of State regulation, and that the

charter implies an undertaking, on the part of the State,

["* 577] that in the same way in which their exercise is * permis-

sible at ﬁrst, and under the regulations then existing, and

those only, may the corporators continue to exercise their rights

while the artiﬁcial existence continues. The obligation of the con-

tract by no means extends so far; but, on the contrary, the rights

and privileges which it confers are only thereby placed upon the

same footing with other legal rights and privileges of the citizen in

respect to proper rules for their due regulation, protection, and

enjoyment. ~

The limit to the exercise of the police power in these eases must

be this : the regulations must have reference to the comfort, safety,

or welfare of society ; they must not be in conﬂict with any of the

provisions of the charter; and they must not, under pretence of

regulation, take from the corporation any of the essential rights

and privileges which the charter confers. In short, they must be
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police regulations in fact, and not amendments of the charter in

curtailment of the corporate franehise.1 The maxim, Sic utere tu_o

ut aliertum non laedas, is that which lies at the foundation of the

' Washington Bridge Co. v. State, 18 Conn. 53; Bailey v. Philadelphia, &c.,

R.R. Co. 4 Harr. 389; State v. Noyes, 47 Me. 189; Pingrey v. \Vashburn,

1 Aiken, 268; Miller v. N.Y. and Erie R.R. Co. 21 Barb. 513; People v.

Jackson and Michigan Plank Road Co. 9 Mich. 307. In Benson v. Mayor, &c.,

of New York, 10 Barb. 245, it is said, in considering a ferry right granted to a

city: “Franchises of this description are partly of a public and partly of a pri-

vate nature. So far as the accommodation of passengers is concerned, they are

publici juris; so far as they require capital and produce revenue, they are privati

juris. Certain duties and burdens are imposed upon the grantees, who are

compensated therefor by the privilege of levying ferriage and the security from

spoliation arising from the irrevocable nature of the grant. The State may

legislate touching them, so far as they are publici juris. Thus, laws maybe

be made by the State with a view to the public protection, health,
and safety, and to properly guard the rights of other individuals
and corporations. Although these charters are to be regarded as
contracts, and the rights assured by them are inviolable, it does
not follow that these rights are at once, by force of the chartercontract, removed from the sphere of State regulation, and that the
charter implies an undertaking, on the part of the State,
[* 577] that in the same way in which their exercise is • permissible at first, and under the regulations then existing, and
those only, may the corporators continue to exercise their rights
while the artificial existence continues. The obligation of the contract by no means extends so far; but, on the contrary, the rights
and privileges which it confers are only thereby placed upon the
same footing with other legal rights and privileges of the citizen in
respect to proper rules for their due regulation, protection, aud
enjoyment.
The limit to the exercise of the pollee power in these cases must
be this: the regulations must have reference to the comfort, safety,
or welfare of society ; they must not be in conflict with any of the
provisions of the charter ; and they must not, under pretence of
regulation, take ft·om the corporation any of the essential rights
and privileges which the charter confers. In short, they must be
police regulations in fact, and not amendments of the charter in
curtailment of the corporate franchise. 1 The maxim, Sic tdere tuo
ut alier~;um non lredas, is that which lies at the foundation of the

passed to punish neglect or misconduct in conducting the ferries, to secure the

safety of passengers from danger and imposition, &c. But the State cannot

take away the ferries themselves, nor deprive the city of their legitimate rents

and profits." And see People v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 32 Barb. 102,

116.
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1 Washington Bridge Co. v. State, 18 Conn. 53; Bailey v. Philadelphia, &c.,
R.R. Co. 4 Harr. 389; State "· Noyes, 47 Me. 189; Pingrey "· W~hbum,
1 Aiken, 268; Miller "· N.Y. and Erie R.R. Co. 21 Barb. 513; People v.
Jackson and Michigan Plank Road Co. 9 Mich. 307. In Benson v. Mayor, &c.,
of N ~w York, 10 Barb. 24.'>, it is said, in considering a ferry right granted to a
city: "Franchises of this description are partly of a public and partly of a private nature. So far as the accommodation of passengers is concerned, they are
publici juris; so far as they require capital and produce revenue, they are prirmti
juris. Certain duties and burdens are imposed upon the g1·antees, who are
compensated therefor by the privilege of levying ferriage and the security from
spoliation arising from the irrevocable nature of the grant. The State may
legislate touching them, so far as they are pubh:ci juris. Thus, laws may be
passed to punish neglect or misconduct in conducting the ferries, to secure the
safety of pa~sengers from danger and imposition, &c. But the State cannot
take away the ferries themselves, nor deprive the city of their legitimate rents
and profits." And see People v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 32 Barb. 10:?,
116.
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power ; and to whatever enactment affecting the management and

business of private corporations it cannot fairly be applied, the

power itself will not extend. It has accordingly been held that

where a corporation was chartered with the right to take toll from

passengers over their road, a subsequent statute authorizing a

certain class of persons to go toll free was void.1 This was not a

regulation of existing rights, but it took from the corpora-

tion that "‘ which they before possessed, namely, the right ["‘ 578]

to tolls, and conferred upon individuals that which before

they had not, namely, the privilege to pass over the road free of

toll. “ Powers,” it is said in another case, “ which can only be

justiﬁed on this speciﬁc ground [that they are police regulations],

and which would otherwise be clearly prohibited by the constitu-

tion, can be such only as are so clearly necessary to the safety,

comfort, and well-being of society, or so imperatively required by

the public necessity, as to lead to the rational and satisfactory con-

clusion that the framers of the constitution could not, as men of

ordinary prudence and foresight, have intended to prohibit their

exercise in the particular case, notwithstanding the language of the

prohibition would otherwise include it.”2 And it was therefore

held that an act subsequent to the charter of a plank-road com-

pany, and not assented to by the corporators, which subjected them
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to a total forfeiture of their franchises for that which by the char-

ter was cause for partial forfeiture only, was void as violating the

obligation of contracts.“ And even a provision in a corporate

charter, empowering the legislature to alter, modify, or repeal it,

would not authorize a subsequent act which, on pretence of amend-

ment, or of a police regulation, would have the effect to appropriate

a portion of the corporate property to the public use.‘ And where

' Pingrey v. \Vashburn, 1 Aiken, 268. This decision, and those which follow,

assume that there is nothing in the original charter of the corporation ivhich

would warrant an amendment of the charter to this effect.

2 Christiancy, J ., in People v. Jackson and Michigan Plank Road Co. 9 Mich.

307.

° Ibid. And see State v. Noyes, 47 Me. 189.

‘ The reservation of a right to amend or repeal would not justify an act re-

quiring s. railroad company to cause a proposed new street or highway to be

taken across their track, and to cause the necessary embankments, excavations,

and other work to be done for that purpose at their own expense; thus not only

appropriating a part of their property to another public use, but compelling them

to be at the expense ofﬁtting it for such use. Miller v. N. Y. and Erie R.R. Co.

21 Barb. 513.

[ 637 ]

power ; and to whatever enactment affecting the management and
business of private corpot·ntions it cannot fairly be applied, the
power itself will not extend. It has accordingly been held that
where a corporation was chat·tered with the right to take toll from
passengers over their road, a subsequent statute authorizing a
certain class of persons to go toll free was void. 1 This was not a
regulation of existing rights, but it took from the corporatiou that • which they before possessed, namely, the right [* 57~]
to tolls, and conferred upon individuals that which before
they had not, namely, the privilege to pass over the road free of
toll. " Powers," it is said in another case, " which can only be
justified on this specific ground [that they are police regulations],
and which would otherwise be clearly prohibited by the constitution, can be such only as are so clearly necessary to the safety,
comfort, and well-being of society, or so imperatively required by
the public necessity, as to lead to the rational and satisfactory conclusion that the framers of the constitution could not, as men of
ordinary prudence and foresight, have intended to prohibit their
exercise in the particular case, notwithstanding the language of the
prohibition would otherwi8e include it." 2 And it was therefore
held that an act subsequent to the charter of a plank-road company, and not assented to by the corporators, which subjected them
to a total forfeiture of their franchises for that which by the charter was cause for partial forfeiture only, was void as violating the
obligation of contracts.3 And even a provision in a corporate
charter, empowering the legislature to alter, modify, or repeal it,
would not authorize a subsequent act which, on pretence of amendment, or of a police regulation, would have the effect to appropriate
a portion of the corporate property to the public use. 4 And where
Pingt·ey v. 'Vashburn, 1 Aiken, 268. This decision, and those which follow,
assume that there is nothing in the original charter of the corporation \vhich
would warrant an amendment of the charter to this effect.
1 C!tristiaru:y, J., in People v. Jackson and Michigan Plank Road Co. !) Mich.
1

307.
Jbid. And see State tl. Noyes, 47 Me. 189.
• The reservation of a right to amend or repeal would not justify an act requiring a railroad company to l'au~e a proposed. new street or highway to be
taken across their track, and to cause the necessary embankments, excavations,
and other work to be done for that purpose at their own expense; thus not only
appropriating a part of their property to another public use, but compelling them
to be at the expense of fitting it for such use. Miller v. N.Y. and Erie R.R. Co.
21 Barb. 513.
3
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by its charter the corporation was empowered to construct over a

river a certain bridge, which must necessarily constitute an obstruc-

tion to the navigation of the river, a subsequent amendment mak-

ing the corporation liable for such obstruction was held void, as in

effect depriving the corporation of the very right which the charter

assured to it.1 So where the charter reserved to the legislature

the right of modiﬁcation after the corporators had been reimbursed

their expenses in constructing the bridge, with twelve per

[*‘ 579] cent interest thereon, "‘ an amendment before such reim-

bursement, requiring the construction of a ﬁfty-foot draw

for the passage of vessels, in place of one of thirty-two feet, was held

unconstitutional and void.“ So a power to a municipal corporation

to regulate the speed of railway carriages would not authorize

such regulation except in the streets and public grounds of the

city; such being the fair construction of the power, and the neces-

sity for this police regulation not extending further.3

On the other hand, the right to require existing railroad corpo-

rations to fence their track, and to make them liable for all beasts

killed by going upon it, has been sustained on two grounds: ﬁrst,

as regarding the division fence between adjoining proprietors, and

in that view being but a reasonable provision for the protection of

domestic animals; and second, and chieﬂy, as essential to the pro-

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:23 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105011581
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

tection of persons being transported in, the railway carriages.‘

' Bailey v. Philadelphia, &c., R.R. Co. 4 Harr. 389.

’ Washington Bridge Co. v. State, 18 Conn. 53.

3 State v. Jersey City, 5 Dutch. 170. In Buffalo and Niagara Falls R.R. Co.

v. Buffalo, 5 Hill, 209, it was held that a statutory power in a. city to regulate

the running of cars within the corporate limits would justify an ordinance entirely

prohibiting the use of steam for propelling cars through any part of the city.

And see Great \Vestcrn R.R. Co. v. Decatur, 33 Ill. 381.

‘ Thorpe v. Rutland and Burlington R.R. Co. 27 Vt. 156; New Albany and

Salem R.R. Co. v. Tilton, 12 Ind. 3; Same v. Maiden, ib. 10; Same 0. McNam-

ara, 11 Ind. 543; Ohio and Mississippi R.R. Co. v. McClelland, 25 Ill. 145;

by its charter the corporation was empowered to construct over a
river a certain bridge, which must necessarily constitute an obstruction to the navigation of the river, a subsequent amendment making the corporation liable for such obstruction was held void, as in
effect depriving the corporation of the very right which the charter
assured to it.1 So where the charter reserved to the legislature
the right of modification after the corporators had been reimbursed
their expenses in constructil\g the bridge, with twelve per
[* 579] cent interest thereon, • an amendment before such reimbursement, requiring the construction of a fifty-foot draw
for the passage of vessels, in place of one of thirty-two feet, was held
unconstitutional and void.2 So a power to a municipal corporation
t«? regulate the speed of railway carriages would not authorize
such regulation except in the streets and public grounds of the
city; such being the fair construction of the power, and the necessity for this police regulation not extending further. 3
On the other hand, the right to require existing railroad corporations to fence their track, and to make them liable for all beasts
killed by going upon it, has been sustained on two grounds : first,
as regarding the division fence between adjoining proprietors, and
in that view being but a reasonable provision for the protection of
domestic animals; and second, and chiefly, as essential to the protection of persons being transported il\ the railway carriages.•

Madison and Indianapolis R.R. Co. v. \Vhitencck, 8 Ind. 230; Indianapolis and

Cincinnati B..R. Co. v. Townsend, 10 Ind. 38; Same v. Kercheval, 16 Ind. 8-1;

Corwin v. N. Y. and Erie R.R. Co. 13 N.Y. 42; Horn v. Atlantic and St. Law-

rence R.R.. Co. 35 N. H. 169, and 36 ib. 4-10; Fawcett u. York and North Midland

R. Co. 15 Jur. 173; Smith v. Eastern R.R.. Co. 35 N. H. 356; Bulkley v. N. Y.

and N. H. R..R. Co. 27 Conn. 479; Jones v. Galena, &c., R.R. Co. 16 Iowa, 6;

Winona, &c., R.B.. Co. v. \Valdron, 11 Minn. 515; Bradley v. Buffalo, &c., RR.

Co. 34 N. Y.-129. A subsequent statute making railroad companies liable for

injuries by ﬁre communicated by their locomotive-engines was sustained in Lyman

[ass]

Bailey t!. Philadelphia, &c., R.R. Co. 4 Harr. 389.
Washington Bridge Co. v. State, 18 Conn. 53.
3 State v. Jersey City, 5 Dutch. 170.
In Buffalo and Niagara Falls R.R. Co.
t!. Buffalo, 5 Hill, 209, it was held that a statutory power in a city to regulate
the running of cars within the corporate limits would justify an ordinance entirely
prohibiting the use of steam for propelling cars through any part of the city.
And see Great Western R.R. Co. v. Decatur, 33 Ill. 381.
' Thorpe v. Rutland and Burlington R.R. Co. 27 Vt. 156; New Albany and
Salem R.R. Co. v. Tilton, 12 Ind. 3; Same v. Maiden, ib. 10; Same o.l\IcNamara, 11 Ind. 543; Ohio and Mississippi R.R. Co. v. McClelland, 25 Ill. 145;
Madison and Indianapolis R.R. Co. v. Whitencck, 8 Ind. 230; Indianapolis and
Cincinnati R.R. Co. "·Townsend, 10 Ind. 38; Same v. Kercheval, 16 Ind. 84;
Corwin v. N.Y. and Erie R.R. Co. 13 N.Y. 42; Horn v. Atlantic and St. Lawrence R.R. Co. 35 N.H. 169, and 36 ib. 440; Fawccttv. York and North Midland
R. Co. Vi Jur. 173; Smith v. Eastern R.R. Co. 35 N.H. 356; Bulkley v. N.Y.
and N.H. R.R. Co. 27 Conn. 479; Jones"· Galena, &c., R.R. Co. 16 Iowa, 6;
Winona, &c., R.R. Co. v. \Valdron, 11 Minn. 515; Bradley t!. Buffalo, &c., R.R.
Co. 84 N. Y. 429. A subsequent statute making railroad companies liable for
injuries by fire communicated by their locomotive-engines was sustained in Lyman
1

1
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injured may maintain an action for the damage suffered, notwith-

standing he may not himself be free from negligence} But it

would, perhaps, require an express legislative declaration that the

corporation should be liable for the beasts thus destroyed

to * create so great an innovation in the common law. The [* 580]

general rule, where a corporation has failed to obey the

police regulations established for its government, would not make

the corporation liable to the party injured, if his own negligence

contributed with that of the corporation in producing the injury.”

The State may also regulate the grade of railways, and prescribe

how, and upon what grade, railway tracks shall cross each other ;

and it may apportion the expense of making the necessary cross-

ings between the corporations owning the roads? And it may

establish regulations requiring existing railways to ring the bell

or blow the whistle of their engines immediately before passing

highways at grade, or other places where their approach might be

dangerous to travel.* And it has even been intimated that it

v. Boston and Worcester R.R. Co. 4 Cush. 288. And see Camden and Amboy

R.R. Co. v. Briggs, 2 Zab. 623.

' Corwin v. N. Y. and Erie R.R. Co. 13 N. Y. 42; Indianapolis and Cincinnati

R.R. Co. v. Townsend, 10 Ind. 38; Suydam v. Moore, 8 Barb. 358; Fawcett v.
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York and North Midland R. Co. 15 J ur. 173; Waldron v. Rensselaer and

Schenectady R.R. Co. 8 Barb. 390; Horne v. Atlantic and St. Lawrence R.R.

Co. 35 N. H. 169.

2 Jackson v. Rutland and Burlington R.R. Co. 25 Vt. 150. And see Marsh

v. N. Y. and Erie R.R. Co. 14 Barb. 364; Joliet and N. I. R.R. Co. v. Jones,

20 Ill. 221; Tonawanda R.R. Co. v. Munger, 5 Denio, 255, and 4 N. Y. 255;

Price v. New Jersey R.R. Co. 31 N. J. 229; Drake -v. Philadelphia, &c., R.R.

Co. 51 Penn. St. 240. In Indianapolis and Cincinnati R.R. Co. v. Kercheval, 16

Ind. 84, it was held that a clause in the charter of a railroad corporation which

declared that when the corporators should have procured a right of way as therein

provided, they should be seised in fee-simple of the right to the land, and should

have the sole use and occupation of the same, and no person, body corporate or

politic, should in any way interfere therewith, molest, disturb, or injure any of

the rights and privileges thereby granted, &c., would not take from the State the

power to establish a police regulation making the corporation liable for cattle

killed by their cars. .

’ Fitchburg R.R. Co. v. Grand Junction R.R. Co. 1 Allen, 552, and 4Allen,

198.

‘ “ The legislature has the power, by general laws, from time to time, as the

public exigencies may require, to regulate corporations in their franchises, so as

to provide for the public safety. The provision in question is a mere police

regulation, enacted for the protection and safety of the public, and in no manner
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Having this double purpose in view, the owner Of beasts killed or
injured may maintain an action for the damage suffered, notwithstanding he may not himself be free from negligence.1 But it
would, perhaps, require an express legislative declaration that the
corporation should be liable for the beasts thus destroyed
to • create so great an innovation in the common law. The [* 580]
general rule, where a corporation has failed to obey the
police regulations established for its government, would not make
the corporation liable to the party injured, if his own negligence
contributed with that of the corporation in producing the injury .2
The State may also regulate the grade of railways, and prescribe
how, and upon what grade, railway tracks shall cross each other;
and it may apportion the expense of making the necessary crossings between the corporations owning the roads.8 And it may
establish regulations requiring existing railways to ring the bell
or blow the whistle of their engines immediately before passing
highways at grade, or other places where their approach might be
dangerous to travel:' And it has even been intimated that it
Boston and Worcester R.R. Co. 4 Cush. 288. And see Camden and Amboy
R.R. Co. "· Briggs, 2 Zab. 623.
1 Corwin v. N.Y. and Erie R.R. Co. 13 N.Y. 42; Indianapolis and Cincinnati
R.R. Co. v. Townsend, 10 Ind. 38; Suydam "· Moore, 8 Barb. 368; Fawcett v.
York and North Midland R. Co. 15 Jur. 173; Waldron "· Rensselaer and
Schenectally R.R. Co. 8 Barb. 390; Horne v. Atlantic and St. Lawrence R.R.
Co. 85 N. H. 169.
' Jackson v. Rutland and Burlington R.R. Co. 25 Vt. toO. And see Marsh
v. N.Y. and Erie R.R. Co. 14 Barb. 364; Joliet and N. I. R.R. Co. v. Jones,
20 III. 221; Tonawanda R.R. Co. 11. Munger, 5 Denio, 255, and 4 N.Y. 205;
Price v. New Jersey R.R. Co. 81 N.J. 229; Drake v. Philadelphia, &c., R.R.
Co. 51 Penn. St. 240. In Indianapolis and Cincinnati R.R. Co. v. Kercheval, 16
Ind. 84, it was held that a clause in the charter of a railroad corporation which
declared that when the corporators should have procured a right of way as therein
provided, they should be seised in fee-simple of the right to the land, and should
have the sole use and occupation of the same, and no person, body corporate or
politic, should in any way interfere therewith, molest, disturb, or injure any of
the rights and privileges thereby granted, &c., would not take from the State the
power to establish a police regulation making the corporation liable for cattle
killed by their cars.
' Fitchburg R.R. Co. v. Grand Junction R.R. Co. 1 Allen, 552, and 4AUen,
198.
4 "The legislature has the power, by general laws, from time to time, as the
public exigencies may require, to regulate corporations in their franchises, so as
to provide for the public safety. The provision in question is a mere police
regulation, enacted for the protection and safety of the public, and in no manner

tl.
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might be competent for the State to make railway corporations

liable as insurers for the safety of all persons carried by them, in

the same manner that they are by law liable as carriers of goods ;

though this would seem to be pushing the police power to

[* 581] an "‘ extreme} But those statutes which have recently

become common, and which give an action to the repre-

sentatives of persons killed by the wrongful act, neglect, or default

of another, may unquestionably be held applicable to corporations

previously chartered, and may be sustained as only giving a rem-

edy for a wrong for which the common law had failed to make

pI‘0ViSi0I1.2 '

interferes with or impairs the powers conferred on the defendants in their act of

incorporation.” Galena and Chicago U. R.R. Co. v. Loomis, 13 Ill. 548. And

see Stuyvesant v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 7 Cow. 604; Benson v. Mayor, &c.,

of New York, 10 Barb. 240; Bulkley v. N. Y. and N. H. R.R. Co. 27 Conn.

486; Veazie v. Mayo. 45 Me. 560; Same Case, 49 Me. 156; Galena and Chicago

U. R.R. Co. v. Dill, 22 Ill. 264; Same v. Appleby, 28 Ill. 283; Ohio and Mis-

might be competent for the State to make railway corporations
liable as insurers for the safety of all persons carried by them, in
the same manner that they are by law liable as carriers of goods ;
though this would seem to be pushing the police power to
[* 581] an • extreme .I But those statutes which have recently
become common, and which give an action to the representatives of persons killed by the wrongful act, neglect, or default
of another, may unquestionably be held applicable to corporations
previously chartered, and may be sustained as only giving a remedy for a wrong for which the common law had failed to make
provision.2

sissippi R.R. Co. 0. 1\IcClclland, 25 Ill. 145; Clark‘s Adm‘r v. Hannibal and

St. Jo. R.R. C0. 36 Mo. 202; Chicago, &c., R.R.. Co. v. Triplett, 38 Ill.

482. .

‘ Thorpe v. Rutland and Burlington R.R. Co. 27 Vt. 152. Carriers of goods

are liable as insurers, notwithstanding they may have been guiltless of negligence,
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because such is their contract with the shipper when they receive his goods for

transportation; but carriers of persons assume no such obligations at the common

law; and where a company of individuals receive from the State a charter which

makes them carriers of persons, and chargeable as such for their own default or

negligence only, it may well_ be doubted if it be competent for the legislature

afterwards to impose upon their contracts new burdens, and make them respond

in damages where they have been guilty of no default. In other words, whether

that could be a proper police regulation which did not assume to regulate the

business of the carrier with a view to the just protection of the rights and inter-

ests of others, but which imposed a new obligation, for the beneﬁt of others, upon

a party guilty of no neglect ofduty. But perhaps such a regulation would not go

further than that in Stanley v. Stanley, 26 Me. 191, where it was held competent

for the legislature to pass an act making the stockholders of existing banks liable

for all corporate debts thereafter created; or in Peters v. Iron Mountain R.R. Co.

23 Mo. 107, and Grannahan v. Hannibal, &c., R.R. Co. 30 Mo. 546, where an

act was sustained which made companies previously chartered liable for the debts

of contractors to the workmen whom they had employed.

* Southwestern R.R. Co. v. Paulk, 24 Geo. 356; Coosa River Steamboat Co.

v. Barclay, 30 Ala. 120. In Boston, Concord, and Montreal B..R. v. State, 32

N. H. 215, a statute making railroad corporations liable to indictment and ﬁne,

in case of the loss of life by the negligence or carelessness of the proprietors or

their servants, was adjudged constitutional, as applicable to corporations pre-

viously in existence. -

A > _ M.
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interferes with or impairs the powers conferred on the defendants in their act of
incorporation." Galena and Chicago U. R.R. Co. v. Loomis, 18 Ill. 048. And
see Stuyvesant v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 7 Cow. 604; Benson v. Mayor, &c.,
of New York, 10 Barb. 240; Bulkley"· N.Y. and N.H. R.R. Co. 27 Conn.
486; Veazie v. Mayo, 45 Me. 560; Same Case, 49 Me. 156; Galena and Chicago
U. R.R. Co."· Dill, 22 Ill. 26!; Same v. Appleby, 28 Ill. 283; Ohio and Mississippi R.R. Co. " · :McClelland, 25 Ill. 14:5; Clark's Adm'r v. Hannibal and
St. Jo. R.R. Co. 36 Mo. 20:l; Chicago, &c., R.R. Co. v. Triplt!tt, 38 Til.
482.
1 Thorpe v. Rutland and Burlington R.R. Co. 27 Vt. 152.
Carriers of goods
are liable as insurers, notwithstanding they may have been guiltless of negligence,
because such is their contract with the shipper when they receive his goods for
transportation ; but catTiers of persons assume no such obligations at the common
law ; and where a company of individuals receive from the State a charter which
makes them carriers of persons, and chargeable as such for their own default or
negligence only, it may well. be doubted if it b~ competent for the legislature
afterwards to impose upon their contracts new burdens, and make them re~>pood
in damages where they have been guilty of no default. In other words, whether
that could be a proper police regulation wllich did not assume to regulate the
business of the carrier with a view to the just protection of the rights and interests of others, but whil'h imposed a new obligation, for the benefit of others, upon
a party guilty of no neglect of duty. But perhaps such a regulation would not go
further than that in Stanley "· Stanley, 26 Me. 191, where it was held competent
for the legislature to pass an act making the stockholders of existing banks liable
for all corporate debts thereafter created; or in Peters v. Iron Mountain R.R. Co.
23 :Mo. 107, and Grannahan "·Hannibal, &c., R.R. Co. 30 Mo. 546, where an
act was sustained which made companies previously chartered liable for the debts
of contractors to the workmen whom they bad employed.
• Southwestern R.R. Co. v. Paulk, 2! Gco. Sb6 ; Coosa River Steamboat Co.
"· Barclay, 30 Ala. 120. In Boston, Concord, and Montreal R.R. v. State, 32
N. H. 215, a statute making railroad corporations liable to indicbnent and fine,
in case of the loss of life by the negligence or carelessness of the proprietors or
their servants, was adjudged constitutional, as applicable to corporations previously in existence.
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Those statutes which regulate or altogether prohibit the sale of
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intoxicating drinks as a beverage have also been, by some persons,

supposed to conﬂict with the Federal Constitution. Such of these,

however, as assume to regulate only, and to prohibit sales by other

persons than those who should be licensed by the public author-

ities, have not suggested any serious question of constitutional

power. They are but the ordinary police regulations, such as the

State may make in respect to all classes of trade or employment}

But those which undertake altogether to prohibit the manufacture

and sale of intoxicating drinks as a beverage have been assailed

as violating express provisions of the national Consti-

tution, and also as *subversive of fundamental rights, [’*582]

and therefore not within the grant of legislative power.

That legislation of this character was void, so far as it affected

imported liquors, or such as might be introduced from one State

into another, because in conﬂict with the power of Congress over

commerce, was strongly urged in the License Cases before the Su-

preme Court of the United States; but that view did not obtain

the assent of the Court. The majority of the court expressed the

opinion-— which, however, was obiter in those cases—that the in-

troduction of imported liquors into a State, and their sale in the

original packages as imported, could not be forbidden, because to
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do so would be to forbid what Congress, in its regulation of com-

merce, and in the levy of imposts, had permitted ;2 but it was

conceded by all, that when the original package was broken up for

use or for retail by the importer, and also when the commodity

had passed from his hands into the hands of a purchaser, it ceased

to be an import, or a part of foreign commerce, and thereby

became subject to the laws of the State, and might be taxed for

State purposes, and the sale regulated by the State like any other

property? It was also decided, in these cases, that the power of

1 Bode v. State, 7 Gill, 326; Bancroft v. Dumas, 21 Vt. 456; Thomasson v.

State, 15 Ind. 449; License Cases, 5 How. 504; Metropolitan Board of Excise v.

Barrie, 34 N. Y. 657 ; Goddard v. Jacksonville, 15 Ill. 59 ; Kettering v. Jackson-

ville, 50 Ill. 39.

2 Taney, Ch. J., 5 How. 574; 1l[cLean, J., ib. 589; Catron, J., ib. 608.

And see Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419; Lincoln v. Smith, 27 Vt. 335.

Bradford v. Stevens, 10 Gray, 379; State v. Robinson, 49 Me. 285.

" Daniel, J ., held that the right to regulate was not excluded, even while the

packages remained in the hands of the importer unbroken (p. 612). See also

the views of Grier, J. (p. 631

41 [ 641 ]

Those statutes which regulate or altogether prohibit the sale of
intoxicating drinks as a beverage have also been, by some persons,
supposed to c01~flict with the Federal Constitution. Such of these,
however, as assume to regulate only, and to prohibit sales by other
persons than those who should be licensed by the public authorities, have not suggested any serious question of constitutional
power. They are but the ordin~ry police regulations, such as the
State may make in respect to all classes of trade or employment.1
But those which undertake altogether to prohibit the manufacture
and sale of intoxicating drinks as a beverage have been assailed
as Yiolating express provisions of the national Constitution, and also as • subversive of fundamental rights, [* 582]
and therefore not within the gt·ant of legislative power.
That legislation of this character was void, so far as it affected
imported liquors, or such as might be introduced from one State
into another, because in conflict with the power of Congress over
commerce, was strongly urged in the License Cases before the Supreme Court of the United States; but that view did not obtain
the assent of the Court. The majority of the court expressed the
· opinion- which, however, was obiter in those cases- that the introduction of imported liquors into a State, and their sale in the
original packages as imported, could not be forbidden, because to
do so would be to forbid what Congress, in its regulation of commerce, and in the levy of imposts, had permitted ; 2 but it was
conceded by all, that when the original package was broken up for
use or for retail by the importer, and also when the commodity
had passed from his hands into the hands of a purchaser, it ceased
to be an import, or a part of foreign commerce, and thereby
became subject to the laws of the State, and might be taxed for
State purposes, and the sale regulated by the State like ai}Y other
property .a It was also decided, in these cases, that the power of
1 Bode v. State, 7 Gill, 326 ; Bancroft v. Dumas, 21 Vt. 456 ; Thomasson v.
State, 15 Ind. 449; Licl'nse Cases, 5 How. 504; Metropolitan Board of Excise v.
Barrie, 84 N.Y. 657; Goddard v. Jacksonville, 15 Ill. 59; Kettering v. Jaeksonville, 50 Ill. 39.
2 Taney, Ch. J.,5 How. 574; McLean, J., ib. 589; Catron, J., ib. 608.
And see Brown v. 1\Iaryland, 12 Wheat. 419; Lincoln v. Smith, 27 Vt. 385.
Bradford v. Stevens, 10 Gray, 3i9; State v. Robinson, 49 l\Ie. :285.
3 Daniel, J ., held that the right to regulate was not excluded, even while the
packages remained in the hands of the importer unbroken ( p. 612 ). See also
the views of Grier, J. ( p. 631 ).
41
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Congress to regulate commerce between the States did not ex-
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clude regulations by the States, except so far as they might come

in conﬂict with those established by Congress; and that, conse-

quently, as Congress had not undertaken to regulate commerce in

liquors between the States, a law of New Hampshire could not be

held void which punished the sale, in that State, of gin purchased

in Boston and sold in New Hampshire, notwithstanding the sale

was in the cask.in which it was imported, but by one not licensed

by the selectmen}

It would seem, from the views expressed by the several members

of the court in these cases, that the State laws known as Prohib-

itory Liquor Laws, the purpose of which is to prevent

[* 583] altogether ‘the manufacture and sale of intoxicating

drinks as a beverage, so far as legislation can accomplish

that object, cannot be held void as in conﬂict with the power of

Congress to regulate commerce, and to levy imposts and duties.

And it has been held that they were not void, because tending to

prevent the fulﬁlment of contracts previously made, and thereby

violating the obligation of contracts?

The same laws have also been sustained, when the question of

conﬂict with State constitutions, or with general fundamental

principles, has been raised. They are looked upon as police
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regulations established by the legislature for the prevention of

intemperance, pauperism, and crime, and for the abatement of

nuisances.” It has also been held competent to declare the liquor

kept for sale a nuisance, and to provide legal process for its con-

demnation and destruction, and to seize and condemn the building

‘ See also Bode v. State, 7 Gill, 326; Jones v. People, 14 lll. 196; State 0.

IVhceler, :25 Conn. 290; Santo v. State, 2 Iowa, 202; Commonwealth v. Clapp,

5 Gray, 97.

' People v. Hawley, 3 Mich. 330 ; Reynolds v. Geary, 26 Conn. 179.

3 Commonwealth v. Kendall, 12 Cush. 414; Commonwealth v. Clapp, 5 Gray,

97; Commonwealth v. Howe, 13 Gray, 26; Santo v. State, 2 Iowa, 202; One

House v. State, 4 Greene (Iowa), 172; Zumhoff v. State, ib. 526; State v.

Donehey, 8 Iowa, 396; State v. Wheeler, 25 Conn. 290; Reynolds v. Geary, 26

Conn. 179; Oviatt v. Pond, 29 Conn. 479; People v. Hawley, 3 Mich. 330; Peo-

ple v. Gallagher, 4 Mich. 244; Jones v. People, 14 Ill. 196 ; State v. Prescott, 27

Vt. 194; Lincoln v. Smith, ib. 328; Gill v. Parker, 31 Vt. 610. But see

Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 501; Meshmeier v. State, 11 Ind. 484; \Vynehamer v.

Congress to regulate commerce between the States did not exclude regulations by the States, except so far as they might come
in conflict with those established by Congress ; and that, consequently, as Congress had not undertaken to regulate commerce in
liquors between the States, a law of New Hampshire could not be
held void which punished the sale, in that State, of gin purchased
in Boston and sold in New Hampshire, notwithstanding the sale
was in the cask.in which it was imported, but by one not licensed
by the selectmen.t
It would seem, from the views expressed by the several members
of the court in these cases, that the State laws known as Prohibitory Liquor Laws, the purpose of which is to prevent
[* 583] altogether • the manufacture and sale of intoxicating
drinks as a beverage, so far as legislation can accomplish
that object, cannot be held void as in conflict with the power of
Congress to regulate commerce, and to levy imposts and duties.
A.ud it has been held that they were not void, because tending to
prevent the fulfilment of contracts previously made, and thereby
violating the obligation of contracts. 2
The same laws have also been sustained, when the question of .
conflict with State constitutions, or with general fundamental
principles, has been raised. They are looked upon as police
regulations established by the legislature for the prevention of
intemperance, pauperism, and crime, and for the abatement of
nuisances.8 It has also been held competent to declare the liquor
kept for sale a nuisance, aud to provide legal process for its condemnation and destruction, and to seize and condemn the J>uilding

People, 13 N. Y. 378. In Reynolds v. Geary, 26 Conn. 179, it was held that

the State law forbidding suits for the price of liquors sold was to be applied to

contracts made out of the State, and lawful where made.

_,_-~
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1 See also Bode "· State, 7 Gill, 826; Jones"· People, 14 Ill. 196; State "·
'Wheeler, 2o Conn. 290; Santo"· State, 2 Iowa, 202; Commonwealth"· Clapp,
l'> Gray, 97.
' People"· Hawley, 8 Mich. 830; Reynolds"· Geary, 26 Conn. 179.
3 Commonwealth v. Kendall, 12 Cush. 414; Commonwealth "· Clapp, 5 Gray,
97; Commonwealth 11. Howe, 13 Gray, 26; Santo"· State, 2 Iowa, 202; One
House v. State, 4 Greene (Iowa), 172; Zumhoft' "· State, ib. 526; State "·
Donehey, 8 Iowa, 396; State tl. Wheeler, 25 Conn. 290; Reynolds"· Gearv, 26
Conn. 179; Oviatt 11. Pond, 29 Conn·. 479; People v. Hawley, 8 Mich. 380; .People v. Gallagher, 4 Mich. 244; Jones"· People, 14 lll. 196; State"· Prescott, 27
Vt. 194; Lincoln v. Smith, ib. 3~8; Gill "· Parker, 81 Vt. 610. But see
Beebe "· State, 6 Ind. 501; Meshmeier "· State, 11 Ind. 484; Wynehamer v.
People, 13 N. Y. 878. In Reynolds tl. Geary, 26 Conn. 179, it was held that
the State law forbidding suits for the price of liquors sold was to be applied to
contracts made out of the State, and lawful where made.
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occupied as a dram shop on the same ground} And it is only

where, in framing such legislation, care has not been taken to
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observe those principles of protection which surround the persons

and dwellings of individuals, securing them against unreasonable

searches and seizures, and giving them a right to trial before con-

demnation, that the courts have felt at liberty to declare that it

exceeded the proper province of police regulation? Perhaps there

is no instance in which the power of the legislature to make such

regulations as may destroy the value of property, without com-

pensation to the owner, appears in a more striking light than in

the case of these statutes. The trade in alcoholic drinks

being lawful, and the ‘capital employed in it being [* 584]

fully protected by law, the legislature then steps in, and,-

by an enactment based on general reasons of public utility, annihi-

lates the traffic, destroys altogether the employment, and reduces

to a nominal value the property on hand. Even the keeping of

that for the purposes of sale becomes a. criminal offence; and, with-

out any change whatever in his own conduct or employment, the

merchant of yesterday becomes the criminal of to-day, and the

very building in which he lives and conducts the business which

to that moment was lawful becomes perhaps a nuisance, if the

statute shall so declare, and liable to be proceeded against for a
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forfeiture. A statute which can do this must be justified upon the

highest reasons of public beneﬁt ; but, whether satisfactory or not,

they rest exclusively in the legislative wisdom.

Within the last two or three years, new questions have arisen in

regard to these laws, and other State regulations, arising out of

the imposition of burdens on various occupations by Congress,

with a view to raising revenue for the national government.

These burdens are imposed in the form of what are called license

fees ; and it has been claimed that, when the party paid the fee, he

was thereby licensed to carry on the business, despite the regula-

tions which the State government might make upon the subject.

This view, however, has not been taken by the courts, who have

' One House v. State, 4 Greene (Iowa), 172. See also Lincoln v. Smith, 27

Vt. 328; Oviatt v. Pond, 29 Conn. 479; State v. Robinson, 33 Maine, 568;

License Cases, 5 How. 589. But see Wynehamer v. People, 13 N Y. 378;

Welch v. Stowell, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 332.

' Hibbard v. People, 4 Mich. 125; Fisher v. McGirr, 1 Gray, 1. But see

Meshmeier v. State, 11 Ind. 484; \Vynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 378.

. [ 643 ]

occupied as a dram shop on the same ground. 1 And it is only
where, in framing snch legislation, care has not been taken to
observe those principles of protection which surround the persons
and dwellings of individuals, securing them against unreasonable
searches and seizures, and giving them a right to trial before condemnation, that the courts have felt at liberty to declare that it
exceeded the proper province of police regulation.2 Perhaps there
is no instance in which the power of the legislature to make such
regulations as may destroy the value of property, without compensation to the owner, appearM in a more striking light than in
the case of these statutes. The trade in alcoholic drinks
being lawful, and the *capital employed in it being [* 584]
fully protected by law, the legislature then steps in, and,by an enactment based op general reasons of public utility, annihilates the traffic, destroys altogether the employment, and reduces
to a nominal value the property on hand. Even the keeping of
that for the purposes of sale becomes a criminal offence ; and, without any change whatever in his own conduct or employment, the
merchant of yesterday becomes the criminal of to-day, and the
very building in which he lives and conducts the business which
to that moment was lawful becomes perhaps a nuisance, if the
statute shall so declare, and liable to be proceeded against for a
forfeiture. A statute which can do this must be justified upon the
highest reasons of public benefit ; but, whether satisfactory or not,
they rest exclusively in the legislative wisdom.
Within the last two or three years, new questions have arisen in
regard to these laws, and other State regulations, arising out of
the imposition of burdens on various occupations by Congress,
with a view to raising revenue for the national government.
These burdens are imposed in the form of what are called license
fees; and it has been claimed that, when the party paid the fee, he
was thereby licensed to carry on the business, despite the regulations which the State government might make upon the subject.
This view, however, has not been tak.en by the courts, who have
1 One House v. State, 4 Greene (Iowa), 172.
See also Lincoln v. Smith, 27
Vt. :328; Oviatt v. Pond, 29 Conn. 479; State v. Robinson, :33 Maine, 568;
License Cases, 5 How. 589. But see Wynehamer v. People, 1:3 N Y. 378;
Welch t•. Stowell, 2 Doug. (1\lich.) :332.
t Hibbar•l v. People, 4 1\lich. 12.5; Fhher v. McGirr, 1 Gray, 1.
But see
Me~hmeier v. State, 11 Ind. 481; Wynebamer t?. People, 13 N.Y. 378.
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regarded the congressional legislation imposing a license fee as
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only a. species of taxation, without the payment of which the busi-

ness could not lawfully be carried on, but which, nevertheless, did

not propose to make any business lawful which was not lawful

before, or to relieve it from any burdens or restrictions imposed by

the regulations of the State. The licenses give no authority, and

are mere receipts for'taxes.1

Numerous other illustrations might be given of the power in the

States to make regulations affecting commerce, which are sus-

tainable as regulations of police. Among these, quarantine regu-

lations and health laws of every description will readily suggest

themselves, and these are or may be sometimes carried to the

extent ‘of ordering the destruction of private property when

infected with disease or otherwise dangerous? These

[* 585] regulations * have generally passed unchallenged. The

right to pass inspection laws, and to levy duties so far as

may be necessary to render them effectual, is also undoubted, and

is expressly recognized by the Oonstitution.3 'But certain powers

which still more directly affect commerce may sometimes he exer-

cised where the purpose is not to interfere with congressional legis-

lation, but merely to regulate the times and manner of transacting

business with a view to facilitate trade, secure order, and prevent
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confusion.

An act of the State of New York declared that the harbor-

masters appointed under the State laws should have authority to

regulate and station all ships and vessels in the stream of the East

and North rivers, within the limits of the city of New York, and

the wharves thereof, and to remove from time to time such vessels

as were not employed in receiving and discharging their cargoes,

to make room for such others as required to be more immediately

accomriiodated, for the purpose of receiving and discharging theirs ;

and that the harbor-masters or either of them should have author-

‘ License Tax Cases, 5 \Val. 462; Purvear v. Commonwealth, ib. 475;

Commonwealth v. Holbrook, 10 Allen, 200; Block v. Jacksonville, 36 Ill.

301.

' See remarks of Grier, J. in License Cases, 5 How. 632; Meeker v. Van

Rensselaer, 15 Wend. 397. A liquor law may annul a previous license, and not

be invalid on that ground. Metropolitan Board of Excise v. Barrie, 34 N. Y.

667; ante, p. 283, note.

' Art. 1, § 10, clause 2.
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regarded the congressional legislation imposing a license fee as
only a species of taxation, without the payment of which the business could not lawfully be carried on, but which, nevertheless, did
not propose to make any business lawful which was not lawful
before, or to relieve it from any burdens or restrictions imposed by
the regulations of the State. The licenses give no authority, and
are mere receipts for· taxes.l
Numerous other illustrations might be given of the power in the
States to make regulations affecting commerce, which are sustainable as regulations of police. Among these, quarantine regulations and health laws of every description will readily suggest
themselves, and these are or may be sometimes carried to the
extent 'of ordering the destruction of private property when
infected with disease or otherwise dangerous.2 These
[* 5R5] regulations *have generally passed unchallenged. The
right to pass inspection laws, and to levy duties so far as
may be necessary to render them effectual, is also undoubted, and
is expressly recog1~ized by the Constitution.8 ·But certain powers
which still more directly affect commerce may sometimes be exercised where the purpose is not to interfere with congressional legislation, but merely to regulate the times and manner of transacting
business with a view to facilitate trade, secure order, and prevent
confusion.
An act of the State of New York .declared that the harbormasters appointed under the State laws should have authority to
regulate and station all ships and vessels in the stream of the East
and North rivers, within the limits of the city of New York, and
the wharves thereof, and to remove from time to time such vessels
as were not employed in receiving and discharging their cargoes,
to make room for such others as required to be more immediately
accommodated, for the purpose of receiving and discharging theirs;
and that the harbor-ma.sters or either of them should have authorLicense Tax Cases, 5 Wal. 462; Purvear t1. Commonwealth, ib. 475;
Commonwealth "· Holbrook, 10 Allen, 200; Block "· Jacksonville, 36 IJI.
301.
1 See remarks of Grier, ,J. in License Cases, 5 How. 632; Meeker t1. Van
Rensselaer, 15 Wend. 397. A liquor law may annul a previous license, and not
be invalid on that ground. Metropolitan Board of Excise v. Barrie, 34 N. Y.
667 ; a11te, p. 28:!, note.
J Art. 1, § 10, clause 2.
1
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ity to determine how far and in what instances it was the duty of
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the masters and others, having charge of ships or vessels, to

accommodate each other in their respective situations ; and it

imposed a penalty for refusing or neglecting to obey the directions

of the harbor-masters or either of them. In a suit brought against

the master of a steam vessel, who had refused to move his vessel a

certain distance as directed by one of the harbor-masters, in order

to accommodate a new arrival, the act was assailed as an unconsti-

tutional invasion of the power of Congress over commerce, but

was sustained as a regulation prescribing the manner of exercising

individual rights over property employed in commerce.‘

‘The line of distinction between that which constitutes [* 586]

an interference with commerce, and that which is a mere

police regulation, is sometimes exceedingly dim and shadowy, and

it is not to be wondered at that learned jurists diﬁ"er when endeavor-

ing to classify the cases which arise. It is not doubted that

Congress has the power to go beyond the general regulations of

‘ Vanderbilt v. Adams, 7 Cow. 351. Woodworth, J ., in this case, states very

clearly the principle on which police regulations, in such cases, are sustainable:

“ It seems to me the power exercised in this case is essentially necessary for the

purpose of protecting the rights of all concerned. It is not, in the legitimate

sense of the term, a violation of any right, but the exercise of a power indispen-
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sably necessary, where an extensive commerce is carried on. If the harbor is

crowded with vessels arriving daily from foreign parts, the power is incident to

such a slate of things. Disorder and confusion would be the consequence, if

ity to determine how far and in what instances it was the duty of
the masters and others, having charge of ships or vessels, to
accommodate each other in their respecth·e situations ; and it
imposed a penalty for refusing or neglecting to obey the directions
of the harbor-masters or either of them. In a suit brought against
the master of a steam vessel, who had refused to move his vessel a
certain distance as directed by one of the harbor-masters, in order
to accommodate a new arrival, the act was assailed as an unconstitutional invasion of the power of Congress over commerce, but
was sustained as a regulation prescribing the ~anner of exercising
individual rights over property employed in commerce. 1
*The lino of distinction between that which constitutes [* 586]
an interference with commerce, and that which is a mere
police regulation, is sometimes exceedingly dim and shadowy, and
it is not to be wondered at that learned jurists differ when endeavoring to classify the cases which arise. It is not doubted that
Congress has the power to go beyond the general regulations of

there was no control . . . . The right assumed under the law would not be upheld, if

exerted beyond what may be considered a necessary police regulation. The line

between what would be a clear invasion of right on the one hand, and regulations

not lessening the value of the right, and calculated for the beneﬁt of all, must be

distinctly marked . . . . Police regulations are legal and binding, because for the

general beneﬁt, and do not proceed to the length of impairing any right, in the

proper sense of that term. The sovereign power in a community, therefore, may

and ought to prescribe the manner of exercising individual rights over property.

It is for the better protection and enjoyment ofthat absolute dominion which the

individual claims. The power rests on the implied right and duty of the supreme

power to protect all by statutory regulations; so that, on the whole, the beneﬁt of

all is promoted. Every public regulation in a city may, and does in some sense,

limit and restrict the absolute right that existed previously. But this is not

considered as an injury. So far from it, the individual, as well as others. is

supposed to be beneﬁted. It may, then, be said that such a power is incident to

every well-regulated society, and without which it could not well exist.” See

Owners of James Gray v. Owners of The John Frazer, 21 How. 18-1; Benedict v.

Vanderbilt, 1 Robertson, 194.

[645]

1 Vanderbilt v. Adams, 7 Cow. 351.
Woodworth, J., in this case, states very
clearly the principle on which police regulations, in such cases, are sustainable:
"It seems to me the power exercised in this case is essentially necessary for the
purpose of protecting the rights of all concerned. It is not, in the legitimate
sense of the term, a violation of any right, but the exercise of a power indispensably nel'essary, where an extensive commerce is carried on. If the harbor is
crowded with vessels arriving daily from foreign parts, the power is incident to
such a slate of things. Disorder and confusion would be the consequence, if
there was no control ...• The right assumed under the law would not be upheld, if
exerted beyond what may be considered a necessary police regulation. The line
between what would be a clear invasion of right on the one hand, and regulation II
not lessening the value of the right, and calculated for the benefit of all, must be
distinctly marked ...• Police regulations are legal and binding, because for the
general benefit, and do not proceed to the length of impairing any right, in the
proper sense of that term. The sovereign power in a community, therefore, may
and ought to pre!lcribe the manner of exercising individual rights over property.
It is for the better protection and enjoyment of that absolute dominion which the
individual claims. The power rests on the implied right and duty of the supreme
power to protect all by statutory regulations; so that, on the whole, the benefit of
all is promoted. Every public regulation in a city may, and does in some sense,
limit and restrict the absolute right that existed pre,·iously. But this is not
considered as an injury. So far from it, the individual, as well as olhers, is
supposed to be benefitt'd. It may, then, be said that such a power is incident to
every well-regulated society, and without which it could not well exist." See
Owners of James Gray v. OwnersofTheJohn Frazer, 21 How. 18-1; Benedict 11.
Vanderbilt, 1 Robertson, 194.

[ 645]

* 586 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [cH. XVI.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

commerce which it is accustomed to establish, and to descend to
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the most minute directions, if it shall be deemed advisable; and

that to whatever extent ground shall be covered by those directions,

the exercise of State power is excluded. Congress may establish

police regulations, as well as the States ; conﬁning their operation

to the subjects over which it is given control by the Constitution.

But as the general_poliee power can better be exercised under the

supervision of the local authority, and mischiefs are not likely to

spring therefrom so long as the power to arrest collision resides in

the national courts, the regulations which are made by Congress

do not often exclude the establislnnent of others by the. State

covering very many particulars. Moreover, the regulations of

commerce are usually, and in some cases must be, general and

uniform for the whole country ; while in some localities, State and

local policy will demand peculiar regulations with reference to

special and peculiar circumstances.

The State of Maryland passed an act requiring’ all importers of

foreign goods, by the bale or package, &c., ,to take out a license,

for which they should pay ﬁfty dollars, and, in case of neglect or

refusal to take out such license, subjected them to certain forfeit-

ures and penalties. License laws are of two kinds: those which

require the payment of a license fee hy way of raising a revenue,
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and are therefore the exercise of the power of taxation;

[* 587] and those "‘ which are mere police regulations, and which

require the payment only of such license fee as will cover

the expense of the license and of enforcing the regulation.‘ The

Maryland act seems to fall properly within the former of these

classes, and it was held void as in conﬂict with that provision of

the Constitution which prohibits a State from laying any impost,

&c., and also with tho clause which declares that Congress shall

have the power to regulate commerce. The reasoning of the court

was this: Sale is the object of all importation of goods, and the

power to allow importation must therefore imply the power to

authorize the sale of the thing imported; that consequently a

penalty inﬂicted for selling an article in the character of importer

was in opposition to the act of Congress, which authorized impor-

tation ; that a power to tax an article in the hands of the importer

the instant it was landed was the same in effect as a power to tax

it whilst entering the port ; that consequently the law of Maryland

‘ Ash v. People, 11 Mich. 3-L7. See ante, p. 201.
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commerce which it is accustomed to establish, and to descend to
the most minute directions, if it shall be deemed advisable ; and
that to whatever extent ground shall be covered by those directions,
the exercise of State power is excluded. Congress may establish
police regulations, as well as the States ; confining their operation
to the subjects over which it is given control by the Constitution.
But as the general police power can better be exercised under the
supervision of the local authority, and mischiefs are not likely to
spring therefrom so long as the power to arrest collision resides in
the national courts, the regulations which are made by Congress
do not often exclude the establishment of others by the . State
covering very many particulars. Moreover, the regulations of
commerce are usually, and in some cases must be, general and
uniform for tho whole country ; while in some localities, State and
local policy will demand peculiar regulations with reference to
special and peculiar circumstances.
The State of Maryland passed an act requiring. all importers of
f01:eign goods, by the bale or package, &c., ,to take out a license,
for which they should pay fifty dollars, and, in case of neglect or
refusal to take out such license, subjected them to certain forfeitures and penalties. License laws are of two kinds : those which
require the payment of a license fee by way of raising a revenue,
and are the1·efore the exercise of the power of taxation ;
[* 587] and those • which are mere police regulations, and which
require the payment only of such license fee as will cover
the expense of the license and of enforcing the ·regulation. 1 The
Maryland act seems to fall properly within the former of these
classes, aud it was held void as in conflict with that provision of
the Constitution which prohibits a State from laying any impost,
&c., and also with tho clause which declares that Congress shall
have the power to regulate commerce. The reasoning of the court
was \.his: Sale is the object of all importation of goods, and the
power to allow importation must therefore imply the power to
authorize the sale of the thing imported; that consequently a
penalty iuflicted for selling an article in the character of importer
was in opposition to the act of Congress, which authorized importation ; that a power to tax an article in the hands of the importer
the instant it was la1ided was the same in effect as a power to tax
it whilst entering the port; that consequently the law of Maryland
1

Ash v. People, 11 Mich. 3!7. See ante, p. 201.
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a

was obnoxious to the charge of unconstitutionality, on the ground

of its violating the two provisions referred to.‘ And a State law

which required the master of every vessel engaged in foreign

commerce to pay a certain sum to a State ofﬁcer, on account of

every passenger brought from a. foreign country into the State,

or before landing any alien passenger, was held void for similar

reasons?

On the other hand, a law of the State of New York was sus-

tained which required, under a penalty, that the master of every

vessel arriving from a foreign port should report to the mayor or

recorder of the city of New York an account of his passengers;

the object being to prevent New York from being burdened by an

inﬂux of persons brought thither in ships from foreign countries

and the other States, and for that purpose to require a report of

the names, places of birth, &c., of all passengers, that the neces-

sary steps might be taken by the city authorities to prevent them

from becoming chargeable as paupers.3 And a State regulation of

pilots and pilotage was held unobjectionable, though it was con-

ceded that Congress had full power to make regulations on

the same * subject, which, however, it had not exercised.‘ [* 588]
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These several cases, and the elaborate discussions with

which the decisions in each were accompanied, together with the

leading case of Gibbons v. Ogden,‘ may be almost said to exhaust

the reasoning upon the subject, and to leave little to be done by

those who follow beyond the application of such rules for classiﬁ-

cation as they have indicated.

We have elsewhere referred to cases in which laws requiring all

persons to refrain from their ordinary callings on the ﬁrst day of

the week have been held not to encroach upon the religious liberty

of those citizens who do not observe that day as sacred. Neither

are they unconstitutional as a restraint upon trade and commerce,

or because they have the eﬁ'ect to destroy the value of a lease of

' Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419.

' Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283; see also Lin Sing v. Washburn, 20 Cal. 534,

where a State law imposing a special tax on every Chinese person over eighteen

years of age for each month of his residence in the State was held unconstitu-

tional, as in conﬂict with the power of Congress over commerce.

' City ofNew York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 102.

‘ Cooley v. Board of \Vardens, 12 How. 299. See Bamaby n. State. 21 Ind.

450.

‘ 9 Wheat. 1.
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a

was obnoxious to the charge of unconstitutionality, on the ground
of its violating the two provisions referred to. 1 And a State Ia w
which required the master of every vessel engaged in foreign
commerce to pay a certain sum to a State officer, on account of
every passenger brought from a foreign country into the State,
or before landing any alien passenger, was held void for similar
reasons. 2
On th~ other hand, a law of the State of New York was sustained which required, under a penalty, that the master of every
vessel arriving from a foreign port should report to the mayor or
recorder of the city of New York an account of his passengers ;
the object being to prevent New York from being burdened by an
influx of persons brought thither in ships from foreign countries
and the other States, and for that purpose to require a report of
the names, places of birth, &c., of all passengers, that the necessary steps might be taken by the city authorities to prevent them
from becoming· chargeable as paupers.3 And a State regulation of
pilots and pilotage was held unobjectionable, though it was conceded that Congress had full power to make regulations on
the same • subject, which, however, it had not exercised.4 [* 588]
These several cases, and the elaborate discussions with
which the decisions in each were accompanied, together with the
leading case of Gibbons v. Ogden,6 may be almost said to exhaust
the reasoning upon the subject, and tO leave little to be done by
those who follow beyond the application of such rules for classification as they have indicated.
We have elsewhere referred to cases in which laws requiring all
persons to refrain from their ordinary callings on the first day of
the week have been held not to encroach upon the religious liberty
of those citizens who do not observe that day as sacred. Neither
are they unconstitutional as a restraint upon trade and commerce,
or because they have the effect to destroy the value of a lease of
Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419.
Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283; see also Lin Sing v. Washburn, 20 Cal. 534,
where a State law imposing a. ~pecia.l tax on every Chinese person over eighteen
years of age for each month of his residence in the State was held unconstitutional, a.s in conflict with the power of Congress over commerce.
~ City ofNew York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 102.
4 Cooley v. Board of,Vardens, 12 How. 299.
See Barnaby"· State. 21 Ind.
450.
• 9 Wheat. 1.
1

1
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property to be used on that day, or to make void a contract for

Sunday services}

i The highways within and through a State are constructed by the

State itself, which has full power to provide all proper regulations

of police to govern the action of persons using them, and to make

from time to time such alterations in these ways as the proper

authorities shall deem proper? A very common regulation is that

parties meeting shall turn to the right; the propriety of which

none will question. So the speed of travel may be regulated with

a view to safe use and general protection, and to prevent a public

nuisance.3 So beasts may be prohibited from running at large,

under the penalty of being seized and sold.4 And it has been held

competent under the same power to require the owners of urban

property to construct and keep in repair and free from obstructions

the sidewalks in front of it, and in case of their failure to do so to

authorize the public authorities to do it at the expense of the

property,5 the courts distinguishing this from taxation, on

[* 589] the * ground of the peculiar interest which those upon

whom the duty is imposed have in its performance, and

their peculiar power and ability to perform it with the promptness

which the good of the community requires.“ For the like reasons
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it has been held competent, where a district of country was liable

to be inundated by the overﬂow of a large river, to require the

owners of lands lying upon the river to construct levees on the

' Lindenmuller v. People, S3 Barb. 576. And see Exparte Andrews, 18 Cal.

678; Ea: parte Bird, 19 Cal. 130.

' As to the right to change the grade of a street from time to time without

liability to parties incidentally injured, see ante, 207.

‘l Commonwealth v. Worcester, 3 Pick. 473; People 0. Jenkins, 1 Hill, 469;

People v. Roe, ib. 470. ‘

‘ McKee v. McKee, 8 B. Monr. 433.

5 Godard, Petitioner, 16 Pick. 504; Bonsall v. Mayor of Lebanon, 19 Ohio,

418; Paxson v. Sweet, 1 Green (N. J.), 196; Lowell v. Hadley, 8 Met. 180;

Washington v. Mayor, &c., of Nashville, 1 Swan, 177; Mayor, &c. v. Medbury, 6

property to be used on that day, or to make void a contract for
Sunday services.I
· The highways within and through a State are constructed by the
State itself, which has full power to provide all proper regulations
of police to govern the action of persons using them, and to make
from time to time such alterations in these ways as the proper
authorities shall deem proper. 2 A very common regulation is that
parties meeting shall turn to the right ; the propriety of which
none will question. So the speed of travel may be reguhited with
a view to safe use and general protection, and to prevent a public
nuisance.8 So beasts may be prohibited from running at large,
under the penalty of being seized and sold.4 And it has been held
competent under the same power to require the owners of urban
property to construct and keep in repair and free from obstmctions
the sidewalks in front of it, and in case of their failure to do so to
authorize the public authorities to do it at the expense of the
property,6 the courts distinguishing this from taxation, on
[• 589] the • ground of the peculiar interest which those upon
whom the duty is imposed have in its performance, and
their peculiar power and ability to perform it with the promptness
which the good of the community requires.6 For the like reasons
it has been held competent, where a district of country was liable
to be inundated by the overflow of a large river, to require the
owners of lands lying upon !he river to construct levees on the

Humph. 368; Woodbridge v. Detroit, 8 Mich. 309, per C'ln'istianvy, J.; Matter

of Dorrance St. 4 R. I. 230; Deblois v. Barker, ib. 4-l5;Hart v. Brooklyn, 36

Barb. 226. So in Pennsylvania it has been held competent to require the owners

of city lots, in front of which sewers are constructed, to pay the expense thereof

in proportion to the street front. Philadelphia v. Tryon, 35 Penn. St. 400;

Stroud v. Philadelphia, 61 Penn. St. 255.

° See especially the case of Godard, Petitioner, 16 Pick. 504, for a clear and

strong statement of the grounds on which such legislation can be supported.
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1 Lindenmuller "·People, 83 Barb. 676.
And see E~ parte Andrews, 18 Cal.
678; Ex parte Bird, 19 Cal. 130.
' As to the right to change the grade of a street from time to time without
liability to parties incidentally injured, see ante, 207.
1 Commonwealth"· Worcester, 3 Pick. 478; People "· Jenkins, 1 Hill, 469;
People v. Roe, ib. 470.
4 McKee v. McKee, 8 B. Monr. 438.
• Godard, Petitioner, 16 Pick. 50!; Bonsall v. Mayor of Le'hanon, 19 Ohio,
418; Paxson v. Sweet, 1 Green (N.J.), 196; Lowell v. Hadley, 8 Met. 180;
Washington v. Mayor, &c., of Nashville, 1 Swan, 177; Mayor, &c."· Meubury, 6
Humph. 368; Woodbridge v. Detroit, 8 Mich. 309, per Ch,·istiancy, J.; Matter
of Dorrance St. 4 R. I. 280; Deblois v. Barker, ib. -145; Hart v. Brooklyn, 86
Barb. 226. So in Pennsylvania it has been held competent to require the owners
of city lots, in front of which sewers are constructed, to pay 1he expense thereof
in proportion to the street front. Philadelphia v. Tryon, 85 Penn. St. 400;
Stroud v. Philadelphia, 61 Penn. St. 2M.
• See especially the case of Godard, Petitioner, 16 Pick. 504, for a clear and
strong statement of the grounds on which such legislation can be supported.
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this regulation, to cause such levees to be constructed under the

direction of the public authorities, and the expense assessed upon

the laud of such owners}

Navigable waters are also a species of public highway, and as

such come under the control of the States. The term “navigable,”

at the common law, was only applied to those waters where the tide

ebbed and ﬂowed, but all streams which were of sufficient capacity

for useful navigation, though not called navigable, were public, and

subject to the same general rights which the public exercised in

highways by land.” In this country there has been a very general

disposition to consider all streams public which are useful as chan-

nels for commerce, wherever they are found of sufficient capacity

to ﬂoat the products of the mines, the forests, or the tillage of the

country through which they ﬂow, to market?’ And if a stream is

of suﬁicient capacity for the ﬂoating of rafts and logs in the condi-

tion in which it generally appears by nature, it will be regarded as

public, notwithstanding there may be times when it be-

comes too dry and "‘ shallow for the purpose. “ The capac- [“' 590]

ity of a stream, which generally appears by the nature,

amount, importance, and necessity of the business done upon it,

must be the criterion. A brook, although it might carrry down
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saw-logs for a few days, during a freshet, is not therefore a public

highway. But a stream upon which and its tributaries saw-logs to

an unlimited amount can be ﬂoated every spring, and for the period

of from four to eight weeks, and for the distance of one hundred

and ﬁfty miles, and upon which unquestionably many thousands

will be annually transported for many years to come, if it be legal

so to do, has the character of a public stream for that purpose.

So far the purpose is useful for trade and commerce, and to the

' Crowley v. Copley, 2 La. An. 329.

' L01-man v. Benson, 8 Mich. 26; Morgan v. King, 18 Barb. 288.

' Brown v. Chadbourne, 31 Me. 9; Shaw v. Crawford, 10 Johns. 236 ; Munson

v. Hungcrford, 6 Barb. 265; Browne v. Scoﬁeld, 8 Barb. 239; Morgan v. King,

18 Barb. 284, 30 Barb. 9, and 35 N. Y. 454; Cates v. \Vadlington, 1 McCord,

680; Commonwealth v. Chapin, 5 Pick. 199; Moore v. Sanbourne, 2 Mich. 519;

Lorman 1». Benson, 8 Mich. 18; Depew v. Board of Commissioners, &c., 5 Ind. 8;

Board of Trustees v. Pidge, ib. 13; Stuart v. Clark, 2 Swan, 9; Dalrymple v.

Mead, 1 Grant’s Cases, 197; Commissioners of Homochitto River v. “Withers,

29 Miss. 21 ; Rhodes v. Otis, 33 Ala. 578; Mt-Manus v. Carmichael, 3 Iowa, 1 ;

Gcrrish v. Brown, 51 Me. 256. And see Scott v. \Villson, 3 N. H. 321.
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river front at their own expense, and, on their failure to comply with
this regulation, to cause snch levees to be constructed under the
direction of the public authorities, and the expense assessed upon
the land of such owners.1
Navigable waters are also a species of public highway, and as
such come under the control of the States. The term "navigable,"
at the common law, was only applied to those waters where the tide
ebbed and flowed, but all streams which were of sufficient capacity
for useful navigation, though not called navigable, were public, and
subject to the same general rights which the public exercised in
highways by land.2 In this country there has been a very general
disposition to consider all streams public which are useful as channels for commerce, wherever they are found of sufficient capacity
to float the products of the mines, the forests, or the tillage of the
country through which they flow, to market.3 And if a stream is
of sufficient capacity for the floating of rafts and logs in the condition in which it generally appears by nature, it will be regarded as
public, notwithstanding there may be times when it becomes too dry and • shallow for the purpose. "The capac- [* 590]
ity of a stream, which generally appears by the nature,
amount, importance, and necessity of the business done upon it,
must be the criterion. A brook, although it might carrry down
saw-logs for a few days, during a freshet, is not therefore a public
highway. But a stream upon which and its tributaries saw-logs to
an unlimited amount can he floated every spring, and for the period
of from four to eight weeks, and for the distance of one hundred
and fifty miles, and upon which unquestionably many thousands
will be annually transported for many years to come, if it be legal
so to do, has the character of a public stream for tltat purpose.
So far the purpose is useful for trade and commerce, and to the
Crowley"· Copley, 2 La. An. 329.
Lorman "· Benson, 8 Mich. 26; Morgan "· King, 18 Barb. 288.
a Brown "· Chadbourne, 31 Me. 9; Shaw"· Crawford, 10 Johns. 2S6; Munson
"· Hungerford, 6 Barb. 265; Browne 11. Scofield, 8 Barb. 239; Morgan v. King,
18 Barb. 28~. SO Barb. 9, and 85 N. Y. 454; Cates v. Wadlington, 1 McCord,
580; Commonwealth v. Chapin, 5 Pick. 199; Moore"· San bourne, 2 Mich. 519;
Lorman t•. Benson, 8 Mich. 18; Depew v. Board of Commissioners, &c., 5 Ind. 8;
Board of Trustees "· Pidge, ib. IS; Stuart v. Clark, 2 Swan, 9; Dalrymple "·
Mead, 1 Grant's Cases, 197; Commissioners of Homocbitto River "· 'Vitbers,
29 Miss. 21 ; Rhodell "· Otis, 33 Ala. 578; McManus "· Cannicbacl, S Iowa, 1 ;
Gerrish v. Brown, 511\le. 256. And see Scott"· Willson, 8 N. H. S:21.
1

1
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interests of the community. The ﬂoating of logs isnot mentioned

by Lord Hale [in De J ure Maris], and probably no river in Great

Britain was, in his day, or ever will be, put to that use. But here

it is common, necessary, and proﬁtable, especially while the coun-

try is new; and if it be considered a lawful mode of using the

river, it is easy to adapt well-settled principles of law to the case.

And they are not the less applicable because this particular busi-

ness may not always continue; though if it can of necessity last

but a short time, and the river can be used for no other purpose,

that circumstance would have weight in the consideration of the

question.” 1 But if the stream was not thus useful in its natural

condition, but has been rendered susceptible of use by the labors of

the owner of the soil, the right of passage will be in the nature of

a private way, and the public do not acquire a right to the beneﬁt

of the owner’s labor, unless he sees ﬁt to dedicate it to their

use?

' All navigable waters are for the use of all the citizens; and

there cannot lawfully be any exclusive private appropriation of any

portion of them? The question what is a navigable stream would

seem to be a mixed question of law and fact;4 and though it is

said that the legislature of the State may determine

[* 591] whether a * stream shall be considered a public highway or
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not,“ yet if in fact it is not one, the legislature cannot

make it so by simple declaration, since, if it is private property,

the legislature cannot appropriate it to a public use without provid-

ing for compensation.‘ 7

The general right to control and regulate the public use of nav-

‘ Morgan v. King, 18 Barb. 288; Moore v. Sanbourne, 2 Mich. 519.

‘ ' \Vadsworth‘s Adm‘r v. Smith, 11 Me. 278; “lard v. Warner, 8 Mich. 521.

" Commonwealth v. Charlestown, 1 Pick. 180; Kean v. Stetson, 5 Pick. 492;

Arnold v. Mundy, 1 Halst. 1; Bird v. Smith, 8 Watts, 434. They are equally

for the use of the public in the winter when covered with ice; and one who cuts

a hole in the ice in an accustomed way, by means of which one passing upon the

ice is injured, is liable to an action for the injury. French v. Camp, 6 Shep.

433. An obstruction to a navigable stream is a nuisance which any one having

occasion to use it may abate. Inhabitants of Arundel v. McCulloch, 10 Mass.

70; State v. Moﬁiett, 1 Greene (Iowa), 247; Selman v. Wolfe, 27 Texas, 68.

‘ See Treat v. Lord, 42 Me. 552.

' Glover v. Powell, 2 Stockt. 211; American River Vi/ater Co. v. Alnsden,

interests of the community. The floating of logs is not mentioned
by Lord Hale [in De Jure Maris], and probably no river in Great
Britain was, in his day, or ever will be, put to that use. But here
it is common, necessary, and profitable, especially while the country is new; and if it be considered a lawful mode of using the
river, it is easy to adapt well-settled princip1es of law to the case.
And they are not the less applicable because this particular business may not always continue; though if it can of necessity last
but a short time, and the river can be used for no other purpose,
that circumstance would have weight in the consideration of the
question." 1 But if the stream was not thus useful in its natural
condition, but has been rendered susceptible of use by the labors of
the owner of the soil, the right of passage will be in the nature of
a private way, and the public do not acquire a right to the benefit
of the owner's labor, unless he sees fit to dedicate it to their
use. 2
All navigable waters are for the use of all the citizens ; and
there cannot lawfully be any exclusive private appropriation of any
portion of them. 3 The question what is a navigable stream would
seem to be a mixed question of law and fact; • and though it is
said that the legislature of the State may determine
[* 591] whether a* stream shall be considered a public highway or
not,6 yet if in fact it is not one, the legislature cannot
make it so by simple declaration, since, if it is private property,
the legislature cannot appropriate it to a public use without providing for compens~tiou.o
The general right to control and regulate the public use of nav-

6 Cal. 443; Baker v. Lewis, 33 Penn. St. 301.

° Morgan v. King, 18 Barb. 284; Same Case, 35 N. Y. 454.
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Morgan v. King, 18 Barb. 288; Moore v. San bourne, 2 Mich. 519.
Wadsworth's Adm'r v. Smith, 11 Me. 278; Ward v. Warner, 8 Mich. 521.
3 Commonwealth v. Charlestown, 1 Pick. 180; Kean v. Stetson, 5 Pick. 492;
Arnold v. Mundy, 1 Haist. 1; .Bird v. Smith, 8 Watts, 434. They are equally
for the use of the public in the winter when covered with ice; and one who cuts
a hole in the ice in an accustomed way, by means of which one passing upon the
ice is injured, is liable to an action for the injury. French v. Camp, 6 Shep.
433. An obstruction to a navigable stream is a nuisance which any one having
occasion to use it may abate. Inhabitants of Arundel v. McCulloch, 10 Mass.
70; State v. Moffett, 1 Greene (Iowa), 247; Selman v. Wolfe, 27 Texa~, 68.
4 See Treat v. Lord, 42 Me. 552.
• Glm·er v. Powell, 2 Stockt. 211; American River Water Co. v. Atusden,
6 Cal. 443; Baker v. Lewis, 83 Penn. St. 301.
• Morgan v. King, 18 Barb. 284; Same Case, 85 N.Y. 454.
1

· 1
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restrictions upon this right growing out of the power of Congress

over commerce. Congress is empowered to regulate commerce

with foreign nations and among the several States; and wherever

a river forms a highway upon which commerce is conducted with

foreign nations or between States, it must fall under the control

of Congress, under this power over commerce. The circumstance,

however, that a stream is navigable, and capable of being used for

foreign or inter-State commerce, does not exclude regulation by

the State, if in fact Congress has not exercised its power in regard

to it;1 or having exercised it, the State law does not come in con-

ﬂict with the congressional regulations, or interfere with the rights

which are permitted by them.

The decisions of the Federal judiciary in regard to navigable

waters seem to have settled the following points: —

1. That no State can grant an exclusive monopoly for the navi-

gation of any portion of the waters within its limits upon which

commerce is carried on under coasting licenses granted under the

authority of Congress,” since such a grant would come directly in

conﬂict with the power which Congress has exercised. But a State

law granting to an individual an exclusive right to navigate the

upper waters of a river, lying wholly within the limits of the State,
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separated from tide water by falls impassable for pur-

poses of * navigation, and not forming a part of any con- [* 592]

tinuous track of commerce between two or more States,

or with a foreign country, does not come within the reason of this

decision, and cannot be declared void as opposed to the Constitu-

tion of the United States.“

' Wilson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co. 2 Pet. 245. In this case it was held

that a State law permitting a creek navigable from the sea to be dammed so as

to exclude vessels altogether was not opposed to the Constitution of the United

States, there being no legislation by Congress with which it would come in con-

ﬂict. And see Wheeling Bridge Case, 13 How. 518.

’ Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1. The case was the well-known historical

one, involving the validity of the grant by the State of New York to Robert

Fulton and his associates of the exclusive right to navigate the waters of that

State with vessels propelled by steam.

“ Veazie v. Moor, 14 How. 568. The exclusive right granted in this case was

to the navigation of the Penobscot River above Old Town, which was to continue

for twenty years, in consideration of improvements in the navigation to be made

igable waters is unquestionably in the State ; but there are certain
restrictions upon this right growing out of the power of Congress
over commerce. Congress is empowered to regulate commerce
with foreign nations and among the several States; and wherever
a river forms a highway upon which commerce is conducted with
foreign nations or between States, it must fall under the control
of Congress, under this power over commerce. The circumstance,
however, that a stream is navigable, and capable 'Of being used for
foreign or inter-State commerce, does not exclude regulation by
the State, if in fact Congress has not exercised its power in regard
to it; 1 or having exercised it, the State law does not come in conflict with the congressional regulations, or interfere with the rights
which are permitted by them.
The decisions of the Federal judiciary in regard to navigable
waters seem to have settled the following points:1. That no State can grant an exclusive monopoly for the navigation of any portion of the waters within its limits upon which
commerce is carried on under coasting licenses granted under the
authority of Congress,2 since such a grant would come directly in
conflict with the power which Congress has exercised. But a State
law granting to an individual an exclusive right to navigate the
upper waters of a river, lying wholly within the limits of the State,
separated from tide water by falls impassable for purposes of • navigation, and not forming a part of any con- [* 592]
tinuous track of commerce between two or more States,
or with a foreign country, does not come within tl!e reason of this
decision, and cannot be declared void as opposed to the Constitution of the United States.a

by the grantees. Below Old Town there were a fall and several dams on the

river, rendering navigation from the sea impossible.
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1 Wilson v. Black Bird Creek 1\Iarsh Co. 2 Pet. 245.
In this case it was held
that a State law permitting a creek navigabl~ from the sea to be dammed so ir.s
to exelude vessels altogether was not opposed to the Constitution of the United
States, there bt>ing no legislation by Congress with which it would come in conflict. And see Wheeling Bridge Case, lS How. 518.
~ Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1. The case was the well-known historical
one, involving the validity of the grant by the State of New York to Robert
Fulton and his a8sociates of the exclusive right to navigate the waters of that
State with vessds propelled by steam.
~ Veazie v. Moor, a How. 568. The exclusive right granted in this case was
to the navigation of the Penobscot River above Old Town, which Wl\.'1 to continue
for twenty years, in consideration of improvements in the navigation to be made
by the grantees. Below Old Town there were a fall and several dams on the
river, rendering navigation from the sea impossible.
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2. The States have the same power to improve navigable waters

(CH•. XVI.

which they possess over other highways;1 and where money has

been expended in making such improvement, it is competent for

the State to impose tolls on the commerce which passes through

and has the beneﬁt of the improvement, even where the stream is

one over which the regulations of commerce extend.“

3. The States may authorize the construction of bridges over

navigable waters, for railroads as well as for every other species of

highway, notwithstanding they may to some extent interfere with

the right of navigation.3 If the stream is not one which is subject

to the control of Congress, the State law permitting the erection

cannot be questioned on any ground of public inconvenience. The

legislature must always have power to determine what public ways

are needed, and to what extent the accommodation of travel over

one way must yield to the greater necessity for another. But if the

stream is one over which the regulations of Congress extend, the

question is somewhat complicated, and it becomes necessary to

consider whether such bridge will interfere with the regulations or

not. But the bridge is not necessarily unlawful, because it may

constitute, to some ‘degree, an obstruction to commerce, if it is

properly built, and upon a proper plan, and if the general traﬁic

of the country will be aided rather than impeded by its construc-
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tion. There are many cases where a bridge over a river maybe

vastly more important than the navigation; and there are other

cases where, although the traﬁic upon the river is impor-

[* 593] tant, yet an " inconvenience caused by a bridge with draws

would be much less seriously felt by the public, and be a

much lighter burden upon trade and travel than a break in a line

of railroad communication necessitating the employment of a ferry.

In general terms it may be said that the State may authorize such

constructions, provided they do not constitute material obstructions

to navigation; but whether they are to be regarded as material

obstructions or not is to be determined in each case upon its own

' The improvement of a stream by State authority will give no right of action

to an individual incidentally injured by the improvement. Zimmerman v. Union

Canal Co. 1 \V. & S. 346.

' Palmer v. Cuyahoga Co. 3 McLean, 226 ; Kellogg v. Union Co. 12 Conn. 7;

Thames Bank v. Lovell, 18 Conn. 500.

' See Commonwealth v. Breed, 4 Pick. 460; Depew v. Trustees of ‘V. and E.

Canal. 5 Ind. 8; Dover v. Portsmouth Bridge, 17 N. H. 200; Illinois, &c., Co.

v. Peoria, &c., Association, 38 Ill. 467.

ir
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2. The States have the same power to impro'\"'e navigable waters
which they possess over other highways ; 1 and where money has
been expended in making such improvement, it is competent for
the State to impose tolls on the colllmerce which passes through
and has the benefit of the improvement, even where the Rtream is
one over which the regulations of commerce extend. 2
3. The States may authorize the construction of bri.dges over
navigable waters, for railroads as well as for every other species of
highway, notwithstanding they may to some extent interfere with
the right of navigation.3 If the stream is not one which is subject
to the control of Congress, the State law permitting the erection
cannot be questioned on any ground of public inconvenience. The
legislature must always have power to determine what public ways
are needed, and to what extent the accommodation of travel over
one way must yield to the greater necessity for another. But if the
stream is one over which the regulations of Cong•·ess extend. the
question is somewhat complicated, and it becomes necessary to
consider whether such bridge will interfere with the regulations or
not. But the bridge is not necessarily unlawful, because it may
constitute, to some degree, an obstruction to cvmmerce, if it is
properly built, and upon a proper plan, and if the general traffic
of the country will be aided rather than impeded by its construction. There are many cases where a bridge over a river may be
vastly more important than the navigation ; and there are other
cases where, although the traffic upon the river is impor[* 593] taut, ye~ an • inconvenience caut;ed by a bridge with draws
would be much less seriously felt by the public, and be a
much lighter burden upon trade and travel than a break in a line
of railroad communication necessitating the employment of a ferry.
In general terms it may be said that the State may authorize such
constructions, provided they do not constitute material obstructions
to navigation; but whether they are to be regarded as material
obstructions or not is to be determined in each case upon its own
1 The improvement of a stream by State authority will give no right of action
to an individual incide.ntally injured by the improvement. Zimmerman v. Union
Canal Co. 1 W. & S. 346.
1 Palmer"· Cuyahoga Co. 3 McLean, 226; Kellogg"· Union Co. 12 Conn. 7;
Thames Bank v. Lovell, 18 Conn. 500.
a See Commonwealth v. Breed, 4 Pick. 460; Depew v. Trustees of W. and E.
Canal. 5 Ind. 8; Dover v. Portsmouth Bridge, 17 N. H . 200; Illinois, &c., Co.
"· Peoria, &c., Association, 38 Ill. 467.
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circumstances. The character of the structure, the facility af-

forded for vessels to pass it, the relative amount of traﬂic likely

to be done upon the stream and over the bridge, and whether the

traﬂic by rail would be likely to be more incommoded bythe want

of the bridge than the trafﬁc by water with it, are all circumstances

to be taken into account in determining this question. It is quite

evident that the same structure might constitute a material ob-

struction on the Ohio or the Mississippi, where vessels are con-

stantly passing, which would be unobjectionable on a stream which

a boat only enters at intervals of weeks or months. The decision

of the State legislature that the erection is not an obstruction is

not conclusive ; but the ﬁnal determination will rest with the Fed-

eral courts, who have jurisdiction to cause the structure to be

abated, if it be found to obstruct unnecessarily the tralﬁc upon the

water. Parties constructing the bridge must be prepared to show,

not only the State authority, and that the plan and construction

are proper, but also that it accommodates more than it impedes the

general commerce}

4. The States may lawfully establish ferries over navigable

waters, and grant licenses for keeping the same, and forbid un-

licensed persons from running boats or ferries without such
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license. This also is only the establishment of a public way,

and it can make no difference whether or not the water is en-

tirely within the State, or, on the other hand, is a highway for

inter-State or foreign commerce.”

5. The State may also authorize the construction of

dams across “navigable waters; and where no question [* 594]

of Federal authority is involved, the legislative permission

' See this subject fully considered in the VVheeling Bridge Case, 13 How. 518.

See also Columbus Insurance Co. v. Peoria Bridge Co. 6 Mt-Lean, 72; Same

v. Curtenius, ib. 209; Jolly v. Terre Haute Draw-Bridge Co. ib. 237; U. S. v.

New Bedford Bridge, 1 VV. & M. 401 ; Commissioners ofSt. Joseph Co. v. Pidge,

5 Ind. 13.

" Conway v. Taylor‘s Ex’r, 1 Black, 603; Chilvers v. People, 11 Mich. 43.

In both these cases the State license law was sustained. as against a vessel en-

rolled and licensed under the laws of Congress. And see Fanning v. Gregorie,

16 How. 534. Ferry rights may be so regulated as to rates of ferriage, and

ferry franchises and privileges so controlled in the hands of grantees and lessees,

that they shall not be abused to the serious detriment or inconvenience of the

public. “there this power is given to a municipality, it may be recalled at any

circumstances. The character of the structure, the facility afforded for vessels to pass it, the relative amount of traffic likely
to be done upon the stream and ovel' the bridge, and whether the
traffic by rail would be likely to be more incommoded by the want
of the bridge than the traffic by water with it, are all circumstances
to be taken into account in determining this question. It is quite
evident that the same structure might constitute a material obstruction on the Ohio or the Mississippi, where vessels are constantly passing, which would be unobjectionable on a stream which
a boat only enters at intervals of weeks or months. The decision
of the State legislature that the erection is not an obstruction is
not conclusive ; but the final determination will rest with the Federal courts, who have jurisdiction to cause the structure to be
abated, if it be found to obstruct unnecessarily the traffic upon the
water. Parties constructing the bridge must be prepared to show,
not only the State authority, and that the plan and constl'nction
are proper, but also that it accommodates more than it impedes the
general commerce.I
4. The States may lawfully establish ferries over navigable
waters, and grant licenses for keeping the same, and forbid unlicensed persons from running boats or ferries without such
license. This also is only the estab~ishment of a public way,
and it can make no difference whether or not the water is entirely within the State, or, on the other hand, is a highway for
inter-State or foreign comruerce.2
5. The State may also authorize the constrqction of
dams across *navigable waters; and where no question [* 594]
of Federal authority is involved, the legislative permission

time. People v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 32 Barb. 102.
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1 See this subject fully considered in the Wheeling Bridge Case, 13 How. 518.
See also Columbus Insurance Co. v. Peoria Bridge Co. 6 McLean, 72; Same
v. Curtenius, ib. 209; Jolly v. Terre Haute Draw-Bridge Co. ib. 237; U.S. v.
New Bedford Bridge, 1 'tV. & l\1. 401; Commissioners of St. Joseph Co. v. Pidge,
5 Ind. 13.
1 Conway v. Taylor's Ex'r, 1 Black, 603; Chilvers v. People, 11 Mich. 43.
In both these cases the State license law was sustained. as against a \'cssel enrolled and licensed under the laws of Congress. And see Fanning v. Gregorie,
16 How. 534. Ferry rights may be so regulated as tQ rates of ferriage, and
ferry franchises and privileges so controlled in the hands of grantees and lessees,
that they shall not be abused to the serious detriment or inconvenience of the
public. Where this power is given w a municipality, it may be recalled at any
time. People v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 32 Barb. 102.
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to erect a dam will exempt the structure from being considered a.

(CH. XVI.

nuisance,‘ and it would seem also that it must exempt the party

constructing it from liability to any private action for injury to

navigation, so long as he keeps within the authority granted, and

is guilty of no negligence.”

6. To the foregoing it may be added that the State has the same

power of regulating the speed and general conduct of ships or

other vessels navigating its water highways, that it has to regulate

the speed and conduct of persons and vehicles upon the ordinary

highway; subject always to the restriction that its regulations

must not come in conﬂict with any regulations established by

Congress for the foreign commerce or that between the States.“

It would be quite impossible to enumerate all the instances in

which police power is or may be exercised, because the various cases

in which the exercise by one individual of his rights may conﬂict

with a similar exercise by others, or may be detrimental to the

public order or safety, are inﬁnite in number and in variety. And

there are other cases where it becomes necessary for the public

authorities to interfere with the control by individuals of their

property, and even to destroy it, where the owners themselves have

fully observed all their duties to their fellows and to the State, but

where, nevertheless, some controlling public necessity demands the
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interference or destruction. A strong instance of this description

is where it becomes necessary to take, use, or destroy the private

property of individuals to prevent the spreading of a ﬁre, the

ravages of a pestilence, the advance of a hostile army, or any

other great public calamityﬁ Here the individual is in no

‘ Wilson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co. 2 Pet. 2-l5; Brown v. Commonwealth,

3 S. & R. 273; Bacon v. Arthur, 4 \Vatts, -137; Hogg v. Zanesville Co. 5 Ohi'o,

410; Neaderhouser v. State, 28 Ind. 257. And see Flanagan v. Philadelphia,

42 Penn. St. 219; D1-pew v. Trustees of W. and E. Canal, 5 Ind. 8.

’ See Bailey v. Philadelphia, &c., R.R. Co. 4 Harr. 389; Roush v. Walter,

10 Watts, 86; Parker v. Cutler Mill Dam Co. 7 Shep. 353; Zimmerman 0.

Union Canal Co. 1 W. & S. 3-16; Depew v. Trustees of ‘V. and E. Canal,

5 Ind. 8.

“ People v. Jenkins, 1 Hill, 469; People v. Roe, 1 Hill, 470. As to the

right to regulate ﬁsheries in navigable waters, see Gentile v. State, 29 Ind. 409;

Phipps v. State, 22 Md. 380; People v. Reed, 47 Barb. 235.

‘ Mayor, &c., of New York v. Lord, 18 VVend. 129; Russell u. Mayor, &c.,

to erect a dam will exempt the structure from being considered a
nuisance,1 and it would seem also t.hat it must exempt the party
constructing it from liability to any private action for injury to
navigation, so long as he keeps within the authority granted, and
is guilty of no negligence.2
6. To the foregoing it may be added that the State has the same
power of regulating the speed and general conduct of ships or
other vessels navigating its water highways, that it has to t·egnlate
the speed and conduct of persons and vehicles upon the Ol'dinary
highway; subject always to the restriction that its regulations
must not come in conflict with any regulations established by
Congress for the foreign commerce or that between the States.8
It would be quite impossible to enumerate all the instances in
which police power is or may be exercised, because the various cases
in which the exercise by one individual of his rights may conflict
with a similar exercise by ot!1ers, or may be detrimental to the
public order or safety, are infinite in number and in variety. And
there are other cases where it becomes necessary for the public
authorities to interfere with the control by individuals of their
property, and even to destroy it, where the owners themselves have
fully observed all their duties to their fellows and to the State, but
where, nevertheless, some controlling public necessity demands the
interference or destruction. A strong instance of this description
is where it becomes necessary to take, use, or destroy the private
property of individuals to prevent the spreading of a fire, the
ravages of a pestilence, the advance of a hostile army, or any
other great public calamity.* Here the individual is in no

of New York, 2 Denio, 461 ; Sorocco v. Geary, 8 Cal. 69; Hale 1:. Lawrence,

1 Zab. 714; American Print \Vorks v. Lawrence, ib. 248; Meeker v. Van Rena-

selaer, 15 Wend. 397 ; McDonald v. Redwing, 13 Minn. 38.
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1 Wilson"· Black Bird Creek Marsh Co. 2 Pet. 2·l5; Brown"· Commonwealth,
'
S S. & R. 273; Bacon"· Arthur, 4 Watt.~. •s7; Hogg "·Zanesville Co. 5 Ohio,
410; N eaderhouser "· State, 28 Ind. 257. And see Flanagan v. Philadelphia,
42 Penn. St. 219; Dt>pew "·Trustees of W . and E. Canal, 5 Ind. 8.
1 See Bailey v. Philadelphia, &c., R.R. Co. 4 Harr. 389; Roush"· Walter,
10 Watts, 86; Puker "· Cutler Mill Dam Co. 7 Shep. 853; Zimmerman 11.
Union Canal Co. 1 W. & S. 846; Depew "· Trustees of W. and E. Canal,
6 Ind. 8.
3 People "· Jenkins, 1 Hill, 469; People "· Roe, 1 Hill, 470.
As to the
right to regulate fisheries in navigable waters, see Gentile v. State, 29 Inti. 409;
Phipps v. State, 22 1\ld. 380; People v. Reed, 47 Barb. 285.
• Mayor, &c., of New York v. Lord, 18 Wend. 129; Russell"· Mayor, &c.,
of New York, 2 Denio, 461; Sorocco "·Geary, 8 Cal. 69; Hale"· Lawrence,
1 Zab. 714; American Print Works v. Lawrence, ib. ~-!8; Meeker "· Van Rensselaer, 15 Wend. 397; McDonald"· Redwing, 18 Minn. 88.
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“necessity ” which “ knows no law.” The establishment

of limits within the denser portions of cities and villages, within

which buildings constructed of inﬂammable materials shall not

be erected or repaired, may also, in some cases, be equivalent to

a destruction of private property; but regulations for this purpose

have been sustained notwithstanding this result} Wharf lines

may also be established for the general good, even though they

prevent the owners of water-fronts from building out on that which

constitutes private property.’ And, whenever the legislature deem

it necessary to the protection of a harbor to forbid the removal of

stones, gravel, or sand from the beach, they may establish regula-

tions to that eﬁ"ect under penalties, and make them applicable to

the owners of the soil equally with other persons. Such regulations

are only “ a just restraint of an injurious use of property, which the

legislature have authority ” to impose.“

So a particular use of property may sometimes be forbidden,

where, by a change of circumstances, and without the fault of the

owner, that which was once lawful, proper, and unobjectionable

has now become a public nuisance, endangering the public health

or the public safety. Mill-dams are sometimes destroyed upon this

ground ;4 and churchyards which prove in the advance of urban
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population, to be detrimental to the public health, or in danger of

becoming so, are liable to be closed against further use for cemetery

purposes.” The keeping of gunpowder in unsafe quantities in

cities or villages;“ the sale of poisonous drugs, unless labelled;

allowing unmuzzled dogs to be at large when danger of hydro-

phobia is apprehended ; 7 or the keeping for sale unwholesome

' Respublica. v. Duquet, 2 Yeates, 493; Wadleigh v. Gilman, 3 Fairf. 403;

Brady v. Northwestern Ins. Co. 11 Mich. 425; Vanderbilt v. Adams, 7 Cow.

352, per Woodworth, J .

' Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53. See Hart v. Mayor, &c., of Albany,

9 Wend. 571.

3 Commonwealth v. Tewksbury, 11 Met. 55.

4 Miller v. Craig, 3 Stockt. 175. And oﬁ'ensive manufactures may be stopped.

Coe v. Schultz, 47 Barb. 64. See League v. Journeay, 26 Texas, 172.

‘ Brick Presbyterian Church v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 5 Cow. 538;

Coates v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 7 Cow. 604.

‘ Foote v. Fire Department, 5 Hill, 99. And see License Cases, 5 How. 589,

per 1ll('/181171, J.; Fisher v. McGirr, 1 Gray, 27, per Shaw, Ch. J.

7 Morey v. Brown, 42 N. H. 373. Dogs, which are animals in which the

owner has no absolute property, are subject to such regulations as the legislature

[655]
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degree in • fault, but his interest must yield to that-[• 595]
"necessity" which "knows no law." The establishment
of limits within the denser portions of cities and villages, within
which buildings constructed of inflammable materials shall not
be erected or repaired, may also, in some cases, be equivalent to
a destruction of private property; but regulations for this purpose
have been sustained notwithstanding this rcsnlt.1 Wharf lines
may also be established for the general good, even though they
prevent the owners of water-fronts from building out on that which
constitutes private property. 2 And, whenever the legislature deem
it necessary to the protection of a harbor to forbid the removal of
stones, gravel, or sand from the beach, they may establish regulations to that effect under penalties, and make them applicable to
the owners of the soil equally with other persons. Such regulations
are only " a just restraint of an injurious use of property, which the
legislature have authority" to impose.s
So a particular use of property may sometimes be forbidden,
where, by a change of circumstances, and without the fault of the
owner, tJ1at which was once lawful, proper, and unobjectionable
has now become a public nuisance, endangering the public health
or the public safety. :Mill-dams are sometimes destroyed upon this
ground; • and churchyards which prove in the advance of urban
population, to be detrimental to the public health, or in danger of
becoming so, are liable to be closed against further use for cemetery
purposes.6 · The keeping of gunpowder in unsafe quantities in
cities or villages ; 6 the sale of poisonous drugs, unless labelled ;
allowing unmuzzled dogs to be at large when danger of hydrophobia is apprehended ; 7 or the keeping for sale unwholesome
1 Respublica "· Duquet, 2 Yeates, 493; Wadleigh "·Gilman, 8 Fairf. 403;
Brady v. Northwestern Ins. Co. 11 l\Iich. 425; Vanderbilt o. Adams, 7 Cow.
352, per Woodworth, J.
1 Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 58.
See Hart o. Mayor, &c., of Albany,
9 Wend. 571.
• Commonwealth "· Tewksbury, 11 Met. 55.
4 Miller v. Craig, 8 Stockt. 175.
And offensive manufactures may be stopped.
Coe v. Schultz, 47 Barb. 64. See League v. Journeay, 26 Texas, 172.
• Brick Presbyterian Church v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 5 Cow. 538;
Coates"· Mayor, &c., of New York, 7 Cow. 60-l.
' Foote"· Fire Department, 5 Hill, 99. And see License Cases, 5 How. 589,
per Jll!'l,ean, J.; Fisher v. l\lcGirr, 1 Gray, 27, per Shmc, Ch. J.
7 Morey v. Brown, 42 N. H. 373.
Dogs, which are animals in which the
owner bas no absolute property, arc subject to such regulations as the legislature
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[* 596] * provisions, or other deleterious substances, — are all

(CH. XVI.

subject to be forbidden under this power. And, generally,

it may be said that each State has complete authority to provide

for the abatement of nuisances, whether they exist by the fault of

individuals or not.1

The preservation of the public morals is peculiarly subject to

legislative supervision, which may forbid the keeping, exhibition,

or sale of indecent books or pictures, and cause their destruction if

seized; or prohibit or regulate the places of amusement that may

be resorted to for the purpose of gaming ; 2 or forbid altogether the

keeping of implements of gaming for unlawful games; or prevent

the keeping and exhibition of stallions in public places.” And the

power to provide for the compulsory observance of the ﬁrst day of

the week is also to be referred to the same authority.‘

So the markets are regulated, and particular articles allowed to

be sold in particular places only, or after license;5 weights and

measures are established, and dealers compelled to conform to the

ﬁxed standards under penalty, and the like.“ These instances are

may prescribe, and it is not unconstitutional to authorize their destruction, with-

out previous adjudication, when found at large without being licensed and collared

according to the statutory regulation. Blair v. Forehand, 100 Mass. 136. And

see Carter v. Dow, 16 Wis. 298; Morey v. Brown, supra. As a measure of
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internal police, the State has the power to encourage the keeping of sheep, and

to discourage the keeping of dogs, by imposing a penalty upon the owner of a

dog for keeping the same. Mitchell v. Williams, 27 Ind. 62.

‘ See Miller v. Craig, 3 Stockt. 175; \Veeks v. Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 242. But

under this power it would not be competent for a city to tax a lot owner for

the expense of abating a nuisance on his lot which the city itself had created.

Weeks v. Milwaukee, ib. See Barring v. Commonwealth, 2 Duv. 95.

’ Tanner v. Trustees of Albion, 5 Hill, 121; Commonwealth 0. Colton, 8 Gray,

488.

i‘ Nolin v. Mayor of Franklin, 4 Yerg. 163. A city may forbid the keeping

of swine within its densely settled portions. Commonwealth v. Patch, 97 Mass.

221.

‘ Specht v. Commonwealth, 8 Penn. St. 312; State v. Ambs, 20 Mo. 214;

Adams v. Hamel, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 73; Vogelsong v. State, 9 Ind. 112; Shover

v. State, 5 Eng. 259; Bloom v. Richards, 2 Ohio, N. s. 387; Lindenmuller 0.

People, 33 Barb. 548; Ea: parte Andrews, 18 Cal. 678; Ea: parts Bird, 19 Cal.

130.

5 Nightingale’s Case, 11 Pick. 168; Buffalo v. \Vebster, 10 Wend. 99; Bush

v. Seabury, 8 Johns. 418; Ash v. People, 11 Mich. 347; State 0. Leiber, 11

Iowa, ~LU7; Le Claire v. Davenport, 13 Iowa, 210; White v. Kent, 11 Ohio, x.s.

550.

° Guillotte v. New Orleans, 12 La. An. 432; Page v. Fazackerly, 36 Barb.

* "~ . __ __
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[* 596] • provisions, or other deleterious substances, - are all
subject to be forb.idden under this power. And, generally,
it may be said that each State has complete authority to provide
for the abatement of nuisances, whether they exist by the fault of
individuals or not.1
The preservation of the public morals is peculiarly subject to
legislative supervision, which may forbid the keepinf!, exhibition,
or sale of indecent books or pictures, and cause their destruction if
seized; or prohibit or regulate the places of amusement that may
be resorted to for the purpose of gaming; 2 or forbid altogether the
keeping of implements of gaming for unlawful games; or prevent
the keeping and exhibition of stallions in public places.8 And the
power to provide for the compulsory observance of the first day of
the week is also to be referred to the same authority.'
So the markets are regulated, and particular articles allowed to
be sold in particular places only, or after license ; 6 weights and
measures are established, and dealers compelled to conform to the
fixed standards under penalty, and the like.6 These instances are
may prescribe, and it is not unconstitutional to authorize their destruction, with·
out previous adjudication, when found at. large without being licensed and collared
according to the statutory regulation. Blair v. Forehand, 100 .Mass. 136. And
see Carter "· Dow, 16 Wis. !l98; :Morey "· Brown, aupra. As a measuPe of
internal police, the S~te has the power to encourage the keeping of sheep, and
to discourage the keeping of dogs, by imposing a penalty upon the owner of a·
dog for keeping the same. Mitchell "· Williams, 27 Ind. 62.
1 See Miller"· Craig, 3 Stockt. 175; Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 242. But
under this power it would not be competent for a city to tax a lot owner for
the expense of abating a nuisance on his lot which the city itself had created.
Weeks v. Milwaukee, ib. See Barring v. Commonwealth, 2 Duv. 95.
1 Tanner v. Trustees of Albion, 5 Hill, 121; Commonwealth o. Colton, 8 Gray,
488.
3 Nolin v. 1\Iayor of Franklin, 4: Yerg. 163.
A city may forbid the keeping
of swine within its densely settled portions. Commonwealth v. Patch, 97 Mass.
221.
4 Specht "· Commonwealth, 8 Penn. St. 312; State "· Ambs, 20 1\lo. 214;
Adams v. Hamel, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 73; Vogelsong "· State, 9 Ind. 112; Shover
o. State, 5 Eng. 259; Bloom v. Richards, 2 Ohio, N. s. 887; Lindenmuller "·
People, 83 Barb. 548; Ex parte Andrews, 18 Cal. 678 ; Ex parte Bird, 19 Cal. ·
130.
6 Nightingale's Case, 11 Pick. 168; Buffalo tl. Webster, lOWend. 99; Bush
"· Seabury, 8 Johns. 418; Ash v. People, 11 Mich. 847; State v. Leiber, 11
Iowa, 407; LeClaire v. Davenport, 13 Iowa, 210; White v. Kent, 11 Ohio, N.s.
550.
• Guillotte v. New Orleans, 12 La. An. 432; Page "· Fazackerly, 36 Barb.
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more than suﬂicient to illustrate the pervading nature of this power,

CH. XVI.]

THE POLICE POWER OF THE STATES.

and we need not weary the reader with further enumeration. Many

of them have been previously referred to under the head of municipal

by-laws.

Whether the prohibited act or omission shall be made acriminal

offence, punishable under the general laws, or subject to punish-

ment under municipal by-laws, or, on the other hand, the party be

deprived of all remedy for any right which, but for the

* regulation, he might have had against other persons, are ["‘ 597]

questions which the legislature must decide. It is suﬁ‘i~

cient for us tolhave pointed out that, in addition to the power to

punish misdemeanors and felonies, the State has also the authority

to make extensive and varied regulations as to the time, mode, and

circumstances in and under which parties shall assert, enjoy, or

exercise their rights, without coming in conﬂict with any of those

constitutional principles which are established for the protection of

private rights or private property.

392; Mayor, &c., of Mobile v. Yuille, 3 Ala. 139. The sale of pure milk and

pure water mixed may be made a penal offence. Commonwealth 0. Waite,

11 Allen, 264.

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:23 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105011581
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

42 [651]

more than sufficient to illustrate the l:lervading nature of this power,
and we need not weary the reader with further enumeration. Many
of them have been previously referred to under the head of municipal
by-laws.
Whether the prohibited act or omission shall be made a· criminal
offence, punishable under the general laws, or subject to punishment under municipal by-laws, or, on the other hand, the party be
deprived of all remedy for any right which, but for the
• regulation, he might have had against other persons, are (* 597]
questions which the legislature must decide. It is sufficient for us to .have pointed out that, in addition to the power to
punish misdemeanors and felonies, the State has also the authority
to make extensive and varied regulations as to the time, mode, and
circumstances in and under which parties shall assert, enjoy, or
exercise their rights, without coming in conflict with any of those
constitutional principles which are established for the protection of
private rights or private property.
392; Mayor, &c., of Mobile v. Yuille, 3 Ala. 139. The sale of pure milk and
pure water mixed may be made a penal offence. Commonwealth "·Waite,
11 Allen, 264.
42
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS,

[*598] . *CHAPTER XVII.

(CH. XVII.

THE EXPRESSION or run POPULAR WILL.

ALTHOUGH by their constitutions the people have delegated the

exercise of sovereign powers to the several departments, they have

not thereby divested themselves of the sovereignty. The govern-

ments which they create, they retain in their own hands a power

to control so far as they have thought needful, and the three

departments are responsible to and subject to be ordered, directed,

[* 598] .

*CHAPTER XVII.

changed, or abolished by them. But this control and direction

must be exercised in the legitimate mode previously agreed upon.

The voice of the people can only be of legal force when expressed

THE EXPRESSION OF THE POPULAR WILL.

in the times and under the conditions which they themselves

have prescribed and pointed out by the constitution; and if any

attempt should be made by any portion of the people, however

large, to interfere with the regular working of the agencies of

government at any other time or in any other mode than as allowed

by existing law, either constitutional or statutory, it would be

revolutionary in character, and must be resisted and repressed by

the oﬁicers who for the time being represent legitimate govern-

ment.1

The authority of the people is exercised through elections, by

means of which they select and appoint the legislative, executive,
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and judicial oﬂicers, to whom shall be intrusted the exercise of the

powers of government. In some cases also they pass upon other

questions specially submitted to them, and adopt or reject a

measure according as a. majority vote for or against it. It is obvi-

' “The maxim which lies at the foundation of our government is, that all

political power originates with the people. But since the organization of gov-

ernment it cannot be claimed that either the legislative, executive, or judicial

powers, either wholly or in part, can be exercised by them. By the institution

of government, the people surrender the exercise of all these sovereign func-

tions of government to agents chosen by themselves, who at least theoretically

represent the supreme will of their constituents. Thus all power possessed

by the people themselves is given and centred in their chosen representatives.”

Davis, Ch. J., in Gibson v. Mason, 5 Nev. 291. .

' [ass]

ALTHOUGH by their constitutions the people have delegated the
exercise of sovereign powers to the several departments, they have
not thereby divested themselves of the sovereignty. The governments which they create, they retain in their own hands a power
to control so far as they have thought needful, and the three
departments are responsible to and subject to be ordered, directed,
changed, or abolished by them. But this control and direction
must be exercised in the legitimate mode previously agreed upon.
The voice of the people can only be of legal force when expressed
in the times and under the conditions which they themselves
have prescribed and pointed out by the constitution; and if any
attempt should be made by any portion of the people, however
large, to interfere with the regular working of the agencies of
government at any other time or in any other mode than as allowed
by existing law, either constitutional or statutory, it would be
revolutionary in character, and must be resisted and repressed by
the officers who for the time being represent legitimate government.1
The authority of the people is exercised through elections, by
means of which they select and appoint the legislative, executh·e,
and judicial officers, to whom shall be intrusted the exercise of the
powers of government. In some cases also they pass upon other
questions specially submitted to them, and adopt or reject a
measure according as a majority vote for or against it. It is obvi1 "The maxim which lies at the foundation of our government is, that all
political power originates with the people. But since the organization of government it cannot be claimed that either the legislative, executive, or judicial
powers, either wholly or in part, can be exercised by them. By the institution
of government, the people surrender the exercise of all these sovereign functions of goYernment to agents chosen by themselves, who at least theoretically
represent the supreme will of their constituents. Thus all power possessed
by the people themselves is given and centred in t.heir chosen representatives."
Da.,is, Ch. J., in Gibson v. Mason, 5 Nev. 291.
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ously impossible that any considerable people should in general

CH. XVII.)

THE EXPRESSION OF THE POPULAR WILL.

meeting consider, mature, and adopt their own laws; but when a

law has been perfected, or when it is deemed desirable to take the

expression of public sentiment upon any one question, the ordinary

machinery of elections is adequate to the end, and the expression

is easily and without confusion obtained by submitting the law for

an aﬂirmative or negative vote. In this manner are constitutions

and amendments thereof adopted or rejected, and matters of local

importance in many cases, like the location of a county seat,

the contracting of a local debt, the erection of a public building,

the acceptance of a municipal charter, and the like, are passed

upon and determined by the people whom they concern,

* under constitutional or statutory provisions which re- [‘* 599]

quire or permit it.

q The Right to Participate in Elections.

In another place we have -said that though the sovereignty is in

the people, as a practical fact it resides in those persons who by

the constitution of the State are permitted to exercise the elective

franchise.1 Each State establishes its own regulations on this

subject; subject only to the ﬁfteenth amendment to the national

Constitution, which forbids that the right of citizens to vote shall

ously impossible that any considerable people should in general
meeting consider, mature, and adopt their own laws; but when a
law has been perfected, or when it is deemed desirable to take the
expression of public sentiment upon any one question, the ordinary
machinery of elections is adequate to the end, and the expression
is easily and without confusion obtained by submitting the law for
an affirmative or negative vote. In this manner are constituiions
and amendments thereof adopted or rejected, and matters of local
importance in many cases, like the location of a county seat,
the contracting of a local debt, the erection of a public building,
the acceptance of a municipal charter, and the like, are passed
upon and determined by the people whom they concern,
• under coastitutional or statutory provisions which re- [* 599]
quire or permit it.

be denied or abridged on account of race, color, or previous
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condition of servitude. Participation in the elective franchise is a

privilege rather than a right, and it is granted or denied on

The Rigltt to Participate in Elections.

grounds of general policy; the prevailing view being that it should

be as general as possible consistent with the public safety. Aliens

are generally excluded, though in some States they are allowed to

vote after residence for a speciﬁed period, provided they have

declared their intention to become citizens in the manner pre-

scribed by law. The ﬁfteeenth amendment, it will be seen, does

not forbid denying the franchise to citizens except upon certain

speciﬁed grounds, and it is matter of public history that its purpose

was to prevent discriminations in this regard as against the newly

enfranchised slaves. Minors, who equally with adult persons are

citizens, are still excluded, as are also women, and sometimes

persons who have been convicted of infamous crimes. In some

States laws will be found in existence which, either generally or in

‘ Ante, p. 29. _

I

[ 659 ]

In another place we have 11aid tbat though the sovereignty is in
the people, as a practical fact it resides in those persons who by
the constitution of the State are permitted to exercise the elective
franchise. 1 Each State establishes its own regulations on this
subject; subject only to the fifteenth amendment to the national
Constitution, which forbids that the right of citizens to vote shall
be denied or abridged on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude. Participa!ion in the elective franchise is a
privilege rather than a right, and it is granted or denied on
grounds of general policy ; the prevailing view being that it should
be as general as possible consistent with the public safety. Aliens
are generally excluded, though in some States they are allowed to
vote after residence for a specified period, provided they have
declared their intention to become citizens in the manner prescribed by law. The fifteeenth amendment, it will be seen, does
not forbid denying the franchise to citizens except upon certain
specified grounds, and it is matter of public history that its purpose
was to prevent discriminations in this regard as against the newly
enfranchised slaves. Minors, who equally with adult persons are
citizens, are still excluded, as are also women, and sometimes
persons who hal'e been convicted of infamous crimes. In some
States laws will be found iu existence which, either generally or iu
1

Ante, p. 29.

[ 659]
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

particular cases deny the right to vote to those persons who lack a

[cH. XVII.

speciﬁed property qualiﬁcation, or who do not pay taxes. In some

States idiots and lunatics are also expressly excluded; and it has

been supposed that these unfortunate classes, by the common

political law of England and of this country, were excluded with

women, minors, and aliens from exercising the right of suffrage,

even though not prohibited therefrom by any express constitutional

or statutory provision} Wherever the constitution has prescribed

the qualiﬁcations of electors, they cannot be changed or added to

particular cases deny the right to vote to those persons who lack a
specified property qualification, or who do not pay taxes. In some
States idiots and lunatics are also expressly excluded ; and it bas
been supposed that these unfortunate classes, by the common
-political law of England and of this country, were excluded with
women, minors, and aliens from exercising the right of suffrage,
even though not prohibited therefrom by any express constitutional
or statutory provision. 1 Wherever the constitution has prescribed
the qualifications of electors, they cannot be changed or added to
by the legislature,2 or otherwise than by an amendment of the
con:ititution.
One of the most common requirements is, that the party offering
to vote shall reside within the district which is to be affected by
the exercise of the right. If a State officer is to be chosen, the
voter should be a resident of the State ; and if a county, city, or
township officer, he should reside within such county, city, or
township. This is the general rule; and for the more convenient
determination of the right to vote, and' to prevent fraud, it is now
generally required that the elector ~hall only exercise
["' 600] within the municipality where he has "' his residence his
right to participate in either local or general elections.
Requiring him to vote among his neighbors, by whom he will be
likely to be generally known, the opportunities for illegal or fraudulent voting will be less than if the voting were allowed to take
place at a distance and among strangers. And wherever this is the
requirement of the constitution, any statute permitting voters to
deposit their ballots elsewhere must necessarily be void.a
I

by the legislature} or otherwise than by an amendment of the

constitution. ‘

One of the most common requirements is, that the party offering

to vote shall reside within the district which is to be affected by

the exercise of the right. If a State oﬂicer is to be chosen, the

voter should be a resident of the State ; and if a county, city, or

township oﬂicer, he should reside within such county, city, or

township. This is the general rule; and for the more convenient

determination of the right to vote, and to prevent fraud, it is now

generally required that the elector shall only exercise

[* 600] within the municipality where he has ‘his residence his

right to participate in either local or general elections.

Requiring him to vote among his neighbors, by whom he will be
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likely to be generally known, the opportunities for illegal or fraud-

ulent voting will be less than if the voting were allowed to take

place at a distance and among strangers. And wherever this is the

requirement of the constitution, any statute permitting voters to

deposit their ballots elsewhere must necessarily be void.3

‘ See Cushing’s Legislative Assemblies, § 24. Also § 27, and notes referring

to legislative cases. Drunkenness is regarded as temporary insanity. lbid.

Idiots and lunaties are expressly excluded by the Constitutions of Delaware,

Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon,

Rhode Island, VVest Virginia, and \Visconsin._ Paupers are excluded in New

York, California, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode

Island, South Carolina, and West Virginia. Persons under guardianship are

excluded in Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and \Visconsin. Persons

under interdiction are excluded in Louisiana; and persons named from paying

taxes at their own request, in New Hampshire. Capacity to read is required in

Connecticut, and capacity to read and write in Massachusetts.

' McCaﬂ‘erty v. Guyer, 67 Penn. St. 109. See State v. Staten, 6 Cold. 243;

Davies v. Mt-Keeby, 5 Nev. 369; State v. Symonds, 57 Me. 148; Monroe v.

Collins, 17 Ohio, N. s. 665; Brown v. Grover, 6 Bush, 1; ante, p. 64, note 3.

' Opinions of Judges, 30 Conn. 591; Hulseman v. Rems, 41 Penn. St. 896

[ 660 ]

See Cushing's Legislative Assemblies, § 24. Also § 27, and notes referring
Drunkenness is regarded as temporary insanity. Ibid.
Idiots and lunatics are expressly excluded by the Constitutions of Delaware,
Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon,
Rhode Island, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Paupera are excluded in :Xew
York, California, Maine, Massachusetts, New. Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, and West Virginia. Persom undu guardianship are
excluded in Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Wisconsin. Person~~
under interdiction are excluded in Louisiana; and persons excused from paying
taxes at their ozcn request, in New Hampshire. Capacity to read is required in
Connecticut, and capacity to read and write in Massal·huaetta.
I McCafferty "· Guyer, 67 Penn. St. 109.
See State "· Staten, 6 Cold. 243;
Davies"· McKeeby, 5 Nev. 869; State " · Symonds, 67 Me. 148; Monroe "·
Collins, 17 Ohio, N. s . 665; Brown"· Grover, 6 Bush, 1; ante, p. 64, note 8.
1 Opinions of Judges, SO Conn. 591; Hulseman "· Rema, 41 Penn. St. 896 i
1

to legislative cases.
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A person’s residence is the place of his domicile, or the place

CH. XVII.]

• 600

THE EXPRESSION OF THE POPULAR WILL.

where his habitation is ﬁxed, without any present intention of

removing therefrom.1 The words “ inhabitant,” “citizen,” and

“resident,” as employed in different constitutions to deﬁne the

qualiﬁcations of electors, mean substantially the same thing; and

one is an inhabitant, resident, or citizen at the‘ place where he has

his domicile or home.“ Every person at all times must be consid-

ered as having a domicile somewhere, and that which he has

acquired at one place is considered as continuing until another is

acquired at a diﬁerent place. It has been held that a student in

an institution of learning, who has residence there for purposes of

instruction, may vote at such place, provided he is emancipated

from his father’s family, and for the time has no home elsewhere.“

Chase v. Miller, ib. 403; Opinions of Judges, 44 N. H. 633; Bourland v. Hil-

dreth, 26 Cal. 161; People -v. Blodgett, 13 Mich. 127; Opinions of Judges,

37 Vt. 665; Day v. Jones, 31 Cal. 261. The case of Morrison v. Springer, 15

Iowa, 301, is not in harmony with those above cited. So far as the election of

representatives in Congress and electors of president and vice-president is eon-

cerned, the State constitutions cannot preclude the legislature from prescribing

the “ times, places, and manner 01' holding " the same, as allowed by the national

A person's residence is the place of his domicile, or the place
where his habitation is fixed, without any present intention of
removing therefrom. 1 The words " inhabitant," " citizen," and
"resident," as employed in different constitutions to define the
qualifications of electors, mean substantially the same thing ; and
one is an inhabitant, resident, or citizen at the place where he has
his domicile or home.2 Every person at all times must be considered as having a domicile somewhere, and that which he has'
acquired at one place is considered as continuing until another is
acquired at a different place. It has been held that a student in
an institution of learning, who has residence there for purposes of
instruction, may vote at such place, provided he is emancipated
from his father's family, and for the time has no home elsewhere.11

Constitution,—art. 1,§ 4, and art. 2, § 1,—and a statute permitting such

election to be held out of the State would consequently not be invalid. Opinions
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of Justices, 45 N. H. 595; Opinions of Judges, 37 Vt. 665. There are now con-

stitutional provisions in New York, Michigan, Missouri, Connecticut, Maryland,

Nevada, Rhode Island, and Pennsylvania, which permit soldiers in actual service

to cast their votes where they may happen to be stationed at the time of voting.

It may also be allowed in Ohio. Lehman v. McBride, 15 Ohio, N. s. 573.

' Putnam v. Johnson, 10 Mass. 488; Rue High’s Case, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 523;

Story, Conﬂ. Laws, § 43.

' Cushing’s Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies, § 36.

3 Putnam v. Johnson, 10 Mass. 488; Lincoln v. Hapgood, 11 Mass. 350.

“ The questions of residence, inhabitancy, or domicile—for although not in all

respects precisely the same, they are nearly so, and depend much upon the same

evidenee—are attended with more diﬂiculty than almost any other which are

presented for adjudication. No exact deﬁnition can be given of domicile; it

depends upon no one fact or combination of circumstances; but, from the whole

taken together, it must be determined in each particular case. It is a maxim

that every man must have a domicile somewhere, and also that he can have but

one. Of course it follows that his existing domicile continues until he acquires

another; and vice versa, by acquiring a new domicile he relinquishes his former

one. From this view it is manifest that very slight circumstances must often

decide the question. It depends upon the preponderance of the evidence in

favor of two or more places; and it may often occur that the evidence of facts

tending to establish the domicile in one place would be entirely conclusive, were

. [661]

Chase v. Miller, ib. 403; Opinions of Judges, 44 N. H. 633; Bourland v. Hildreth, 26 Cal. 161; People v. Blodgett, 13 Mich. 127; Opinions of Judges,
87 Vt. 665; Day"· Jones, 81 Cal. 261. The case of Morrison v. Springer, 15
Iowa, 30!, is not in harmony with those above cited. So far as the election of
representatives in Congress and electors of president and vice-president is concerned, the State constitutions cannot preclude the legislature from prescribing
th" " times, places, and manner of holding " the same, as allowed by the national
Constitution,- art. 1, § 4, and art. 2, § 1,- and a statute permitting such
election to be held out of the State would consequently not be invalid. Opinions
of JustiL-es, 45N. H. 595; Opinions of Judges, 37 Vt. 665. There are now constitutional provisions in New York, Michigan, Missouri, Connecticut, MarJland,
Nevada, Rhode Island, and Pennsylvania, which permit soldiers in actual service
to cast their votes where they may happen to be stationed at the time of voting.
It may also be allowed in Ohio. Lehman "· McBride, 15 Ohio, N. s. 573.
1 Putnam"· Johnson, 10 Mass. 488; Rue High's Case, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 523;
Story, Conti. Laws, § 43.
1 Cushing's Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies, § 3G.
3 Putnam v. Johnson, 10 Mass. 488; Lincoln "· Hapgood, 11 Mass. 350.
"The questions of residence, inhabitancy, or domicile-for although not in all
respects precisely the same, they are nearly so, and depend much upon the same
evidence -are attended 'vith more difficulty than almost any other which are
presented for adjudication. No exact definition can be given of domicile; it
depends upon no one fact or combination of circumstances ; but, from the whole
taken together, it must be determined in each particular case. It is a. maxim
that every man must have a domicile somewhere, and also that be can have but
one. Of course it follows that his existing domicile continues until he acquires
another; and vice ver1a, by acquiring a new domicile he relinquishes hi~ former
one. From this view it is manifest that very slight circumstances mnst oft.en
decide the question. It depends upon the preponderance of the evidence in
favor of two or more places; aml it may often occur that the evidence of facts
tending to t>stablish the domicile in one place would be entirely conclusive, were

[ 661]
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CONSTITUTIONAL UMITATIONS.

[* 601] ‘* Conditions to the Exercise of the Elective Franchise.

[CH. XVII.

While it is true that the legislature cannot add to the constitu-

tional qualiﬁcations of electors, yet it must devolve upon that body

to establish such regulations as will enable all persons entitled to

the privilege to exercise it freely and securely, and exclude all

[• 601] • Conditions to the Exercise of the Elective Franchise.

who are not entitled from improper participation therein. For this

purpose the times of holding elections, the manner of conducting

them and of ascertaining the ‘result, are prescribed, and heavy

it not for the existence of facts and circumstances of a still more conclusive and

decisive character, which ﬁx it beyond question in another. So, on the contrary,

very slight circumstances may ﬁx one’s domicile, if not controlled by more con-

clusive facts ﬁxing it in another place. If a seaman, without family or property,

sails from the place of his nativity, which may be considered his domicile of

origin, although he may return only at long intervals, or even be absent many

years, yet if he does not by some actual reidence or other means acquire a

domicile elsewhere, he retains his domicile of origin.” Shaw, Ch. J., Thorndike

While it is true that the legislature cannot add to the constitutional qualifications of electors, yet it must devolve upon that body
to establish such regulations as will enable all persons entitled to
the privilege to exercise it freely and securely, and exclude all
who are not entitled from improper participation therein. For this
purpose the times of holding elections, the manner of conducting
them and of ascertaining the ·result, are prescribed, and heavy

0. City of Boston, 1 Met. 245. In Inhabitants of Abington v. Inhabitants of

North Bridgewater, 23 Pick. 170, it appeared that a town line run through the

house occupied by a party, leaving a portion on one side sufficient to form a

habitation, and a portion on the other not suﬂicient for that purpose. Held,

that the domicile must be deemed to be on the side ﬁrst mentioned. It was

intimated also that where a house was thus divided, and the party slept habitually
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on one side, that circumstance should he regarded as a preponderating one to ﬁx

his residence there, in the absence of other proof. And see Rex v. St. Olave‘s,

1 Strange, 51.

By the constitutions of several of the States, it is provided, in substance, that

no person shall be deemed to have gained or lost a residence by reason of his

presence or absence, while employed in the service of the United States; nor

while a student in any seminary of learning; nor while kept at any almshouse

or asylum at public expense, nor while conﬁned in any public prison. See Const.

of N. Y., art. 2, § 3; Const. of Illinois, art. 7, § 1; Const. of Ind., art. 2, §-1»;

Const. of California, art. 2, § 4; Const. of Mich., art. 7, § 5 ; ‘Const. of Rhode

Island, art. 2, § 4; Const. of Minnesota, art. 7, § 3; Const. ofMissouri, art. 2,

§20; Const. of Nevada, art. 2, § 2; Const. of Oregon, art. 2, §§ 4 and 5;

Const. of Wisconsin, art. 3, §§ 4 and 5. A provision that no person shall be

deemed to have gained or lost a residence by reason of his presence or absence

in the service of the United States, does not preclude a. person from acquiring a

residence in the place where, and in the time while he is present in such service.

People v. Holden, 28 Cal. 123. If a man takes up his permanent abode at the

place of an institution of learning, the fact of his entering it as a student will not

preclude his acquiring a legal residence there; but if he is domiciled at the place

for the purposes cf instruction only, it is deemed proper and right that he should

neither lose his former residence nor gain a new one in consequence thereof.

[662]

it not. for the existence of facts and circumstances of a still more conclusive and
decisive character, which fix it beyond question in another. So, on the contrary,
very slight circumstances may fix one's domicile; if not controlled by more conclusive facts fixing it in another place. If a seaman, without family or property,
sails from the place of his nativity, which may be considered his domicile of
origin, although he may return only at long intenals, or even be absent many
years, yet if be does not by some actual reaidence or other means acquire a
domicile elsewhere, he retains his domicile of origin." ShaVJ, Cb. J., Thorndike
"· City of Boston, 1 Met. 246. In Inhabitant• of Abington "· Inhabitants of
North Bridgewater, 28 Pick. 170, it appeared that a town line run through the
house occupied by a party, leaving a portion on one side sufficient to form a
habitation, and a portion on the other not sufficient for that purpose. Held,
that the domicile must be deemed to be on the side first rpentioned. It wu
intimated also that where a house was thus divided, and the party slept habitually
on one side, that circumstance should be regarded as a preponderating one to fix
his residence there, in the absence of other proof. And see Rex v. St. Olave's,
1 Strange, 51.
By the constitutions of several of the States, it is provided, in substance, that
no person shall be deemed to have gained or lost a residence by reason of hia
presence or absence, while employed in the service of the United State&; nor
while a student in any seminary of learning; nor while kept at any almshouse
or asylum at public expense, nor while confined in any public prison. See Con st.
of N. Y., art. 2, § 8; Con st. of Illioois, art. 7, § 1 ; Const. of Ind., art. 2, § 4;
Con st. of California, art. 2, § 4; Const. of Mich., art. 7, § 5; ·Con st. of Rhode
Island, art. 2, § 4; Const. of MinnetiOt&, art. 7, § 8; Const. of Missouri, art 2,
§ 20; Const. of Nevada, art. 2, § 2; Canst. of Oregon, art. 2, §§ 4 and 5;
Const. of Wisconsin, art. 8, §§ 4 and 5. A provision that no person shall be
deemed to have gained or lost a residence by reason of his presence or absenc;e
in the service of the United States, does not preclude a person from acquiring a
residence in the place where, and in the time while he is present in such ser,·ice.
People v. Holden, 28 Cal. 123. If a man takes up his permanent abode at the
place of an institution of learning, the fact of his entering it as a student will not
predudc his acquiring a legal residence there; but if he is domiciled at the place
for the purposes cf instruction only, it is deemed proper and right that be should
neither lose his former residence nor gain a new one in consequence thereof.
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penalties are imposed upon those who shall vote illegally, or

CH. XVII.)

THE EXPRESSION OF THE POPULAR WILL,

instigate others to do so, or who shall attempt to preclude a fair

election or to falsify the result. The propriety, and indeed the

necessity, of such regulations is undisputed. In some of the States

it hasalso been regarded as important that lists of voters should

be prepared before the day of election, in which should be regis-

tered the name of every person qualiﬁed to vote. Under such a

regulation, the oﬂicers whose duty it is to administer the election

laws are enabled to proceed with more deliberation in the dis-

charge of their duties, and to avoid the haste and confusion that

must attend the determination upon election day of the various

and sometimes difficult questions concerning the right of individ-

uals to exercise this important franchise. Electors, also, by

means -of this registry, are notiﬁed in advance what persons claim

the right to vote, and are enabled to make the necessary examina-

tion to determine whether the claim is well founded, and to exer-

cise the right of challenge if satisﬁed any person registered is

unqualiﬁed. When the constitution has established no such rule,

and is entirely silent on the subject, it has sometimes been claimed

that the statute requiring voters to be registered before the day of

election, and excluding fromthe right all whose names do not ap-

pear upon the list, was unconstitutional and void, as adding another
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test’ to the qualiﬁcations of electors which the constitu-

tion ' has prescribed, and as having the eﬂ'ect, where [*‘ 602]

electors are not registered, to exclude from voting persons

who have an absolute right to that franchise by the fundamental

law. This position, however, has not been accepted as sound by

the courts. The provision for a registry deprives no one of his

right, but is only a reasonable regulation under which the right

may be exercised} Such regulations must always have been

within the powerof the legislature, unless forbidden. Many rest-

ing upon the same principle are always prescribed, and have never

been supposed to be open to objection. Although the constitution

provides that all male citizens twenty-one years of age and upwards

shall be entitled to vote,it would not be seriously contended that a

statute which should require all such citizens to go to the estab-

lished place for holding the polls, and there deposit their ballots,

' Capen v. Foster, 12 Pick. 485; People v. Kopplekom, 16 Mich. 342; State

v. Bond, 38 Mo. 425; State v. Hilmantel, 21 Wis. 566.

[663]

penalties are imposed upon those who shall vote illegally, or
instigate others to do so, or who shall attempt to preclude a fair
election or to falsify the result. The propriety, and indeed the
necessity, of such regulations is undisput~d. In some of the States
it has 'also been regarded as important that lists of voters should
be prepared before the day of election, in which should be registered the name of every person qualified to vote. Under such a
regulation, the officers whose duty it is to administer the election
laws are enabled to proceed with more deliberation in the discharge of their duties, and to avoid the haste and confusion that
must attend the determination upon election day of the various
and sometimes difficult questions concerning the right of individuals to exercise this important franchise. Electors, also, by
means of this registry, are notified in advance what persons claim
the right to vote, and are enabled to make the necessary examination to determine whether the claim is well founded, and to exercise the right of challenge if satisfied any person registered is
unqualified. When the constitution has established no such rule,
and is entirely silent on the subject, it has sometimes been claimed
that the statute requiring voters to be registered before the day of
election, and excluding from .the right all whose names do not appear upon the list, was unconstitutional and void, as adding another
test' to the qualifications of electors which the constitution • has prescribed, and as having the effect, whero [* 602]
electors are not registered, to exclude from voting persons
who have an absolute right to that franchise by the fundamental
law. This position, however, has not been accepted as sound by
registry depriYes no one of his
the courts. The provision for
right, but is only a reasonable regulation under which the right
may be exercised.1 Such regulations must always have been
within the power. of the legislature, unless forbidden. Many l'esting upon the same principle are always prescribed, and have never
been supposed to be open to objection. Although the constitution
provides that all male citizens twenty-one years of age and upwards
shall be entitled to vote, it would not be seriously contended that a
statute which should require all such citizens to go to the established place for holding the polls, and there deposit their ballots,

a

1 Capen v. Foster, 12 Pick. 485; People v. Kopplekom, 16 Mich. 342; State
o. Bond, 38 Mo. 425; State o. Hilmantel, 21 Wis. 566.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

and not elsewhere, was a violation of the constitution, because pre-

[CH. xvn.

scribing an additional qualiﬁcation, namely, the presence of the

elector at the polls. All such reasonable regulations of the consti-

tutional right which seem to the legislature important to the pres-

ervation of order in elections, to guard against fraud, undue

inﬂuence, and oppression, and to preserve the purity of the ballot-

box, are not only within the constitutional power of the legislature,

but are commendable, and at least some of them absolutely essen-

tial. And where the law requires such a registry, and forbids the

reception of votes from any persons not registered, an election in a

township where no such registry has ever been made will be void,

and cannot be sustained by maki_ng proof that none in fact but

duly qualiﬁed electors have voted. It is no answer that such a

rule may enable the registry oﬁicers, by neglecting their duty, to

disfranchise the electors altogether; the remedy of the electors is

by proceedings to compel the performance of the duty; and the

statute, being imperative and mandatory, cannot be disregarded.‘

The danger, however, of any such misconduct on the part of officers

is comparatively small, when the duty is intrusted to those who

are chosen in the locality where the registry is to be made, and who

are consequently immediately responsible to those who are inter-

ested in being registered.
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All regulations of the elective franchise, however, must be rea-

sonahle, uniform, and impartial; they must not have for their

purpose directly or indirectly to deny or abridge the constitutional

right of citizens to vote, or unnecessarily to impede its exercise:

if they do, they must be declared void.“

‘ People v. Kopplekom, 16 Mich. 842.

' Capen v. Foster, 12 Pick. 488; Monroe v. Collins, 17 Ohio, N. 8. 665.

Under the Constitution of Ohio, the right of suffrage is guaranteed to “ white

male citizens ; ” and by a long series of decisions it was settled that persons hav-

ing a preponderance of white blood were “ white “ within its meaning. It was

also settled that judges of election were liable to an action for refusing to receive

the vote of a qualiﬁed elector. A legislature unfriendly to the construction of

the constitution above stated, passed an act which, while prescribing penalties

against judges of election who should refuse to receive or sanction the rejection

of a ballot from any person knowing him to have the qualiﬁcations of an elector,

concluded with a proviso that the act and the penalties thereto “ shall not apply

to clerks or judges of election for refusing to receive the votes of persons having

and not elsewhere, was a violation of the constitution, because prescribing an additional qualification, namely, the presence of the
elector at the polls. All such reasonable regulations of the constitutional right which seem to the legislature important to the preservation of order in elections, to guard against fraud, undue
influ~nce, and oppression, and to preserve the purity of the ballotbox, are not only within the constitutional power of the legislature,
but are commendable, and at least some of them absolutely essential. And where the law requires su~h a registry, and forbids the
reception of votes from any persons not registered, an election in a
township where no such registry has ever been made will be void,
and cannot be sustained by maki.ng proof that none in fact but
duly qualified electors have voted. It is no answer that such a
rqle may enable the registry officers, by neglecting their duty, to
disfranchise the electors altogether ; the remedy of the electors is
by proceedings to compel the performance of the duty ; and the
statute, being imperative and mandatory, cannot be disregarded. 1
The danger, however, of any such misconduct on the part of offiOOI"s
is comparatively small, when the duty is intrusted to those who
are chosen in the locality where the registry is to be made, and who
are consequently immediately responsible to those who are interested in being registered.
All regulations of the elective franchise, however, must be reasonable, uniform, and impartial ; they must not have for their
purpose directly or indirectly to deny or abridge the constitutional
right of citizens to vote, or unnecessarily to impede its exercise :
if they do, they must be declared void.3

a distinct and visible admixture of African blood, nor shall they be liable to

damages by reason of such rejection.” Other provisions of the act plainly dis-

criminated against the class of voters mention:-d, and it was held to be clearly
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People v. Kopplekom, 16 Mich. 842.
Capen "· Foster, 12 Pic~. 488; Monroe v. Collins, 17 Ohio, N. s. 665.
Under the Constitution of Ohio, the right of suffrage is guaranteed to " white
male citizens;" and by a long series of decisions it was settled that persons having a preponderance of white blood were "white " within its meaning. It was
also settled that judges of eleetion were liable to an action for refusing to rcceivP.
the vote of a qualified elector. A legi;lature unfriendly to the construct-ion of
the constitution above stated, passed no act which, while prescribing penalties
against judges of election who should refuse to receive or sanction the rt•jection
of a ballot from any person knowing him to have the qualifications of an elector,
concluded with a proviso that the act and the penalties thereto "shall not apply
to clerks or judges of election for refusing to reeeive the votes of persons having
a distinct and ,·bible admixture of African blood, nor shall they be liable to
damages by reason of such rejection." Other provisions of the act plainly discriminated against the class of voters mention(·d, and it was held to be clearly
1

1
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In some other cases preliminary action by the public authorities

may be requisite before any legal election can be held.

If an "‘ election is one which a municipality may hold or [* 603]

not at its option, and the proper municipal authority de-

cides against holding it, it is evident that individual citizens must

acquiesce, and that any votes which may be cast by them on the

assumption of right must be altogether nugatory} The same

would be true of an election to be held after proclamation for that

purpose, and which must fail if no such proclamation has been

made.” Where, however, both the time and the place of an elec-

tion are prescribed by law, every voter has a right to take notice of

the law, and to deposit his ballot at the time and place appointed,

notwithstanding the oﬂicer, whose duty it is to give notice of the

election, has failed in that duty. The notice to be thus given is

only additional to that which the statute itself gives, and is pre-

scribed for the purpose of greater publicity; but the right to hold

the election comes from the statute, and not from the oﬁicial notice.

It has therefore been frequently held that when ae vacancy exists in

an oﬁice, which the law requires shall be ﬁlled at the next general

election, the time and place of which are ﬁxed, and that notice of
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the general election shall also specify the vacancy to be ﬁlled, an

election at that time and place to ﬁll the vacancy will be valid, not-

withstanding the notice is not given; and such election cannot be

defeated by showing that a small portion only of the electors were

actually aware of the vacancy or cast their votes to ﬁll it.3 But

this would not be the case if either the time or the place were

unreasonable, partial, calculated to subvert or impede the exercise of the right

of suffrage by this class, and therefore void. Monroe v. Collins, supra.

‘ Opinions of Judges, 7 Mass. 525; Opinions of Judges, 15 Mass. 537.

1 People v. Porter, 6 Cal. 26; Mt-Kune v. Weller, 11 Cal. 49; People v. Mar-

tin, 12 Cal. 409; Jones v. State, 1 Kansas, 273; Barry v. Lauck, 5 Cold. 588.

' People v. Cowles, 13 N. Y. 350; People v. Brenahm, 3 Cal. 477; State v.

Jones, 19 Ind. 356; People v. Hartwell, 12 Mich. 508; Dishon v. Smith, 10

Iowa, 212; State v. Orvis, 20 Wis. 235; State v. Goetze, 22 Wis. 363. The

Case of Foster v. Scartf, 15 Ohio, N. s. 532, would seem to be contra. A gen-

eral election ivas to be held, at which by law an existing vacancy in the ofﬁce of

In some other cases preliminary action by the public authorities
may be requisite before any legal election can be held.
If an • election is one which a municipality may hold or [• 603]
not at its option, and the proper municipal authority decides against holding it, it is evident that individual citizens must
acquiesce, and that any votes which may be cast by them on the
assumption of right must be altogether nugatory. 1 The same
would be true of an election to be held after pro~lamation for that
purpose, and which must fail if no such proclamation has been
made.2 Where, however, both the time and the place of an election are prescribed by law, every voter has a right to take notice of
the law, and to deposit his ballot at the time and place appointed,
notwithstanding the officer, whose duty it is to give notice of the
election, has failed in that duty. The notice to be thus given is
only additional to that which the statute itself gives, and is prescribed for the purpose of greater publicity; but the right to hold
the election comes from the statute, and not from the official notice.
It has therefore been frequently held that when a- vacancy exists in
an office, which the law requires shall be filled at the next general
election, the time and place of which are fixed, and that notice of
the general election shall also specify the vacancy to be filled, an
election at that time and place to fill the vacancy will be valid, notwithstanding the notice is not given ; and such election cannot be
defeated by showing that a small portion only of the electors were
actually aware of the vacancy or cast their votes to fill it.3 But
this would not be the case if either the time or the place were

Judge of Probate was required to be ﬁlled. The sheriff, however, omitted all

mention of this oﬂice in his notice of election, and the voters generally were not

aware that a vacancy was to be ﬁlled. Nominations were made for the other

offices, but none for this, but a candidate presented himself for whom less than a

fourth of the voters taking part in the election cast ballots. It was held that the

election to ﬁll the vacancy was void.

[565]

unreasonable, partial, calculated to subvert or impede the exercise of the right
of suffrage by this class, and therefore void. Monroe "· Collins, supra.
1 Opinions of Judges, 7 Mass. 525; Opinions of Judges, 15 Mass. 5::17.
~ People"· Porter, 6 Cal. 26; McKune"· Weller, 11 Cal. 49; People"· Martin, 12 Cal. 409; Jones"· State, 1 Kansn.s, 273; Barry v. Lauck, 5 Cold. 588.
1 People "· Cowles, 13 N. Y. 350; People 11. Brenahm, 3 Cal. 477; ~tate 11.
Jones, 19 Ind. 356 ; People v. Hartwell, 12 Mich. 508; Dishon v. Smith, 10
Iowa, 212; State v. Orvis, 20 Wis. 285; State "· Goetze, 22 Wis. 368. The
Case of Foster "· Scarff, 15 Ohio, N. s. 532, would seem to be contra. A general election was to be held, at. which by law an existi.ng vacancy in the office of
Judge of Probate was required to be filled. The sheriff, however, omitted all
mention of this office in his notice of election, and the voters generally were not
aware that a vacancy was to be filled. Nominations were made for the other
offici's, but none for this, but a candidate presented himself for whom less than a
fourth of the voters taking part in the election cast ballots. It was held that the
election to fill the vacancy was void.

[ 665]
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not ﬁxed by law, so that notice became essential for that pur-

• 603

CONSTITUTIONAL LllfiTATIONS.

(CH. XVII.

pose}

[*60'-1] * The Manner of Exercising the Right.

The mode of voting in this country, at all general elections, is

almost universally by ballot.” “A ballot may be deﬁned to be a

not fixed by law, so that notice became essential for that purpose.1

piece of paper, or other suitable material,with the name written or

printed upon it of the person to be voted for; and where the suf-

frages are given in this form, each of the electors in person depos-

• The Manner of Exercising tlte Right.

its such a vote in the box, or. other receptacle provided for the

purpose, and kept by the proper ofﬁcers/’3 The distinguishing

feature of this mode of voting is, that every voter is thus enabled

to secure and preserve the most complete and inviolable secrecy in

regard to the persons for whom he votes, and thus escape the in-

ﬂuences which, under the system of oral suffrages, may be brought

to bear upon him with a view to overhear and intimidate, and thus

prevent the real expression of public sentiment.‘

' State v. Young, 4 Iowa, 561. An act had been passed for the incorporation

of the city of VVashington, and by its terms it was to be submitted to the people

on the 16th of the following February, for their acceptance or rejection, at an

election to be called and holden in the same manner as township elections under

the general law. The time of notice for the regular township elections was, by

law, to be determined by the trustees, but for the ﬁrst township meeting ﬁfteen
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days’ notice was made requisite. An election was holden, assumed to be under

the act in question; but no notice was given of it, except by the circulation, on

the morning of the election, of an extra newspaper containing a notice that an

election would be held on that day at a speciﬁed place. It was held that the

election was void. The act contemplated some notice before any legal vote

The mode of voting in this country, at all general elections, is
almost universally by ballot.2 " A ballot may be defined to be a
piece of paper, or other suitable material, with the name written or
printed upon it of the person to be voted for; and where the suffrages are given in this form, each of the electors in person deposits such a vote in the box, or. other receptacle provided for the
purpose, and kept by the proper officers." a The distinguishing
feature of this mode of voting is, that every voter is thus enabled
to secure and preserve the most complete and inviolable secrecy iu
regard to the persons for whom he votes, and thus escape the influences which, under the system of oral suffrages, may be brought
to bear upon him with a view to overbear and intimidate, and thus
prevent the real expression of public sentimmit.4

could be taken, and that which was given could not he considered any notice at

all. This case differs from all of those above cited, where vacancies were to .be

ﬁlled at a general election, and where the law itself would give to the electors

all the information which was requisite. In this case, although the time was

ﬁxed, the place was not; and, ifa notice thus circulated on the morning of elec-

tion could be held snfﬁcicnt, it might well happen that the elcctors generally

would fail to be informed, so that their right to vote might be exercised. See

also Barry v. Lauck, 5 Cold. 588.

’ The exceptions are in Virginia, Arkansas, Kentucky, Georgia, and possibly

by law in some other States.

' Cush. Leg. Assemb. § 103.

4 “In this country, and indeed in every country where oﬂiccrs are elective,

different modes have been adopted for the electors to signify their choice. The

most. common modes have been either by voting viva race, that is, by the elector

[ 666 ]

· State v. Young, 4 Iowa, 561. An act had been passed for the incorporation
of the city of Washington, and by its tenus it was to be submittt!d to the people
on the 16th of the following February, for their acceptance or rt'jection, at an
election to be called and holden in the same manner as township elections undf'r
the general law. The time of notice for the regular township elections was, by
law, to be determined by the trustees, but for the first township meeting fiftl·en
days' notice was made requisite. An election was holden, assumed to be under
the act in question ; but no notice was given of it, except by the circulation, on
the monting of the election, of an extra newspaper containing a notice that an
election would be held on that day at a specified place. It was held that the
election was void. The net contemplated B011U! notice before any IPgal ,·ote
could be taken, and that which was given could not be considered any notice at
all. This case differs from all of those above cited, where vacancit>s were to .be
filled at a general election, and where the law itself would give to the t'lectors
all the information which was requisite. In this case, although the time was
fixed, the place was not; and, if a notice thus circulated on the morning of election could be held sufficient, it might well happen that the eh•ctors generally
would fail to be informed, so that their right to vote might be exerl'ised. See
also Barry v. Lauck, 5 Cold. 588.
1 The exceptions are in Virginia, Arkansas, Kentucky, Georgi&, and possibly
by law in some other States.
1 Cush. Leg. Assemb. § 103.
4 "In this country, and indeed in every country where officers are Plecth·e,
different mode~ have been adopted for the eleetors to signi(v their choice. The
most common modes have been either by voting viva roce, that is, by the elector
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* In order to secure as perfectly as possible the beneﬁts [* 605]
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anticipated from this system, statutes have been passed,

in some of the States, which prohibit ballots being received or

counted unless tlre same are written or printed upon white paper,

without any marks or ﬁgures thereon intended to distinguish one

ballot from another.‘ These statutes are simply declaratory of a

constitutional principle that inheres in the system of voting by

ballot, and which ought to be inviolable whether declared or not.

In the absence of such a statute, all devices by which party man-

agers are enabled to distinguish ballots in the hand of the voter,

and thus determine whether he is voting for or against them, are

opposed to the spirit of the Constitution, inasmuch as they tend to

defeat the design for which voting by ballot is established, and,

though they may not render an election void, they are exceedingly

reprehensible, and ought to be discountenanced by all good citizens.

The system of ballot-voting rests upon the idea that every elector

is to be entirely at liberty to vote for whom he pleases and with

openly naming the person he designates for the oﬂice, or by ballot, which is

depositing in a box provided for the purpose a paper on which is the name of the

person he intends for the oﬁice. The principal object of this last mode is to

enable the elector to express his opinion secretly, without being subject to be

overawed, or to any ill-will or persecution on account of his vote for either
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of the candidates who may be before the public. The method of voting by

tablets in Rome was an example of this manner of voting. There certain

oﬁicers appointed for that purpose, called Diribitores, delivered to each voter as

many tablets as there were candidates, one of whose names was written upon

• In order to secure as perfectly as possible the benefits [* 605]
anticipated from this system, statutes have been passed,
in some of the States, which prohibit ballots being received or
counted unless tlre same are written or printed upon white paper,
without any marks or figures thereon intended to distinguish one
ballot from another.1 These statutes arc simply declaratory of a
constitutional principle that inheres in the system of voting by
ballot, and which ought to be inviolable whether declared or not.
In the absence of such a statute, all devices by which party managers are enabled to distinguish ballots in the hand of the voter,
and thus determine whether he is voting for or against them, are
opposed to the spirit of the Constitution, inasmuch as they tend to
defeat the design for which voting by ballot is established, and,
though they may not render an election void, they are exceedingly
reprehensible, and ought to be discountenanced by all good citizens.
The system of ballot-voting rests upon the idea that every elector
is to be entirely at liberty to vote for whom he pleases and with

every tablet. The voter put into a chest prepared for that purpose which of

these tablets he pleased, and they were afterwards taken out and counted.

Cicero deﬁnes tablets to be little billets, in which the people brought their suf-

frages. The clause in the constitution directing the election of the several

State oﬂicers was undoubtedly intended to provide that the election should

be made by this mode of voting to the exclusion of any other. In this

mode the freemen can individually express their choice, without being under

the necessity of publicly declaring the object of their choice; their collective

voice can be easily ascertained, and the evidence of it transmitted to the place

where their votes are to be counted, and the result declared with as little incon-

venience as possible.” Temple v. Mead, 4 Vt. 541. In this case it was held

that a printed ballot was within the meaning of the constitution which required

all ballots for certain State ofﬁcers to be “ fairly written.” To the same effect

is Henshaw v. Foster, 9 Pick. 312.

‘ See People v. Kilduff, 15 Ill. 500. In this case it was held that the common

lines on ruled paper did not render the ballots void. See also Druliner v. State,

29 Ind. 308.

- [ sew ]

openly naming the person he designates for the office, or by ballot, which is
depositing in a box provided for the purpose a paper on which is the name of the
person he intends for the office. The principal object of thia last mode is to
enable the elector to express his opinion secretly, without being subject to be
overawed, or to any ill-lYill or persecution on account of his vote for either
of the candidates who may be before the public. The method of voting by
tableta in Rome was an example of this manner of voting. There certain
officers appointed for that purpose, called IJiribitoree, delivered to each voter as
many tablets as there were candidates, one of whose names wa11 written upon
every tablet. The voter put into a chest prepared for that purpose which of
these tablets he pleased, and they were afterwards taken out and counted.
Cicero defines tablets to be little billets, in which the people brought their suffrages. The clause in the constitution directing the election of the several
State officers was undoubtedly intended to provide that the clecdon should
be made by this mode of voting to the exclusion of any other. In this
mode the freemen can individually express their choice, without being under
the necessity of publicly declaring the object of their choice; their collective
voice can be easily ascertained, and the evidence of it transmitted to the place
where their votes are to be counted, and the result declared with as little inconvenience as possible." Temple v. Mead, 4 Vt. 541. In this case it was held
that a pri11ted ballot was within the meaning of the constitution which required
all ballots for certain State officers to be .. fairly written." To the same effect
is Henshaw v. Foster, 9 Pick. 312.
1 See People v. Kilduff, 15 Ill. 500.
In this case it was held that the common
lines on ruled paper did not render the ballots void. See also Druliner v. State,
29 Ind. 308.
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what party he pleases, and that no one is to have the right, or be

• 605

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

[ca. xvn.

in position, to question him for it, either then or at any subsequent

time.‘ The courts have held that a voter, even in case of a con-

tested election, cannot be compelled to disclose for whom he

voted; and for the same reason we think others who may acci-

dentally, or by trick or artiﬁce, have acquired knowledge

[* 606] on the subject, should not be allowed to testify ‘ to such

knowledge, or to give any information in the courts upon

the subject. Public policy requires that the veil of secrecy should

be impenetrable, unless the voter himself voluntarily determines

to lift it;2 his ballot is absolutely privileged; and to allow evidence

of its contents, when he has not waived the privilege, is to encour-

age trickery and fraud, and would in effect establish this remark-

able anomaly, that, while the law from motives of public policy

establishes the secret ballot with a view to conceal the elector’s ae-

tion, it at the same time encourages a system of espionage, by

means of which the veil of secrecy may be penetrated and the

voter’s action disclosed to the public.“

‘ “ The right to vote in this manner has usually been considered an important

and. valuable safeguard of the independence of the humble citizen against the

inﬂuence which wealth and station might be supposed to exercise. This object

would be accomplished but very imperfectly if the privacy supposed to be secured
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was limited to the moment of depositing the ballot. The spirit of the system

requires that the elector should be secured then and at all times thereafter against

reproach or animadversion, or any other prejudice on account of having voted

according to his own unbiassed judgment; and that security is made to consist

in shutting up within the privacy of his own mind all knowledge of the manner in

what party be pleases, an~ that no one is to have the right, or be
in position, to question him for it, either then or at any subsequent
time. 1 The courts have held that a voter, even in case of a contested election, cannot be compelled to disclose for whom he
voted ; and for the same reason we think others who may accidentally, or by trick or artifice, have acquired knowledge
[• 606] on the subject, should not be allowed to testify • to such
knowledge, or to give any information in the courts upon
the subject. Public policy requires that the veil of secrecy should
be impenetrable, unless the voter himself voluntarily determines
to lift it; 2 his ballot is absolutely privileged; and to allow evidence
of its contents, when he has not waived the privilege, is to encourage trickery and fraud, and would in effect establish this remarkable anomaly, that, while the law from motives of public policy
establishes the secret ballot with a view to conceal the elector's action, it at the same time encourages a system of espionage, by
means of which the veil of secrecy may be penetrated and the
voter's action disclosed to the public.a

which. he has bestowed his suifrage.” Per Dcnio, Ch. J ., in People 0. Pease,

27 N. Y. 81.

' “ The ballot," says Cicero, “is dear to the people, for it uncovers men"s

faces, and conceals their thoughts. It gives them the opportunity of doing what

they like, and of promising all that they are asked.” Speech in defence of

Plaucius. Forsyth’s Cicero, Vol. I. p. 339.

' See this subject fully considered in People v. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 283. A very

loose system prevails in the contests over legislative elections, and it has been

held that when a voter refuses to disclose for whom he voted, evidence is admis-

sible of the general reputation of the political character of the» voter, and as to

the party to which he belonged at the time of the election. Cong. Globe, XVI.

App. 456. This is assuming that the voter adheres strictly to party, and always

votes the “straight ticket;” an assumption which may not be a very violent

one in the majority of cases, but which is scarcely creditable to the manly inde-

pendence and self-reliance of any free people; and however strongly disposed

legislative bodies may be to act upon it, we are not prepared to see any such

[ ass] .

"The right to vote in this manner has usually been considered an important
and valuable safeguard of the independence of the bumble citizen against the
influence which wealth and station might be supposed to exercise. This object
would be accomplished but very imperfectly if the privacy supposed to be secured
was limited to the moment of depositing the ballot. The spirit of the system
requires that the elector should be secured then and at all times thereafter against
reproach or animadversion, or any other prejudice on account of having voted
according to his own unbiassed judgment; and that security is made to consist
in shutting up within the privacy of his own mind all knowledge of the manner in
which. ~e has bestowed his suffrage." Per D~io, Ch. J., in People 11. Pease,
'1.7 N.Y. 81.
1 " The ballot," says Cicero, " is dear to the people, for it uncovers men's
faces, and conceals their thoughts. It gives them the opportunity of doing what
they like, and of promising all that they are asked." Spee<.'h in defen<.'C of
Plaucius. Forsyth's Cicero, Vol. I. p. HS9.
1 See this subject fully considered in People "· Cicotte, 16 Mich. 283. A very
loose system prevails in the conksts over legislative elections, and it bas been
held that when a voter rt'fuses to disclose for whom be voted, evidem:e is admissible of the general reputation of the political character of the voter, and as to
the party to which he belonged at the time of the election. Cong. Globe, XVI.
App. 456. This is assuming that the voter adheres strictly to party, and always
votes the " straight ticket; " au assumption which may not be a very ,·iolent
one in the majority of cases, but which is scarcely creditable to the manly independence and self-reliance of any 1i-ee people; and however strongly disposed
legislative bodies may be to act upon it, we are ~ot prepared to sec any such
1
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Every ballot should be complete in itself, and ought not to re-
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THE EXPRESSION OF THE POPULAR WILL.

quire extensive evidence to enable the election officer to

determine * the voter’s intention. Perfect certainty, how- [* 607]

ever, is not required in these cases. It is sufficient if an

examination leaves no reasonable doubt upon the intention, and

technical accuracy is never required in any case. The cardinal

rule is to give effect to the intention of the voter, whenever it is not

left in uncertainty ;1 but if an ambiguity appears upon 1' _

elector cannot be received as a witness to make it gooduloﬂ yﬂzl

,._

ing for whom or forwhat oﬁice he intended to vote? ,5,“ "“,-

The ballot in no case should contain more names than are au-

thorized to be voted for, for any particular ofﬁce at that election;

rule of evidence adopted by the courts. If a voter chooses voluntarily to exhibit

his ballot publicly, perhaps there is no reason why those to whom it was shown

should not testify to its contents; but in other cases the knowledge of its con-

tents is his own exclusive property, and he can neither be compelled to part

with it, nor, as we think, is any one else who accidentally or surreptitiously

becomes possessed of it, or to whom the ballot has been shown with a view to

Every ballot should be complete in itself, and ought not to require extensive evidence to enable the election officer to
determine • the voter's intention. Perfect certainty, how- [* 607]
ever, is not required in these cases. It is sufficient if an
examination leaves no reasonable doubt upon the intention, and
technical accuracy is never required in any case. The cardinal
rule is to give effect to the intention of the voter, whenever it is not
left in uncertainty; 1 but if an ambiguity appears upon~
~lector cannot be received as a wit~ess to make it gooqV}f~-e'\
mg for whom or for·what office he mtended to vote.2
..t._,t.1, .... · ' ·Jt-,..
The ballot in no case should contain more names than are
thorized to be voted for, for any particular office at that election;
~J.,lf\'t;

au-

information, advice, or alteration, at liberty to make the disclosure. Such third

person might be guilty of no legal olfence if he should do so; but he is certainly

invading the constitutional privileges of his neighbor, and we are aware of no
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sound principle of law which will justify a court in compelling or even permitting

him to testify to what he has seen. And as the law does not compel a voter to

testify, “ surely it cannot be so inconsistent with itself as to authorize a judicial

inquiry upon a particular subject, and at the same time industriously provide for

the concealment of the only material facts upon which the results of such an

inquiry must depend.” Per Denio, Ch. J., in People v. Pease, 27 N. Y. 81. It

was held in People v. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 283, that until it was distinctly shown

that the elector waived his privilege of secrecy, any evidence as to the character

or contents of his ballot was inadmissible. It was also held that where a voter’s

qualiﬁcation was in question, but his want of right to vote was not conceded, the

privilege was and must be the same; as otherwise any person’s ballot might be

inquired into by simply asserting his want of qualiﬁcation. In State v. Olin,

23 lVis. 319, it was decided that where persons who had voted at an election

had declined to testify concerning their qualiﬁcations, and how they had voted,

it was competent to prove their declarations that they were unnaturalized for-

eigners, and had voted a particular way.

‘ People v. Matteson, 17 Ill. 169; People v. Cook, 8 N. Y. 67; State v.

Elwood, 12 \Vis. 551; People v. Bates, 11 Mich. 362.

' People v. Seaman, 5 Denio, 409. The mental purpose of an elector is not

provable; it must be determined by his acts. People v. Saxton, 22 N. Y. 309.

And where the intent is to be gathered from the ballot, it is a question of law,

and cannot be submitted to the jury as one of fact. People v. Me-Manus, 34

Barb. 620.

[669]

rule of evidence adopted by the courts. If a voter chooses voluntarily to exhibit
his ballot publicly, perhaps there is no reason why those to whom it was shown
should not testify to its contents; but in other cases the knowledge of its contents is his own exclusive property, and he can neither be compelled to part
with it, nor, as we think, is any one else who accidentally or surreptitiously
becomes possessed of it, or to whom the ballot has been shown with a view to
information, advice, or alteration, at liberty to make the disclosure. Such third
person might be guilty of no legal offence if he should do so ; but he is certainly
invading the constitutional privileges of his neighbor, and we are aware of no
sound principle of law which will justify a court in compelling or even permitting
him to testify to what he has seen. And as the law does not compel a voter to
testify, " surely it cannot be so inconsbtent with itself as to authorize a judicial
inquiry upon a particular subject, and at the same time industriously provide for
the conct:alment of the only ma~rial facts upon which the results of such an
inquiry must depend." Per Denio, Ch. J., in People v. Pease, 27 N. Y. 81. It
was held in People v. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 283, that until it was distinctly shown
that the elector waived his privilege of secrecy, any evidence as to the character
or contents of his ballot was inadmissible. It was also held that where a voter's
qualification was in question, but his want of right to vote was not conceded, the
privilege was and must be the same; as otherwise any person's ballot might be
inqu1red into by simply asserting his want of qualification. In State v. Olin,
23 Wis. 319, it was decided that where persons who had voted at an election
had declined to testify concerning their qualifications, and how they had voted,
it was competent to prove their declarations that they were unnaturalized foreigners, and had voted a particular way.
1 People v. Matteson, 17 Ill. 169; People v. Cook, 8 N. Y. 67; State v.
Elwood, 12 Wis. 551; People~'· Bates, 11 Mich. 362.
1 People v. Seaman, 5 Denio, 409.
The mental purpose of an elector is not
provable; it must be determined by his acts. People v. Saxton, 22 N.Y. 309.
And where the intent is to be gathered from the ballot, it is a question of law,
and cannot be submitted to the jury as one of fact. People v. McManus, 84
Barb. 620.
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and, if it should, it must be rejected for the obvious impossibility
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of the canvassing otﬁcers choosing from among the names on the

ballot, and applying the ballot to some to the exclusion of others.

The choice must be made by the elector himself, and be expressed

by the ballot. Accordingly, where only one supervisor was to be

chosen, and a ballot was deposited having upon it the names of two

persons for that oﬁice, it was held that it must be rejected for am-

biguity} It has been decided, however, that if a voter shall write

a name upon a printed ballot, in connection with the title to an

oﬁice, this is such a designation of the name written for that ofﬁce

as sufﬁciently to demonstrate his intention, even though he omit to

strike off the printed name of the opposing candidate. The writing

in such a case, it is held, ought to prevail as the highest evidence

of the voter’s intention, and the failure to strike off the printed

name will be regarded as an accidental oversight.”

‘ People v. Seaman, 5 Denio, 409. See also Attorney-General v. Ely, 4Wis.

420; People v. Loomis, 8W'end. 396; People v. Cook, 14 Barb. 259, and 8 N. Y.

67. Such a vote, however, could not be rejected as to candidates for other oﬂices

regularly named upon the ballot; it would be void only as to the particular oﬁice

for which the duplicate ballot was cast. Attorney-General v. Ely. 4 \Vis. 420.

If the name of a candidate for an oﬂice is given more than once, it is proper to

count it as one ballot, instead of rejecting it as illegally thrown. People v.
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Holden, 28 Cal. 123.

and, if it should, it must be rejected for the obvious impossibility
of the canvassing officers choosing from among the names on the
ballot, and applying the ballot to some to the exclusion of others.
The choice must be made by the elector himself, and be expressed
by the ballot. Accordingly, where only one supervisor was to be
chosen, and a ballot was deposited having upon it the names of two
persons for that office, it was held that it must be rejected for ambiguity.I It has been decided, however, that if a voter shall write
a name upon a printed ballot, in connection with the title to an
office, this is such a designation of the name written for that office
as sufficiently to demonstrate his intention, even though he omit to
.strike off ~he printed name of the opposing candidate. The writing
in such a case, it is held, ought to prevail as the highest evidence
of the voter's intention, and the failure to strike off the printed
name will be regarded as an accidental oversight.2

’ People v. Saxton, 22 N. Y. 309. This ruling suggests this query : Suppose

at an election where printed slips containing the names of candidates, with a

designation of the oﬁice, are supplied to voters, to be pasted over the names of

opposing candidates, -- as is very common. — a ballot should be found in the box

containing the names of a candidate for one oﬂice.—say the county clerk,—with

a designation of the oﬁice pasted over the name of a candidate for some other

oﬁice,—say coroner; so that the ballot would contain the name of two persons

for county clerk, and of none for coroner. In such a case, is the slip the highest

evidence of the intention of the voter as to who should receive his suffrage for

county clerk, and must it be counted for that office? And if so, then does not

the ballot also show the intention of the elector to cast his vote for the person for

coroner whose name is thus accidentally pasted over, and should it not be counted

for that person? The case of People v. Saxton would seem to be opposed to

People v. Seaman, 5 Denio, 409, where the court refused to allow evidence to be

given to explain the ambiguity occasioned by the one name being placed upon

the ticket, without the other being erased. “ The intention of the elector cannot

be thus inquired into, when it is opposed or hostile to the paper ballot which he

has deposited in the ballot-box. We might with the same propriety permit it to

be proved that he intended to vote for one man, when his ballot was cast for

another; a. species of proof not to be tolerated." Per Whitllcsay, J . The

case of People v. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 283, is also opposed to People v. Saxton.

[670]

1 People v. Seaman, 5 Denio, 409.
See also Attorney-Generalr1. Ely, 4 Wis.
420; People "·Loomis, 8 Wend. 896; People v. Cook, 14 Barb. 259, and 8 N.Y.
67. Such a vote, however, could not be rejected as to candidates for other offices
regularly named upon the ballot; it would be void only as to the particular office
for which the duplicate ballot was cast. Attorney-General 11. Ely, 4 'Vis. 420.
If the name of a candidate for an office is given more than once, it is proper to
count it as one ballot, instead of rejecting it as illegally thrown. People 11.
Holden, 28 Cal. 128.
1 People v. Saxton, 22 N.Y. 809.
This ruling suggests this query: Suppose
at an election where printed slips containing the names of candidates, with a
designation of the office, are supplied to voters, to be pasted over the names of
opposing candidates,- as is very common,- a ballot should be found in the box
containing the names of a candidate for one office,- say the county clerk,- with
a designation of the office pasted over the name of a candidate for some other
office, -say coroner; so that the ballot would contain the name of two persons
for county clerk, and of none for c.:oroner. In such a case, is the slip the highest
evidence of the intention of the voter as to who should receive his suffrage for
county clerk, and must it be counted for that office? And if so, then does not
the ballot also show the intention of the elector to cast his vote for the person for
coroner whose name is thus accidentally pasted over, and should it. not be counted
for that person? The case of People tl. Saxton would seem to be opposed to
People tl. Seaman, 5 Denio, 409, where the court refused to allow evidence to be
given to explain the ambiguity occasioned by the one name being placed upon
the ticket, without the other being erased. "The intention of the elector cannot
be thus inquired into, when it is opposed or hostile to the paper ballot which he
has deposited in the ballot-box. We might 'vith the same propriety pem1it it to
be proved that he intended to vote for one man, when his ballot was ~·ast for
another; a species of proof not to be tolerated." Per Whittlesay, J. The
case of People tl. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 283, is also opposed to People "· Saxton.
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and ought to be given fully. Errors in spelling, however,

will not defeat the ballot, if the sound is the same ;1 nor abbrevia-

tions,2 if such as are in common use and generally understood, so

that there can be no reasonable doubt of the intent. And it would

seem that where a ballot is cast which contains only the initials of

the Christian name of the candidate, it ought to be sufficient, as it

designates the person voted for with the same certainty which is

commonly met with in contracts and other private writings, and

the intention of the voter cannot reasonably be open to any

doubt.” As the law knows only * one Christian name, the [* 609]

In the Michigan case a slip for the office of sheriff was pasted over the name of

the candidate for another county office, so that the ballot contained the names

of two candidates for sheriff. It was argued that the slip should be counted as

the best evidence of the voter’s intention; but the court held that the ballot

could be counted for neither candidate, because of its ambiguity.

‘ People v. Mayworm, 5 Mich. 146; Attorney-General v. Ely, 4 ‘Via. 430.

• The name on the ballot should be clearly expressed, [* 608]
and ought to be given fully. Errors in spelling, however,
wi,ll not defeat the ballot, if the sound is the same ; 1 nor abbreviations,2 if such as are in common use and generally understood, so
that there can be no reasonable doubt of the intent. And it would
seem that where a ballot is cast which contains only the initials of
the Christian name of the candidate, it ought to be sufficient, as it
designates the person voted for with the same cer.tainty which is
commonly met with in contracts and other private writings, and
the intention of the voter cannot reasonably be open to any
doubt. 8 As the law knows only • one Christian name, the [* 609]

' People v. Furguson, 8 Cow. 102. See also, upon this subject, People v.

Cook, 14 Barb. 259, and 8 N. Y. 67; and People v. Tisdale, 1 Doug. (Mich.)

65.

-‘ In People v. Furguson, 8 Cow. 102, it was held, that, on the trial of a con-

tested election case before a jury, ballots cast for H. F. Yates should be counted
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for Henry F. Yates, if, under the circumstances, the jury were of the opinion

they were intended for him; and to arrive at that intention, it was competent to

prove that he generally signed his name H. F. Yates; that he had before held

the same ofﬁce for which these votes were cast, and was then a candidate again;

that the people generally would apply the abbreviation to him, and that no

other person was known in the county to whom it would apply. This ruling was

followed in People v. Seaman, 6 Denio, 409, and in People v. Cook, 14 Barb.

259, and 8 N. Y. 67. The courts also held, in these cases, that the elector

voting the defecting ballot might give evidence to enable the jury to apply it, and

might testify that he intended it for the candidate the initials of whose name he

had given. In Attomey-General v. Ely, 4 \Vis. 429, a rule somewhat different

was laid down. In that case, Matthew H. Carpenter was candidate for the ofﬁce

of prosecuting attorney; and besides the perfect ballots there were others, cast

for “ D. M. Carpenter," “ M. D. Carpenter,” “ M. T. Carpenter," and “ Carpen-

ter.” The jury found that there was no lawyer in the county by the name of

D. M. Carpenter, M. D. Carpenter, M. T. Carpenter, or whose surname was

Carpenter, except the relator, Matthew H. Carpenter; that the relator was a

practising attorney of the county, and eligible to the office, and that the votes

above mentioned were all given and intended by the electors for the relator.

The court say: “ How was the intention of the voter to be ascertained? By

reading the name on the ballot, and ascertaining who was meant and intended by

that name? Is no evidence admissible to show who was intended to be voted

for under the various appellations, except such evidence as is contained in the

[611]

In the :Michigan case a slip for the office of sheriff was pasted over the name of
the candidate for another county office, so that the ballot contained the names
of two candidates for sheriff. It was argued that the slip should be counted as
the be11t evidence of the voter's intention; but the court held that the ballot
could be counted for neither candidate, because of its ambiguity.
1 People 11. Mayworm, 5 Mich. 146; Attorney-General 11. Ely, 4 Wis. 430.
1 People v. Furguson, 8 Cow. 102.
See also, upon this subject, People 11.
Cook, 14 Barb. 259, and 8 N.Y. 67; and People 11. Tisdale, 1 Doug. (1\Iich.)
65.
3 In People 11. :J:t~urguson, 8 Cow. 102, it was held, that, on the trial of a contested election case before a jury, ballots cast for H. F. Yates should be counted
for Henry F. Yates, if, under the circumstances, the jury were of the opinion
they were intended for him; and to arrive at that intention, it was competent to
prove that he generally signed his name H. F. Yates ; that he bad before held
the same office for which these votes were cast, and was then a candidate again;
that the people generally would apply the abbreviation to him, and that no
other person was known in the county to whom it would apply. This ruling was
followed in People 11. Seaman, o Denio, 409, and in People "· Cook, 14 Barb.
259, and 8 N. Y. 67. The courts also held, in these cases, that the elector
voting the defecting ballot might give evidence to enable the jury to apply it, and
might testify that he intended it for the candidate the initials of whose name he
bad given. In Attorney-General v. Ely, 4 Wis. 429, a rule somewhat different
was laid down. In that case, Matthew H. Carpenter was candidate for the office
of prosecuting attorney; and besides the perfect ballots there were others, cast
for •• D. M. Carpenter," "M.D. Carpenter," "M. T. Carpenter,'' and" Carpenter." The jury found that t.here was no lawyer in the county by the name of
D. M. Carpenter, M. D. Carpenter, M. T. Carpenter, or whose Eumame was
Carpenter, except the relator, Matthew H. Carpenter; that the relator wa!! a
practising attorney of the county, and eligible to the office, and that the votes
above mentioned were all given and intended by the electors for the relator.
The court say : " How was the intention of the voter to be ascertained ? By
reading the name on the ballot, and ascertaining who was meant and intended by
that name ? Is no evidence admissible to show who was intended to be voted
for under the various appellations, except such evidence as is contained in the
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giving of an initial to a middle name when the party has

(CH. XVII.

[* 610] none, or the giving of a wrong initial, will * not render the

ballot itself? Or may you gather the intention of the voter from the ballot, ex-

plained by the surrounding circumstances, from facts of a general public nature

giving of an initial to a middle name when the party has
[• 610] none, or the giving of a wrong initial, will • not render the

connected with the election, and the different candidates which may aid you in

coming to the right conclusion? These facts and circumstances might, perhaps,

be adduced so clear and strong as to lead irresistibly to the inference that a vote

given for Carpenter was intended to be cast for Matthew H. Carpenter. A con-

tract may be read by the light of the surrounding circumstances, not to contra-

dict it, but in order more perfectly to understand the intent and meaning of the

parties who made it. By analogous principles, we think that these facts, and

others of like nature connected with the election, could be given in evidence, for

the purpose of aiding the jury in determining who was intended to be voted for.

In New York, courts have gone even farther than this, and held, that not only

facts of public notoriety might be given in evidence to show the intention of the

elector, but that the elector who cast the abbreviated ballot may be sworn as to

who was intended by it. People v. Ferguson, 8 Cow. 102. But this is pushing

the doctrine to a great extent; further, we think, than consideration of public

policy and the well-being of society will warrant; and to restrict the rule, and

say that the jury must determine from an inspection of the ballot itself, from the

letters upon it, aside from all extraneous facts, who was intended to be desig-

nated by the ballot, is establishing a principle unnecessarily cautious and limited.
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In the present case, the jury, from the evidence before them, found that the votes

[above described] were, when given and cast, intended, by the electors who gave

and cast the same respectively, to be given and cast for Matthew H. Carpenter,

the relator. Such being the case, it clearly follows that they should be counted

for him.” See also State v. Elwood, 12 Wis. 551; and People v. Pease, 27 N. Y.

84, per Denio, Ch. J.

On the other hand, it was held, in Opinions of Judges, 38 Maine, 559, that

votes could not be counted for a person of a different name from that expressed

by the ballot, even though the only difference consisted in the initial to the mid-

dle name. But see People v. Cook, 14 Barb. 259, and 8 N. Y. 67. And in

People u. Tisdale, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 65, followed, in People v. Higgins, 3 Mich.

233, it was held that no extrinsic evidence was admissible in explanation or sup-

port of the ballot; and that, unless it showed upon its face for whom it was

designed, it must be rejected. And it was also held, that a ballot for “J. A.

Dyer ” did not show, upon its face, that it was intended for the candidate James

A. Dyer, and therefore could not be counted with the ballots cast for him by his

full name. This rule is convenient of application, but it probably defeats the

intention of the electors in every case to which it is applied, where the rejected

votes could inﬂuence the result,—an intention, too, which we think is so ap-

parent on the ballot itself, that no person would be in real doubt concerning it.

In People v. Pease, 27 N. Y. 64, in which Moses M. Smith was a candidate for

county treasurer, Seldcn, J ., says: “ According to well-settled rules, the board

of canvassers erred in refusing to allow to the relator the nineteen votes given

for Moses Smith and M. M. Smith ; ” and although we think this doctrine cor-

rect, the cases he cites in support of it (8 Cow. 102, and 5 Denio, 409) would

[ 672 ]
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ballot itself? Or may you gather the intention of the voter from the ballot, explained by the surrounding circumstances, from facta of a general public nature
connected with the election, and the different candidates which may aid you in
coming to the right conclusion? These facts and circumstances might, perhaps,
be adduced so clear and strong as to lead irresistibly to the inference that a vote
given for Carpt>nter was intended to be cast for Matthew H . Carpenter. A con·
tract may be read by the light of the surrounding circumstances, not to contradict it, but in order more perfectly to understand the intent and meaning of the
parties who made it. By analogous principles, we think that these facts, and
others of like nature connected with the election, could be given in evidence, for
the purpose of aiding the jury in determining who was intended to be voted for.
In New York, courts have gone even farther than this, and held, that not only
facts of public notoriety might be given in evidence to show the intention of the
elector, but that the elector who cast the abbreviated ballot may be sworn as to
who was intended by it. People"· Ferguson, 8 Cow. 102. But this is pushing
the doctrine to a great extent; further, we think, than consideration of public
policy and the well-being of society will warrant; and to restrict the rule, and
say that the jury must determine from an inspection of the ballot itself, from the
letters upon it, aside from all extraneous facts, who was intended to be designated by the ballot, is establishing a principle unnecessarily r.autious and limited.
In the present case, the jury, from the evidence before them, found that the votes
[above described] were, when given and cast, intended, by the electors who gave
and cast the same respectively, to be given and cast for Matthew H. Carpenter,
the relator. Such being the case, it clearly follows that they should be counted
for him." See also State"· Elwood, 12 Wis. 551; and People"· Pease, 27 N.Y.
84, per Denio, Ch. J.
On the other hand, it was held, in Opinions of Judges, 38 :Maine, 559, that
votes could not be counted for a person of a different name from that expressed
by the ballot, even though the only difference consisted in the initial to the middle name. But see People "·Cook, 14 Barb. 259, and 8 N.Y. 67. And in
People"· Tisdale, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 65, followed, in People v. Higgins, 3 Mich.
233, it was held that no extrinsic evidence was admissible in explanation or support of the ballot; and that, unless it showed upon ita face for whom it wu
designed, it must be rejected. And it was also held, that a ballot for "J. A.
Dyer" did not show, upon its face, that it was intended for the candidate James
A. Dyer, and therefore could not be counted with the blillots cast for him by his
full name. This rule is convenient of application, but it probably defeats the
intention of the electors in every case to which it is applit•d, where the rejected
votes could influence the result, - an intention, too, which we think 1s so apparent on the b11.llot itself, that no perkon would be in real doubt concerning it.
In People"· Pease, 27 N.Y. 64, in which Moses M. Smith was a candidate for
county treasurer, Selden, J., says: "According to well-settled rules, the board
of canvassers erred in refusing to allow to the relator the nineteen votes given
for Moses Smith and l\1. M. Smith ; " and although we think this doctrine correct, the cases be cites in support of it (8 Cow. 102, and f> Denio, 409) would
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ballot nugatory;1 nor will a failure to give the addition to a
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name—such as “Junior”—render it void, as that is a mere

matter of description, not constituting a part of the name,

and if given erroneously may be treated as surplusage.2 But

only warrant a jury, not the canvassers, in allowing them; or, at least, those cast

for M. M. Smith. The case of People v. Tisdale was again followed in People

v. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 283; the majority of the court, however, expressing the

opinion that it was erroneous in principle, but that it had (for twenty-ﬁve years)

ballot nugatory ; 1 nor will a failure to give the addition to a
name- such as "Junior''- render it >oid, as that is a mere
matter of description, not constituting a part of the name,
and if given erroneously may be treated as surplusage.2 But

been too long the settled law of the State to be disturbed, unless by the legis-

lature.

' People v. Cook, 14 Barb. 259, 8 N. Y. 67. But see Opinions of Judges,

38 Maine, 597.

' People v. Cook, 14 Barb. 259, and 8 N. Y. 67. In this case, the jury found,

as matter of fact, that ballots given for Benjamin Welch were intended for Ben-

jamin Welch, Jr.; and the court held, that, as a matter of law, they should

have been counted for him. It was not decided, however, that the canvassers

were at liberty to allow the votes to Benjamin \vVelch, Jr. ; and the judge, deliv-

ering the prevailing opinion in the Court of Appeals, says (p. 81), that the State

canvassers cannot be charged with error in refusing to add to the votes for Ben-

jamin Welch, J r., those which were given for Benjamin VVelch, without the junior.

“ They had not the means which the court possessed, on the trial of this issue, of

obtaining, by evidence aliunde, the several county returns, the intention of the
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voters, and the identity of the candidate with the name on the defective ballots.

Their judicial power extends no further than to take notice of such facts of pub-

lic notoriety as that certain well’ known abbreviations are generally used to

designate particular names, and the like." So far as this case holds, that the can-

vassers are not chargeable with error in not counting the ballots with the name

Benjamin VVelch for Benjamin Welch, J r., it is, doubtless, correct. But suppose

the canvassers had seen ﬁt to do so, could the court hold they were guilty of

usurpation in thus counting and allowing them? Could not the canvassers take

notice of such facts of general public notoriety as everybody else would take

notice of P Or must they shut their eyes to facts which all other persons must

see? The facts are these: Benjamin Welch, Jr., and James M. Cook are the

candidates, and the only candidates, for State Treasurer. These facts are noto-

rious, and the two political parties make determined efforts to elect one or the

other. Certain votes are cast for Benjamin Welch, with the descriptive word

“junior ” omitted. The name is correct, but, as thus given, it may apply to some

one else; but it would be to a person notoriously not a candidate. Under these

circumstances, when the facts of which it would be necessary to take notice have

occurred under their own supervision, and are universally known, so that the

result of a contest in the courts could not be doubtful, is there any reason why

the canvassers should not take notice of these facts, count the votes which a jury

would subsequently be compelled to count, and thus save the delay, expense,

vexation, and confusion of a contest? lf their judicial power extends to a deter-

mination of what are common and well-known abbreviations, and what names

spelled differently are idem sonans, why may it not also extend to the facts, of

43 [ 613 ]

only warrant a jury, not the canvassers, in allowing them; or, at least, those cast
for M. M. Smith. The case of People v. Tisdale was again followed in People
v. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 283; the majority of the court, however, expressing the
opinion that it was erroneous in principle, but that it bad (for twenty-five years)
been too long the settled law of the State to be disturbed, unless by the legislature.
1 People v. Cook, 14 Barb. 259, 8 N.Y. 67.
But see Opinions of Judges,
38 Maine, 597.
1 People v. Cook, 14 Barb. 259, aml8 N.Y. 67.
In this case, the jury found,
as matter of fact, that ballots given for Benjamin Welch were intended for Benjamin Welch, Jr.; and the court held, that, as a matter of law, they should
have been counted for him. It was not decided, however, that the canvassers
were at liberty to allow the votes to Benjamin Welch, Jr.; and the judge, delivering the prevailing opinion in the Court of Appeals, says (p. 81), that the State
can"\·assers cannot be charged with error in refusing to add to the votes for Benjamin Welch, Jr., those which were given for Benjamin 'Velcb, without the junior.
"They bad not the means which the court posses3ed, on the trial of this issue, of
obtaining, by evidence aliunde, the several county returns, the intention of the
voters, aud the identity of the candidate with the name on the defective ballots.
Their judicial power extends no further than to take notice of such facts of public notoriety as that certain well known abbreviations are generally used to
designate particular names, and the like." So far as this case holds, that the canvassers are not chargeable with error in not counting the ballots with the name
Benjamin Welch for Benjamin Welch, Jr., it is, doubtless, correct. But suppose
the canvassers had seen fit to do so, could the court hold they were guilty of
usurpation in thus counting and allowing thl!m P Could not the canvassers take
notice of such facts of general public notoriety as everybody else would take
notice of? Or must they shut their eyes to facts which all other persons must
see? The facts are these: Benjamin Welch, Jr., and James M. Cook are the
candidates, and the only candidates, for State Treasurer. These facts are notorious, and the two political. parties make detennined efforts to elect one or the
other. Certain votes are cast for Benjamin Welch, with the descriptive word
"junior" omitted. The name is correct, but, as thus given, it may apply to some
one else; but it would be to a person notoriously not a candidate. Under these
circumstances, when the facts of which it would be necessary to take notice have
occurred under their own supervision, and are universally known, so that the
result of a contest in the courts could not be doubtful, is there any reason why
the canvassers should not take notic~ of these facts, count the votes which a jury
would subs~quently be coll}pelled to count, and thus save the delay, ~xpcnse,
vexation, and confusion of a contest? lf their judicial power extends to a determination of what are common and well-known abbreviations, and what names
spelltd differently are idem sonans, why may it not also extend to the facts, of
43
[ 673]

* 610 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [c11. xvn.

• 610

\

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

[CH. XVII •

[* 611] where the *name upon the ballot is altogether different

from that of a candidate, and not the same in sound and

not a mere abbreviation, the evidence of the voter cannot be re-

ceived to show for whom it was intended.‘

Upon the question how far extrinsic evidence is admissible by

way of helping out any imperfections in the ballot, no rule can be

laid down which can be said to have a preponderating weight of

authority in its support. We think evidence of such facts as may

be called the circumstances surrounding the election—such as

who were the candidates brought forward by the nominating con-

ventions ; whether other persons of the same names resided in the

district from which the oﬁicer was to be chosen, and if so whether

they were eligible or had been named for the ofﬁce ; if a ballot was

printedimperfectly, how it came to be so printed, and the like —

is admissible for the purpose of showing that an imperfect ballot

was meant for a particular candidate, unless the name is so differ-

ent that to,thus apply it would be to contradict the ballot itself;

or unless the ballot is so defective that it fails to show any inten-

tion whatcver: in which cases it is not admissible. And

[* 612] we also * think that in any case to allow a voter to testify

by way of explanation of a ballot otherwise fatally defec-
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tive, that he voted the particular ballot, and intended it for a par-

ticular candidate, is exceedingly dangerous, invites corruption and

fraud, and ought not to be suifered. Nothing is more easy than

for reckless parties thus to testify to their intentions, without the

possibility of disproving their testimony if untrue ; and if one

falsely swears to having deposited a particular ballot, unless the

party really depositing it sees ﬁt to disclose his knowledge, the

which there will commonly be quite as little doubt, as to who are the candidates

at the election over which they preside? It seems to us, that, in every case

where the name given on the ballot, though in some particulars imperfect, is not

different from that of the candidate, and facts of general notoriety leave no doubt

in the minds of canvassers that it was intended for him, the canvassers should be

at liberty to do what a jury would afterwards be compelled to do, — count it for

such candidate.

' A vote for “ Pence ” cannot be shown to have been intended for “ Spence.”

Hart v. Evans, 8 Penn. St. 13. Where, however, wrong initials were given to

the Christian name, the ballots were allowed to the candidate; the facts of pub-

lic notoriety being such as to show that they were intended for him. Attorney-

General v.'Ely, 4 \Vis. 420. This case goes farther in permitting mistakes in

[* 611 J where the • name upon the ballot is altogether different
from that of a candidate, and not the same in sound and
not a mere abbreviation, the evidence of the voter cannot be received to show for whom it was intended.1
Upon the question how far extrinsic evidence is admissible by
way of helping out any imperfections in the ballot, no rule can be
laid down which can be said to have a preponderating weight of
authority in its support. We think evidence of such facts as may
be called the circumstances surrounding the election- such as
who were the candidates brought forward by the nominating conventions ; whether other persons of the same names resided in the
district from which the officer was to be chosen, and if so whether
they were eligible or had been named for the office ; if a ballot waa
printed imperfectly, how it came to be so printed, and the likeis admissible for the purpose of showing that an imperfect ballot
was meant for a particular candidate, unless the name is so different that to, thus apply it would be to contradict the ballot itself;
or unless the ballot is so defective that it fails to show any intention whatever : in which cases it is not admissible. And
[* 612] we also • think that in any case to allow a voter to testify
by way of explanation of a ballot otherwise fatally defective, that he voted the particular ballot, and intended it for a particular candidate, is exceedingly dangerous, invites corruption and
fraud, and ought not to be suffered. Nothing is more easy than
for reckless parties thus to testify to their intentions, without the
possibility of disproving their testimony if untrue ; and if one
falsely swears to having deposited a particular ballot, unless the
party really depositing it sees fit to disclose his knowledge, the

ballots to be corrected on parol evidence than any other in the books.

[ 674 ]

which there will commonly be quite as little doubt, as to who are the candidates
at the election over which t.hey preside? It seems to us, that, in every case
where the name given on the ballot, though in some particulars imperfect, is not
different from that of the candidate, and facts of general notoriety leave no doubt
in the minds of canvassers that it was intended for him, the canvassers should be
at liberty to do what a jury would afterwards be compelled to do, -count it for
sneh candidate.
1 A vote for " Pence" cannot be shown to have been intended for " Spence.''
Hart v. Evans, 8 Penn. St. 13. Where, however, wrong initials were given to
the Christian name, the ballots were allowed to the candidate; the facts of public notoriety being such as to show that they were intended for him. AttorneyGeneral t•."Ely, 4 Wis. 420. This case goes farther in permitting mistakes in
ballots to be corrected on parol evidence than any other in the books.
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evidence must pass unchallenged, and the temptation to suborna-
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tion of perjury, when public oﬂices are at stake, and when it may

be committed with impunity, is too great to allo‘w such evidence to

be sanctioned. While the law should seek to give effect to the in-

tention of the-voter, whenever it can be fairly ascertained, yet this

intention must be that which is expressed in due form of law, not

that which remains hidden in the elector’s breast; and where the

ballot, in connection with such facts surrounding the election as

would be provable if it were a ease of contract, does not enable the

proper oﬁicers to apply it to one of the candidates, policy, coincid-

ing in this particular with the general rule of law as applicable to

other transactions, requires that the ballot shall not be counted for

such candidate} '

The ballot should also sufficiently show on its face for what oﬁice

the person named upon it is designated ; but here again technical

accuracy is not essential, and the oﬁice is sufficiently named if it

be so designated that no reasonable doubt can exist as to what is

meant. A great constitutional privilege—the highest under the

government— is not to be taken away ‘on a mere technicality, but

the most liberal intendment should be made in support of the elec-

tor’s action wherever the application of the common-sense rules

which are applied in other cases will enable us to understand and
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render it eﬁ'ectual.2

' This is substantially the New York rule as settled by the later decisions, if

we may accept the opinion of Denio, Ch. J., in People v. Pease, 27 N. Y. 84, as

taking the correct view of those decisions. See People v. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 283,

for a discussion of this point.

’ In People v. Matteson, 17 Ill. 167, it was held that where “police magis-

trates ” were to be chosen, votes cast for “ police justices ” should be counted, as

they suiliciently showed upon their face the intention of the voters. So where

the question was submitted to the people, whether a part of one county should be

annexed to another, and the act of submission provided that the electors might

express their choice by voting “for detaching Ri,” or “ against detaching

R--,” it was held that votes cast for “ Hi attached," and for “ R——-

evidence must pass unchallenged, and the temptation to subornation of perjury, when public offices are at stake, and when it may
be committed with impunity, is too great to allo'w such evidence to
be sanctioned. While the law should seek to give effect to the intention of the·voter, whenever it can be fairly ascertained, yet this
intention must be that which is expressed in due form of law, not
that which remains hidden in the elector's breast ; and where the _
ballot, in connection with such facts surrounding the election as
would be provable if it were a case of contraqt, does not enable tho
proper officers to apply it to one of the candidates, policy, coinciding in this parti~ular with the general rule of law as applicable to
other transactions, requires that the ballot shall not be counted for
such candidate. 1
The ballot should also sufficiently show on its face for what office
the person named upon it is designated ; but here again technical
accuracy is not essential, and the office is sufficiently named if it
be so designated that no reasonable doubt can exist as to what is
meant. A great constitutional privilege- the highest under the
government- is not to be taken away 'on a mere technicality, but
the most liberal intendment should be made in support of the elector's action wherever the application of the common-sense rules
which are applied in other cases will enable us to understand and
render it effectual.2

detached," and “ for division," and “ against division,” were properly counted

by the canvassers, as the intention of the voters was clearly ascertainable from

the ballots themselves with the aid of the extrinsic facts of a public nature con-

nected with the election. State v. Elwood, 12 Wis. 551. So where trustees of

common schools were to be voted for, it was held that votes for trustees of public

schools should be counted; there being no trustees to be voted for at that elec-

tion except trustees of common schools. People v. McManus, 34 Barb. 6'20. In

Phelps v. Goldthwaite, 16 Wis. 146, where a city and also a county superinten-

, [675]

I This is substantia11y the New York rule a8 settled by the later decisions, if
we may accept the opinion of De11io, Ch. J., in People v. Pease, 27 N.Y. 84:, as
taking the correct view of those decisions. See People v. Cicotte, 16 1\fich. 283,
for a discussion of this point.
t In People v. Matteson, 17 Ill. 167, it was held that where "police magistrates" were to be chosen, votes cast for "police justices" should be counted, as
they sufficiently showed upon their face the intention of the voters. So where
the question was submitted to the people, whether a part of one county should be
annexed to another, and the act of submission provided that the electors might
express their choice by voting "for detaching R--," or " against detaching
R --," it was held that votes cast for " R-- attached," and for " R-detachcd," and " for division," and " against division," were properly counted
by the canvassers, as the intention of the voters was clearly ascertainable from
the ballots themselves with the aid of the extrinsic facts of a public nature con·
nected with the election. State v. Elwood, 12 Wis. 551. So where trustees of
common schools were to be voted for, it was held that votes for trustees of public
schools should be counted ; there being no trustees to be voted for at that election except trustees of common schools. People v. McManus, 34: Barb. 620. In
Phelps v. Goldthwaite, 16 Wis. 146, where a city and also a county superinten-
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[* 613] * Where more than one office is to be ﬁlled at an election,
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the law may either require all the persons voted for, for

the several offices,‘ to be so voted for by each elector on the same

ballot, or it may provide a different receptacle for the ballots for

some one office or set of oﬂiees from that which is to receive the

others. In such a case‘ each elector will place upon the ballot to

be deposited in each the names of such persons as he desires to

vote for, for the dilferent ofﬁces to be ﬁlled at the election for which

that box is provided. If, for instance, State and township officers

are to be chosen at the same election, and the ballots are to be kept

separate, the elector must have different ballots for each ; and if he

should designate persons for a township oﬂice on the State ballot,

such ballot would, to that extent, be void, though the improper

addition would not defeat the ballot altogether, but would be

treated as surplusage, and the ballot be held good as a vote for the

State oﬂicers designated upon it.‘ But an accidental error in

depositing the ballot should not defeat it. If an elector should

deliver the State and township ballots to the inspector of election,

who by mistake should deposit them in the wrong boxes respec-

tively, this mistake is capable of being corrected without confusion

when the boxes are opened, and should not prevent the ballots

being counted as intended. And it would seem that, in any case,
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the honest mistake, either of the oﬂicer or the elector, should not

defeat the intention of the latter, where it was not left in doubt by

his action?

The elector is not under obligation to vote for every oﬁice to be

ﬁlled at that election ; nor where several persons are to be chosen

to the same ofﬁce is he required to vote for as many as are

[* 614] to be * elected. He may vote for one or any greater

dent of schools were to be chosen at the same election, and ballots were cast for

“ superintendent of schools,” without further designation, pnrcl evidence of sur-

rounding circumstances was admitted to enable the proper application to be

made of the ballots to the respective candidates. In Peck v. Weddell‘, 17 Ohio,

N. s. 271, an act providing for an election on the question of the removal ,0!‘ a

county seat to the “ town ” of Bowling Green, was held ‘not invalid by reason of

Bowling Green being in law not a “town,” but an incorporated village. In

voting for a county seat it was held proper to count votes cast for a town by its

popular, which dilfered from its legal name. State v. Cavers, 22 Iowa, 343.

‘ See People v. Cook, 14 Barb. 259, and 8 N. Y. 67.

‘ People u. Bates, 11 Mich. 362. See Lanier v. Gallatas, 13 La. An. 175;

McKinney 0. O’Connor. 26 Texas, 5.

I

[* 613]

*Where more than one office is to be filled at au election,
the law may either require all the persons voted for, for
the several offices, to be so voted for by each elector on the same
ballot, or it may provide a different receptacle for the ballots for
some one office or set of offices from that which is to receive tl1e
others. In such a case' each elector will place upon the ballot to
be deposited in each the names of such persons as he desires to
vote for, for the different offices to be filled at the election for which
that box is provided. If, for instance, State and township officers
are to be chosen at the same election, and the ballots are to be kept
separate, the elector must have different ballots for each ; and if he
should designate persons for a township office on the State ballot,
such ballot would, to that extent, be void, though the improper
addition would not defeat the ballot altogether, but would be
treated as surplusage, and the ballot be held good as a vote for the
State officers designated upon it. 1 But an accidental error in
depositing the ballot should not defeat it. If an elector should ·
deliver the State and township ballots to the inspector of election,
who by mistake should deposit them in the wrong boxes respectively, this mistake is capable of being corrected without confusion
when the boxes are opened, and should not prevent the ballots
being counted as intended. And it would seem that, in any case,
the honest mistake, either of the officer or the elector, should not
defeat the intention of the latter, where it was not left in doubt by
his nction.2
The elector is not under obligation to vote for every office to be
filled at that election ; nor where several persons are to be chosen
to the same office is he required to vote for as many as are
[* 614] to be *elected. He may vote for one or any greater
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dent of schools were to be chosen at the same election, and ballots were cast for
•• superintendent of schools," without further designation, parol evidence of surrounding circumstances was admitred to enable the proper application to be
made of the ballots to the respective candidates. In Pet'k v. Weddell, 17 Ohio,
N. s. 271, an act providing for an election on the question of the removal .of a
county seat to the "town" of Bowling Green, was held not invalid by reason of
Bowling Gr<'en being in law not a "town," but an incorporated village. In
voting for a eonnty seat it was held proper to count ,·otes cast for a town by its
popular, which ditfered from its legal name. State v. Cavers, 22 Iowa, 843.
1 See People v. Cook, 14 Barb. 259, and 8 N.Y. 6i.
1 People v. Bates, 111\fich. 362.
See Lanier v. Gallatas, 13 La. An. 175;
McKinney v. O'Connor. 26 Texas, 5.
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most of the States a plurality of the votes cast determines the

election. In others, as to some elections, a majority; but in

determining upon a majority or plurality, the blank votes, if any,

are not to be counted; and a candidate may therefore be cho-

sen without receiving a plurality or majority of voices of those

who actually participated in the election. Where, however, two

offices of the same name wereto be ﬁlled at the same election, but

the notice of election speciﬁed one only, the political parties each

nominated one candidate, and, assuming that but one was to be

chosen, no elector voted for more than one, it was held that the one

having a majority was alone chosen; the opposing candidate could

not claim to be also elected, as having received the second highest

number of votes, but as to the other ofﬁcevthere had been a

failure to hold an election.‘

The Freedom of Elections.

To keep every election free of all the inﬂuences and surround-

ings which might bear improperly upon it, or might impel the

electors to cast their suffrages otherwise than as their judgments

would dictate, has always been a prominent object in American

legislation. We have referred to fundamental principles which

protect the secrecy of the ballot, but in addition to these there are
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express constitutional and statutory provisions looking to the

number, not to exceed the whole number to be chosen. In
most of the States a plurality of the votes cast determines the
election. In others, as to some elections, a majority ; but in
determining upon a majority or plurality, the blank votes, if any,
are not to be counted; and a candidate may therefore be chosen without receiving a plurality or majority of voices of those
who actually participated in the election. Where, however, two
offices of the same name were to be filled at the same election, but
the notice of election specified one only, the political parties each
nominated one candidate, and, assuming that but one was to be
chosen, no elector voted for more than one, it was held that the one
having a majority was alone chosen; the opposing candidate could
not claim to be also elected, as having received the second highest
number of votes) but as to the other office . there had been a
failure to hold an election. 1

accomplishment of the same general purpose. It is provided by

the constitutions of several of the States that bribery of an elector

The Freedom of Elections.

shall constitute a disqualification of the right to vote or to hold

office;2 the treating of an elector, with a view to inﬂuence his vote,

is in some States made an indictable 0ﬁ'ence;3 courts are not

allowed to be held, for the two reasons, that the electors ought to

‘ People v. Kent County Canvassers, 11 Mich. 111.

' See the Constitutions of Maryland. Missouri, New Jersey, \Vest Virginia,

Oregon, California, Kansas, Texas, Arkansas, Rhode Island, Alabama, Florida,

New York, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, Nevada, Tennessee, Con-

necticut, Louisiana, Mississippi, Ohio, \Visconsin. And it has been held on gen-

eral principles that if an elector is induced to vote in a particular way by the

payment or promise of any money or other valuable consideration for such vote,

his vote should be rejected as illegal. State v. Olin, 23 \Vis. 327.

' State v. Rutledge, 8 Humph. 32. And see the provision in the Constitution

of Vermont on this subject.
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To keep every election free of all the influences and surroundings which might bear improperly upon it, or might impel the
electors to cast their suffrages otherwise than as their judgments
would dictate, has always been a prominent object in American
legislation. We have referred to fundamental principles which
protect the secrecy of the ballot, but in addition to these there are
express constitutional and statutory provisions looking to the
accomplishment of the same general purpose. It is provided by
the constitutions of several of the States that bribery of ai1 elector
shall constitute a disqualification of the right to vote or to hold
office; 2 the treating of an elector, with a view to influence his vote,
is in some States made an indictable offence ; 8 courts are not
allowed to be held, for the two reasons, that the electors ought to
People v. Kent County Canvassers, 11 Mich. 111.
See the Constitutions of Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, West Virginia,
Oregon, California, Kansas, Texas, Arkansas, Rhode Island, Alabama, Florida,
Ne'v York, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, Nevada, Tennessee, Connecticut, Louisiana, Mississippi, Ohio, Wisconsin. And it bas been held on general principles that if an elector is induced to vote in a particular way by tbe
payment or promise of any money or other valuable consideration for such vote,
his vote should be rejected as illegal. State v. Olin, 23 Wis. 327.
• State v. Rutledge, 8 Humph. 32. And see the provision in the Constitution
of Vermont on this subject.
1

1
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[*‘ 615] high trust, and that ’* suits if allowed on that day might

be used as a means of intimidation ;1 legal process in some

States, and for the same reasons, is not permitted to be served on

that day; intimidation of voters by threats or otherwise is made

punishable ;2 and generally all such precautions as the people in

framing their organic law, or the legislature afterwards, have

thought might be made available for the purpose, have been pro-

vided with a view to secure the most completely free and uubiassed

expression of opinion that shall be possible.

Betting upon elections is illegal at the common law, on grounds

of public policy ;3 and all contracts entered into with a view im-

properly to inﬂuence an election would be void for the same

reason!‘ And with a just sense of the danger_ of military inter-

‘ But it was held in New York that the statute of that State forbidding the

holding of courts on election days did not apply to the local elections. Matter

of Election Law, 7 Hill, 19-1; ltedﬁeld v. Florence, 2 E. D. Smith, 339.

’ As to what shall constitute intimidation, see Respnblica v. Gibbs, 3 Yeates,

429.

3 Bunn v. Riker, 4 Johns. 426; Lansing v. Lansing, 8 Johns. 454; Ball v.

Gilbert, 12 Met. 397; Laval v. Myers, 1 Bailey, 486; Smyth v. Mcliiasters, 2

be left free to devote their attention to the exercise of this
(* 615] high trust, and that • suits if allowed on that day might
be used as a means of intimidation; 1 legal process in some
States, and for the same reasons, is not permitted to be served on
that day; intimidation of voters by threats or otherwise is made
punishable ; 2 and generally all such precautions as the people in
framing their organic law, or the legislature afterwards, have
thought might be made available for the purpose, have been provided with a view to secure the most completely free and uubiassed
expression of opinion that shall be possible.
Betting upon elections is illegal at the common law, on grounds
of public policy ; 3 and all contracts entered into with a view improperly to influence an election would be void for the same
reasou. 4 And with a just sense of the danger. of military inter-

Browne, 182; McAllister v. Hoﬂinan, 16 ~S. & R. 147; Stoddard v. Martin, 1
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R. I. 1; Wroth v. Johnson, 4 H. & M. 284; Tarelton v. Baker, 18 Vt. 9; Davis

v. Holbrook, 1 La. An. 176; Freeman v. Hardwick, 10 Ala. 316; Wheeler 1-.

Spencer, 15 Conn. 28; Russell v. Pylsnd, 2 Humph. 131; Porter v. Sawyer, 1

Harr. 517 ; Hickerson v. Benson, 8 Mo. 8; Machir -v. Moore, 2 Grat. 257; Rust

v. Gott, 9 Cow. 169; Brush v. Keeler, 5 \Vend. 250.

‘ In Jackson v. Walker, 5 Ilill, 27, it was held that an agreement by the de-

fendant to pay the _plaintiﬁ' 81000, in consideration that the latter, who had

built a log-cabin, would keep it open for political meetings to further the suc-

cess of certain persons nominated for members of Congress, &c., by one of the

political parties, was illegal within the statute of New York, which prohibited

contributions of money “ for any other purpose intended to promote the election

of any particular person or ticket, except for defraying the expenses of printing

and the circulation of votes, handbills, and other papers.” This case is criticised

in Hurley v. Van Wagner, 28 Barb. 109, and it is possible that it went further

than either the statute or public policy would require. In Nichols v. Mudgett,

32 Vt. 546, the defendant being indebted to the plaintiff, who was a candidate for

town representative, the parties agreed that the former should use his inﬂuence

for the plaintiﬁ"s election, and do_ what he could for that purpose, and that if the

plaintiff was elected, that should be a satisfaction of his claim. Nothing was

speciﬁcally said about the defendant's voting for the plaintiﬁ', but he did vote for

him, and would not have done so, nor favored his election, but for this agree-

ment. The plaintiif was elected. Held, that the agreement was void, and con-

— — _ _ i _ ___;~‘
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1 But it was held in New York that the statute of that State forbidding the
holding of courts on election days did not apply to the local elections. Matter
of Election Law, 7 Hill, 194; Redfield v. Florence, 2 E. D. Smith, 339.
1 As to what shall constitute intimidation, see Respublica v. Gibbs, 3 Yeates,
429.
3 Bunn v. Riker, 4 Johns. 426; Lansing v. Lansing, 8 Johns. 454; Ball v.
Gilbert, 12 Met. 397; Laval v. Myers, 1 Bailey, 486; Smyth v. McMasters, 2
Browne, 182; McAllister v. Hoffman, 16 S. & R. 147; Stoddard v. Martin, 1
U. I. 1; Wroth v. Johnson, 4 H. & M . 284; Tarelton v. Baker, 18 Yt. 9; Davis
v. Holbrook, 1 La. An. 176; Freeman v. Hardwick, 10 Ala. 316; Wheeler r.
Spencer, 15 Conn. 28; Russell t•. Pyland, 2 Humph. 131 ; Porter v. Sawyer, 1
Harr. 517; Hickerson v. Benson, 8 Mo. 8; Machir v. Moore, 2 Grat. 257; Rust
v. Gott, 9 Cow. 169; Brush v. Keeler, 5 Wend. 250.
' In Jackson v. Walker, !j Hill, 27, it was held that an agreement by the defendant to pay the -plaintiff $1000, in consideration that the latter, who had
built a log-cabin, would keep it open for political meetings to further the suecess of certain persons nominated for members of Congress, &c., by one of the
political parties, was illegal within the statute of New York, which prohibited
contributions of money " for any other purpose intended to promote the election
of any particular person or ticket, except fol' defraying the expenses of printing
and the circulation of votes, handbills, and other })apers." This case is criticised
in Hurley v. Van Wagner, 28 Barb. 109, and it is po~sible that it went further
than either the statute or public policy would require. ln Nichols v. Mudgett,
32 Vt. M6, the defendant being indebted to the pla.intiff, who was a ca.ndidate for
town representative, the parties agreed that the former should use his influence
for the plaintiff's election, and do what he could for that purpose, and that if the
plaintiff was elected, that should be a satisfaction of his claim. Nothing was
specifically said about the defendant's voting for tho plaintiff, but he did \'Ole for
him, and would not haYe done so, nor fa,·ored his election, but for this agreement. The plaintiff was elected. Held, that the agreement was Yoid, and con·
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ference, where a trust is to be exercised, the highest as well as the

most delicate in the whole machinery of government, it has not

been thought unwise to prohibit the militia. being called out on

election days, even though for no other purpose than for enrolling

and organizing them.‘ The ordinary police is the peace force of the

State, and its presence suggests order, individual safety, and public

security ; but when the military appear upon the stage, even though

composed of citizen militia, the circumstances must be assumed to

be extraordinary, and there is always an appearance of threatening

and dangerous compulsion which might easily interfere seriously

with that calm and unimpassioned discharge of the elector’s duty

which the law so justly favors. The soldier in organized ranks

can know no law but such as is given him by his commanding

oﬂicer; and when he appears at the polls, there is necessarily a

suggestion of the presence of an enemy against whom he may be

compelled to exercise the most extreme and destructive force; and

that enemy must generally be the party out of power, while the

authority that commands the force directed against them will be

the executive authority of the State for the time being wielded by

their opponents. It is consequently of the highest importance that

the presence of a military force at the polls be not suffered except
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in serious emergencies, when disorders exist or are threatened for

the suppression or prevention of which the ordinary peace force is

insuﬁicient; and any statute which should provide for or permit

such presence as an usual occurrence or except in the last resort,

though it might not be void, would nevertheless be a serious

invasion of constitutional right, and should not be submitted to in

a free government without vigorous remonstrance?

stituted no bar to a recovery upon the demand. See also Meachem 0. Dow, 32

Vt. 721, where it was held that a note executed in consideration of the payee’s

agreement to resign public oﬂice in favor of the maker, and use inﬂuence in favor

of the latter’s appointment as his successor, was void in the hands of the payee.

In Pratt v. People, 29 Ill. 54, it was held that an agreement between two electors

that they should “ pair off,” and both abstain from voting, was illegal, and the

inspectors could not refuse to receive a vote of one of the two, on the ground

of his agreement.

' See Hyde v. Melvin, 11 Johns. 521.

' The danger as well as the folly of military interference with the deliberations

or action of electors except in the last necessity, was fearfully illustrated in the

case of the " Manchester Massacre,” which occurred in 1819. An immense

fcrence, where a trust is to be exercised, the highest as well as the
most delicate in the whole machinery of government, it has not
been thought unwise to prohibit the militia being called out on
election days, even though for no other purpose than for enrolling
and organizing them. 1 The ordinary police is the peace force of the
State, and its presence suggests order, individual safety, an.d public
security ; but when the military appear upon the stage, even though
composed of citizen militia, the circumstances must be assumed to
be extraordinary, and there is always an appearance of threatening
and dangerous compulsion which might easily interfere seriously
with that calm and unimpassioned discharge of the elector's duty
which the law so justly favors. The soldier in organized ranks
can know no law but such as is given him by his commanding
officer; and when he appears at the polls, there is necessarily a
suggestion of the presence of an enemy against whom he may be
compelled to exercise the most extreme and destructive force; and
that enemy must generally be the party out of power, while the
authority that commands the force directed against them will be
the executive authority of the State for the time being wielded by
their opponents. It is consequently of the highest importance that
the presence of a military force at the polls be not suffered except
in serious emergencies, when disorders exist or are threatened for
the suppression or prevention of which the ordinary peace force is
insufficient; and any statute which should provide for or permit
such presence as an usual occurrence or except in the last resort,
though it might not be void, would nevertheless be a serious
invasion of constitutional right, and should not be submitted to in
a free government without vigorous remonstrance.2

meeting of radical parliamentary reformers, whose objects and purposes appeared
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etituted no bar to a recovery upon the demand. See also Meachem o. Dow, 32
Vt. 721, where it was held that a note executed in consideration of the payee's
agreement to resign public office in favor of the maker, and use influence in favor
of the latter's appointment as his successor, was void in the hands of the payee.
In Pratt v. People, 29 lll. 54, it was held that an agreement between two electors ·
that they should "pair off," and both abstain from voting, was illegal, and the
inspectors could not refuse to receive a vote of one of the two, on the ground
of his agreement.
1 See Hyde v. Melvin, 11 Johns. 621.
' The danger as well as the folly of military interference with the deliberations
or action of electon except in the last necessity, was fearfully illustrated in the
case of the "Manchester Massacre," which occurred in 1819. An immense
meeting of radical parliamentary reformers, whose objects and purposes appeared
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[* 616] ' The Elector mt to be deprived qf his Vote.

That one entitled to vote shall not be deprived of the privilege

by the action of the authorities, is a fundamental principle.

It has been held, on constitutional grounds, that a law creating a

new county, but so framed as to leave a portion of its territory

unorganized, so that the voters within such portion could not

participate in the election of county officers, was inoperative and

void} So a law submitting to the voters of a county the question

of removing the county seat is void if there is no mode under

the law by which a city within the county can participate in

the election." And although the failure of one election precinct

to hold an election, or to make a return of the votes cast,

might not render the whole election a. nullity, where the electors

of that precinct were at liberty to vote had they so chosen,

or where, having voted but failed to make return, it is not

made to appear that the votes not returned would have changed

the result,“ yet if any action was required of the public author-

ities preliminary to the election, and that which was taken

was not such as to give all the electors the opportunity to par-

ticipate, and no mode was open to the electors by which the

officers might be compelled to act, it would seem that such neglect,
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constituting as it would the disfranchisement of the excluded

threatening to the government, was charged upon by the military, with some loss

of life, and with injury to the persons of several hundred people. As usual in

such cases, the extremists of one party applauded the act and complimented the

military, while the other party was exasperated in the last degree, by what seemed

to them an unnecessary, arbitrary, and unconstitutional exercise of force. The

most bitter and dangerous feeling was excited throughout the country by this

occurrence, and it is not too much to say that if disorders were threatening be-

fore, the government had done nothing in this way to strengthen its authority, or

to insure quiet or dispassionate action. No one had been conciliated; no one

had been reduced to more calm and deliberate courses ;. but, on the other hand,

[• 616]

• The Elector rwt to be deprived of hiB Vote.

That one entitled to vote shall not be deprived of the privilege
by the action of the authorities, is a fundamental principle.
It has been held, on constitutional grounds, that a law creating a
new county, but so framed as to leave a portion of its territory
unorganized, so that the voters within such portion could not
participate in the election of county officers, was inoperative and
void. 1 So a law submitting to the voters of a county the question
of removing the county seat is void if there is no mode under
the law by which a city within the county can participate in
the election.2 And although the failure of one election precinct
to hold an election, or to make a return of the votes cast,
might not render the whole election a nullity, where the electors
of that precinct were at liberty to vote had they so chosen,
or where, having voted but failed to make return, it ia not
made to appear that the votes not returned would have changed
the result,3 yet if any action was required of the public authorities preliminary to the election, and that which was taken
was not such as to give all the electors the opportunity to participate, and no mode was open to the electors by which the
officers might be compelled to act, it would seem that such neglect,
constituting as it would the disfranchisement of the excluded

even moderate men had been exasperated and inclined to opposition by this

violent, reckless, and destructive display of coercive power. See IIansard’s De-

bates, Vol. XLI. pp. 4, 51, 230.

' People v. Maynard, 16 Mich. 471. For similar reasons the act for the or-

ganization of Schuyler County was held invalid in Lanning v. Carpenter, 20 N.

Y. 477.

' Attorney-General v. Supervisors of St. Clair, _11 Mich. 63. For a similar

principle see Foster v. Scartf, 15 Ohio, N. s. 532.

3 See Ea: parts Heath, 3 Hill, 42; Louisville and Nashville R.R. Co. v. County

Court of Davidson, 1 Sneed, 637. Also Marshall v. Kerns, 2 Swan, 68.

_.|r—

[680]

threatening to the government, was charged upon by the military, with some loss
of life, and with injury to the persons of several hundred people. As usual in
such cases, the extremists of one party applauded the act and complimented the
military, while the other party was exasperated in the last degree, by what seemed
to them an unnecessary, arbitrary, and unconstitutional exercise of force. The
most bitter and dangerous feeling was excited throughout the country by this
occurrence, and it is not too mueh to say that if disorders were threatening before, the government had done nothing in this way to strengthen its authority. or
to insure quiet or dispassionate action. No one bad been conciliated; no one
had been reduced to more calm and deliberate courses;. but, on the other hand,
even moderate men had been exasperated and inclined to oppo~ition by this
violent, reckless, and destructive display of coercive power. See Hansard's Debates, Vol. XLL pp. 4, 51, 230.
1 People v. Maynard, 15 Mich. 471.
For similar reasons the act for the organization of Schuyler County was held invalid in Lanning "· Carpenter, 20 N.

Y. 477.
' Attorney-General "· Supervisors of St. Clair, p Mich. 63. For a similar
principle see Foster"· Scarff, Hi Ohio, N. s. 532.
a See Ex parte Heath, 3 Hill, 42; J,ouisville and Nashville R.R. Co. v. County
Court of Davidson, 1 Sneed, 637. Also Marshall v. Kerns, 2 Swan, 68.
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electors pro hac vice, must on general principles render the whole
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election nugatory; for that cannot be called an election/ or the

expression of the popular sentiment where a part only of the

electors have been allowed to be heard, and the others, without

being guilty of fraud or negligence, have been excluded.‘

If the inspectors of elections refuse to receive the vote of an

elector duly qualiﬁed, they may be liable both civilly and crimi-

nally for so doing: criminally, if they were actuated by improper

and corrupt motives; and civilly, it is held in some of the States,

even though there may have been no malicious design in

so doing;* " but other cases hold that, where the inspec- [* 617]

tors are vested by the law with the power to pass upon the

qualiﬁcations of electors, they exercise judicial functions in so doing,

and are entitled to the same protection as other judicial officers in

the discharge of their duty, and cannot be made liable except upon

proof of express malice.” Where, however, by the law under which

the election is held, the inspectors are to receive the voter’s ballot,

if he takes the oath that he possesses the constitutional qualiﬁca-

tions, the oath is the conclusive evidence on which the inspectors

are to act, and they are not at liberty to refuse to administer the

oath, or to refuse the vote after the oath has been taken. They are

only ministerial ofﬁcers in such a case, and have no discretion but
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to obey the law and receive the vote.‘

‘ See Fort Dodge v. District Township, 17 Iowa, 85; Barry v. Lauck, 5 Cold.

588. In People v. Salomon, 46 Ill. 415, it was held that where an act of the

legislature. before it shall become operative, is required to be submitted to the

vote of the legal electors of the district to be affected thereby, if the election

which is attempted to be held is illegal within certain precincts containing a

majority of the voters of the district, then the act will not be deemed to have

been submitted to the required vote, and the result will not be declared upon the

votes legally cast, adverse to what it would have been had no illegality inter-

vened.

' Kilham v. Ward, 2 Mass. 236; Gardner v. Ward, 2 Mass. 244, note; Lin-

coln v. Hapgood, 11 Mass. 350; Capen v. Foster, 12 Pick. 485; Gates v. Neal,

23 Pick. 808; Blanchard v. Stearns, 5 Met. 298; Jetfries v. Ankeny, ll Ohio,

372; Chrisman v. Bruce, 1 Duvall, 63; Monroe v. Collins, 17 Ohio, N. s. 665;

Gillespie v. Palmer, 20 Wis. 544.

' Carter v. Harrison, 5 Blackf. 138; Rail v. Potts, 8 Humph. 225; Peavey v.

Robbins, 3 Jones, Law, 339; Gordon v. Farrar, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 411 ; Caulﬁeld

v. Bullock, 18 B. Monr. 494; Morgan v. Dudley, ib. 693.

‘ Spriggins v. Houghton, 2 Scam. 377; State v. Robb, 17 Ind. 536; People v.

Pease, 30 Barb. 588. And see People v. Gordon, 5 Cal. 235; Chrisman v. Bruce,

1 Duvall, 63; Gillespie v. Palmer, 20 Wis. 544.
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electors pro hac vice, must on general principles render the whole
election nugatory; for that cannot he called an election' or the
expression of the popular sentiment where a part only of the
electors have been allowed to be heard, and the others, without
being guilty of fraud or negligence, have been excluded. 1
If the inspectors of elections refuse to receive the vote of an
elector duly qualified, they may he liable both civilly and crimi- ·
nally for so doing : criminally, if they were actuated by improper
and corrupt motives; and civilly, it is held in some of the States,
even though there may have been no malicious design in
so doing; 2 • but other cases hold that, where the inspec- [* 617]
tors are vested by the law with the power to pass upon the
qualifications of electors, they exercise judicial functions in so doing,
and are entitled to the same protection as other judicial officers in
the discharge of their duty, and cannot be made liable except upon
proof of express malice.8 Where, however, by the law under which
the election is held, the inspectors are to receive the voter's ballot,
if he takes the oath that he possesses the constitutional qualifications, the oath is the conclusive evidence on which the inspectors
are to act, and they are not at liberty to refuse to administer the
oath, or to refuse the vote after the oath has been taken. They are
only ministerial officers in such a case, and have no discretion but
to obey the law and receive the vote.4
1 See Fort Dodge "· District Township, 17 Iowa, 85; Barry v. Lauck, 5 Cold.
588. In People "· Salomon, 46 TIL 415, it was held that where an act of the
legislature, before it shall become operative, is required to be submitted to the
vote of the legal electors of the district to be affected thereby, if the election
which is attempted to be held is illegal within certain precincts containing a
majority of the voters of the district, then the act will not be deemed to have
been submitted to the required vote, and the result will not be declared upon the
votes legally cast, adverse to what it would have been had no illegality intervened.
1 Kilham "·Ward, 2 Mass. 236; Gardner"· Ward, 2 Mass. 244, note; Lincoln "· Hapgood, 11 Mass. 3.')0; Capen 11. Foster, 12 Pick. 485; Gates v. Neal,
23 Pick. 808; Blanchard "· Stearns, 6 Met. 298; Jeffries "· Ankeny, 11 Ohio,
872; Chrisman v. Bruce, 1 Duvall, 68; Monroe v. Collins, 17 Ohio, N. s. 665;
Gillespie "· Palmer, 20 Wis. 544.
' Carter v. Harrison, 5 Blackf. 188; Rail 11. Potts, 8 Humph. 225; Peavey "·
Robbins, S Jones, Law, 839; Gordon"· Farrar, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 411; Caulfield
1:1. Bullock, 18 B. Monr. 494; Morgan "· Dudley, ib. 693.
4 Spriggins "·Houghton, 2 Scam. 377; State v. Rohb, 17 Ind. 536; People 11.
Pease, SO Barb. 588. And see People "· Gordon, 6 Cal. 235; Chrisman "· Bruce,
1 Duvall, 63; Gillespie "· Palmer, 20 Wis. 544.
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The statutes of the diﬂerent States point out speciﬁcally the

mode in which elections shall be conducted ; but, although there

are great diversities of detail, the same general principles govern

them all. As the execution of these statutes must very often fall

The Conduct of the Election.

to the hands of men unacquainted with the law and unschooled in

business, it is inevitable that mistakes shall sometimes occur, and

that very often the law will fail of strict compliance. Where an

election is thus rendered irregular, whether the irregularity shall

avoid it or not must depend generally upon the eﬁect the failure to

comply strictly with the law may have had in obstructing the

complete expression of the popular will, or the production of

satisfactory evidence thereof. Election statutes are to be tested

like other statutes, but with a leaning to liberality, in view of the

great public purposes which they accomplish; and except where

they speciﬁcally provide that a thing shall be done in the

[* 618] manner indicated and not otherwise, " their provisions

designed merely for the information and guidance of the

oﬁicers must be regarded as directory only, and the election will

not be defeated by a failure to comply with them, providing the

irregularity has not hindered any who were entitled .from exercising

the right of suffrage, or rendered doubtful the evidences from
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which the result was to be declared. In a leading case the follow-

ing irregularities were held not to vitiate the election: the acci-

dental substitution of another book for the holy evangelists in the

administration of an oath, both parties being ignorant of the error

at the time ; the holding of the election by persons who were not

oﬁicers dc jure, but who had colorable authority, and acted defacto

in good faith; the failure of the board of inspectors to appoint

clerks of the election; the closing of the outer door of the room

where the election was held at sundown, and then permitting the

persons within the room to vote ; it not appearing that legal voters

were excluded by closing the door, or illegal allowed to vote ; and

the failure of the inspectors or clerks to take the prescribed oath

of ofﬁce. And it was said, in the same case, that any irregularity

in conducting an election which does not deprive a legal voter of

his vote, or admit a disqualiﬁed voter to vote, or cast uncertainty

on the result, and has not been occasioned by the agency of a

[ 682 ]

The statutes of the different States point out specifically the
mode in which elections shall be conducted ; but, although there
are great diversities of detail, the same general principles govern
·them all. As the execution of these statutes must very often fall
to the hands of men unacquainted with the law and unschooled in
business, it is inevitable that mistakes shall sometimes occur, and
that very often the law will fail of strict compliance. Where an
election is thus rendered irregular, whether the irregularity shall
avoid it or not must depend generally upon the effect the failure to
comply strictly with the law may liave had in obstructing the
complete expression of the popular will, or the production of
satisfactory evidence thereof. Elec'tion statutes are to be tested
like other statutes, but with a leaning to liberality, in view of the
great public purposes which they accomplish ; and except where
they specifically provide that a thing shall be done in the
[* 618] manner indicated and not otherwise, • their provisions
designed merely for the information and guidance of the
officers must be regarded as directory only, and the election will
not be defeated by a failure to comply with them, providing the
irregularity has not hindered any who were entitled from exercising
the right of suffrage, or rendered doubtful the evidences from
which the result was to be declared. In a leading case the following irregularities were held not to vitiate the election : the accidental substitution of another book for the holy evangelists in the
administration of an oath, both parties being ignorant of the error
at the time ; the holding of the election by persons who were not
officers de jure, but who had colorable authority, and acted de facto
in good faith ; the failure of the board of inspectors to appoint
clerks of the election ; the closing of the outer door of the room
where the election was held at sundown, and then permitting the
persons within the room to vote ; it not appearing that legal voters
were excluded by closing the door, or illegal allowed to vote; and
the failure of the inspectors or clerks to take the prescribed oath
of office. And it was said, in the same caije, that any irregularity
in conducting an election which does not deprive a legal voter of
his vote, or admit a disqualified voter to vote, or cast uncertainty
on the result, and has not been occasioned by the agency of a
[ 682]
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party seeking to derive a beneﬁt from it, should be overlooked in
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a proceeding to try the right to an ofﬁee depending on such

election.‘ This rule is an eminently proper one, and it furnishes

a very satisfactory test as to what is essential and what

not in election laws.’ And where a party contests ‘an [*‘ 619]

election on the ground of these or any similar irregular-

ities, he ought to aver and be able to show that the result was

‘ People v. Cook, 14 Barb. 259, and 8 N. Y. 67. To the same effect, see

Clifton v. Cook, 7 Ala. 114; Truehart v. Addicks, 2 Texas, 217 ; Dishon v.

Smith, 10 Iowa, 212; Attorney-General v. Ely, 4 Wis. 420; State v. Jones, 19

Ind. 356; People v. Higgins, 3 Mich. 233; Gorham v. Campbell, 2 Cal. 135;

People v. Bates, 11 Mich. 362; Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Minn. 112; People v.

party seeking to derive a benefit from it, should be overlooked in
a proceeding to try the right to an office depending on such
election. 1 This rule is an eminently proper one, and it furnishes
a very satisfactory test as to what is essential and what
not in election laws. 2 And where a party contests • an [*619]
election on the ground of these or any similar irregularities, he ought to aver and be able to show that the result was

McManus, 34 Barb. 620; TVhipley v. McCune, 12 Cal. 352 ; Bourland v. Hildreth,

26 Cal. 161; Day 12. Kent, 1 Oregon, 123; Piatt v. People, 29 Ill. 54; Ewing v.

Filley, 43 Penn. St. 384; Howard v. Shields, 16 Ohio, N. s. 184; State v. Stumpf,

21 \/Vis. 579; McKinney v. O’Connor, 26 Texas, 5; Sprague v. Norway, 31 Cal.

173. In Ea: parts Heath, 3 Hill, 42, it was held, that, where the statute re-

quired the inspectors to certify the result of the election on the next day there-

after, or sooner, the certiﬁcate made the second day thereafter was sufficient, the

statute as to time being directory merely. In People v. Moll/Ianus, 34 Barb. 620,

it was held that an election was not made void by the fact that one of the three

inspectors was by the statute disqualiﬁed from acting, by being a candidate at
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the election, the other two being qualiﬁed. In Spragne 1:. Norway, 31 Cal. 173,

it was decided that where the judges of an election could not read, and for that

reason a person who was not a member of the board took the ballots from the

box, and read them to the tellers, at the request of the judges, the election was

not affected by the irregularity.

’ This rule has certainly been applied with great liberality in some cases. In

People v. Higgins, 3 Mich. 233, it was held that the statute requiring ballots to

be sealed up in a package, and then locked up in the ballot-box, with the oriﬁce

at the top sealed, was directory merely, and that ballots which had been kept in

a locked box, but without the oriﬁce closed or the ballots sealed up, were admis-

sible in evidence in a contest for an office depending upon this election. This

case was followed in People v. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 283, and it was held that whether

the ballots were more satisfactory evidence than the inspector's certiﬁcates, where

a discrepancy appeared between them, was a question f'or the jury. In Morril

12. Haines, 2 N. H. 246, the statute required State oﬁicers to be chosen by a

check-list, and by delivery of the ballots to the moderator in person ; and it was

held that the requirement of a check-list was maudiatory, and the election in the

town was void if none was kept. The decision was put upon the ground that

the check-list was provided as an important guard against indiscriminate and

illegal voting, and the votes given by ballot without this protection were there-

fore as much void as if given viva voce. An election adjourned without warrant

to another place, as well as an election held without the officers required by law,

is void. Commonwealth v. County Commissioners, 5 Rawle, 75.

[ass]

1 People v. Cook, 14 Barb. 259, and 8 N.Y. 67.
To the same effect, see
Clifton v. Cook, 7 Ala. 114; Truehart v. Addicks, 2 Texas, 217; Dishon v.
Smith, 10 Iowa, 212; Attorney-General v. Ely, 4 Wis. 420; State t•. Jones, 19
Ind. 856 ; People v. Higgins, 3 Mich. 233; Gorham v. Campbell, 2 Cal. 185;
People v. Bates, 11 Mich. 362; Taylor v. Taylor, 10 :Minn. 112; People v.
McManus, 84 Barb. 620; Wbipley v. McCune, 12 Cal. 8.52; Bourland v. Hildreth,
26 Cal. 161; Day v. Kent, 1 Oregon, 123; Piatt v. People, 29lll. 54; Ewing v.
Filley, 43 Penn. St. 884; Howard v. Shields, 16 Ohio, N. s. 184; State v. Stumpf,
21 Wis. 579; McKinney v. O'Connor, 26 Texas, 5; Sprague v. Norway, 31 Cal.
173. In Ex parte Heath, 3 Hill, 42, it was held, that, where the statute required the inspectors to certify the result of the election on the next day thereafter, or sooner, the certificate made the second day thereafter was sufficient, the
statute as to time being directory merely. In People v. McManus, 84 Barb. 620,
it was held that an election was not made void by the fact that one of the three
inspectors was by the statute disqualified from acting, by being a candidate at
the election, the other two being qualified. In Sprague v. Norway, 31 Cal. 173,
it was decided that where the judges of an election could not read, and for that
reason a person who was not a member of the board took the ballots from the
box, and read them to the tellers, at the request of the judges, the election was
not affected by the irregularity.
1 This rule has certainly been applied with great liberality in some cases.
In
People v. Higgins, 3 .Mich. 233, it was held that the statute requiring ballots to
be sealed up in a package, and then locked up in the ballot-box, with the orifice
at the top sealed, was directory merely, and that ballots which bad been kept in
a locked box, but without the orifice closed or the ballots sealed up, were admissible in evidence in a contest for an offictl depending upon this election. This
case was followed in People v. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 283, and it was held that whether
the ballots were more satisfactory evidence than the inspector's certificates, where
a discrepancy appeared between them, was a question for the jury. In :Morril
v. Haines, 2 N. H. 246, the statute required State officers to be chosen by a
check-list, and by delivery of the ballots to the moderator in person ; and it was
held that the requirement of a check-list was mandatory, and the election in the
town was void if none was kept. The decision was put upon the ground that
the check-list was provided as an important guard against indiscriminate and
illegal voting, and the votes given by ballot without this protection were therefore as much void as if given viva voce. An election adjourned without warrant
to another place, as well as an election held without tbe officers required by law,
is void. Commonwealth v. County Commissioners, 6 Rawle, 75.
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affected by them} Time and place, however, are of the substance

of every election,’ and a failure to comply with the law in these

particulars is not generally to be treated as a mere irregularity?

l'Vhat is a Szgﬂicient Election.

Unless the law under which the election is held expressly

affected by them.1 Time and place, however, are of the substance
of every election,2 and a failure to comply with the law in these
particulars is not generally to be treated as a mere irregularity .3

requires more, a plurality of the votes cast will be sutiicient to

elect, notwithstanding these may constitute but a small

What is a Sufficient Election.

[* 620] portion of those ‘who are entitled to vote,‘ and notwith-

standing the voters generally may have failed to take

notice of the law requiring the election to be held.“

If several persons are to be chosen to the same oﬂice, the

requisite number who shall stand highest on the list will be elected.

But without such a plurality no one can be chosen to a public

oﬂice; and if the person receiving the highest number of votes

' Lanier v. Gallatas, 13 La. An. 175; People v. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 283; Tay-

lor v. Taylor, 10 Minn. 107.

’ Dickey v. Hurlburt, 5 Cal. 343; Knowles v. Yeates, 31 Cal. 82.

3 The statute of Michigan requires the clerks of election to keep lists of the

persons voting, and that at the close of the polls the ﬁrst duty of the inspectors

shall be to compare the lists with the number of votes in the box, and if the

count of the latter exceeds the former, then to draw out unopened and destroy a
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suﬂicient number to make them correspond. In People v. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 283,

it appeared that the inspectors in two wards of Detroit, where a surplus of votes

(Jnless the law under which the election is held expressly
requires more, a plurality of the votes cast will be sufficient to
elect, notwithstanding these may constitute but a small
[• 620] portion of those • who are entitled to vote,' and notwithstanding the voters generally may have failed to take
notice of the law requiring the election to be held. 5
If several persons are to be chosen to the same office, the
requisite number who shall stand highest on the list will be elected.
But without such a plurality no one can be chosen to a public
office ; and if the person receiving the highest number of votes

had been found, had neglected this duty, and had counted all the votes without

drawing out and destroying any. The surplus in the two wards was sixteen.

The actual majority of one of the candidates over the other on the count as it

stood (if certain other disputed votes were rejected) would be four. It was held

that this neglect of the inspectors did not invalidate the election; that had the

votes been drawn out, the probability was that each candidate would lose a num-

ber proportioned to the whole number which he had in the box; and this being

a probability which the statute providing for the drawing proceeded upon, the

court should apply it afterwards, apportioning the excess of votes between the

candidatesin that proportion.

‘ Augustin v. Eggleston, 12 La. An. 366; Gillespie v. Palmer, 20 \Vis. 544.

See also State v. Mayor, &c., of St. Joseph, 37 Mo. 270; State v. Binder, 38

Mo. 450.

° People v. Hartwell, 12 Mich. 508. Even if the majority expressly dissent,

yet if they do not vote, the election by the minority will be valid. Oldl-mow u.

Wainwright. 1 W'. Bl. 229; Rex v. Foxcroit, 2 Burr. 1017; Rex v. \Vithers,

referred to in same case. Minority representation in certain cases has been

introduced in New York and Illinois, and the principle is likely to ﬁnd favor

elsewhere. .

[cs4]

1 Lanier 11. Gallatas, 13 La. An. 175; People 11. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 283; Taylor"· Taylor, 10 Minn. 107.
1 Dickey v. Hurlburt, 5 Cal. 343; Knowles v. Yeates, 31 Cal. 82.
3 The statute of Michigan requires the clerks of election to keep lists of tbe
persons voting, and that at the close of the polls the first duty of the inspectors
shall be to compare the lists with the number of votes in the box, and if the
count of the latter exceeds the former, then to draw out unopened and destroy a
sufficient number to make them correspond. In People 11. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 283,
it appeared that the inspectors in two wards of Detroit, where a surplus of votes
had been found, had neglected this duty, and had counted all the votes without
drawing out and destroying any. The surplus in the two wards was sixteen.
The actual majority of one of the candidates over the other on the count as it
stood (if certain other disputed votes were rejected) would be four. It was held
that this neglect of the inspectors did not invalidate the election ; that had the
votes been drawn out, the probability was that each candidate would lose a number proportioned to the whole number which he had in the box ; and this being
a probability which the statute providing for the drawing proceeded upon, the
court should apply it afterwards, apportioning the excess of votes between the
candidatea.in that proportion.
4 Augustin 11. Eggleston, 12 La. An. 366; Gillespie 11. Palmer, 20 Wis. 544.
See also State 11. Mayor, &c., of St. Joseph, 37 Mo. 270; State "· Binder, 38
:Mo. 450.
• People v. Hartwell, 12 Micb. 508. Even if the majority expressly dissent,
yet if they do not vote, the election by the minority will be valid. Oldknow "·
Wainwright, 1 W. Bl. 229; Rex "· Foxcroft, 2 Burr. 1017; Rex 11. Withers,
referred to in same case. Minority representation in certain cases has been
introduced in New York and Illinois, and the principle is likely to find favor
elsewhere.

[ 684]
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was ineligible, the votes cast for him will. still be effectual so far
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as to prevent the opposing candidate being chosen, and the election

must be considered as having failed}

The admission of ‘illegal votes at an election will not necessarily

defeat it, but to warrant its being set aside on that ground it

should appear that the result would have been different had they

been excluded.” And the fact that unqualiﬁed persons are allowed

to enter the room, and participate in an election, does not justify

legal voters in refusing to vote, and treating the election as void,

but it will be held valid if the persons declared chosen had a

plurality of the legal votes actually cast.“ So it is held that an

exclusion of legal votes—not fraudulently, but through error in

judgment-— will not defeat an election ; notwithstanding the error

in such a case is one which there was no mode of correcting, even

by the aid of the courts, since it cannot be known with certainty

afterwards how the excluded electors would have voted, and it

would obviously be dangerous to receive and rely upon their sub-

sequent statements as to their intentions, after it is ascer-

tained precisely what eifect their * votes would have upon [‘ 621]

the result.‘ If, however, the inspectors of election shall

exclude legal voters, not because of honest error in judgment, but

wilfully and corruptly, and to an extent that affects the result, or
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if by riots or otherwise legal voters are intimidated and prevented

from voting, ‘or for any other reasons the electors have not had

opportunity for the expression of their sentiments through the

ballot-box, the election should be set aside altogether, as having

failed in the purpose for which it was called. Errors of judgment

' State v. Giles, 1 Chand. 112; Opinions of Judges, 38 Maine, 597; State v.

Smith, 14 ‘Via. 497; Saunders v. Haynes, 13 Cal. 145. But it has been held

that if the ineligibility is notorious, so that the electors must be deemed to have

voted with full knowledge of it, the votes for the ineligible candidate must be

declared void, and the next highest candidate is chosen. Gulick v. New, 14 Ind.

93; Carson v. McPhetridge, 15 Ind. 327. So if the law which creates the dis~

qualiﬁcation expressly declares all votes cast for the disqualiﬁed person void,

they must be treated as mere blank votes, and cannot be counted for any

purpose.

’ Ea: parte Murphy, 7 Cow. 153; First Parish in Sudbury v. Stearns, 21 Pick.

148; Blandford School District v. Gibbs, 2 Cush. 39; People v. Cicotte, 16 Mich.

283. Votes received illegally will be rejected by the court in an action to try

was ineligible, the votes cast for him will, still be effectual so far
as to pre;ent the opposing candidate being chosen, and the election
must be considered as having failed.!
The admission of· illegal votes at an election will not necessarily
defeat it, but to warrant its being set aside on timt ground it
should appear that the result would have been different had they
been excluded.2 And the fact that unqualified persons are allowed
to enter the room, and participate in an election, does not justify
legal voters in refusing to vote, and treating the election as void,
but it will be held valid if the persons declared chosen had a
plurality of the legal votes actually cast.8 So it is held that an
exclusion of legal votes- not fraudulently, but through error in
judgment- will not defeat an election ; notwithstanding the error
in such a case is one which there was no mode of correcting, even
by the aid of the courts, since it cannot be known with certainty
afterwards how the excluded electors would have voted, and it
would obviously be dangerous to receive and rely upon their subsequent statements as to their intentions, after it is ascertained precisely what effect their • votes would have upon [• 621]
the result.i If, however, the inspectors of election shall
exclude legal voters, not because of honest error in judgment, but
wilfully and corruptly, and to an extent that affects the result, or
if by riots or otherwise legal voters are intimidated and prevented
from voting, .or for any other reasons the electors have not had
opportunity for the expression of their sentiments through the
ballot-box, the election should be set aside altogether, as having
failed in the purpose for which it was called. Errors of judgment

title to an oliice. State v. Hilmantel, 21 Wis. 566.

' First Parish in Sudbury v. Stearns, 21 Pick. 148.

‘ Newcum v. Kirtley, 13 B. Monr. 515.

[ ass]

1 State v. Giles, 1 Chand. 112; Opinions of Judges, 88 Maine, 697; State v.
Smith, 14 Wis. 497; Saunders "· Haynes, 13 Cal. 146. But it has been held
that if the ineligibility is notorious, so that the electon must be deemed to have
voted with full knowledge of it, the votes for the ineligible candidate JDust be
declared void, and the next highest candidate is chosen. Gulick v. New, 14 Ind.
93; Carson v. McPhetridge, 16 Ind. 327. So if the law which creates the disqualification expressly declares all votes cast for the disqualified person "oid,
they must be treated as mere blank votes, and cannot be counted for any
purpose.
' Ez parte Murphy, 7 Cow. 153; First Parish in Sudbury"· Steams, 21 Pick.
148; Blandford School District"· Gibbs, 2 Cush. 89; People"· Cicotte, 161\Iich.
283. Votes received illegally will be rejected by the court in an action to try
title to an office. State "· Hilmantel, 21 Wis. 666.
3 First Parish in Sudbury"· Stearns, 21 Pick. 148.
' Newcum v. Kirtley, 18 B. Monr. 515.
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are inevitable, but fraud, intimidation, and violence the law can

[CH. :X:Vll.

and should protect against. A mere casual aﬁfray, however, or

accidental disturbance, without any intention of overawing or

intimidating the electors, cannot be considered as affecting the

freedom of the election ;1 nor in any case would electors be justi-

ﬁed in abandoning the ground for any light causes, or for improper

interference by others where the oﬂieers continue in the discharge

of their functions, and there is opportunity for the electors to vote?

And, as we have already seen, a failure of an election in one pre-

cinct, or disorder or violence which prevent a return from that

precinct, will not defeat the whole election, unless it appears that

the votes which could not be returned in consequence of the

violence would have changed the result.” It is a little diﬁicult at

times to adopt the true mean between those things which should

and those which should not defeat an election; for while on the

one hand the law should seek to secure the due expression of his

will by every legal voter, and guard against any irregularities or

misconduct that may tend to prevent it, so, on the other hand, it

is to be borne in mind that charges of irregularity and misconduct

are easily made, and that the dangers from throwing elections open

to be set aside or controlled by oral evidence, are perhaps as great

as any in our system. An election honestly conducted under the
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forms of law ought generally to stand, notwithstanding individual

electors may have been deprived of their votes, or unqualiﬁed

voters have been allowed to participate. Individuals may suffer

wrong in such cases, and a candidate who was the real choice of

the people may sometimes be deprived of his election ; but as it is

generally impossible to arrive at any greater certainty of

[* 622] ‘result by resort to oral evidence, public policy is best

subserved by allowing the election to stand, and trusting

to a strict enforcement of the criminal laws for greater security

against the like irregularities and wrongs in the future.

The Canvass and the Return.

If the election is purely a local one, the inspectors who have had

charge of the election canvass the votes and declare the result. If,

' Cush. Leg. Assemb. § 184.

' See First Parish in Sudbury v. Stearns, 21 Pick. 148.

“ Exparte Heath, 3 Hill. 42. See ante, p. 616 and note.

. 7 7 _ i id‘

[ ass]

are inevitable, but fraud, intimidation, and violence the law can
and should protect against. A mere casual affray, however, or
accidental disturbance, without any intention of overawing or
intimidating ~he electors, cannot be considered as affecting the
freedom of the election ; 1 nor in any case would electors be justified in abandoning the ground for any light causes, or for improper
interference by others where the officers continue in the discharge
of their functions, and there is opportunity for the electors to vote.2
And, as we have already seen, a failure of an election in one precinct, or disorder or violence which prevent a return from that
precinct, will not defeat the whole election, unless it appears that
the votes which could not be returned in consequence of the
violence would have changed the result. 8 It is a little difficult at
times to adopt the true mean between those things which should
and those which should not defeat an election ; for while on the
one hand the law should seek to secure the due expression of his
will by every legal voter, and guard against any irregularities or
misconduct that may tend to prevent it, so, on the other hand, it
is to be borne in mind that charges of irregularity and misconduct
are easily made, and that the dangers from throwing elections open
to be set aside or controlled by oral evidence, are perhaps as great
as any in our system. .An election honestly conducted under the
forms of law ought generally to stand, notwithstanding individual
electors may have been deprived of their votes, or unqualified
voters have been allowed to participate. Individuals may suffer
wrong in such cases, and a candidate who was the real choice of
the people may sometimes be deprived of his election ; but as it is
generally impossible to arrive at any greater certainty of
[* 622] *result by resort to oral evidence, public policy is best
subservod by allowing the election to stand, and trusting
to a strict enforcement of the criminal laws for greater security
against the like irregularities and wrongs in the future.

The Canvass and the Return.
If the election is purely a local one, the inspectors who have had
charge of the election canvass the votes and declare the result. If,
1
1
3

Cush. Leg. Assemb. § 184.
See First Parish in Sudbury v. Steams, 21 Pick. 148.
Ex parte Heath, 3 Hill. 42. See ante, p. 616 and note.
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on the other hand, their district is one precinct of a larger district,
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they make return in writing of the election over which they have

presided to‘ the proper board of the larger district, and if the

election is for State oﬁicers,_ this district board will transmit the

result of the district canvass to the proper State board, who will

declare the general result. In all this the several boards act for

the most part ministerially only, and are not vested with judicial

powers to correct the errors and mistakes that may have occurred

with any oﬂicer who preceded them in the performance of any duty

connected with the election, or to pass upon any disputed fact

which may affect the result. Each board is to receive the returns

transmitted to it, if in due form, as correct, and is to ascertain and

declare the result as shown by such returns ;1 and if other matters

are introduced into the return than those which the law provides,

they are to that extent unoﬂicial, and such statements must be

disregarded.“ If a district or State board of canvasscrs assumes to

reject returns transmitted to it on other grounds than those appear-

ing upon its face,_or to declare persons elected who are not shown

by the returns to have received the requisite plurality, it is usurp-

ing functions, and its conduct will be reprehensible, if not even

criminal. The action of such boards is to be carefully conﬁned to

an examination of the papers-before them, and a determi-
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nation of the ‘ result therefrom, in the light of such facts [* 623]

of public notoriety connected with the election as every

one takes notice of, and which may enable them to apply such

ballots as are in any respect imperfect to the proper candidates or

ofﬁces for which they are intended, provided the intent is suﬁi-

ciently indicated by the ballot in connection with such facts, so

that extraneous evidence is not necessary for this purpose. If

canvassers refuse or neglect to perform their duty, they may be

‘ Ea: parie Heath, 3 Hill, 42; Brower -v. O’Brien, 2 Ind. 423; People v. Hil-

liard, 29 Ill. 413; People v. Jones, 19 Ind. 357; Ballou v. York County Com’rs,

13 Shep. 491; Mayo o. Freeland, 10 Mo. 629; Thompson v. Circuit Judge,

9 Ala. 338; People v. Kilduif, 15 Ill. 492; O‘Farrell v. Colby, 2 Minn. 180;

People v. Van Cleve, 1 Mich. 362; People v. Van Slyck, 4 Cow. 297; Morgan

v. Quackenbush, 22 Barb. 72; Dishon v. Smith, 10 Iowa, 212; People v. Cook,

14 Barb. 259, and 8 N. Y. 67 ; Hartt v. Harvey, 32 Barb. 55; Attorney-General

v. Barstow, 4 Wis. 567; Attorney-General v. Ely, ib. 420; State v. Governor,

1 Dutch. 331; State v. Clerk of Passaic, ib. 354; Marshall v. Kerns, 2 Swan,

68; People v. Pease, 27 N. Y. 45-

' Ex parte Heath, 3 Hill, 42.
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on the other hand, their· district is one precinct of a larger district,
they make return in writing of the election over which they have
presided to· the proper board of the larger district, and if the
election is for State officers,, this district board will transmit the
result of the district canvass to the proper State board, who will
declare the general result. In all this the several boards act for
the most part ministerially only, and are not vested with judicial
powers to correct the errors and mistakes that may have occurred
with any officer who preceded them in the performance of any duty
connected with the election, or to pass upon any disputed fact
which may affect the result. Each board is to receive the returns
transmitted to it, if in due form, as correct, and is to ascertain and
declare the result as shown by such returns ; 1 and if other matters
are introduced into the return than those which the law provides,
they are to that extent unofficial, and such statements must be
disregarded.2 If a district or State board of canvassers assumes to
reject returns transmitted to it on other grounds than those appearing upon its face, or to declare persons elected who are not shown
by the returns to have received the requisite plurality, it is usurping functions, and its conduct will be reprehensible, if not even
criminal. The action of such boards is to be carefully confined to
an examination of the papers· before them, and a determination of the • result therefrom, in the light of such facts [* 623]
of public notoriety connected with the election as every
one takes notice of, and which may enable them to apply such
ballots as are in any respect imperfect to the proper candidates or
offices for which they are intended, pro¥ided the intent is sufficiently indicated by the ballot in connection with such facts, so
that extraneous evidence is not necessary for this purpose. If
canvassers refuse or neglect to perform their duty, they may be
1 Ex parte Heath, 3 Hill, 42; Brower ·v. O'Brien, 2 Ind. 423; People v. Hilliard, 291ll. 413; People v. Jones, 19 Ind. 357; Ballou v. York County Com'rs,
18 Sbep. 491; Mayo v. Freeland, 10 1\lo. 629; Thompson v. Circuit Judge,
9 Ala. 338; PeoP.le v. Kilduff, 15 Ill. 492; O'Farrell v. Colby, 2 Minn. 180;
People v. Van Cleve, 1 Mich. 362; People v. Van Slyck, 4 Cow. 297; Morgan
v. Quackenbush, 22 Barb. 72; Dishon v. Smith, 10 Iowa, 212; People v. Cook,
14 Barb. 259, and 8 N.Y. 67; Hartt v. Harvey, 32 Barb. 55; Attorney-General
v. Barstow, 4 Wis. 567; Attorney-General v. Ely, i'b. 420; State v. Governor,
1 Dutch. 831 ; State v. Clerk of Passaic, ib. 354; Marshall v. Kerns, 2 Swan,
68; People v. Pease, 27 N. Y. 45.
1 Ex parte Heath, 3 Hill, 42.
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compelled by mandamus; though as these boards are created for a
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single purpose only, and are dissolved by an adjournment without

day, it would seem that, after such adjournment, mandamus would

be inapplicable, inasmuch as there is no longer any board which

can act;1 and the board themselves, having once performed and

fully completed their duty, have no power afterwards to reconsider

their determination and come to a different conclusion.”

Contesting Elections.

As the election officers perform for the most part ministerial

functions only, their returns, and the certiﬁcates of election which

are issued upon them, are not conclusive in favor of the oﬂicers

who would thereby appear to be chosen, but the ﬁnal decision must

compelled by mandamus ; though as these boards are created for a
single purpose only, and are dissolved by an adjournment without
day, it would seem that, after such adjournment, mandamus would
be inapplicable, inasmuch as there il~ no longer any board which
can act; 1 and the board themselves, having once performed and
fnlly completed their duty, have no power afterwards to reconsider
their determination and come to a different conclusion.2

rest with the courts.“ This is the general rule, and the exceptions

are of those cases where the law under which the canvass is made

Contesting Elections.

declares the decision conclusive, or where a special statutory board

is established with powers of ﬁnal decision.‘ And it

[* 624] matters not how ‘high and important the oﬂice; an

election to it is only made by the candidate receiving

the requisite plurality of the legal votes cast; and if any one,

without having received such plurality, intrudes into an oﬂﬁce,

‘ Clark v. Buchanan, 2 Minn. 346; People v. Supervisors, 12 Barb. 217.

’ Hadley v. Mayor, &c., 33 N. Y. 603; State v. Warren, 1 Houston, 43;
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State v. Harrison, 38 Mo. 540.

3 State v. Justices of Middlesex, Coxe, 244; Hill v. Hill, 4 McCord, 277;

\Vammack v. Holloway, 2 Ala. 31; State v. Clerk of Passaie, 1 Dutch. 354;

Marshall v. Kcrns, 2 Swan, 68; Attorney-General v. Barstow, 4 Wis. 567 ; At-

torney-General v. Ely, ib. 420; People v. Van Cleve, 1 Mich. 362; People

v. Higgins, 3 Mich. 233; Dishon v. Smith, 10 Iowa, 211; State v. Johnson, 17

Ark. 407; State v. Fttter, 12 Wis. 566; State v. Avery, 14 Wis. 122; People v.

Jones, 20 Cal. 50; Newcum v. Kirtley, 13 B. Monr. 515; People v. Van Slyck, 4

Cow. 297; People v. Vail, 20 Wend. 12; People v. Seaman, 5 Denio, 409; Peo-

ple v. Cook, 14 Barb. 259, and 8 N. Y. 67; People v. Matteson, 17 Ill. 167;

As the election officers perform for the most part ministerial
functions only, their returns, and the certificates of election which
are issued upon them, are not conclusive in favor of the officers
who would thereby appear to be chosen, but the final decision must
rest with the courts.8 This is the general rule, and the exceptions
are of those cases where the law under which the canvass is made
declares the decision conclusive, or where a special statutory board
is established with powers of final decision.4 And it
[• 624] matters not how • high and importatit the office; an
election to it is only made by the candidate receiYiug
the requisite plurality of the legal votes cast; and if any one,
without having r~ceived such plurality, intrudes into an office,

Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Minn. 107; Calaveras County v. Brockway, 30 Cal. 325.

‘ See Grier v. Shackleford, Const. Rep. 642; Batman v. Megowan, 1 Met.

(Ky.) 533; People v. Goodwin, 21 Mic-h.; State v. Marlow, 15 Ohio, N. S. 114.

F or the proceedings in the State of New York in the canvass of votes for governor

in 1792, where the election of John Jay to that oﬂice was defeated by the rejec-

tion of votes cast for him for certain irregularities, which under the more recent

judicial decisions, ought to have been overlooked, see Hammond’s Political His-

tory of New York, ch. 3. The law then in force made the decision of the State

canvassers ﬁnal and conclusive.

[ ass]

Clark v. Buchanan, 2 Minn. 846; People v. Supervisors, 12 Barb. 217.
Hadley o. Mayor, &c., 33 N. Y. 608; State o. Warren, 1 Houston, 48;
State o. Harrison, 88 Mo. 540.
3 State v. Justices of Middlesex, Coxe, 244; Hill o. Hill, 4 McCord, 277 ;
)Vammack v. Holloway, 2 Ala. 81; State v. Clerk of Passaic, 1 Dutch. 3.'>4;
Marshall v. Kerns, 2 Swan, 68; Attorney-General o. Barstow, 4 Wis. 567; Attorney-General v. Ely, ib. 420; People v. Van Cleve, 1 Mich. 862; People
o. Higgins, 3 Mich. 233; Dishon o. Smith, 10 Iowa, 211; State v. Johnson, 17
Ark. 407; State v. Fltter, 12 Wis. 566; State o. Avery, 14 Wis. 122; People t'.
Joues, 20 Cal. 50; Newcum v. Kirtley, 13 B. Monr. 615; People v. Van Slyck, 4
Cow. 297 ; People v. Vail, 20 Wend. 12; People v. Seaman, 5 Denio, 409; l'eople v. Cook, 14 Barb. 269, and 8 N.Y. 67; People v. Matteson, 17 Ill. 167;
Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Minn. 107; Calaveras County v. Brockway, 30 Cal. 325.
4 See Grier o. Shackleford, Const. Rep. 642; Batman v. Mcgowan, 1 Met.
(Ky.) 633; People o. Goo.dwin, 21 Mich.; State v. Marlow, 15 Ohio, N. s. 114.
:For the proceedings in the State of New York in the canvass of votes for governor
in 17!J2, where the election of John Jay to that office was defeated by the rejection of votes cast for him for certain irregularities, which under the more recent
judicial decisions, ought to have been overlooked, see Ham1Mnd'1 Political History of New York, ch. 3. The law then in force made the decision of the State
canvassers final and conclush·e.
1

1
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whether with or without a certiﬁcate of election, the courts have
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jurisdiction to oust, as well as to punish him for such in-

trusion.1

Where, however, the question arises collaterally, and not in a

direct proceeding to try the title to the ofﬁce, the correctness of the

decision of the canvassers cannot be called in question, but must

be conclusively presumed to be correct ;2 and where the election

was to a legislative office, the ﬁnal decision, as well by parlia-

mentary law as by constitutional provisions, rests with the legisla-

tive body itself, and the courts, as we have heretofore seen,3 cannot

interfere. _

The most important question which remains to be mentioned,

relates to the evidence which the courts are at liberty to receive,

and the facts which it is proper to spread before the jury

for their ‘consideration when an issue is made upon an [* 625]

election for trial at law.

The questions involved in every case are, ﬁrst, has there been an

‘ Barstow, being Governor of Wisconsin, was candidate for re-election against

Bashford. A majority of the votes was cast for Bashford, but certain spurious

returns were transmitted to the State canvassers, which, together with the legal

returns, showed a plurality for Barstow. and he was accordingly declared chosen.

Proceedings being taken against him by qua warranto -in the Supreme Court,
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Barstow objected to the jurisdiction, on the ground that the three departments of

the State government, the legislative, the executive, and the judicial, were equal,

co-ordinate, and independent of each other, and that each department must be

whether with or without a certificate of election, the courts have
jurisdiction to oust, as well as to punish him for such intrusion.1
Where, however, the question arises collaterally, and not in a
direct proceeding to try the title to the office, the correctness of the
decision of the canvassers cannot be called in question, but must
be conclusively presumed to be correct; 2 and where the election
was to a legislative office, the final decision, as well by parliamentary law as by constitutional provisioils, rests with the legisla' we have heretofore seen,a cannot
tive body itself, and the courts, as
interfere.
The most important question which remains to be mentioned,
relates to the e~"idence which the courts are at liberty to receive,
and the facts which it is proper to spread before the jury
for their • consideration when an issue is made upon an [* 625]
election for trial at law.
The questions involved in every case are, first, has there been au

and is the ultimate judge of the election andiqualiﬁcation of its own member or

members, subject only to impeachment and appeal to the people; that the question

who is rightfully entitled to the otﬁce of governor could in no case become a

judicial question; and that as the constitution provides no means for ousting a

successful usurper of either of the three departments of the government, that

power rests exclusively with the people, to be exercised by them whenever they

think the exigency requires it. A strange doctrine in this country of laws! but

which, of course, received no countenance from the able court to which it was

addressed. In People v. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 283, the opinion is expressed by two

of the judges, that one claiming a public oﬂice has a constitutional right to a trial

by jury, and that this right cannot be taken away from him by any law which

shall undertake to make the decision of the canvassing board conclusive. But see

Ewing v. Filley, 43 Penn. St. 384; Commonwealth v. Leech, 44 Penn. St. 332.

' Morgan v. Quackenbush, 22 Barb. 72; Hadley v. Mayor, &c., 33 N. Y. 603.

And see Hulseman v. Rens, 41 Penn. St. 396, where it was held that the court

could not interfere summarily to set aside a certiﬁcate of election, where it did

not appear that the officers had acted corruptly, notwithstanding it was shown to

be based in part upon forged returns.

3 See ante, p. 133. See also Commonwealth v. Meeser, 44 Penn. St. 341.

. 4”‘ [689]

1 Barstow, being Governor of Wisconsin, was candidate for re-election against
Bashford. A majority of the vote~ was cast for Bashford, but certain spurious
returns were transmitted to the State canvassers, which, together with the legal
returns, showed a plurality for Barstow. and he was accordingly declared chosen.
Proceedings being taken against him by quo warranto ·in the Supreme Court,
Barstow objected to the jurisdiction, on the ground that the three departments of
the State government, the legislative, the executive, and the judicial, were equal,
co-ordinate, and independent of each other, and that each department must be
and is the ultimate judge of the election and 'qualification of its own member or
members, subject only to impeachment and appeal to the people; that the question
who is rightfully entitled to the office of governor could in no case become a
judicial question; and that as the constitution provides no means for ousting a
successful usurper of either of the three departments of the government, that
power rests exclusively with the people, to be exercised by them whenever they
think the exigency requires it. A strange doctrine in this country of laws ! but
which, of course, received no countenance from the able court to which it was
addressed. In People v. Cicotte, 16 1\lich. 288, the opinion is expressed by two
of the judges, that one claiming a public office has a constitutional right to a trial
by jury, and that this right cannot be taken away from him by any law which
shall undertake to make the decision of the canvassing board conclusive. But see
Ewing v. Filley, 43 Penn. St. 384; Commonwealth v. Leech, 44 Penn. St. 332.
1 Morgan v. Quackenbush, 22 Barb. 72; Hadley v. Mayor, &c., 33 N.Y. 603.
And see Hulseman v. Reus, 41 Penn. St. 396, where it was held that the court
could not interfere summarily to set aside a certificate of election, where it did
not appear that the officers had acted corruptly, notwithstanding it was shown to
be based in part upon forged returns.
3 See ante, p. 133.
See also Commonwealth v. Meeser, H Penn. St. 341.
44
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election? and second, was the party who has taken possession of
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the oﬂice the successful candidate at such election, by having

received a majority of the legal votes cast? These are ques-

tions which involve mixed considerations of law and fact, and

the proper proceeding in which to try them in the courts is by qua

warranto, when no special statutory tribunal is created for the

purpose.‘

Upon the ﬁrst question, we shall not add to what we have

already said. When the second is to be considered, it is to be

constantly borne in mind that the point of inquiry is the will qf the

electors as ma'n1§fested by their ballots; and to this should all the

evidence be directed, and none that does not bear upon it should

be admissible. .

We have already seen that the certiﬁcates or determinations of

the various canvassing boards, though conclusive in collateral

inquiries, do not preclude an investigation by the courts into_ the

facts which they certify. They are pr-ima facie evidence, however,

even in the courts ;2 and this is so, notwithstanding they appear to

have been altered; the question of their fairness in such a case

being for the jury.3 But back of this prinm faeie case the courts

may go, and the determinations of the State board may be corrected

by those of the district boards, and the latter by the ballots them-
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selves when the ballots are still in existence and have been kept as

required by law.‘ If, however, the ballots have not been kept

as required by law, and surrounded by such securities as the law

has prescribed with a view to their safe preservation as the best

evidence of the election,it would seem that they should not be

received in evidence at a1l,5 or, if received, that it should be left to

the jury to determine, upon all the circumstances of the case,

whether they constitute more reliable evidence than the inspectors’

‘ People v. Matteson, 17 Ill. 167.

' Marshall v. Kerns, 2 Swan, 68; Morgan v. Quackenbush, 22 Barb.

Calaveras County v. Brockway, 30 Cal. 325. ~

“ State v. Adams, 2 Stew. 231.

‘ People v. Van Cleve, 1 Mich. 362; People 0. Higgins, 3 Mich. 233; State

v. Clerk of Passaic, 1 Dutch. 354; State v. Judge, &c., 13 Ala. 80-5; People v.

Cook, 1-L Barb. 259; Same Case, 8 N. Y. 67; People v. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 263.

The ballot is always the best evidence of the voter‘s action. Wheat v. Ragsdale,

27 Ind. 191 ; People v. Holden, 28 Cal. 123.

° People v. Sackett, 1-L Mich. 320. But see People 1:. Higgins, 3 Mich.

233.

-1
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election? and second, was the party who has taken possession of
the office the successful candidate at such election, by having
received a majority of the legal votes cast ? These are questions which involve mixed considerations of law and faci, and
the proper proceeding in which to try them in the courts is by quo
warranto, when no special statutory tribunal is created for the
purpose.1
Upon the first question, we shall not add to what we have
already said. When the second is to be considered, it is to be
constantly borne in mind that the point of inquiry is the will of the
electors as manifested by their ballots; and to this should all the
evidence be directed, and none that does not bear upon it should
•
be admissible.
We have already seen that the certificates or determinations of
the various canvassing ·boards, though conclusive in collateral
inquiries, do not preclude au investigation by the courts into. the
facts which they certify. They are prima facie evidence, however,
even in the courts ; 2 and this is so, notwithstanding they appear to
have been altered ; the question of their fairness in such a case
being for the jury.3 But back of this prima facie case the courts
may go, and the determinations of the State boa1·d may be corrected
by those of the district boards, and the latter by the ballots themselves when the ballots are still in existence and have been kept as
required by law.4 If, however, the ballots have not been kept
as required by law, and surrounded by such securities as the law
has prescribed with a view to their safe preservation as the best
evidence of the election, it would seem that they should not be
received in evidence at all,6 or, if received, that it should be left to
the jury to determine, upon all the circumstances of the case,
whether they constitute more reliable evidence than the inspectors'
People v. Matteson, 17 Ill. 167.
:Marshall ~'· Kerns, 2 Swan, 68; Morgan v. Quackenbush, 22 Barb. 72;
Calaveras County v. Brockway, SO Cal. 325.
~ State v. Adams, 2 Stew. 2:H.
4 People v. Van Cleve, 1 Mich. 862; People v. Higgins, 8 Mich. 238; State
v. Clerk of Passaic, 1 Dutch. 854; State v. Judge, &c., 18 Ala. 805; People v.
Cook, 1! Barb. 259 ; Same Case, 8 N. Y. 67 ; People v. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 2i:!8.
The ballot is always the best evidence of the voter's action. Wheat v. Ragsdale,
27 Ind. 191; People v. Holden, 28 Cal. 128.
& People ~'· Sackett, 14 Mich. 820.
But see People ~'· Higgins, 8 Mich.
2SS.
1

~
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certiﬁcate,‘ which is usually prepared immediately on the
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close of *‘ the election, and upon actual count of the ballots [" 626]

as then made by the oﬂicers whose duty it is to do so.

Something has already been said regarding the evidence which

can be received where the elector’s ballot is less complete and

perfect in its expression of intention than it should have been.

There can be no doubt under the authorities that, whenever a

question may arise as to the proper application of a ballot, any

evidence is admissible with a view to explain and apply it which

would be admissible under the general rules of evidence for the

purpose of explaining and applying other written instruments.

But the rule, as it appears to us, ought not to\go further. The

evidence ought to be conﬁned to proof of the concomitant circum-

stances; such circumstances as may be proved in support or

explanation of a contract, where the parties themselves would not

be allowed to give testimony as to their actual intention, when

unfortunately the intention was ineffectually expressed? And we

have seen that no evidence is admissible as to how parties intended

to vote who were wrongfully prevented or excluded from so doing.

Such a case is one of wrong without remedy, so far as candidates

are concernedﬁ’ There is more diﬂiculty, however, when the

question arises whether votes which have been cast by incompetent
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persons, and which have been allowed in the canvass, can after-

wards be inquired into and rejected because of the want of

qualiﬁcation.

If votes were taken viva voce, so that it could always be deter-

mined with absolute certainty how every person had voted, the

objections to this species of scrutiny after an election had been held

would not be very formidable. But when secret balloting is the

policy of the law, and no one is at liberty to inquire how any

elector has voted, except as he may voluntarily have waived his

privilege, and when consequently the avenues to correct informa-

tion concerning the votes cast are carefully guarded against judicial

exploration, it seems exceedingly dangerous to permit any ques-

tion to be raised upon this subject. For the evidence voluntarily

given upon any such question will usually come from those least

' People v. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 283.

’ People v. Pease, 27 N. Y. 84, per Denio, Ch. J., commenting upon preﬁ.

ous New York cases. See also Attorney-General v. Ely, -1 Wis. 420.

' See ante, 620.
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certificate,1 which is usually prepared immediately on the
close of* the election, and upon actual count of the ballots [• 626]
as then made by the officers whose duty it is to do so.
Something has already been said regarding the evidence which
can be received where the elector's ballot is less complete and
perfect in its expression of intention than it should have been.
There can be no doubt under the authorities that, whenever a
question may arise as to the proper application of a ballot, any
evidence is admissible with a view to explain and apply it which
would be admissible under the general rules of evidence for the
purpose of explaining and applying other written instruments.
But the rule, as it appears to us, ought not to. go further. The
evidence ought to be confined to proof of the concomitant circumstances ; such circumstances as may be proved in support or
explanation of a contract, where the parties themselves would not
be allowed to give testimony as to their actual intention, when
unfortunately the intention was ineffectually expressed.2 And we
have seen that no evidence is admissible as to how parties intended
to vote who were wrongfully prevented or excluded from so doing.
Such a case is one of wrong without remedy, so far as candidates
are concerned.3 There is more difficulty, however, when the
question arises whether votes which have been cast by incompetent
persons, and which have been allowed in the canvass, can afterwards be inquired into and rejected because of the want of
qualification.
If votes were taken viva voce, so that it could always be determined with absolute certainty how every person had voted, the
objections to this species of scrutiny after an eJection had been held
would not be very formidable. But when secret balloting is the
policy of the law, and no one is at liberty to inquire how any
elector has voted, except as he may voluntarily have waived his
privilege, and when consequently the avenues to correct iuformation concerning the votes cast are carefully guarded against judicial
exploration, it seems exceedingly dangerous to permit any question to be raised upon this subject. For the evidence voluntarily
given upon any such question will usually come from those least
People v. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 283.
People v. Pease, 27 N.Y. 84, per Denio, Ch. J., commenting upon previous New York cases. See also Attorney-General,, Ely, 4 Wis. 420.
• See ante, 620.
1

1
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worthy of credit, who, if they have voted without legal right in

• 626
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' order to elect particular candidates, will be equally ready

[* 627] to testify * falsely, if their testimony can be made to help

the same candidates ; especially when, if they give evidence

that they voted the opposing ticket, there can usually be no means, as

they will well know, of showing the evidence to be untrue. More-

over, to allow such scrutiny is to hold out strong temptation to

usurpation of oﬁice, without pretence or color of right; since the

nature of the case, and the forms and proceedings necessary to a

trial are such that, if an issue may be made on the right of every

individual voter, it will he easy, in the case of important elections,

to prolong a contest for the major part if not the whole of an

oﬂicial term, and to keep perpetually before the courts the same

excitements, strifes, and animosities which characterize the hust-

ings, and which ought, for the peace of the community, and the

safety and stability of our institutions, to terminate with the close

of the polls.‘

Upon this subject there is very little judicial authority, though

legislative bodies, deriving their precedents from England, where

the system of open voting prevails, have always been accustomed

to receive such evidence, and have indeed allowed a latitude of

inquiry which makes more to depend upon the conscience of the
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witnesses, and of legislative committees, in some cases, than upon

the legitimate action of the voters. The question of the right to

inquire into the qualiﬁcations of those who had voted at an election,

on a proceeding in the nature of a. quo warranto, was directly

presented in one case to the Supreme Court of New York, and the

court was equally divided upon it.2 On error to the Court of

Appeals, a decision in favor of the right was rendered with the

concurrence of ﬁve judges, against three dissentients.3 The same

question afterwards came before the Supreme Court of Michigan,

and was decided the same way, though it appears from the opinions

that the court were equally divided in their views.‘ To these

cases we must refer for a full discussion of the reasons inﬂuencing

1 This is one reason, perhaps, why in the case of State oﬁicers a statutory

tribunal is sometimes provided with powers of summary and ﬁnal decision.

’ People v. Pease, 30 Barb. 588.

' People v. Pease, 29 N. Y. 45.

‘ People v. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 283.
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worthy of credit, who, if they have voted without legal right in
order to elect particular candidates, will be equally ready
[* 627] to testify • falsely, if their testimony can be made to help
the same candidates; especially when, if they give evidence
that they voted the opposing ticket, there can usually be no means, as
they will well know, of showing the evidence to be untrue. Moreover, to allow such scrutiny is to hold out strong temptation to
usurpation of office, without pretence or color of right ; since the
nature of the case, and the forms and proceedings necessary to a
trial are such that, if an issue may be made on the right of every
individual voter, it will be easy, in the case of important elections,
to prolong a contest for the major part if not the whole of an
official term, and to keep perpetually before the courts the same
excitements, strifes, and animosities which characterize the hustings, and which ought, for the peace of the community, and the
safety and stability of our institutions, to terminate with the close
of the polls.1
Upon this subject there is very little judicial authority, though
legislative bodies, deriving their precedents from EnglaiH:i, where
the system of open voting prevails, have always been accustomed
to receive such evidence, and have indeed allowed a latitude of
inquiry which makes more to depend upon the conscience of the
witnesses, and of legislative committees, in some cases, than upon
the legitimate action of the voters. The question of the right to
inquire into the qualifications of those who had voted at an election,
on a proceeding in the nature of a quo warranto, was directly
presented in one case to the Supreme Court of New York, and the
court was equally divided upon it.2 On error to the Court of
Appeals, a decision in favor of the right was rendered with the
concurrence of five judges, against three dissentients.8 The same
question afterwards came before the Supreme Court of Michigan,
and was decided the same way, though it appears from the opinions
that the court were equally divided in their views. 4 To these
cases we must refer for a full discussion of the reasons influencing
1 This is one reason, perhaps, why in the case of State officers a statutory
tribunal is sometimes provided with powers of summary and final decision.
1 People v. Pease, 80 Barb. 588.
1 People v. Pease, 29 N. Y. 45.
• People v. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 283.
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authoritative settlement} .

' Considerable stress was laid by the majority of the New York Court of

Appeals on the legislative practice, which, as it seems to us, is quite too loose in

these cases to constitute a safe guide. Some other rulings in that case also seem

the several judges; but future decisions alone can give the question
authoritative settlement,!

more latitudinarian than is warranted by sound principle and a due regard to the

secret ballot system which we justly esteem so important. Thus, Selden, J .,

says: “VVhen a voter refuses to disclose or fails to remember for whom he voted,

I think it is competent to resort to circumstantial evidence to raise a presump-

tion in regard to that fact. Such is the established rule in election eases before

legislative committees, which assume to be governed by legal rules of evidence

(Cush. Leg. Assem. §§ 199 and 200); and within that rule it was proper, in

connection with the other circumstances stated by the witness Loitis, to ask him

for whom he intended to vote; not, however, on the ground that his intention,

as an independent fact, could be material, but on the ground that it was a cir-

cumstance tending to raise a presumption for whom heidid vote.” Now as, in

the absence of fraud or mistake, you have arrived at a knowledge of how the

man voted, when you have ascertained how, at the time, he intended to vote, it

is dillicult to discover much value in the elector’s privilege of secrecy under this

ruling. And if “ circumstances ” may be shown to determine how he probably

voted, in cases where he insists upon his constitutional right to secrecy, then, as

it appears to us, it would be better to abolish altogether the secret ballot than to
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continue longer a system which falsely promises secrecy, at the same time that it

gives to party spies and informers full license to invade the voter’s privilege in

secret and surreptitious ways, and which leaves jurors, in the absence of any

deﬁnite information, to act upon their guesses, surmises, and vague conjectures

as to the contents of a ballot.

Upon the right to inquire into the qualiﬁcations of those who have voted, in a

proceeding by quo warranto to test the right to a public oflice, Justice Chris-

tiancy, in People v. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 311, expresses his views as follows : —

“ I cannot go to the extent of holding that no inquiry is admissible in any case

into the qualiﬁcation of voters or the nature of the votes given. Such a rule, I

admit, would be easy of application, and, as a general rule, might not be produc-

tive of a great amount of injustice, while the multitude of distinct-questions of

fact in reference to the great number of voters whose qualiﬁcations may be con-

tested, is liable to lead to some embarrassment, and sometimes to protracted

trials, without a more satisfactory result than would have been attained under a

rule which should exclude all such inquiries. Still, I cannot avoid the conclusion

that in theory and spirit our constitution and our statutes recognize as valid

those votes only which are given by electors who possess the constitutional quali-

ﬁcations; that they recognize as valid such elections only as are effected by the

votes of a majority of such qualiﬁed electors; and though the election boards of

inspectors and canvassers, acting only ministerially, are bound in their decisions

by the number of votes deposited in accordance with the forms of law regulating

their action, it is quite evident that illegal votes may have been admitted by the

perjury or other fault of the voters, and that the majority to which the inspectors
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1 Considerable stress was laid by the majority of the New York Court of
Appeals on the legislative practice, which, as it seems to us, is quite too loose in
these cases to constitute a safe guide. Some other rulings in that case also seem
more latitudinarian than is warranted by sound principle and a due regard to the
secret ballot system which we justly esteem so important. Thus, Selden, J .,
says: "When a voter refuses to disclose or fails to remember for whom he voted,
I think it is competent to resort to drcumstantial evidence to raise a presumption in regard to that fact. Such is the established rule in election cases before
legislative committees, which assume to be governed by legal rules of evidence
(Cush. Leg. Assem. §§ 199 and 200); and within that rule it was proper, in
connection with the other circumstances stated by the witness Loftis, to ask him
for whom he intended to vote; not, however, on the ground that his intention,
as an independent fact, could be material, but on the ground that it was a circumstance tending to raise a presumption for whom he~did vote." Now as, in
the absence of fraud or mistake, you have arrived at a knowledge of how the
mari voted, when you have ascertained how, at the time, he intended to vote, it
is difficult to discover much value in the elector's privilege of secrecy under this
ruling. And if " circumstances " may be shown to determine how he probably
voted, in cases where he insists upon his constitutional right to secrecy, then, as
it appears to us, it would be better to abolish altogether the secret ballot than to
continue longer a system which falsely promises secrecy, at the same time that it
gives to party spies and informers full license to invade the voter's privilege in
secret and surreptitious ways, and which leaves jurors, in the absence of any
definite information, to act upon their guesses, surmises, and vague conjectures
as to the contents of a ballot.
·
Upon the right to inquire into the qualifications of those who have voted, in a
proceediog by quo warranto to test the right to a public office, Justice Cltristiancy, in People v. Cicotte, 16 Mich. 811, expresses his views as follows:" I cannot go to the extent of holdiog that no inquiry is admissible in any case
into the qualification of Yoters or the nature of the votes given. Such a rule, I
admit, would be easy of application, and, as a general rule, might not be productive of a great amount of injustice, while the multitude of distinct· questions of
fact in reference to the great number of voters whose qualifications may be contested, is liable to lead to some embarrassment, and sometimes to protracted
trials, without a more satisfactory result than would have been attained under a
rule which should exclude all such inquiries. Still, I cannot avoid the conclusion
that in theory and spirit our constitution and our statutes recognize as valid
those votes only which are given by electors who possess the constitutional qualifications; that they recognize as valid such elections only as are effected by the
votes of a majority of such qualified electors ; and though the election boards of
inspectors and canvassers, acting only ministerially, are bound in their decisions
by the number of votes deposited in accordance with the forms of law regulating
their action, it is quite evident that illegal votes may have been admitted by the
perjury or other fault of the voters, and that the majority to which the inspector:~
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have been constrained to certify and the canvassers to allow has been thus wrong-
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fully and illegally secured; and I have not been able to satisfy myself that in

such a case, these boards, acting thus ministerially, and often compelled to admit

votes which they know to be illegal, were intended to constitute tribunals of last

resort for the determination of the rights of parties claiming an election. If this

were so, and there were no legal redress, I think there would be much reason to

apprehend that elections would degenerate into mere contests of fraud.

“ The person having the greatest number of the votes of legally qualiﬁed

electors, it seems to me, has a constitutional right to the oilice: and if no inquiry

can be had into the qualiﬁcation of any voter, here is a constitutional right de-

pending upon a mode of trial unknown to the constitution, and, as I am strongly

inclined to think, opposed to its provisions. I doubt the competency of the

legislature, should they attempt it, which I think they have not, to make the

decision of inspectors or canvasscrs ﬁnal under our constitution.”

The opposite view is expressed by Justice Campbell as follows (ib. p. 294) :—

“ The ﬁrst inquiry is whether an election can be defeated as to any candidate

by showing him to have received illegal votes. The authorities upon election

questions are, in this country, neither numerous nor satisfactory. In England,

where votes are given viva voce, it is always easy to determine how any voter has

given his voice. And in some States of the Union, a system seems to prevail

of numbering each ballot as given, and also numbering the voter‘s name on the

poll list, so as to fumish means of veriﬁcation when necessary. It has always
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been held, and is not disputed, that illegal votes do not avoid an election, unless

it can be shown that their reception affects the result. And where the illegality

consists in the casting of votes by persons unqualiﬁed, unless it is shown for

whom they voted, it cannot be allowed to change the result.

“ The question of the power of courts to inquire into the action of the author-

ities in receiving or rejecting votes is, therefore, very closely connected with the

power of inquiring what persons were voted for by those whose qualiﬁcations are

denied. It is argued for the relator that neither of these inquiries can be made.

No use can fairly be made in such a controversy as the present of decisions or

practice arising out of any system of open voting. The ballot system was de-

signed to prevent such publicity, and not to encourage it. And the course

adopted by legislative bodies cannot be regarded as a safe guide for courts of

justice. There is little uniformity in it, and much of it is based on English pre-

cedents belonging to a different practice. The view taken of contested elections

by these popular bodies is not always accurate, or consistent with any settled

principles. '

“ There is no case so far as I have been able to discover, under any system of

voting by closed ballot, which has held that any account could be taken of rejected

votes in a suit to try title for oﬁice. The statutes here, and probably elsewhere,

require the election to he made out by the votes given. But it is plain enough

that in most cases it would be quite as easy to determine for whom a rejected

voter would have voted as for whom any other actually did vote. In many

cases it would be easier, because the vote is always ready and tendered with

better opportunities of observation than are given where it is received and de-

posited. But the element of uncertainty has been regarded as suﬁicient to cause

the rejection of any such inquiry, and, in most cases, probably it would not be
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have been constrained to certify and the canvassers to allow has been thus wrongfully and illegally secured; and I have not been able to satisfy myself that in
such a case, these boards, acting thus ministerially, and often compelled to admit
votes which they know to be illegal, were intended to constitute tribunals of last
resort for the determination of the rights of parties claiming an election. If this
were so, and there were no legal redress, I think there would be much reason to
apprehend that elections would degenerate into mere contests of fraud.
" The person having the greatest number of the votes of legally qualified
electors, it seems to me, has a constitutional right to the office ; and if no inquiry
can be had into the qualification of any vot(lr, here is a constitutional right depending upon a mode of trial unknown to the constitution, and, as I am strongly
inclined to think, opposed to its provision:~. I doubt the competency of the
legielatur~, should they attempt it, which I think they have not, to make the
decision of inspectors or canvassers final under our constitution."
The opposite view is expressed by Justice Campbell as follows (ih. p. 294):.. The first inquiry is whether an election can be defeated as to any candidate
by showing him to have received illegal votes. The authorities upon election
questions are, in this country, neither numerous nor satisfactory. In England,
where votes are gi\'en t•ira voce, it is always easy to determine how any voter bas
given his voice. And in some States of the Union, a system seems to prevail
of numbering each ballot as given, and also numbering the voter's name on the
poll list, so as to furnish means of verification when necessary. It has always
been held, and is not disputed, that illegal votes do not avoid an election, unless
it can be shown that their reception affects the result. And where the illegality
consists in the ('&sting of votes by persons unqualified, unle~s it is shown for
whom they voted, it cannot be allowed to change the result.
" The question of the power of courts to inquire into the action of the authorities in receiving or rejecting votes is, therefore, very closely connected with the
power of inquiring what persons w.ere voted for by those whose qualifications are
denied. It is argued for the relator that neither of these inquiries can be made.
No use can fairly be made in such a controversy as the present of decisions or
practice arising out of any system of open voting. The ballot system was designed to prevent such publicity, and not to encourage it. And the course
adopted by legislative bodies cannot be regarded as a safe guide for courts of
justice. There is little uniformity in it, and much of it is ba!ed on English precedents belonging to a different practice. The view taken of contested elections
by these popular bodies is not always accurate, or consistent with any settled
principles.
·
"There is no case so far as I have been nble to discover, under any system of
voting by closed ballot, which has held that any account could be taken of rejected
\'Otes in a suit to try title for office. The statutes here, and probably elsewhere,
require the election to be made out by the votes given. But it is plain enough
that in most cases it would be quite as easy to determine for whom a rejected
voter would have voted as for whom any other actually did vote. In many
cases it would be easier, beeause the ,·ote is always ready and tendered with
better opportunities of observation than are given where it is received and deposited. But the element of uncertainty has been regarded as sufficient to cause
the rejection of any such inquiry, and, in most cases, probably it would not be
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have some bearing upon the construction of the whole system.

“ So far as I have been able to discover by means of the somewhat imperfect

indexes on this head, there is but one case in which the decision has turned upon

the propriety of allowing inquiry into the qualiﬁcations of voters, and the identi-

ﬁcation of their tickets when claimed to be,disqualiﬁed. That case was the case

of People v. Pease, 27 N. Y. 45. In the Supreme Court the judges, although

arriving at a general result, were equally divided on this point. In the Court of

Appeals, the judges elected to that tribunal were also equally divided, and the

majority of the Supreme Court judges, belonging to it by rotation, turned the

scale, and decided that the inquiry was proper. The decision was based chieﬂy

upon English authorities; the previous New York decisions having turned princi-

pally on other errors which rest upon somewhat different grounds.

“New York, so far as may be inferred from the absence of decisions else-

where, seems, until recently, to have been the only Slate preserving the ballot

system, in which the right to otﬁce by election is open to examination on the

merits to any considerable extent. The courts of that State have gone further

than any others in opening the door to parol proof. Some of the ‘Vestern States

have. upon the authority of the New York cases, permitted some of these matters

to be litigatcd,' but they are not in any majority. And it is quite manifest that

the decisions have not in general acteil upon any careful consideration of the im-

portant questions of public policy underlying the ballot system, which are so for-
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cibly explained by Denio, Ch. J ., in his opinion in People v. Pease; and it is a

little remarkable that in New York, while so many doors have been opened by

the decisions, the law requires all the ballots, except a single specimen of each

kind, to be destroyed; thus leaving the number of votes of each kind, in all

cases, to be determined by the inspectors, and rendering any correct-ion impossi-

ble. I think the weight of reasoning is in favor of the view of Judge Denio in

the New York case, that no inquiry can be made into the legality of votes actu-

ally depositcd by a voter upon any ground of personal right as an elector.

“ The reasons why such an inquiry should be prevented do not necessarily rest

on any assumption that the inspectors act throughout judicially, although under

our registration system that objection has a force which would not otherwise be

so obvious. Neither do they rest in any degree upon the assumption that one

rule or another is most likely to induce perjury, as very hastily intimated in

People v. Ferguson, 5 Cow. 102. But a very strong ground for them is found

in the fact that our whole ballot system is based upon the idea that unless inviola-

ble secrecy is preserved concerning every voter’s action, there can be no safety

against those personal or political inﬂuences which destroy individual freedom of

choice.

“ lt is altogether idle to expect that there can be any such protection where

the voter is only allowed to withhold his own oath concerning the ticket he has

voted, while any other prying meddler can be permitted in a court of justice to

guess under oath at its contents. If the law could permit an inquiry at all, there

is no reason whatever for preventing an inquiry from‘ the voter himself, who

alone can actually know how he voted, and who can suﬂ'er no more by being

compelled to answer than by having the fact established otherwise. The reason

why the ballot is made obligatory by our constitution is to secure every one the

l
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admissible under the statutes. But the policy which leads to this result must
have some bearing upon the construction of the whole system.
"So far as I have been able to discover by means of the somewhat imperfect
indexes on this bead, there is but one case in which the decision has turned upon
the propriety of allowing inquiry into the qualifications of voters, and the identification of their tickets when claimed to be.disqualified. That case was the case
of People"· Pease, 27 N.Y. 45. In the Supreme Court the judges, alt.hough
arriving at a general re~ult, were equally divided on this point. In the Court of
Appeals, the judges elected to that tribunal were also equally divided, and the
majority of the Supreme Court judges, belonging to it by rotation, turned the
scale, and decided that the inquiry was proper. The rlecision was based chiefly
upon English authorities; the previous Xew York decisions having turned principally on other errors which rest upon somewhat different grounds.
"New York, so far as may be inferred from the ab~ence of decisions elsewhere, seems, until recently, to have been the only State preserving the ballot
system, in which the right to office by election is open to examination on the
merits to any considerable extent. The courts of that State have gone further
than any others in opening the door to parol proof. Some of theW estern States
have, upon the authority of the New York cases, permitted some of these matter:!
to be litigated; but they are not in any majority. And it is quite manifest that
the decisions have not in ~eneral a.cte:l upon any careful consideration of the important questions of public policy underlying the ballot system, which are so forcibly explained by Denio, Ch. J ., in his opinion in People"· Pease; and it is a.
little remarkable that in New York, while so many doors have been opened by
the decisions, the law requires all the ballots, except a single specimen of each
kind, to be destroyed; thus leaving the number of votes of each kind, in all
cases, to be determined by the inspectors, and rendering any correction irnpossible. I think the weight of reasoning is in favor of the view of Judge Denio in
the New York case, that no inquiry can be made into the legality of votes actu·
ally deposited by a yoter upon any ground of personal right as an elector.
" The reasons why such an inquiry should be prevented do not necessarily rest
on any assumption that the inspectors act throughout judicially, although under
our registration system that objection has a force which would not otherwise be
so obvious. X either do they rest in any degree upon the assumption that one
rule or another is most likely to induce perjury, as very hastily intimated in
People v. Ferguson,~ Cow. 102. But a very strong ground for them is found
in the fact that our whole ballot system is based upon the idea that unless im·iolable secrel'Y is presen-cd concerning every votu's action, there can be no safety
against those personal or political influences which destroy individual freedom of
d10icc.
"lt is altogether idle to expect that there can be any such proteetion where
the voter is only allowed to withhold his own oath concerning the ticket he has
voted, while any other prying meddler can be permitted in a court of justice to
guess under oath at its contents. If the law could permit an inquiry &L all, there
is no reason whatever for preventing an inquiry froni the voter himself, who
alone can actually know how he voted, and who can suffer no more. by being
compelled to answer than by having the fact established otherwise. The reason
why the ballot is made obligatory by our constitution i:~ to secure every one the
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propriety in any rule which renders such a safeguard valueless.

“ It has always been the case that the rules of evidence have, on grounds of

public policy, excluded proof tending to explain how individuals have acted in

positions where secrecy was designed for their protection or that of the public.

No grand juror could be permitted to disclose as a witness the ballots given by

himself or others upon investigations of crime. Informers cannot be compelled

to disclose to whom they have given their information. And many oﬂicial facts

are denied publicity. In all of these cases, the rule is not conﬁned to one person

any more than to another; for public policy is against publication from any

source. And if, as is clear, a man is entitled to keep his own vote secret, it is

diﬂicult to sce how any testimony whatever can be allowed, from any source, to

identify and explain it.

“ The statutes contain some provisions bearing upon these topics with con-

siderable force. By sec. 47 of the Compiled Laws, every voter is compelled to

deliver his ballot folded; and, by sec. 52, the inspector is prohibited from either

Opening or permitting it to be opened.

“ The devices adopted for creating different appearances in the ballots of

different parties are such palpable evasions of the spirit of the law as to go very

ﬁn‘ towards destroying the immunity of the voter, and in some States it has

been found desirable to attempt by statute the prevention of such tricks; but the

diﬁiculty of doing this eﬂectually is exempliﬁed in People v. Kilduff, 15 Ill. 492,
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where the evidence seems to have shown that a uniform variation may be entirely

accidental. Unless some such difference exists, it would be idle to attempt any

proof how a person voted, and it would be better to do away at once with the

whole ballot than to have legal tribunals give any aid or countenance to indirect

violations of its security; and the evidence received in the present case exempli-

ﬁes the impropriety of such investigations. In some instances, at least, the only

proof that a voter, complained of as illegal, cast his ballot for one or the other

of these candidates, was, that he voted a ticket externally appearing to belong

to one of the two political parties, and containing names of both State and

county oﬂicers. To allow such proof to be received in favor of or against any

particular candidate on the ticket, is to allow very remote circumstances indeed

to assume the name of evidence. And the necessity of resorting to such out-of-

the-way proofs only puts in a clearer light the impropriety and illegality of

entering upon any such inquiry, when the law sedulously destroys the only real

proofs, and will not tolerate a resort to them. And the whole State is much

more interested than any single citizen can be, in emancipating elections from

all those sinister inﬂuences, which have so great a tendency to coerce or deceive

electors into becoming the mere instruments of others.

“ But there are further provisions bearing more directly on the propriety and

necessity of allowing no inquisition into individual votes.

“ County oﬂicers are among those included tmdcr sec. 31 of the Compiled

Laws, which declares that ‘ the persons having the greatest number of votes shall

be deemed to have been duly elected.’ The law does not conﬁne this to votes

cast by authorized voters, and can only be applied to votes cast and recorded in

the manner provided by law. And although this section, standing alone, might

be open to construction, yet, when the whole law is taken together, there are
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right of preventing any one else from knowing how he voted, and there is no
propriety in any rule which renders such a safeguard valueless.
"It has always been the case that the rules of evidence have, on grounds of
public policy, excluded proof tending to explain how indi\'iduals have acted in
positions where secrecy was designed for their protection or that of the public.
No grand juror could be permitted to disclose as a witness the ballots gi\'en by
himself or others upon investigations of crime. Informers cannot be compelled
to disclose to whom they have given their information. And many official facta
are denied publicity. ln all of these cases, the rule is not confined to one person
any more than to another; for public policy is againBt publication from a.ny
source. And if, as is clear, a man is entitled to keep his own vote secret, it is
difficult to see how any testimony whatever can be allowed, from any source, to
identify and explain it.
" The statutes contain some provisions bearing upon these topics with considerable force. By sec. 47 of the Compiled Laws, every voter is compelled to
delh·er his ballot folded; and, by sec. 52, the inspector is prohibited from either
opening or permitting it to be opened.
" The devices adopted for creating different appearances in the ballots of
different parties are such palpable evasions of the spirit of the law as to go very
far towards destroying the immunity of the voter, and in some States it luts
been found desirable to attempt by statute the pre,·ention of such tricks; but the
difficulty of doing this effectually is exemplified in People v. Kilduff, 15 Ill. 492,
where the evidence seems to have shown that a uniform variation may be entirely
aceidental. Unless some such difference exists, it would be idle to attempt any
proof how a person Yoted, and it would be better to do away at once with the
whole ballot than to have legal tribunals give any aid or countenance to indirect
violations of its security ; and the evidence received in the present case exemplifies the impropriety of such investigations. In some instances, at least, the only
proof that a voter, complained of as illegal, cast his ballot for one or the other
of these candidates, was, that he voted a ticket externally appearing to belong
to one of the two political parties, and containing names of both State and
county officers. To allow such proof to be received in favor of or against any
particular candidate on the ticket, is to allow very remote circumstances indeed
to assume the name of evidence. And the necessity of resorting to 11uch out-ofthe-way proofs only puts in a clearer light the impropriety and illegality of
entering upon any such inquiry, when the law sedulously destroys the only real
proofs, and will not tolerate a resort to them. And the whole State is mut'b
more interested than any single citizen can be, in emancipating elections from
all those sinister influences, which have so great a tendency to coerce or deceive
electors into becoming the mere instruments of others.
" But there are further provisions bearing more directly on the propriety and
necessity of allowing no inquisition into indi1·idual votes.
" County officers are among those included under sec. 31 of the Compilt-d
Laws, which declares that 'the persons having the greatest number of votes shall
be deemed to have been duly elected.' The law does not confine this to votes
cast by authorized voters, and can only be applied to votes cast and recorded in
the manner pro\'idcd by law. And although this section, standing alone, might
be open to construction, yet, when the whole law is taken together, there are

[ 696]

on. xvn.] THE uxrnmsiou or THE rorunsn WILL. * 631

provisions not to be reconciled with any rule allowing single voters and their

CH. XVII.]

THE EXPRESSION OF THE POPULAR WILL.

• 631

votes to be made the subject of inquiry. It will not be denied, that an inquiry

into the legality of a particular voter’s qualiﬁcations, after his vote has been cast,

is of a strictly judicial nature; and it cannot be proper or legal to allow such an

inquiry in one case, and not in another. But it will be found not only that the

rejection of votes from the count is required to be in such a way as to preclude

any consideration of the person giving or putting them in, but that there are

cases where even a legal inquiry into the ballots themselves is prevented.

“ In the ﬁrst place, when two or more ballots are so folded together as to

present the appearance of one, and if counted will make the ballots exceed the

names on the poll-list, they are to be destroyed. And whenever, for any other

reason, the number of ballots found in the box exceeds the number of names on

the corrected poll-lists, the inspectors are required to draw out and destroy un-

opened a number equal to the excess. This is, of course, upon the assumption

that the excess has probably been caused by fraud, and assumes that no man’s

vote ought to be counted, unless the testimony of the poll-lists shows that he

actually handed in his ballot. It is, therefore, altogether likely, upon any theory

of probabilities, that, in drawing out these extra ballots, they will really be bal-

lots lawfully put in, and this probability is in the ratio furnished by a comparison

of numbers between lawful and unlawful votes. In other words, it is more than

likely to punish the innocent, instead of the guilty. The true method of arriving

at thé truth would be to inquire what vote each voter on the list actually cast,
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and destroy the remainder. The absurdity of this process upon such a large

scale is such as to need no pointing out. But unless something very like it is

done in such a case as the present, the result obtained by any partial inquiry

will be no better than guesswork. Where votes are thrown out, no one can tell

whether the illegal voter whose vote is sought to be assailed has not already had

his vote cancelled. The adoption of the principle of allotment is the most sen-

sible and practicable measure which could be devised, and I cannot conceive how

it can be improved upon by any subsequent search.

“ But when the inspectors have made their returns to the county canvassers, and

by those returns a tie vote appears between two or more candidates, who are

highest on the list, their right to the oﬂice is to be determined by lot, and the

person drawing the successful slip is to be ‘ deemed legally elected to the Qﬂice in

question.’ Compiled Laws, §§ 76, 132, 133.

“ In case the State canvassers (who can only count the votes certiﬁed to them)

ﬁnd a tie vote, the legislature has power to choose between the candidates. Coii-

stitution. art. 8, §5. In these cases, there can be no further scrutiny; and in

the case of State oﬂicers, if such a scrutiny were had, no end could be reached

within any reasonable time, and there would be a practical impossibility in at-

tempting to conduct it in any time within the oﬂicial term, or to approach accu-

racy in a count of some-thousand or more ballot-boxes before a jury. Yet State

oﬂicers are not less important to the private elector, and, of course, are not to

the community at large, than local. And the nearer a vote approaches a tie, the

more likely it is that a rigid scrutiny might change its character. There is no

more reason for preventing investigation behind the ballots in the one case than

in the other.

“ The statute also takes very efficient measures to prevent any needless litiga-
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provisions not to be reconciled with any rule allowing single voters and their
votes to be made the subject of inquiry. It will not be denied, that an inquiry
into the legality of a particular voter's qualificat-ions, after his vote bas been cast,
is of a strictly judicial nature; and it cannot be proper or legal to allow such an
inquiry in one case, and not in another. But it will be found not only that the
rejection of votes from the count is required to be in such a way as to preclude
any consideration of the person giving or putting them in, but that there are
cases where even a legal inquiry into the ballots themselves is prevented.
" In the first place, when two or more ballots are so folded together as to
present the appearance of one, and if counted will make the ballots exceed the
names on the poll-list, they are to be destroyed. And whenever, for any other
reason, the number of ballots found in the box exceeds the number of names on
the corrected poll-lists, the inspectors are required to draw out and destroy unopened a number. equal to the excess. This is, of course, upon the assumption
that the excess has probably been caused by fraud, and assumes that no man's
vote ought to be counted, unless the testimony of the poll-lists shows that he
actually handed in his ballot. It is, therefore, altogether likely, upon any theory
of probabilities, that, in drawing out these extra ballots, they will really be ballots lawfully put in, and this probability is in the ratio furnished by a comparison
of numbers between lawful and unlawful votes. In other words, it is more than
likely to punish the innocent, instead of the guilty. The true method of arriving
at the truth would be to inquire what vote each voter on the list actually cast,
and destroy the remainder. The absurdity of this process upon such a large
scale is such as to need no pointing out. But unless something very like it is
done in such a case as the present, the result obtained by any partial inquiry
will be no better than guesswork. Where votes are thrown out, no one can tell
whether the illegal voter whose vote is sought to be assailed has not already had
his vote cancelled. The adoption of the principle of allotment is the most sensible and practicable measure which could be devised, and I cannot conceive how
it can be improved upon by any subsequent search.
"But when the inspectors have made their returns to the county canvassers, and
by those returns a tie vote appears between two or more candidates, who are
highest on the list, their right to the office is to be determined by lot, and the
person drawing the successful slip is to be ' deemed legally eleded to the office in
question.' Compiled Laws, §§ 76, 132, 133.
"In case the State canvassers (who can only count the votes certified to them)
find a tie vote, the legislature has power to choose between the candidates. Constitution, art. 8, § 5. In these cases, there can be no further scrutiny; and in
the case of State officers, if such a scrutiny were had, no end could be reached
within any reasonable time, and there would be a practical impossibility in attempting to conduct it in any time within the official term, or to approach accuracy in a count ofsome•thousand or more ballot-boxes before a jury. Yet State
officers are not less important to the private elector, and, of course, are not to
the community at large, than local. And the nearer a vote approaches a tie, the
more likely it is that a rigid scrutiny might change its character. There is no
more reason for preventing investigation behind the ballots in the one case than
in the other.
" The statute also takes very efficient measures to prevent any needless litiga-
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"‘ 632 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. [on. XVII.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

tion by shutting out any preliminary resort to the means of information. If the

(CH. XVII.

oﬁicers do their duty, no one else can ever know whether their count is correct or

not, until a suit is brought and issue joined upon it. The ballots are required to

be sealed up, and not opened except for the inspection of the proper authorities,

in case of a contest. The only ballots open to public inspection are those which

are rejected upon the canvass for defects apparent on their face. These ballots

are not sealed up with the rest, but are ﬁled; while, therefore, it can be deter-

mined by inspection whether votes which have been thrown out should have been

counted, the law does not seem to favor any unnecessary disturbance of the

oﬂicial returns, and any one who assumes to dispute an election is compelled to

begin his suit before he can have access to the means of proof. This is not the

usual course of litigation, and the rule has a strong bearing upon the policy to be

deduced from the law.

“ Under our statute, there is no general provision which makes the canvass

for local oﬁicers conclusive in all cases, and therefore the rule is recognized that

the election usually depends upon the ballots, and not upon the returns. These

being written and certain, the result of a recount involves no element of diﬂiculty

or ambigity, beyond the risk of mistakes in counting or footing up numbers,

which may, in some respects, be more likely in examining the ballots of a whole

county than in telling off those of a town or ward, but which involves no great

time or serious disadvantage. But the introduction of parol evidence conceming

single voters in a considerable district, can rarely reach all cases of illegality
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effectually, and must so multiply the issues as to seriously complicate the inquiry.

And when we consider, that, for many years, legislation has been modiﬁed for

the very purpose of suppressing illegal voting, and when we know that hundreds

of elections must have been turned by the ballots of unqualiﬁed voters, the ab-

sence of any body of decisions upon the subject is very strong proof that inquiry

into private ballots is felt to be a violation of the constitutional safeguard on

which we pride ourselves as distinguishing our elections from those which we are

wont to regard as conducted on unsafe principles.”

[698]
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tion by shutting out any preliminary resort to the means of information. If the
officers do their duty, no one else can ever know whether their count is correct or
not, until a suit is brought and issue joined upon it. The ballots are required to
be sealed up, and not opened except for the inspection of the proper authorities,
in case of a contest. The only ballots open to public inspection are those which
are rejected upon the canvass for defects apparent on their face. These ballots
are not sealed up with the rest, but are filed; while, therefore, it can be determined by inspection whether votes which have been thrown out should have been
counted, the law does not seem to favor any unnecessary disturbance of the
official returns, and any one who assumes to dispute an election is compelled to
begin his suit before he can have access to the means of proof. This is not the
usual course of litigation, and the rule has a strong bearing upon the policy to be
deduced from the law.
"Under our statute, there is no general provision which makes the canvass
for local officers conclusive in all cases, and therefore the rule is recognized that
the election usually depends· upon the ballots, and not upon the returns. These
being written and certain, the result of a recount involves no element of difficulty
or ambiguity, beyond the risk of mistakes in counting or footing up numbers,
which may, in some respects, be more likely in examining the ballots of a whole
county than in telling off those of a town or ward, but which involves no great
time or serious disadvantage But the introduction of parol evidence concerning
single voters in a considerable district, can rarely reach all cases of illegality
effectually, and must so multiply the issues as to seriously complicate the inquiry.
And when we consider, that, for many years, legislation has been modified for
the very purpose of suppressing illegal voting, and when we know that hundreds
of elections must h11.ve been turnl'd by the ballots of unqualified voters, the absence of any body of decisions upon the subject is very strong proof that inquiry
into private ballots is felt to be a violation of the constitutional safeguard on
which we pride ourselves as distinguishing our elections from those which we are
wont to regard as conducted on unsafe principles."
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I INDEX.

A.

ABBREVIATIONS,

when ballots rendered ineﬂectual by, 608, 609.

ACCUSATIONS OF CRIME,

are actionable, per se, 423.

how made with a view to investigation and trial, 309.

(See PERSONAL LIBERTY.)

varying form of, cannot subject party to second trial, 328.

INDEX.

ACTION,

against election oﬂicers for refusing to receive votes, 616.

for negligent or improper construction of public works, 571.

for property taken under right of eminent domain, 559—564.

(See EMINENT DOMAIN.)

for exercise of legislative power by municipal bodies, 208.

for slander and libel, rules for, 422-425.

A.

modiﬁcation of, by statute, 430.

(See LIBERTY or SPEECH AND or TEE Pm-xss.)

rights in, cannot be created by mere legislative enactment, 369.

nor taken away by legislature, 362.

nor appropriated under right of eminent domain, 527.

ABBREVIATIONS,
when ballots rendered ineffectual by, 608, 609.

ACCUSATIONS OF CRUIE,
are actionable, per ae, 423.

nor forfeited, except by judicial proceedings, 362, 363.

statutory penalties may be taken away before recovery of judgment
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362, n.; 383, n.

limitation to suits, 364-367.

statutes for, are unobjectionable in principle, 365.

subsequent repeal of statute cannot revive rights, 293, 365.

principle on which statutes are based, 365.

cannot apply against a party not in default, 366.

must give parties an opportunity for trial, 366.

for causing death by negligence, &c., 581.

ACTS OF THE LEGISLATURE,

- (See Srarnrns.)

ADJOURNMENT OF SUIT,

from regard to religious scruples of party, 477, n.

ADJOURNMENT OF THE LEGISLATURE,

on its own motion, 132.

by the governor, 132.

how made with a view to investigation and trial, 809.
(See PERSONAL LIBERTY.)
varying form of, cannot subject party to second trial, 328.
ACfiO~,

against election officers for refusing to receive votes, 616.
for negligent or improper construction of public works, 571.
for property taken under right of eminent domain, 559-564.
(See EMIN&.""T DOMAIN.)
for exercise of legislative power by municipal bodies, 208.
for slander and libel, rules for, 422-425.
modification of, by statute, 430.
(See LmERTY OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS.)
rights in, cannot be created by mere legislative enactment, 369.
nor taken away by legislature, 362.
nor appropriated under right of eminent domain, 527.
nor forfeited, except by judicial proceedings, 362, 863.
statutory penalties may be taken away before recovery of judgment,
362, n. ; 383, n.
limitation to suits, 364-367.
statutes for, are unobjectionable in principle, 366.
subsequent repeal of statute cannot revive rights, 293, 365.
principle on which statutes arc based, 365.
cannot apply against a party not in default, 366.
must give parties an opportunity for trial, 366.
for causing death by negligence, &c., 581.

ACTS OF THE LEGISLATURE,
(See

STATUTES.)

ADJOURNMENT OF SUIT,
from regard to religious scruples of party, 477, n.

ADJOURNMENT OF THE LEGISLATURE,
on its own motion, 132.
by the governor, 132.

702 mmsx.

ADMINISTRATORS,

702

INDEX.

(See Exacurons mo ADMINISTRATORS.)

ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION,

exercise of, by the Revolutionary Congress, 6.

conferred upon courts of United States, 11.

ADMISSIONS, I

of accused parties as evidence, 313-318.

(See Conrsssrons.)

ADVERTISEMENT,

notice to foreign parties by, 404.

ADMINISTRATORS,
(Bee ExECUTORS ANI> Anl\IINISTJUTORs.)
ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION,
exercis~ of, by the Revolutionary Congress, 6.
conferred upon courts of United States, 11.
ADMISSIONS,
of accused parties as evidence, :h3-318.
(See

not effectual to warrant a personal judgment, 404, 405.

AGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT, ~

not to be taxed, 18, 482-485.

AGREEMENTS,

(See Coxrnacrs.)

ALABAMA,

divorces not to be granted by legislature, 110, n. '

title of acts to express the object, 142, n. 1

protection of person and property by law of the land, 351, n.

liberty of speech and the press, 417, n.

legislature may make rules respecting pardons, 116, n.

persons conscientiously opposed to bearing arms excused, 478.
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ALIENS, \

exclusion of, from suffrage, 29, 30, 599.

ALIMONY,

payment of, cannot be ordered by legislature, 114.

decree for, not valid unless process served, 405.

AMBASSADORS,

jurisdiction of United States courts in respect to, 11.

AMENDMENT,

of money bills, may be made by Senate, 131.

of indictments, 272.

ofstatutes, 151, 152.

republication of statute amended, 151.

by implication, 152.

at the sanie session of their passage, 152.

of defective proceedings by legislation, 293, 371-381.

I of State constitutions, 21.

(See STATE CONSTITUTIONS.)

AMERICAN COLON IES,

(See Conoxms.)

AMUSEMENT,

regulation of places of, 596.

APPEAL,

right of, may be taken away, 384.

CONFESSIONS.)

ADVERTISEMENT,
notice to foreign parties by, 404.
not effectual to warrant a personal judgment, 404, 405.
AGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT,
not to be taxed, 18, 482-485.
AGREEMENTS,
(See Cmn'RACTS.)
ALABAMA,
divorces not to be granted by legislature, 110, n.
title of acts to express the object, 142, n.
protection Of person and property by law ofthe land, 3lH, n.
liberty of speech and the press, 417, n.
legislature may make rules respecting pardons, 116, n.
persons conscientiously opposed to bearing arms excused, 478.
ALIENS,
'
exclusion of, from suffrage, 29, 30, 599.
ALIMONY,
payment of, cannot be ordered by legislature, 114.
decree for, not valid unless process served, 405.
AMBASSADORS,
jurisdiction of United States courts in respect to, 11.
AMENDMENT,
of money bills, may be made by Senate, 181.
of indictments, 272.
ofstatutes, 151, 152.
republication of statute amended, 151.
by implication, 152.
at the same session of their passage, 152.
of defective proceedings by legislation, 293, 371-881.
of State constitutions, 21.

effect of change in the law pending an appeal, 381.

APPORTIONMENT,

of powers between the States and the nation , 2.

(See STATE Co:ssTITUTio:ss.)

AMERICAN COLONIES,
(See CoLONIEs.)

AMUSEMENT,
regulation ofplaces of, 596.
APPEAL,
right of, may be taken away, 384.
effect of change in the law pending an appeal, 881.
APPORTIONMENT,
of powers between the States and the nation , 2.

mnnx. 703

INDEX.

APPORTIONMENT — continued. '

between the departments of the State government, 83-37, 39, 90-92.

of taxes, 495.

APPORTIONMENT- continued.

(See Taxxrrox.)

APPRAISAL,

of private property taken by the public, 559-570.

APPRAISEMENT LAWS,

how far invalid, 290.

APPRENTICE,

control of master over, 340.

APPROPRIATION,

between the departments of the State government, 33-37, 39, 90-92.
of taxes, 495.
(See TAXATION.)

APPRAISAL,
of private property taken by the public, 069-570.

APPRAISEI\IENT LAWS,
how far invalid, 290.

of private property to public use, 525.

(See Eumxnr Domam.)

ARBITRARY ARRESTS,

illegality of‘, 300, 302.

(See Pnnsoxar. Lmmrr.)

APPRENTICE,
control of master over, 3-!0.

APPROPRIATION,
of private property to public use, 525.
(See EMINENT Do:rtiAIN.)

ARBITRARY EXACTION S,

distinguished from taxation, 490, 491.

ARBITRARY POWER,

unknown among common-law principles, 22.

cannot be exercised under pretence of taxation, 490, 508.

ARBITRARY RULES,
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of construction, danger of, 59, 61, 62, 83.

of presumption, 326, n.

ARBITRATION,

submission of controversies to, 399.

AR GUMENTUM AB 1N CON VENIENTI,

in constitutional construction, 70, 71, n.

ARKANSAS,

divorces not to be granted by legislature, 110, n.

special acts for sale of lands of infants, &c., forbidden, 98, n.

protection of person, &c., by law of the land, 352, n.

liberty of speech and of the press, 414, n.

legislature may regulate granting of pardons, 116, n.

exclusion from oﬂice for want of religious belief, 468, n.

ARBITRARY

A~RESTS,

illegality of, 300, 302.
(See

PERSONAL

LmERTY.)

ARBITRARY EXACTIONS,
distinguished from taxation, 490, 491.

ARBITRARY POWER,
unknown among common-law principles, 22.
cannot be exercised under pretence of taxation, 490, 508.

ARBITRARY RULES,
of construction, danger of, 59, 61, 62, 83.
of presumption, 326, n.

ARBITRATION,
submission of controversies to, 399.
ARGUJI./EN'l'UAI AB JNCONVENIENTI,
in constitutional construction, 70, 71, n.

ARKANSAS,

ARMS,

right to bear, 350.

exemption from bearing of persons conscientiously opposed, 478.

ARMY.

quartering in private houses, 308.

jealousy of standing army, 350. '

ARREST,

privilege of legislators from, 134.

on criminal process. (See Cnmms.)

of judgment, new trial alter, 328 and n.

ART, WORKS OF,

criticism of, how far privileged, 457.

divorces not to be granted by legislature, 110, n.
special acts for sale of lands of infants, &c., forbidden, 98, n.
protection of person, &c., by law of the land, 352, n.
liberty of speech and of the press, 414, n.
legislature may regulate granting ofpardons, 116, n.
exclusion from office for want of religious belief, 468, n.

ARMS,
right to bear, 350.
exemption from bearing ofpersons conscientiously opposed, 478.

ARMY,
quartering in private houses, 308.
jealousy of standing army, 350. '

ARREST,
privilege of legislators from, 134.
on criminal process. (See CRIMES.)
of judgment, new trial after, 328 and n.

ART, WORKS OF,
criticism of, how far privileged, 457.

703

704 mnnx.

ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION,

704

INDEX.

adoption of, 7.

why superseded, 7, 8.

ASSESSMENTS,

for local improvements, generally made in reference to beneﬁts, 497.

special taxing districts for, 497.

not necessarily made on property according to value, 497.

are made under the power of taxation, 498.

not covered by the general constitutional provisions respecting taxation,

498.

not unconstitutional to make beneﬁts the basis for, 499, 505, 511.

apportionment necessary in cases of, 499.

may be made in reference to frontage, 507.

but each lot cannot be compelled to make the improvement in front of

it, 508.

for drains, levees, &c., 510.

in labor for repair of roads, 512.

ATTAINDER,

meaning of the term, 259.

bills of, not to be passed by State legislatures, 15, 33, 259.

cases of such bills, 259-264. .

bills of pains and penalties included in, 261.
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ATTORNEYS,

exclusion of, from practice‘ is a punishment, 263, 264.

right to notice of proceedings therefor, 337, n., 404, n.

laws requiring service from, without compensation, 393, 394.

punishment of, for misconduct, 337.

(See COUNSEL.)

AUTHORS,

not to be assailed through their works, 457.

criticism of works of, how far privileged, 457.

B.

BAIL,

ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION,
adoption of, 7.
why superseded, 7, 8.
ASSESSMENTS,
for local improvements, generally made in reference to benefits, 497.
special taxing districts for, 497.
not necessarily made on property according to value, 497.
are made under the power of taxation, 498.
not covered by the general constitutional provisions respecting taxation,
498.
not unconstitutional to make benefits the basis for, 499, 505, 511.
apportionment necessary in cases of, 499.
may be made in reference to frontage, 507.
but each lot cannot be compelled to make the improvement in front of
it, 508.
for drains, levees, &c., 510.
in labor for repair of roads, 512.
ATTAINDER,
meaning of the term, 259.
bills of, not to be passed by State legislatures, 15, 83, 259.
cases of such bills, 259-264.
bills of pains and penalties included in, 261.
ATTORNEYS,
exclusion of, from practice· is a punishment, 263, 264.
right to notice ofproceedin~s therefor, 387, n., 404, n.
laws requiring service from, without compensation, 393, 394.
punishment of, for misconduct, 337.
(See COUNSEL.)

accused parties entitled to, 309-311.

unreasonable, not to be demanded, 310.

on habeas corpus, 348.

control of bail over principal, 341.

AUTHORS,
not to be assailed through their works, 457.
critici:~m of works of, how far privileged, 457.

BAILMENT,

(See COMMON Canmnns.)

B.

BALLOT,

system of voting by, generally prevails, 604.

BAIL,

right of the elector to secrecy, 605.

must be complete in itself, 606.

abbreviated names, 608.

how far open to explanation, 611, 626.

(See Etncrroxs.)

accused parties entitled to, 309-311.
unreasonable, not to be demanded, 310.
on habeas corpus, 348.
control of bail over principal, 341.

BAILMENT,

I

(See CoMMoN CARRIERs.)

BALLOT,
system of voting by, generally prevails, 60!.
right of the elector to secrecy, 605.
must be complete in itself, 606.
abbreviated names, 608.
how far open to explanation, 611, 626.
(See Eu:crwNs.)
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INDEX.

BANKRUPTCY,

power of Congress over, 10.

legislation by the States, 18, 293, 294.

revival of debts barred by discharge, 293.

BEARING ARMS,

persons conscientiously opposed to, are excused, 478.

705

BANKRUPTCY,
power of Congress over, 10.
legislation by the States, 18, 293, 294.
revival of debts barred by discharge, 293.

BEARING ARMS,

constitutional right Of, 350.

BEASTS, '

police regulations regarding, 596.

regulations making railway companies liable for killing, 579.

BENEFITS,

may be taken into account in assessments for local improvements,

499, 505, 511.

what may be deducted when private property is taken by the

public, 565.

BETTERMEN T LAVVS,

principle of, 386.

are constitutional, 387. '

owner cannot be compelled to improve his lands, 885.

not applicable to lands appropriated by the public, 389, n.

BETTING ON ELECTIONS,

illegality of‘, 615.
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BEVERAGES,

police regulations to prevent the sale of intoxicating, 581.

BILL OF RIGHTS (English),

a declaratory statute, 23, 257.

BILL OF RIGHTS (National),

not originally inserted in Constitution, 256.

reasons for omission, 256.

objections to Constitution on that ground, 257-259.

persons conscientiously opposed to, are excused, 4 78.
constitutional right of, 850.

BEASTS,
police regulations regarding, 596.
regulations making railway companies liable for killing, 579.

BENEFITS,
may be taken into account in assessments for local improvements,
499, 505, 511.
what may be deducted when private property is taken by the
public, 565.

BETTERMENT LAWS,
principle of, 386.
are constitutional, 387.
owner cannot be compelled to improve his lands, 385.
not applicable to lands appropriated by the public, 389, n.

BETTING ON ELECTIONS,
illegality of, 615.

BEVERAGES,
police regulations to prevent the sale of intoxicating, 581.

BILL OF RIGHTS (English),
a declaratory statute, 23, 257.

afterwards added by amendments, 259.

BILL OF RIGHTS (State),

generally found in constitution, 35.

classes of‘ provisions in, 35, 36.

what prohibitions not necessary, 175.

BILLS, LEGISLATIVE,

constitutional provisions for three readings, 80, 81, 139, 140.

title of, to express object, 81, 141-151.

(See LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE.)

BILLS OF ATTAINDER,

not to be passed by State legislature, 15, 33, 259.

meaning of attainder, 259.

cases of such-bills, 259-264.

BILLS OF CREDIT,

States not to emit, 15.

BILLS OF PAINS AND PENALTIES,

BILL OF RIGHTS (National),
not originally inserted in Constitution, 256.
reasons for omission, 256.
objections to Constitution on that ground, 257-259.
afterwards added by amendments, 259.
BILL OF RIGHTS (State),
generally found in constitution, 35.
classes of provisions in, 35, 36.
what prohibitions not necessary, 175.

BILLS, LEGISLATIVE,
constitutional provisions for three readings, 80, 81, 189, 140.
title of, to express ohject, 81, 141-151.
(See LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE.)

BILLS OF ATTAINDER,

included in bills of attainder, 261.

BLASPHEMY,

punishment of, does not violate religious liberty, 471-476.

45

not to be passed by State legislature, 15, 83, 259.
meaning of attainder, 259.
cases of such bills, 259-264.

BILLS OF CREDIT,
States not to emit, 15.

BILLS OF PAINS AND
included in

bill:~

PE~ALTIES,

of attainder, 261.

BLASPHEMY,
punishment of, does not violate religious liberty, 471-476.
46

706 mnsx.

706

INDEX.

BLASPHEMY — continued.

nor the liberty of speech, 422.

published in account of judicial

BOATS,

ferry, licensing of, 593.

proceedings is not privileged, 449.

speed of, on navigable waters may be regulated by States, 594.

BONA FIDE PURCHASERS,

not to be affected by retrospective legislation, 378, 379, 382, n.

BONDS, '

issue of, by municipalities in aid of internal improvements, 119,

213-219.

BOOKS,

criticism of, how far privileged,

457 .

indecent, sale of, may be prohibited, 596.

BOUNTIES,

when earned, become vested rights, 383, 384.

payment of, to soldiers by municipal corporations, 219-229.

BOUNTY SUBSCRIPTIONS,

by municipal corporations, how

BRIDGES,
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far valid, 219-229.

erection of, by State authority over navigable waters, 592.

(See Nsvramm Warsns.)

BUILDINGS,

condemnation and forfeiture of,

as nuisances, 583, 584.

destruction of, to prevent spread of ﬁres, 526, n.

appropriation of‘, under right of eminent domain, 526.

BURLESQUES,

libels by means of, 423.

BY-LAWS,

of municipal corporations, 198-208.

must be reasonable, 200-203.

must be certain, 202.

must not conﬂict with constitution of State or nation, 198.

nor with statutes of State, 198.

imposing license fees, 201.

CALIFORNIA,

C.

legislature of, not to grant divorces, 110, n.

BLASPHEMY- continued.
nor the liberty of speech, 422.
published in account of judicial proceedings is not privileged, 449.
BOATS,
ferry, licensing of, 593.
speed of, on navigable waters may be regulated by States, 594.
BONA FIDE PURCHASERS,
not to be affected by retrospective legislation, 378, 879, 882, n.
BONDS,
issue of, by municipalities in aid of internal improvements, 119,
213-219.
BOOKS,
criticism of, how far privileged, 457.
indecent, sale of, may be prohibited, 596.
BOUNTIES,
when earned, become vested rights, 388, 884.
payment of, to soldiers by municipal corporations, 219-229.
BOUNTY SUBSCRIPTIONS,
by municipal corporations, how far valid, 219-229.
BRIDGES,
erection of, by State authority over navigable waters, 592.
(Su

NAVIGABLE WATERS.)

BUILDINGS,
condemnation and forfeiture of, as nuisances, 588, 584.
destruction of, to prevent spread of fires, 526, n.
appropriation of, under right of eminent domain, 526.
BURLESQUES,
libels by means of, 428.
BY-LAWS,
of municipal corporations, 198-208.
must be reasonable, 200-203.
must be certain, 202.
must not confiict with constitution of State or nation, 198.
nor with statutes of State, 198.
imposing license fees, 201.

title of acts to express their object, 142, n.

protection of property, &c., by

law ofthe land, 352, n.

liberty of speech and of the press in, 416.

CANALS,

appropriation of private property for, 583.

when are private property, 590.

CANDIDATES FOR OFFICE,

criticism of, how far privileged,

431-441, 455.

ineligibility of, how to affect election, 620.

c.
CALIFORNIA,
legislature of, not to grant divorces, 110, n.
title of acts to express their object, 142, n.
protection of property, &c., by law of the land, 852, n.
liberty of speech and of the press in, 416.
CANALS,
appropriation of private property for, 583.
when are private property, 590.
CANDIDATES FOR OFFICE,
l'ritici~m of, bow far privileged, 431-44:1, 455.
ineligJb,Jity of, how to affect election, 6:40.
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INDEX.

CANVASSERS, .

act ministerially in counting and returning votes, 622. '

whether they may be compelled by mandamus to perform duty, 623.

certiﬁcate of, conclusive in collateral proceedings, 624.

(See EL1~:c'rxoNs.)

CARRIERS, V

police regulations making them liable for beasts killed, 570.

CANVASSERS,
act ministerially in counting and returning votes, 622.
whether they may be compelled by mandamus to perform duty,
certificate of, conclusive in collateral proceedings, 624.
(S~ ELECTIONS.)

change of common-law liability of, by police regulations, 580, 581.

may be made responsible for death caused by negligence, &c., 581.

CATTLE,

police regulations making railway companies liable for killing, 579.

CEMETERIES,

further use of, may be prohibited when they become nuisances, 595.

CENSORSHIP OF THE PRESS, _

in England and America, 417-419, 420.

CENTRALIZATION, I‘

American system the opposite of, 189.

CHARACTER,

bad, of attorney, suﬁicient reason to exclude him from practice, 337.

slander of, 422-424.

good, of defendant in libel suit, no defence to false publication, 466.

beneﬁt of, in criminal cases, 326, n.
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CHARTERS,

Ofliberty, 24, n.

colonial, swept away by Revolution, 26.

exceptions of Connecticut and Rhode Island, 26.

municipal, do not consti ute contracts, 193.

control of legislature over, 192, 193.

construction of, 195, 211.

(See Mm\'1cn=,\L CORPORATIONS.)

of private corporations are contracts, 279.

police regulations affecting, 577-579.

strict construction of, 394-396.

CHASTITY,

accusation of want of, not actionable per se, 423, 424.

CARRIERS,
police regulations making them liable for beasts killed, 570.
change of common-law liability of, by police regulations, 580, 581.
may be made responsib~e tor death caused by negligence, &c., 581.
CATTLE,
police regulations making railway companies liable for killing, 579.
CEMETERIES,
further use of, may be prohibited when they become nuisances, 595.
CENSORSHIP OF THE PRESS,
in England and America, 417-419, 420.
CENTRALIZATION,
American system the opposite of, 189.
CHARACTER,
bad, of attorney, sufficient reason to exclude him from practice, 337.
slander of, 422-424.
good, of defendant in libel suit, no defence to false publication, 466.
benefit of, in criminal cases, 326, n.
CHARTERS,
of liberty, 24, n.
colonial, swept away by Revolution, 26.
exceptions of Connecticut and Rhode Island, 26.
municipal, do not consti ute contracts, 193.
control oflegislature over, 192, 193.
construction of, 195, 211.
(See

statutory provisions on the subject, 424.

CHILDREN, _

control of parent, &c., over, 339, 340.

obtaining possession of, by habeas corpus, 348.

decree for custody of, in divorce suits, 405.

CHRISTIANITY,

its inﬂuence in the overthrow_ of slavery, 297, 298, and n.

in what sense part of the law of the land, 472-475.

(Sec RELIGIOUS Lrnanw.)

CHURCH ENDOVVMENTS,

not to be taken away by legislature, 275, n.

CHURCH ESTABLISHMENTS,

forbidden by State constitutions, 469.

6~3.

:MUKICIPAL CORPORATIONS.)

of private corporations are contracts, 279.
police regulations affecting, 577-579.
strict construction of, 39-1-396.
CHASTITY,
accusation of want of, not actionable pe1· se, 423, 424.
statutory provisions on the subject, 424.
CHILDREN,
control of parent, &c., over, 339, 340.
obtaining possession of, by habeas corpus, 348.
decree for custody of, in divorce suits, 405.
CHRISTIANITY,
its influence in the overthrow of slavery, 297, 298, and n.
in what sense part of the law of the land, 472-475.

.

(See

REUGIOUS LIBERTY.)

CHURCH ENDOWMENTS,
not to be tahn away by legislature, 275, n.
CHURCH ESTABLISHMENTS,
forbidden by State constitutions, 469.

708 mnnx.

CHURCH ORGANIZATIONS,

708

INDEX.

powers and control of, 467, n.

CITIES AND VILLAGES.

(See l\IU1~x1cn>.tL CORPORATIONS.)

CITIZENS,

CHURCH ORGANIZATIONS,
powers and control of, 467, n.

CITIES AND VILLAGES,

who are, 11.

(See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.)

of the several States, privileges and immunities of, 11, 15, 16, 391-397.

discriminations in taxation of, 397, 487.

jurisdiction of United States courts in respect to, 11, 12, 294.

CIVIL RIGHTS,

discriminations not to be made in, on account of religious beliefs, 467-470.

(See C1'r1zs:.\'s; Cmss LEGISLATION.)

CLASS LEGISLATION,

private legislation which grants privileges, 389-397.

party petitioning for, estopped from disputing validity, 390.

public laws may be local in application, 390.

special rules for particular occupations, 390, 393.

proscription for opinion"s sake unconstitutional, 390.

suspensions of laws must be general, 391, 392.

each individual entitled to be governed by general rules, 391, 392.

discriminations should be based upon reason, 393.

equality of rights, &c., the aim of the law, 393.
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strict construction of special burdens and privileges, 393-397.

discriminations not to be made on account of religious beliefs, 467-470.

COINING MONEY,

power over, 10.

COLLUSION,

conviction by, no bar to new prosecution, 327, n.

COLONIES.

union of, before Revolution, 5.

authority of the crown and parliament in, 5.

Revolutionary Congress and its powers, 6, 7.

controversy with the mother country, 23, 24.

legislatures of, 25.

substitution of constitutions for charters of, 26.

censorship of the press in, 418.

COLOR, .

not to be a disqualiﬁcation for sulfrage, 11, 599.

COMMERCE,

power of Congress to regulate, 10.

State regulations valid when they do not interfere with those of Congress,

581-587.

(See Pouca Powmz.)

State taxation of subjects of, 586, 587.

(See TAXATION.)

CITIZENS,
who are, 11.
of the several States, privileges and immunities of, 11, 15, 16, 391-897.
discriminations in taxation of, 897, 487.
jurisdiction of United States courts in respect to, 11, 12, 294.

CIVIL RIGHTS,
discriminations not to be made in, on account of religious beliefs, 467-470.
(See CITizENs; CLA.Ss LEGisLATION.)

CLASS LEGISLATION,
private legislation which grants privileges, 389-397.
party petitioning for, estopped from disputing validity, 890.
public Jaws may be local in application, 390.
special rules for particular occupations, 890, 398.
proscription for opinion's sake unconstitutional, 390.
suspensions of laws must be general, 391, 392.
each individual entitled to be governed by general rules, 891, 392.
discriminations should be based upon reason, 393.
equality of rights, -&c., the aim of the law, 893.
strict construction of special burdens and privileges, 398-397.
discriminations not to be made on account of religious beliefs, 467-470.

COINING MONEY,
power over, 10.

COLLUSION,
conviction by, no bar to new prosecution, 827, n.

COLONIES,
union of, before Revolution, 5.
authority of the crown and parliament in, 5.
Revolutionary Congress and its powers, 6, 7.
controversy with the mother country, 28, 24.
legislatures of, 25.
sub~titution of constitutions for charters of, 26.
censorship of the press in, 418.

COLOR,
not to be a disqualification for suffrage, 11, 599.

in intoxicating drinks, how far State regulations may affect, 581-584.

COIIIMITTEI-IS OF THE LEGISLATURE,

collection of information by, 135.

COMMERCE,
power of Congress to regulate, 10.
State regulations valid when they do not interfere with those of Congress,
681-[)87.
(See Poucs PowER.)
State taxation of subjects of, 586, 587.
(See TAXATION.)
in intoxicating drinks, bow fa; State regulations may afFect, 581-b84.
CO~DIITTEES

OF THE LEGISLATURE,

collection of information by, 135.

nmnx. 709
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COMMITTEES OF THE LEGISLATURE— continued.

709

contempts of witnesses how punished, 135.

employment of counsel before, I36.

COMLION CARRIERS,

police regulations regarding, 579-581.

(See RAILWAY Conmmas.)

COMMON LAW,

Federal courts acquire no jurisdiction from, 19, 20.

COMMITTEES OF THE LEGISLATURE- continued.
contempts of witnes~es how punished, 185.
employment of eounsel before, 136.

COMMON CARRIERS,
police regulations regarding, 579-581.

(Su

pre-existing the Constitution, 21.

what it consists in, 21.

RAILW.\Y CoMPANIES.)

COMMON LAW,

its general features, 22.

modiﬁcation of, by statutes, 22, 23.

colonists in America claimed beneﬁts of, 23, 24.

how far in force, 23, n.

evidences of, 24.

decisions under, as precedents, 51, 52.

gradual modiﬁcation of, 54, 55.

to be kept in view in construing constitutions, 60.

statutes in derogation of, 61, n.

not to control constitutions, 61. ‘

municipal by~laws must harmonize with, 202.

rules of liability for injurious publications, 417, 422-425.
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modiﬁcation of, by statute, 430.

modiﬁcation by police regulations of common-law liability of carriers,

579-581.

COMMON RIGHT,

statutes against, said to be void, 165, n., 166, 167, n.

COMPACTS BETWEEN STATES,

must have consent of Congress, 16.

are inviolable under United States Constitution, 275, and n.

COMPENSATION,

for private property appropriated by the public, 559.

(See EMINENT Dosum.)

what the tax-payer receives as an equivalent for taxes, 498.

COMPLAINTS,

for purposes of search-warrant, 304.

of crime how made, 309.

COMPULSORY TAXATION,

by municipal bodies, 231-233.

CONCLUSIVENESS OF J UDGMENTS,

full faith and credit to be given in each State to those of other States, 16, 17.

parties and privies estopped by, 47-54, 408.

but not in controversy with new subject-matter, 49.

strangers to suit not bound by, 48.

irregularities do not defeat, 409.

(See Juarsmcrxon.)

CONDITIONAL LEGISLATION,

power of the States to adopt, 117.

Federal courts acquire no jurisdiction from, 19, 20.
pre-existing the Constitution, 21.
what it consists in, 21.
its general features, 22.
modification of, by statutes, 22, 23 .
colonists in America claimed benefits of, 28, 24.
how far in force, 23, n.
evidences of, 24.
decisions qoder, as precedents, 51, 52.
gradual modification of, 54, 55.
to be kept in vie\Y in construing constitutions, 60.
statutes in derogation of, 61, n.
not to control constitutions, 61.
municipal by-laws must harmonize with, 202.
rules of liability for injurious publications, 417, 422-425.
modification of, by statute, 430.
modification by police regulations of common-law liability of carriers,
579-.)81.

COMMON RIGHT,
statutes against, said to be void, 165, n., 166, 167, n.

COMPACTS BETWEEN STATES,
must have consent of Congress, 16.
are inviolable under United States Constitution, 275, and n.

COMPENSATION,
for private property appropriated by the public, 509.
(See EmNENT DoMAIN.)
what the tax-payer receives as an equivalent for taxes, 498.

COMPLAINTS,
for purposes of search-warrant, 304.
of crime how made, 309.

COMPULSORY TAXATION,
by municipal bodies, 231-233.

CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENTS,
full faith and credit to be given in each State to those of other States, 16, 17.
parties and privies estopped by, 47-54, 408.
but not in controversy with new subject-matter, 49.
strangers to suit not bound by, 48.
irregularities do not defeat, 409.
(See JURISDICTION.)

CONDITIONAL LEGISLATION,
power of the States to adopt, 117.

710 mnax.

CONDITIONS,

710

INDEX.

what may be imposed on right of sulfrage, 362, n., 601, 602.

< (See Emcrxons.)

precedent to exercise of right of eminent domain, 528, 529.

CONFEDERACY OF 1643,

CONDITIONS,
what may be imposed on right of suffrage, 862, n., 601, 602.
(See

brought about by tendency of Colonies to union, 5.

CONFEDERATE DEBT,

not to be assumed or paid, 11.

CONFEDERATION, ARTICLES OF,

adoption of, 6, 7.

authority to supersede, 8, n. I

CONFESSIONS,

dangerous character of, as evidence, 314.

must appear to have been made voluntarily, 313, 314.

excluded if solicitations or threats have been used, 315.

will not prove the corpus delicti, 315. 1|‘

CONFIDENCE,

communications in, when privileged, 425, 426.

between attorney and client, is client‘s privilege, 334, and n.

CONFIRMING INVALID PROCEEDINGS,

of a judicial nature, 107, 108.

admissible when defects are mere irregularities, 371.
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(See Rnrnosracrrvn Laws.)

CONFISCATIONS,

require judicial proceedings, 363, 364.

during the Revolutionary War, 262.

CONFLICT OF LAVVS,

in divorce cases, 401, and n.

(See UNCONSTXTUTIONAL Laws.)

CONGRESS OF 1690,

brought together by tendency of Colonies to union, 5.

CONGRESS OF THE REVOLUTION,

powers assumed and exercised by, 5-7.

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,

ELECTIONS.)

precedent to exercise of right of eminent domain, 528, 529.
CONFEDERACY OF 1643,
brougllt about by tendency of Colonies to union, 5.
CONFEDERATE DEBT,
not to be assumed or paid, 11.
CONFEDERATION, ARTICLES OF,
adoption of, 6, 7.
authority to supersede, 8, n.
CONFESSIONS,
dangerous character of, as evidence, 514.
must appear to have been made voluntarily, 813, 314.
excluded if solicitations or threats have been used, 315.
will not prove the corpus delicti, 815.
CONFIDENCE,
communications in, when privileged, 425, 426.
between attorney and client, is client's privilege, 834, and n.
CONFIRMING INVALID PROCEEDINGS,
of a judicial nature, 107, 108.
admissible when defects are mere irregularities, 871.
(See RETROSPECTIVE L.&.ws.)
CONFISCATIONS,
require judicial proceedings, 868, 864.
during the Revolutionary War, 262.
CONFLICT OF LAWS,
in divorce cases, 401, and n.

general powers of, 10-12.

(See

UNCONSTITUTIONAL LAWS.)

enabling acts by, for formation of State constitutions, 30, 31.

cannot divest vested rights, 362.

exercise of power of eminent domain by, 525.

regulations of commerce by, are supreme, 581, 591.

(See Poucu Powna.)

CONNECTICUT,

charter government of, 26.

protection of property by law of the land, 352, n.

freedom of speech and of the press in, 414, n.

CONSCIEN CE, FREEDOM OF,

(See RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, 467-478.)

CONSENT,

conviction by collusion no bar to new prosecution, 327.

CONGRESS OF 1690,
brought together by tendency of Colonies to union, 5.
CONGRESS OF THE REVOLUTION,
powers Msumed and exercised by, 5-7.
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
general powers of, 10-12.
enabling acts by, for formation of State constitutions, SO, 81.
cannot divest vested rights, 362.
exercise of power of eminent domain by, 525.
regulations of commerce by, are supreme, 581, 591.
(See POLICE Pow:Ba.)
CONNECTICUT,
charter government of, 26.
protection of property by law of the land, 852, n.
freedom of speech and of the press in, 414, n.
CONSCIENCE, FREEDOM OF,
(See RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, 467-478.)
CONSENT,
conviction by collusion no bar to new prosecution, 827.
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cannot confer jurisdiction of subject-matter upon courts, 398.

cannot authorize jury trial by less than twelve jurors, 319, n. .

is a waiver of irregularities in legal proceedings, 409.

waiver of constitutional privileges by, 181, 319, n., 390, and n.

CONSEQUENTIAL INJURIES, '

caused by exercise of legal right give no ground of complaint, 384.

do not constitute a. taking of property, 542-544.

are covered by assessment of damages when property taken by the public,

570.

but not such as result from negligence or improper construction, 571.

CONSTITUTION,

deﬁnition of, 2, 3.

object of, in the American system, 37.

CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND,

theory of, 3, 4. I

power of parliament under, 3.

developed by precedents, 50, n.

CONSENT- continued.
cannot confer jurisdiction of subject-matter upon courts, 398.
cannot authorize jury trial by less than twelve jurors, 319, n.
is a waiver of irregularities in legal proceedings, 409.
waiver of constitutional privileges by, 181, 319, n., 390, and n.

CONSEQUENTIAL INJURIES,
caused by exercise of legal right give no ground of complaint, 384.
do not constitute a taking of property, 542-544.
are covered by assessment of damages when property taken by the public,
570.
but not such as result from negligence or improper construction, 571.

CONSTITUTION,
definition of, 2, 3.
object of, in the American system, 37.

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES,

origin of, 5-7.

ratiﬁcation of‘, 7, 8.

government of enumerated powers formed by, 9, 10, 173.
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general powers of the government under, 10-12.

ijudicial powers under, 11-13, 19.

(See Counrs or rm-1 UNITED Sraras.)

prohibition by, of powers to the States, 15, 294, 599.

guaranty ofrcpublican government to the States, 17.

implied prohibitions on the States, 18.

and on municipal corporations, 198.

reservation of powers to States and people, 19.

difference between, and State constitutions, 9, 10, 173.

construction of, 9, 10, 19.

amendment of State constitutions how limited by, 33.

protection of person and property by, as against State action, 256-294.

bill of rights not at ﬁrst inserted in, and why, 256.

addition of, afterwards, 257-259.

bills of attainder prohibited by, 259-264.

(See BILLS or ATTAINDEB.)

ex postfacto laws also forbidden, 264-273.

(See Ea: postfacto LAWS.)

laws impairing obligation of contracts forbidden, 273-294.

what is a contract, 273-279.

what charters of incorporation are, 279.

whether release of taxation is contract, 280, 283.

whether Slates can relinquish right of eminent domain, 281, 525.

or the police power, 282, 283, 525.

general laws of the States not contracts, 284.

what the obligation of the contract consists in, 525.

CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND,
theory of, 3, 4.
power of parlia~ent under, 3.
developed by precedents, 50, n.

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES,
origin of, 5-7.
ratification of, 7, 8.
government of enumerated powers formed by, 9, 10, 173.
general powers of the government under, 10-12.
· judicial powers under, 11-13, 19.
(See CounTs Ol'' THE UNITED STATEs.)
prohibition by, of powers to the States, 15, 294, 599.
guaranty of republican government to the States, 17.
implied prohibitions on the States, 18.
and on municipal corporations, 198.
reservation of powers to States and people, 19.
difference between, and State constitutions, 9, 10, 173.
construction of, 9, 10, 19.
amendment of State constitutions how limited by, 33.
protection of person and property by, as against State action, 256-294.
bill of rights not at first inserted in, and why, 256.
addition of, afterwards, 257-259.
bills of attainder prohibited by, 2!,9-264.

(See BILLS OF ATTAINDER.)
ex post facto laws also forbidden, 264-273.
(See Ex post facto LAws.)
laws impairing obligation of contracts forbidden, 273-294.
what is a contract, 273-279.
what charters of incorporation are, 279.
whether release of taxation is contract, 280, 283.
whether States can relinquish right of eminent domain, 281, 525.
or the police power, 282, 283, 525.
general laws of the States not contracts, 284.
what the obligation of the contract consists in, 525.
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power of the States to control remedies, 287-294.

and to pass insolvent laws, 293," 294.

(See OBLIGATION or Coxrnacrs.)

police regulations by the States, when in conﬂict with, 579 587.

(See Poucs: Powsn.)

taxation of the subjects of commerce by the States, 586, 587.

CONSTITUTIONS OF THE STATES,

compared with that of the United States, 9, 173.

formation and amendment of, 21-37.

construction of,-38-84.

not the source of individual rights, 37.

(See S"r.\'r1-: CONSTXTUTIONS; CONSTRUCTION or STATE Coxsrnunoxs.)

CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS,

for formation and amendment of State constitutions, 30-32.

proceedings of, as bearing on construction of constitution, 66.

of 1787 sat with closed doors, 419.

CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENTS,

meaning of the term, 2, 3.

CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGES,

may be waived generally, 181. (See \V.uvan.)

CONSTRUCTION,
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meaning of and necessity for, 38.

of United States Constitution and laws by United States courts, 12.

of State constitution and laws by State courts, 13, 14, 294.

CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS,

meaning of the term “ construction,” 38, n.

necessity for, 38.

questions of‘, arise whenever powers to be exercised, 39.

who ﬁrst to decide upon, 39-41.

in certain States judges may be called upon for opinions in advance, 40.

in what cases construction by legislature or executive to be ﬁnal, 41-43.

in what cases not. 42, 43.

when questions of, are addressed to two or more departments, 42, 43.

ﬁnal decision upon, rests generally with judiciary, 43-46, 53, 54.

reasons for this, 44.

this does not imply pre-eminence of authority in the judiciary, 45, n.

the doctrine of res adjudicata, 47-54.

decisions once made binding upon parties and privies, 47, 48.

force of judgment does not depend on reasons given, 49.

strangers to suit not bound by, 49.

nor the parties in a controversy about a new subject-matter, 49.

the doctrine of stare deciszls, 47-54.

only applicable within jurisdiction of court making the decision, 51, 52.

importance of precedents, 51, n.

when precedents to be disregarded, 52.

when other departments to follow decisions of the courts, and when

not, 53, 54.

CONSTITUTlON OF THE UNITED STATES-continued.
power of the States to control remedies, 287-294.
anq to pass insolvent laws, 293; 294.
(See OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS.)
police regulations by the States, when in conftict with, 579 587.
(See PoLICE PowER.)
taxation of the subjects of commerce by the States, 586, 587.
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE STATES,
compared with that of tbe United States, 9, 173.
formation and amendment of, 21-37.
construction of,-88-84.
not the source of individual rights, 37.
(See Sn.n; CoNSTITUTIONS; CoNSTRU CTION OJ.' STATE CoNSTITUTIONs.)
CONSTITUl'ION AL CONVENTIONS,
for formation and amendment of State constitutions, 30-32.
proceedings of. as bearing on construction of constitution, 66.
of 1787 sat with dosed doors, 419.
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENTS,
meaning of the term, 2, 3.
CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGES,
may be waived generally, 181. (See WAIVER.)
CONSTRUCTION.
meaning of and necessity for, 38.
of United States Constitution and laws by United States courts, 12.
of State constitution and laws by State courts, 13, 14, 294.
CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
meaning of the term " construction," 38, n.
necessity for, 88.
questions of, arise whenever powers to be exercised, 89.
who first to decide upon, 39-41.
in certain States judges may be called upon for opinions in advance, 40.
in what cases construction by legislature or executive to be final, 41-43.
in what cases not, 42, 43.
when questions of, are addressed to two or more department11, 42, 43.
final decision upon, rests generally with judiciary, 48-46, 53, 54.
reasons for this, 44.
this does not imply pre-eminence of authority in the judiciary, 45, n.
the doctrine of rea adjudicata, 47-54.
decisions once made binding upon parties and privies, 47, 48.
force of judgment does not depend on reasons gi,·en, 49.
strangers to suit not bound by, 49.
nor the parties in a controversy about a new subject-matter, 49.
the doctrine of stare decisi.~, 47-5-l.
only applicable within jurisdiction of court making the decision, 51, 52.
importance of preL-edents, 51, n.
when precedents to be disregarded, 52.
when other departments to follow decisions of the courts, and when
not, 53, 54.
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uniformity of construction, importance of, 54, 55.

not to be atfccled by changes in public sentiment, 54, 55.

words of the instrument to control, 55-57, 65. 83, n., 130.

intent of people in adopting it to govern, 55-57.

intent to be found in words employed, 55, and n., 57.

whole instrument to be examined, 57, 59, n. .

words not to be supposed employed without occasion, 57, 58.

etfect to be given to whole instrument, 58.

irreconcilable provisions, 58, and n.

general intent as opposed to particular intent, 58, and n.

words to be understood in their ordinary sense, 58, 59, 83, n.

of art, to be understood in technical sense, 60.

importance of the history of the law to, 59, 65.

common law to be kept in view, 59-62.

but not to control constitution, 61.

whether provisions in derogation of, should be strictly construed,

61, n.

arbitrary rules of, dangerous, 59, 61, 62, 83.

and especially inapplicable to constitutions, 58.

same word presumed employed in same sense throughout, 62.

this not a conclusive rule, 62.
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operation to be prospective, 62, 63.

implied powers to carry into eﬂ'ect express powers, 63, 64.

power granted in general terms is co-extensive with the terms, 64. '

when constitution prescribes conditions to a right, legislature cannot add

others, 64.

mischief to be remedied, consideration of, 65.

prior state of the law to be examined, 65.

proceedings of constitutional convention may be consulted, 66.

reasons why unsatisfactory, 66, 67.

weight of contemporary and practical construction, 67.

the argument ab inconvenienti, 67;-70, 72, n.

deference to construction by executive oﬂicers, 69.

plain intent not to be defeated by, 69-73.

injustice of provisions will not render them void, 72, 73.

nor authorize courts to construe them away, 73.

doubtful cases of, duty of officers acting in, 73, 74.

directory and mandatory statutes, doctrine of, 74-78.

not applicable to constitutions, 78-82.

has been sometimes applied, 79-81.

authorities generally the other way, 82.

CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES.

to be such as to give them effect, if possible, 184.

conﬂict with constitution not to be presumed, 185, 186.

directory and mandatory, 74-78.

contemporary and practical, weight to be given to, 67-71.

to be prospective, 370.

CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS- continued.
uniformity of construction, importance of, 54, b5.
not to be affected by changes in public sentiment, 54, 55.
words of the instrument to control, 55-57, 65, 83, n., 130.
intent of people in adopting it to govern, 55-57.
intent to be found in words employ<>d, 55, and n., 57.
wl10le instrument to be examined, 57, 69, n.
words not to be supposed employed without occasion, 57, 58.
etfc:>ct to be given to whole instrument, 58.
irrecom·ilahle provisions, 58, and n.
general intent as opposed to particular intent, 58, and n.
words to be understood in their ordinary sense, 5h, 59, 83, n.
of art, to be understood in technical sense, 60.
importance of the history of the law to, 59, 65.
common law to be krp£ in view, 59-62.
but not to control constitution, 61.
whether provisions in derogation of, should be strictly construed,
61, n.
arbitrary rules of, dangerous, 59, 61, 62, 88.
and especially inapplicable to constitutions, 58.
same worrl presumed employed in same sense throughout, 62.
this not a conclusive rule, 62.
operation to be prospective, 62, 63.
implied powers to carry into effet·t express powers, 63, 64.
power granted in g<>neral terms is co·extensive with the terms, 64. when constitution prescribes conditions to a right, legislature cannot add
others, 64.
mischief to be remedied, consideration of, 65.
prior state of the law to be examined, 65.
proceedings of constitutional convention may be consulted, 66.
reasons why unsatisfactory, 66, 67.
weight of contemporary and practical construction, 67.
the argument ab inconvenienti, 67r70, 72, n.
deference to construction by exet•utive officel'8, 69.
plain intent not to be defeated by, 69-73.
injustice of provisions will not render them void, 72, 73.
nor authorize courts to construe them away, 78.
doubtful cases of, duty of officers acting in, 73, 74.
directory and mandatory statutes, doctrine of, 74-78.
not applieable to constitutions, 78-82.
has been sometimes applie!l, 79-81.
authorities generally the other way, 82.

CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES,
to be such as to give them effect, if possible, 18!.
conflict with constitution not to be presumed, 185, 186.
direetory and mandatory, 74-78.
contemporary an!l practical, weight to be given to, 67-71.
to be prospt:ctive, 370.
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INDEX.

force and elfect of, 67-71.

CONTEMPTS,

of the legislature, punishment of, 133-135.

of legislative committees, 135.

CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSTRUCTION,
force and effect of, 6i-71.

CONTEMPTS,

CONTESTED ELECTIONS,

right of the courts to determine upon, 623.

(See Em-zcrlons.)

of the legislature, punishment of, 133-185.
of legislative committees, 135.

CONTESTED ELECTIONS,

\

CON TESTED FACTS,

cannot be settled by statute, 96, 104, 105.

CONTESTED SEATS,

legislative bodies to decide upon, 133.

right of the courts to determine upon, 628.
(See ELECI"IONS.)

CONTESTED FACTS,
cannot be settled by statute, 96, 104, 106.

CONTINENTAL CONGRESS,

powers assumed and exercised by, 5-7.

CONTINGENT LEGISLATION,

authority of the States to adopt, 117.

CONTRACTS, t

for lobby services, illegal, 136.

to inlluencc elections, are void, 615. _

cannot be made for individuals by legislative act, 369, and n.

CONTESTED SEATS,
legislative bodies to decide upon, 133.

CONTINENTAL CONGRESS,
powers assumed and exercised by, 6-7.

CONTINGENT LEGISLATION,
authority of the States to adopt, 117.

CONTRACTS,

charters of municipal corporations do not constitute, 192, 193.
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of private corporations are, 279.

of municipal corporations ultra vires void, 196.

invalid, may be validated by legislature, 372-383.

obligation of‘, not to be violated, 126, 273.

(See OBLIGATION or Coxrnacrs.)

COPYRIGHT,

Congress may secure to authors, 10.

CORPORATE CHARTERS,

(See Cnanrans.)

CORPORATE FRANCHISES,

may be appropriated under right of eminent domain, 526.

CORPORATE PROPERTY.

legislative control of, 235.

for lobby services, illegal, 186.
to influence elections, are void, 616.
cannot be made for individuals by legislative' act, 869, and n.
charters of municipal corporations do not constitute, 19:2, 198.
ofprivate corporations are, 279.
of municipal corporations ultra vires void, 196.
invalid, may be validated by legislature, 872-383.
obligation of, not to be violated, 126, 273.
(See OBLIGATION OF CoNTRA.crs.)

COPYRIGHT,
Congress may secure to authors, 10.

CORPORATE CHARTERS,

CORPORATIONS,

private, may be authorized to take lands for public use, 536-538.

irregular organization of, may be validated, 371, 374, n.

(See CHARTERS; I\IU1\'IClPAL CORPORATIONS.)

CORRESPONDENCE,

private, inviolability of, 307, n.

COUNSEL,

constitutional right to, 330-338.

oath of, 330, 331, n.

duty of, 331, 335, 338, n.

denial of, in England, 331-333.

court to assign for poor persons, 334.

- whether those assigned may refuse to act, 334.

privilege of, is the privilege of the client, 334, and n.

(See

CHARTERS.)

CORPORATE FRANCHISES,
may be appropriated under right of eminent domain, 626.

CORPORATE PROPERTY,
legislative control of, 286.

CORPORATIONS,
private, may be authorized to take lands for public use, 536-538.
Irregular organization of, may be validated, 371, 874, n.
(See CHARTERS; MuNICIPAL CoRPORATIONs.)

CORRESPONDENCE,
private, inviolability of, 807, n.

COUNSEL,
constitutional right to, 380-338.
oath of, 330, 331, n.
duty of, 331, 885, 838, n.
denial of, in England, 331- 883.
court to assign for poor per~ons, 884.
whether those &.~~signed may rt'fuse to act, 334.
privilege of, is the privilege of the client, 384, and n.

nmnx. 715

INDEX.

COUNSEL — continued. ~

715

not at liberty to withdraw from cause, except by consent, 335.

how far he may go in pressing for acquittal, 335, 336.

duty of, as between the court and the prisoner, 335, n.

whether to address the jury on the law, 336, 337.

summary punishment of, for misconduct, 337.

limitation of client’s control over, 338, and n.

(See ATTORNEYS.)

may be employed before legislative committees, 136, n.

but not as lobbies, 136, n.

not liable to action for what he may say in judicial proceedings, 442-445.

unless irrelevant to the case, 444.

not privileged in afterwards publishing his argument, if it contains injuri-

ous reﬂections, 448.

newspaper publisher not justiﬁed in publishing speech of a criminal reﬂect-

ing on his counsel, 456.

COUNTERFEITING,

Congress may provide for punishment of, 10, 18.

States also may punish, 18.

COUNTIES AND TOWNS,

COUNSEL- continued.
not at liberty to withdraw from cause, except by consent, 335.
bow far he may go in pressing for acquittal, 335, 336.
duty of, as between the court and the prisoner, 335, n.
whether to address the jury on the law, 336, 337.
summary punishment of, for misconduct, 337.
limitation of client's control over, 338, and n.
(See ATTOllNEYs.)
may be employed before legislative committees, 136, n.
but not as lobbies, 136, n.
not liable to action for what he may say in judicial proceedings, 442-445.
unless irrelevant to the case, 444.
not privileged in afterwards publishing his argument, if it contains injurious reflections, 448.
newspaper publisher not justified in publishing speech of a criminal reflecting on his counsel, 456.

difference from chartered incorporations, 240.

(See l\1uN1c11>.\L Conronarroxs.)
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COURTS,

duty of, to refuse to execute unconstitutional laws, 71, n., 81, 82, 159, et seq.

contested elections to be determined by, 623.

not to be directed by legislature in decisions, 94, 95.

action of, not to be set aside by legislature, 95.

must act by majorities, 96.

COUNTERFEITING,
Congress may provide for punishment of, 10, 18.
States also may punish, 18.

COUNTIES AND TOWNS,
difference from chartered incorporations, 240.
(See MUNICIPAL CORPOHATIONS.)

COURTS,

not to be open on election days, 614.

power to declare laws unconstitutional a delicate one, 159, 160.

will not be exercised by bare quorum, 161.

nor unless necessary, 163. ~

nor on complaint of one not interested, 163, 164.

nor of one who has assented, 164.

will not declare laws void because solely of unjust provisions, 164-168.

nor because in violation of fundamental principles, 169,170.

nor because conﬂicting with the spirit of the constitution, 171-174.

nor unless a clear repugnancy between the laws and the constitution,

173-176.

special, for trial of rights of particular individuals, 392.

of star chamber, 342.

of high commission, 342.

martial, 319, n.

of the United States, to be created by Congress, 10.

general powers of, 11.

removal of causes to, from State courts, 12, 13.

to follow State courts as to State law, 13, 14.

to decide ﬁnally upon United States laws, &c., 12, 294.

duty of, to refuse to execute unconstitutional laws, 71, n., 81, 82, 159, et 8eq.
contested elections to be determined by, 623.
not to be directed by legislature in decisions, 94, 95.
action of, not to be set aside by legislature, 95.
must act by majorities, 96.
not to be open on election days, 61!.
power to declare laws unconstitutional a delicate one, 159, 160.
will not be exercised by bare quorum, 161.
nor unles~ necessary, Hl3.
nor on complaint of one not interested, 163, 164.
nor of one who has assented, 164.
will not declare laws void because solely of unjust provisions, 164-168.
nor because in violation of fundamental principles, 169, 170.
nor because conflicting with the spirit of the constitution, 171-174.
nor unless a clear repugnancy between the laws and the constitution,
173-176.
special, for trial of right!! of particular individuals, 392.
of star chamber, 342.
of high commission, 342.
martial, 319, n.
of the United States, to be created by Congress, 10.
general powers of, 11.
removal of causes to, from State courts, 12, 13.
to follow State courts as to State law, 13, 14.
to decide finally upon United States laws, &c., 12, 29-!.
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INDEX.

require statutes to apportion jurisdiction, 19.

have no common-law jurisdiction, 19, 20.

COURTS- continued.
require statutes to apportion jurisdiction, 19.
have no common-law jurisdiction, 19, 20.
in what cases may issue writs of habeas corpus, 345, 346.

in what cases may issue writs of habeas corpus, 345, 346.

CREDITOR,

control of debtor by, 341.

CRIMES,

legislative convictions of, prohibited, 15, 33, 259.

apost facto laws prohibited, 15, 33, 264.

punishment of, by servitude, 299.

search warrants for evidence of. (Sec Smncnas AND SEIZURES.)

accusations of, how made, 309.

presumption of innocence, 309, 311.

right of accused party to bail, 309-311.

prisoner refusing to plead, 311.

trial to be speedy, 311, 31.2.

and public, 312.

and not inquisitorial, 313.

prisoner"s right to make statement, 313-318.

confessions as evidence, 313-318.

prisoner to be confronted with the witnesses, 318.

exceptional cases, 318.
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to be byjury, 309, 319.

jury must consist of twelve, 319.

right to jury cannot be waived, 319.

prisoner’s right to challenges, 319.

jury must be from vicinage, 319, 320. '

must unanimously concur in verdict, 320.

must be left free to act, 320.

judge not to express opinion upon the facts, 320.

nor to refuse to receive the verdict, 820.

but is to give instruction in the law, 322.

how far jury may judge of the law, 321-324. I

acquittal by jury is ﬁnal, 321, 322.

accused not to be twice put in jeopardy, 325-328.

what is legal jeopardy, 326, 327.

when nolle prosequi equivalent to acquittal, 327.

when jury may be discharged without verdict, 327.

second trial aiter verdict set aside, 327, 328.

cruel and unusual punishments prohibited, 328-330.

counsel to be allowed, 330-338.

oath of, 330, 331. n.

duty of, 331, 335, 338, n.

denial of, in England, 331-333.

court to designate for poor persons, 334.

whether one may refuse to act, 334.

privilege of, is the privilege of the client, 334, and n.

not at liberty to withdraw from case, except by consent, 335.

CREDITOR,
control of debtor by, 341.

CRIMES,
legislative convictions of, prohibited, 15, 38, 259.

ez po&t facto laws prohibited, 15, 83, 264.
punishment of, by servitude, 299.
search warrants for evidence of. (See SEARCHES AND SEIZURES.)
accusations of, how made, 809.
presumption of innocence, 309, 311.
right of accused party to bail, 809-311.
prisoner refusing to plead, 311.
trial to be speedy, 311, 812.
and public, 312.
and not inquisitorial, 313.
prisoner's right to make statement, 313-318.
confessions as eviden<.-e, 313-318.
prisoner to be confronted with the witnesses, 818.
exceptional eases, 318.
to be by jury, 309, 319.
jury must consist of twelve, 319.
right to jury cannot be waived, 319.
prisoner's right to challenges, 319.
jury must be from vicinage, 319, 320.
must unanimously concur in verdict, 320.
must be left free to act, 320.
judge not to express opinion upon the facts, 320.
nor to refuse to receive the verdict, 320.
but is to give instruction in the law, 322.
how far jury may judge of the law, 321-324.
acquittal by jury is final, 321, 322.
accused not to be twice put in jeopardy, 325-328.
what is legal jeopardy, 326, 827.
when noUe prosequi equivalent to acquittal, 327.
when jury may be discharged without verdict, 327.
second trial after verdict set aside, 327, 328.
cruel and unusual punishments prohibited, 328-330.
counsel to be allowed, 330-338.
oath of, 330, 331. n.
duty of, 831, 835, 338, n.
denial of, in England, 331-883.
court to designate for poor persons, 38-1.whether one may refuse to act, 834.
privilege of, is the privilege of the client, 334, and n.
not at liberty to withdraw from case, except by consent, 885.
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CRIMES — continued.

how far he may go in pressing for acquittal, 335, 336.

duty of, as between the court and the prisoner, 335, n.

CRIMES- continued.

whether to address the jury on the law, 336, 337.

bow far he may go in pressing for acquittal, 335, 336.
duty of, as between the court ami the prisoner, 335, n.
whether to address the jury on the law, 336, 337.
summary punishment of, for misconduct, 337, 404, n.
not to be made the instrument of injustice, 338.
habeas corpus for imprisoned parties, 338-:348.
accusations of, are libellous, per se, 424-426.
but prh·ileged if made in course of jutlicial proceedings, 441, 444.
violations of police regulations of States, 596.

summary punishment of‘, for misconduct, 337, 404, n.

not to be made the instrument of injustice, 338.

habeas covpus for imprisoned parties, 338-348.

accusations of, are libcllous, per se, 424-426.

but privileged if made in course of judicial proceedings, 441, 444.

violations of police regulations of States, 596.

CRITICISM,

of works of art and literary productions is privileged, 457.

but not the personal character of the author, 457.

of public entertainments and sermons, 457. n.

CROWN OF GREAT BRITAIN,

CRITICISM,
of works of art and literary productions is privileged, 457.
but not the personal character of the author, 457.
of public entertainments and sermons, 457. n.

succession to, may be changed by parliament, 86.

union of the colonies under, 5.

CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENTS,

constitutional prohibition of, 328-330.

CROWN OF GREAT BRITAIN,

what are, 329, 330.

succession to, may be changed by parliament, 86.
union of the colonit's under, 5.

CUMULATIVE PUNISHMENTS,

for counterfeiting money, 18.
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under State and municipal laws, 199.

CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENTS,
constitutional prohibition of, 3:28-330.
what are, 329, 330.

CURTESY, ESTATE BY THE,

power of legislature to modify or abolish, 360, 361.

CUSTODY,

CUMULATIVE PUNISHMENTS,
for counterfeiting money, 18.
under State and municipal laws, 199.

of wards, apprentices, servants, and scholars, 340.

of wife by husband, 339.

of children by parents, 340, 348.

of principal by his bail, 341.

CURTESY, ESTATE BY THE,
power of legislature to modify or abolish, 360, 361.

CUSTOMS,

(See Common Law; Dorms Am) Inrosrs.)

D.

CUSTODY,
of
of
of
of

DAM,

to obtain water power, condemnation of land for, 532, 534-536.

erection of, across navigable waters by State authority, 593, 594.

wards, apprentices, servants, and scholars, 340.
wife by husband, 339.
children by parents, 340, 348.
principal by his bail, 341.

destruction of, when it becomes a nuisance, 595.

DAMAGES.

CUSTOl\IS,
(See Co:\L'\ION LAw ; DunEs

in libel cases, increased by attempt at justification, 438.

AND

hlPOsTs.)

' when exemplary, not to be awarded. 457.

for property taken by the public, must be paid, 559.

D.

(See Emnnxr Doxam.)

DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA,

DAM,

what consequential injuries are, 384, 543.

DEATH,

common carriers may be made liable for causing, 581.

to obtain water power, condemnation of land for, 532, 534-536.
erection of, across navigable waters by State authority, b98, 594.
destruction of, when it becomes a nuisance, 595.

DAMAGES,
in libel cases, increased by attempt at justification, 438.
when exemplary, not to be awarded, 457.
for property taken by the public, must be paid, 559.
(See E:.u:sENT DOllAIN.)
DAMNUM .ABSQUE INJURIA.,
what consequential injuries are, 384, 543.

DEATH,
common carriers may be made liable for causing, 581.

718 INDEX.

DEBATES,

718

INDEX.

in Parliament, formerly not suffered to be published,’418.

in American legislative bodies. publication of, 419, 420, 457, 460.

privilege of members in, 445-447.

(See FREEDOM or SPEECH am) or "rm: Pnass.)

DEBT,

public, declared inviolable, 11.

confederate, not to be assumed or paid, 11.

imprisonment for, may be abolished as to pre-existing obligations, 287.

_ imprisonment for, now generally abolished, 341.

DEBTOR,

control of creditor over, 341.

DEBTS BY 'l‘HE STATE,

prohibition of, whether it precludes indebtedness by municipalities, 217,

218.

- DECENTRALIZATION,

the peculiar feature in American government, 189.

DECISIONS, '

judicial, binding force of, 47-54.

(See JUDICIAL Pnocnnnnvos.)

DECLARATION OF RIGHTS,

DEBATES,
in Parliament, formerly not suffered to be published,' 418.
in American legislative bodies, publication of, 419, 420, 457, 460.
privilege· of members in, 445-447.
(See FREEDOM OF SPEKCH AND OF THE PnBSS.)

DEBT,
public, declared inviolable, 11.
confederate, not to be assumed or paid, 11.
imprisonment for, may be abolished as to pre-existing obligations, 287 .
. imprisonment for, now generally abolished, 341.

DEBTOR,
control of creditor over, 841.

DEBTS BY THE STATE,
prohibition of, whether it precludes indebtedness by municipalities, 217,
218 .

. DECENTRALIZATION,
the peculiar feature in American government, 189.

was a declaratory statute, 257.
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(See Btu. or RIGHTS.)

DECLARATORY STATUTES,

in English constitutional law, 22-24.

arc not encroachments upon judicial power, 93-95.

judgments not to be reversed by means of, 94, 95.

purpose and proper force of, 93-95.

DEDICATION,

DECISIONS,
judiCial, binding force of, 47-M.
(See JuDICIAL

PROCEEDINGS.)

DECLARATION OF RIGHTS,
was a declaratory statute, 257.

(See BILL
DECLARATORY STATUTES,

OF RIGHTS.)

of lands to public use, 238, n, 565.

DEEDS,

invalid, may be conﬁrmed by legislature, 377, 378.

but not to prejudice of bona ﬁde purchasers, 378, 879.

DEFENCES,

not based upon equity, may be taken away by legislature, 370-383.

under statute of limitations are vested rights, 365.

DEFINITIONS,

of a State, 1.

of a nation, 1.

of a people, sovereignty and sovereign state, 1.

of _a consti ution, 2.

of an unconstitutional law, 3, 4.

of construction and interpretation, 38, n.

of legislative power, 90-‘J2, 94.

in English constitutional law, 22-24.
are not encroachments upon judicial power, 98-95.
judgments not to be reversed by means of, 94, 95.
purpose and proper force of, 98-95.

DEDICATION,
of lands to public use, 288, n, 565.

DEEDS,
invalid, may be confinned by legislature, 377, 378.
but not to prejudice of bona fide purchasers, 378, 379.

DEFENCES,
not based upon equity, may be taken away by legislature, 370-388.
under statute of limitations are vested rights, 365.

DEFINITIONS,

of judicial power, 91, 92, 94.

of <'ccl ratory statutes, 93.

of due process of law, 353.

of law of the land, 353.

of a State, 1.
of a nation, 1.
of a people, sovereignty and sovereign state, 1.
of.a consti ution, 2.
of an unconstitutional law, 8, 4.
of construction and interpretation, 38, n.
of legislative power, UO-V2, 94:.
of judicial power, 91, 92, 94.
of •'eel ratory statutes, 93.
of due process oflaw, 853.
oflaw of the land, 353.

mnnx. 719

719

INDEX.

DEFINITIONS — continued.

of personal l berty, 339.

of natural liberty, 393, n.

ofliberty of the press, 420, 422.

of liberty of speech, 422.

of religious liberty, 467, 468.

of taxation, 479.

of the eminent domain, 524.

of police power, 572.

of domicile, 600, n.

DELAWARE,

revenue bills must originate in lower house, 131, n.

protection of property and person by law of the land, 352, n.

liberty of speech and of the press in, 415, n.

DEFINITIONS- continutd.
ofpersonall berty, 889.
of natural liberty, 393, n.
of liberty of the press, 420, 422.
of liberty of speech, 422.
of religious liberty, 467, 468.
of taxation, 4 79.
of the eminent domain, 524.
of police power, 572.
of domicile, 600, n.

DELAWARE,

disqualiﬁcation of religious teachers for oﬂice, 468, n.

religious tests forbidden, 469, n.

DELEGATION OF POWER,

by the legislature not admissible, 116-125.

except as to powers of local government, 191.

by municipal corporations invalid, 204.

DEPARTMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT,

division of powers between, 33-37, 39, 87-94.
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equality of, 45, n., 47, n.

DESECRATION OF THE SABBATII,

constitutional right to punish, 476, 588.

DIRECTORY STATUTES,

what are, and what are mandatory, 74, 78.

doctrine of, not admissible as to constitutional provisions, 78-83.

DISCRETION ARY POWERS,

what are, 39- 13.

revenue bills must originate in lower bouse, 131, n.
protection of property and person by law of the land, 352, n.
liberty of speech and ofthe press in, 415, n.
disqualification of religious teachers for office, 468, n.
religious tests forbidden, 469, n.

DELEGATION OF POWER,
by the legislature not admissible, 116-125.
except as to powers oflocal government, 191.
by municipal corporations invalid, 204.

DEPARTMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT,
division of powers between, 33-37, 89, 87-94.
equality of, 45, n., 47, n.

DESECRATION OF THE SABBATH,
constitutional right to punish, 476, 588.

department to which they are conﬁded decides ﬁnally upon, 39-43, 115, n.

DISCRIMINATIONS,

cannot be made in taxation between citizens of different States, 487.

' in legislation between diﬂerent classes, 389-397.

in the privileges and immunities of citizens, 11, 15, 16, 397, 599.

not to be made on account of religious belief, 467-470.

DISCUSSION,

right of, 349.

DIRECTORY STATUTES,
what are, and what are mandatory, 74, 78.
doctrine of, not admissible as to constitutional provisions, 78-88.

DISCRETIONARY POWERS,
what are, 39-!3.
department to which they are confided decides finally upon, 39-43, 115, n.

DISCRil\IINATIONS,

(See LIBERTY or S1-neon AND or rm: Panss.)

DISFRAN CHISEMEN T, '

of voters, may render a statute void, 616.

what classes excluded from suﬁrage, 28-30, 73, 599.

DISTRICTS, _

for schools, powers of, 240, 247, 248.

exercise by, of power of eminent domain, 537.

for taxation, necessity for, 495, 497.

not to tax property outside, 499.

taxation to be uniform within, 502.

\

cannot be made in taxation between citizens of different States, 487.
in legislation between different classes, 389-397.
in the privileges and immunities of citizens, 11, 15, 16,397, 599.
not to be made on account of religious belief, 467-470.

DISCUSSION,
right of, 349.

(See LIBERTY
DISFRANCHISEMENT,

OF SPEECH AND m;· THE

P.RESS.)

of voters, may render a statute void, 616.
what classes excluded from suffrage, 28-30, 73, 599.

DISTRICTS,
for schools, powers of, 240, 247, 248.
exercise by, of power of eminent domain, 537.
for taxation, necessity for, 495, 497.
not to tax property outside, 499.
taxation to be uniform within, 502.

720 mm-zx.

DIVISION OF POWERS,

720

INDEX.

between sovereign States, 2.

between the States and the Union, 2.

among (Icpartments of State government, 33-37, 39, 87.

DIVISION OF TOWNSHIPS, &c.,

question of, may be submitted to

DIVORCE,

question of, is properly judicial,

people, 119.

between sovereign States, 2.
between the States and the Union, 2.
among dl:'partments of State government, 83-37, 39, 87.
DIVISION OF TOWNSHIPS, &c.,
question of, may be submitted to people, 119.

DIVORCE,

/

109. '

power of the legislature over, 109, 110.

general doctrine of the courts on the subject, 111.

' conﬂicting decisions, 112, 113.

legislative divorce cannot go beyond dissolution of the status, 114.

' constitutional provisions requiring judicial action, 110, n.

laws for, do not violate contracts, 284.

and may be applied to pre-existing causes, 266, n.

what gives jurisdiction in cases 0

f, 400, 401 .

actual residence of one party in the State sufficient, 400, 401.

conﬂict of decisions on this subject, 401, 402.
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not suﬂicient if residence m

necessity for service of process,

erely colorable, 401.

402.

DIVISION OF POWERS,

~ cannot be served out of State, 403.

substituted service by publication, 403, 404.

restricted effect of such notice, 405, 406.

order as to custody of children, 405.

question of, is properly judicial, 109.
power of the lt-gislature over, 109, 110.
general doctrine of the courts on the subject, 111.
· conflicting decisions, 112, 113.
legislative divorce cannot go beyond dissolution of the statui, 114.
constitutional provisions requiring judicial action, 110, n.
laws for, do not violate contracts, 284.
and may be applied to pre-existing causes, 266, n.
what gives jurisdiction in cases of, 400, 401.
actual residence of one party in the State sufficient, 400, 401.
conflict of decisions on this subject, 401, 402.
not sufficient if residence merely colorable, 401.
necessity for service of process, 402.
cannot be served out of State, 408.
substituted service by publication, 403, 404.
restricted effect of such notice, 405, 406.
order as to custody of children, 405.
alimony not to be awarded if defendant not served, 406.

alimony not to be awarded if defendant not served, 406.

DOGS,

police regulation of, 595.

DOMAIN,

ordinary, of the State, distinguished from eminent domain, 523.

DOMICILE,

gives jurisdiction in divorce cases, 400.

but must be bona jide, 401.

of wife, may be different from th

at of husband, 401, n.

of one party, may give jurisdiction in divorce cases, 400.

of voters, meaning of, 599, 600.

DOUBLE PUNISHMENT,

for same act under State and mu

for counterfeiting money, 18.

DOUBLE TAXATION,

DOGS,
police regulation of, 595.

DOMAIN,
ordinary, of the State, distinguished from eminent domain, 528.

DOMICILE,
gives jurisdiction in divorce cases, 400.
but must be bona fide, 401.
of wife, may be different fi·om that of husband, 401, n.
of one party, may give jurisdiction in divorce caaea, 400.
of voters, meaning of, 699, 600.

DOUBLE PUNISHMENT,
for same act under State and municipal law, 199.
for counterfeiting money, 18.

DOUBLE TAXATION,

sometimes unavoidable, 613.

DOUBTF UL QUESTIONS,

nicipal law, 199.

of constitutional law, duty in case of, 73, 74, 182-186.

DOWER,

legislative control of estates in, 360, 361.

DRAIN S,

sometimes unavoidable, 618.

DOUBTFUL QUESTIONS,
of constitutional law, duty in case of, 78, 74, 182-186.

DOWER,
legislati\'e control of estates in, 860, 361.

DRAINS,

appropriating property for purposes of, 533.

special assessments for, 510, 511

appropriating property for purposes of, 638.
special asse8sments for, 610, 611.

mm-ax. 721

INDEX.

DRUNKENNESS,

does not excuse crime, 476, n.

is a temporary insanity, 599, n.

DRUNKENNESS,

DUE PROCESS OF LAIV,

meaning of the term, 353, 369, n.

(See Law or run Laxn.)

DUPLICATE PUNISHLIENTS,

by States and United States, 18.

does not excuse crime, 476, n.
is a temporary insanity, 599, n.

DUE PROCESS OF LAW,
meaning of the term, 353, 369, n.
(See LAW OF THE LAND.)

by States and municipal corporations, 199.

DUTIES AND IMPOSTS,

to be uniform throughout the United States, 10.

what the States may lay, 15.

DWELLING—HOUSE,

is the owner’s castle, 22, 299.

homicide in defence of, 308.

quartering soldiers in, prohibited, 308.

DYING DECLARATIONS, ~

admissible in evidence on trials for homicide, 318.

inconclusive character of the evidence, 318.

E.

EASEMENTS,

acquirement by the public under right of eminent domain, 524.
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private, cannot be acquired under this right, 530, 531.

(See Emm-xxvr Domam.)

DUPLICATE PUNISHMENTS,
by States and United States, 18.
by States and municipal corporations, 199.

DUTIES AND IMPOSTS,
to be uniform throughout the United States, 10.
what the States may lay, 15.

DWELLING-HOUSE,
is the owner's castle, 22, 299.
homicide in defence of, 308.
quartering soldiers in, prohibited, 308.

DYING If.ECLARATIONS,
admissible in evidence on trials for homicide, 318.
inconclusive character of the evidence, 318.

ECCLESIASTICAL CORPORATIONS,

powers and control of, 467, n. _

E.

ELECTIONS,

people exercise the soyereignty by means of, 598.

who to participate in, 599.

constitutional qualiﬁcations cannot be added to by legislature, 64, n.

exclusion of married women, aliens, minors, idiots, &c., 599.

conditions necessary to participation, 599, 601, 602.

presence of voter at place of domicile, 599.

what constitutes residence, 599, 600.

registration may be made a condition, 601.

preliminary action by the authorities, notice, &c., 602.

mode of exercising the right, 604. ’

the elector’s privilege of secrecy, 604-606.

a printed ballot is “ written,” 604.

ballot must be complete in itself, 606.

technical accuracy not essential, 607.

explanations by voter inadmissible, 607.

must not contain too many names, 607.

name should be given in full, 608.

sufficient if idem sonans, 608.

what abbreviations suﬂicient, 608, 609.

46

EASEMENTS,
acquirement by the public under right of eminent domain, 524.
private, cannot be acquired under this right, 530, li31.
(See E::\nNENT DoMAIN.)

ECCLESIASTICAL CORPORATIONS,
powers and control of, 467, n.

ELECTIONS,
people exercise the Sll,.vereignty by means of, li98.
who to participate in, 599.
constitutional qualifications cannot be added to by legislature, 64, n.
exclusion of married women, aliens, minors, idiots, &c., 599.
conditions necessary to participation, 599, 601, 602.
presence of voter at place of domicile, 599.
what constitutes residence, 599, 600.
registration may be made a condition, 601.
preliminary action by the authorities, notice, &c., 602.
mode of exercising the right, 604.
the elector's privilege of secrecy, 604-606.
a printed ballot is " written," 604.
ballot must be complete in itself, 606.
technical accuracy not essential, 607.
explanations by voter inadmissible, 607.
must not contain too many names, 607.
name should be given in full, 608 ..
sufficient if idem sonans, 608.
what abbreviations sufficient, 608, 609.
46

721

722 mnnx.

ELECTIONS - continued.

722

INDEX.

erroneous additions not to affect, 610.

extrinsic evidence to explain imperfections, 611.

ballot must contain name of oliice, 612.

but need not be strictly accurate, 612.

different boxes for different ballots, 613.

elector need not vote for every oﬁice, 613.

plurality of votes cast to elect, 614, 620.

eﬁ'ect if highest candidate is ineligible, 620.

freedom of elections, 614.

bribery or treating of voters, 614.

militia not to be called out on election day, 615.

courts not to be open on election day, 614.

bets upon election are illegal, 615.

contracts to inﬂuence election are void, 615.

elector not to be deprived of his vote, 362, n., 616.

statutes which would disfranchise voters, 616.

failure to hold election in one precinct, 616.

liability of inspectors for refusing to receive vote, 616.

elcct0r’s oath when conclusive on inspector, 617.

conduct of the election, 617. ~

effect of irregularities upon, 617, 618.
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what constitutes a suﬁicient election, 619.

not necessary that a majority participate, 620.

admission of illegal votes not to defeat, 620.

unless done fraudulently, 621.

effect of casual affray, 621.

canvass and return, 622.

canvassers are ministerial oﬁicers, 622.

canvassers not to question returns made to them, 622.

whether they can be compelled by mandamus to perform duty, 623.

contesting elections in the courts, 623.

canvassers’ certiﬁcate as evidence, 624.

courts may go behind certiﬁcate, 624.

what surrounding circumstances may be given in evidence, 626.

whether qualiﬁcation of voters may be inquired into, 627.

to legislative body, house to decide upon, 133.

EMANCTPATION,

of slaves in Great Britain and America, 11, 295-299.

of children by parents, 340.

EMINENT DOMAIN,

distinguished from ordinary domain of States, 523.

deﬁnition of, 524. '

right of, rests upon necessity, 524.

cannot be bargained away, 281, 525.

general right is in the States, 525.

for what purposes nation may exercise right, 525, 526.

all property subject to right, 526.

ELECTIONS -continued.
erroneous additions not to affect, 610.
extrinsic evidence to explain imperfections, 61J.
ballot must contain name of office, 612.
but need not be strictly accurate, 612.
different boxes for different ballots, 613.
elector need not vote for every office, 613.
plurality of votes cut to elect, 614, 620.
effect if highest candidate is ineligible, 620.
freedom of elections, 614.
bribery or treating of voters, 614.
militia not to be called out on election day, 615.
courts not to be open on election day, 614.
bets upon election are illegal, 615.
contracts to influence election are void, 615.
elector not to be deprived of his vote, 362, n., 616.
statutes which would disfranchise voters, 616.
failure to bold election in one precinct, 616.
liability of inspectonJ for refusing to receive vote, 616.
elector's oath when conclusive on inspector, 617.
conduct of the election, 617.
effect of irregularities upon, 617, 618.
what constitutes a sufficient election, 619.
not necessary that a majority participate, 620.
admission of illegal votes not to defeat, 620.
unless done fraudulently, 621.
effect of casual affray, 621.
canvass and return, 622.
canvassers are ministerial officers, 622.
canvassers not to question returns made to them, 622.
whether they can be compelled by mandamus to perform duty, 623.
contesting elections in the courts, 623.
canvassers' certificate as evidence, 624.
courts may go behind certificate, 624.
what surrounding circumstances may be given in evidence, 626.
whether qualification of voters may be inquired into, 627.
to legislative body, house to decide upon, 133.

EMANCIPATION,
of slaves in Great Britain and America, 11, 295-299.
of children by parents, 340.

EMINENT DOMAIN,
distinguished from ordinary domain of States, 528.
definition of, 524.
•
right of, rests upon necessity, 524.
cannot be bargained away, 281, 525.
general right is in the States, 525.
for what purposes nation may exercise right, 525, 526.
all property subject to right, 526.

mnnx. 723

EMINENT DOMAIN — continued.

INDEX.

1

723

exception of money and rights in action, 527.

legislative authority requisite to, 527.

EMINENT DOMAIN- continued.
exception of money and rights in action, 527.
legislative authority requisite to, 521.
legislature may determine upon.the necessity, 528, 538.
conditions precedent must be complied with, 528, 529.
statutes for exercise of, not to be extended by intendment, 530.
the purpose must be public, 530, 531.
private roads cannot be laid out under, 530, 531.
what constitutes public pUl'pose, 532, 533.
whether erection of mill-dams is, 534-536.
property need not be taken to the State, 536.
individuals or corporati~ns may be public agents for the purpose, 537, 538.
• the taking to be limited to the necessity, 539-541.
statute for taking more than is needed is ineffectual, unless owner assents,
540, Ml.
what constitutes a taking of property, 541.
incidental injuries do not, 542-544.
any deprivation of use of property does, 544.
water front and right to wharfage is property, 544.
right to pasturage in streets is property, 545.
taking of common highway for higher gralle of way, 545.
if taken for turnpike, &c., owner not entitled to compensation, 546.
difFerence when taken for a railway, 546-548.
owner entitled to compensation in such case, 049, 550.
whether he is entitle() in case of street railway, 551.
decisions where the fee of the streets is in the public, 552, 555.
distinction between a street railway and a thoroughfare, 556.
right to compensation when course of a strea1n is diverted, 557.
whether the fee in the land can be taken, 557-559.
compensation must be made for property, 559.
must be pecuniary, 559.
preliminary surveys may be made without liability, 560.
need not be first made when property taken by State, &c.,-560.
sufficient if party is given a remedy by means of which he may obtain
it, 560, 561.
time for resorting to remedy may be limited, 561.
waiver of right to compensation, 561, 562.
when property taken by individual or private corporation, compensation must ,be first made, 062.
tribunal for assessment of, 563.
time when right to payment is complete, 563, 564.
principle on which compensation to be assessed, 565.
allowance of incidental injuries and benefits, 556.
not those suffered or received in common with public at large, 569,
570.
if benefits equal damages, owner entitled to nothing, 570.
asRessment of damages covers all consequential injurieto, 5i0.
for injuries arising from negligmt·e, &c., party may have action, 571 .

legislature may determine upon.the necessity, 528, 538.

conditions precedent must be complied with, 528, 529.

statutes for exercise of, not to be extended by intendment, 530.

the purpose must be public, 530, 531. .

private roads cannot be laid out under, 530, 531.

what constitutes public purpose, 532, 533.

whether erection of mill-dams is, 534-536.

property need not be taken to the State, 536.

individuals or corporations may be public agents for the purpose, 537, 538.

the taking to be limited to the necessity, 539-541.

statute for taking more than is needed is ineﬂ'ectual, unless owner assents,

540, 541.

what constitutes a taking of property, 541.

incidental injuries do not, 542-544.

any deprivation of use of property does, 544.

water front and right to wharfage is property, 544.

right to pasturage in streets is property, 545.

taking of common highway for higher grade of way, 545.
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if taken for turnpike, &c., owner not entitled to compensation,

difference when taken for a railway, 546-548.

owner entitled to compensation in such case, 549, 550.

whether he is entitled in case of street railway, 551.

decisions where the fee of the streets is in the public, 552, 555.

distinction between a street railway and a thoroughfare, 556.

right to compensation when course of a stream is diverted, 557.

whether the fee in the land can be taken, 557-559.

compensation must be made for property, 559.

must be pecuniary, 559.

preliminary surveys may be made without liability, 560.

need not be ﬁrst made when property taken by State, &c.,'560.

sufficient it‘ party is given a remedy by means of which he may obtain

it, 560, 561.

time for resorting to remedy may be limited, 561.

waiver of right to compensation, 561, 562.

when property taken by individual or private corporation, compen-

sation must be ﬁrst made, 562.

tribunal for assessment of, 563.

time when right to payment is complete, 563, 564.

principle on which compensation to be assessed, 565.

allowance of incidental injuries and beneﬁts, 556.

not those suffered or received in common with public at large, 569,

570.

if beneﬁts equal damages, owner entitled to nothing, 570.

assessment of damages covers all consequential injuries, 570.

for injuries arising from negligence, &c., party may have action, 571.

546.

•
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724 mm-1x.

ENABLING ACT,

724

INDEX.

to entitle Territory to form State constitution, 27, 28, 30.

ENGLAND,

(Sec GREAT Bnrmm.)

ENABLING ACT,
to entitle Territory to form State constitution, 27, 28, 30.

EQUALITY,

of protection guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment, 11.

ENGLAND,
(See GREAT

_ of the several departments of the government, 45, n.

of rights and privileges, the aim of the law, 393.

grants of special privileges construed strictly, 393-396.

religious, 467-478. l

(See Rauoxons Lmnnrr.)

EQUITABLE TITLES,

may be changed by legislature into legal, 377 and n., 378. _

ERRONEOUS JUDGMENTS,

may be overruled, 52.

when they should not be, 52. I

ERRORS,

waiver of, in legal proceedings, 409.

judgments, &c., not void by reason of, 408.

curing by retrospective legislation, 370-383.

BRITAIN.)

EQUALITY,
of protection guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment, 11.
of the several departments of the government, 45, n.
of rights and privileges, the aim of the law, 393.
grants of special privileges construed strictly, 393-396.
religious, 467-178.
·
(See RELIGIOUS LIBERTY.)

EQUITABLE TITLES,
may be changed by legislature into legal, 877 and n., 378.

ERRONEOUS JUDGMENTS,
may be overruled, 52.
when they should not be, 52.

in conduct of elections, effect of, 613, 617-619.

ESSENTIAL POWERS OF GOVERNMENT,
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taxation, eminent domain, &c., cannot be bartered away, 280, 284, 525.

ESTABLISHMENTS,

religious, are forbidden by State constitutions, 469.

ESTATES OF DECEASED PERSONS, "

special legislative authority to sell lands for payment of debts is consti-

ERRORS,
waiver of, in legal proceedings, 409.
judgments, &c., not void by reason of, 408.
curing by retrospective legislation, 37G-383.
in conduct of elections, effect of, 613, 61i-619.

ESSENTIAL POWERS OF GOVERNMENT,

tutional, 97-106.

taxation, eminent domain, &c., cannot be bartered away, 280, 284, li26.

such acts forbidden by some constitutions, 98, n.

legislature cannot adjudicate upon debts, 103, 104.

ESTATES IN LAND,

subject to change by the legislature before they become vested, 360.

but.not afterwards, 93, n.

ESTOPPEL,

by judgment only applies to parties and privies, 48.

does not depend on reasons given by the court, 48, 49.

ESTABLISHl\IENTS,
religious, are forbidden by State constitutions, 469.

ESTATES OF DECEASED PERSONS,
special legislative authority to sell lands for payment of debts is constitutional, 97-106.
such acts forbidden by some constitutions, 98, n.
·legislature cannot adjudicate upon debts, lOS, 104.

’ does not apply in controversy about new subject-matter, 49.

of the State by its legislation, 73, n., 254, n.

EVIDENCE,

complete control of legislature over rules of, 288, 367-369.

conclusive rules of, not generally admissible, 368, 369.

confessions of accused parties as, 313-318.

dying declarations, when are, 318. .

search-warrants to obtain, not constitutional, 305, 307, n.

correspondence not to be violated to obtain, 307, n.

accused party not compelled to give, against himself, 313.

by accused parties in their own favor, 317, n.

against accused parties, to be given publicly, and in their presence, 312,

318.

ESTATES IN LAND,
subject to change by the legislature before they become vested, 360.
but.not afterwards, 93, n.

ESTOPPEL,
by judgment only applies to parties and privies, 48.
does not depend on reasons given by the court, 48, 49.
. does not apply in controversy about new subj~ct-matter, 49.
of the State by its legislation, 73, n., 25!, n .

.EVIDENCE,
complete control of legislature over rules of, 288, 367-369.
conclusive rules of, not generally admissible, 868, 869.
confessions of accused parties as, 313-318.
dying declarations, when are, 318.
search-warrants to obtain, not constitutional, 305, 307, n.
correspondence not to be violated to obtain, 307, n.
accused party not compelled to give, against himself, 313.
by accused parties in their own favor, 317, n.
against accused parties, to be ghen publicly, and in their presence, 31:?,
318.

•
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INDEX.

EVIDENCE — continued.

725

communications by client to counsel not to be disclosed, 334.

to explain imperfections in ballots, 611, 624.

EVIL TO BE REMEDIED,

weight of, in construing constitutions, 65, 83, n.

what in view in requiring title of act to state the object, 142-144.

EXAMINATIONS, '

of accused parties, when to be evidence against them, 313, 314.

EXCESSIVE PUNISHMENTS,

EVIDENCE- continued.
communications by client to counsel not to be disclosed, 334.
to explain imperfections in ballots, 611, 624.

EVIL TO BE REMEDIED,
weight of, in construing constitutions, 65, 83, n.
what in view in requiring title of act to state the object, 142-144.

constitutional prohibition of, 330.

EXCESSIVE TAXATION,

renders tax proceedings and sales void, 520.

EXCISE TAXES,

Congress may lay, 10.

EXCLUSIVE PRIVILEGES,

not to be taken by implication, 393-396.

strict construction of, 282, n., 393-396.

EXAMINATIONS,
of accused parties, when to be evidence against them, 313, 314.

EXCESSIVE PUNISHMENT&,
constitutional prohibition of, 330.

EXCESSIVE TAXATION,
renders tax proceedings and sales void, 520.

EXCISE TAXES,

are subject to right of eminent domain, 281.

EXECUTION, '

exemptions from, may be increased without violating pre-existing con-

tracts, 287.

and may be recalled, 383.
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imprisonment upon, may be abolished, 287.

EXECUTIVE,

construction of constitution by, 39-43.

weight of practical construction by, 69.

power of, to pardon and reprieve, 115 and n., 116 and n.

approval or veto of laws by, 153, 154.

EXECUTIVE POIVER, p

what is, 91.

not to be exercised by legislature, 87, 114-116.

of the United States, 11.

EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS,

special statute, authorizing sales by, 97-106.

propriety of judicial action in these cases, 97.

legislature cannot adjudicate upon debts, 104.

EXEMPLARY DAMAGES, _

against publisher of newspaper, 457.

EXEMPTIONS,

from taxation, when not repealable, 127, 280.

Congress may lay, 10.

EXCLUSIVE PRIVILEGES,
not to be taken by implication, 393-396.
strict construction of, 282, n., 393-396.
are subject to right of eminent domain, 281.

EXECUTION,
exemptions from, may be inlTeased without violating pre-existing contracts, 287.
and may be recalled, 383.
imprisonment upon, may be abolished, 287.

EXECUTIVE,
construction of constitution by, 89-43.
weight of practical construction by, 69.
power of, to pardon and reprieve, 115 and n., 116 and n.
approval or veto of laws by, 153, 1M.

EXECUTIVE POWER,
what is, 91.
not to be exercised by legislature, 87, 114-116.
of the United States, 11.

EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS,

power of the legislature to make, 514.

from public duties, &c., may be recalled, 220, 383.

of property, from right of eminent domain, 281.

of property, from police power of the State, 282.

from execution, may be increased without violating contracts, 287.

of debtor from imprisonment, 287, 341.

privilege of, may be made to depend upon residence, 397.

laws for, not to be suspended for individual cases, 891, n.

special statute, authorizing sales by, 97-106.
propriety of judicial action in these cases, 97.
legislature cannot adjudicate upon debts, 104.

EXEMPLARY DAMAGES,
against publisher of newspaper, 457.

EXEMPTIONS,
from taxation, when not repealable, 127, 280.
power of the legislature to make, 514.
from public duties, &c., may be recalled, 220, 883.
of property, from right of eminent domain, 281.
of property, from police power ofthe State, 282.
from execution, may be increased without violating contracts, 287.
of debtor from imprisonment, 287, 341.
privilege of, may be made to depend upon residence, 897.
laws for, not to be suspended for individual cases, 391 1 n.

726 mnsx.

EX PAR TE PROCEEDINGS,

726

INDEX.

publication of, not privileged, 449-451.

EXPECTANCY,

interest in, are not vested rights, 359-361.

EX POST FA GTO LAWS,

States not to pass, 15, 33, 264.

meaning of the term, 264.

only applies to criminal laws, 264. ,

classiﬁcation of, 265.

laws in mitigation of punishment are not, 267.

what is in mitigation, and what not, 267-272.

modes of procedure in criminal cases may be changed, 272.

punishment of second offences, 273.

EXPRESSION OF POPULAR VVILL,

must be under forms of law, 598.

(See ELECTIONS.)

EXPULSION,

of legislative members for misconduct, 133, 134.

F.

FACT AND LAW,

province of judge and jury respectively, 320-324.

in libel cases, 460.
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FAST DAYS,

EX PARTE PROCEEDINGS,
publication of, not privileged, 449-451.
EXPECTANCY,
interest in, are not vested rights, 359-361.
EX POST FACTO LAWS,
States not to pass, 15, 33, 264.
meaning of the term, 264.
only applies to criminal laws, 264.
classification of, 265.
laws in mitigation of punishment are not, 267.
what is in mitigation, and what not, 267-272.
modes of procedure in criminal cases may be changed, 272.
punishment of second offences, 273.
EXPRESSION OF POPULAR WILL,
must be under forms of law, 598.
(See ELECTIONS.)
EXPULSION,
oflegislative members for misconduct, 133, 134.

appointment of, does not violate religious liberty, 471.

FEDERAL COURTS,

F.

(See Counrs or THE Umrnn STATES.)

FEDERALIST,

FACT AND LAW,

on the power toisupersede the Articles of Confederation, 8, n.

province of judge and jury respectively, 820-324.
in libel cases, 460.

reasons of, for dispensing with national bill of rights, 256.

reference in, to laws violating obligation of contracts, 273.

FEE,

FAST DAYS,
appointment of, does not violate religious liberty, 471.

whether the public may appropriate, in taking lands, 557-559.

FEMALES,

FEDERAL COURTS,
(See

accusation of want of chastity not actionable, per se, 423, 424.

statutes on the subject, 424.

CouRTS OF THE UNITED ST..&.n:s.)

FEDERALIST,

excluded from suffrage, 599.

on the power to supersede the Articles of Confederation, 8, n.
reasons of, for dispensing with national bill of rights, 256.
reference in, to laws violating obligation of rontracts, 273.

(See Mxnnmn \V0Ma1v.)

FERRY FRANCHISES,

granted to municipal corporations, may be resumed, 277, 278.

strict construction of, 396.

grants of, by the State across navigable waters, 593.

police regulations respecting, 577.

FEUDAL SYSTEM,

Mackintosh‘s deﬁnition of, 22 and n.

FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT,

provisions of, 11, 599.

FEE,
whether the public may appropriate, in taking lands, 557-559.

FEMALES,
accusation of want of chastity not actionable, per ae, 423, 424.
statuws on the subject, 424.
excluded from suffrage, 599.
(See M.umiED Wol\IEN.)

FERRY FRANCHISES,
granted to municipal corporations, may be resumed, 277, 278.
strict construction of, 896.
grants of, by the State across navigable waters, 593.
police regulations respecting, 577.

FEUDAL SYSTEM,
Mackintosh's definition of, 22 and n.

FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT,
provisions of, 11, 599.

INDEX.

INDEX.

727

FIRE,

destruction of buildings to prevent spread of, 526, n., 594.

FIRE,

precautions against, by establishing ﬁre limits, 594.

FISHERY,

public rights of, in navigable waters, 524.

restrictions upon, 202, and n.

FLORIDA,

legislative divorces forbidden in, 110, n. -

legislature may make rules respecting pardons, 116.

protection of property, &c., by law of the land, 352, n.

liberty of speech and the press in, 416.

FOREIGNERS,

(See ALIENS.)

FORFEITURES,

under municipal by-laws, 204, n.

destruction of buildings to prevent spread of, 526, n., 594.
precautions against, by establishing fire limits, 594.

FISHERY,
public rights of, in navigable waters, 524.
restrictions upon, 202, and n.

FLORIDA,
legislative divorces forbidden in, 110, n.
legislature may make rules respecting pardons, 116.
protection of property, &c., by law of the land, 3:i2, n.
liberty of speech and the press in, 416.

FOREIGNERS,
(See Ar..ucNs.)

must be judicially declared, 263-264, 292.

FORMS,

prescribed by constitution are essential, 78-83, 177.

F OURTEENTH_ AMENDMENT,

protections of, 11, 294, and n., 397.

FOURTH OF JULY,
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celebration of, at public expense, 211.

FOX’S LIBEL ACT,

provisions of, 462.

import and purpose of, 462, 463.

FORFEITURES,
under municipal by-laws, 204, n.
must be judicially declared, 263-264, 292.

FORMS,
prescribed by constitution are essential, 78-88, 177.

FOURTEENTH. AMENDMENT,
protections of, 11, 294, and n., 397.

FOURTH OF JULY,

FRANCHISES,

of incorporation, when they constitute contracts, 279.

granted to municipal bodies may be resumed, 276.

repeal of, where right to repeal is reserved, 384, 578.

strict construction of, 195, 394-396.

police regulations respecting, 577.

may be appropriated under right of eminent domain, 526.

FRAUD,

as affecting decrees of divorce, 401, and n.

FREEDMEN,

made citizens, 294, 599.

FREEDOM,

maxims of, in the common law, 21, 22.

gradually acquired by servile classes in Great Britain, 295, 299.

(See PERSONAL Lmnnrr.)

FREEDOM OF ELECTIONS, _

celebration of, at public expense, 211.

FOX'S LIBEL ACT,
provisions of, 462.
import and purpose of, 462, 468.

FRANCHISES,
of incorporation, when they constitute contracts, 279.
granted to municipal bodies may be resumed, 276.
repeal of, where right to repeal is reserved, 884, 578.
strict construction of, 195, 394--396.
police regulations respecting, 577.
may be appropriated under right of emineat domain, 526.

FRAUD,
as affecting decrees of divorce, 401, and n.

FREEDMEN,

provisions to secure, 614, 615.

bribery and treating of electors, 614.

militia not to be called out on election day, 614.

courts not to be open on election day, 614.

betting on elections illegal, 615.

contracts to inﬂuence elections void, 615.

made citizens, 294, 599.

FREEDOM,
maxims of, in the common law, 21, 22.
gradually acquired by servile classes in Great Britain, 295, 299.
(See PERSONAL LIBERTY.)

FREEDOM OF ELECTIONS,
provisions to secure, 614, 615.
bribery and treating of electors, 614.
militia not to be called out on election day, 614.
courts not to be open on election day, 614.
betting on elections illegal, 615.
contracts to influence elections void, 615.

727

728 mnsx.

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS,

728

INDEX.

Hamilton’s reasons why protection of, by bill of rights not important, 256.

opposing reasons by J etferson, 258, n.

(See LIBERTY on Srnncn AND or THE Pnnss.)

FREEDOM OF SPEECH,

deﬁnition of, 422.

(See LIBERTY or Srnscn mo or THE Panes.)

FUGITIVES FROM JUSTICE,

to be delivered up by the States, 15, 16.

FUNDAMENTAL LAW,

constitutions are, 2.

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS,‘

bills of, in State constitutions, 35.

in the national Constitution, 256-259.

in England, 23, 257.

are before constitutions, 36, 37.

statutes in violation of, 169-176.

under fourteenth amendment, 11, 294, 397.

G.

GAl\ﬂN G IMPLEMENTS,

keeping of, for unlawful games, may be prohibited, 596.

GENERAL INTENT,
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when to control particular intent, 58, n.

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS,
Hamilton's reasons why protection of, by bill of rights not important, 256.
opposing reasons by Jefferson, 258, n.
(See

LmERTY OF SPEECH AND OF THE PREss.)

FREEDOM OF SPEECH,
definition of, 422.
(See

LmERTY OF SPEIOCH AND OF THE

PRESS.)

FUGITIVES FROM JUSTICE,
to be delivered up by the States, 15, 16.
FUNDAMENTAL LAW,
constitutions are, 2.
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS,'
bills of, in State constitutions, 35.
in the national Constitution, 256-259.
in England, 23, 257.
are before constitutions, 36, 37.
statutes in violation of, 169-176.
under fourteenth amendment, 11, 294, 897.

GENERAL LAWS,

required instead of special by some constitutions, 128, 129, n.

G.

' in cases of divorce, 110, n.

due process of law does not always require, 353-355, 389-393.

submission of, to vote of people invalid, 116-125.

suspension of, 391.

changes in, give citizens no claim to remuneration, 358.

respecting remedies, power of legislature to change, 267-273, 287-294,

361-367.

GENERAL WARRAN TS,

illegality of, 299-303.

(See Snancnas AND Snrznnas.)

GEORGIA,

divorce cases to be adjudged by the courts, 110, n.

liberty of speech and of the press in, 417, n.

GOOD MOTIVES AND JUSTIFIABLE ENDS,

defence of, in libel cases, 464. ,

. burden of proof on defendant to show, 464.

GOVERNMENT,

constitutional, what is, 2, 3.

GAMING IMPLEMENTS,
keeping of, for unlawful games, may be prohibited, 596.
GENERAL INTENT,
when to control particular intent, 58, n.
GENERAL LAWS,
required instead of special by some constitutions, 128, 129, n.
in cases of divorce, 110, n.
due process of law does not always require, 353-355, 889-393.
submission of, to vote of people invalid, 116-125.
suspension of, 391.
changes in, give citizens no claim to remuneration, 358.
respecting remedies, power of legislature to change, 267-273, 287-29!,
361-367.
GENERAL WARRANTS,
illegality of, 299-S03.

republican, to be guaranteed tothe States, 17.

of the United States, origin of, 5-8.

(See Umrnn Srarns.)

(See

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES.)

GEORGIA,
divorce cases to be adjudged by the courts, 110, n.
liberty of speech and ofthe press in, 417, n.
GOOD MOTIVES AND JUSTIFIABLE ENDS,
defence of, in libel cases, 464.
burden of proof on defendant to show, 464.
GOVERNMENT,
constitutional, what is, 2, 8.
republican, to be guaranteed to ·the States, 17.
of the United States, origin of, 5-8.
(See

UNITED STATES.)

mnnx. 729

GOVERNOR,

INDEX.

approval or veto of laws by, 153, 154.

messages to legislature, 155.

power to prorogue or adjourn legislature, 132.

power to convene legislature, 155.

legislative encroachment on powers of, 114-116.

power to pardon, 115, n.

power to reprieve, 116, n.

GRADE OF RAILROADS,

legislature may establish for crossings, 580.

GRADE OF STREETS,

change of, gives parties no right to compensation, 207.

special assessments for grading, 497, 505-509.

GRAND JURY, ‘

criminal accusations by, 309.

presentments by, are privileged, 442, n.

GRANTS,

are contracts, and inviolable, 274.

by States, cannot be resumed, 274, 275, n.

of franchises, strict construction of, 195, 394-396.

when they constitute contracts, 279.

to municipal bodies, may be recalled, 276.
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GREAT BRITAIN,

how it became a constitutional government, 3, n., 50, n .

power of parliament to change constitution, 3.

meaning of unconstitutional law in, 4.

control over American Colonies, 5, 23-25.

statutes of, how far in force in America, 23, 24.

bill of rights of, 23, 257.

habeas corpus act of, 23, 344.

local self-government in, 189.

declaration of rights of, 257.

bills of attainder in, 260, 261.

money bills to originate in the Commons, 132, n.

emancipation of slaves in, 295-299.

prosecutions for libel in, 427, 460-462.

(See Panuamnrrr.)

GUARDIANS,

special statutes authorizing sales by, 97-106.

propriety of judicial action in such cases, 97.

control of ward by, 340.

appointment of, in divorce suits, 405.

authority of, is local, 405, n.

GUNPOWDER,

police regulations concerning, 595.

GOVERNOR,
approval or veto of laws by, 153, 154.
messages to le~slature, 155.
power to prorogue or adjourn legislature, 132.
power to convene legislature, 155.
legislative encroachment on powers of, 114-116.
power to pardon, 115, n.
power to reprieve, 116, n.
GRADE OF RAILROADS,
legislature may establish for crossings, 580.
GRADE OF STREETS,
change of, gives parties no right to compensation, 207.
special assessments for grading, 497, 505-509.
GRAND JURY,
criminal accusations by, 309.
presentments by, are privileged, 442, n.
GRANTS,
are contracts, and inviolable, 27 4.
by States, cannot be resumed, 274, 275, n.
of franchises, strict construction of, 195, 394-396.
when they constitute contracts, 279.
to municipal bodies, may be recalled, 276.
GREAT BRITAIN,
how it became a constitutional government, 3, n., 50, n •
power of parliament to change constitution, 3.
meaning of unconstitutional law in, 4.
control over American Colonies, 5, 23-25.
statutes of, how far in force in America, 23, 24.
bill of rights of, 23, 257.
habeas corpus act of, 23, 344.
local self-government in, 189.
declaration of rights of, 257.
bills of attainder in, 260, 261.
money bills to originate in tho Commons, 132, n.
emancipation of slaves in, 295-299.
prosecutions for libel in, 427, 460--462.
(See PARLLWENT.)
GUARDIANS,
special statutes authorizing sales by, 97-106.
propriety of judicial action in such cases, 97.
control of ward by, 340.
appointment of, in divorce suits, 405 .
•
authority of, is local, 405, n.
GUNPOWDER,
police regulations concerning, 595.

729

730 mnnx.

730

H.

INDEX.

HABEAS CORPUS,

writ of, a principal protection to personal liberty, 338, 342.

H.

personal liberty, meaning of, 339.

restraints upon, to prevent or punish crime, &c., 339.

HABEAS CORPUS,

growing out of relation of husband and wife, 339.

of parent and child, 340.

of guardian and ward, 340.

of master and apprentice, 340.

of master and servant, 341.

of teacher and scholar, 341.

of principal and bail, 341.

of creditor and debtor, 341.

insecurity of, formerly, in England, 342, 343.

habeas corpus act, and its purpose, 23, 344.

general provisions of, 344, 345.

adoption of, in America, 345.

writ of, when to be issued by national courts, 345, 346.

generally to issue from State courts, 346.

return to, where prisoner held under national authority, 347.

cases for, determined by common law, 347.

not to be made a writ of error, 347.
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what to be inquired into under, 348.

to obtain custody of children, 348.

HARBOR REGULATIONS,

establishment of, by the States, 585.

wharf lines may be prescribed, 595.

HARDSHIP,

of particular cases not to control the law, 71, 72, n.

unjust provisions not necessarily unconstitutional, 72, 73, 513.

HEALTH,

police regulations for protection of, 595.

draining swamps, &c., in reference to, 510.

HEIRSHIP,

right to modify, 359.

HIGH SEAS,

not subject to exclusive appropriation, 2.

States no authority upon, 128.

HIGHWAYS, _

establishment of, under right of eminent domain, 524.

when owner entitled to compensation in such case, 564.

appropriation of, to purposes of turnpike, railroad, &c., whether it entitles '

owner to compensation, 545-557.

(See EMINENT DOMAIN.)

regulations of, by States under police power, 588, 594.

HOMESTEADS,

exemption of, from execution, 288, n.

writ of, a principal protection to personal liberty, 838, 842.
personal liberty, meaning of, 389.
restraints upon, to prevent or punish crime, &c., 339.
growing out of relation of husband and wife, 889.
of parent and child, 840.
of guardian and ward, 840.
of master and apprentice, 340.
of master and servant, 841.
of teacher and scholar, 841.
of principal and bail, 841.
of creditor and debtor, 841.
insecurity of, formerly, in England, 342, 843.
habeas corpus act, and its purpose, 28, 844.
general provisions of, 344, 346.
adoption of, in America, Mo.
writ of, when to be issued by national courts, 845, 346.
generally to issue from State courts, 846.
return to, where prisoner held under national authority, 347.
cases for, determined by common law, 847.
not to be made a writ of error, 847.
what to be inquired into under, 848.
to obtain custody of children, 348.
HARBOR REGULATIONS,
et1tablishment of, by the States, 685.
wharf lines may be prescribed, 595.

HARDSHIP,
of particular cases not to control the law, 71, 72, n.
unjust provisions not necessarily unconstitutional, 72, 73, 613.
HEALTH,
police regulations for protection of, 695.
draining swamps, &c., in reference to, 510.

HEIRSHIP,
right to modify, 359.

HIGH SEAS,
not subject to exclusive appropriation, 2.
States no authority upon, 128.

HIGHWAYS,
establishment of, under right of eminent domain, 524.
when owner entitled to compensation iq sue~!. case, 564.
appropriation of, to purposes of turnpike, railroad, &c., whether it entitles •
owner to compensation, 545-557.
(See EMINENT DOMAIN.)
regulations of, by States under police power, 688, 694.
HOMESTEADS,
exemption of, from execution, 288, n.
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INDEX.
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HUSBAND AND WIFE,

power of legislature to divorce, 109-114.

jurisdiction in divorce cases, 401-406.

(See DIVORCE.)

HUSBAND AND WIFE,
power of legislature to divorce, 109-114.
jurisdiction in divorce cases, 401-406.

control of husband over wife, 339.

(See

DIVORCE.)

obligation of husband to support wife, 339, n.

right as between, to custody of children, 348.

property rights, how far subject to legislative control, ‘B60, 361.

validating invalid marriage by legislation, 372.

I.

IDEM SONANS,

control of husband over wife, 339.
obligation of husband to support wife, 389, n.
right as between, to custody of ('hildren, 348.
property rights, how far subject to legislative control, SGO, 361.
validating invalid marriage by legislation, 872.

ballots suﬁicient in cases of, 608.

IDIOTS,

I.

exclusion of, from suffrage, 599.

special legislative authority for sale of lands of, 97-106, 389.

ILLEGAL CONTRACTS,

have no obligation, 286.

legalization of, 293, 374-377.

for lobby legislative services, 136, and n.

designed to atfect elections, 615.

ILLINOIS,
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legislature of, not to grant divorces, 110, n.

special legislative sessions, 155, n.

when statutes of, to take eﬂect, 156.

title to private or local bill to express object, 142, n.

protection of property by law of the land, 352, n.

IDEM SONANS,
ballots sufficient in cases of, 608.

IDIOTS,
exclusion of, from suffrage, 599.
special legislative authority for sale of lands of, 97-106, 389.

ILLEGAL CONTRACTS,
have no obligation, 286.
legalization of, 293, 374-377.
for lobby legislative services, 136, and n.
designed to affect elections, 615.

ILLINOIS,

liberty of speech and the press in, 416.

religious tests forbidden, 469, n.

persons conscientiously opposed to bearing arms ex

IMMUNITIES,

of citizens of the several States, 15, 16, 397.

citizens not to be deprived of, 11.

IMPAIRIN G CONTRACTS,

- (See Oaucnxon or Conrnacrs.)

IMPEACHMENT,

of judges for declaring law unconstitutional, 160.

IMPLICATION,

amendments by, not favored, 152.

repeals by, 152.

grant of powers by, in State constitutions, 63, 64.

corporations established by, 197.

IMPLIED POWERS,

of municipal corporations, what are, 194-209.

granted by State constitutions, 63, 64.

IMPLIED PROHIBITION S,

to the States by the national Constitution, 18.

upon legislative power, 164-177.

cused, 478, n.

legislature of, not to grant divorces, 110, n.
speciallt>gislative sessions, 155, n.
when statutes of, to take effect, 156.
title to private or local bill to express object, 142, n.
protection of property by law of the land, 352, n.
liberty of speech and the press in, 416.
religious tests forbidden, 469, n.
persons conscientiously opposed to bearing arms excused, 478, n.

IMMUNITIES,
of citizens of the several States, 15, 16, 397.
citizens not to be deprived of, 11.

IMPAIRING CONTRACTS,
(See OBLIGATION
IMPEACHMENT,

OF CONTRACTS.)

of judges for declaring law unconstitutional, 160.

IMPLICATION,
amendments by, not favored, 152.
repeals by, 152.
grant of powers by, in State constitutions, 63, 64.
corporations established by, 197.

IMPLIED POWERS,
of municipal <'Orporations, what are, 194-209.
granted by State constitutions, 63, 64.

IMPLIED PROHIBITIONS,
to the States by the national Constitution, 18.

upon Jegislati,·e power, 164-177.

731

732 mnsx.

IMPORTS.

732

INDEX.

State taxation of, 586, 587.

IMPOST S,

IMPORTS,

to be uniform throughout the Union, 10.

State taxation of, 586, 687.
what the States may lay, 15. '

' taxation by, 495.

IMPRESSMENT OF SEAMEN,

not admissible in America, 299.

IMPRISONMENT, '

for legislative contempt must terminate with the session, 134.

for debt may be abolished as to existing contracts, 287.

unlimited, cannot be inﬂicted for common-law olfence, 329.

IMPOSTS,
to be uniform throughout the Union, 10.
what the States may lay, 15.
·
taxation by, 495.

IMPRESSMENT OF SEAMEN,
not admissible in America, 299.

IMPRISONMENT,

relief from. (See Hxnnss Conrus.)

IMPROVEMENTS,

owner of land cannot be compelled to make, 385, 532.

betterment laws, 385-389. -

local, assessments for the making of, 497-510.

(See Assassumrrs.)

IN CHOATE RIGHTS,

power of the legislature in regard to, 359-361.

INCIDENTAL INJURIES,

by change in the law, give no claim to compensation, 384.
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(See Emusxr Dostsm.)

INCOMPETENT PERSONS,

legislative authority for sale of lands of, 97-106, 389.

exclusion of, from suffrage, 599.

' INCONTINENCE,

accusation of, against female, not actionable, per se, 423, 424.

for legislative contempt must terminate with the session, 184.
for debt may be abolished as to existing contracts, 287.
unlimited, cannot be inflicted for common-law offence, 329.
relief from. (See HABEAS CoRPus.)

IMPROVEMENTS,
owner of land cannot be compelled to make, 885, 682.
betterment laws, 885-389.
local, assessments for the making of, 497-510.
(See AssE88MENT8.)

INCHOATE RIGHTS,
power of the legislature in regard to, 859-861.

INCIDENTAL INJURIES,
by change in the Jaw, give no claim to compensation, 884.
(See EMINENT DoM.UN.) ·

statutory provisions respecting, 424.

INCORPORATIONS,

charters of private, are contracts, 279.

charters of municipal, are not, 192, 276.

control of, by police regulations, 577-579.

(See Cn.\R'rans; 1\~Iumcu=.u. Couronarroxs.)

INDEBTEDNESS BY STATE, -

prohibition of, whether it precludes debts by towns, counties, &c., 217,

218.

INDECENT PUBLICATIONS,

sale of, may be prohibited, 596.

parties not free to make, 422.

INDEMNIFICATION,

of ofﬁcers of municipal corporation where liability is incurred in supposed

discharge of duty, 209, 210.

power of legislature to compel, 211.

not to be made in case of refusal to perform duty, 212.

INDEMNITY,

for property taken for public use.

(See EMINENT DOMAIN.)

I

INCOMPETENT PERSONS,
legislative authority for sale of lands of, 97-106, 889.
exclusion of, from suffrage, 599.

INCONTINENCE,
accusation of, against female, not actionable, per ae, 428, 424.
statutory provisions respecting, 424.

INCORPORATIONS,
charters of private, are contracts, 279.
charter11 of municipal, are not, 192, 276.
control of, by police regulations, 577-579.
(See CuARTER8j MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.)
li~DEBTEDNESS

BY STATE,

prohibition of, whether it precludes debts by towns, counties, &e., 217,
218.

INDECENT PUBLICATIONS,
sale of, may be prohibited, 696.
parties not free to make, 422.

INDEMNIFICATION,
of officers of municipal corporation where liability is incurred in supposed
discharge of duty, 209, 210.
power of legislature to compel, 211.
not to be made in case of refusal to perform duty, 212.

INDEMNITY,
for property taken for public use.

(See EMINE!'I"T Do!IUIN.)

INDEX. 733

INDEX.

INDELDTITY -— continued.

733

for consequential injuries occasioned by exercise of legal rights, 384.

INDEPENDENCE,

declaration of, by Continental Congress, 6.

new national government established by, 6.

celebration of at public expense, 211.

INDIANA,

special statutes licensing sale of lands forbidden, 98, n.

legislature of, not to grant divorces, 110, n.

when laws to take effect without governor’s signature, 154, n.

INDEl\INITY- continued.
for consequential injuries occasioned by exercise of legal rights, 384.

INDEPENDENCE,
declaration of, by Continental Congress, 6.
new national government established by, 6.
celebration of at public expense, 211.

INDIANA,

revenue bills to originate in lower house, 132, n.

prohibition of special laws where general can be made applicable,

129, n.

title of acts to express the object, 142.

liberty of the press in, 416, n.

religious tests for oﬂice forbidden, 469, n.

exemption from bearing arms of persons conscientiously opposed, 478, n.

republication of amended statutes, 152.

IN DICTMENT,

criminal accusations to be by, 309.

trial on defective, 272, n., 327.

(See Camus.)
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INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS,

provisions for protection of, in State Constitutions, 35, 36.

in national Constitution, 256-259.

do not owe their origin to constitutions, 36, 37.

English statutes declaratory of, 22, 23, 257.

(See Pnnsouxr. LIBERTY.)

INELIGIBILITY,

of highest candidate, how to aﬂ'ect election, 620.

INFANTS,

excluded from suffrage, 29, 30, 599.

special statutes authorizing sale of lands of, 97-106, 389. \

custody of, by parents, 340, 348.

special statutes licensing sale of lands forbidden, 98, n.
legislature of, not to grant divorces, 110, n.
when laws to take effect without governor's signature, 154, n.
revenue bills to originate in lower bouse, 132, n.
prohibition of special laws where general can be made applicable,
129, n.
title of acts to express the object, 142.
liberty of the press in, 416, n.
religious tests for office forbidden, 469, n.
exemption from bearing arms of persons conscientiously opposed, 478, n.
republication of amended statutes, 162.

INDICTMENT,
criminal accusations to be by, 309.
trial on defective, 272, n., 327.
(See CRIMES.)

INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS,
provisions for protection of, in State Constitutions, 35, 36.
in national Constitution, 256-259.
do not owe their origin to constitutions, 36, 37.
English statutes declaratory of, 22, 23, 257.
(See PERSONAL LmERTY.)

emancipation of, 340. I

control of, by masters, guardians, and teachers, 340, 341.

INFERIOR COURTS,

duty of, to pass upon constitutional questions, 162, n.

distinguished from courts of general jurisdiction, 406.

disproving jurisdiction of, 406, 407.

INFORMALITIES,

right to take advantage of, may be taken away by legislation, 370-383.

do not defeat jurisdiction of court, 408.

waiver of, in legal proceedings, 409.

INHABITAN T,

meaning of, in election laws, 599, 600.

INITIALS,

to Christian name of candidate, whether snﬁicicnt in ballot, 609.

INELIGIBILITY,
of highest candidate; how to affect election, 620.

INFANTS,
excluded from suffrage, 29, 30, 599.
special statutes authorizing sale of lands of, 97-106, 389.
custody of, by parents, 340, 348.
emancipation of, 340.
control of, by masters, guardians, and teachers, 340, 341.

INFERIOR COURTS,
duty of, to pass upon constitutional questions, 162, n.
distinguished from courts of general jurisdiction, 406.
disproving jurisdiction of, 406, 407.

INFORMALITIES,
right to take advantage of, may be taken away by legislation, 370-888.
do not defeat jurisdiction of court, -!08.
waiver of, in legal proceedings, 409.

INHABITANT,
meaning of, in election laws, 599, 600.

INITIALS,
to Christian name of candidate, whether suffieicnt in ballot, 609.

734 mnnx.

INJUSTICE,

734

INDEX.

of constitutional provisions, cannot be remedied by the courts,'72, 73.

of statutes, does not render them unconstitutional, 164-168.

in taxation, sometimes inevitable, 5_13.

INNOCENCE,

of accused parties, presumption of, 309-311.

only to be overcome by confession in open court, or verdict, 311.

conclusive presumptions against, 326, n.

INQUISITORIAL TRIALS,

not permitted where the common law prevails, 313. .

accused parties not compellable to give evidence against themselves,

313-317.

IN SANITY,

defence of, in criminal cases, 309, n.

INSOLVENT LAWS, .

right of the States to pass, 293, 294.

Congressional regulations supersede, 294.

INJUSTICE,
of constitutional provisions, cannot be remedied by the courts; 72, 78.
of statutes, does not render them uncont~titutional, 16-l-168.
in taxation, sometimes inevitable, 5,18.

INNOCENCE,
of accused parties, presumption of, 809-311.
only to be overcome by confession in open court, or verdict, 811.
conclusive presumptions against, 326, n.

INQUISITORIAL TRIALS,
not permitted where the common law prevails, 813.
accused parties not compellable to give evidence against themselves,
818-317.

INSANITY,

what contracts cannot be reached by, 294.

creditor making himself a party to proceedings is bound, 294.

INSPECTION LAIVS,

of the States, imposts or duties under, 15.

constitutionality of, 584, 585.
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INSURRECTIONS,

employment of militia for suppression of, 11.

defence of, in criminal cases, 809, n.

INSOLVENT LAWS,
right of the States to pass, 293, 294.
Congressional regulations supersede, 294:.
what contracts cannot be reached by, 294.
creditor making himself a party to proceedings is bound, 294.

INTENT,

to govern in construction of constitutions, 55.

whole instrument to be examined in seeking, 57, 58.

in ineffectual contracts, may be given eﬂ'ect to by retrospective legislation,

372-383.

' question of in libel cases, 460-466.

in imperfect ballot, voter cannot testify to, 607.

what evidence admissible on question of, 611, 626.

INTEREST,

in party, essential to entitle him to question the validity of a law, 163.

in judge, precludes his acting, 175, 410-413.

of money, illegal reservation of, may be legalized, 375, 376.

INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS,

giving municipal corporations power to subscribe to, is not delegating

legislative power, 119 and n.

constitutionality of municipal subscriptions to, 213-219.

INSPECTION LAWS,
of the States, imposts or duties under, 15.
constitutionality of, 584, 585.

INSURRECTIONS,
employment of militia for suppression of, 11.

INTENT,
to govern in construction of constitutions, 55.
whole instrument to be examined in seeking, 57, 58.
in ineffectual contracts, may be given effect to by retrospective legislation,
872-883.
question of in libel cases, 46()-466.
in imperfect ballot, voter cannot testify to, 607.
what evidence admissible on question of, 611, 626.

INTEREST,

special legislative authority requisite, 215.

negotiable securities issued without authority are void, 215.

prohibition to the State engaging in, whether it applies to municipalities,

216-219.

retrospective legalization of securities, 379, 380.

INTERNATIONAL LAW,

equality of States under, 1.

in party, essential to entitle him to question the validity of a law, 163.
in judgP., precludes his acting, 175, 410-418.
of money, illegal reservation of, may be legalized, 875, 876.

INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS,
giving municipal corporations power to subscribe to, is not delegating
legislative power, 119 and n.
constitutionality of municipal subscriptions to, 218-219.
special legislative authority requisite, 215.
negotiable securities issued without authority are void, 215.
prohibition to the State engaging in, whether it applies to municipalities,
216-219.
retrospective legalization of securities, 379, 880.

INTERNATIONAL LAW,
equality of States under, 1.

mosx. 735

INDEX.

INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS,

735

States no jurisdiction over, 128.

INTERPRETATION,

meaning of, 38, n. _

(See Cossrnocrrozv or Sure CONSTITUTIONS.)

INTIMIDATION,

of voters, secrecy as a protection against, 604, 605.

securities against, 614, 615.

INTOXICATING DRINKS,

INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS,
States no jurisdiction o'•er, 128.

INTERPRETATION,
meaning of, 38, n .
(See Co:sSTRUCTION

OF

STATE CoNSTITUTIONs.)

INTIMIDATION,

power of States to require licenses for sale of, 581-584.

power of States to prohibit sales of, 581-584.

payment of license fee to United States does not give right to sell as

against State laws, 584.

furnishing to voters, 614.

INTOXICATION,

not an cxcuse for crime, 476, n.

is temporary insanity, 599.

INTRODUCTION OF BILLS,

for revenue purposes, 131, 132.

generally, 137, 138.

INVASIONS,

employment of militia to repel, 11.
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INVENTIONS,

securing right in, to inventors, 10.

INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE,

of voters, secrecy as a protection against, 60!, 605.
securities against, 614, 615.

INTOXICATING DRINKS,
power of States to require licenses for sale of, 581-584.
power of States to prohibit sales of, 581-584.
payment of license fee to United States does not give right to sell as
against State laws, 58!.
furnishing to voters, 614.

INTOXICATION,
not an excuse for crime, 4i6, n.
is temporary insanity, 599.

INTRODUCTION OF BILLS,
for revenue purposes, 131, 132.
generally, 137, 138.

gradual abolition of, in England, 295-299.

as a punishment for crime, 299.

(See Pnnsornu. LIBERTY.)

IOWA,

legislature of, not to grant divorces, 110, n.

special legislative sessions, 155, n.

when statutes of, to take eﬁ'ect, 158.

title of acts to express the object, 142, n.

legislative regulations of pardons, 116, n.

INVASIONS,
employment of militia to repel, 11.

INVENTIONS,
securing right in, to inventors, 10.

INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE,
gradual abolition of, in England, 295-299.
as a punishment for crime, 299.
(See

liberty of the press in, 416, n.

religious tests for ollice forbidden, 469.

religious belief not to be test of competency of witness, 478.

IRREGULARITIES,

in judicial proceedings, not inquirable into on habeas corpus, 347, 348.

do not render judicial proceedings void, 408.

waiver of, 409.

may be cured by retrospective legislation, 370-383.

eﬁ'ect of, upon elections, 617-619.

IRREPEALABLE LAWS,

legislature cannot pass, 125-127, 284.

parliament cannot bind its successors, 126.

laws which constitute contracts are inviolable, 127.

whether essential powers of government can be bartered away, 280-284, 525.

municipal corporations cannot adopt, 206-208.

PERSONAL LIBERTY.)

IOWA,
legislature of, not to grant divorces, 110, n .
special legislative sessions, 1:)5, n.
when statutes of, to take effect, 158.
title of acts to express the obj·~ct, 1!2, n.
legislative regulations of pardons, 116, n.
liberty of the press in, 416, n.
religious tests for office forbidden, 469.
religious belief not to be test of competency of witness, 478.

IRREG ULARlTIES,
in judicial proceedings, not inquirable into on habeas corpus, 34:7, 348.
do not render judicial proceedings voi<l, 408.
waiver of, 409.
may be cured by retrospective legisla.tion, 370-383.
effect of, upon eh:<'tions, 617-619.

IRREPEALABLE LAWS,
legislature cannot pass, 125-127, 28!.
parliament cannot bind its successors, 126.
laws which constitute contracts are inviolable, 127.
whether essential powers of government can be bartered away, 280-284,525.
municipal corporations cannot adopt, 20G-21J8.

736 mnax.

J EOPARDY,

736

INDEX.

party not to be twice put in for

what constitutes, 326, 327.

J.

J.

same cause, 325-328.

when jury may be discharged without verdict, 327.

when nolle prosequi is an acquittal, 327. -

second trial after verdict set aside, 327, 328.

acquittal on some counts is a bar pro tanto to new trial, 328.

varying form of the charge, 327.

duplicate punishments under State and municipal laws, 199.

JOURNAL OF THE LEGISLATURE,

is a public record, 135.

is evidence whether a law is properly adopted, 135, 136.

presumption of correct action where it is silent, 135, 136.

J UDGE—MADE LAW,

objectionable nature of, 56, n.

JUDGMENTS,

conclusiveness of those of other States, 17.

general rules as to force and effect, 47-54.

' are void if jurisdiction is wanting, 382, 398, 406, 413.

JEOPARDY,
party not to be twice put in for same cause, 326-328.
what constitutes, 326, 327.
when jury may be discharged without verdict, 327.
when nolle prosequi is an acquittal, 327.
second trial after verdict set aside, 327, 328.
acquittal on some counts is a bar pro tanto to new trial, 328.
varying form of the charge, 327.
duplicate punishments under State and municipal laws, 199.

JOURNAL OF THE LEGISLATURE,
is a public record, 135.
is evidence whether a law is properly adopted, 135, 136.
presumption of correct action where it is silent, 135, 136.

JUDGE-MADE LAW,

irregularities do not defeat, 347, 348, 408.
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(See Junrcmr. Pnocaaomos; Jumsmcrron.)

JUDICIAL DECISIONS,

general rules as to force and effect of, 47-54.

JUDICIAL POWER,

of the United States, 19.

' (See Couurs or rue Uxrrno STATES.)

not to be exercised by State legislatures, 87-114, 392.

objectionable nature of, 56, n.

JUDGMENTS,
conclusiveness of those of other States, 17.
general rules as to force and effect, 47--54.
are void if jurisdiction is wanting, 382, 398, 406, 413.
irregularities do not defeat, 347, 348, 408.
(See ,JUIIICIAL PROCEEDINGS j JURISDICTION.)

what it is, 90-92.

declaratory statutes not an exercise of, 93-95.

such statutes not to be applied to judgments, 94.

instances of exercise of, 95, 96.

is apportioned by legislature, 89, n.

legislature may exercise, in deciding contested seats, 133.

JUDICIAL PROCEEDLN GS,

conﬁrmation of invalid by legislature, 107, 108, 370.

are void if court has no jurisdiction of the case, 397.

jurisdiction of subject-matter, what is, 398.

consent will not confer, 398.

if wanting, objection may be taken at any time, 398.

law encourages voluntary settlements and arrangements, 399.

arbitrations distinguished from,

399. _ -

JUDICIAL DECISIONS,
general rules as to force and effect of, 47-54.

JUDICIAL POWEH,
of the United States, 19.
(See CounTS OF THE UNITED STATES.)
not to be exercised by State legislatures, 87-114, 392.
what it is, 90-92.
declaratory statutes not an exercise of, 93-95.
such statutes not to be applied to judgments, 94.
instances of exercise of, 95, 96.
is apportioned by legislature, 89, n.
legislature may exercise, in deciding contested seats, 133.

JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS,

transitory and local actions, 399, 400.

jurisdiction in divorce cases, 400, 401.

necessity for service of process,

or substitute therefor, 402-404.

proceedings in rem and in personam, 403.

confirmation of invalid by legislature, 107, 108, 370.
are void if court has no jurisdiction of the case, 397.
jurisdiction of subject-matter, what is, 398.
consent will not confer, 398.
if wanting, objection may be tak~n at any time, 398.
law encourages voluntary settlements and arrangements, 399.
arbitrations distinguished from, 399 . .
transitory and local actions, 399, 400.
jurisdiction in divorce cases, 400, 401.
necessity for service of process, or substitute therefor, 402-!04.
proceedings ~·n rem and in personam, 403.

mnsx. 737

737 .

INDii:X.

JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS — continued.

bringing in parties by publication, 404.

JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS- continued.

no personal judgment in such case, 404, 406.

bringing in parties by publication, 404.
no personal judgment in such case, 40!, 406.
decree for custody of children, effect of, 405.
contesting jurisdiction, 406, 407.
courts of general and special jurisdiction, 406, 407.
record of, how far conclusive, 406, 407.
irregularities do not defeat, 347, 348, 408.
waiver of, 409.
judicial power cannot be delegated, 410.
right to jury trial in civil cases, 410, n.
judge not to sit when interested, 410-U3.
statements in course of, how far privileged, 441-4~5.
publication of accounts of trials privileged, 448, 449.
but must be fair and full, 448, 449.
and not ex parte, 449-451.
and not contain indecent or blasphemous matter, 449.

decree for custody of children, elfect of, 405.

contesting jurisdiction, 406, 407.

courts of general and special jurisdiction, 406, 407.

record of, how far conclusive, 406, 407.

irregularities do not defeat, 347, 348, 408.

waiver of, 409.

judicial power cannot be delegated, 410.

right to jury trial in civil cases, 410, n.

judge not to sit when interested, 410-413.

statements in course of, how far privileged, 441-445.

publication of accounts 01' trials privileged, 448, 449.

but must be fair and full, 448, 449.

and not ez parts, 449-451.

and not contain indecent or blasphemous matter, 449.

JUDICIARY,

. construction of constitution by, 44-46.

equality of, with legislative department, 45, n.

independence of, 46, n.

when its decisions to be ﬁnal, 44-54.

JUDICIARY,
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(See Counrs; J unxcnu. Powun; JUDICIAL Pnocnnnmes.)

•

JURISDICTION, '

of courts, disproving, 17, 406, 407.

want of, cannot be cured by legislation, 107.

of subject-matter, what it consists in, 398.

construction of constitution by, 44-46 .
equality of, with legislative department, 45, n.
independence of, 46, n.
when its decisions to be final, 44-54.

not to be conferred by consent, 398, 409.

(See CouRTS;
JURISDICTION,

if wanting, objection may be taken at any time, 398.

in divorce cases, what gives, 400, 401.

JUDICIAL PowER; JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS.)

irregularities do not affect, 347, 348, 408.

interest in judge, effect of, 410-413.

general and special distinguished, 406, 407.

where it exists, proceedings not to be attacked collaterally, 408, 409.

in tax proceedings, 499.

JURY,

independence of, 320, 321 and n., 325, n.

JURY TRIAL,

the mode for the trial of criminal accusations, 309, 319.

importance of, 320, n.

must be speedy, 311.

and public, 312.

and not inquisitorial, 313.

JURY,

prisoner to be confronted with witnesses, 318.

independence of, 320, 821 and n., 325, n.

to be present during trial, 319.

JURY TRIAL,

jury to consist of twelve, 319.

challenges of, 319.

47

.

of courts, disproving, 17, 406, 407.
want of, cannot be cured by legislation, 107.
of subject-matter, what it consists in, 398.
not to be conferred by consent, 398, 409.
if wanting, objection may be taken at any time, 398.
in divorce cases, what gives, 400, 401.
necessity for service of process, 402-101.
irregularities do not affect, 347, 3~8. 408.
interest in judge, effect of, 410-413.
general and special distinguished, 406, 407.
where it exists, proceedings not to be attacked collaterally, 408, 409.
in tax proceedings, 499.

necessity for service of process, 402-404.

•

the mode for the trial of criminal accusations, 309, 319.
importance of, 320, n.
must be speedy, 3ll.
and public, 812.
and not inquisi~rial, 313 .
prisoner to be confronted with witnesses, 318.
to be present during trial, 319.
jury to consist of twelve, 319.
challenges of, 319.
47

738

INDEX.

738

INDEX.

JURY TRIAL — continued.

must be from vicinage, 24, 319, 320.

must be left free to act, 320.

how far to judge of the law, 321-324.

in libel cases, 460-463.

acquittal by, is ﬁnal, 321, 322.

judge to instruct jury on the ‘law, 322.

but not to express opinion on facts, 320.

nor to refuse to receive verdict, 320.

accused not to be twice put in jeopardy, 325-328.

what is legal jeopardy, 326, 327.

when jury may be discharged without verdict, 327.

when nolle prosequi equivalent to verdict, 327.

second trial after verdict set aside, 327, 328.

right to counsel, 330-338.

constitutional right to jury trial in civil cases, 19, n., 410, n.

JUST COMPENSATION,

what constitutes, when property taken by the public, 559-570.

(See Emu!-:x'r DOM.\l.\‘.) .

JURY TRIAL- continued.
must be from vicinage, 24, 319, 3~.
must be left free to act, 3~0.
how far to judge of the law, 821-324.
in libel cases, 460-463.
acquittal by, is final, 321, 322.
judge to instruct jury on the-law, 322.
but not to express opinion on fo.cts, 320.
nor to refuse to receive verdict, 820.
accused not to be twice put in jeopart.ly, 325-328.
what is legal jeopardy, 32o, 327.
when jury may be discharged without verdict, 327.
when nolle pro8equi equivalent to verdict, 327.
second trial after verdid eet aside, 327, 828.
right to counsel, 830-338.
constitutional right to jury trial in civil cases, 19, n., 410, n.

JUSTIFICATION,

in libel cases by showing truth of charge, 424, 464.
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showing of good motives and justiﬁable occasion, 464-466.

unsuccessful attempt at, to increase damages, 438.

K.

KANSAS,

requirement of general laws when they can be made applicable, 129.

power to grant divorces vested in courts, 110, n.

JUST COMPENSATION,
what constitutes, when propert_r taken by the public, 569-670.
{See .EmNE.~T DoMAL~.)

JUSTIFICATION,
in libel cases by showing truth of charge, 424, 464:.
showing of good motives and justifiable occasion, 464:-466.
unsuccessful attempt at, to increue damages, 438.

privilege of members of legislature from arrest, 134, n.

title of acts to express the object, 141, n.

legislative regulation of pardons, 116, n.

K.

liberty of the press in, 416, n.

religious test for oﬂice forbidden, 469.

KENTUCKY ,

special statutes licensing sale of lands forbidden, 98, n.

legislature of, not to grant divorces, 110, n.

title of acts to express the object, 141, n.

revenue bills to originate in lower house, 132, n.

protection of property by law of the land, 352, n.

persons conscientiously opposed to bearing arms excused, 468, n.

L. '

LAW, r

common, how far in force, 23, n.

(See COMMON Law.)

KANSAS,
requirement of general laws when they can be made applicable, 129.
power to grant divorces vested in courts, 110, n.
privilege of members of legislature from arrest, 134, n.
title of acts to express the object, 141, n.
legislative regulation of pardons, 116, n.
liberty of the press in, 416, n.
religious test for office forbidden, 469.

KENTUCKY,
special atatutes licensing sale of lands forbidden, 98, n.
legislature of, not to grant divorces, 110, n.
tide of acts to express the object, 141, n.
revenue bills to originate in lower house, 132, n.
protection of property by law of the land, 352, n.
persowt conacientiously opposed to bearing arms excused, 468, n.

L.
LAW,common, how far in force, 23, n.
(See CoMMON L.t..w.)

•

mnnx. 739

INDEX.

\

739

LAW — continued.

and fact, respective province of court and jury in regard to, 320-324,

460-463.

the jury as judges of, 321-324.

in libel cases, 460-463. \

LAW-MAKING POWER, -

(See Laoxsurnnas or THE Srarns.)

LAW OF THE LAND,

protection of, insured by-magna ckaria, 351.

American constitutional provisions, 351, n.

meaning of the term, 353-357, 369, n.

vested rights protected by, 357.

meaning of vested rights, 358, 370, 378.

subjection of, to general laws, 358.

interests in expectancy are not, 359-361.

rights acquired through the marriage relation, 360, 361.

legal remedies not the subject of vested rights, and may be changed,

361, 362.

statutory privileges are not, 383.

rights in action are, 362.

forfeitures must be judicially declared, 363, 364.
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limitation laws may be passed, 364-367, 369.

rules of evidence may be changed, 367-369.

retrospective laws, when admissible, 369-384.

cannot create rights in action, 369.

nor revive debts barred by statute of limitations, 369.

may cure informalities, 370-383.

may perfect imperfect contracts, 293, 371-381.

may waive a statutory forfeiture, 375, n., 376, n.

may validate imperfect deeds, 376-379.

but not as against bona ﬁde purchasers, 378, 379.

cannot validate proceedings the legislature could not have authorized,

381-383.

cannot cure defects of jurisdiction in courts, 382.

consequential injuries give no right to cdmplain, 384.

sumptuary laws inadmissible, 385.

betterment laws, 385-389.

unequal and partial laws, 389-397.

invalid judicial proceedings, 397.

what necessary to give courts jurisdiction, 397-400.

K consent cannot confer, 398-400.

in divorce cases, 400, 401, 405.

process must be served or substitute had, 402-404.

proceedings in rem and in personam, 403.

bringing in parties by publication, 403, 404.

no personal judgment in such case, 404, 406.

process cannot be served in another State, 403.

jurisdiction over guardianship of children in divorce cases, 405.

LA.W- continu.t.
and fact, respective province of court and jury in regard to, 320-324,
460-463.
the jury as judges of, 321-324.
in libel cases, 460--463.
LAW-MAKING POWER,
(See

LEGISLATURES OF THE STA.TF.s.)

LAW OF THE LAND,
protection of, insured by·magna ckarla, 8.'>1.
American constitutional provisions, 351, n.
meaning of the term, 353-Sb7, 369, n.
vested rights protected by, 8.'>7.
meaning ofvested rights, 358, 370, 878.
subjection of, to general laws, 858.
interests in expectancy are not, 359-361.
rights acquired through the marriage relation, 360, 361.
legal reJRedies not the subject of vested rights, and may be changed,
361, 362.
statutory privileges are not, 883.
rights in action are, 362.
forfeitures must be judicially declared, 363, 364.
limitation laws may be passed, 364--867, 369.
rules of evidence may be changed, 867-369.
retrospective laws, when admissible, 869-384:.
cannot create rights in action, 369.
nor revive debts barred by statute oflimitations, 369.
may cure informalities, 3i0-383.
may perfect imperfect contracts, 293, 371-381.
may waive a statutory forfeiture, 375, n., 376, n.
may validate imperfect deeds, 376--879.
but not as against bona fide purchasers, 378, 379.
cannot Yalidate proceedings the legislature could not have auth'lrized,
381-388.
cannot cure defects of jurisdiction in courts, 382.
consequential injuries give no right to complain, 38!.
sumptuary laws inadmissible, 385.
betterment laws, 385-389.
unequal and partial laws, 389-397.
invalid judicial proceedings, 397.
what necessary to give courts jurisdiction, 397-400.
consent cannot confer, 398-400.
in divorce cases, 400, 401, 405.
process must be served or substitute had, 402-!04.
proceedings in rem and in personam, 403.
bringing in parties by publication, 40:3, 404.
no personal judgment in such case, 40-!, 406.
process cannot be served in another State, 403.
jurisdiction over guardianship of children in divorce cases, -!05.

740 mnnx. _

LAW OF THE LAND — confirmed.

740

INDEX.

courts of general and special jurisdiction, and the rules as to ques-

tioning their jurisdiction, 406, 407.

irregular proceedings do not defeat jurisdiction, 408.

waiver of irregularities, 409.

judicial power cannot be delegated, 410.

judge cannot sit in his own cause, 410-413.

objection to his interest cannot be waived, 413.

right to jury trial in civil cases, 410, n.

LAVVS, ENACTMENT OF.

(Sec S'r.\'ru'rx-zs.)

LAWS IMPAIRING OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS.

(See OBLIGATION or Coxrnxcrs.)

LAW OF THE LAND -continud.
courts of general and special jurisdiction, and the rules as to questioning t.beir jurisdiction, 406, 407.
irregular proceedings do not defeat jurisdiction, 408.
waiver of irregulariti~a, 409.
judidal power cannot be delegated, 410.
judge cannot sit in his own cause, 41~!13.
objection to hi:~ interest cannot be waived, 413.
right to jury trial in civil cases, 410, n.

LAWS, ENACTMENT OF.

LAWS, EX POST FACTO,

(See

STATUTES.)

(See Ea: Post Facto Laws.)

LEGAL PROCEEDINGS,

LAWS IMPAIRING OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS.
(See OBLIGATION

publication of accounts of, how far privileged, 448-451.

statements in course of, when privileged, 441-445.

(See Ez Post Facto LAws.)

(See J UDICIAL Paocnnmxos.)

LEGAL TENDER,

only gold and silver to be made by the States, 15.

LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT,
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not to exercise executive or judicial powers, 87-116.

equality of, with other departments, 4-5, n., 47, n.

' (See LEGISLATURES or 'rn1=: Srxri-:s.)

LEGISLATIVE DIVORCES,

whether they are an exercise of judicial power, 109-114.

impropriety of, 110, 114, n.

LEGISLATIVE MOTIVES, '

not to be inquired into by courts, 135, 136, 186, 187, 208.

presumption of correctness of; 186, 187, 208.

LEGISLATIVE POWERS,

enactments in excess of, are void, 3, 174.

distihguished from judicial, 91.

cannot be delegated, 116-125.

exercise of, will not give right of action, 208.

cannot extend beyond territorial limits, 127.

OF CoNTRACTs.)

LAWS, EX POST FACTO,
LEGAL PROCEEDINGS,
publication of accounts of, how far privileged, 448-1.51.
statements in course of, when privileged, 441-4!5.
(See JUDICIAL PBOCEEDINGS.)

LEGAL TENDER,
only gold and silver to be made by the States, 15.

LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT,
not to exercise executive or judicial powers, 87-116.
equality of, with other departments, 45, n., 47, n.
(Set LEGISLATURES OJl TllE STATES.)

LEGISLATIVE DIVORCES,
whether they are an exercise of judicial power, 109-114.
impropriety of, 110, 114, n.

LEGISLATIVE MOTIVES,
not to be inquired into by courts, 135, 136, 186, l87, 208.
presumption of correctness of, 186, 187, 208.

grant of, will not warrant exercise of executive or judicial powers,

87-116.

LEGISLATIVE PROCEEDINGS,

privilege of publication of, 457-460.

members not to be questioned for words in course of, 445-447.

LEGISLATORS, _

contested elections of, to be decided by house, 133.

duty of, not to violate constitution, 185.

presumed correctness of motives, 186, 187.

privilege of, in debate, 445-447.

right of, to publish speeches, 457-460.

LEGISLATIVE POWERS,
enactments in excess of, are void, 3, 174.
distinguished from judicial, 91.
cannot be delegated, 116-125.
exercise of, will not give right of action, 208.
cannot extend beyond territorial limits, 127.
grant of, will not warrant exercise of executive or judicial powers,
87-116.

LEGISLATIVE PROCEEDINGS,
privilege of publication of, 457--460.
members not to be questioned for words in course of, 445--447.

LEGISLATORS,
contested elel'tions of, to be decided by house, 133.
duty of, not to violate constitution, 185.
presumed correctness of motives, 186, 187.
privilege of, in debate, 445-447.
right of, to publish speeches, 457-460.

_ INDEX. 741

INDEX.

LFGISLATURES, COLONIAL, '

statutes adopted by, in force at Revolution, 25.

LEGISLATURES OF THE STATES,

power to originate amendments to State constitution, 31, and n

construction of constitution by, 39-43.

deference due to judicial construction by, 53.

powers of, compared with those of parliament, 85, 86, 172, 173.

not to exercise executive or judicial powers, 87, 116, 174-176.

complete legislative power vested in, 87, 168, 172, 1'73.

speciﬁcation of powers in constitution unnecessary, 88.

declaratory statutes not the exercise of judicial power, 93-95.

cannot set aside judgments, grant new trials, &c., 95, 96, 392.

how far may bind parties by recital of facts in statutes, 96.

power of, to grant divorces, 109-114.

delegation of legislative power inadmissible, 116-125.

but conditional legislation is not, 117.

nor making charters subject to acceptance, 118, 119.

nor conferring powers of local government, 118-125, 191.

irrepealable legislation cannot be passed, 125-127, 284. "

but exemptions from taxation may be made, 127, 280, 514.

power of, limited to territory of the State, 127.

discretionary powers of, how restricted, 129.
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courts no control over, 129.

enactment of laws by, 130-158.

must be under the constitutional forms, 130, 131.

parliamentary common law of, 130, 131, 134.

division of, into two houses, 131, 132.

when to meet, 132.

proroguement by executive, 132. ‘

rules o order of, 133.

election and qualiﬁcation of members, determination of, 133.

contempts of, may be punished by, 133, 134.

but not by committees, 135.

members of‘, may be expelled, 183.

their privilege from arrest, &c., 134.

committees of, for collection of information, &c., 135.

power of, to terminate with session, 135.

journals of, to be evidence, 13.5, 136."

action of, to be presumed legal and correct, 135, 136.

motives of members not to be questioned, 135, 186, 187, 208.

“lobby " services illegal, 136, and n.

hills, introduction and passage of, 137-141.

three several readings of, 80, 81, 139, 140.

yeas and nays to be entered on journal, 140.

vote on passage of, what sufficient, 141.

title of, formerly no part of it, 141.

constitutional provisions respecting, 81’, 82, 141, n.

purpose of these, 142.

LEGISLATURES, COLONIAL,
statutes adopted by,

mforce at Revolution, 25.

LEGISLATURES OF THE STATES,
power to originate amendments to State constitution, 31, and n.
construction of constitution by, 39-43.
deference due to judicial construction by, 53.
powers of, compared with those of parliament, 85, 86, 172, 173.
not to exercise executive or judicial powers, 87, 116, 174-i76.
complete legislative power vested in, 87, 168, 172, 1'73.
specificati9n of powers in const.itution unnecessary, 68.
declaratory statutes not the exercise of judicial power, 93-95.
cannot set aside judgments, grant new trials, &c., 95, 96, 392.
how far may bind parties by recital of facts in statutes, 96.
power of, to grant divorces, 109-114.
delegation of legislative power inadmissible, 116-125.
but conditional legislation is not, 117.
nor making charters subject to acceptance, 118, 119.
nor conferring powers of local government, 118-125, 191.
irrepealable legislation cannot be passed, 125-127, 28-!.
but exemptions from taxation may be made, 127, 280, 514.
power of, limited to territory of the State, 127.
discretionary powers of, how restricted, 129.
courts no control over, 129.
enactment of law~ by, 130--158.
must be under the constitutional forms, 130, 131.
parliamentary common law of, 130, 131, 134.
division of, into two houses, 131, 132.
when to meet, 132.
proroguement by executive, 132.
rules o order of, 133.
election and qualification of members, determination of, 133.
contempts of, may be puni:;hed by, 133, 134.
but not by committees, 135.
members of, may be expelled, 133.
their privilege from arrest, &c., 134.
committees of, for collection of information, &c., 135.
power of, to terminate with session, 135.
jouma!,IJ of, to be evidence, 135, 136. ·
action of, to be presumed legal and correct, 135, 136.
moti\·es of members not to be questioned, 135, 186, 187, 208.
"lobby" services illegal, 136, and n.
bills, introduction and passage of, 137-141.
three seYeral readings of, 8Q, 81, 139, 140.
yeas and nays to be entered on journal, 140.
vote on passage of, what sufficient, 141.
title of, formerly no part of it, 141.
constitutional provisions respecting, 81, 82, 141, n.
purpose of these, 142.

741
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LEGISLATURES OF THE STATES —continued.

742

INDEX.

they are mandatory, 150, 151.

particularity required in stating object, 144, 145.

LEGISLATURES OF THE STATES -continued.

what is embraced by title, 148-150.

effect. if more than one object embraced, 147, 148.

etfect if act is broader than title, 148-150.

amended statutes, publication of, at length, 151, 152.

repeal of statutes at session when passed, 152.

signing of bills by oflicers of the houses, 152.

approval and veto of bills by governor, 153, 154.

governor’s messages to, 155.

special sessions of, 155.

when acts to take effect, 155-158.

power of the courts to declare statutes unconstitutional, 159-188.

full control of, over municipal corporations, 192, 193, 226, 233.

legalization by, of irregular municipaf action, 224.

of invalid contracts, 293, 371-381.

of irregular sales, taxation, &c., 370-383.

not to pass bills of attainder, 15, 33, 259.

nor expost facto laws, 15, 33, 264.

nor laws violating obligation of contracts, 15, 33, 127, 273.

(See OBLIGATION or Coxrmcrs.)
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insolvent laws, what may be passed, 293, 294.

right to petition, 349.

vested rights protected against, 351-397.

(See Law or rm: LAND.)

control by, of remedies in criminal cases, 267-273.

in civil cases, 287-294, 361-367.

control of rules of evidence, 288, 367-369.

may change estates in land, 359-361. '

and rights to property under the marriage relation, 360, 361.

limitation laws may be passed by, 364-367.

retrospective legislation by, 369-383.

(See Rt-:"rn0sr1:c1"1vn LEGISLATION.)

privileges granted by, may be recalled, 383.

consequential injuries from action of, 384.

sumptuary laws, 385.

betterment laws, 386-389.

unequal and partial legislation, 389-397.

general laws not always essential, 389, 390.

special rules for particular occupations, 390.

proscriptions for opinion’s sake, 390, 391.

suspensions of laws in special cases, 391, 392.

special remedial legislation, 389, 391.

special franchises, 393-397.

restrictions upon suﬂrage, 394.

power of, to determine for what purposes taxes may be levied, 488-492, 517.

cannot authorize property to be taxed out of its district, 499-504.

they are mandatory, 150, 151.
particularity required in stating object, 144, 145.
what is embraced by title, 148-150.
effect if more than one object embraced, 147, 148.
effect if act is broader than title, 148-150.
amended statutes, publication of, at length, 151, 152.
repeal of statutes at session when passed, 152.
signing of billl by officers of the houses, 152.
approval and veto of bills by governor, 153, 154.
governor's messages to, 155.
special sessions of, 155.
when acts to take effect, 155-158.
power of the courts to declare statute11 unconstitutional, 159-188.
full control of, over municipal corporations, 192, 193, 226, 233.
legalization by, of irregular municipar action, 224:.
of invalid contracts, 293, 371-881.
of irregular sales, taxation, &c., 870-383.
not to pass bills of attainder, 15, 83, 259.
nor tz post facto laws, 15, 33, 264.
nor laws violating obligation of contracts, 15, 88, 127, 278.
(See OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS.)
insolvent laws, what may be pused, 298, 294.
right to petition, 849.
vested rights protected again~t. 851-897.
(See L.&.w OF THE LAND.)
control by, of remedies in criminal cases, 267-273.
in civil cases, 287-294, 361-367.
control of rules of evidence, 288, 867-869.
may change estates in land, 359-861.
and rights to property under the marriage relation, 860, 361.
limitation laws may be pused by, 36!-867.
retrospective legislation by, 369-888.
(See RETROSPECTIYK LEOISLA.TION.)
privileges granted by, may be recalled, 883.
consequential injuries from action of, 384.
sumptuary laws, 885.
betterment laws, 886-)389.
unequal and partial legislation, 889-897.
general laws not always essential, 889, 390.
special rules for particular occupations, 890.
proscriptions for opinion's sake, 890, 891.
suspensions of laws in special cases, 891, 392.
spel'ial remedial legislation, 889, 891.
special franchises, 393-397.
restrictions upon suffrage, 894.
power of, to determine for what purposes taxe11 may be levied, 488-492, 517.
cannot authorize property to be taxed out of its district, 499-504.

mnnx. 743

INDEX.

LEGISLATURES OF THE STATES —-continued.

743

must select the subjects of taxation, 514.

may determine necessity of appropriating private property to public use

528, 538, 539.

authority of, requisite to the appropriation, 5'28. _

cannot appropriate property to private use, 530, 531.

LETTERS, _

legal inviolability of, 307, n.

LEVEES,

establishment of, under police power, 589.

special assessments for, 510.

LIBEL, (See LIBERTY or Srancu mo or THE Pnnss.)

LIBERTY,

personal,

(See Paasoxn. Lmrmrr.)

of the press,

(See Lxmmrr or Sraaca AND or THE Paass.)

religious, .

(See Rauorous Lusanrv.)

of discussion, 349.

of bearing arms, 350. ‘

of petition, 849.
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charters of, 24, n.

LIBERTY OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS,

Hamilton’s reasons why protection of", -by bill of rights, was not important.

256.

opposing reasons by Jefferson, 258, n.

Congress to pass no law abridging, 414.

State constitutional provisions respecting, 414, n.

these create no new rights, but protect those already existing, 415, 416.

liberty:of the press neither well deﬁned nor protected at the common law,

417.

censorship of publications, 417-419.

debates in parliament not suﬂered to be published, 418.

censorship in the Colonies, 418, 419.

secret sessions of Constitutional Convention, 419.

and of United States Senate, 420.

what liberty of speech and of the press consists in, 420, 421, 422.

general purpose of the constitutional provisions, 421, 422.

rules of common-law liability for injurious publications, 422-425.

modiﬁcation of, by statute, 430.

privileged cases, 425, 426.

libels upon the government indictable at the common law, 426.

prosecutions for, have ceased in England, 427.

sedition law for punishment of, 427.

whether now punishable in America, 428-430.

criticism upon ofﬁcers and candidates for oﬁicc, 431-441.

statements in the course of judicial proceedings, 441-445.

(

LEGISLATURES OF THE STATES -continued.
must select the subjects of taxation, 514.
may detennine necessity of appropriating private property to public use
528, 538, 539.
authority of, requisite to the appropriation, 528.
cannot appropriate property to private use, 530, 531.
LETTERS,
legal inviolability of, 807, n.
LEVEES,
establishment of, under police power, 589.
special assessments for, 510.
LIBEL,
(See LIBERTY OF SPEECH AND OF THE PREss.)
LIBERTY,
personal,
(See PERSONAL LIBERTY.)
of the press,
(See LIBERTY OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS.)
religious,
(See RELIGious LIBERTY.)
of discussion, 849.
of bearing arms, 850.
of petition, 849.
charters of, 24, n.
LIBERTY OF SPEECH AND OF THE l,RESS,
Hamilton's reasons why protection of, ·by bill of rights, was not important,
256.
opposing reasons by Jefferson, 258, n.
Congress to pass no law abridging, 414.
State constitutional provisions respecting, 414, n.
these create no new rights, but protect those already existing, 415, 416.
liberty :or the press neither well defined nor protected at the common law,
417.
censorship of publications, 417-419.
debates in parliament not tmffered to be published, 418.
censorship in the Colonies, 418, 419.
secret sessions of Constitutional Convention, 419.
and of United States Senate, 420.
what liberty of speech and of the press consists in, 420, 421, 422.
general purpose of the constitutional provisions, 421, 422.
rules of common-law liability for injurious publications, 422-425.
modification of, by statute, 430.
privileged cases, 425, 426.
libels upon the government indictable at the common law, 426.
prosecutions for, have ceased in England, 427.
sedition law for punishment of, 427.
whether now punishable in America, 428-430.
criticism upon officers and candidates for office, 431-441.
statements in the course of judicial proceedings, 441-445.

744 mnsx.

LIBERTY OF SPEECH AND OF TIIE PRESS— continued.

744-

INDEX.

privilege of counsel, 442-445.

privilege of legislators, 445-447.

LIBERTY OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS- continued.

publication of privileged communications through the press, 448-160.

privilege of counsel, 442-445.
privilege of legislators, 441)--447.
publication of privileged communications through the press, 448-460.
publication of speeches of counsel, &c., not privileged, 448.
fair and impartial account of judicial trial is, 448.
but not of ex parte proceedings, 448, 449.
whole case must be published, 448, 449.
must be confined to what t.ook place in court, 449.
must not include indecent or blasphemous matter, 449.
privilege of publishers of news, 451-457.
publishers generally held to same responsibility as other persons, 4[)5.
not excused by giving source of information, 455.
nor because the publication was without their personal knowledge, 4M.
nor by its being a criticism on- a candidate for office, 455.
nor by its constituting a fair account of a public meeting, 4M, 456.
criticisms by, on works of art and literary productions, 456, 457.
exemplary damages against publishers, 457.
publication of legislative proceedings, how far privileged, 457.
rule in England, 457, 458.
the case of Stockdale v. Hansard, 458, n.
publication of speeches by members, 457, 459, 460.
the jury as judges of the law in libel cases, 460.
Woodfall's 'and Miller's cases, 460, 461.
Mr. Fox's Libel Act, 462.
the early rulings on the subject in America, 462, 463.
provisions on the subject in State constitutions, 463.
the truth. as a defence when good motives and justifiable ends in the publication can be shown, 464.
burden of proof on the defendant to show them, 464.
that publication was copied from another source is not sufficient, 466.
motives or character of deftmdant no protection, if publication is falae,
466.

publication of speeches of counsel, &c., not privileged, 443.

fair and impartial account of judicial trial is, 448.

but not of arparie proceedings, 448, 449.

whole case must be published, 448, 449.

must be conﬁned to what took place in court, 449.

must not include indecent or blasphemous matter, 449.

privilege of publishers of news, 451-457.

publishers generally held to same responsibility as other persons, 455.

not excused by giving source of information, 455.

nor because the publication was without their personal knowledge, 455.

nor by its being a criticism one a candidate for office, 455.

nor by its constituting a fair account of a public meeting, 455, 456.

criticisms by, on works of art and literary productions, 456, 457.

exemplary damages against publishers, 457.

publication of legislative proceedings, how far privileged, 457.

rule in England, 457, 458.

the case of Stockdale v. Hansard, 458, n.

publication of speeches by members, 457, 459, 460.
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the jury as judges of the law in libel cases, 460.

lVoodfall’s and Miller‘s cases, 460, 461.

Mr. Fox’s Libel Act, 462.

the early rulings on the subject in America, 462, 463.

provisions on the subject in State constitutions, 463.

the truth as a defence when good motives and justiﬁable ends in the pub-

lication can be shown, 464.

burden of proof on the defendant to show them, 464.

that publication was copied from another source is not suﬁicient, 466.

motives or character of defendant no protection, if publication is false,

466.

LICENSE,

for ferry across navigable waters, 593.

revoking, where a fee was received therefor, 283, n.

LICENSE FEES,

when are taxes, 201, 495. _

limited generally to necessary expenses, &c., 201.

payment of, to United States, does not give rights as against State laws,

584.

LICENSE,
for ferry across navigable waters, 593.
revoking, where a fee was received therefor, 283, n.

LICENTIOUSNESS,

distinguished from liberty, 339, n.

LIFE,

LICENSE FE.ES,

action for taking through negligence, &c., 581.

when are taxes, 201, 495.
limited generally to necessary expenses, &c., 201.
payment of, to United States, does not give rights as against State lawa,
584.

not to be taken but by due process of law, 11.

LIMITATION,

of time to apply for compensation for property taken by public, 561.

v

UCENTIOUSNESS,
distinguished from liberty, 339, n.

LIFE,
action for taking through negligence, &c., 581.
not to be taken but by due process of law, 11.

LIMITATION,
of time to apply for compensation for property taken by public, 561.

mnnx. .745

INDEX.

LIMITATION LAVVS,

may cut off vested rights, 364-367.

opportunity to assert rights must ﬁrst be given, 365, 366.

cannot operate upon party in

legislature to determine what

suspension of, 365, n., 391, n

possession, 366.

is reasonable time, 366.

legislature cannot revive demands barred by, 365.

legislature may prescribe form for new promise, 293.

LIMITATIONS TO LEGISLATIVE POWER,

are only such as the people have imposed by their constitutions, 87.

LIMITATION LAWS,
inay cut off vested rights, 86.!-367.
opportunity to assert rights must first be given, 365, 366.
cannot operate upon party in possession, 366.
legislature to determine what is reasonable time, 366.
suspension of, 365, n., 391, n.
legislature cannot revive demands barred by, 365.
legislature may prescribe form for new promise, 293.

LIMITATIONS TO LEGISLATIVE POWER,

(See LEGISLATURES or "run Srxrss.)

LITERARY PRODUCTIONS,

copyright to, Congress may provide for, 10.

privilege of criticism of, 457.

LOBBY SERVICES,

contract for, unlawful, 136, and n., 212, n.

LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMEN']‘,

are only such as the people have imposed by their constitutions, 87.
(See LEGISLATURES OF THE STATES.)

LITERARY PRODUCTIONS,
copyright to, Congress may provide for, 10.
privilege of criticism of, 457.

LOBBY SERVICES,

State constitutions framed in

contract for, unlawful, 136, and o., 212, n.
reference to, 35.

the peculiar feature of the American system, 189.
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(See l\IUN1cn>AL CORPORATIONS.)

LOCAL TAXATION,

(See

LOCALITY OF PROPERTY,

LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT,
State constitutions framed in reference to, 35.
the peculiar feature of the American system, 189.
(See MuNICIPAL CoRPORATIONS.)

LOCAL TAXATION,

TAXATION.)

may give jurisdiction to courts, 404, 406.

taxation dependent upon, 499-504, 516.

LOG-ROLLING LEGISLATION,

constitutional provisions to prevent, 142-144.

LORD’S DAY,

laws for observance of, how justiﬁed, 476, 477.

LOUISIANA,

divorces not to be granted by special laws, 110, n.

title of acts to express their object, 142, n.

liberty of the press in, 417, n.

persons conscientiously opposed to bearing arms excused, 468, n.

republication of amended statutes, 152.

LUNATICS,

excluded from suffrage, 599.

special statutes for sale of lands of, 97-106.

MA GNA CHA RTA ,

M.

grant of, did not create constitutional government, 3, n.

a declaratory statute, 22, 23,

(See

TAXATION.)

LOCALITY OF PROPERTY,
may give jurisdiction to courts, 404, 406.
taxation dependent upon, 499-504, 516.

LOG-ROLLING LEGISLATION,
constitutional provisions to prevent, 142-144.

LORD'S DAY,
laws for observance of, how justified, 4i6, 4i7.

LOUISIANA,
divorces not to be granted by special laws, 110, n.
title of acts to express their object, 142, n.
liberty of the press in, 417, n.
persons conscientiously opposed to bearing arms excused, 468, n.
republication of amended statutes, 1fi2.

LUNATICS,
excluded from suffrage, 599.
special statutes for sale oflands of, 97-106.

its maxims the interpreters of

257.

:M.

constitutional grants of power, 175.

~ provision in, for trial by peers, &c., 351.

MAILS,

inviolability of, 307, n.

MAGNA CHARTA,
grant of, did not create constitutional~:overnment, 3, n.
a de~laratory statute, 22, 23, 257.
its maxims the interpreters of constitutional grants ofpower, 175.
provision in, for trial by peers, &c., 351.
MAILS,
inviolability of, 307, n.

.74.5

746 INDEX.

MAINE,

746

INDEX.

judges of, to give opinions to legislature, 40.

revenue bills to originate in lower house, 132, n.

protection of property by law of the land, 352, n.

liberty of the press in, 414, n.

religious tests forbidden in, 469.

periodical valuations for taxation, 496.

MAJORITY,

what constitutes two thirds, 141.

- what sufficient in elections, 614.

MALICE,

MAINE,
judges of, to give opinions to legislature, 40.
revenue bills to originate in lower bouse, 132, n.
protection of property by law of the land, 352, n.
liberty of the press in, 414, n.
religious tests forbidden in, 469.
periodical valuations for taxation, 496.

MAJORITY,

presumption of, from falsity of injurious publications, 422, 455.

in refusing to receive legal votes, 616.

MAN DAMUS, V

to compel registration of voters, 602.

to compel canvassers to perform duty, 623.

MANDATORY STATUTES,

doctrine of, 74-78.

constitutional provisions always mandatory, 78-83, 140, 150.

but courts cannot always enforce, 129.

what constitutes two thirds, 141.
what sufficient in elections, 614.

MALICE,
presumption of, from falsity of injurious publications, 422, 455.
in refusing to receive legal votes, 616.

MANDAMUS,
to compel registration of voters, 602.
to compel canvassers to perform duty, 623.

MAN UFACTURING PURPOSES,

whether dams for, can be established under right of eminent domain,
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53-1-536.

MARKETS, ,

‘lite power to regulate, 596.

MARRIAGE,

validating invalid, by retrospective legislation, 372.

legislative control of rights springing from, 360, 361.

MANDATORY STATUTES,
doctrine of, 74-78.
constitutional provisions always mandatory, 7b-SS, 140, 150.
but courts cannot always enforce, 129.

MANUFACTURING PURPOSES,
whether dams for, can be established under right of eminent domain,
534-536.

power of the legislature to annul, 109-114.

(See Divonca; 1\hnnn:n Woman.)

MARRIED YVOMEN,

' exclusion of, from suffrage, 29, 599.

statutes enlarging rights of, 61, n.

testimony of, in favor of husband, 317, 318, n.

invalid deeds of, may be validated by legislature, 377, 378.

control of, by husband, 339, 840.

(See Divonci-1; Do\v1=:n.)

MARSHES,

draining of, and assessments therefor, 510, 511, 533.

MARTIAL LAVV,

when may be declared, 309, n., 319, n.

legality of action under, 362, n.

MARYLAND,

MARKETS,
IMte power to regulate, 596.

MARRIAGE,
validating invalid, by retrospective legislation, 372.
legislative control of rights springing from, 360, 361.
power of t~e legislature to annul, 109-114.
(See DIVORCE; MARRIED Wo:\n;N.)

MARRIED WOMEN,
' exdusion of, from suffrage, 29, 599.
statutes enlarging rights of, 61, n.
testimony of, in favor of husband, 817, 318, n.
invalid deeds of, may be validated by legislature, 377, 378.
control of, by husband, 389, 340.

special statutes licensing sale of lands forbidden, 98, n.-

(See

legislature of, not to grant divorces, 110, n.

title of acts to express the object, 141, n.

protection of property by law of the land, 352, n.

liberty of the press in, 415, n.

tests of religions belief to public oﬂicers, 469.

_ f l __-———-

Dn'ORCE ; DowER.)

MARSHES,
draining of, and assessments therefor, 510, 511, 533.

MARTIAL LAW,
when may be declared, 309, n., 319, n.
legality of action under, 362, n.

MARYLAND,
special statutes licensing sale of lands forbidden, 98, n.·
legislature of, not to grant divorces, 110, n.
title of acts to express the object, 141, n.
protection of property by law of the land, 352, n.
liberty of the press in, 415, n.
tests of religious belief to public officers, 469.

INDEX. 747

INDEX.

MASSACHUSETTS,

747

judges of, to give opinions to legislature, 40.

divorces in, to be granted by courts, 110, n.

revenue bills to originate in lower house, 131, n.

protection of property by law of the land, 352, n.

liberty of the press in, 414, n.

periodical valuations for taxation, 496.

MASTER,

of apprentice, control by, 340.

of servant, power of, 341.

of scholar, power of, 341.

MAXIMS, j

of government, laws in violation of, 169, 170.

of the common law, what they consist in, 22.

gradual growth and expansion of, 54, 55.

for construction of statutes, \

a statute is to be construed as prospective, and not retrospective, in

its operation, 62.

such an interpretation shall be put upon a law as to uphold it, and

give eifect to the intention of the law-makers, 58.

words in a statute are presumed to be employed in their natural and

ordinary sense, 58, 83, n.
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contemporary construction is best and strongest in the law, 67-71.

a statute is to be construed in the light of the mischief it was designed

to remedy, 65.

he who considers the letter merely, goes but skin deep into the

meaning, 84.

statutes in derogation of the common law are to be construed strictly,

61, n.

an argument drawn from inconvenience is forcible in the law,

67-71.

general principles,

no man can be judge in his own cause, 410-413.

consent excuses error, 181, 182, 409.

the law does not concern itself about triﬂes, 520.

that to which a party assents is not in law an injury, 181, 182.

no man shall be twice vexed for one and the same cause, 47-54.

every man‘s house is his castle, 22, 299.

that which was originally void cannot by mere lapse of time become

valid, 366, n.

necessity knows no law, 594.

so enjoy your own as not to injure that of another, 573.

MEANING OF WORDS,

(See D1-:1-‘tNrr1oxs.)

MEASURES AND WEIGHTS,

regulation of, 596.

MEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATURE,

contested seats of, decided by the house, 133.

MASSACHUSETTS,
judges of, to give opinions to legislature, 40.
divorces in, to be granted by courts, 110, n.
revenue bills to originate in lower house, 181, n.
protection of property by law of the land, 352, n.
liberty of the press in, 414, n.
periodical valuations for taxation, 496.

MASTER,
of apprentice, control by, 340.
of servant, power of, 341.
of scholar, power of, 341.

MAXIMS,
of government, laws in violation of, 169, 170.
of the common law, what they consist in, 22.
gradual growth and expansion of, M, 55.
for construction of statutes,
a statute is to be construed as prospective, and not retrospective, in
its operation, 62.
such an interpretation shall be put upon a law as to uphold it, and
give effect to the intention of the law-makers, .'i8.
words in a statute are presumed to be employed in their natural and
ordinary sense, 58, 83, n.
contemporary. construction is best and strongest in the law, 67-71.
a statute is to be construed in the light of the mischief it was designed
to remedy, 65.
he who considers the letter merely, goes but skin deep into the
meaning, 84.
statutes in derogation of the common law are to be construed strictly,
61, n.
a~ argument drawn from inconvenience is forcible in the law,
67-71.
general principles,
no man can be judge in his own cause, 410-413.
consent excuses error, 181, 182, 409.
the law does not concern itself about trifles, 520.
that to which a party assents is not in law an injury, 181, 182.
no man shall be twice vexed for one and the same cause, 47-54.
every man's house is his castle, 22, 299.
that which was originally void cannot by mere lapse of time become
valid, 366, n.
necessity knows no law, 594.
so enjoy your own as not to injure that of another, 573.

l'tiEANING OF WORDS,
(See DEFINITIO:ss.)
MEASURES AND WEIGHTS,
regulation of, 596.
MEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATURE,
contested seats of, decided by the house, 133.

748 . . mm-1x.

LLEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATURE— continued.

74:8

INDEX.

punishment of‘, for contempts, &c., 133.

power of the houses to expel, 133, 134.

exemption of, from arrest, 134.

publication of speeches by, 457-460.

privilege of, in debate, &c., 445-448.

MICHIGAN,

right of, to admission to the Union under ordinance of 1787, 28.

repeal of acts of parliament in, 25, n.

right of married women to property in, 61, n.

special statutes licensing sale of lands forbidden, 98, n.

legislature of, not to grant divorces, 110, n.

privilege of legislators from arrest, 134, n.

special legislative sessions in, 155, n.

title of acts to express the object, 142, n.

when statutes of, to take effect, 156.

protection of property by law of the land, 352, n.

liberty of the press in, 416.

religious belief of witness not to be inquired into, 478.

periodical valuation of property for taxation, 496.

MILITARY BOUNTIES,

by municipal corporations, when legal, 219-229.
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MILITARY COMMISSIONS,

when not admissible, 319, n.

(See 1\I.uzr1.u. Law.)

MILITIA,

power of Congress in respect to, 11.

State laws concerning, 18.

not to be called out on election days, 615.

President exclusive judge when exigency has arisen requiring him to call

out, 41, n.

MILL-DAMS,

construction of, across navigable waters, 594.

abatement of, as nuisances, 595.

MILL—DAM ACTS,

do not confer vested rights, 384.

constitutionality of, 534-536. _

MEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATURE-continued.
punishment of, for contempt&, &c., 138.
power of the houses to expel, 183, 184.
exemption of, from arrest, 184.
publiC'.ation of speeches by, 457-460.
privilege of, in debate, &c., 445-448.

MICHIGAN,
right of, to admission to the Union under ordinance of 1787, 28.
repeal of acts of parliament in, 25, n.
right of married women to property in, 61, n.
special statutes licensing sale of lands forbidden, 98, n.
legislature of, not to grant divorces, 110, n.
privilege of legislators from arrest, 184, n.
special legislative sessions in, 155, n.
title of acts to express the object, 142, n.
when statutes of, to take effect, 156.
protection of property by law of the land, 852, n.
liberty of the press in, 416.
religious belief of witness not to be inquired into, 47.8.
periodit~al valuation of property for taxation, 496.

MILITARY BOUNTIES,
by municipal corporations, when legal, 219-229.

MILITARY COMMISSIONS,
when not admissible, 819, n.
(Su MARTUL L.t.w.)

MILITIA,
power of Congress in respect to, 11.
State laws concerning, 18.
not to be called out on election days, 615.
President exclusive judge when exigency has arisen requiring him to call
out, 41, n.

MINNESOTA.

divorces not to be granted by legislature, 110, n.

title of acts to express the object, 141, n.

revenue bills to originate in lower house, 132, n.

protection to property by law of the land, 352, n.

liberty of the press in, 416, n.

want of religious belief not to render witness incompetent, 478, n.

MINORS,

(See Inrmrs.)

MISCHIEF TO BE REMEDIED,

may throw light on constitutional clause, 65.

_ _ } M __; _q»zr-———'

MILL-DAMS,
construction of, across navigable waters, 594:.
abatement of, as nuisances, 595.

MILL-DAM ACTS,
do not confer vested rights, 884.
constitutionality of, 534-536.

MINNESOTA.
divorces not to be granted by legislature, 110, n.
title of acts to express the object, 141, n.
revenue bills to originate in lower house, 132, n.
protection to property by law of the land, 852, n.
liberty of the press in, 416, n.
want of religious belief not to render witness incompetent, 478, n.

MINORS,
(See hii-'ANTS.)
MISCHIEF TO BE REMEDIED,
may throw light on constitutional clause, 65.

mnsx. 749

INDEX.

MISSISSIPPI,

749

constitutional provision respecting divorces, 110, n.

when statutes to take etfect, 156. 9

MISSISSIPPI,

revenue bills to originate in lower house, 132, n.

protection to property by law of the land, 352, n.

liberty of the press in, 417, n.

religious test for oﬂice, 468, 469.

IMISSOURI,

legislative licenses for sale of lands forbidden, 98, n.

judges of, to give opinions to legislature, 40.

restrictions upon legislative power in constitution of, 128, n.

constitutional provision respecting divorces, 110, n.
when statutes to take effect, 156.
revenue bills to origin~te in lower house, 132, n.
protection to property by law of the land, 352, n.
liberty of the press in, 417, n.
religious test for office, 468, 469.

:MISSOURI,

legislature of, not to grant divorces, 111, n.

special legislative sessions in, 155, n.

title of acts to express the object, 142, n.

’ protection to property by law of the land, 352, n.

liberty of the press in, 416.

MONEY,

Congress may coin and regulate value of, 10.

States not to coin, 15.

legal tender, 15.

punishment of counterfeiting, 10, 18.

V bills for raising, to originate in lower house in some States, 131, 132.
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cannot be appropriated under right of eminent domain, 527.

MONOPOLIES,

odious nature of, 393.

grant of, not presumed, 395.

MORTGAGES,

right to possession under, cannot be taken away by legislature, 290, 291.

MOTIVES,

of legislative body not to be inquired into by courts, 135, 136, 186, 187.

nor those of municipal legislative body, 208.

good, when a defence in libel cases, 464.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS,

question of formation or division of, may be submitted to people inter-

ested, 118, 119. ‘

powers of local government may be conferred upon, 118-125, 191.

whether they may engage in internal improvements, &c., 119, 213-219.

general view of the system, 189-192.

legislature prescribes extent of powers, 191.

charter of, the measure of their authority, 192.

complete control of, by legislature, 191, 193, 170, n.

whether it may compel them to assume obligations aside from their ordi-

nary functions, 230-235.

charter of‘, not a contract, 192.

implied powers of, 194, 209, 210.

charter to be strictly construed, 195.

contracts, ultra 1-ires, void, 196, 211, 212, 215, and n.

negotiable paper issued by, when valid, 212, 215, and n.

legislative lic£1nses for sale of lands forbidden, 98, n.
judges of, to give opinions to legislature, 40.
restrictions upon legislative power in constitution of, 128, n.
legislature of, not to grant divorces, 111, n.
special legislative sessions in, 155, n.
title of acts to express the object, 142, n.
protection to property by law of the land, 852, n.
liberty of the press in, 416.

MONEY,
Congress may coin and regulate value of, 10.
States not to coin, 15.
legal tender, 15.
punishment of counterfeiting, 10, 18.
bills for raising, to originate in lower bouse in some States, 131, 132.
cannot be appropriated under right of eminent domain, 527.

MONOPOLIES,
odious nature of, 393.
grant of, not presumed, 395.

MORTGAGES,
right to possession under, cannot be taken away by legislature, 290, 291.

MOTIVES,
of legislative body not t~ be inquired into by courts, 135, 136, 186, 187.
nor those of munil'ipallegislative body, 208.
good, when a defence in libel cases, 46-l.

l'riUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS,
question of formation or division of, may be submitted to people interested, 118, 119.
powers of local government may be conferred upon, 118-125, 191.
whether they may engage in internal improvements, &c., 119, 213-219.
general view of the system, 189-192.
legislature prescribes extent of powers, 191.
charte; of, the measure of their authority, 192.
complete control of, by legislature, 191, 193, 170, n.
whether it may compel them to assume obligations aside from their ordinary functions, 230-235.
charter of, not a contract, 192.
implied powers of, 194, 209, 210.
charter to be strictly construed, 195.
contracts, ultra t'ires, void, 196, 211, 212, 215, and n.
negotiable paper issued by, when valid, 212, 215, and n.
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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS —- continued
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INDEX.

may exist by prescription, 197.

powers thereof, 197.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS- continutd

what by-laws they may make, 195, 198.

must not be opposed to constitution of State or nation, 198.

nor to charter, 198.

nor to general laws of the State, 198.

nor be unreasonable, 200.

nor uncertain, 202.

cannot delegate their powers, 204, 205.

nor adopt irrepealable legislation, 206-208.

nor preclude themselves from exercise of police power, 206-208.

nor grant away use of streets, 207, 208.

incidental injuries in exercise of powers give no right of action, 208.

may indemnify oﬂicers, 209, 210.

but not for refusal to perform duty, 212.

may contract to pay for liquors destroyed, 211, n.

powers of. to be construed with reference to the purposes of their cre-

ation, 211.

will not include furnishing entertainments, 211.

or loaning credit or making accommodation paper, 212.

must be confined to territorial limits, 213.
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power of, to raise bounty moneys, &c., 219-229.

legislative control of corporate property, 235-239.

towns, counties, &c., how differing from chartered corporations, 240, 247,

248. .

judgments against, may be collected of corporators, 241-247.

but only in New England, 246, 247.

not liable for failure of ofﬁcers to perform duty, 247.

chartered corporations undertake for performance of corporate duty, 247.

liability to persons injured by failure, 247-253,

may exist by prescription, 197.
powers thereof, 197.
what by-laws they may make, 195, 198.
must not be opposed to constitution of State or nation, 198.
nor to charter, 198.
nor to general laws of the State, 198.
nor be unreasonable, 200.
nor uncertain, 202.
cannot delegate their powers, 204, 205.
nor adopt irrepealable legislation, 206-208.
nor preclude themselves from exerdse of police power, 206-208.
nor grant away use of streets, 207, 208.
incidental injuries in exercise of powers give no right of action, 208.
may indemnify officers, 209, 210.
but not for refusal to perform duty, 212.
may contract to pay for liquors destroyed, 211, n.
powers of, to be construed with reference to the purposes of their creation, 211.
will not include furnishing entertainments, 211 .
or loaning credit or making accommodation paper, 212.
must be confined to territorial limits, 213.
power of, to rai~e bounty moneys, &c., 219-229.
legislative control of corporate property, 236-289.
towns, counties, &c., how differing from chartered corporations, 2l0, 247,

248.

corporate organization how questioned, 254.

imperfect contracts of, may be validated, 379.

must tax all property within their limits alike, 502.

cannot tax property not lying within their limits, 500.

bounds of, cannot be arbitrarily enlarged in order to bring in property for

taxation, 500-504.

obtaining water for, under right of eminent domain, 533.

taking of lands for parks for, 533, 534, n.

MUTE,

wilfully standing when arraigned, 311.

N.

NATION,

deﬁnition of, 1.

distinguished from State, 1.

(See UNITED Srarns.)

judgments against, may be collet"ted of corporators, 241-247.
but only in New England, 246, 247.
not liable for failure of officers to perform duty, 247.
chartered corporations undertake for performance of corporate duty, 247.
liability to persons injured by failure, 247-263.•
corporate organization how questioned, 254.
imperfect contracts of, may be validated, 379.
must tax all property within their limits alike, 502.
cannot tax property not lying within their limits, 500.
bounds of, cannot be arbitrarily enlarged in order to bring in property for
taxation, 500-50-l.
obtaining water for, under right of eminent domain, 533.
taking of lands for parks for, 633, 634, n.

MUTE,
wilfully standing when arraigned, 311.

N.
NATION,
definition of, 1.
distinguished from State, 1.
(See UNITKD

STATES.)

‘ mnnx. 751

INDEX.

N ATURALIZATION,

power of Congress over, 10.

NAVIGABLE WATERS,

made free by ordinance of 1787, 25, n.

right of States to improve and charge toll, 26, n., 592.

N ATURALIZATtON,
power of

Congr~11s

OYer, 10.

NAVIGABLE WATERS,

what are, 589.

what are private channels, 589.

are for use of all equally, 590.

general control of‘, is in the States, 591.

Congressional regulations, when made, control, 591.

States cannot grant monopolies of, 591.

States may authorize bridges over, 592.

when bridges become nuisances, 592.

States may establish ferries across, 593.

States may authorize dams of, 593, 594.

regulation of speed of vessels upon, 594.

rights of ﬁshery in, 524.

frontage upon, is property, 544.

(See W.l'rnR-Counsas.)

NAVIGATION,

right of, pertains to the eminent domain, 524.

(See Navrcanuz Wxrnns.)
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NEBRASKA,

legislature of, not to grant divorces, 110, n.

privilege of members of legislature from arrest, &c., 134, n.

title of acts to express the object, 141, n.

liberty of the press in, 416, n.

religious tests forbidden in, 469, n.

made free by ordinance of 1787, 25, n.
right of States to improve and charge toll, 26, n., 592.
what are, 589.
what are private channels, 589.
are for use of all equally, 590.
general control of, is in the States, 591.
Congressional regulations, when made, control, 591.
States cannot grant monopolies of, 591.
States may authorize bridges over, 592.
when bridges become nuisances, 592.
States may establish ferries across, 593.
States may authorize dams of, 593, 594.
regulation of speed of vessels upon, 594.
rights of fishery in, 524.
frontage upon, is property, 044.
(See \VATER-COUR8E8.)

NAVIGATION,
right of, pertain• to the eminent domain, 524.
(See NAVIGABLE WATERs.)

NEBRASKA,

NECESSITY,

is the basis of the right of eminent domain, 524, 538.

extent of property to be taken is limited by, 539.

destruction of buildings to prevent spread of ﬁre, 594.

NEGLIGENCE,

as a foundation for rights under betterment laws, 388.

carriers of persons may be made responsible for deaths by, 581.

in the construction of public works may give right of action, 571.

NEGOTIABLE PAPER,

when municipal corporations liable upon, 212, 215, and n.

NEVADA,

special statutes licensing sale of lands forbidden, 98.

legislature of, not to grant divorces, 110, n.

special legislative sessions in, 155, n.

title of acts to express the subject, 142, n.

protection by the law of the land, 352, n.

legislature of, not to grant dh·orces, 110, n.
privilege of members of legislature from arrest, &c., 134, n.
title of acts to express the object, 141, n.
liberty of the press in, 416, n.
religious tests forbidden in, 469, n.
NECESSITY,
is the basis of the right of eminent domain, 524, 538.
extent of property to be taken is limited by, 539.
destruction of buildings to prevent spread of fire, 594.

NEGLIGENCE,
as a foundation for rights under betterment laws, 388.
carriers of persons may be made responsible for deaths by, 581.
in the construction of public works may give right of action, 571.

NEGOTIABLE PAPER,

liberty of the press in, 416, n.

NEW ENGLAND CONFEDERACY,

of 1643, why formed, 5.

when municipal corporntions liable upon, 212, 215, and n.

NEVADA,
special statutes licensing sale of lands forbidden, 98.
legislature of, not to grant divorces, 110, n.
special legislative sessione in, 1[15, n.
title of acts to express the subject, 142, n.
protection by the law of the land, 352, n.
liberty of the. press in, 416, n.

NEW ENGLAND CONFEDERACY,
of 1643, why formed, 5.
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NEW HAMPSHIRE,

judges of, to give opinions to legislature, &c., 40.

causes of divorce to be heard by courts, 110, n.

revenue bills to originate in lower house, 132, n.

retrospective laws forbidden in, 370.

protection by the law of the land, 352, n.

liberty of the press in, 414, n.

\ persons conscientiously opposed to bearing arms excused, 478, n.

NEW JERSEY,

special statutes licensing sale of lands forbidden, 98, n.

legislature of, not to grant divorces, 110, n.

title of acts to express the object, 142, n. -

revenue bills to originate in lower house, 132, n.

liberty of the press in, 415, n.

religious tests forbidden in, 469, n.

NEWSPAPERS,

publication of privileged connnunications in, 448-451.

whether they have any privilege in publishing news, 451.

privilege not admitted by the courts, 453-457.

when publisher not liable to vindictive damages, 457.

(See Lmanrr or SPEECH AND or rm: Pmass.)

NEW STATES,
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admission of, 27-37.

NEW TRIALS,

not to be granted by the legislature, 95, 392.

not granted on application of State in criminal cases, 321.

may be had after verdict set aside on application of defendant, 327, 328.

but not on counts on which he was acquitted, 328.

9 (See Jnormnv.)

NEW HAMPSHIRE,
judges of, to give opinions to legislature, &e., 40.
causes of divorce to be heard by courts, 110, n.
revenue bills to originate in lower house, 132, n.
retrospective laws forbidden in, 870.
protection by the law of the land, 352, n.
liberty of the press in, 414, n.
' persons conscientiously opposed to bearing arms excused, 478, n.

NEW JERSEY,
special statutes lieensing sale of lands forbidden, 98, n.
legislature of, not to grant divorces, 110, n.
title of acts to express the object, 142, n.
revenue bills to originate in lower house, 132, n.
liberty of the press in, 415, n.
religious tests forbidden in, 469, n.

NEWSPAPERS,
publication of privileged communications in, 448-4/H.
whether they have any privilege in publishing news, 451.
privilege not admitted by the courts, 453-4.57.
when publisher not liable to vindictive damages, 467.
(See LmBRTY O.F SPEECH AND O.F THE PRESS.)

NEW STATES,
admission of, 27-87.

NEW TRIALS,

NEW YORK,

divorces only to be granted in judicial proceedings, 110, u.

title of private and local acts to express the subject, 142, n.

amendment of ﬁrst constitution in, 31.

protection by law of the land, 852, n.

liberty of the press in, 414, n.

witnesses not rendered incompetent from want of religious belief, 478, n.

contested election of governor in, 623, n.

NOBILITY,

titles of, forbidden to be granted, 17.

NOLLE PROSEQUI,

when equivalent to acquittal, 327.

NON COMPOTES MENTIS,

legislative authority for sale of lands of, 97-106.

excluded from suffrage, 599.

NON-RESIDENT PARTIES,

not to be granted by the legislature, 95, 392.
not granted on application of State in criminal cases, 321.
may be had af~r verdict set aside on application of defendant, 327' 328.
but not on counts on which he was acquitted, 328.
(Su JEOPARDY.)

NEW YORK,
divorces only to be granted in judicial proceedings, 110, n.
title of private and local acts to express the subject, 142, n.
amendment of first constitution in, 31.
protection by law of the land, 852, n.
liberty of the press in, 414, n.
witnesses not rendered incompetent from want of religious belief, 478, n.
contested election of goven:ior in, 623, n.

NOBILITY,

subjecting to jurisdiction of court by publication, 403-406.

restricted eﬂ'ect of the notice, 404.

discrimination in taxation of, 487.

titles of, forbidden to be granted, 17.
NOLLE PROSEQUI,
when equivalent to acquittal, 827.
NON COMPOTES MENTIS,
legislative authority tor sale of lands of, 97-106.
excluded from suffrage, 599.
NON-RESIDENT PARTIES,
subjecting to jurisdiction of court by publication, 403-406.
restricted effect of the notice, 40-!.
discrimination in taxation of, 487.

INDEX.
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INDEX.

NORTH CAROLINA,

ratiﬁcation of Constitution by, 8, 9.

legislature of, niot to grant divorces, 111, n.

protection by the law of the land, 352, n.

liberty of the press in, 417, n.

inﬁdels disqualiﬁed for holding oﬂice, 468.

NOTICE,

necessity for, in legal proceedings, 402-406.

bringing in non-resident parties by publication of, 403, 404.

of elections, when essential to their validity, 602, 603.

NUISANCE,

when bridges over navigable waters are, 593.

when dams are, and may be abated, 594, 595.

forbidding use of cemeteries which have become, 595.

general power in the States to abate, 596.

created by public, not to be abated at expense of individual, 596, n.

O.

OATH,

of attorneys, 330, 331, n.

test, may be punishment, 263, n.

NORTH CAROLINA,
ratifil·ation of Constitution by, 8, 9.
legislature of, n-ot to grant divort.-es, 111, n.
protection by the law of the land, 352, n.
liberty of the press in, 417, n.
infidt:ls disqualified for holding office, 468.

NOTICE,
necessity for, in legal proceedings, 402-406.
bringing in non-resident parties by publication of, 403, 404.
of elections, when essential to their validity, 602, 603.
NUIS~NCE,
'
when bridges over navigable waters are, 593.
when dams are, and may be abated, 594, 595.
forbidding use of cemeteries which have become, 595.
general power in the States to abate, 5!)6.
created by public, not to be abated at expense of individual, 596, n.

o_f voter, when conclusive of his right, 617.
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blasphemy and profanity punishable by law, 471-476.

o.

OBJECT OF STATUTE, \

in some States required to be stated in title, 141-151.

OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS,

States not to pass laws violating, 15, 33, 126, 273.

what is a contract, 273-281.

agreements by States are, 274, 275.

executed contracts, 275.

appointments to office are not, 276.

municipal charters are not, 192, 193, 276.

franchises granted to municipal corporations are not, 277.

but grants of property in trust are, 277-279.

and grants of property for municipal use, 236.

private charters of incorporation are, 279.

whether an exemption from taxation is, 127, 280-284.

it is if granted for a consideration, 281.

whether right of eminent domain can be relinquished, 281.

or the right to exercise the police power, 282, 283.

change in general laws of the State does not violate, 284.

nor divorce laws, 284.

such laws not to divest rights in property, 284, 285.

what obligation consists in, 285-287.

remedies for enforcement of contracts may be changed, 287-289.

imprisonment for debt may be abolished, 287.

exemptions from execution may be increased, 287.

48

OATH,
of attorneys, 830, 331, n.
test, may be punishment, 263, n.
of voter, when conclusive of his right, 617.
blasphemy anrl profanity punishable by law, 471-476.
OBJECT OF STATUTE,
in some States required to be stated in title, 141-151.

'

OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS,
States not to pass laws violating, 15, 33, 126, 273.
what is a contract, 273-281.
agreements by States are, 274, 275.
executed contracts, 275.
appointments to office are not, 276.
municipal charteJ;S are not, 192, 193, 276.
franchises granted to municipal corporations are not, 277.
but grants of property in trust are, 277-279.
and grants of property for municipal use, 236.
private charters of incorporation are, 279.
whether an exemption from taxation is, 127, 280-284.
it is if granted for a consideration, 2Bl.
whether right of eminent domain cau be relinquished, 281.
or the right to exercise the police power, 282, 283.
change in gtmerallaws of the State does not violate, 284.
nor divorce laws, 28!.
sueh laws not to divest rights in property, 284, 285.
what obligation consists in, 285-287.
remedil'B for enforcement of contracts may be changed, 287-289.
imprisonment for debt may be abolished, 287.
exemptions from execution may be increased, 287.
48
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OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS-—continued.

rules of evidence may be changed, 288.

but all remedy cannot be taken away, 289, 290.

repeal of statute giving remedy cannot destroy contracts, 290.

appraisement laws cannot be made applicable to existing debts, 290.

right to possession under mortgages cannot be taken away, 290.

nor time to redeem lands shortened or extended, 291.

laws staying execution, how far invalid, 292, 293.

when power of municipal taxation may not be taken away, 292.

stockholders liable for corporate debts may not be released by law, 292.

whether a party may release, by contract, a privilege granted for reasons

of Stale policy, 293.

when a contract requires new action to its enforcement, changes may be

made as to such action, 293.

new promise to revive a debt may be required to be in writing, 293.

laws validating invalid contracts do not violate Constitution, 293.

nor laws extending corporate franchises, 293.

State insolvent laws, how far valid, 293, 294.

OBSCEN ITY,

OBSC
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in legal proceedings, not to be published, 449.

sale of obscene books and papers may be prohibited, 596.

URITIES,

aids in interpretation of, 65-73.

(See CONSTRUCTION or S-ra-ra CONSTITUTIONS.)

OBSTRUCTIONS TO NAVIGATION,

when bridges and dams to be considered -such, 592-594.

when channels cut by private parties are private property, 590.

OCEAN,

(See HIGH Snas.)

OFFICE, , Y

appointments to, do not constitute contracts, 276.

OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS- continued.
rules of evidence may be changed, 288.
but all remedy cannot be taken away, 289, 290.
repeal of statute giving remedy cannot destroy contracts, 290.
appraisement laws cannot be made applicable to existing debts, 290.
right to possession under mortgages cannot be taken away, 290.
nor time to redeem lands shortened or extended, 291.
laws staying execution, how far invalid, 292, 293.
when power of municipal taxation may not be taken away, 292.
stockholders liable for corporate debts may not be released by law, 292.
whether a party may release, by contract, a privilege granted for reasons
of State policy, 293.
when a contract requires new action to its enforcement, changes may be
made as to such action, 293.
new promise to revive a debt may be required to be in writing, 293.
laws validating invalid contracts do not violate Coo11titution, 293.
nor laws extending corporate franchises, 293.
State insolvent laws, how far valid, 293, 294.
OBSCENITY,
in legal proceedings, not to be published, 449.
sale of obscene books and papers may be prohibited, 596.
OBSCURITIES,
aids in interpretation of, 65-73.
(See

Co:oiBTRUCTION OF STATE CoNSTITUTIONs.)

OBSTRUCTIONS TO NAVIGATION,
when bridges and dams to be considered 'Such, 592-594.
when channels cut by private parties are private property, 590.
OCEAN,
.

OFFICER,

OHIO

protection of dwelling-house against, 22, 299.

general warrants to, are illegal, 300-302.

may break open house to serve criminal warrant, 303.

service of search-warrant by,

(See SEARCHES AND SEIZURES.)

privilege of criticism of, 431-441, 455, 456.

constitutional qualiﬁcations cannot be added to, by the legislature, 64.

duty of, when doubtful of constitutional construction, 73, 74.

of the legislature, election of, 133.

municipal, may be indemniﬁed by corporation, 209.

but not for refusal to perform duty, 212.

9

legislature not to grant divorces, or exercise judicial power, 111, n.

title of acts to express the object, 142, n.

general laws to be uniform, 63.

appointing power, how exercised, 115.

retrospective laws, what not to be passed, 370, n. ‘

(See

HIGH SEAs.)

OFFICE,
appointments to, do not constitute contracts, 276.
OFFICER,
protection of dwelling-house against, 22, 299.
general warrants to, are illegal, 300-302.
may break open house to serve criminal warrant, 303.
service of search-warrant by,
(See SE.\UCHES AND SEIZURES.)
privilege of criticism of, 431-441, 455, 456.
constitutional qualifications cannot be added to, by the legislature, 64:.
duty of, when doubtful of constitutional construction, 73, 74:.
of the legislature, election of, 133.
municipal, may be indemnified by corporation, 209.
but not for refusal to perform duty, 212.
OHIO,
legislature not to grant divorces, or exercise judicial power, 111, n.
title of actM to express the object, 142, n.
general laws to be uniform, 63.
appointing power, how exercised, 115.
retrospective laws, what not to be passed, 3i0, n.
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OHIO — continued.

liberty of the press in, 415, n.

INDEX.
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religious tests forbidden, 469.

impeachment of judges of, 160, n.

OMNIPOTENCE OF PARLIAMENT,

meaning of the term, 3, 4, 86.

OPINION, .

proscription for, is unconstitutional, 390.

Von religious subjects to be free, 467-470.

religious tests forbidden in some States, 469, n.

of witnesses on religious subjects not to constitute disqualiﬁcation in some

States, 478.

judicial, force of, as precedents, 50-54.

ORDINANCE OF 1787,

how far still in force, 25, 26, n. i

admission of States to the Union under, 28, n.

ORDINANCES, MUNICIPAL,

(See BY—L.\WB.)

OREGON,

special statutes licensing sale of lands forbidden, 98.

legislature of, not to grant divorces, 110, n.

revenue bills to originate in lower house, 132, n.
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legislative regulation of pardons, 116.

liberty of the press in, 416, n.

religious tests forbidden in, 469, n.

want of religious belief not to render witness incompetent, 478, n.

P.

.PAPERS,

private, exempt from seizure, 300, n, 306, n, 307, n.

protected the same as property, 358, n.

PARDON,

power of, to be exercised by governor, 115, n.

constitutional provisions as to rules for, 116, n.

OHIO -continued.
liberty of the press in, 415, n.
religious tests forbidden, 469.
impeachment of judges of, 160, n.
OMNIPOTENCE OF PARLIAMENT,
meaning of the term, 3, 4, 86.
OPINION,
proscription for, is unconstitutional, 390.
on religious subjects to be free, 467-470.
religious tests forbidden in some States, 469, n.
of witnesses on religious subject!! not to constitute disqualification in some
States, 478.
judicial, force of, as precedents, 50-54.
ORDINANCE OF 1787,
bow far still in force, 25, 26, n.
admission of States to the Union under, 28, n.
ORDINANCES, :MUNICIPAL,
(See BY-LAws.)
OREGON,
special statutes licensing sale of lands forbidden, 98.
legislature of, not to grant divorces, 110, n.
revenue bills to originate in lower house, 132, n.
legislative regulation of pardons, 116.
liberty of the press in, 416, n.
religious tests forbidden in, 469, n.
want of religious belief not to render witness incompetent, 478, n.

power to, does not include reprieves, 116, n.

PARENT,

right of, to custody of child, 340.

respective rights of father and mother, 348.

PARLIAMENT,

power of, to change the constitution, 3, 4, 86.

acts of, adopted in America, 23, 24.

repeal of acts of, 25, n.

comparison of powers with those of State legislatures, 85, 88.

may exercise judicial authority, 87.

' bills of attainder by, 259.

publication of proceedings of, not formerly allowed, 418.

publication of speeches by members, 457-160.

publication of reports and papers of, 457-460.

P.
.PAPERS,
private, exempt from seizure, 300, n, 306, n, 307, n.
protected the same as property, 358, n.
PARDON,
power of, to be exercised by governor, 115, n.
constitutional provisions as to rules for, 116, n.
power to, does not inciude reprieves, 116, n.
PARENT,
right of, to custody of child, 340.
respective rights of father and mother, 348.
PARLIAMENT,
power of, to change the constitution, 3, 4, 86.
acts of, adopted in America, 23, 24.
repeal of a<:ts of, 25, n.
comparison of powers with those of State legislatures, 85, 88.
may exercise judicial authority, 87.
bills of attainder by, 259.
publication of procemlings of, not formerly allowed, 418.
publication of speeches by members, 457-!60.
gublication of reports and papers of, 457-!60.

756 mnsx.

PARLIAMENTARY LAW,

inﬂuence of, in construction of constitutions, 130, 131.

756

INDEX.

legislative power in regard to, 133. p

power to preserve order, &c., under, 133, 134.

privilege by, of members from arrest, 134.

PARTIAL LEGISLATION,

legislature to govern by equal laws, 392. -

special laws for particular individuals not permissible, 392.

suspensions of laws not allowed in special cases, 392, 393.

regulations for special localities or classes, 393.

equality of rights, &c., the aim of the law, 393.

strict construction of special privileges and grants, 393-396.

and of discriminations against individuals and classes, 398, 394.

_ and of statutes in derogation of the common law, 61, n.

citizens of other States not to be discriminated against, 397.

PARTICULAR INTENT,

control of, by general intent, 58, n.

PARTIES,

defendants in criminal suits, evidence of, 317.

not compellable to testify against themselves, 313, 394.

how subjected to jurisdiction of courts, 402, 403.

estopped by judgment, 48, 49.
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PARTITION,

PARLIAMENTARY LAW,
influence of, in construction of constitutions, 130, 181.
legislative power in regard to, 133.
power to preserve order, &c., under, 133, 134.
privilege by, of members from arrest, 184.

PARTIAL LEGISLATION,
legislature to govern by equal laws, 392. special laws for particular individuals not permissible, 392.
suspensions of laws not allowed in special cases, 392, 393.
regulations for special localities or classes, 393.
equality of rights, &c., the aim of the law, 393.
strict construction of special privileges and grants, 393-396.
and of discriminations against individuals and classes, 398, 39-1.
and of statutes in derogation of the common law, 61, n.
citizens of otber States not to be discriminated againzot, 397.

PARTICULAR INTENT,
control of, by general intent, 58, n.

PARTIES,

legislature may authorize sale of lands for purposes of, 102.

PASTURAGPZ,

right of, in public highway, is property, 545, n.

PASSENGERS,

power of States to require report of, from carriers, and to levy tax upon,

587.

making carriers responsible for safety oi, 580, 581.

PAUPERS,

defendants in criminal suits, evidence of, 817.
not compellable to testify against themselves, 318, 394.
how subjected to jurisdiction of courts, 402, 403.
estopped by judgment, 48, 49.

PARTITION,
legislature may authorize sale of lands for purposes of, 102.

PASTURAGE,

exclusion of, from suffrage, 599.

PAVING STREETS,

assessments for, not within constitutional provisions respecting taxation,

497.

special taxing districts for, 505-507.

assessments may be made in proportion to beneﬁts, 505, 506.

or in proportion to street front, 507.

but each separate lot cannot be made a separate district, 508.

right of, in public highway, is property, 545, n.

PASSENGERS,
power of States to require report of, from carriers, and to levy tax upon,
587.
making carriers responsible for safety ot; 580, 581.

PAUPERS,
exclusion of, from suffrage, 599.

PEACE AND VVAR,

power over, of the revolutionary Congress, 6.

of Congress under the Constitution, 20.

PENALTIES,

for the same act under State and municipal laws, 199.

given by statute may be taken away, 362, 375, and n., 383.

for violation of police regulations, 596.

PENNSYLVANIA,

PAVING STREETS,
assessments for, not within constitutional provisions respecting taxation,
497.
special taxing districts for, 505-507.
assessments may be made in proportion to benefits, 505, 506.
or in proportion to ~treet front, 507.
but each separate lot cannot be made a separate district, 508.

legislature of, not to grant divorces, 111, n.

PEACE AND WAR,
power over, of the revolutionary Congress, 6.
of Congresl! under the Constitution, 20.

PENALTIES,
for the same act under State and municipal laws, 199.
given by statute may be taken away, 362, 375, and n., 383.
for violation of police regulations, 596.

PENNSYLVA..~ lA,
legislature of, not to grant divorces, 111, n.

•

INDEX.

INDEX.

PENNSYLVANIA — continued.

title of acts to express the object, 142, n.

revenue bills to originate in lower house, 132, n.

protection by law of the land, 352, n.

liberty of speech and the press in, 415, n.

religious tests in, 468, n.

PEOPLE.

reservation of powers to, by national Constitution, 19.

sovereignty vested in, 28, 598.

formation and change of constitutions by, 30.

PENNSYLVANIA- continued.
title of acts to express the object, 142, n.
revenue bill~ to originate in lower house, 132, n.
protection by law of the land, 352, n.
liberty of speech and the press in, 415, n.
religious tests in, 468, n.

PEOPLE,

who are the, 28-30.

exercise of sovereign powers by, 598.

PERSONAL LIBERTY,

gradually acquired by servile classes in Great Britain, 295-299.

constitutional prohibition of slavery in America, 299.

of bills of attainder, 15, 33, 259.

(See Bums or Arramnnn.)

of apost facto laws, 15, 33, 264.

(See Ea: Post Facto ﬂaws.)

of unreasonable searches and seizures, 299-308.

' (See S1-:.ancu1:s AND Snizuues.)

of quartering soldiers in private houses, 308, 309.
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protection of, in one’s dwelling-house, 22, 299, 308.

criminal accusations, how made, 309.

bail for accused parties, 309-311.

unreasonable, not to be demanded, 310.

trials for crimes, 311-338.

(See Camus.)

meaning of the term, 339, 393.

legal restraints upon, 339-341.

right to, in England, did not depend on any statute, 342.

reason why it was not well protected, 342.

evasions of the writ of habeas corpus, 343.

reservation of powers to, by national Constitution, 19.
sovereignty vested in, 28, 598.
fonnation and change of constitutions by, 30.
who are the, 28-30.
exercise of sovereign !JOWers by, 598.

PERSONAL LIBERTY,
graduslly ac(1uired by servile classes in Great Britain, 295-299.
constitutional prohibition of slavery in An1erica, 299.
of bill:t of attainder, 15, 33, 259.
·
(See BILLS OF ATTAINDER.)
of ex post facto laws, 15, 33, 264.
(See Ex Post Facto tAws.)
of unreasonable searches and seizures, 299-308.
(See SE.mCHES AND SEIZUUES.)
of quartering soldiers in private houses, 308, 309.
protection of, in one's dwelling-house, 22, 299, 308.
criminal accusations, how made, 309.
bail for accused parties, 309-311.
unreasonable, not to be demanded, 310.
trials for crimes, 311-338.

the habeas corpus act, 23, 344.

cs~

ca1111ES.)

did not extend to American Colonies, 345.

general adoption of, 345.

writ of habeas corpus, 345-348.

when national courts may issue, 345, 346.

State courts to issue generally, 346, 347.

return to, when prisoner held under national authority, 347.

not to be employed as a writ of error, 347.

application fur, need not be made in person, 347, n.

what the ofﬁcer to inquire into, 347, 348.

to enforce relative rights, 348.

PETITION,

right of, 349, 433, 434.

PETITION OF RIGHT,

was a declaratory statute, 23, 257 .

quartering soldiers upon subjects forbidden by, 308.

meaning of the term, 339, 393.
legal restraints upon, 339-341.
right to, in England, did not depend on any statute, 342.
reason why it was not well protected, 342.
evasions of the writ of habeas corpus, 343.
the habeas eorpus act, 23, 344.
did not extend to American Colonies, 345.
general adoption of, 3!5.
writ of habeas corpus, 34~348 .
when national courts may issue, 315, 346.
State courts to issue generally, 346, 3 !7.
return to, when prisoner hdd under national authority, 347.
not to be employed as a writ of error, 347.
application fur, neetl not be made in person, 347, n.
what the officer to inquire into, 347, 348.
to enforce relative rights, 348.

PETITION,
right of, 349, 4:33, 434.
PETITIO~

OF RIGHT,

was a dedaratory statute, 23, 257.
quartering soldiers upon subjects forbidden by, 308 .

•

757

758 ¢ mnnx.

PETIT JURY,

758

•

INDEX •

trial by,

(See J uav Tarn.)

PETIT JURY,

PICTURES,

libels by, injury presumed from, 423. I

trial by,
(See JuRY TRIAL)

indecent, sale of, may be prohibited, 596.

PLURALITY,

suﬁicient in elections, 620.

POISON S, V

regulation of sales of, 595.

POLICE POVVER, r

PICTURES,
libels by, injury presumed from, 423. ·
indecent, sale of, may be prohibited, 596.

PLURALITY,
sufficient in elections, 620.

pervading nature of, 572, 574. '

deﬁnition of, 572, n.

the maxim on which it rests, 573.

power of States to make regulations which affect contracts, 574-581.

how charters of private incorporation may be affected by, 575-581.

charters cannot be amended on pretence of, 577, 578.

States no power to relinquish it. 282-284.

nor rights granted by charters taken away, 578, 579. ,

railroad corporations niay be required to fence track, 579.

and made liable for beasts killed on track, 579.

grade of railways and crossings may be prescribed, 580,

580.
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requirement that bell shall be rung or whistle sounded at crossings, &c.,

whether carriers of persons may not be made insurers, 580.

action may be given for death caused by negligence, 581. l

sale of intoxicating drinks may be regulated by States, 581. ‘

regulation of, does not interfere with power of Congress over com-

merce, 582.

sale of intoxicating drinks as a beverage may be prohibited by States,

582, 583.

payment of United States license fee does not give rights as against State ‘

law, 584. ‘

quarantine and health regulations by States, 584. i

harbor regulations by the States, 585.

line of distinction between police regulations and interference with com-

merce, 586.

police regulations may be established by Congress, 586.

State requirement of license fee from importers illegal, 586.

State regulations to prevent immigrants becoming a public charge, 587.

State regulations of pilots and pilotagc, 587.

Sunday laws as regulations of police, 588.

regulation by States of use of highways, 588.

owners of urban property may be required to build sidewalks, 588.

construction of levees on river fronts, 589.

control of navigable waters by States, 589, 591.

restrictions on this control, 591.

monopolies not to be granted, 591.

_ _ _ *__ __ _ _ 1

POISONS,
regulation of sales of, 596.

POLICE POWER,

•
pervading nature of, 572, 574.
definition of, 572, n.
the maxim on which it rests, 573.
States no power to relinquish it. 282-284.
power of States to make regulations which affect contracts, 574-581.
how charters of private incorporation may be affected by, 575-581.
charters cannot be amended on pretence of, 577, 578.
nor rights granted by charters taken away, 578, 579.
railroad corporations ~ay be required to fence track, 579.
and made liable for beasts killed on track, 579.
grade of railways and crossings may be prescribed, 580.I
requirement that bell shall be rung or whistle sounded at crossings, &c.,
580.
whether carriers of persons may not be made insurers, 580.
action may be given for death caused by negligence, 581.
sale of intoxicating drinks may be regulated by States, 581.
regulation of, does not interfere with power of Congress over commerce, 582.
sale of intoxicating drinks as a beverage may be prohibited by States,
582, 583.
payment of United States license fcc does not give rights as against State
law, 584.
quarantine and health regulations by States, 584.
harbor regulat.ions by the States, b85.
line of distinction between police l't'gttlations and interference with .commerce, 686.
police regulations may be established by Congress, 086.
State requirement of licen~e fee from importers illegal, 686.
State regulations to prevent immigrants becoming a public charge, 587.
State regulations of pilots and pilotage, 587.
Sunday laws as regulations of police, 588.
regulation by States of use of highways, 588.
owners of urban property may be required to build sidewalks, 588.
construction of lc\'ccs on river fronts, 589.
control of navigable waters by States, 589, 591.
restrictions on tbis control, 591.
monopolies not to be granted, 591.
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States may improve and charge tolls, 592.

may authorize bridges, 592.

when these bridges to be abated, 593.

may establish ferries, 593.

may authorize dams, 593, 594.

when the dams may be abated, 594, 595.

may regulate speed of vessels, 594.

other cases of police regulations, 594.

destruction of property to prevent spread of ﬁre, 594.

establishment of ﬁre limits, wharf lines, &c., 595.

regulations respecting gunpowder, poisons, dogs, unwholesome provisions,

&c., 595, 596.

regulations for protection of public morals, 596.

market regulations, 596.

prohibited act or omission may be made criminal, 596.

POLICE REGULATIONS,

power to establish, may be conferred on municipal corporations, 123-125.

(See Pouca Pownu.) I

POLICE REPORTS,

publication of, 449, and n.

POLITICAL OPINIONS,
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citizens not to be proscribed for, 390, n.

POLITICAL RIGHTS,

equality of, 390, 467-470.

POPULAR RIGHTS, '

not measured by constitutions, 36, 37.

POPULAR VOTE,

submission of laws to, not generally allowable, 116-125.

(See Emcrroxs.)

POPULAR WILL,

expression of, as to amendment of constitutions, 31-33.

must be obtained under forms of law, 598.

(See Eaacrrorzs.)

POSSESSION,

_ importance of, in limitation laws, 366, n.

POST-OFFICES,

and post-roads, Congress may establish, 10.

inviolability of correspondence through, 307, n.

POWDER,

police regulations concerning storage of, 595.

POWERS,

ofgovemment, apportionment of, by State constitutions, 33 37.

of Congress, 10-12.

of State legislatures, 85-129.

‘ (See J umcuz. Powan; Laoxsnarrva Powans.)

PRACTICAL CONSTRUCTION,

weight to be given to, 67-71.

not to override the Constitution, 71.

POLICE POWER- continued.
States may improve and charge tolls, 592.
may authorize bridges, 592.
when these bridges to be abated, 593.
may establish ferries, 593.
may authorize dams, 593, 59!.
when the dams may be abated, 594, 595.
may regulate speed of vessels, 594.
other cases of police regulations, 594.
destruction of property to prevent spread of fire, 594.
establi~hment of fire limits, wharf lines, &c., 595.
regulations respecting gunpowder, poisons, dogs, unwholesome provisions,
&c., 595, 596.
regulations for protection of public morals, 596.
market regulations, 596.
prohibited act or omission may be made criminal, 596.
POLICE REGULATIOXS,
power to establish, may be conferred on municipal corporations, 123-125.
(See PoLICE PowER.)
POLICE REPORTS,
publication of, 449, and n.
POLITICAL OPINIONS,
citizens not to be proscribed for, 390, n.
POLITICAL RIGHTS,
equality of, 390, 467-470.
POPULAR RIGHTS,
not measured by constitutions, 36, 37.
POPULAR VOTE,
submission oflaws to, not generally allowable, 116-125.
(See ELECTIONS.)

POPULAR WILL,
expression of, as to amendment of constitutions, 31-33.
must be obtained under forms of law, 598.
(See ELJWriONS.)

POSSESS!OS",
importance of, in limitation laws, 366, n.
POST-OFFICES,
and post-roads, Congress may establish, 10.
inviolability of correspondence through, 307, n.
POWDER,
police regulations concerning storage of, 595.
POWERS,
of government, apportionment of, by State constitutions, 33 37.
ofCongress, 10-12.
of State legislatures, 85-129.
(See .JuDICIAL PowER; LEGISLATIVE PowERS.)

PRACTICAL CONSTRUCTION,
weight to be given to, 67-71.
not to override the Constitution, 71.

760 mnnx.

PRECEDENTS,

760

INDEX.

importance of, 50, 51, n.

judicial, how far binding, 50-54.

law made by, 56, 57, n.

only authoritative within country where decided, 51, 52.

when to be overruled, 52.

of executive department, force of, 67-71.

PRECIOUS METALS,

in the soil belong to sovereign authority, 524.

PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION S,

of persons accused of crimes, 313.

PRECEDENTS,
importance of, 50, 51, n.
judicial, how far binding, 50-54.
law made by, 56, 57, n.
only authoritative within country where decided, 51, 52.
when to be overruled, 52.
of executive department, force of, 67-71.

PRECIOUS METALS,

publication of proceedings on, not privileged, 449.

PRESCRIPTIVE CORPORATIONS,

powers of, 197.

PRESENCE,

of prisoner at his trial, 319.

PRESIDENT,

powers and duties of, 11.

in the soil belong to sovereign authority, 524.

PRELIMINARY EXAl\liNATIO.NS,
of persons accused of crimes, 313.
publication of proceedings on, not privileged, 449.

PRESCRIPTIVE CORPORATIONS,
powers of, 197.

calling out the militia by, 41, n.

PRESS, LIBERTY OF,

(See LIBERTY or Sr:-zncn AND or "run Pnass.)

PRESUMPTION,
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of constitutionality of statutes, 168, 183.

of existence of corporation, 197.

of innocence of accused party, 309, 310.

PRESENCE,
of prisoner at his trial, 319.

PRESIDENT,
powers and duties of, 11.
calling out the militia by, 41, n.

PRESS, LIBERTY OF,

of correctness of legislative motives, 186, 187, 208.

(See

LIBERTY OF SPEECH ..um OF THE

PRESS.)

PRINCIPAL AND BAIL,

custody of principal by bail, 341.

PRINTED BALLOTS,

answer the requirement of written, 605, n.

PRIVATE CORPORATIONS,

distinguished from public, 279, 280, n.

charters of, are contracts, 279.

PRIVATE PAPERS,

PRESUMPTION,
of constitutionality of statutes, 168, 183.
of existence of corporation, 197.
of innocence of accused party, 809, 310.
of correctness of legislative motives, 186, 187, 208.

PRINCIPAL AND BAIL,
custody of principal by bail, 34:1.

(See Parana.)

PRIVATE PROPERTY,

right to, is before constitutions, 37, 354, n.

of municipal corporations, how far under legislative control, 235.

owners cannot be compelled to improve, 385, 532.

appropriating under right of eminent domain, 523.

trial of right to, 369, and n.

PRINTED BALLOTS,
answer the requirement of written, 605, n.

PRIVATE CORPORATIONS,
distinguished from public, 279, 280, n.
charters of, are contracts, 279.

PRIVATE PAPERS,

(See Emnvsnr Dontam; Vrsran Rienrs.)

(See

PAPERS.)

PRIVATE ROADS.

cannot be laid out under right of eminent domain, 530, 531.

PRIVATE STATUTES,

not evidence against third parties, 96.

to authorize sales by guardians, &c., are constitutional, 97-106, 389.

PRIVIES.

estoppel of, by judgment, 48, 49.

PRIVATE PROPERTY,
right to, is before constitutions, 37, 354, n.
of municipal corporations, how far under legislative control, 235.
owners cannot be compelled to improve, 385, 532.
appropriating under right of eminent domain, 523.
trial of right to, 869, and n.
(See EML...,ENT Do!IIAIN; VESTED RIGHTs.)

PRIVATE ROADS.
cannot be laid out under right of eminent domain, 580, 531.

PRIVATE STATUTES,
not evidence against third parties, 96.
to authorize sales by guardians, &c., are constitutional, 97-106, 889.

PRIVIES,
estoppel of, by judgment, 48, 49.

mm-1x. 761
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PRIVILEGES, '

of citizens of the several States, 15, 16, 487.

citizens not to be deprived of, 11, 294.

protection of, rests with the States, 294, n.

of legislators, 134, 135. .

special, strict construction of, 389-397.

PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS,

meaning of the term, 425.

when made in answer to inquiries, 425, 4261

between principal and agent, 426.

where parties sustain conﬁdential relations, 426.

discussing measures or principles of government, 426-430.

criticising oﬁicers or candidates, 431-441. A

made in the course of judicial proceedings, 441, 442.

made by counsel, 442-445.

by legislator to constituents, 457-460.

by client to counsel, 334.

PROCEEDINGS,

of constitutional convention may be looked to on questions of construction,

66, 67.

PRIVILEGES,
of citizens of the several States, 15, 16, 487.
citizens not to be deprived of, 11, 2!).1.
protection of, rests with the States, 294:, n.
of legislators, 13!, 135.
special, strict construction of, 389-397.

PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS,
meaning of the tenn, 425.
when made in answer to inquiries, 425, 426:
between principal and agent, 426.
where parties sustain confidential relations, 426.
discussing musures or principles of government, 426-430.
criticising officers or candidate3, 431-!41.
·
made in the c.ourse of judicial proceedings, 441, 442.
made by counsel, 442-445.
by legislator to constituents, 457-460.
by client to counsel, 334.

of legislative bodies, publication of, 418-420, 457-460.
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PROFANITY,

in judicial proceedings, publication of, 449.

punishment of, 471-476.

PROFESSIONAL COMMUNICATIONS,

not to be disclosed, 334, and n.

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES,

to inﬂuence legislation cannot be contracted for, 136, n.

PROCEEDINGS,
of constitutional convention may be looked to on questions of construction,
66, 67.
of ll'gislative bodies, publication of, 418-420, 457-460.

PROFANITY,
in judicial proceedings, publication of, 449.
punishment of, 471-476.

law requiring, without compensation, to be strictly construed, 393, 394.

(See Couxsat.)

PROHIBITORY LIQUOR LAWS,

constitutionality of, 582, 583.

PROPERTY,

qualiﬁcation for suﬁrage, 599. .

protection of, by fourteenth amendment, 11.

(See EMINENT DOMAIN; Pntvara PROPERTY; Vxsrnn RIGHTS.)

PROFESSIONAL CO.M.MUNICATIONS,
not to be disclosed, 334, and n.

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES,
to influence legislation cannot be contracted for, 136, n.
law requiring, witbi1Ut compensation, to be strictly construed, 393, 394.
(See CouNSEL.)

PROHIBITORY LIQUOR LAWS,

PROROGUEMENT,

of the legislature by governor, 132.

PROSCRIPTION, .

of persons, for their opinions, 390, 467-470.

PROSECUTING OFFICERS,

duty of, to treat accused parties with judicial fairness, 311, and n.

PROTECTION,

constitutionality of, 582, 583.

PROPERTY,
qualification for suffrage, 599.
•
protection of, by fourteenth amendment, 11.
(See E~uNENT DoMAlN; PRIVATE PnoPKRTY; VESTED RIGHTS.)

PROROGUEMENT,

the equivalent for taxation, 559.

of the legislature by go\·ernor, 132.

PROVISIONS,

regulations to prevent sale of unwholesome, 595. '

PUBLIC CORPORATIONS,

(See Mmvrcxrn. Conromrroxs.)

PROSCRIPTION,
of persons, for their opinions, 390, 467-470.

PROSECUTING OFFICERS,
duty of, to treat accused parties with judicial fairness, 311, and n.

PROTECTION,
the equivalent for taxation, 559.

PROVISIONS,
regulations to prevent sale of unwholesome, 595.

PUBLIC CORPORATIONS,
(See

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.)

762 mm-xx. 5

PUBLIC DEBT,

762

INDEX.

inviolability of, 11.

PUBLIC GOOD,

laws should have reference to, 117, n., 129.

PUBLIC GROUNDS,

PUBLIC DEBT,
inviolability of, 11.

PUBLIC GOOD,

lands dedicated for, not to be put to other uses, 238, n.

PUBLIC MORALS,

regulations for protection of‘, 596.

(See RELIGIOUS LIBERTY.)

PUBLIC OFFICERS,

(Sec OFFICER.)

PUBLIC OPINION, _

not to aﬂ'ect construction of constitution, 54, 55.

laws should have reference to, 117, n., 129.

PUBLIC GROUNDS,
lands dedicated for, not to be put to other uses, 238, n.

PUBLIC MORALS,
regulations for protection of, 596.
(See R~;uGrous

LIBERTY.)

PUBLIC OFFICERS,

expression of, by elections, 598.

(See

PUBLIC PURPOSES,

appropriation of property for, 523.

(Sec EMINENT DOMAIN.)

PUBLIC STATUTES,

what are, 390.

PUBLIC TRIAL,

accused parties entitled to, 312.

OFFICER.)

PUBLIC OPINION,
not to affect construction of constitution, 54, 55.
expression of, by elections, 598.

PUBLIC PURPOSES,
appropriation of property for, 523.
(See E:\IINENT

DOMAIN.)

not essential that everybody be allowed to attend, 312.
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PUBLIC USE,

of property, what constitutes, 581.

(See EMXNENT Domm.)

PUBLICATION,

of statutes, 156-158.

of debates in parliament, formerly not suffered, 418.

of books, &c., censorship of. 417-419. '

of debates in American legislative bodies, 419, 420.

of legislative speeches, 457-460.

of notice to non-resident parties, 403, 404.

(See LIBERTY or SPEECH AND or THE Pmcss.)

PUBLISHERS OF N E\VS,

not privileged in law, 451-457.

PUNISHMENTS,

what changes in, the legislature may make applicable to previous offences,

267-272.

of crimesrby servitude, 299. Y

cruel and unusual, prohibited, 328-330.

must not exceed measure the law has prescribed, 330.

(See BxLLs or Armrsnun; Camus; Ex Post Facto Lsws.)

Q.

QUALIFICATIONS.

of oﬂicer or voter under constitution cannot be added to by legislature, 64.

of members of legislature to be determined by the two houses, 138.

of voter, inquiring into, on contested election, 627.

PUBLIC STATUTES,
what are, 390.

PUBLIC TRIAL,
accused parties entitled to, 812.
not e11sential that everybody be allowed to attend, 312.

PUBLIC USE,
of property, what constitutt-s, 531.
(See EMINL'iT DoMAIN.)

PUBLICATION,
of statutes, 156-158.
of debates in parliament, formerly not suffered, 418.
of books, &c., censorship of, 417-419.
•
of debates in Ameril·an legislative bodies, 419, 420.
of legi~lativc speeches, 457-460.
of notice to non-resident parties, 403, 40!.
(See LmERTY OF SPKECH AND OF THE PRESs.)

PUBLISHERS OF NEWS,
not privileged in law, 451-457.

PUNISHMENTS,
what changes in, the legislature may make applicable to previous offences,
267-272.
of crimesoby servitude, 299.
cruel and unusual, prohibited, 328-330.
must not exceed measure the law bas prescribed, 830.
(See BILLS OF ATTAINDER; CRIMESj Ex Post Facto LAWS.)

Q.
QUALIFICATIONS.
of officer or voter under constitution cannot be added to by legislature, 64.
of members of legislature to be dett>rmined by the two houses, 133.
of voter, inquiring into, on contested election, 627.

mnnx. 763

QUARANTINE,

INDEX.

763

regulations by the States, 584.

QUARTERING SOLDIERS,

in private houses in time of peace forbidden, 308.

QUORUM,

majority of, generally suﬁicient for passage of laws, 141.

of courts, must act by majorities, 96.

full court generally required on constitutional questions, 161, 162.

R.

RACE,

not to be a disqualiﬁcation for suffrage, 11.

QUARANTINE,
regulations by the States, li84.
QUARTERING SOLDIERS,
in private houses in time of peace forbidden, 308.
QUORUM,
majority of, generally sufficient for passage of laws, 141.
of courts, must act by majorities, 96.
full court generally required on constitutional questions, 161, 162.

RAILROADS,

authorizing towns, &c., to subscribe to, is not delegating legislative power,

R.

I19.

whether such subscriptions may be made, 213-219.

appropriations of lands for, 533.

and of materials for constructing, 526.

and of lands for depot buildings, &c., 541.

corporations may take, 537, 538.

(See EMINENT DOMAIN.)

appropriation of highways for, 545-557.

must be legislative permission, 545.
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whether adjoining owner entitled to compensation, 546-557.

police regulations in respect to, 573.

requiring corporations to fence track and pay for beasts killed,

579.

regulation of grade and crossings, 580.

provisions regarding alarms, 580.

responsibility for persons injured or killed, 580, 581.

bridges for, over navigable waters, 592.

READING OF BILLS,

constitutional provisions for, 80, 139, 140.

REAL ESTATE,

not to be taxed out of taxing district, 499, 500.

within taxing district to be taxed uniformly, 502.

taking for public use,

(See Emmnxr DOMAIN.)

REASONABLENESS,

.of municipal by-laws, 200.

of limitation laws, 366.

REBELLIONS,

employment of militia to suppress, 11.

RECITALS,

in statutes, not binding upon third parties, 96.

when they may be evidence, 96.

RECONSTRUCTION OF STATES, .

control over, 34, n.

RACE,
not to be a disqualification for suffrage, 11.
RAILROADS,
authorizing towns, &c., to subscribe to, is not delegating legislative power,
119.
whether such subscriptions may be made, 213-219.
appropriations of lands fot•, li33.
and of materials for constructing, 526.
and of lands for depot buildings, &c., 541.
corporations may take, 537, 538.
(See E:\nNENT DOMAIN.)
appropriation of highways for, 5!5-M7.
must be legislative permission, 545.
whether adjoining owner entitled to compensation, 546-557.
police regulations in respect to, 573.
requiring corporations to fence track and pay for beasts killed,
579.
regulation of grade and crossings, 580.
provisions regarding alarms, 080.
responsibility for persons injured or killed, 580, 581.
bridges for, over navigable waters, 592.
READING OF BILLS,
constitutional provisions for, 80, 139, 140.
REAL ESTATE,
not to be taxed out of taxing district, 499, 500.
within taxing district to be taxed uniformly, 502.
taking for public use,
(See EMI~'E.."!T DoMAIN.)
REASONABLENESS,
_of municipal by-laws, 200.
of limitation laws, 366.
REBELLIONS,
employment of militia to suppress, 11.
RECITALS,
in statutes, not binding upon third parties, 96.
when they may be evidence, 96.
RECONSTRUCTION OF STATES,,
control over, 34, n.

764 mnax.

RECORDS,

764

INDEX.

public, of the States, full faith and credit to be given to, 15, 16.

judicial, not generally to be contradicted, 407.

(See Jumcmr. Pnocnnnmcs.)

REDEMPTION, '

RECORDS,
public, of the States, full faith and credit to be given to,
judicial, not generally to be contradicted, 407.

right oi", cannot be shortened or extended by legislature, 291.

(See

1~,

16.

JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS.)

REFUSAL TO PLEAD,

in criminal cases, consequence of, 311.

REGISTRATION, _

of voters, may be required, 601.

REGULATION,

of commerce by Congress, 10, 581-587.

of navigable waters by Congress, 591.

police, by the States,

(See Poucu Powan.)

of the right of suﬁrage, 601, 602.

right of, does not imply a right to prohibit, 202, 203, n.

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, .

care taken by State constitutions to protect, 467-470.

distinguished from religious toleration, 467, and n.

does not preclude recognition of superintending Providence by public

authorities, 470, 471.
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nor appointment of chaplains, thanksgiving and fast days, 471.

nor recognition that the prevailing religion of the State is Christian,

471. "

the maxim that Christianity is part of the law of the land, 472-477.

punishment of blasphemy does not invade, 472-474.

or of other forms of profanity, 476.

Sunday laws, how justified, 476, 477.

REDEMPTIO~.
right of, cannot be shortened or extended by legislature, 291.
REFUSAL TO PLEAD,
in criminal cases, consequence of, 311.
REGISTRATION,
of voU>rs, may be required, 601.
REGULATION,
of commerce by Congress, 10, 581-587.
of navigable waters by Congress, 591.
police, by the States,
(See Poucx Powxn.)
of the right of suffrage, 601, 602.
right of, does not imply a right to prohibit, 202, 203, n.
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY,
care taken by State constitutions to protect, 467-470.
distinguished from religious toleration, 467, and n.
does not preclude recognition of superintending Providence by public
authorities, 470, 471.
nor appointment of chaplains, thanksgiving and fast days, 471.
nor recognition that the prevailing religion of the State is Christian,

respect for religious scruples, -177, 478. I

471.

religious belief, as affecting the competency or credibility of witnesses,

473.

REMIEDIAL STATUTES,

liberal construction of, 61, n.

parties obtaining, are bound by, 96.

REMEDY,

power of legislature over, in criminal cases, 267-273.

in civil cases, 287-294, 361-367.

legislature cannot take away all remedy, 289.

may give new remedies, 361.

may limit resort to remedies, 364-367.

for compensation for property taken by public, 560, 561.

REMOVAL,

of causes from State to national courts, 12, 13. 4

REPEAL,

of old English statutes, 25, n., 26, n.

all laws subject to, 125-127.

of statutes at same session of passage, 152.

the maxim that Christianity is part of the law of the land, 4:72-477.
punishment of blasphemy does not invade, 472-474.
or of other forms of profanity, 476.
Sunday laws, hmv justified, 476, 477.
respect for religious scruples, 477, 478.
religious belief, as affecting the competency or credibility of witnesses,
.4:78.
REMEDIAL STATUTES,
liberal construction of, 61, n.
parties obtaining, are bound by, 96.
REMEDY,
power of legislature over, in criminal cases, 267-278.
in civil cases, 287-294, 361-367.
legislature cannot take away all remedy, 289.
may give new remedies, 361.
may limit resort to remedies, 364-367.
for compensation for property taken by public, 560, 561.
REMOVAL,
of causes from State to national courts, 12, 13.
REPEAL,
of old En~-tlish statutes, 2.'i, n., 26, n.
all laws suhjcct to, 125-127.
of statutes at same session of passage, 152.

,
mnsx. 765

I

INDEX.

765

REPEAL —- continued.

of laws conﬂicting with unconstitutional law, 186.

question of, not to be referred to the people, 123.

REPORTS,

of public meetings, 435.

of legislative proceedings, publication of, 418-420, 457-460.

of judicial proceedings, publication of, 448-451.

(See LIBERTY or Sraacn AND or THE Panss.)

REPRIEVE,

power of, not included in power to pardon, 116, n.

REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT,

guarantee of, by United States to the States, 17, 33.

maxims of, do not constitute limitations on legislative power, 169, 170.

REPUBLICATION,

of amended statutes under certain State constitutions, 151, 152.

RESERVED POWERS,

under United States Constitution in the States and people, 19.

RES ADJUDICA TA,

parties and privies estopped by judgments, 48.

V force ofjudgment does not depend on reasons assigned, 49.

strangers not bound by, 49.
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parties and privies not bound in new controversy, 49.

RESIDENCE,

gives jurisdiction in divorce suits, 400, 401.

but not unless bonaﬁde, 401.

as etfecting right to impose personal taxes, 499.

of voters, what constitutes, 599, 600. i

RESTRICTIONS,

in United States Constitution on powers of the States, 15, 16, 18.

on power of people to amend constitutions, 31, 33.

on powers oflegislature,

(See Lsorsmrnnzs or nus: Snras.)

RESUMPTION OF GRANTS,

by the States are forbidden, 274, 275.

RETROSPECTIVE LEGISLATION,

when admissible generally, 369-383.

cannot revive demands which are barred, 369.

nor create a demand where none ever equitably existed, 369.

may take away defences based on informalities, 370.

REPEAL- continued.
of laws conflicting with unconstitutional law, 186.
question of, not to be referred to the people, 123.

REPORTS,
of public meetings, 435.
of legislative proceedings. publication of, 418-420, 457-460.
of judicial proceedings, publication of, 448-451.
(See LmKRTY OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESs.)

REPRIEVE,
power of, not inclu!led in power to pardon, 116, n.

REPUBLICAN GOVERNIIIENT,
guarantee of, by United States to the States, 17, 38.
maxims of, do not constitute limitations on legislative power, 169, 170.

REPUBLICATION,
of amended statutes under certain State constitutions, 151, 152.

RESERVED POWERS,
under United States Constitution in the States and people, 19.
RES ADJUDICATA,
parties and privies estopped hy judgments, 48.
force of judgment does not depend on reasons assigned, 49.
strangers not bound by, 49.
parties and privies not bound in new controversy, 49.
RESIDENCE,
gives jurisdiction in divorce suits, 400, 401.
but not unless bonafide, 401.
as effecting right to impose personal taxes, 499.
of voters, what constitutes, 599, 600.
·
RESTRICTIONS,
in United Statt>s Constitution on powers ofthe States, 15, 16, 18.
on power of people to amend con~titution~, 31, 33.
on powers of legi~lature,
(See

LEGISLATUREB OF THE STATEB.)

RESUMPTION OF GRANTS,

may cure irregularities in legal proceedings, 371.

or in corporate action, &c., 371, 373.

what defects can and what cannot be covered by, 371.

may validate imperfect marriages, 372. ,

or otherimperfect contracts, 374. 376.

or invalid deeds, 376-378.

may take away defence of usury, 375.

bonaﬁtle purchasers not to be aﬂected by, 378.

may legalize municipal subscriptions, 224, 379.

by the States are forbidden, 274, 275.

RETROSPECTIVE LEGISLATION,
when admissible generally, 369-383.
cannot revive demands which are barred, 369.
nor create a demand where none ever equitably existed, 369.
may take away defence11 based on informalities, 370.
may cure irregularities in lt>gal proceedings, 371.
or in corporate action, &c., 371, 373.
what detects can aml what cannot be covered by, 371.
may validate imperfect marriages, 372.
or other imperfect contracts, 374. 376.
or invalid deeds, 376-378.
may take away defence of usury, 375.
bona fide purchasers not to be affected by, 378.
m&y legalize municipal subscriptions, 224, 379.

•

766 mnnx.

766

\

INDEX.

RETROSPECTIVE LEGISLATION — continued.

pendency of suit does not affect power to pass, 381.

cannot make good what the legislature could not originally have permit-

RETROSPECTIVE LEGISLATION- cominued.
pendency of suit does not affect power to pass, 881.
cannot make good what the legislature could not origin.Ily have permitted, 381, 382.
cannot cure defects of jurisdiction, 382, 388.
forbidden in some States, 370, and notes.
statutes generally construed to operate prospectively, 870.
prospective construction of constitution, 62, 63.

ted, 381, 382.

cannot cure defects ofjurisdiction, 382, 383.

forbidden in some States, 370, and notes. i

statutes generally construed to operate prospectively, 370.

prospective construction of constitution, 62, 63.

REVENUE,

in some States bills for, to originate with lower house, 131, 132.

cannot be raised under right of eminent domain, 527.

(See TAXATION.)

REVENUE,
in some States bills for, to originate with lower house, 131, 132.
cannot be raised under right of eminent domain, 627.
(See TA-XATION.)

REVISION, .

of State constitutions, 30-37.

of statutes,

(Sec Srnurns.)

REVISION,

REVOLUTION, AMERICAN,

of State constitutions, 30-37.
of statutes,
(See

powers of the Crown and parliament over Colonies before, 5, 6.

Congress of the, its powers, 6, 7.

division of powers of government at time of, 6, n.

REWARDS, '

powers of the Crown and parliament over Colonies before, 5, 6.
Congress of the, its powers, 6, 7.
division of powers of government at time of, 6, n.

cannot be paid by towns for apprehension of olfenders, 212, n.
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STATUTES.)

REVOLUTION, AMERICAN,

RHODE ISLAND,

ratiﬁcation of Constitution by, 8, 9.

impeachment of judges ol", 26, n., 160, n.

charter government, 26, n., 30, n.

REWARDS,
cannot be paid by towns for apprehension of offenders, 212, n.

privilege of members of legislature from arrest, 134, n.

protection by law of the land, 352, n.

RHODE ISLAND,
ratification ofConstitution by, 8, 9.
impeachment of judges of, 26, n., 160, n.
charter government, 26, n., 30, n.
privilege of members of legislature from arrest, 134, n.
protection by lnw ofthe land, 352, n.
liberty of the press in, 414, n.
periodical valuation of property, 496.

liberty of the press in, 414, n.

periodical valuation of property, 496.

RIGHTS,

distinguished from the remedy, 285-287.

vested,

(Sec V1-zsran Rronrs.)

in action,

(See Acrrox.)

ROADS,

RIGHTS,
distinguished from the remedy, 285-287.
vested,
(See VESTED RIGHTS.)
in action,
(Ste AcTION.)

appropriation of private property for, 533.

appropriation of materials for constructing, 526.

appropriation of, for railroads, &c., 545-557.

(See EMINENT Doaum.)

regulation of _use of, by States, 588. ¢

' . action for exclusion from, 543, n.

RULES OF CONSTRUCTION,

ROADS,

(See CONSTRUCTION or STATE Coxs'rrro'rx0.\'s.)

RULES OF EVIDENCE,

power of the legislature to change, 288, 367-369.

(See Evu)1-zxcn.)

•

appropriation of private property for, 533.
appropriation of materials for constructing, 526.
appropriation of, for railroads, &c., 545-557.
(See EMINENT Do~UL.'I!.)
regulntion of _use of, by States, 588.
action for exclusion from, 543, n.

RULES OF CONSTRUCTION,
(See

Co:ssTRUCTION OF STATE CoNSTITUTIONS.)

RULES OF EVIDENCE,
power of the legislature to change, 288, 367-369.
(See EYIDE:SCE.)

INDEX. 767

RULES OF LEGISLATIVE ORDER,

INDEX.

767

are under the controL of the legislature, 130-136.

(See LEGISLATURES or ma Smrss.)

S.

SABBATH,

RULES OF LEGISLATIVE ORDER,
are under the control.ofthJ legislature, 130-136.
(See

laws for observance of, 476, 596.

LEGISLATURES OF THE STATES.)

SALE OF LANDS,

of incompetent persons, &c., special legislative authority for, 97-106.

s.

propriety of judicial action in sn_h cases, 97.

SCHOOL-HOUSES,

exercise of right of eminent domain for sites f0r,':533.

SCOTLAND,

servitude in, 298.

SEAMEN,

I impressment of, 299.

SEAB.CH—WARRANTS,

(See SEARCHES AND Smzum-zs.)

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES,

the maxim that every man’s house is his castle, 22, 299.

unreasonable searches and seizures prohibited, 299, 300. _

origin of the prohibition, 300.

history of general warrants in England, 300, n.
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general warrants in America, 301, 302. I

search-warrants, their arbitrary character, 303.

only granted after a showing of cause on oath, 304.

must specify place to be searched and the object, 304.

particularity of description required, 304.

should be served in daytime, 305.

must be directed to proper ofﬁcer, 305.

must command accused party and property, &c., to be brought

before oﬁicer, 305. 1

cannot give discretionary power to ministerial officer, 305.

not allowed to obtain evidence of intended crime, 305.

cases in which they are permissible, 305-307.

not to seize correspondence, 307, n.

for libels, illegal at common law, 307, n.

oﬂicer following command of, is protected, 307.

and may break open doors, 308.

SEAS,

(See H1011 Sass.)

SECRECY,

inviolability of‘, in correspondence, 307, n.

elector-’s privilege of‘, 604, 605.

privilege of‘, as between counsel and client, 334.

SEDITION LAW, ’

passage of, and prosecutions under, 427, 428.

SABBATH,
laws for observance of, 476, 596.
SALE OF LANDS,
.
of incompetent persons, &c., special legislative authority for, 97-106.
propriety of judicial action in su. h cases, 97.
SCHOOL-HOUSES,
exercise of right of eminent domain for sites for,~533.
SCOTLAND,
servitude in, 298.
SE~MEN,

impressment of, 299.
SEARCH-WARRANTS,
(See

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES.)

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES,
the maxim that every man's house is his castle, 22, 299.
unreasonable searchE's and seizures prohibited, 299, 300.
origin of the prohibition, 300.
history of general warrants in England, 300, n.
general warrants in America, 3'01, 302.
search-warrants, their arbitrary charac~er, 303.
only granted after a showing of cause on oath, 304.
must specify place to be searched and the object, 304.
particularity of description required, 304:.
should be served in daytime, 305.
mu~t be directed to proper officer, 305.
must command accused party and property, &c., to be brought
before officer, 305.
cannot gi,·e discretionary power to ministerial officer, 305.
not allowed to obtain evidence of intended crime, 305.
cases in which they are permissible, 305-307.
not to seize correspondence, 307, n.
for libels, illegal at common law, 307, n.
officer following command of, is protected, 307.
and may break open doors, 308.
SEAS,
(See

HIGH SEAs.)

SECRECY,
im·iolability of, in correspondence, 307, n.
elector's privilege of, 604, 605.
privilege of, as between counsel and client, 334.
SEDITION LAW,
passage of, and prosecutions under, 427, 428.

768 INDEX.

SELF-GOVERNMENT,

768

INDEX.

(See ELECTIONS; Mumcn>aL CORPORATIONS.)

SERMONS,

privilege of criticism of, 441.

SELF-GOVERNMENT,
(See

SERVANT,

control of, by master, 341.

SERVICES,

laws requiring, without compensation, strictly construed, 393.

ELECTIONS j MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.)

SERMONS,
privilege of criticism of, 441.

SERVANT,

to influence legislation cannot be contracted for, 136, n.

control of, by master, 8!1.
of child, right of father to, 340.

SERVITUDE,

(See Suvnnv.)

SIDEWALKS,

owners of lots may be compelled to build under police power, 588.

SIGNING OF BILLS,

SERVICES,
laws requiring, without compensation, strictly construed, 893.
to influence legislation cannot be contracted for, 136, n.
of child, right of father to, 3!0.

SERVITUDE,

by ofﬁcers of legislature, 151.

by the governor, 153, 154.

SLANDER,

general rules of liability for, 422-424.

' (See Lmanrv or Season axn or run Panes.)

SLAVERY, i

former state of, in England, 295.
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causes of its disappearance, 296-298.

in Scotland, 298, 299.

in America, 299.

now prohibited, 11.

servitude in punishment of crime, 299.

SOLDIERS,

quartering of, in private houses prohibited, 308.

municipal bounties to, 219-229.

military suffrage laws, 699.

jealousy of standing armies, 350.

SOUTH CAROLINA,

title of acts to express the object, 142, n.

revenue bills to originate in lower house, 132, n.

protection by law of the land, 352, n.

liberty of the press in, 417.

SOVEREIGN POWERS,

cannot be granted away, 125, 206, 280-284.

SOVEREIGN STATE,

(See

SUVERY.)

SIDEWALKS,
owners of lots may be compelled to build under police power, 588.

SIGNING OF BILLS,
by officers of legislature, 151.
by the governor, 153, 154:.

SLANDER,
general rules of liability for, 422-424.
(See LIBERTY OF SPEECH AND

OF THE PRESS.)

SLAVERY,
former state of, in England, 295.
causes of its disa!ipearance, 296-298.
in Scotland, 298, 299.
in America, 299.
now prohibited, 11.
servitude in punishment of crime, 299.

SOLDIERS,
quartering of, in private houses prohibited, 308.
municipal bounties to, 219-229.
military suffrage laws, 599.
jealousy of standing armies, 350.

SOUTH CAROLINA,

what it is, 1.

American States not strictly such, 6-9.

SOVEREIGNTY,

deﬁnition of, 1.

territorial and other limits of, 2.

in America, rests in people, 28, 598.

division of powers of, in American system, 2, 47, n.

legislature not to bargain away, 125-127, and n., 280-284.

-

i ____--3

title of acts to express the object, 142, n.
revenue bills to originate in lower house, 182, n.
protection by law of the land, 352, n.
liberty of the press in, 417.

SOVEREIGN POWERS,
cannot be granted away, 125, 206, 280-284.

SOVEREIGN STATE,
what it is, 1.
American States not strictly such, 6-9.

SOVEREIGNTY,
definition of, 1.
territorial and other limits of, 2.
in America, rests in people, 28, 598.
division of powers of, in American system, 2, 47, n.
legislature not to bargain away, 125-1:!7, and n., 280-284.

*_'—* *-» “$1 i ,r~“"—.'-au,-f-
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1

mnsx. ' 769

SOVEREIGNTY- continued.

SOVEREIGNTY — continued.

exercise of, by the people, 598.

(See Emcrroxs.)

SPECIAL JURISDICTION,

courts of, O6.

SPECIAL LAWS,

forbidden in certain States where general can be made applicable, 110,

111, n., 128, 129, n.

due process of law does not always forbid, 389-397.

for sale of lands, &c., 97-106.

SPECIAL PRIVILEGES,

‘ strict construction of, 389-397.

SPECIAL SESSIONS OF LEGISLATURE,

calling of, by the governor, 132, 155.

SPEECH, FREEDOM OF,

(See LIBERTY or SPEECH AND or THE Pmass.)

exercise of, by the people, 598.
(See EI.ECTro;ss.)

SPECIAL JURISDICTION,
courts of, 06.

SPECIAL LAWS,
forbidden in certain States where general can be made applicable, 110,
111, n., 128, 129, n.
due process of law does not .always forbid, 389-397.
for sale of lands, &c., 97-106.

SPECIAL PRIVILEGES,
strict construetion of, 889-397.

SPECIAL SESSIONS OF LEGISLATURE,
calling of, by the governor, 132, 155.

SPEECH,

FREElJ0~1

OF,

SPEECHES,

(See LmERTY OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS.)

of legislators, publication of, 457-460.

SPEED,
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upon public highways, regulation of, 588, 589, 594.

SPEEDY TRIAL, .

right of accused parties to, 311.

SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION,

must be found in the words employed, 72, 73.

SPEECHES,
of legislators, publication of, 457-460.

SPEED,
upon public highways, regulation of, 588, 589, 594:.

SPEEDY TRIAL,
right of accused parties to, 311.

laws in supposed violation of, 171, 172.

STALLIONS,

prohibition of standing of, in public places, 596.

STAMP,

V defence to contract based on the want of, may be taken away, 378.

cannot be required on process of State courts, 483.

upon contracts, 484, n.

STAMP ACT CONGRESS,

what led to, 5.

STANDING ARMIES,

jealousy of, 350.

STANDING MUTE,

of accused party, proceeding in case of, 311.

STAR CHAMBER,

court of, 342.

STATE,

SPffi!T OF THE CONSTITUTION,
must be found in the words employed, 72, 73.
laws in supposed violation of, 171, 172.

STALLIONS,
prohibition of standing of, in public places, 596.

STAMP,
defence to contract based on the want of, may be taken away, 378.
cannot be required on process of State courts, 483.
upon contracts, 48!, n.

STAMP ACT CONGRESS,
what led to, 5.

STANDING ARMIES,
jealousy of, 350.

STANDING MUTE,

deﬁnition of, 1.

I sovereign, what is, 1.

.l distinguished from nation, 1.

’- limits to jurisdiction of, 2.

STATES OF THE UNION,

in what sense sovereign, 6.

always subject to a common government, 9.

suits between, in Federal courts, 11.

49

J0

i

1

i

of accused p:uty, proceeding in case of, 311.

STAR CHAMBER,
court of, 3!2.

STATE,
definition of, 1.
sovereign, what is, 1.
distinguished from nation, 1.
limits to jurisdiction of, 2.

STATES OF THE UNIOX,
in what sense sovereign, 6.
alway11 subject to a common government, 9.
suits between, in Federal courts, 11.
49

770 mnax.

STATES OF THE UNION-—contz'mzed.

770

INDEX.

division of powers between, and the nation, 2.

not suable by individuals, 12.

powers prohibited to, 15, 16, 18.

faith to be given to public records of, 16, 17.

- privileges and immunities of citizens of, 15, 16, 487.

agreements of, are inviolable, 275.

compacts between are inviolable, 275.

STATE CONSTITUTIONS,

in existence when United States Constitution was formed, 21.

pre-existing laws, common and statutory, 21-25, 26, n.

ordinance of 1787, 25, n.

colonial charters, 26, 27.

how modiﬁed when not containing provisions therefor, 28.

theory that the people are sovereign, 28.

general rules for modiﬁcation of, 30-37.

right of people of territories to form, 30.

right to amend rests in people as an organized body politic, 31.

will of the people must be expressed under forms of law, 31.

conventions to amend or revise, 32.

limitations by Constitution of the United States on power to amend, 33.

protection of personal rights by, 33, 35, 36.
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unjust provisions, &c., must be enforced, 34.

what is generally to be expected in, 34.

are not the origin of individual rights, 36.

are presumed to have been drafted with care, 58.

are successors of English charters of liberty, 59, 60.

construction of, 38.

(See Consrnucrxox or STATE CONSTITUTIONS.)

STATE COURTS,

removal of causes from, to United States courts, 12, 13.

to decide ﬁnally questions of State law, 13, 14.

protection to personal liberty by, 29-L, n., 345.

(See Counrs.)

STATE INDEBTEDNESS, I

prohibition of, will not prevent indebtedness by municipal corporations, ,

217-219.

STATEMENT, _

of defendant in criminal case, right to make, and effect of, 313-318.

STATUS,

of marriage, control of, by legislature, 109, 110.

, (See Dxvoncn.)

STATUTES,

directory and mandatory, 74-78.

enactment of, 130-158.

STATES OF THE tTh"'lON- continued.
division of powers between, and the nation, 2.
not suable by individuals, 12.
powers prohibited to, 15, 16, 18.
faith to be given to public records of, 16, 17.
privileges and immunities of citizens of, 15, 16, 487.
agreements of, are inviolable, 275.
compacts between are inviolable, 275.

STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
in existence when United States Constitution was formed, 21.
pre-existing laws, common and statutory, 21-25, 26, n.
ordinance of 1787, 25, n.
colonial charters, 26, 27.
how modified when not containing provisions therefor, 28.
theory that the people are sovereign, 28.
general rules for modification of, 30-87.
right of people of territories to form, 30.
right to amend rests in people as an organized body politic, 31.
will of the people must be expressed under forms of law, 31.
conventions to amend or revise, 32.
limitations by Constitution of the United States on power to amend, 33.
protection of personal rights by, 33, 35, 36.
unjust provisions, &c., must be enforced, 34.
what is generally to be expected in, 34.
are not the origin of individual rights, 36.
are presumed to have been drafted with care, 58.
are successors of English charters of liberty, 59, 60.
construction of, 88.
(See CoNSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS.)

STATE COURTS,
removal of <"&uses from, to United States courts, 12, 13.
to decide finally questions of State law, 13, 14.
protection to personal liberty by, 29!, n., 345.
(See CounTs.)

STATE INDEBTEDNESS,
prohibition of,
217-219.

will not prevent indebtedness by municipal corporations,

STATEMENT,

constitutional requirements must be observed, 130, 131.

common parliamentary law as affecting, 131.

the two houses must act separately, 131.

J ____g A 8,5‘

of defendant in criminal case, right to make, and effect of, 313-318.
STATUS,
of marriage, control of, by legislature, 109, 110.
(See DIVORCE.)

STATUTES,
directory and mandatory, 74-78.
enactment of, 130-158.
constitutional requirements must be observed, 130, 131.
common parliamentary law as affecting, 131.
the two houses must act separately, 131.

mnnx. 771

INDEX.

STATUTES — continued.
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' to proceed in their own way in collecting information, 135.

journals of houses as evidence, 135, 136.

introduction of bills, 137-139.

three several readings of bills, 80, 81, 139, 140.

yeas and nays, entry of, 140.

what suﬁicient vote on passage, 141.

title of bill, formerly no part of it, 141.

constitutional provisions requiring object to be expressed, 81, 82,

141.

' these provisions mandatory, 150.

evil to be remedied thereby, 142-144.

STATUTES- cnntinued.
to proct>ed in their own way in collecting information, 135.
journals of houses as evidence, 135, 136.
introduction of bills, 137-189.
three several readings of bills, 80, 81, 139, 140.
yeas and nays, entry of, 140.
what sufficient vote on passage, 141.
title of bill, formerly no part of it, 141.
constitutional provigions requiring object to be expressed, 81, 82,

particularity required in stating object, 144.

“ other purposes ” ineffectual words in, 145.

examples as to what can be held embraced in, 145, 146.

effect if more than one object embraced, 147, 148.

effect where act broader than title, 148-150.

amendatory, 151, 152.

requirement that act amended be set forth at, length, 151.

this not applicable to amendments by implication, 152.

repeal of, at same session of their passage, 152.

by unconstitutional act, 186.
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approval of, by the governor, 153, 154.

passage of, at special sessions, 155.

when to take effect, 155-158. '

publication of, 157, 158.

presumed validity of, 168, 172-177, 182-186.

power of courts to declare their unconstitutionality, 159, 169.

not to be exercised by bare quorum, 161, 162.

nor unless decision on the very point necessary, 163.

nor on complaint of party not interested, 163, 164.

nor solely because of unjust provisions, 164-168.

nor because violating fundamental principles, 169, 170.

nor because opposed to spirit of constitution, 171-177.

nor in any doubtful case, 182-186.

may be unconstitutional in part, 177-181.

instances of, 179-181.

constitutional objection to, may be waived, 181.

motives in passage of, not to be inquired into, 186, 187.

consequence when invalid, 188.

whether jury may pass upon, 336, n.

retrospective, 369-383.

construction of, to be such as to give eﬂiect, 184.

presumption against conﬂict with Constitution, 185, 186.

to be prospective, 370.

contemporary and practical, 67-73.

ea: postfacto, 264-272.

(See Ex Post Facto Laws.)

Hl.

these provisions mandatory, 150.
evil to be remedied thereby, 142-144.
particularity required in 8tating object, 144.
" other purposes" ineffectual words in, 145.
examples as to what can be held embraced in, 145, 146.
effect if more than one object embrac~d. 147, 148.
efft!ct where act broader than title, 148-150.
amendatory, 151, 152.
requirement that act amended be set forth at. length, 151.
this not applicable to amendments by implication, 152.
repeal of, at same session of their passage, 152.
by unconstitutional act, 186.
approval of, by the governor, 153, 164.
passage of, at special sessions, 155.
when to take effect, 155-158.
publication of, 157, 158.
presumed validity of, 168, 172-177, 182-186.
power of courts to declare their unconstitutionality, 159, 169.
not to be exercised by bare quorum, 161, 162.
nor unless decision on the very point necessary, 163.
nor on complaint of party not interested, 163, 164.
nor solely because of unjust provisions, 164-168.
nor becaust! violating fundamental principles, 169, 170.
nor because opposed to spirit of constitution, 171-177.
nor in any doubtful cage, 182-186.
may be unconstitutional in part, 177-181.
instances of, 179-181.
constitutional objection to, may be waived, 181.
motives in passage of, not to be inquired into, 186, 187.
consequence when invalid, 188.
whether jury may pass upon, 336, n.
retrospective, 869-383.
construction of, to be 1.1uch as to give effect, 184.
presumption against conflict with Constitution, 185, 186.
to be prospective, 370.
contemporary and practical, 67-73.
ex post facto, 264-272.
(See Ex Post Facto L.&.ws.)

772 mm-xx.

STATUTES -— continued.
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INDEX.

violating obligation of contracts, 273-294.

(Sec Onuoarxou or Cournacrs.)

unequal and partial, 389-397.

of limitation, 364-367.

of parliament, how far in force in America, 23, 24. _

STATUTORY PRIVILEGES,

are not vested rights, 383.

strict construction of, 389-897.

STAY LAWS,

law taking from mortgagees right to possession invalid as to existing

mortgages, 290.

STATUTES -continued.
violating obligation of contracts, 273-294.
(See OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS.)
unequal and partial, 389-897.
of limitation, 364-367.
of parli&ment, how far in force in America, 28, 24.

STATUTORY PRIVILEGES,
are not vested rights, 883.
strict construction of, 389-897.

law extending time of redemption of lands previously sold is void, 291.

law shortening redemption void, 291.

stay of execution on existing demands for unreasonable or indeﬁnite time

is void, 292. .

STOCK IN CORPORATIONS,

municipal subscriptions to, 119, 213-219.

when liable for debts cannot be released by legislative act, 292.

STREETS,

power of cities, &c.. to change grade of, 207.

STAY LAWS,
law taking from mortgagees right to possession invalid as to existing
mortgages, 290.
law extending time of redemption of lands previously sold is void, 291.
law shortening redemption void, 291.
stay of execution on existing demands for unreasonable or indefinite time
is void, 292.

STOCK IN CORPORATIONS,

special assessments for grading and paving, 505-508.

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:24 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105011581
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

assessment of labor upon, 512.

exercise of right of eminent domain for, 533.

' and for materials for constructing, 526.

when owner of land to receive compensation, 563, 564.

appropriation of, for railways, 545-557.

police regulations for use of, 588, 589.

STRICT CONSTRUCTION,

of laws in derogation of common law, 61, n.

of statutes granting special privileges, 389-397.

of statutes requiring gratuitous services, 393, 394.

of statutes taking property for public use, 528, 529.

SUBJECT OF STATUTE,

required in some States to be stated in title, 141-151.

SUBMITTING LA\VS TO POPULAR VOTE,

whether it is a delegation of legislative power, 116-125.

authorities generally do not allow, 120. _

corporate charters, &c., may be submitted, 118.

and questions of divisions of towns, &c., 119.

and questions of local subscriptions to improvements, 119.

SUBSCRIPTIONS,

to internal improvements by municipal corporations, 119, 213-219.

submitting questions of, to corporation is not delegating legislative power,

119.

power of taxation to provide for, cannot he taken away, 292.

SUCCESSION TO TIIE CROWN,

power of parliament to change, 86. '

_ L? if __-|—"‘

. _l

municipal subscriptions to, 119, 218-219.
when liable for debts cannot be released by legislative act, 292.

STREETS,
power of cities, &c., to change grade of, 207.
special assessments for grading and paving, 505-508.
assessment of labor upon, 612.
exercise of right of eminent domain for, 633.
and for materials for constructing, 526.
when owner of land to receive compensation, 563, 564.
appropriation of, for railways, 545--557.
police regulations for use of, 588, 589.

STRICT CONSTRUCTION,
of
of
of
of

laws in derogation of common law, 61, n.
statutes granting special privileges, 889-397.
statutes requiring gratuitous services, 398, 394.
statutes taking property for public use, 628, 529.

SUBJECT OF STATUTE,
required in some States to be stated in title, 141-151.

SUBMITTING LAWS TO POPULAR VOTE,
whether it is a delegation of legislative power, 116-125.
authorities generally do not allow, 120.
corporate charters, &c., may be submitted, 118.
and questions of divisions of towns, &c., 119.
and questions of local subscriptions to improvements, 119.

SUBSCRIPTIONS,
to internal improvements by municipal corporatio011, 119, 218-219.
submitting questions of, to corporation ia not delegating legislative power,
119.
power of taxation to provide for, cannot be taken away, 292.

SUCCESSION TO THE CROWN,
power of parliamens to change, 86.

mm-1x. 773

INDEX.

SUFFRAGE.

773

right of, in forming new constitutions, 28, 30, 34.

restrictions upon, to be construed strictly, 394.

SUFFRAGE,

constitutional qualifications for, not to be added to by legislature, 64.

right of, in forming new constitutions, 28, 30, 34.
restrictions upon, to be construed strictly, 394.
constitutional qualifications for, not to be added to by legislature, 64.
who to exercise generally, 599.
regulation of right of, 601, 602.
•
(See ELECTIONS.)

who to exercise generally, 599. ‘

regulation of right of, 601, 602.

' (See Euccrrons.)

SUIT,

notiﬁcation of, by publication, 403, 404.

(See Ac'r1o1\'.)

SULIPTUARY LAWS, -

SUIT,

odious character of, 385.

SUNDAY,

laws to prevent desecration of‘, how defended, 476, 477.

police regulations regarding, 596.

SUPPORT,

of children, liability of father for, 340.

lateral, of lands, right to, 543, n.

SUPREMACY OF PARLLAMENT,

notification of, by publication, 403, 404.
(See ACTION.)

SUMPTU A~Y LAWS,
odious character of, 385.

SUNDAY,
laws to prevent desecration cif, how defended, 476, 477.
police regulations regarding, 596.

extent of, 3, 4, 86-88, 259.

SUPREME LA\V,

Constitution, laws, and treaties of United States to be, 12.
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of a State, constitution to be, 2, 3.

SUSPENSION OF LAIVS,

when authorized must be general, 391.

for limitation of actions, 365, n.

SUPPORT,
of children, liability of father for, 340.
lateral, of lands, right to, 5!3, n.

SUPREMACY OF

PAH.LIA~IENT,

extent of, 3, 4, 86-88, 259.

SUPREME LAW,

SWAMPS,

drains for, 533.

special assessments for draining, 510, 511.

T.

TAKDTG OF PROPERTY,

of individuals for public use, 524.

(See Emxaxr Douam.)

TAX LAWS,

directory and mandatory provisions in, 75, 76.

Constitution, laws, and treaties of United States to be, 12.
of a State, constitution to be, 2, 3.

SUSPENSION OF LAWS,
when authorized must be general, 391.
for limitation of actions, 365, n.

SWAMPS,
drains for, 533.
special asse.ssmenu for draining, 510, .'Hl.

(See Taxanon.)

TAX SALES,

curing defective proceedings in, by retrospective legislation, 382, 383.

T.

what defects should avoid, 521.

deeds given upon, may be made evidence of title, 367.

conditions to redemption from, 369, n.

(See TAXATION.)

TAXATION,

and representation to go together, 24, and n., 59, n., 117, n., 169.

right of, compared with eminent domain, 559.

TAKING OF PROPERTY,
of individuals for public use, 524.
(See E::\HNEST

DoMAIN.)

TAX LAWS,
directory and mandatory provisions in, 75, 76.
(See TAXATION.)

TAX SALES,
curing defective proceedings in, by retrospective legislation, 382, 383.
what defects Mhould avoid, 521.
deeds gi\'en upon, may be made evidence of title, 367.
conditions to redemption from, 369, n.
(See TAXATION.)

TAXATION,
and representation to go together, 24, and n., 59, n., 117, n., 169.
right of, compared with emment domain, 559.

774 mnnx.

TAXATION -— continued.

774

INDEX.

exemptions from, by the States, when not repealable, 127, 280.

can only be for public purposes, 129, 487-495.

must be by consent of the people, 117, n.

license fees distinguished from, 201, 586, 587.

by municipalities, power oflegislature over, 118, n., 230-235.

- reassessment ofirregular, may be authorized, 209.

irregular may be conﬁrmed by legislative, 379, n., 382.

necessary to the existence of government, 479.

unlimited nature of power of; 479-485.

of agencies of national government by the States impliedly forbidden,

480-483.

of agencies of the States by the national government also forbidden,

483.

of the subjects of commerce by the States, 485, 486, 586.

discriminations in, as between citizens ofdilfercnt States, 487.

legislature the proper authority to determine upon, 488-495.

apportionment essential to, 495.

taxing districts, necessity of, 495, 499.

apportionment not always by values, 496, 501.

license fees and other special taxes, 496.

assessments for local improvements, 497.
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beneﬁts from the improvement may be taken into the account, 497,

‘ 505, 511. ‘ i

general provisions requiring taxation by value do not apply to these

assessments, 498.

taxation of persons or property out of the district is void, 499, 500-504,

516.

must be uniform throughout the district, 502.

local assessments may be made in proportion to frontage, 507.

necessity for apportionment in such case, 508.

special taxing districts for drains, levees, &c., 509, 510.

taxation in labor for repair of roads, &c., 512.

diﬂiculty in making taxation always equal, 513.

hardships ofindividual cases do not make it void, 513.

legislature must select the objects of taxation, 514.

exemptions of property from, 514, 515.

constitutional provisions which preclude exemptions, 515, 516.

special exemptions void, 515, n., 516.

legislative authority must be shown for each particular tax, 517420.

excessive taxation, 520.

the maxim de minimis la: non curat not applicable in tax proceedings,

521.

what defects and irregularities render tax sales void, 521, and n.

TEACHER AND SCHOLAR,

control of former over latter, 341.

TECHNICAL RULES OF CONSTRUCTION,

danger of resorting to, 83, 84, and n.,‘ 61, n.

TAXATION- continued.
exemptions from, by the Statee, when not repealable, 127, 280.
can only be for public purposes, 129, 487-495.
must be by consent of the people, 117, n.
license fl!es distinguished from, 201, 586, 587.
by munil'ipalities, power of legislature over, 118, n., 280-285.
reassessment of irregular, may be authorized, 209.
irregular may be confirmed by legi:~lative, 879, n., 882.
necessary to the existence of government, 479.
unlimited nature of power of, 479-485.
of agencies of national government by tbe Statea impliedly forbidden,
460-483.
of agencies of the States by the national government also forbidden,
488.
of the subjects of commerce by the States, 485, 486, 586.
discriminations in, as between citizens of different States, 487.
legislature the proper authority to determine upon, 488-495.
apportionment essential to, 495.
taxing districts, necessity of, 495, 499.
apportionment not always by values, 496, 501.
license fees and other special taxes, 496.
assessments for local improvements, 497.
benefits from the improvement may be taken into the account, 497,
505, 511.
general provisions requiring taxation by value do not apply to these
assessments, 498.
taxation of persons or property out of the district is void, 499, 50(h')()4,
616.
must be uniform throughout the district, 502.
local assessments may be made in proportion to frontage, 507.
necessity for apportionment in such case, 508.
special taxing districts for drains, levees, &c., 509, 510.
taxation in labor for repair of road:!, &c., iH2.
diffi.culty in making taxation always equal, 513.
hardships of individual cases do not make it void, 518.
legislature must select the objects of taxation, 514.
exemptions of property from, 614, 515.
conz;titutional provisions which preclude exemptions, 515, 516 .
.special cxtJmptions void, 515, n., 516.
legislative authority must be shown for each particular tax, 517-620.
excessive taxation, 520.
the maxim de minimia le:z non cu1·at not applicable in tax proceedings,
521.
what defects and irregularities render tax sales void, 521, and n.
TEACHER AND SCHOLAR,
control of former over latter, 8-U.
TECIL.~"ICAL RULES OF CONSTRUCTION,
danger of resorting to, 88, 84, and n.; 61, n.

INDEX.

INDEX.

TELEGRAPHIC CORRESPONDENCE,

775

right to secrecy in, 307, n.

TEMPERANCE LAWS, '

right of the States to pass, 581-583.

TENNESSEE,

legislature of, not to grant divorces, 110, n.

retrospective laws in, 371, n.

protection by the law of the land, 353, n.

freedom of speech and of the press in, 415, n.

exclusion of religious teachers from ofﬁce, 468, n.

religious tests in, 468, n., 469, n.

persons conscientiously opposed to bearing arms excused 478 n

TERRITORIAL LIMITATION,

to the powers of sovereignty, 2.

to the exercise of power by the States, 127, 128.

to municipal authority, 213.

to power of taxation, 499, 500-504, 516.

TERRITORIES,

power of eminent domain in, 525.

formation of constitutions by people of, 30, 31.

TEST OATHS,

when may constitute a punishment, 263, 264.
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forbidden in some States, 469, n.

TEXAS,

admission of, to the Union, 9.

legislature of, not to grant divorces, 110, n.

legislative rules for regulation of pardons, 116.

title of acts to express the object, 142, n.

liberty of speech and the press in, 353, n.

exclusion of religious teachers from ofﬁce, 468, n.

religious tests forbidden in, 469, n.

persons conscientiously opposed to bearing arms excused 478 n.

THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT,

provisions of, 11, 294.

TIME,

loss of remedy by lapse of, 364-367.

and place are of the essence of election laws, 602, 603

TITLE TO LEGISLATIVE ACT,

requirement that it shall state subject, &c., is mandatory, 81-83 141-150

TITLES OF NOBILITY,

States not to grant, 17, 33.

TOLERATION,

as distinguished from religious liberty, 467, 468

TOVVN SHIPS ,

importance of, in the American system, 190, n.

origin of, 189, and n.

distinguished from chartered corporations, 240.

collection from corporators of judgments against, 241-247

TELEGRAPHIC CORRESPONDENCE,
right to secrecy in, 307, n.
TEMPERANCE LAWS,
right of the States to pass, 581-583.
TENNESSEE,
legislatnre of, not to grant divorces, 110, n.
retrospective laws in, 371, n.
protection by the law of the land, 353, n.
freedom of speech and of the press in, 415, n.
exclusion of religious teachers from office, 468, n.
religious tests in, 468, n., 469, n.
per~ons conscientiously opposed to bearing arms excused, 478, n.
TERRITORIAL Ll.MITATION,
to the powers of sovereignty, 2.
to the exercise of power by the States, 127, 128.
to municipal authority, 213.
to power of taxation, 499, 500-504, 516.
TERRITORIES,
power of eminent domain in, 525.
fom1ation of constitutions by people of, 30, 31.
TEST OATHS,
when may constitute a punishment, 263, 264:.
forbidden in some States, 469, n.
TEXAS,
admission of, to the Union, 9.
legislature of, not to grant divorces, 110, n.
legislative rules for regulation of pardons, 116.
title of acts to express the object, 142, n.
liberty of speech and the press in, 853, n.
exclusion of religious teachers from office, 468, n.
religious tests forbidden in, 469, n.
persons conscientiously opposed to bearing arms excused, 478, n.
TH~TEENTH A:\1END:\1ENT,
provisions of, 11, 294.
TIME,
loss of remedy by lapse of, 364-367.
and place nre of the essence of election laws, 602, 603.
TITLE TO LEGISLATIVE ACT,
requirement that it shall state subject, &c., is mandatory, 81-88, 141-100.
TITLES OF NOBILITY,
States not to grant, 17, 33.
TOLERATIO~,

as distinguished from religious liberty, 467, 468.
TOWNSHIPS,
importance of, in the American system, 190, n.
origi'n of, 189, and n.
distinguished from chartered corporations, 240.
collection from corporators of judgments against, 241-247.

776 mmzx.

TOWNSHIPS — continued.

776

INDEL

not liable for neglect of duty by officers, 247.

apportionment of debts, &c'., on division, 237, 290.

indemniﬁcation of ofliccrs of, 209, 212.

(See l\IUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.)

TRADE,

by-laws in general restraint of, 202.

TRAVEL,

obstructions to, on navigable waters, 592, 593.

regulating speed of, 588, 594.

TRAVERSE JURY,

trial of accused parties by, 319-328.

(See Camus.)

TREASON,

evidence required to convict of, 314, and n.

TREATIES,

TOWNSHIPS- continued.
not liable for neglect of duty by officers, 247.
apportionment of debttl, &c:, on division, 237, 290.
indemnification of officers of, 209, 212.

(See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.)
TRADE,
by-laws in general restraint of, 202.

TRAVEL,
obstructions to, on navigable waters, 592, 598.
regulating speed of, 588, 594.

TRAVERSE JURY,
trial of accused parties by, 819-328.

(See

of the United States, to be the supreme law, 12.

States forbidden to enter into, 15.

TREATING VOTERS,

laws against, 614. '

CRIMES.)

TREASON,
evidence required to convict of, 314, and n.

TREATIES,

TRIAL,

of right to property, 369, and n.
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new, not to be granted by legislature, 95, 392.

of accused parties to be by jury, 309.

must be speedy, 311.

must be public, 312.

(Sec Cnnms; Junv Tmat.)

TRUST,

the legislative, not to be delegated, 116, 204.

TRUSTEES, _

special statutes authorizing sales by, constitutional, 97-106.

rights of cestuis qua trust not to be determined by legislature, 105..

TRUTH,

as a defence in libel cases, 424, 438, 464.

necessity of showing good motives for publication of, 464.

TURNPIKES.

exercise of eminent domain for, 533.

appropriation of highways for, 545.

change of, to common highways, 546, n.

TWICE IN J EOPARDY,

punishment of same act under State and national law, 18.

under State law and municipal by-law, 198, 199.

(See J1-zorsnnv.)

TWO—THIRDS OF HOUSE,

what constitutes, 141.

U.

UNANIMITY. ,

required in jury trials, 320.

I

-4' ' é -i— ___ _ _._

of the United States, to be the supreme law, 12.
States forbidden to enter into, 15.

TREATING VOTERS,
laws against, 614.
TRIAL,
of right to property, 369, and n.
new, not to be granted by legislature, 95, 892.
of accused parties to be by jury, 309.
must be speedy, 311.
must be public, 812.
(See CRIMES j JURY TRIAL.)

TRUST,
the legislative, not to be delegated, 116, 204.

TRUSTEES,
special statutes authorizing sales by, constitutiona1, 97-106.
rights of cestuis que trust not to be determined by legislature, 105.
TRUTH,
as a detence in libel cases, 424, 438, 464.
nece'ssity of showing good motives for publication of, 464.

TURNPIKES,
exercise of eminent domain for, 533.
appropriation of highways for, 545.
change of, to common highways, 546, n.
TWICE IN JEOPARDY,
punishment of same act under State and national law, 18.
under State law and municipal by-law, 198, 199.

(See
TWO-THIRDS OF HOUSE,

JEOPARDY.)

.

what constitutes, 141.

UNANil\HTY,
required in jury trials, 320.

u.

mnnx. 7 4 7

INDEX.

UNCONSTITUTIONAL LAW,

777

deﬁnition of the term, 3, 4.

ﬁrst declaration of, 160, n.

power of the courts to annul, 159.

whether jury may pass upon, 336, n.

(See Covers; Srxrnres.)

UNEQUAL AND PARTIAL LEGISLATION,

special laws of a remedial nature, 389.

local laws, or laws applying to particular classes, 390-393.

proscription of parties for opinions, 390.

suspensions of the laws must be general, 391, 892.

distinctions must be based upon reason, 393.

equality the aim of the law, 393.

strict construction of special burdens and privileges, 393-396

discrimination against citizens of other States, 15, 397.

UNIFORMITY, . V

in construction of constitutions, 54.

in taxation, 495, 499. _

(See Taxurxozv.)

UNION,

UNCONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
definition of the term, 3, 4.
fii'Bt declaration of, 160, n.
power of the courts to annul, 159.
whether jury may pass upon, 336, n.
(S~ CouRTS; STATUTES.)
UNEQUAL AND PARTIAL LEGISLATlON,

special laws of a remedial nature, 389.
local laws, or laws applying to particular classes, 390-393.
proscription of parties for opiniom, 390.
suspensions of the laws must be general, 391, 892.
distinctions must be based upon reason, 393.
equality the aim of the law, 393.
strict construction of special burdens and privileges, 893-396.
discrimination against citizens of other States, 15, 397.

UNIFORMITY,

of the Colonies before the Revolution, 5.

UNITED STATES,
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division of powers between the States and Union, 2.

origin of its government, 5.

Revolutionary Congress, and its powers, 6, 7.

Articles of Confederation and their failure, 6-8.

formation of Constitution of, 8.

govemment of, one of enumerated powers, 9, 10, 173.

general powers of, 10-12.

its laws and treaties the supreme law, 12.

judicial powers of, 12, 19.

removal of causes from State courts to courts of, 12, 13.

prohibition upon exercise of powers by the States, 15, 16.

guaranty of republican government to the States, 17.

implied prohibition of powers to the States, 18.

reservation of powers to States and people, 19. -

consent of, to formation of State constitutions, 30, 31.

(See Cosonsss; CONSTITUTION or Unrrnn Sums; Counrs or UNITED

Sums ; PRESIDENT.)

UNJUST PROVISIONS,

in constitutions, must be enforced, 72.

in statutes, do not necessarily avoid them, 164-168.

(See PARTIAL Lnorsmrrox.)

UNLAWFUL CONTRACTS,

(See ILLEGAL Coxrnscrs.)

in construction of constitutions, 5!.
in taxation, 495, 499.
(See TAXATION.)

UNION,
of the Colonies before the Revolution, 5.

UNITED STATES,
division of powers between the States and Union, 2.
origin of its government, 5.
Revolutionary Congress, and its powers, 6, 7.
Articles of Confederation and their failure, G-8.
formation of Constitution of, 8.
government of, one of enumerated powers, 9, 10, 173.
general powers of, 10-12.
its laws and treaties the supreme law, 12.
judicial powers of, 12, 19.
removal of causes from State courts to courts of, 12, 13.
prohibition upon exercise of powers by the States, 15, 16.
guaranty of republican government to the States, 17.
implied prohibition of powers to the St.ates, 18.
reservation of powers to States and people, 19.
consent of, to formation of State constitutions, 30, 31.
(See CoNGRESS; CoNSTITUTION OF UNITED STATES; CounTs OF UNITED

UNMUZZLED DOGS,

STATES j PRESIDENT.)

restraining from running at large, 595.

UNREASONABLE BAIL,

not to be required, 310.

UNJUST PROVISIONS,
in constitutions, must be enforced, 72.
in statutes, do not necessarily avoid them, 16!--168.
(See PARTIAL LEGISLATION.)

UNLAWFUL CONTRACTS,
(See ILLEGAL CoNTRACTS.)

UNMUZZLED DOGS,
restraining from running at large, 595.

UNREASON ABLE BAIL,
not to be required, 310.

778 INDEX.

UNREASON ABLE BY-LAWS,

778

INDEX.

are void, 200.

UNREASON ABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES,

(See SEARCHES AND SEIZURES.)

UNWHOLESOME PROVISIONS,

UNREASONABLE BY-LAWS,
are void, 200.

UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES,

prohibiting sale of, 595.

(See

USAGE AND CUSTOM,

(See Comuorz Law.)

USURY,

right to defence of, may be taken away by legislature retrospectively, 375,

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES.)

UNWHOLESOME PROVISIONS,
prohibiting sale of, 595.

USAGE AND CUSTOM,
(See

376.

CoMMON L.lw.)

USURY,

V.

VALIDATING IMPERFECT CONTRACTS,

by retrospective legislation, "293, 371—381f

(See RETROSPECTIVE LEGISLATION.)

right to defence of, may be taken away by legislature retrospectively, 875,
376.

VALUATION, ‘

v.

of property for taxation, 496.

(See Taxarrou.)

of land taken for public use,

VALIDATING IMPERFECT CONTRACTS,

(See Emmnnr DoM.u1v.)

VERDICT,

jury not to be controlled by judge in giving, 320.

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 18:24 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105011581
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

judge cannot refuse to receive, 320.’ -

jury may return special, 321. -

but cannot be compelled to do so, 321.

general, covers both the law and the facts, 321, 323.

in favor of defendant in criminal case, cannot be set aside, 321, 322, 326.

against accused, may be set aside, 323.

by retrospective legislation, 293, 371-381:
(See RETROSPECTIVE LEGISLATION.)

VALUATION,
of property for taxation, 496.
(See T.&.UTION.)
of land taken for public use,
(See EMINENT DoMAIN.)

VERDICT,

in libel cases, to cover law and fact, 322, 460.

to be a bar to new prosecution, 326.

when defendant not to be deprived of, by nolle prosequi, 327.

not a bar if court had no jurisdiction, 327.

or if indictment fatally defective, 327.

when jury may be discharged without, 327.

set aside on defendant‘s motion, may be new trial, 327, 328.

on some of the counts, is bar to new trial thereon, 328.

cannot be received from less than twelve jurors, 319.

VERMONT,

revenue bills to originate in lower house, 142, n.

liberty of speech and the press in, 41-L, n.

persons conscientiously opposed to bearing arms excused, 478.

betterment law of, 386.

VESTED RIGHTS,

not conferred by charters of municipal incorporation, 192, 193.

grants of property to corporations not revocable, 236-239, 275.

under the marriage relation, cannot be taken away, 284, 285.

jury not to be controlled by judge in giving, 820.
judge cannot refuse to receive, 320:
jury may return special, 321.
but cannot be compelled to do so, 821.
general, covers both the law and the facts, 321, 328.
in favor of defendant in criminal case, cannot be set aside, 821, 822, 326.
against accused, may be set asil\e, 823.
in libel cases, to cover law and fact, 322, 460.
to be a bar to new prosecution, 326.
when defendant not to be deprived of, by Mlle prosequi, 827.
not a bar if court had no jurisdiction, 327.
or if indictment fatally defective, 327.
when jury may be discharged without, 327.
set aside on defendant's motion, may be new trial, 327, 828.
on some of the counts, is bar to new trial thereon, 828.
cannot be received from less than twelve jurors, 819.

VERMONT,
revenue bills to originate in lower house, 142, n.
liberty of speech and the press in, 41-1:, n.
persons con~cientiously opposed to bearing arms excused, 478.
betterment law of, 386.

VESTED RIGHTS,
not conferred by charters of municipal incorporation, 192, 193.
grants of property to corporations not revocable, 236-239, 275.
under the marriage relation, cannot be taken away, 284, 285.

INDEX. 779
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INDEX.

VESTED RIGHTS — continued.

not to be disturbed except by due process of law, 357.

meaning of the term, 358, 370, 378.

subjection of, to general laws, 358.

interests in expectancy are not, 359, 361.

rights under the marriage relation, when are, 360, 361.

in legal remedies, parties do not have, 361, 362.

exceptions, 290-292.

statutory privileges are not, 383.

in rights of action, 362.

forfeitures of, must be judicially declared, 363, 364.

time for enforcing, may be limited, 364-367, 369.

do not exist in rules of evidence, 369.

rights to take advantage of informalities are not, 370-378.

or of defence of usury, 375.

VILLAGES AND CITIES, - '

(See Muxrcmu. Conronsrroxs.)

VILLEIN AGE, ‘

in England, 295-298.

VINDICTIVE DAMAGES,

VESTED RIGHTS- continued.
not to be disturbed except by due process of law, 857.
meaning of the tenn, 858, 870, 878.
subjection of, to general laws, 358.
interests in expectancy are not, 359, 861.
rights under the marriage relation, when are, 860, 861.
in legal remedies, parties do not have, 861, 362.
exceptions, 290-292.
statutory privileges are not, 888.
in rights of action, 362.
forfeitures of, must be judicially declared, 868, ll64.
time for enforcing, may be limited, 864-367, 869.
do not exist in rules of evidence, 369.
rights to take advantage of informalities are not, 870-878.
or of defence of usury, 875.

VILLAGES AND CITIES, ·

when publisher of newspaper not liable to, 457.

(See

MUNICIP.u. CoRPORATIONs.)

VIOLATING OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS,
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(See Onmoxrrox or Coxrnacrs.)

VIRGINIA, I

special statutes licensing sale oflands forbidden, 98.

special laws for divorce cases, &c., forbidden. 110, n.

legislative regulation as to pardons, 116, n.

VILLEIN AGE,
in England, 295-298•

. VINDICTIVE DAMAGES,
when publisher of newspaper not liable to, 457.

VIOLATING OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS,
(See

liberty of speech and the press in, 417.

exclusion of religious teachers from ofﬁce, 468.

religious tests forbidden, 468.

VOID CONTRACTS,

(See Coxrnacrs.)

VOID STATUTES,

(Sec Snrurrzs.)

VOLUNTEERS,

in military service, municipal bounties to, 219-229.

VOTERS,

franchise of; cannot be made to depend on impossible condition, 363, n.

- (See "Eu-xrrxoxs.)

W.

CoNTRACTS.)

VOID CONTRACTS,
(See

CoNTRACTS.)

VOID STATUTES,
(See

whether qualiﬁcations of, can be inquired into in contesting election,

627.

ov

special statutes licensing sale of lands forbidden, 98.
special laws for divorce cases, &c., forbidden, 110, n.
legislative regulation as to pardons, 116, n.
liberty of speech and the press in, 417.
exclusion of religious teachers from office, 468.
religious tests forbidden, 468.

constitutional qualiﬁcations of, cannot be added to by legislature, 64, n.

privilege of secrecy of, 605.

OnuoATION

VIRGINIA,

STATUTES.)

VOLUNTEERS,
in military service, municipal bounties to, 219-229.

VOTERS,

WAGERS,

upon elections. are illegal, 615.

fram:bise of, cannot be made to depend on impossible condition, 363, n.
constitutional qualifications of, cannot be added to by legislature, 64, n.
privilege of secrecy of, _!)05.
whether qualifications of, can be inquired into in contesting election,
627.
(See ·ELECTIONS.)

w.
WAGERS,
upon elections. are illegal, 615.

780

INDEX.

'180

INDEX.

WAIVER,

WAR

of constitutional objection, 181, 182.

of irregularities in judicial proceedings, 409.

of objection to interested judge, 413.

of right to full panel ofjurors, 319.

of right to compensation for property taken by public, 561.

none in capital cases, 319, n.

AND PEACE, '

power of Revolutionary Congress over, 6.

control of questions concerning, by Congress, 10.

\VARD,

control of guardian over, 341.

special statutes for sale of lands of, 97-106.

WARRANTS,

general, their illegality, 300-302.

service of, in criminal cases, 303.

search-warrants, 303.

(See Unnnasoxanuz Snsncnes sun Ssrzulms.)

WATER RIGHTS,

right to front on navigable water is property, 544.
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right of the States to establish wharf lines, 595.

right to use of, in running stream, 557.

appropriation of streams under right of eminent domain, 526, 533.

(See NAVIGABLE WATERS; \VaT1=.n-Counsus.)

WATER—COURSES,

navigable, and rights therein, 589-594.

dams across for manufacturing purposes, 534-536, 594, 595.

bridges over, under State authority, 592, 593.

licensing ferries across, 593.

construction of levees upon, 533.

ﬂooding premises by, the liability for, 544.

incidental injury by improvement of, gives no right of action, 592, n.

(See NAVIGABLE VVATERS; \VaTr:u RIGHTS.)

WAYS,

(See HIGHWAYS; Pmva-rs Roaos; Roms; STREETS.)

WEIGHTS AND MEASURES,

Congress may ﬁx standard of, 10.

regulation of, by the States, 596.

WHARFAGE,

right to, is property, 544.

States may establish wharf lines, 595.

WIDOW,

(See Downn.)

WIFE,

' (See DIVORCE; Downn; Msnml-:1) \VouEa'.)

WILL, .

imperfect, cannot be validated after title passed, 93, n.

---—-—~---mi

WAIVER,
of constitutional objection, 181, 182.
of irregularities in judicial proceedings, 409.
of objection to interested judge, 413.
of right to full panel of jurors, 319.
of right to compensation for property taken by public, 561.
none in capital cases, 319, n.
WAR AND PEACE,
power of Revolutionary Congress over, 6.
control of questions concerning, by Congress, 10.
WARD,
control of guardian over, 341.
special statutes for sale of lands of, 97-106.
WARRANTS,
general, their illegality, 300-302.
service of, in criminal cases, 303.
search-warrants, 803.
(See CNREASONADLE SEARCHES AND SEIZuRES.)
WATER RIGHTS,
right to front on navigable water is property, 544.
right of the States to establish wharf lines, 595.
right to use of, in running stream, 557.
appropriation of streams under right of eminent domain, 526, 538.
(See NAVIGABLE WATERS; WATER-COURSES.)
WATER-COURSES,
navigable, and rights therein, 589-594.
dams across for manufacturing purposes, 534-536, 594, 695.
bridges over, under State authority, 592, 693.
licensing ferries across, 593.
construction of levees upon, 588.
flooding premises by, the liability for, 544.
incidental injury by improvement of, gives no right of action, 592, n.
(See NAVIGABLE WATERS; "\VATER RIGHTs.)
WAYS,
(See HIGHWAYS; PRIVATE RoADS; ROADS; STREETS.)
WEIGHTS AND MEASURES,
Congress may fix standard of, 10.
regulation of, by the States, 596.
WHARFAGE,
right to, is property, 544.
States may establish wharflines, 595.
WIDOW,
(See DOWER.)
WIFE,
(See DivoRcE; DowER; MARRIED WoMEN.)

WILL,
imperfect, cannot be validated after title passed, 93, n.

mnsx. 781

WISCONSIN,

INDEX.

781

legislature of, not to grant divorces, 110, n.

when statutes to take effect, 157.

title of private and local acts to express the subject, 142, n.

liberty of speech and the press in, 416, n.

religious tests forbidden in, 469, n.

want of religious belief in witness does not render him incompetent,

478, n.

contested election of governor in, 624, n.

WITNESSES,

power to summon and examine before legislative committees, 135.

accused parties to be confronted with, 318.

not compellable to be against themselves, 317, 394.

evidence by, in their own favor, 317, n.

not liable to civil action for false testimony, 441.

unless the testimony was irrelevant, 441, n.

competency and credibility of, as depending on religious belief, 478,

and n.

testimony of wife on behalf of husband, 317, 318, n.

WORKS OF ART,

liberty of criticism of, 457.

IVRITS OF ASSISTANCE,
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unconstitutional character of, 301, 302, n.

VVRITS OF HABEAS CORPUS,

(See Hannas Conrus.)

Y.

YEAS AND NAYS,

in some States, on passage of laws to be entered on journals, 140.

4

J

Cambridge: Press of John Wilson &. Son.

WISCONSIN,
legislature of, not to grant divorces, 110, n.
when statutes to take effect, 157.
title of private and local acts to express the subject, 142, n.
liberty of speech and the press in, 416, n.
religious tests forbidden in, 469, n.
want of religious belief in witness does not render him incompetent,
478, n.
contested election of governor in, 624, n.
WITNESSES,
power to summon and examine before legislative committees, 135.
accused parties to be confronted with, 318.
not compellable to be against themselves, 317, 394.
evidence by, in their own favor, 317, n.
not liable to civil attion for false testimony, 441.
unless the testimony was irrelevant, 441, n.
competency and credibility of, as depending on religious belief, 478,
and n.
testimony of wife on bchalfofhusband, 317, 318, n.
WORKS OF ART,
liberty of criticism of, 457.
WRITS OF ASSISTANCE,
unconstitutional character of, 301, 302, n.
WRITS OF HABEAS CORPUS,
(See liABEA.S CoRPUS.)

Y.
YEAS AND NAYS,
in some States, on passage of laws to be entered on journals, 140.

Cambridge: Pre. o! John Wlllon & Son.
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